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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

VOLUME XXVI. JUNE—NOVEMBER, 1875



STRAHAN & CO., PUBLISHERS

PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

1875

LONDON:
M'CORQUODALE & CO., "THE ARMOURY," SOUTHWARK.

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LIFE AND SPEECHES OF THE PRINCE CONSORT : COURT OF QUEEN VICTORIA.

1. *The Life of H.R.H. the Prince Consort.* By THEODORE MARTIN. With Portraits and Views. Vol. I. London. 1875.
2. *The Early Years of H.R.H. the Prince Consort.* Compiled under the direction of her Majesty the Queen, by Lt. Gen. the Hon. C. GARY. London. 1867.
3. *The Principal Speeches and Addresses of H.R.H. the Prince Consort.* With an Introduction. London. 1863.

THE day, which announced throughout the land the death of the Prince Consort, was a day of universal gloom. The heart of the nation was touched by the suddenness, with which indisposition had assumed the face of danger, and interest had grown into alarm ; and there was a prescient observation, at an early stage of the illness, that the constitution of the illustrious patient did not seem to offer that stout resistance to the advances of disease which his favourable age and his tall, manly, well-proportioned form would have seemed to insure. The purity of his life, the integrity of his character, his varied talents and accomplishments, and the active share in public undertakings so often and so judiciously assumed, had gradually acquired for him a strong and deep hold upon the esteem of the British people. But the depth of that sympathy and sorrow, which accompanied the catastrophe, was probably a tribute to the sorrow of the Queen in a yet greater degree than to the signal merits of her husband. It was felt, by a just instinct, that love and loss conjointly had perhaps never, amidst all the varieties of life, been raised to so high a pitch : that no woman had ever leant more fondly, and no queen had ever had so much cause to lean. The weight was doubled ; while the strength was halved, and the joy and comfort gone. Accordingly, there was a real and genuine desire of the whole people to be partners in her great affliction, in no conventional or secondary sense, but by truly bearing a portion of it along with her. Nor

was this the case only in the highest circles ; on the contrary, the sentiment deepened, as it widened, with every step downwards from class to class, and to the very base of society. To the same mixed feeling, with the same dominant reference to the Sovereign, may have been partly due the remarkable multiplication in all quarters of the local memorials, which by degrees covered the land. With respect to the most conspicuous of these, the gorgeous structure near the western extremity of Hyde Park, it may perhaps be said that its extraordinary magnitude of scale, and sumptuousness of execution, may in future days be deemed to assert a greater superiority to other mortals, on behalf of the Prince Consort, than even his pure and lofty reputation can be expected to sustain. In any case, we may say of him with truth what the greatest Italian poet of this century, Giacomo Leopardi, has said of Dante—

Io so ben
Che saldi men che cera, e men ch' arena,
Verso la fama che di te lasciasti,
Son bronzi e marmi.*

Happily we have sure memorials of his mind, and faithful chroniclers of his history ; and it may be confidently expected, while it must be ardently desired, that not only our own time, but future generations also, may continue to prize the recollection of a life lifted far above the ordinary level of princely existence, and not only meritorious, but even typical for nations and men at large.

Before taking notice of the work of Mr. Martin, we must briefly refer to the two other offerings of loyal commemoration, which were already before the world.

In 1867, General Grey compiled, under the direction of her Majesty, a memoir of "The Early Years of the Prince Consort," from 1819, the year of his birth, to the birth of the Princess Royal, in 1840. Originally prepared for private circulation, it was afterwards given to the public ; and the intended prosecution of the work was announced in the closing sentence of the volume. But, no long time afterwards, the hand of the writer was cold in death. The work of General Grey was even more communicative, threw even more light upon the personal histories and the domestic interior, than the later biography. He had been chosen to discharge a labour of love, implying, on the part of his Sovereign, the highest confidence. Never was that confidence better

* Rudely and slightly rendered in the following lines :—

Matched with the fame
Of thy great name,
Bronze is but wax,
And marble sand,
To baffle Time's attacks
And stealthy hand.

From G. Leopardi, *Sopra il monumento di Dante che si preparava in Firenze.*

deserved. Besides possessing the other qualities needed for his important functions, he was a man loyal with no common loyalty; and his long standing at the Court gave him the power, which younger men cannot be expected equally to possess, of acting in all points the part of a faithful friend. The "fierce light that beats upon a throne" is sometimes, like the heat of that furnace in which only Daniel could walk unscathed, too fierce for those whose place it is to stand in its vicinity. The incidents of a Court retain, down to our day, their fascination, and we are old-fashioned enough to hope it may not soon be lost; yet it can hardly be denied that it is girt about with a relaxing atmosphere, and that a manful constitution, or adequate refreshment from other sources, is required in order to secure a robust health, in mind and character, to its favoured residents. Had the bodily health of General Grey been equal to his mental soundness and manly truthfulness of stamp, he would still have been among us, with many coming years of usefulness to reckon.

A more recent, but not less loyal or judicious, relation to the throne, was that of Sir Arthur Helps, whose death we have been called, within the last few months, to mourn. So early as in 1862, he had been chosen to edit the Speeches of the Prince; and he had prefixed to them a most able and most discriminating introduction, only second in interest to the Speeches themselves, which were eagerly and extensively read by the nation, and which unquestionably have that in them which ought not to die.

It was much that, after the removal by death of these two admirable servants of the Crown, her Majesty should be able to select, for the definitive execution of a task hitherto only attempted in fragments, a biographer of such high qualifications as Mr. Martin. He has brought to the execution of a task necessarily arduous the same fine hand and accurate discernment with which he had previously rendered the image of some of the best Latin poets, in the guise of happy and elegant English translations. It is, however, unnecessary for us, writing many months after the appearance of the work, to repeat in detail the praises which have been justly, and more promptly, awarded to Mr. Martin already by authoritative and respected organs of the periodical press.* We have only to wish, that he may continue as he has begun. Perhaps we should add the expression of a hope that the nature of his subject matter may not again impose upon him any such necessity of entering largely into the detail of foreign policy as he encountered in the painful case of the Spanish marriages. Even the valuable documents and the authentic history he has here furnished want something of the charm of a biography. But the interest of the Royal portrait, which it has been Mr. Martin's duty

* *Quarterly Review* for January, 1857, pp. 108—110.

to draw, is one not to be exhausted with the run of a successful work. The study and contemplation of the *man* will remain permanently fruitful of the most improving lessons to every learner in the school of human nature. The whole action of the Prince, in its manifold relations both to English society and to the constitution of the country, still forms a subject of deep interest to all who are interested either in free institutions generally, or in the peculiar form of them under which we live. And the amount of calamity we have suffered by his death has, perhaps, not even yet been fully apprehended.

It is not our intention to enter largely into the narrative of a life of which the general features are so well and widely known; especially as we cannot doubt that Mr. Martin's work will in no long period obtain access to a wider circle of readers, through republication in a popular form, than is permitted by its present size and price. But we shall carefully select our points of reference. And there is one anecdote of the Prince's childhood, recorded by Count Arthur Mensdorff, which exhibits in very early times the base, so to speak, of his character.

"One day, when we children, Albert, Ernest, Ferdinand, Augustus, Alexander, myself, and a few other boys, were playing at the Rosenau, and some of us were to storm the old ruined tower on the side of the castle, which the others were to defend, one of us suggested that there was a place at the back by which we could get in without being seen, and thus capture it without difficulty. Albert declared 'that this would be most unbecoming in a Saxon knight, who should always attack the enemy in front.' And so we fought for the tower, so honestly and vigorously, that Albert, by mistake, for I was on his side, gave me a blow upon the nose, of which I still bear the mark. I need not say how sorry he was for the wound he had given me."*

The boy was father of the man; and from the high standard which he had thus early, and thus earnestly, presented to himself, he never deviated. He was also happy, beyond almost all other men, in the aids which he received. His education seems to have been conducted with all the care, the steady direction of means to an end, the determination to turn all minds and all faculties to the very best account, which distinguishes the Germans beyond any people of Europe. It seems as though there were no disturbing element of waste in their moral and intellectual world; and this extraordinary and noble thrift early became a governing principle, and a great power, in the life of the Prince Consort.

But he had higher advantages even than those of a careful and elaborate training, in the constant and affectionate attention of two men, each in himself remarkable, and both devoted in an extraordinary measure to his welfare, as well as to that of the Queen, with whom in a long vista of anticipation we are told that

* Mr. Martin, p. 7; General Grey, p. 57.

his destiny was almost from the very first conjoined (Martin, p. 14). They were men not only of great gifts, but singularly adapted for their work of wardenship.

One of them was King Leopold, of Saxe-Coburg by birth, of Belgium by a happy selection and adoption. This Sovereign must undoubtedly be reckoned among the great statesmen of the nineteenth century. As a monarch, he gave a living example of all the lessons which are to be learned from the free institutions of the world, and some part of which, at least, he may have originally gained from his association with, and residence in, England. Called to the throne under circumstances more menacing than those of his neighbour and father-in-law, Louis Philippe, he lived in prosperity and died in honour, while the heir of the more splendid lot closed his days in obscurity and in exile; and it may not be an unreasonable opinion that, had France been governed from 1830 onwards with the enlightened frankness of King Leopold, the Orleans dynasty might still be on the throne, and Alsace and Lorraine still might bear the *insignia* of France;

“Troja que nunc stares, Priamique arx alta maneres.”

The column of the Place Vendôme would not be in ruins, nor the Hôtel de Ville in ashes.

Married in early life to Princess Charlotte of England, he stood in the line of succession to the very same position which his nephew, Prince Albert, was afterwards to hold. By the early death of that Princess, which was so deeply and, as is now known in the light of later disclosures, so deservedly lamented, the cup was dashed from his lips. But, without doubt, the exact reproduction of the same situation for others so near and dear to him in the next generation must have heightened in his mind that interest in their well-being, which his relationship of itself could not but inspire, and which the early death of the Duke of Kent (in 1820) gave him an appropriate opportunity of bringing into action with reference to the Princess Victoria.

One of his great acts of tutelary friendship was to bring upon the scene Baron Stockmar, a person who was to contribute as directly, and perhaps with a yet larger effect, to the safe and happy direction of the Prince's life. Copious memoirs* of the Baron were printed three or four years back by his son, in German, and were translated into English. But, notwithstanding their near association with persons and matters so interesting to the nation, they did not take any extended hold of the public mind. The almost idolizing ardour of filial affection in the author of the book, failed to redeem a number of errors in point of taste and

* Memoirs of Baron Stockmar. By his son, Baron E. von Stockmar. Translated from the German by G. A. M. Longmans, 1872.

propriety. Fortunately the character of the person commemorated was so high, as to survive and surmount the injudicious and obtrusive commemoration. In the pages of Mr. Martin, Baron Stockmar appears in his just place and relation, which of course is not that of the Olympian Zeus of modern Europe. Of great and cultivated gifts, he was a man absolutely disinterested, not merely in the sense of superiority to pecuniary inducement, but in the power of casting (as it were) himself out of himself, so as to attain a complete identification with those on whose behalf he advised or acted, for all the purposes to which the advice or action might belong. To a fearless independence he added, as Mr. Martin truly says, a penetrating judgment of men and things (p. 15), and an inexhaustible fund of devotion. Eminently cosmopolitan in the framework of his mind, he was free from national limitations; and was able both to appreciate for himself, and to instil into another in a remarkable degree, the true character of the British Constitution, a product of our insular soil which is not only without a parallel, but in its subtler parts almost without analogy elsewhere. It is commonly seen, by even the most intelligent of foreigners, as pictures are seen in gaslight, with a strong projection of their more glaring colours, and a total, or at best very serious, loss of their more delicate, cool, transparent shadows and graduating touches. From 1816 to 1831, the Baron had been resident in England as the private secretary of Prince Leopold, and the comptroller of his household. He had also acted as the organ and representative of the Prince in the difficult negotiations which followed his acceptance of the Belgian crown, and which were well qualified, as may be seen by the readers of the recent "*Life of Lord Palmerston*," to exercise and develop the capacity of any man for statesmanship. Retiring to Coburg in 1834, he obeyed in 1836 a new call of King Leopold for his aid, and became a main agent in the happy and wise conspiracy, of which the King was probably the first author, for disposing all circumstances towards the marriage of the young Prince Albert with the future Queen of England, and for fitting him to adorn the exalted station. The succession of Princess Victoria had now no impediment in its way; and it was time to make preparation for smoothing her arduous upward path with the best of all appliances.

The plan in view was bold, but not more bold than wise. It evidently was to make a preparation ideally perfect, but yet to leave choice as entire and free, as if there had been no preparation whatever. A golden halo of romance thus invested the early life of these young and illustrious persons. The whole narrative really recalls the most graceful fictions of wise genii and gentle fairies, besetting mortals with blessings, and biassing their fates to bliss. It was as

where the highest skill combines with bounteous soil and beneficent climate to secure the golden harvest. There never can have been an instance in which public and domestic aims were more thoroughly harmonised; though there have been so many where the human hearts and lives of Royal persons have been as lightly sacrificed, as if they were creatures doomed to vivisection in the interests of science or of curiosity.

This comprehensive forethought has not failed to secure even a political reward. The palaces of England became shrines of domestic happiness; and the Court exhibited to the nation and the world a pattern of personal conduct, in all the points most slippery and dangerous for a wealthy country, with a large leisured class, in a luxurious age. Idleness was rebuked by the unwearied labours of the highest persons in the land; vulgar ostentation grew pale in the face of a splendour everywhere associated with duty, and measured by its ends; impurity could not live in so clear an atmosphere; even thrift had its tribute of encouragement, where hospitalities truly regal and unwearied were so organized as not to put disdain upon the homely unattractive duty of living within an appointed income. All these personal excellences were seen and appreciated by the public; and they contributed perhaps no less than wise legislation, and conduct inflexibly constitutional, to draw close the ties between the people and the throne.

The culminating point of the interest, with which the life of the Prince Consort should be regarded, is one at which it is really inseparable from the associated life of the Queen. They are ideally the obverse and reverse of the same medal; nay, actually, the several moieties of the same whole. And, thus considered, they supply the one normal exhibition of a case in which the woman-ruler of a great empire, herself highly endowed both with character and intelligence, has rested as it were on the background of another consummately accomplished existence, and has enjoyed the benefit of all its qualities, and all its energies, as amply as if they had belonged to her own original store. Happy marriages, it may be thankfully acknowledged, are rather the rule among us than the exception; but even among happy marriages this marriage was exceptional, so nearly did the union of thought, heart, and action both fulfil the ideal, and make duality approach to the borders of identity. Commonly the wife is to the husband, as the adjective is to the substantive. Undoubtedly the great faculties and comprehensive accomplishments of Prince Albert fully entitled him to claim the husband's place. But he exactly appreciated the demands of the throne upon its occupant, and the consequential demands of his wife upon himself. He saw that it was his duty to live in, for, and through her, and he accepted with a marvellous accuracy of intel-

lectual apprehension, and with an unswerving devotion of his heart, this peculiarly relative element in a splendid existence.

On one occasion, at least, he was led to describe in words* his own life-long function. In the year 1850, nearly at the point of bisection of his married life, the Duke of Wellington strongly urged upon him that he should assume the office of Commander-in-Chief. In this recommendation we see at once one of the many instances of the Duke's enthusiastic attachment to the Sovereign, and an undoubted indication of faculties tending to decline with the lapse of years. The characters of the Queen and of the Prince stood so high, that the first announcement of his acceptance of such an office might have given pleasure. But every man acquainted with the spirit of parliamentary government must at once have seen it to be indefensible, and in a high degree inconvenient. It is, indeed, to be desired that a very close relation of sentiment between the Sovereign and the Army should be permanently maintained. But the Army is, after all, a great department of the State; and departments of the State can only be administered in this country by persons responsible to Parliament. There are, indeed, some features in the office which recommend that its contact with Parliament should be mediate, and not direct. The discipline of the Army is a subject so grave, so delicate, and associated at such a multitude of points with the interests and feelings of the governing class, that it should be as little as possible exposed to the influence of parliamentary pressure; a pressure much more apt to be exercised in the interest of class than in that of the public. The responsibility, therefore, of the Commander-in-Chief is covered by that of the Secretary of State. But this protection is not exemption; and the authority of Parliament is entire with respect to the military as well as the official head. Now, the responsibility of public officers in these days does not usually clothe itself in the hard material forms of impeachments and attainders, as it did in other times. It is sufficiently sustained and enforced, for the most part, through the immensely quickened action of opinion, and an increased susceptibility to its influence. The *ultima ratio* with us is no longer fraught with peril to life, liberty, or estate, but simply means removal from office. This power, however, is indispensable; and the case of the Duke of York may serve to show that it is no mere phantom. But it is quite plain that no such power could have been exercised, or even discussed, in reference to the husband of the Queen, without affecting the Throne; to which he was so closely related, that whatever injured the one must have brought the other more or less into question. Now, in such a matter, there should be no more and less. It follows that, whatever might have been the guarantees

* Speeches, p. 76.

afforded by his character for wise and unimpeachable conduct, there was a radical and incurable fault in the Duke's suggestion. The Prince could not fulfil the very first among the conditions of fitness for the office: he could not be removable.

Yet, how great was the temptation to an active mind, conscious of the capacity, and filled with the desire, to render service to the nation, for once at least to seize the opportunity of claiming to give that service in a form in which it would bring the valuable reward of a daily and palpable appreciation. The recommendation, thus attractive in itself, proceeded from a statesman of fourscore, and from the man who, of all the land could boast, stood first in the public estimation. It might well have been mistaken for a safe proposal. We doubt whether a merely intellectual superiority would have saved the Prince from this serious danger—this trap, laid in innocence by most friendly hands. But his intellectual superiority was backed by a noble power of moral self-denial. And so he found his way to the heart and root of the matter. In a letter to the Duke, he describes the position of the "female Sovereign," and proceeds as follows:—

"This requires that the husband should entirely sink his own individual existence in that of his wife; that he should aim at no power by himself or for himself; should shun all ostentation; assume no separate responsibility before the public; but make his position entirely a part of hers, fill up every gap which, as a woman, she would naturally leave in the exercise of her regal functions, continually and anxiously watch every part of the public business, in order to be able to advise and assist her at any moment, in any of the multifarious and difficult questions or duties brought before her, sometimes international, sometimes political, or social, or personal. As the natural head of her family, superintendent of her household, manager of her private affairs, sole *confidential* adviser in politics, and only assistant in the communications with the officers of the Government; he is, besides, the husband of the Queen, the tutor of the royal children, the private secretary of the Sovereign, and her permanent Minister."

In this admirably large description, we seem to find but one venial error of a word. It is not in the epithet *confidential*; for though this very phrase, by the usage of the constitution, belongs to the successive bodies of her advisers, it is manifestly applicable with perfect propriety to the Prince, in a distinct, and in a much higher than the official sense. It is in the word Minister. Minister to the Queen he could not be, because his conduct was not within the reach and control of Parliament. But, in fact, the word is too weak to convey the character of the relation between his mind and the mind of the Queen. He was to her, in deed and truth, a second self.

Much more, then, than a personal interest (high as in such a case the personal interest is) attaches to this great example. On the Queen, as a woman, was laid a *maximum* of burden. The problem was to find for her a corresponding *maximum*

of relieving aid. The relation of the Prince to the Queen was really an experiment in the science and art of politics for the civilized world. Its success was complete: if it had failed, not England, but the civilized world would have been the loser. For the part sustained by the Monarch, in the system of this extended empire, still remains a great matter, and not a small one.

The weighty business of kingship has in modern times been undergoing a subtle and silent, yet an almost entire transformation; and, in this country at least, the process has reached its maturity. Neither the nature nor the extent of this change appear as yet to have become familiar to the ordinary run of observers. The name of the Queen was still the symbol, and her office the fountain, of all lawful powers; royalty was seen and felt among us, until the darkening shadow of widowhood fell upon the august head, by the people of every rank and class, with unusual frequency, and in a splendour never surpassed by the habit of preceding Sovereigns. Many, then, did not advert to the fact that the character of the regal office had been altered; while those, who believed in the change, for the most part believed that this great function was now emptied of its force, and reduced to an illusion. Both were alike in error; in an error which it is not easy to correct by a summary description. The nearest approach to an account combining truth and brevity would perhaps be found in the statement, that while in extent the change has been, at least inwardly, nothing less than a transformation, its substance may chiefly be perceived in a beneficial substitution of influence for power.

Not that even power is entirely gone. The whole power of the State periodically returns into the Royal hands whenever a ministry is changed. This resumption is usually brought about by forces distinct from the personal action of the Sovereign. The day when George IV., in 1829, after a struggle, renewed the Charter of the Administration of the day, and thereby submitted to the Roman Catholic Relief Act, may be held to denote the death of British kingship in its older sense, which had in a measure survived the Revolution of 1688, and had even gained strength during the reign of George III. The endeavour of King William IV., in 1834, to assert his personal choice in the appointment of a ministry without reference to the will of Parliament, gave to the Conservative party a momentary tenure of office without power. But, in truth, that indiscreet proceeding of an honest and well-meaning man produced a strong reaction in favour of the Liberals, and greatly prolonged the predominance, which they were on the point of losing through the play of natural causes. Laying too great a stress on the instrument of Royal will, it tended not to strengthen the throne, but to enfeeble it. Such was the upshot of an injudicious, though undoubtedly conscientious use of

power. The case was very different when the pressure, not of Royal will, but of Parliamentary difficulties, brought about the first resignation of the Melbourne Government in 1839, and what was called the Bedchamber question arose. It was a question whether the ladies of the Court, who had been politically appointed, should or should not retire from office. The Queen, not yet twenty years old, but capable of contracting attachments at once quick and durable, resisted the demand. There can be no doubt that if Sir Robert Peel had been allowed at that time to proceed with his task, the ministry he would then have formed would have been possessed of reasonable stability. But the power of the young Sovereign, applied with a skilful use of opportunity, sufficed to prolong the duration of the Liberal Government until the summer of 1841, a period of nearly two and a half years. Its exercise produced at the time no revulsion in the public mind. The final judgment upon the conduct of the parties to the crisis has been more favourable to the Minister than to the Monarch. Baron Stockmar himself has expressed this opinion. But the question involved, the claim of the woman in her early youth, was one of which within limits equity would have recommended the allowance. Possibly it was suspicion, the most obstinate among the besetting sins of politicians, even in men of upright nature, which interfered on the side of rigour. The justice of the case has, we think, been expressed in the arrangement which has now long prevailed. The Mistress of the Robes, who is not periodically resident at the Court, but only an attendant on great occasions, changes with the ministry: the Ladies in Waiting, who enjoy much more of personal contact by virtue of their office with the Sovereign, are appointed, and continue in their appointments, without regard to the political connections of their husbands.

The record of the transaction, given in Hansard,* rests mainly upon two letters, one from the Queen, and the other from Sir Robert Peel; and these two letters differ in their representation of the facts. The Queen, in her letter, mentions, and refuses, the proposal of Sir Robert Peel "to remove the ladies of her Bedchamber." Sir Robert Peel, in his answer, speaks only of his desire to remove a portion of them; and in the same letter declines to prosecute the task of forming a ministry. Hence it appears that he abandoned that undertaking to construct a Government upon a decision of the Queen's, which is not the decision announced by her. She declined to remove them as a body; he resigns his charge, because he is not allowed to remove a few among them. It is very difficult to understand why he did not dispel, if only for his own sake, the misapprehension under which the Queen's letter may have been written. At present the

* Vol. xlvii. pp. 984, *seqq.*

documentary evidence only shows that her Majesty refused an unreasonable demand; and that he retired from his high position because he adhered to a demand which, whether necessary or not, was not unreasonable. If in truth the matter turned upon her Majesty's resistance to this narrower request, it is quite possible that it was an error on the one side to press the request to extremity, and on the other to refuse it. Had it been upon the wider one, all would surely have admitted that there was full warrant for the refusal.

We have dwelt upon the case, because it affords the most recent illustration of the successful exercise of Royal power, and, on this account, bears a character of historical importance. The thirty-six years, which have since elapsed, have been undisturbed even by a single shock in the relations between the Sovereign and her Government, which has changed its head no less than twelve times without the slightest jolt or friction in the play of the machinery. But although the admirable arrangements of the Constitution have now completely shielded the Sovereign from personal responsibility, they have left ample scope for the exercise of a direct and personal influence in the whole work of government. The amount of that influence must vary greatly, according to character, to capacity, to experience in affairs, to tact in the application of a pressure which never is to be carried to extremes, to patience in keeping up the continuity of a multitudinous supervision, and, lastly, to close presence at the seat of government; for, in many of its necessary operations, time is the most essential of all elements, and the most scarce. Subject to the range of these variations, the Sovereign, as compared with her Ministers, has, because she is the Sovereign, the advantages of long experience, wide survey, elevated position, and entire disconnection from the bias of party. Further, personal and domestic relations with the ruling families abroad give openings, in delicate cases, for saying more, and saying it at once more gently and more efficaciously, than could be ventured in the more formal correspondence, and ruder contacts, of Governments. We learn from the volume of Mr. Martin, with how much truthfulness and decision, and with how much tact and delicacy, the Queen, aided by the Prince, took a principal part, on behalf of the nation, in the painful question of the Spanish marriages. Instances so very conspicuous as this may be rare; but there is not a doubt that the aggregate of direct influence normally exercised by the Sovereign upon the counsels and proceedings of her Ministers is considerable in amount, tends to permanence and solidity of action, and confers much benefit on the country, without in the smallest degree relieving the advisers of the Crown from their undivided responsibility.

But we doubt whether even this very important function of the Sovereign in watching, following, and canvassing policy, be not less important than the use which may be made of the vast moral and social influence attaching personally to the occupant of the throne. This is a power exercised upon the ordinary relations of life, and greatly through the ceremonial and hospitalities of a Court.

Little are they, who gaze from without upon long trains of splendid equipages rolling towards a palace, conscious of the meaning and the force that live in the forms of a Monarchy probably the most ancient, and certainly the most solid and the most revered, in all Europe. The acts, the wishes, the example, of the Sovereign in this country are a real power. An immense reverence, and a tender affection, wait upon the person of the one permanent and ever faithful guardian of the fundamental conditions of the Constitution. She is the symbol of law; she is by law, and setting apart the metaphysics, and the abnormal incidents, of revolution, the source of power. Parliaments and ministries pass, but she abides in life-long duty; and she is to them, as the oak in the forest is to the annual harvest in the field. When the august functions of the Crown are irradiated by intelligence and virtue, they are transformed into a higher dignity than words can fully convey, or Acts of Parliament can give; and traditional loyalty, with a generous people, acquires the force (as Mr. Burke says) of a passion, and the warmth of personal attachment. But by those to whom we are attached we are ready and prone to be, nay, we are already, influenced.

This power, inherited with the place, will ever prove to have been husbanded and enlarged in strict proportion to the discharge of duty, and is independent of all personal contact, strictly so called, between Sovereign and subject. But the personal contact of the Sovereign with the subject, under favourable circumstances, such as those which the Prince so greatly contributed to form, is of very considerable extent. We do not now speak of local visits, or special relations to a class such as the Army; or of participation in the amusements of the people, as at theatres, or balls, or concerts. And yet these are not to be despised; nay, it may be taken for granted, that the presence and interest of the Sovereign in these recreations tend to expel from them vulgarity, to reduce in many points the capricious excess of fashion, and generally to make their quality better than it would tend to become under other auspices, by giving a distinct and high sanction to the efforts of those who are ever striving to raise the level (for example) of the musical and dramatic arts. But we must likewise take more particularly into view what is more strictly in the nature of personal contact. To come under the roof of the Sovereign, to partake the hospitalities of the

Sovereign, to be admitted, even for moments only, to the converse of the Sovereign, all these in their different degrees constitute powers, and give scope for influence: for influence, which all that is good, as well as something of what is bad, in English society tends to enhance. These things make their mark; and the mark is usually durable.

With us, society is passing under many subtle, yet vital changes. It must never be forgotten, that wealth is now in England no longer the possession of a few, but rather what is termed "a drug." That is to say, it is diffused through a circle so much extended, and so fast extending, that to be wealthy does not of itself satisfy; and the keenness of the unsatisfied desire, aspiring selfishly not to superiority, but rather to the marks of superiority, seeks them above all in the shape of what we term social distinction. But the true test of the highest social distinction in this country is nearness to the Monarch; and all this avidity for access, for notice, for favour, expresses an amount of readiness to conform, to follow, to come under influence, which may often be indifferent enough in quality, but is very large in quantity.

But, quite apart from these more questionable elements, it must be borne in mind that the society of this country is hierarchically constituted. It is not here, as it was in the Court of Louis Napoleon; where there was as much, or more, of splendour and display, but where the influence exercised by personal contact terminated in those who were its immediate objects, because they were often the mere members of a clique, and wire-pullers of political intrigue, never the natural, traditional, accepted heads and teachers of society. At the Court of Queen Victoria, it was otherwise. Those who came within the magic circle were persons, every one of whom was more or less himself a power: the heads of the professions, the leaders of Parliament, the Patriarchs of letters, the chiefs of art, and, as was natural and right, in larger measure than any other class, the aristocracy of the land, themselves having, in so many instances, the double title of inherited station and high personal distinction. Even in dealing with these distinguished orders of men, a principle of selection was not forgotten; and it became evident that, without invidious severances, the Court preferred in every class those who were the best in that class, and leant to passing by those less eligible. Thus the whole force of royal example and authority was given to good; and given in the most efficacious manner. The preferences of the Court silently exhorted to right conduct all who were within their reach, and strongly discountenanced its opposite. This was their operation within the necessarily limited class, to which alone close personal intercourse could by possibility extend.

But it was a very small part of their whole operation. Of the

planets, which wheel round the sun, many are themselves wheeled round by other and secondary stars. The Court touched in the strictest sense only the select men of the country; but of these every one was himself a centre of influence by example, by exertion, by mental activity, it might be by all combined; and each transmitted what he had derived, as one billiard ball carries on the stroke to another, or as the circles widen on the water. Many readers may find something of paradox in what we are now saying; but we venture to believe that it is because they have not taken occasion to make the subject a matter of careful study and observation. Among the things least understood and most sadly under-estimated in the world are the force of example, and the silent influences of leadership. In our social system, so marked by the dove-tailing of classes, the quality of receptivity for these influences is raised to its *maximum*, and they pass from the summit even to the base. We do not hesitate to express a firm conviction that the Court of Victoria was a sensible and important element in the group of forces, which, for two or three decades of years, raised in so beneficial a manner the social and moral tone of the upper classes of this country, although the upward movement they received has of late years not been sustained, if, indeed, it has not for some time been ebbing. If this be true, then that Court was a great fact in history; if at least history is to be a picture, and not only a sign-board. We may also say that its imposing exterior, its regular and many-sided action, and its accurate and refined adjustments, made it a work of art. Of all this the Prince was, and could not but be, the organizing and directing mind. Amply charged with political labour and its moral responsibilities; the Queen was thus provided with an appropriate relief; and in one important sphere of action all things moved, for her, automatically. The quantity of what is expected from a Sovereign, in a state of society like ours, is double and quadruple of what the working force of a single mind and will can readily supply. By the Prince's close union with the Queen, and by his energy, his method, and his judgment, the motive power was at once doubled, while from the close harmony of the two, singleness of impulse and operation was fully maintained.

We have, in these pages, rather endeavoured to bring into view what we think to have been the less observed parts of the Prince's action, than dwelt upon such forms of his useful activity as are better known. Instinctively remote from ideology, he had an energetic tendency towards social improvement in every form, and herein especially towards those reformatory schemes which were calculated to bring into view new modes of coping with social mischief; as well as those which tended to raise the level of culture, and to refine common life by the habits and appliances of art. When

the subjects of his care and attention are brought together, they form a whole so formidable in amount, that the mind is struck and almost shocked at the lavish expenditure of brain-power which they must have required, amidst all the splendour which is readily mistaken for ease by the careless beholder; and wonder becomes less, as pain becomes more, at that sapping and exhaustion of vital forces which probably made openings for disease, and prepared him to succumb to it in the early maturity of his manhood.

But in truth the form of self-sacrifice practised by the Prince seems to be the prime, and perhaps the only, way in which, under the circumstances of modern times, the nobleness of the Royal character can be sustained. The changes, which have affected the position of sovereigns and their families among us, are in many respects fraught with moral danger, and with temptation in peculiar forms, not easily detected. Of old, the king had all his splendours and all his enjoyments weighted by the heavy cares, and very real and rude responsibilities, of government; and "uneasy lay the head that wore a crown." It was a truth as old as Troy, where other gods and warriors slept, but Zeus alone was wakeful.* Thus it was that power, and luxury, and what is far more insidious, flattery, were then compensated and kept in check. In the British monarchy, the lodgment of the various parts of this great whole, making up a king's condition, is changed, and their moral equilibrium put in jeopardy. There, are still gathered the splendours, the enjoyments, all the notes of homage, all the eager obedience, the anticipation of wishes, the surrender of adverse opinions, the true and loyal deference, and the deference which is factitious and conventional. To be served by all is dangerous; to be contradicted by none is worse. Taking into view the immense increase in the appliances of material ease and luxury, the general result is, that in the private and domestic sphere a royal will enjoys at this epoch, more nearly than in any past generation, the privileges of a kind of omnipotence. At the same time, the principal burden of care, and all responsibility for acts of administration, and for the state of the country, is transferred to the head of others, and even the voice of the lightest criticism is rarely heard. In these circumstances it is true that the duties of a Court entail in their full scope a serious and irksome task, and that there must be much self-denial, and much merit, in their due discharge. But it is also in other duties, principally remote from the public eye, that the largest scope is afforded for the patient and watchful labour in public affairs which, balancing effectually mere splendour and enjoyment, secures the true nobleness of kingship against the subtle inroads of selfishness, and raises to their maximum at once the toil, the usefulness, and the influence of the British throne.

Never, probably, under any circumstances, be they favourable as they may, can these reach a higher point of elevation than they had attained by the joint efforts, and during the married life, of the Queen and the Prince. Nor can we well overvalue that addition of masculine energy to female tact and truth, which brought the working of British Royalty so near the standard of ideas excellence.

We proceed to some matters more exclusively personal to the Prince. A German by birth, he never lost the stamp of Germany; and the foreign mark upon his exterior and manner, together with the perpetual presence of a manifest endeavour to turn every man's conversation, every man's particular gift and knowledge, to account for his own mental improvement, most laudable as it was, prevented his attaining that charm of ease in his intercourse with the world, which he is believed to have possessed in the circle of his family; and retarded the growth of his popularity among the wealthy and the great, who are, and may, we fear, always remain, one of the most censorious among the several classes of society.

The precocity of the Prince seems to have been not less remarkable than his solidity and his many-sidedness. In this respect, indeed, all Royal persons enjoy such advantages, through the elaborateness of their training, the devotion of those who surround them, and their large opportunities of contact with the choicest minds, that almost in all cases they seem to exhibit a number of the signs of maturity much earlier than do those in lower station. What was specially noteworthy about the Prince was, that in his precocity there was nothing showy, or superficial, or transitory. Though he had hardly crossed the threshold of manhood when he arrived among us, he gave no signs of crudity, never affected knowledge he did not possess, never slackened in, and never concealed, that anxiety to learn, which seemed to accompany as much his social leisure as his working hours. There seemed, again, to be no branch of human knowledge, no subject of human interest, on which he did not lay his hand.

This early and multitudinous development, which received a share of assistance from the incidents of Royalty, and which in him nature supremely favoured, however dazzling and however real in the advantages it supplies, has likewise at least one great drawback. It is not favourable to the energetic concentration without which the human mind can hardly reach to greatness, and of which it is plain that he was eminently capable. It is impossible to say what growth may have been reserved for the Prince during his later years; but some of the most remarkable and complete among the Speeches—which constitute, after all, his very best memorial—belong to the earlier portion of the volume; and it might be difficult to assign to the later moiety of it any marked superiority over

the first. The circumstances of his life may have thwarted the bias of nature; but undoubtedly these Speeches seem to show the exercise, in a very remarkable degree, of the three combined faculties of terseness in expression, of concentrated attention, and of completeness of thought.

At the age of thirty, in 1850, he delivered a speech, which contains one of the best descriptions of the mind and character of Sir Robert Peel. This description is, among its other features, highly sympathetic. It betokens a real intimacy; and there is no other of the same stamp. In truth, the character of Peel, in some intellectual and many moral qualities, was not without pointed resemblance to his own.* His short speech at the meeting of the Corporation of the Sons of the Clergy, in 1854, affords a remarkable example of handling at once succinct and exhaustive.† The speech at Birmingham, for the Midland Institute, in 1855,‡ and the speech at Aberdeen, at the meeting of the British Association, are excellent. But to our mind the Prince never surpassed in comprehensiveness, in his fearless truthfulness, and in delicacy of touch and handling, his address at the festival of the Royal Academy, in 1850, when he was still but thirty. After treating of the character of Sir Charles Eastlake, he proceeds to the general subject:—

"Gentlemen, the production of all works in art or poetry requires, in their conception and execution, not only an exercise of the intellect, skill, and patience, but particularly a concurrent warmth of feeling and a free flow of imagination. This renders them most tender plants, which will thrive only in an atmosphere calculated to maintain that warmth; and that atmosphere is one of kindness—kindness towards the artist personally, as well as towards his production. An unkind word of criticism passes like a cold blast over their [y. these] tender shoots, and shrivels them up, checking the flow of the sap, which was rising to produce, perhaps, multitudes of flowers and fruit.

"But still, criticism is absolutely necessary to the development of art, and the injudicious praise of an inferior work becomes an insult to superior genius.

"In this respect our times are peculiarly unfavourable, when compared with those when Madonnas were painted in the seclusion of convents. For we have now, on the one hand, the eager competition of a vast array of artists of every degree of talent and skill, and on the other, as judge, a great public, for the greater part wholly uneducated in art, and thus led by professional writers, who often strive to impress the public with a great idea of their own artistic knowledge by the merciless manner in which they treat works which have cost those who produced them the highest efforts of mind or feeling.

"The works of art, by being publicly exhibited and offered for sale, are becoming articles of trade, following, as such, the unreasoning laws of markets and fashion; and public and even private patronage is swayed by their tyrannical influence."§

In these evils he finds the ground for the existence of the

* Speeches, pp. 121-4.

† Speeches, p. 162.

‡ Speeches pp. 146-8.

§ Speeches, p. 123.

Academy, which has done much to deserve the public confidence, but yet to which he does not hesitate to point out its own besetting danger.

We pass on to a still higher matter. Where so warm and so wide an interest is felt in one departed, there cannot but be much desire to know what, in this agitated and expectant age, was his mental attitude with respect to religion. On this great subject there has been some degree of reserve, which we should be the last to blame; for at a time of sharp division, and of much fashionable scepticism as well as bigotry, loving hands, such as those which tend the Prince's memory, are little likely to expose a beloved reputation to the harshest and most penetrating forms of criticism. For the public, however, the matter has now become one of history. The nation knew, during the lifetime of the Prince, all, perhaps, that it had a right to know. They knew that he was a religious man. In his earliest youth,* at the period of his confirmation, to which, in Germany, a peculiar character attaches, he declared with energy his resolved adoption of the Christian profession. To its public duties he paid a regular homage. His life was known to be of a pure and severe morality, of an incessant activity in duty, of an exemplary tone in the various domestic relations. The confidence of the country, won upon these grounds, was sealed by the obvious presence of a determined and even far-reaching Protestantism.† The Prince was friendly to an equality of civil rights independent of religious profession; but with such a frame of opinion for himself, and with his marked earnestness of character, a certain degree of theological bigotry may have formed an ingredient in his views of the religious system of the Latin Church, even when considered apart from its latest and most extravagant developments, of which he lived to witness some bold beginnings.

So far as can be gathered incidentally from those who find admittance to the inner circles, not much is to be added to the outline which met the public eye. Nothing has been learned to show that his mind was deeply impressed with the value or the particulars of dogmatic orthodoxy. With his refined culture, he could not but repel the crude vulgarities, which sometimes discharge themselves from the pulpit, and lurk in forms of popular religion; and it is extensively believed that the Church owes to the Prince's influence and suggestion the appointment of the able Prelate who fills the see of Worcester, in substitution for a person of more popular and showy type, but of far less learning, capacity, and governing force. What was more than this was the conviction, which all intercourse with the Prince conveyed, as to his own ruling notions of daily conduct. His life was, in truth, one

* Martin, p. 10.

† Speeches, p. 10.

sustained and perpetual effort to realize the great law of duty to God, and to discharge the heavy debt which he seemed to feel was laid upon him by his high station, and by the command of the means and sources not less of usefulness than of enjoyment. As a watch wound up obeys its mainspring till it has all run out, so he, at all moments, seemed to be answering the call of an inward voice, summoning him to learn, to think, to do, to bear. In all ranks and forms of life this is a noble, an edifying spectacle; and it is more noble and edifying, in proportion as the elevation is greater, and the object visible from a wider range.

Some religionists will be tempted hereupon to say how sad it was that one who came so near to the kingdom of God should not have entered in. Some will simply hold the description we have given to be that of a dry self-righteousness, which cannot stand in the day of account. A third class, whose doubts and scruples would command more of our sympathy, would ask themselves how it was that a man who thus earnestly and faithfully set himself to do the divine will, did not accordingly appreciate at their fullest value, those specific revelations of truth, in the form of doctrines and institutions, which Christians in general have accepted as the most effectual sources of regenerative power, both for the individual, as established by personal experience, and for society, as written on the long scroll of history during eighteen centuries. But this opens a question alike broad and deep, and we can only glance for a moment along the *vista*.

Let us endeavour to sketch a frame of religious sense and conviction different from that of the Prince. We take a human soul profoundly conscious of the taint and power of sin; one given to the contemplation of the character of Christ, and shocked at its own immeasurable distance from the glorious image of the Master; one pained, not only with the positive forms of corruption, but with the pervading grief of general imperfection and unworthiness, and with the sense how the choicest portions of the life strangely run to waste, how the best designs are spoiled by faulty actuation, how there are tears (in the touching language of Bishop Beveridge) that want washing, and repentance that needs to be repented of. Such an one feels himself engaged in a double warfare, against evil without, and against evil within; and finds the last even fiercer than the first. To deprive one so minded of any fraction of what are termed the doctrines of grace, of such lights as shone upon the souls of Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, and Saint Bernard, is to drain away the life's blood of the spirit, and lay him helpless at the feet of inexorable foes. For a nature such as this, religion is not only a portion or department of conduct, but, by a stringent necessity, the great standing, solemn drama or action of life, that in which all mental powers and all emotions of the heart are

most constantly and intensely exercised ; and the yearnings, efforts, and conflicts which belong to the external order, are as nothing compared to those which are to God-wards.

But as in the Father's house there are many mansions, so there are vast diversities in the forms of character He is preparing to inhabit them. However true it may be that all alike have sinned, it is far from true that all have sinned alike. There are persons, though they may be rare and highly exceptional, in whom the atmosphere of purity has not been dimmed, the forces of temptation are comparatively weak, and at the same time the sense of duty is vigorous and lively. Hence the temper which trusts God and loves Him as a Father, is not thwarted in its exercise by habitual perversity, nor associated with so crushing a sense of the sinfulness that debars us from approach to Him, or of the need of a Saviour, and a sacrifice, and of the gift and guidance of the Holy Spirit working in us that we may have a good will, and with us when we have that good will. Persons such as these, ever active in human duty, need not be indifferent about religion ; on the contrary they may be strongly religious. They may, as the Prince did, condemn coldness and commend fervour.* They may " give their heart to the Purifier, their will to the Will that governs the universe ; " and yet they may but feebly and partially appreciate parts of Christian dogma ; nay, they may even, like Charles Lamb, the writer of these beautiful and powerful words, hold themselves apart from its central propositions. So it may come about that the comparative purity of a man's nature, the milder form of the deterioration he inherits, the fearless cheerfulness with which he seems to stand and walk in the light of God's presence, may impair his estimate of the warmer, more inward, and more spiritual parts of Christianity. Further, they may altogether prevent him from appreciating the Gospel on its severer side. He may generously give credit to others for dispositions corresponding with his own : and may not fully perceive the necessity, on their behalf, of that law which is made, not for the righteous, but for the ungodly and the profane, of those threatenings and prohibitions wherewith the Gospel seeks to arrest reckless or depraved spirits in their headlong course, to constrain them to come in, and to rescue them as brands from the burning. He may unduly generalize the facts of his own mental and moral constitution.

We do not admit that the dissent or only faint or partial adhesion of these exceptional human beings to the ancient creed of the Christian Church detracts from its just authority ; but we should be slow to charge the inadequacy of their doctrinal conceptions upon moral defect, or to deny the truth, force, and value

* *Speeches*, pp. 182, 184.

of the heart-service which they may and do render, and render with affectionate humility, to their Father and their God. The Christian dogma is the ordained means of generating and sustaining the religious life; but the Almighty is not tied to the paths He marks out for His servants, and we are nowhere authorised to say there can be no religious life except as the direct product of the Christian dogma in its entirety.

We might, if space permitted, exhibit largely another class of cases, where the reception of the Gospel seems to be determined to a particular and by no means normal form of conditions of personal character. There is a highly popular kind of Christian teaching, which dwells more or less congenially within the precincts of various communions, and of which it is the distinguishing characteristic that while it retains and presents, with some crudity, the doctrine of the Fall, the Atonement by substitution, the intensity of sin, and the final condemnation of the wicked, it reduces the method of deliverance to a formula of extreme simplicity. A certain reception of Christ, not easy to describe psychologically, is held to be the only door to spiritual life. It conveys a salvation in itself immediate and complete; and not only entails the obligation, but supplies the unfailing motive for walking in the way of Christian obedience towards moral perfection. Purity of mind and natural balance of character supplied us, in the case formerly presented, with the key to the problem; whereas the doctrinal scheme now before us rather commends itself to those who are suddenly awakened to a sense of gross neglect or transgression, and who are in this sense at least childlike, that the elements of their characters are few and simple, and their minds unused to what is profound or complex. A summary presentation and settlement, so to speak, of the religious account between God and the soul, is that which most accords with the general form of their mental habits. These two distinct modes of apprehending religion, so much contrasted, seem to have in common the important points that each may be sincere, and for the individual efficient, but that neither have the solidity necessary for continuous transmission: and the likelihood is, that a great share of the efficacy they possess is derived from that general atmosphere of Christianity in which we live, and much of which we may unconsciously and without moral choice (*προαίρεσις*) inhale.

We proceed to quote from the Speeches a passage addressed to a conference on education in 1857, which distinctly testifies not only to the earnest piety of the speaker, but to his clear and advised convictions:—

“Our Heavenly Father, in His boundless goodness, has made His creatures that they should be happy, and His wisdom has fitted His means to His ends, giving to all of them different faculties and qualities, in using

and developing which they fulfil their destiny, and, running their uniform course according to the prescription, they find that happiness which He has intended for them. Man alone is born into this world with faculties far nobler than the other creatures, reflecting the image of Him who has willed that there should be beings on earth to know and worship Him, but endowed with the power of self-determination. Having reason given him for his guide, he can develop his faculties, place himself in harmony with his Divine prototype, and attain that happiness which is offered to him on earth, to be completed hereafter in entire union with Him through the mercy of Christ. But he can also leave these faculties unimproved, and miss his mission on earth. He will then sink to the level of the lower animals, forfeit happiness, and separate from his God, whom he did not know how to find.”*

There are men who are religious by temperament, though sceptical in their intellect. Such was not the case of the Prince. He had been trained in Germany under influences rather of the rationalising than the orthodox party, but his religion had a firm ground, as must be manifest from this passage, in his mind not less than in his heart.

It will moreover, as we think, be observed with pleasure that as years rolled on, though the flower of life was still in full blow, an increasing warmth of tone pervaded the Prince's sentiments in this great matter. On an occasion secular enough for such as are disposed so to take it, namely, that of presenting colours in 1859 to a battalion of his regiment, he breaks forth copiously into terms of truly Christian and paternal affection :—

“May God's best blessing attend you, shield you from danger, support you under difficulties, cheer you under privations, grant you moderation in success, contentment under discipline, humility and gratitude towards Him in prosperity.”*

More than thirteen years have now passed, since the Prince was gathered to his fathers ; and his character belongs to history. To such a man it is no compliment to treat of him in a strain merely courtly and eulogistic. He will shine most in the colours which the truth supplies : he would have been the first to reject adulation, and to disapprove excess. It is but the naked and cold truth, that we possessed in him a treasure ; that he raised the influence and usefulness of our highest institution to its highest point, and that society has suffered heavily from the slackening of the beneficial action to which he so powerfully contributed.


At Windsor, the noblest and most complete of all the abodes of European royalty, in the beautiful chapel built by Henry VII. eastward from St. George's, and afterwards given to Wolsey, lies the effigy of the Prince, which will probably stand with the public and with posterity as in a proper and especial sense his monument. The outlay of her Majesty upon the interior of the building,

* Speeches, p. 191.

in the endeavour to bring it up to the standard of her love, must have been very large; and the result is that, without losing its solemnity, it has attained exceeding splendour. Roof and floor, walls and windows, altar and sedilia, ancestral, royal, sacred effigies, marbles sculptured and inlaid in colour, all bear the stamp of a more than queenly magnificence; and the criticism which a very few points might invite with reference to the details of execution may be omitted, lest it should jar with the conspicuous and noble harmony of the work as a whole. The pure white marble figure of the Prince reposing on his altar-tomb, amidst all these glories, vividly presents the image of his stainless character and life, persistently exhibited through all the sumptuous fascination and array of brilliancy, which lay along his earthly path.

Over the tomb of such a man many tears might fall, but not one could be a tear of bitterness. These examples of rare intelligences, yet more rarely cultivated, with their great duties greatly done, are not lights kindled for a moment, in order then to be quenched in the blackness of darkness. While they pass elsewhere to attain their consummation, they live on here in their good deeds, in their venerated memories, in their fruitful example. As even a fine figure may be eclipsed by a gorgeous costume, so during life the splendid accompaniments of a Prince Consort's position may for the common eye throw the qualities of his mind and character, his true humanity, into shade. These hindrances to effectual perception are now removed; and we can see, like the forms of a Greek statue, severely pure in their bath of southern light, all his extraordinary gifts and virtues; his manly force tempered with gentleness, playfulness, and love; his intense devotion to duty; his pursuit of the practical, with an unfailing thought of the ideal; his combined allegiance to beauty and to truth; the elevation of his aims, with his painstaking care and thrift, and methodizing of life, so as to waste no particle of his means. His exact place in the hierarchy of bygone excellence it is not for us to determine; but none can doubt that it is a privilege which, in the revolutions of the years, but rarely returns, to find such graces and such gifts of mind, heart, character, and person united in one and the same individual, and set so steadily and firmly, upon a pedestal of such giddy height, for the instruction and admiration of mankind.

ETONENSIS.



RELIGION AND POLITICS IN FRANCE.

IT seems to me that the actual state of Europe, and especially of the Latin races, is such as to make us distrust the ideas by which we have hitherto been guided. There certainly seems to be a necessity for reviewing our theories concerning the moral conditions of civil order, and the part which religious beliefs play, or are destined to play, in the affairs of human society.

We may ascribe it to the raillery of fortune, but never has there been so much discourse as at the present hour about the absolute separation of the spiritual and the temporal. And yet it may be said that, throughout Europe, we see nothing but secular conflicts provoked by differences in religion, religious struggles exasperated by political hatreds, and events which demonstrate that, at the present time, it is impossible to defend a form of government without having also to take part for or against a Church—impossible, both for individuals and parties, to take different sides on religious questions without being also irreconcilable enemies in politics.

But, in fact, the humour of fortune has nothing to do with these matters. If our principles are belied by events, it is because they do not rest on an exact perception of the impossible and the inevitable. The truth is, that Europe, without being sufficiently conscious of the origin and gravity of the schism, finds itself divided into two entirely different methods of understanding life, and the best way of using our faculties. There is on the one

hand Catholicism, which knows of no other way of keeping men from disorder but submission to an external power charged with appointing the rule of life. This rule all are to obey, however much it may be opposed, not only to their desires, but to their conscience. On the other hand there is secular philosophy, which in order to bring man under the guidance of reason, can devise no better means than that of leaving him practically without religion.

I do not speak merely of Positivism, which positively declares that reason itself consists in abjuring all theology and all metaphysics, in giving up the vain search after invisible truth, in order to concentrate our faculties on the study of external facts and their practical bearings. Between this irreligious dogmatism of the Extreme Left and the authoritative Catholicism of the Extreme Right, there exists scarcely anything but a Liberalism which has two divisions—that of the Right Centre and that of the Left. Certainly, this Liberalism has no wish to suppress religious convictions; but it maintains that in all cases religion is purely a private matter, and ought to have no influence on political questions, either as viewed by individuals or by nations. Some, through fear that the State will violate conscience, and not favour their doctrines, proclaim the absolute incompetency of the State to deal with religious matters. Others, fearing that the Churches would trouble society by their pretensions, and interfere with the national liberties, proclaim religion absolutely incompetent to deal with civil matters. In both cases, the same practical conclusion is reached, which is, that secular society is to rest on a law that completely abandons religion to private choice, accords equally to all beliefs the right of propagating themselves, or, rather, gives up to their control public education in religious matters. By a natural law, what the heart wishes the intellect finds. The two Liberal schools have applied themselves to the examination of facts to find proof that the co-existence of the most opposite beliefs is not prejudicial to social order—that there is nothing to hinder the members of the same nation from being at their pleasure Catholics or Protestants, Atheists or indifferent, and yet to agree entirely on secular questions, and the kind of government most suited to the society in which all are to live.

For the last fifty years especially, this Liberal philosophy, or, to speak more correctly, this philosophy for the support of Liberalism, has been the common bond of Europe. With the exception of Catholics, and men devoted to old ideas of government, almost all thinkers, both in England and France, have been unanimous in regarding religious beliefs as opinions essentially speculative, and having no necessary relation to daily life or politics. They set out with the conviction that it is self-interest which guides the

world; and that, to establish solid society, we must, before all things, reckon on the cares which men have in buying and selling, clothing themselves, and increasing their temporal goods. From this they infer that the formation of religious beliefs is a matter quite unimportant, and that it is enough to render them inoffensive. They inculcate on the men of every Church to be utilitarian in their ideas, and to regard as the best policy what is most subservient to their general interests.

To-day we are reaping the fruit of this theory. Preoccupied entirely with political economy, we have not perceived the antagonistic tendencies which our official Church and our lay philosophy have created among the people. We have not kept watch on the influence which these two teachers have exercised over men's minds, and their mode of looking at their interests. Since the fall of the Empire this latent antagonism has become manifest in a political chaos. We have before our eyes the clearest evidence that our irreligious philosophy has only served to perpetuate irrational religion. Moreover, it has been demonstrated, and that by cannon balls, that people do not get rid of superstition by means of unbelief. Whilst the educated preach and practise theological indifference, the multitude who have religious wants have no other resource but to turn to the old Church, which represents the only religion of which they have any idea. Women have counted their beads; the sick and the dying have asked consolation from the curés of their parishes; parents, even the unbelieving, who are unwilling to let their children be without all belief, have sent them to learn the catechism. In fact, France is literally divided into two halves, which threaten to destroy each other. While many go in for socialism and the Commune, multitudes remain faithful to the Church, and other multitudes, who are frightened at the practical consequences of unbelief, allow themselves to be led to Lourdes and Paray-le-Monial. This is the army behind the leaders, who, with their assistance, are re-establishing the rule of the two divine rights.

On this matter it is impossible to have two opinions. There may be a difference as to the part which religion ought to play, and which it will play in the future. We may regard either as sad or as beneficial the influence which Catholicism exercises upon the political destinies of France, but we cannot shut our eyes to the extent of its influence, or the part which it has played in the gravest events of our century. If it has not had the power of creating governments, it has certainly had that of destroying more than one. We have seen the fall of the Conservative Republic of M. Thiers, as well as of Orleanism; and no one is ignorant of the cause of the wreck of both these, which as

moderate solutions, represented the best, perhaps the only chance, which France had of escaping Radicalism without falling into clerical monarchy. M. Thiers fell under the coalition of Conservatives and Ultramontanes. Orleanism has had the same fate; for if it has been abandoned by the Orleanist Princes, it was first abandoned by the country. In other words, the mass of interests, frightened by Radicalism, passed over to the side of clerical monarchy.

Is it necessary to remark that this collapse of the intermediary parties, which leaves the triumph for the Extreme Right or the Extreme Left, can be accounted for only by the particular character of our Church and her doctrines? In England, the cause of constitutional government is not subject to defeat by any league of Conservatives and the Church, and that for this excellent reason, that in England the Church does not make religion to consist in the renunciation of individual reason and national liberty. However great may be the difference which separates Mr. John Bright from Mr. Disraeli or from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of Canterbury might become Prime Minister without the English people running the risk of losing, as individuals, their moral independence, and, as a people, the right of deciding according to their reason and their conscience what ought to be the laws of their country.

But the influence of the national religion in France reaches much beyond the direct action of the Catholic party itself. The more comprehensive the view we take of the forces which are constantly reacting upon each other, the more clearly we shall discover how much our religious past has had to do with making France what it is to-day. It has formed the national character such as we see it in our different parties. It has created the grand currents in the conflict of which we are destined to endless alternations of disorder and despotism, and to excessive outbursts of passion and superstition. In the midst of these the reason of the country is always certain to be with the minority, and always tempted by its own weakness to lean to one or other of the popular Radicalisms.

In reading the judgments which the foreign press makes on our progress, or the comments of our own journals, I am reminded involuntarily of the words of Shakespeare, that "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy." Let the question be the fall of M. Thiers, the pilgrimages, or the Radical returns of the Paris and Lyons elections, none of our parties will trouble themselves to inquire into the reasons, but will be content with attributing whatever in them is reprehensible to the folly of their opponents. During this recrimination, foreigners, who know

nothing of our sharp encounters in the political arena, attribute all simply to the inherent faults of the national character. They ascribe it to the timidity and apathy of the majority of the French people, who allow themselves to be governed in turns by each of the two extreme factions. They set down as the cause the feebleness of our governments, which have never produced anything analogous to the resolution of the Tudors, to the firmness with which the Henrys and the Elizabeths subdued, on the right hand and on the left, the Papists and the ultra-Protestants.

I do not deny that there is much truth in these reproaches, I even believe that our accusers are perfectly in the right, if they mean to say that the French have a character entirely disjointed, and put only the half of themselves into their resolutions. Impulse takes away reflection, and thus they are condemned to oscillate perpetually between impracticable ideas and irrational practices; between asceticism and libertinism, between the fixed idea of living without sleep and the endeavour to sleep without any more thought of living. But that which I cannot admit is the psychology, or if it is preferred the political philosophy, which I find at the foundation of the different judgments, and which consists in seeing things only by pieces and in morsels—which supposes that social events are the work of a single group, or the immediate effect of certain dispositions inherent in individuals. Our modern Rationalism has accustomed us to consider every kind of general idea which we find in a man as a product of his reason alone. We say that if he has an idea of justice, or of the laws of the universe, it is because he possesses personally a kind of inward eye, more or less clear, which permits him to see more or less distinctly the eternal laws of justice and of the universe. In the same way we set out always with the silent supposition that the cause of social facts is to be sought in the intention, the intelligence or want of intelligence, of particular individuals or classes. A revolution which succeeds, a government which has a future, appears to us to be due to the foresight of some statesman or a company of persons who have agreed that it is the very thing which ought to be.

It appears to me that when we come to review the hypothesis on which our philosophers rest, and to ask if, on the contrary, there are not political and other general ideas of individuals which have for their cause the general state of society, our present political and social theories will be completely overturned. That day will show us that the destiny of nations, that all public facts, with the ideas on which they depend, and all collective movements in which individuals take a part, are essentially the products of the conflicts and the co-operation of the different classes of which society is composed. Of course the totality of individual dispositions is

always that which makes the social condition of nations. But what I wish to say is, that these dispositions do not act apart from each other, and do not create directly. They simply contribute to determine the nature of parties, which decide, in spite of individual wills, what for a community is impossible or inevitable.

In France, as in other countries, children are born into a state of things already prepared. They learn to speak a common language, and, whatever may be their instincts, they can only know, love, and hate the things which constitute their everyday world. Granting that in France men are less thoughtful and less firm of will than they are elsewhere, yet any one who looks beyond mere appearance will see that that is not the secret of our disorganization and our incapacity to come out of it. That secret is to be found in the spirit which the past has bequeathed to us, in the form which the good or bad qualities of individuals or classes cannot but take under the pressure of all the permanent influences. The misfortune of France is, that all the social forces are there ill associated, ill combined together; and that, for want of a good tradition, the reason of the country can separate them from dangerous coalitions only to see them soon after form others equally dangerous.

The origin of our misfortunes is far back. Its date is found in the sixteenth century, when France, wearied of the oppressive religion of the middle ages, sought consolation by giving itself up to unbelief and Paganism. What part was she to take at this crisis? Was she to remain Catholic, or follow Luther? One of our greatest historians answers, she did neither. France would only follow her own Rabelais. That was her choice. Whilst other nations reformed their Church, she preferred to let hers stand as it was, to turn her back on it, indulging herself in the enjoyment of the fine arts and clever diplomacy. It was allowed to dispense with theology, to have no great care about what it was necessary to believe, and to devote the faculties to the study of the most charming mythology, or to what is most useful to be said or done to obtain results in accordance with the desires of the moment.

But it is not so easy to live only for pleasure. There are Calvins who are tormented by thoughts of the eternal, and who do not suffer any power to prevent their believing that which they cannot but believe. There are multitudes who, at every political or religious crisis, run, with their eyes shut, whither their impulses lead them. And whilst the intelligent part of France was practising Machiavelism, or writing odes to Venus, the Church, in danger of being overturned, was giving the country the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the League, the Bull *Unigenitus*,

the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV., and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. To speak more correctly, royalty and the aristocracy had no choice left to them but abjuring their philosophy, that with the Church they might seal the alliance of the two absolutisms. The magistracy and the citizens, when they found themselves in the midst of the terrible disasters that followed the overthrow of established beliefs, had no other resource but to join the Holy League. The intelligence of France had arrived at nothing higher than the art of making life agreeable. There has never been in the country more than one philosophy, and that is not concerned with the inquiry as to what is to be believed. It seeks even the contrary of duty. Along with this has been the old Catholic tradition which, as a rule of life, recognized only the passive submission of all to a rule imposed by a material authority. Obviously this tradition, even when it had the support of but a small part of the intelligent, could alone give to the country its government and its ideas of government. In times of revolution and of civil war, when the intolerable inconveniences of anarchy made themselves felt, it was the Church only which had a plan of government capable of application. It alone could offer a creed capable of furnishing ideas of duty.

Henceforth morality and reason were divorced, never again to be united. We now find ourselves in presence of the two spirits that are to be for the future the only real actors in our history. The Church, in its imperious attitude towards the consciences of all who do not accept its doctrines, took the route at the end of which is the Syllabus. It ceased to be the nurse of mind, and to teach doctrines to which reasonable men could give their assent. It predestined itself to be a purely material government, to rest on force and superstition, and to stifle conscience. It concentrated religion on the duty of renouncing private judgment. It proscribed civil liberty, and by making spiritual subjection the only means of order and morality, it has driven all intelligence to the side of atheism and immorality.

On the other hand, secular reason, by turning its back on theology, and setting out with the idea that, to procure what is most agreeable, it is not necessary for us to ask what is true and proper for all, is in the path which leads to Positivism and lawless Socialism. It will often change its object, or, rather, what it supposes to be its most desirable object will change with circumstances. After having sought, without any anxiety for truth, the pleasures of beautiful Pagan art, it will then propose, as the means of happiness, the regeneration of society, or by physical science it will urge on a great development of industry or perfect the economy of legislation. But as to the great social problem, that of putting classes and individuals into the condition

of being able to live together in peace notwithstanding diverse wishes, it is destined to sink deeper into error. As to the superstitious beliefs which it refuses to modify, it can propose nothing but the abjuration of theology and metaphysics. To keep clear of despotism it will propagate materialism and unbelief among the unreasoning masses, which will only lead to the unbridled indulgence of the appetites. By identifying the cause of reason and liberty with that of irreligion and anarchy, it will only further the cause of despotism and superstition.

The part of dupes which the educated classes played in the sixteenth century they will have to play again in the future. In times of peace they will be sceptical for the sake of pleasure, and through hatred of the throne, the altar, and the aristocracy, they will preach Fourierism, Socialism, or Atheism, in order to bring to their help the passions of the street; and then, as soon as a revolution shows them what unbelief has produced, when it descends among those who have neither a position nor a reputation to lose, those who think only of their pleasures, they will tremble for what they have done. Without themselves believing anything, through fear of the Jacobins they will demand the re-establishment of Catholicism, or through hatred of the Commune they will rush into the arms of the Jesuits and the clerical monarchy.

Certainly these two radicalisms which contend for the direction of our affairs do not represent, as to numbers, the whole of the country. It has been said that France is neither Ultramontane, nor Atheist, nor Legitimist, nor Socialist. This is true; only it has been inferred that it is Left Centre, and that it was in favour of a Liberal monarchy or a Conservative republic, which is not the case. The great majority of French people have really no choice between the Syllabus and Democracy. They no more take part with those who practise asceticism than with those who preach cynicism, but live from day to day practising that indifference which our Church and our philosophy agree in recommending.

But while the indifferent multitude are occupied with their pleasures or their business, only two *credos*, two theories, exist in France. On the one hand there is the clerico-monarchical tradition, which seeks order by the suppression of individual reason and national liberties; on the other hand there is an anarchist propaganda which promises prosperity and unbounded pleasure through the suppression of Churches and governments. Of this propaganda the people take no notice, but every time that society is disturbed, or whenever France finds itself governed in a way that it does not like, these thoughtless masses are forced to side with one or other of the two rivals. To speak correctly, they have no choice to make. The Conservative interests are irresistibly led to an alliance with the clerico-legitimist party, and this cannot

attempt to govern without causing a counter-alliance of the Liberal powers with Socialism, cynicism, and all the other forces of destruction.

Let us observe our history a little more closely. For two centuries it presents two regular and parallel movements. At a time when France is progressing in knowledge, the mob, which is the soul of the militant parties, every day becomes more violent. The illusions by which they are guided in the beginning of an enterprise lead to disappointment. Then follows a series of conflicts and misunderstandings, by which the antagonistic parties come to be convinced that agreement between them is impossible, and therefore their only alternative is war to death.

It is well known how the ancient *régime* provoked the Revolution, when the worship of reason took the place of the worship of the saints, and solemn proclamation was made of equality, liberty, and universal sovereignty. This was the hour of idyls and sentimentalities which so enlarged men's hopes that every one believed an image of gold was being erected, in which there would be a place for the whole of humanity. Rationalism, the child of the Renaissance, was as yet in the simple dreams of its infancy. It was intoxicated with the hope of having all the happiness or power that it desired, and being able to celebrate as virtues whatever it approved, and of sending to the Gemonian stairs, as the carcase of a dead enemy, all the restraints against which it had to contend. In answer to the philosophy of the Church which had sought to legitimize despotism by maintaining that men, left to themselves, would only fall into error and wrong, it was now said that the proper gift of man was to be virtuous—that he had no necessity to acquire the sentiment of truth or of justice, for such sentiments were innate in every man born into this world. Moreover, vices, prejudices, and all suffering, were said to come from governments and Churches, from the selfishness of kings, and the hypocrisy of priests.

Accordingly, there was nothing to be done but to enthrone the universal empire of justice, truth, and goodness, which was to overturn all Churches and governments, with whatever was not agreeable to human passions. To this work the party of reason and liberty devoted itself, with a firm conviction that nations and individuals, once delivered from all restraint, could not fail to govern themselves by the innate faculty whose province was to recognize justice and truth.

But after enthusiasm came reflection, and reality succeeded the dream. The party of light and liberty found it easy to abrogate unique privileges, overturn an oppressing royalty, and reject an ecclesiastical dictatorship. But the natural reason, and the clear tendency for virtue, did not make their appearance. In-

stead of a kingdom of fraternity, of justice, and happiness, France had the law against the suspected, the massacres of September, the tribunal of the Revolution, the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety, and the guillotine, as well as war with the whole of Europe. *Sic vos non vobis*. With their irreligious and anarchical Rationalism, the enemies of superstition and absolutism had simply opened the gate for their own destruction.

I need not record how, when the Jacobins and the partisans of the throne and the empire could do nothing, there arose a soldier, who was neither Jacobin nor Legitimist, just because he was for himself. Thanks to the fears which the exaggerations of the two parties created among the masses who have no political convictions, he got possession of France. The new Cæsar has a *carte blanche* to govern according to his pleasure. This continues till he is overthrown by those whose wills would not be subject to his will.

After the fall of the Empire the two hostile tendencies which are at work in the country could not at once renew their fight. France is invaded, and receives a law from without. Besides the two currents of ideas which come from the past, there is an accidental stream of common feelings, of offended patriotism. There is, finally, Bonapartism, which holds in check the radical instincts as well as clerical tradition. Owing to these circumstances, owing to the discouragement given by some and to the scepticism of others, it is a little band of thinkers who are at the head of affairs. Although the France of 1815 is thrown by the excesses of the Revolution into the arms of the clerical monarchy, the power at first belongs to a moderate party, or rather to an *Etat Major*, which is composed of Protestants and Catholics, of Liberals and thoughtful royalists, who hope to restore monarchy by concessions to liberty, or to establish, under the royalty of the divine right, the government of the country by itself. Vain hope! During the Restoration, as at other eras in our history, the small circle of prudent men is only a head without a body, a league of clever generals without armies. Notwithstanding the good intentions of Louis XVIII., and the wisdom of the Liberal Conservatives, the Radicalism and clericalism dominant in their minds awoke to defy them. The party of the Throne and the Altar, which forgets nothing, provoked by its pretensions all the latent elements of opposition, and united against it the common hatred of the Voltaireans and the Bonapartists, the Jacobins and the Liberals—that political despair which dreams of the despotism of a sabre without the sprinkler of the holy water, and all that discontent in which is the germ of Socialism. That came which will come again, should the Count de Chambord mount the throne. Royalty has before it only those enemies who will not have clerical mon-

archy at any price, and the Ultras, who, to bridle these adversaries, wish that France should be subjected absolutely to the will of the King and the clergy. Hence the July ordinances. As a government cannot exist suspended in the air, that of Charles X. trusted for its support to the Ultras, and was carried away with them in a storm.

Let no one speak of accidents; there is nothing more regular than chance. The imprudent act by which a blunderer perishes, or the bad pilot or false stroke of the helm by which a political government is upset, belong to the domain of circumstances. But when the question is of nations or individuals, there are fixed data of character, which determine the impossible or the inevitable, that to which one day or another they cannot fail to come. In the overthrow of the Restoration, the moment and the occasion alone were accidental. The party which came into power with the Bourbons, and the general spirit of France, were too clearly incompatible for them not to come into collision sooner or later, in spite of the cleverness of the clever.

It was the same with the catastrophe which put an end to the monarchy of July.

In 1830, again, it is a moderate party which decides the fate of the nation. During the Restoration, as I have said, political Radicalism had been more or less counteracted by Bonapartism. Its anti-religious and anti-monarchical tendency had not time to draw up its army, to arrange its programme and its plan of propagandism. But Louis Philippe was scarcely on the throne, when the most threatening symptoms were manifest. From the top to the bottom of society that which is most evident is a common hatred of all moderation. The affair of Pritchard, the railleries on peace at any price, on the parsimony of the King, and the agitation for electoral reform, were only pretexts invoked by an antipathy which has altogether different causes. The discontent which increased, and which was to destroy the constitutional monarchy, is purely a matter of temperament. It means that there is an absolute incompatibility of temper between the Parliamentary government which rests on the equilibrium of contrary tendencies and the two exclusive Radicalisms between which men's minds are divided. The unreflecting crowds only make jests of the *centriers* and the *juste milieu*, which to them are words that signify the superlative of the ridiculous. And thinkers put forth profound arguments to demonstrate that the notion of a balance of power is essentially absurd. They do not understand how people can admit two governments at once—that is to say, to their intelligence, as well as for the instincts of the masses, there is no medium between the absolutism of a king and the absolute will of a democracy. The mind of France declares as inconceivable that which to its temperament is impossible.

The fact is, that under the monarchy of July, the liberty which the country enjoyed had for its principal moral result the development of Fourierism, St. Simonianism, and dogmatic democracy. And all these theories are at bottom but so many incarnations of one and the same spirit which rages everywhere. They represent the different forms which the general tendency to extremes takes at different times and places according to the passions of individuals. That the character of Louis Philippe contributed to the overthrow of the dynasty, and that the fall of the monarchy of July would not have taken place in 1848, are things certain. But it is not less certain that with the propagandists busy in the country, the formation of a great constitutional party in France was impossible: 1848 has demonstrated that there is no longer a place for moderate Liberalism, that in our society, such as the fatality of our education has constituted it, there is no chance for the reason of the country being able to establish a government which shall save the nation from despotism or anarchy, and permit it to be governed by reason, and not tossed to and fro by the waves of appetite and passion. Thus Liberalism died in 1848. After, as before the Second Empire, that which now bears the name is in reality but a branch of Radicalism. The class of moderate thinkers who had formerly their own plan of government are now converted to the programme of impulsive democracy. Through despair of vanquishing the coalition of those who are frightened and of the clerico-legitimist despotism, it has adopted direct universal suffrage.

I do not say that this alliance with Radicalism is a thing intended by the Liberal party in our day, nor even that it is conscious of having drifted towards the Extreme Left. The worst is, that its hatred for clericalism hinders it from understanding what it does. But it is not less certain that it advocates just that which has become *the* dogma of democracy, and that it thus proclaims direct universal suffrage as the last hope of France, as the sole means of escaping absolutism, and even, it adds, revolutions. Now there is no question here of the intentions of contemporary Liberalisms. The question is not if our present Liberals really believe that under the sovereignty of the ignorant masses they can obtain an intelligent government, just as the Orleanists persuaded themselves that under the clerical and Legitimist royalty of Count de Chambord they could obtain a Liberal government. Direct universal suffrage does not for all that change its nature, and its real nature is to be a scheme which puts legislation, the constitution, and the daily politics of the country, at the mercy of the restless and uncertain multitude. Direct universal suffrage for a people represents what simple licentiousness is for the individual. It is the dominion of the instincts erected into a principle and systematically organized.

The law which it establishes is really the most efficacious instrument which it is possible to create to secure to poor France the liberty of abandoning itself to its natural passions, without leaving her the chance of being guided and directed by intelligence.

And this solemn proclamation of the reign of impulse is only the conclusion which follows from the principle implied in sensualism and utilitarianism without belief. It is the outcome of the Renaissance. It does not take any account of public instruction, by which contemporary Liberalism seeks to strengthen itself, and to justify its alliance with extreme democracy. People began to wish for universal suffrage, because it was the popular idea of the day, and, after deciding without any thought of what was possible for it, they thought by this means to obtain a just and moderate government. It was then said that the masses must everywhere be instructed, to put them in possession of the power wisely to exercise their right, and to judge of political questions. When will people learn that the desires and intentions which lead them to wish a thing are not at all that which determines the effects which that thing will produce? The real malady of France—that which to-day condemns it to disorder instead of government—is just that it has received an education which has given it the habit of reckoning only on its own desires. If fear does not lead it to submit to the commandments of a director, it conceives nothing wiser than to give up troubling itself about what it ought to believe. Its first business is to employ all its faculties to consider what will give most pleasures, and then to calculate what it ought to do to procure them.

France reasons like a man who, with his eyes shut, takes it in his head to fly up to the moon because he knows of nothing else likely to be more agreeable. He then appeals to science to judge if the vials of Cyrane de Bergerac, or the hollow cannon ball of M. Jules Vernes, or the extermination of all the adversaries who oppose his project, be the means of getting to the moon. Before calculating what precautions it must take, and what instructions it is necessary to give, so that the sovereignty of the masses may produce the best results, both in the way of prudence and justice, that the best of our moderate Republicans could desire, it will not be wrong to examine what is possible or impossible in the matter of public instruction: what it is that the masses, with all our efforts, cannot be, and cannot fail to be. Whatever we do, the masses will always be, for a large part, composed of young people without experience, and, for a larger part still, of working people and peasants, absorbed in the material necessities of life. Numerical majorities will never attain to legislative wisdom, which is the highest stage of intellectual development. They will never have the speculative thought which can sufficiently free itself from

personal feeling, so as to be able duly to weigh the whole of the forces and opposing tendencies, and to seek impartially that balancing power which can reconcile them. The masses, at the most, can only have high intelligence such as we find among young men. They are governed by their personal feelings, by their appetites, and by the hatreds which come from their circumstances in life. All the knowledge which it is possible to give them will only turn to a kind of instinctive Machiavelism. They will only use it to destroy what at the moment is most opposed to their desires, or to give the strongest impulse in favour of what they like. Educated, or not educated, they will be indifferent to the ballot box; and if they come out of their apathy, it will be to vote for Barodet or to go to Paray-le-Monial; to put into power the demagogue who will most flatter their desires and their hatreds, or the nominee of the curé, who will lead them by means of superstition, or the Bonapartist candidate, who appeals both to their distrust of the curé and their fear of the Radical.

As to the general will, which people pretend to discover by universal suffrage, it belongs to the same category as the philosopher's stone. Of what will do they speak? To-day, the masses wish a man or a government because they expect what is impossible; and to-morrow, when they see that they have not obtained the impossible satisfaction of all their desires, they wish the contrary of what they wished the night before. The Empire has made an excellent caricature of direct universal suffrage, by reducing the rôle of the sovereign people to merely deciding by *plébiscite* on the ruler who pleases their humour at the moment. Under the lying appearance of democracy, we have legal juggling, systematic managing of the ignorant by cunning or by fanatics, all power constantly put up to auction between the extreme champions of democracy and those of the Church, between the town clubs and the clerical *salons*. In the present state of France, the direct vote of the masses tends simply to organize an antagonism of the peasants and the working classes; to exasperate the warfare of opposed selfishness, and of the blind leaderships, which succeed each other in turns; to deliver up the country, as the case may be, to Legitimacy or Socialism, or let an Emperor sidle into power between these two impracticable follies, and with official candidatures trick away universal suffrage, as the clerical and the democratic leaders, too, have tricked it away through the *bulletin de liste*.

Such is the system of government which has been adopted by the party of reason and liberty in France. It has its origin in their despair of being able to maintain the cause of the Radicals against the partisans of the two divine rights. At the same time that moderate Liberalism was uniting with Radicalism, the Liberal

Conservatives were coming to terms with the clerical Legitimists. The fusion on the Left, and then on the Right, is but one drama in two acts. Much has been said on the menacing returns of the elections in the large towns, and every party has done its best to hide their significance from itself as well as from others. Monarchists, in their eagerness to turn them into an argument for their favourite scheme of a clerical monarchy, have ascribed them to M. Thiers's tergiversations and imprudent concessions to Radicalism. Moderate Republicans, with a view to make them tell against the opponents of their own Republican scheme, have attributed the triumph of the Radical candidates solely to the provocations of the Right. But, in my judgment, neither of them has fairly looked truth in the face. This nomination of MM. Ranc, Barodet, and Lockroy has simply demonstrated that the masses of our large towns have remained what they were on the eve of the Commune, that they continue to be carried as much as ever to the most violent extremes in their choice. It has caused the most thoughtless, who have had no consideration of the matter, and the most clever, who were too much occupied with their scheming, to feel the terrible danger of the electoral system which our Liberals maintain in concert with the Radicals. And certainly that which has driven the Conservatives of every kind to cast their principles overboard, in order to unite with the Ultramontanes and the Legitimists, is the want of trust which they have long felt in respect to universal suffrage, and which was justified by the votes of our great towns. It was the feeling of daily restlessness produced among them by the anxious consciousness of the caprice to which the present sovereign of France is subject.

I am astonished that to foreigners it is difficult to understand how our electoral system presents an obstacle to every reasonable solution of our social problems. A people cannot exist, if on the eve of every election they are uncertain if the next day will not see their houses overturned, with all that belongs to them. As to France, its education renders it incapable of any moderate opinion in regard to direct universal suffrage. In the press, as well as in the Assembly, there is not to be met a single man who tries to take a position between the two extreme parties, and to rally the wisest portion of the Conservatives and Republicans by proposing to modify our electoral system without narrowing the constituency. Some who dislike universal suffrage, dislike it because it signifies the government of the country by the opinions of the whole country, and they see nothing better to be done than to deliver France from itself, that, in spite of our own judgment, it may be placed under the direction of a man, or a particular party, by which it would not allow itself to be governed. Others, who wish that

France could govern itself, wish to keep universal suffrage as it is; they would save the country from destruction by leaving it under the dominion of ignorant impulses and the transports of chance.

Notwithstanding the great services which M. Thiers has rendered to his country, and notwithstanding the respect which he deserves, I believe that he himself contributed to his fall by a false movement, or at least that he did not make the movement which would have saved a moderate Republic, and at the same time delivered France from the two despotisms that are hanging over it. In his place, I imagine a man less an optimist and more an innovator would have tried, by the same stroke, to lessen the anxiety which was urging the Conservatives towards Legitimacy, and to dispel the illusions which made the Liberals the advocates of democracy. He could have made a step towards the Right Centre by saying to it: "You are right to be dissatisfied, but the true danger is not a Republic. It is entirely in our electoral system, which, under a Monarchy as well as under a Republic, always produces the same disorders, the same irreconcilable warfare between the revolutionary spirit and the spirit of reaction. I am ready with you to seek the means of improving this electoral system." He might then have turned to the Left, and said: "Take care, you wish to maintain universal suffrage as it is. The threatening elections will not on that account cease to be threatening, and to give rise to fears that one day or another we shall be carried into the opposite extreme. If you love the Republic, then help me to make its continuance possible. The first object is to prevent France from coming under the dominion of a party, and from being deprived of the liberty to make its laws according to reason, and this can only be done by rescuing the empire from the sovereignty of the impulsive multitude."

Was it not, for instance, possible to offer a scheme for the transformation of direct universal suffrage into a system of double election—in other words, to have maintained an universal franchise, for the appointment of nominees who would choose the actual deputies? What we have to fear is not Radicalism or Socialism properly called, but the spirit of violence and want of foresight—that Radicalism, or clericalism, which is only an unintelligent passion, often merely the wrath which comes from hatred and fear. The whole politics of some men consist, I may say, in biting with all their might, forgetting that they who bite often find themselves bitten. With a double election, universal suffrage would be neither limited nor tampered with, and it would not cease to be the expression of all the tendencies of the country, Radicalism and Socialism included. Only, instead of expressing these tendencies as they are found in the form of hatred and blind appetite, it would express them in the form of wishes that have

been clearly discerned, and by those most capable of understanding them. Under such a system of election, the masses of the country and of the towns could, at least, use their votes to decide according to their own feelings the only question which they are capable of deciding. They would be able to choose among the men who are personally known to them, and who understand better than they do the algebra of politics. The different interests, as well as instincts, would then be sure of having representatives in the bosom of our legislative assemblies; but these representatives would be nominated by delegates more enlightened than the masses; by men sufficiently intelligent to understand the programmes of the candidates, and perhaps to feel that in the moral, as well as in the physical, all exaggerated action provokes a reaction. At any rate France might have a chance of being governed by the Republicans, who know that, in voting Barodet, they kill the Republic, or by the Radicals, who know that, by showing themselves too indulgent to the murderers of hostages, they prepare pilgrimages to Paray-le-Monial, or by the Orleanists and the Liberals, who know that by going to Paray-le-Monial, or Frohsdorf, they prepare the very contrary of what the Monarchists desire.*

It is true that a few months ago the great Conservative league was apparently dissolved, and that a majority in the Assembly decided for a moderate republic. This was certainly an act of wisdom and self-control on the part of the extreme Left as well as of the Right Centre; and, as far as the party leaders are concerned, it is a most hopeful symptom in them of parliamentary experience. They have become conscious of the Bonapartist sword hanging over them, and have sunk their differences in a common resolve to

* I know, indeed, another method which seems more simple, and probably more efficacious; that would be to restrict the franchise to men of forty years at least. The part of young men is action, and counsel belongs to the aged. "The old man," says Homer, "considers the past and the present, and sees beforehand what will satisfy opposite parties." Violence is the characteristic of youth. At forty, a man may retain the loves and hatreds which he had at twenty. But he has lived. He has been compelled to see that his will is not the only one upon earth. And in the measure that he is intelligent, he ceases to believe, as Danton did, that the art of success lies in having energy, and still energy. Experience proves to him that it was indeed Omnipotence who said that we must not do to others what we would not like done to ourselves. But such a plan is not likely to find favour. It is a striking fact that amidst the numerous electoral schemes which were proposed as the *Commission of the Thirty*, no mention was made of the English system of household suffrage, a system so well calculated to put government into the hands of the more sober and experienced portion of the nation.

No doubt there was more or less peril in any attempt to re-model universal suffrage; and even in the palmy days of M. Thiers's influence, such a plan as I have described, would not have been sure to succeed. Still it was worth the trying, were it only to give the country breathing time, and allow her to reconsider her position, and revise her system of public education. But probably M. Thiers was afraid of losing more votes on the Left than he could have gained on the Right. However this may be, he did nothing to quiet the fears which were driving the Liberal Conservatives to purchase at the expense of their principles the support of the Legitimists, and he was overthrown by the coalition which moderate Liberalism has provoked by its own alliance with the Radical dogma of direct universal suffrage.

be satisfied with the best compromise possible. But, without making light in the least of the new prospects which are thus opened to France, one cannot help anxiously asking if the wisdom of the leaders has made, or is likely to make, any serious change in the moral state of the people. The bulk of peasants and operatives may fall back into one of their periodical slumbers; and the more prudential thinkers may have a new lease of office. Nevertheless, he must be bold who could suppose that the real danger is past. The republican party, dormant or awake, still bears in its constitution the curse of its birth and education. It has been fed on dangerous promises; and when the staff at its head takes to rational counsels, the rank and file are ever tempted to mutter, "Is this a republic?" As to the Conservative element, the peasants, they are fated, by their intellectual condition, to march in the wake of the curé, or vote for the Napoleonic tradition, which is the only bit of romance in their life. Worst of all, direct universal suffrage continues to be the law of the land; and with such an instrument, the irreconcilable tendencies into which the national character has been split are but too likely to burst out into practical consequences.


On the whole, from the Renaissance downwards, French history reads like a progressive demonstration of the fact that a nation cannot cohere together without a public traditionary conception of necessity and duty, and that it cannot progress without sufficient latitude being left for growing knowledge and the unsatisfied wants to protest against, and ask for a revision of, the adopted rules of life. Unfortunately, to-day, as much as ever, no traditional conception of necessity and duty exists in France, except under a form which makes it an intolerable obstacle to progress: as much as ever it is Roman Catholicism alone which shapes the moral sense of the young, teaching them, as soon as they are made conscious of their liability to err and bring evil upon themselves, that the means of salvation does not consist in reforming ourselves—in developing and correcting our own every-day conscience, our own sense of man's position and the best rule of life—but in being placed under the tutelage of a director. From the influence of such a training no one escapes, neither the unbeliever nor the believer. And on the two unavoidable questions: how to account for all that man is subject to see and feel in spite of himself, and how best to use his active powers to guard himself from what is unbearable, or procure what is indispensable—all the independent thought of France has only issued into the conflicting creeds we have seen at work. Everything or nothing—white or black—order through the surrender of reason and liberty, or liberty through the lawless sway of the impulses; this is the dilemma in which the national character has been shut up by the dialectics of

facts. After three centuries of reflection, trials, and study, the two opposite tendencies which began at the Renaissance have simply erected themselves into dogmatic principles. Moral servilism has found its scientific formula in the Syllabus, while the art of arriving at satisfaction by renouncing all theology has been skilfully systematized in Fourierism and Positivism.

This is not very cheering. For until the Liberal forces have renounced their alliance with Radicalism, the Conservative interest will coalesce with Ultramontanism; and with such coalitions, the country runs the risk of having no alternative but an intolerable monarchy or a disorderly republic, both of which, after a period of anarchy, will bring it back under the booted heel of an emperor, a Bonaparte, or some other. The seed of the Cæsars is not yet exhausted.

Is it not possible to arrest that fatality? To give a positive answer would be bold in any one who is not a prophet nor the son of a prophet. This alone seems pretty certain, that it cannot be arrested as long as by the side of the clerico-legitimist tradition, there is only a Liberalism which decides for indifferentism, and an absolute *laissez-faire* in the matter of religious education. The evil is altogether moral, and demands a moral remedy. If France indeed is to have a breathing time, let her thinkers turn it to good account; let them look to the baneful direction which the Church and lay philosophy of the country are giving to the instincts and minds of the people.

J. MILSAND.



NOTES OF AN INDIAN JOURNEY.

II.

DEC. 9th.—We left Bombay soon after 10 a.m., Mr. Le Mesurier, the agent of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, accompanying us as far as Callian (where a branch goes off to Poonah) and giving us much valuable information.

Some of the views before you leave the low ground are enchanting. One of a singularly beautiful mountain, the site of an historical fortress, seen over a foreground of water and wide levels studded with palm trees, dwells especially in my memory. The first station at which we stopped beyond the suburbs of Bombay was Tanna.

This is the place alluded to by Sir Bartle Frere, who in his book on "Indian Missions" says:—

"An officer, Colonel Douglas, who in 1808 served on outpost duty at Tanna, twenty miles north of Bombay, then the northern frontier of the British possessions in Western India, lived to command fifty years later as brigadier at Peshawur, a frontier station more than a thousand miles as the crow flies, in advance of his quarters as an ensign. Almost the whole of the intermediate territory had in the meantime fallen under the rule, more or less direct, of the British crown."

Beyond Callian the ascent of the Thull Ghaut commences, and a noble piece of engineering it is. Fine forests of teak border the road on each side for some way up. You understand of course that at this season almost every tree has got its leaves, though very few are in flower. There is one leafless giant amongst these

forests, with white and ghostly branches tipped with flower buds, whose name I have not yet discovered.

On our way up I saw one of those jungle fires to which my attention was called at dinner last night, as illustrating a passage in the History of the Mahrattas:—

“The Mahomedans, whilst exhausting themselves, were gradually exciting that turbulent predatory spirit, which, though for ages smothered, was inherent in the Hindoo natives of Maharashtra; in this manner the contention of their conquerors stirred those latent embers, till, like the parched grass, kindled amid the forests of the Syhadree Mountains, they burst forth in spreading flame, and men afar off wondered at the conflagration.”*

Arrived at the top we came to a bare upland region which was not without certain features of resemblance to my familiar Buchan.

Far away, however, on either side stretched outliers of the Ghauts, long reaches of level ridge, on which, as on a necklace, were strung, at intervals, peaks, or what would have been peaks, if some giant had not cut off their points with his sword. Near Nassick, where Sir G. Campbell wished, not without having a good deal to say for his idea, to place the capital of India, there is a remarkable group of these strangely shaped hills.

Soon after we passed the station for that place, and crossed the infant Godavery, it grew dark, and we saw nothing more for many hours. When we woke on the morning of the 10th, we had left behind Kandeish and Berar, and were in the heart of the Central Provinces. We had missed the great junction of Bhosawul, whence a line runs to Nagpore, through the Umrawuttee cotton district. We had missed Kundwah, whence a line is being constructed to Holkar's capital of Indore, and were far north of the Taptee.

The operations of washing and dressing were hardly over when we reached Sohagpore, the breakfast station, and saw to the south the fine range of the Satpoora, and the Mahdeo group, near the new Sanitarium of Pachmuree, for more information about which see Forsyth's "Highlands of Central India," which is something very much better than a mere record of sport.

We are now in the great Nerbudda valley, upon secondary rocks. The country is covered with young wheat, as we saw the plain between Abydos and the Nile. I observe, too, some flax just coming into flower. Other crops there are, which I have not yet made out. The station gardens are perfectly lovely. One of the *Convolvulaceæ*, which covers all the buildings and is in full flower, is a great feature. The country is not unlike what the Beauce would be if thinly scattered mangoes and still more thinly scattered palms (*Phoenix sylvestris*) were substituted for its formal lines of poplars.

* Grant Duff's "History of the Mahrattas." Vol. i.

I have just, by a judiciously planned raid at one of the stations, gathered the Mysore thorn (*Cæsalpinia sepiaria*) which grows, in great quantities, all along our track, and looks as the laburnum would look, if its flowers were in a spike instead of being pendant.

As we advance, we see the Vindhya range to the north, and cross the Nerbudda, here a river of moderate size, very unlike the mighty flood which we left at Broach.

The country gets more wooded, and several tanks are passed, with picturesque buildings on their banks. The Satpoora are still to the south of us, and quite close there is a small and singularly rugged ridge belonging to their system, and marking the site of Jubbulpore, which we reach between twelve and one, having traversed 614 miles since we left Bombay—a little more than the distance from London to Inverness.

Railway travelling in Europe would be a very different thing from what it is, if one could sleep as well as we did last night, and wash like civilized beings in the morning. R—— tells me that in America these things are much better managed than even here.

It is delightfully cool—quite a different climate from that below the Ghauts. We slept on sofas and our mattresses, in the ordinary Cashmere sleeping dress of this region, under a light blanket, and towards morning the addition of a railway rug was pleasant. The dust is our great enemy, and from it it is vain to fly, so we pass much of our time on the platform in front of our carriage and see the country admirably. When we retreat into our saloon, and its blue windows are shut, we see the world as Renan, in a delicious passage, says the author of the "Imitation" saw it, "revêtu d'une teinte d'azur comme dans les miniatures du quatorzième siècle."

The houses of the peasantry, on which my eye has fallen, since we got into the Central Provinces, are smaller and poorer than those I chanced to observe in Guzerat or the Mahratta Country. "May Heaven defend us from the Evil One, and from" hasty generalizations!

At Jubbulpore begins the East Indian Railway, and the stations, for some reason which I cannot yet fathom, become gardenless.

We have now (3 p.m.), a range of low hills on our right which connects the Satpoora with the Rajmahal range, to the south of the Ganges. On our left is the prolongation of the Vindhya mountains, which is commonly known as the Kymore Hills.

The streams we cross still run to the Nerbudda, but soon we shall come to the water-parting, which separates the basin of that river from the basin of the Ganges and its tributary the Sone.

Gradually the two ranges approached, and we ran on through a valley that reminded me of a Highland strath, as the tempera-

ture of the December evening did of August in Ross-shire. It was dark before we reached Sutna, the station near which General Cunningham recently made the remarkable Buddhistic discoveries which I mentioned in my address to the Orientalist Congress last September. By half-past ten we were at Government House in Allahabad, having traversed some 830 miles since we ran out of Bombay—something like the distance from Brindisi to Alexandria.

Dec. 11th.—The morning was given to visits and conversation, after which I went to see the proceedings of the High Court, where Special Appeals were being tried. In the afternoon a party of us visited the Fort, which stands near the Confluence of the Jumna with the Ganges. All Confluences in India are more or less sacred, but this one is particularly so, both rivers being holy, and every morning thousands of persons come to bathe in the waters over which we look.

The sunset, as seen from the ramparts, was fine, and we had something very like the Egyptian after-glow, under the crescent moon, from the balcony of one of our companions in the Malwa, who resides here.

Of the various objects of interest in the Fort, that which I was most glad to see was the pillar dating from the age of Asoka, say B.C. 250, one of the oldest architectural monuments in India. You will find it figured in "Fergusson's Handbook." Curious, too, was the stump of the sacred banian, on which the Chinese pilgrim, Hiouen Thsang, looked in the seventh century.

Dec. 12th.—A pretty long walk in the cold, crisp morning took me over admirable roads made of kunkur, a material of which we have all heard, but which I first here actually see, to the house of a resident who kindly shows me his whole establishment. I see the stables, the cattle, the sheep, the fowls, the wheat fields, the swimming bath, and whatever else is characteristic of a prosperous Anglo-Indian *ménage* in these parts. Last, not least, I walk over the garden, on which its owner bestows great care.

There I come to know the Mhowa (*Bassia latifolia*), one of the most important of Indian trees, and see too the tasselled *Duranta*, the large Chinese jasmine, the Peacock flower (*Poyntziana pulcherrima*), the Quisqualis, another favourite Anglo-India shrub, with much else. I have explained to me the method by which turf is formed and kept alive in this thirsty land, and am taught to discriminate between some of the more important foods of the people—the pulse called gram (*Cicer Arietinum*, whence the nickname of Cicero), the millet (*Penicillaria setacea*), known as Bajra, &c.

Then the difficulties which attend vine, peach, and English melon culture in this climate are explained to me, and I learn by

taste the merits of *Hibiscus Subdariffa*, a Malvaceous plant, whose calyx, strange to say, makes excellent jam.

After breakfast comes more political talk with the Lieutenant-Governor of the most instructive kind—while the afternoon is given to the native town, where I have, under the most admirable auspices, a whole succession of peeps into the life of the people. I see the small stores of the pawnbrokers, chiefly in silver ornaments. I see a lapidary cutting gems with bow and wheel. I see cowries used as change, forty-eight going to the anna, which is equivalent to $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. I see the sweetmeat shops, and toy shops, and guitar shops, and a manufactory of lac bracelets. Lastly, I see a curious little scene. A weaver has bought five-shillings' worth of gold, and wants it made into a nose-ring. He covenants with a working jeweller to make it—he paying the jeweller about a penny for his labour, which is to last an hour—the employer sitting by all the while and watching, in the attitude of a cat, that none of his gold be purloined—an arrangement by which he also gets the benefit of the jeweller's fire for an hour on a December afternoon. I first see the gold in the shape of a pea, then I see it assume the shape of a small bar. As we pass homeward, it has become a completed nose-ring, for which, having made the weaver understand, through my guide, that the transaction will be largely to the advantage of all concerned, I give seven shillings and carry it off in triumph.

Inexorable night came upon us long before my curiosity was satisfied, and yet I have been told ten times over that there is nothing to see in Allahabad.

LUCKNOW, *Dec. 16th.*—A journey of 165 miles, much of it performed by night, took me to the capital of Oudh, *via* Cawnpore, where I stayed long enough to see what has given the place its dismal celebrity.

I have been refreshing my recollections of those sad days by George Trevelyan's eloquent book, but you would hardly thank me for recalling the details of one of the most unrelieved tragedies in English history.

The scenes of some of its most hideous passages are veiled by luxuriant gardens, to which wise local regulations have affixed a semi-sacred character.

"The tower has sunk in the castle moat,
And the cushat warbles her one clear note
In the elms that grow into the brooding sky.
Where Anstice sat long ago waiting to die."

I spent most of my time at Cawnpore in the house which once belonged to our friends the H——'s, a roomy, pretty bungalow—that is, being interpreted, a villa in which screens and curtains largely do the work done by partition walls in temperate climates.

On either side lie wide spaces of turf—what was his rose garden on this, and hers on that. Both are still kept up, more or less, but in this climate the plants soon want renewing.

From the broad verandah behind the drawing-room the eye ranges over a vast plain, which, but for its atmosphere and colouring, might be any part of the left bank of the Danube below Pesth. Between the house, however, and that plain spread the broad waters of the Ganges, comparatively scanty at this season, I need hardly say, but in the rains thinking nothing of inundating twenty square miles on its northern shore.

Right below the verandah is a backwater, along the margin of which had collected in great quantities the flowers of the *Tagetes maximus*, a sort of tall marigold, very sacred here.

These had been offered to the hallowed stream by the devotees at a bathing station just above the upper end of the garden, and on the backwater. From that bathing station a long wooden bridge leads to a low islet of shingle, upon which many Brahmins had erected each his own little sacred bathing-shed. Beyond was another branch of the river, and yet beyond a further shingle bank and the deep water channel of the hour, down which an uncouthly shaped boat now and then glided.

My attention was called to the proceedings of a party on the further margin of the deep water channel, and through a telescope I saw them making arrangements for burning a body, to which, ere long, the slowly curling smoke showed that they had set fire.

Here, in Lucknow, we have been the guests of the Judicial Commissioner, and have seen very fairly, thanks to him, all the most important points in this huge place.

There is little very good in the way of architecture. The best buildings are two royal tombs, and the Imambarra, a huge edifice in the fort, which is now converted into a dépôt for ordnance. Other things, such as the Great Mosque, look imposing at a distance, but are seen, when one gets near, to be poor and tawdry.

The historic sites connected with the Mutiny are of the highest interest, and here, though God knows the tragedy was deep enough, it was not the *unrelieved* tragedy of Cawnpore.

I wish our friend G—— could have gone with me over the Residency. I think even he would have admitted that his countrymen, although they are not much less apt than their neighbours to get into scrapes, have a marvellous genius for getting out of them.

The ruins have been left, most wisely, just as they were after the storm had swept by; but tablets fixed here and there mark the most famous spots—Johannes's House, the Baillie Guard-gate, the room where Sir Henry Lawrence died, &c. Here, too, the

scenes of the death-struggle have been veiled in gardens. A model in the Museum (or in the Vernacular, the House of Wonders), hard by, is said accurately to represent the ground as it was when the conflict commenced.

I know scarcely any city of the second order which can vie with the capital of Oudh in the beauty of its parks. Stockholm and Copenhagen no doubt surpass it; but I do not remember any other place of the same size which does.

To the finest of these parks is attached the name of Sir Charles Wingfield, who was Chief Commissioner here, and who sat for Gravesend in the Parliament of 1868-74.

Thither I went one day under the guidance of the Director of the Horticultural Gardens, and saw many new trees, amongst the most noticeable of which were the Bael (*Egle Marmelos*), so important medicinally, the fragrant sandal-wood, and *Bauhinia purpurea* with its superb flowers and scimitar-like pods. It is strange that, although not one single tree which I saw is English, the general effect of the whole, when palms are not in view, should be precisely that of a carefully-planted English arboretum in which pines are not grown.

Very instructive also was a visit to the Horticultural Gardens, where I became acquainted with the Sâl (*Shorea robusta*), almost as important in the north as the teak is in the south of India; with the *Asclepias gigantea*, producing one of the strongest fibres in the world; and with the *Cæsalpinia Sappan*, which gives us the redwood of commerce. Careful and successful experiments are being made here in growing delicate plants under houses formed of split bamboo, with a view to defend them at once against the hot winds of summer and the frosts of winter. They are trying also the date-palm from the Persian Gulf, and are doing very well with the Cintra orange.

We went over much of the native town with the superintendent of police, who keeps a population of 270,000 in order with 700 constables. We saw many of the shops, and lamented the way in which the jewellery is being spoiled with a view to meet a demand which has arisen in England for a very uninteresting kind of bangle. Some of the plate is good, and pieces of rude but very effective enamel can be picked up.

We attended a gathering of pawnbrokers, who sat in conclave daily to have articles brought to them for purchase or hypothecation. The chief of them showed me a very large diamond, for which he asked 20,000 rupees, and it was obvious that his transactions were on a great scale; yet his income tax, even when the rate was $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., was only 225 rupees. It was amusing to see, as we entered the little courtyard, the family cow—kept not for use but for luck.

Many of the Mahometans here belong to the Shiah sect, as did the royal family, and that sect has possession of the Great Mosque. I did not observe any difference in its arrangements from those of the Soonees.

We were met in one of the narrow streets by a most picturesque string of camels, attended by Afghans, who were bringing down dried fruits and Persian cats for sale from beyond the passes.

At Lucknow and Cawnpore conversation turned a good deal on the events of 1857; on the sort of natives who were likely to be useful in Government employ; on the position of the uncovenanted service with reference to leave rules and pensions; on the gradual disappearance of the professional criminal class in this place, which had been abnormally developed in the evil times before annexation; on the transfer of a considerable part of the population to Hyderabad in the Deccan, and to Calcutta, when a more ordered state of things superseded the old days of anarchy and rapine.

Dec. 17th.—We left Lucknow yesterday in excellent company, and, thanks to the courtesy of the Oudh and Rohilcund Railway authorities, were able to get the greatest advantage from it, going on ahead of the ordinary train, and dropping down as from the clouds in the midst of an Oudh village, over which we walked, observing the shrine under the Peepul tree, the gathering of people in the little marketplace, the extreme cleanliness of even the poorest hovels, fresh plastered at frequent intervals, sometimes even daily, by the women. The vast majority of the houses were of mud, but here and there was a dwelling of brick. Several of these had doors of carved wood, with the fish of the expelled dynasty upon them, doors which may have once ornamented some stately mansion at Lucknow. The head-man told us that his family had been here since the days of the Delhi emperors. It belongs to the writer caste, but has gradually made money, and, having bought out some of the old proprietors, now holds sufficient land to give it a local status.

The conversation, as we hurried on to Cawnpore, turned on the question how far these villages appreciated our rule. "True it is," said one of our companions, "every man is now secure from the old violence and the old oppression, but I doubt whether they did not like better the former state of things—when the king sent a regiment against a village which did not pay its taxes. The village knew when the regiment was coming, and put its possessions in safe keeping—then fought the regiment, perhaps successfully. If unsuccessful, it paid up, and was free from interference for some years, while the troops were coercing other villages. Now we take far less at a time, and in a peaceful way, but the idea of resistance to us is ridiculous, and our tax-collectors, although

their demands are moderate and their methods merciful, are yet inexorable as fate."

We crossed a large piece of land covered with low scrub. "What is that?" I asked. "That," said C—— "is a Dāk jungle (*Butea frondosa*); Pullus or Pallas they call it in the south. It has been said that this tree gave its name to the battle of Plassey, which was fought in a Dāk jungle." The sight of this, the first piece of jungle I had seen in the north, made me understand Jacquemont's disappointment with his first Indian jungle. He would not have been disappointed if he had begun with Matheran.

On the Oudh and Rohilcund line we returned to the station gardens, of which we lost sight at Jubbulpore. In more ways than one, indeed, this line has profited by the experience of its predecessors, and prides itself upon its accommodation for native travellers being particularly good. Amongst other boons to them, it has adopted a plan of setting down and taking up passengers at convenient places where there are no stations; a proceeding for which its very slow rate of speed gives great facilities.

At Cawnpore we again joined the East Indian, and went by a very slow train to Agra, reaching Sir J. Strachey's camp about midnight, where we found our tents pitched, and all comfortably arranged. The thermometer at this season falls very low during the night in Northern India. As we passed to the station at Lucknow, we saw them collecting the ice which had formed in shallow pans put out for the purpose; and here, under canvas, it is very decidedly cold.

During the journey from Cawnpore to Agra, I heard a point bearing on the endless controversy about Indian public works more forcibly stated than hitherto. "It is all very well," said one of my fellow-travellers, for people at home to say, 'Don't make sanguine estimates;' but suppose we don't make sanguine estimates, what happens? By no possibility can we keep the amount of our estimates secret. It gets out, and then every native subordinate does his very utmost to take care that he and his work well up to our estimate. Making sanguine estimates is absolutely necessary if we mean to keep down actual costs."

AGRA, Dec. 19th.—This camp life is an admirable institution. As soon as weather and the state of business permit, the Indian magnate of every degree leaves his usual abode, and starts to inspect his county, province, or kingdom, as the case may be. Sir J. Strachey, for instance, will for the next two or three months be moving slowly over his wide dominions, which are about as populous as Great Britain. Soon after sunrise, he drives or rides out, examines schools, gaols, lunatic asylums, remains of antiquity which are in need of repair, and so forth, returning to a late

breakfast between ten and eleven. Then come a number of hours devoted to seeing a variety of officials, and to carrying on the ordinary duties of government, while the evening is given chiefly to receiving at dinner the principal local officials, who come into camp from all the districts round to see the Lieutenant-Governor, and often to settle by a short conversation matters which might otherwise have involved much loss of time in correspondence. You will have observed that we have stayed a good deal in the large towns with judicial officers. They are the only persons of position who at this time of the year are stationary. The executive officers are nearly all on the wing.

The camp is a pretty sight. A broad street of tents leads to the pavilion of the Lieutenant-Governor, over which a flag flies, and in which his guests assemble. For the rest, everything goes on as in a large well-appointed house in Europe. More than thirty people sat down the other night to dinner.

On the 17th there was a formal reception of native noblemen and officials, each of whom, from the least to the greatest, advanced as his name was called, and made his obeisance. Some of the former class were remarkable for the antiquity of their family—Rajpoots of the Rajpoots—but none of much political note.

The chief objects of interest in and near Agra are the fort, Sikundra, the tomb of Itmad-ood-Dowlah, and the Taj.

Our first view of the fort was a very striking one. We saw it in the early morning, ere yet the mist had cleared away, over a foreground of waste interspersed with Mahometan tombs. The beautiful outlines of what we afterwards learned to call the Pearl Mosque seemed really built up of pearl, and stood out clear and distinct, while the two ends of the huge pile over which it rises faded away in the darkness.

Later, we went carefully over the whole of this Indian Windsor, under the best guidance which Agra affords. I was most agreeably surprised—surprised I say, because from a perusal of Fergusson's book, I had been led to suppose that we should see much more Vandalism than now meets the eye. Since he was here, Government has taken up in good earnest the protection of this glorious building; has spent £10,000 most judiciously, and is determined to spend whatever is necessary to remove all removable mischief, and prevent all preventible decay.

The fort was the work of Akbar, one of the few really great men of native Indian history. It is a mass of dark red sandstone, battlemented, and strong enough in its day, though now of little military importance. On this noble foundation Akbar's successors reared many lovely buildings, almost all of white marble. Pre-eminent in beauty is the Pearl Mosque, to which I have already alluded, and of which Fergusson (to whom pray refer for a com-

mentary on all I am writing, since I do not attempt to set down more than impressions) observes:—

“By far the most elegant mosque of this age—perhaps, indeed, of any period of Moslem art—is the Mootee Mesjid, or Pearl Mosque, built by Shah Jehan, in the palace of Agra. Its dimensions are considerable, being externally 235 feet east and west, by 190 north and south, and the courtyard 155 feet square.

“Its mass is also considerable, as the whole is raised on a terrace of artificial construction, by the aid of which it stands well out from the surrounding buildings of the fort. Its beauty resides in its courtyard, which is wholly of white marble from the pavement to the summit of its domes. The western part, or mosque properly so called, is of white marble inside and out, and except an inscription from the Koran, inlaid with black marble as a frieze, has no ornament whatever beyond the lines of its own graceful architecture. It is, in fact, so far as I know, less ornamented than any other building of the same pretensions, forming a singular contrast with the later buildings of this style in Spain and elsewhere, which depend almost wholly for their effect on the rich exuberance of the ornament with which they are overlaid.”

I was extremely pleased with the Jasmine Bower, the apartment, that is, of the favourite sultana, in which everything has been done that grace of form, combined with inlaid and polished marble, can do for the cage of a pet bird.

Beautiful, too, are the rooms in which Shah Jehan ended his long and disastrous reign. His last sight on earth must have been the divine and glorious building, which will keep his otherwise unhonoured memory fresh to all time.

“Der Mensch erfährt er sey auch wer er mag
Ein letztes Glück und einen letzten Tag.”

As I stood looking towards the Taj from the rooms in which Shah Jehan died, there came into my mind those other rooms which S—— will remember, and which struck us both so much; the rooms, I mean, in which Philip II. breathed his last, with his eyes on the altar of the dark Escorial Church. The Mogul, though a prisoner, had by much the best of it.

At Sikundra is the tomb of Akbar, built by his son. It stands in a stately square of gardens, approached by noble though partially ruined gateways, and is, like the fort, built of red sandstone below, and white marble above. Here, however, the red sandstone is disposed in the most exquisite and intricate architectural forms, while the white marble court, high in air, which surrounds the cenotaph of the mighty emperor, is a worthy sister to the Jasmine Bower and the rooms of Shah Jehan.

The actual tomb is far below, a plain mass of white marble, just in the same position as that occupied by the dead monarch in the tumulus of Alyattes. Here, in fact, we have the last and glorified development of the very same idea which heaped up that mighty

mound on the plain of Sardis, and reared the Pyramids over the valley of the Nile.

Dec. 21st.—The tomb of Itmad-ood-Dowlah is one of the earliest works in the style of those buildings which lend so much beauty to Agra. He was a Persian adventurer, prime minister of Jehangeer, father of the famous Noor Jehan, and grandfather of her niece, often carelessly confounded with her, Moomtaza Mehal, the lady who sleeps beneath the Taj. The tomb of Itmad-ood-Dowlah stands in a garden, and may well have been a pleasure place for the living before it became the last home of the dead.

Here it was that my attention was first drawn to the distinction between the tombs of men and women in this part of the world. The former have carved upon them a writing-case, the latter a slate, to indicate their respective relations as active and passive.

We have now visited the Taj three times, once in the early morning and twice in the afternoon, lingering on both these last occasions to see it lit up, first by the sunset and then by the moon, just as we used to do in the case of the Parthenon, when we were together at Athens.

One thinks, of course, of the Parthenon, for it is the one building, so far as I know, in all the earth, which is fit to be named in the same breath as this.

Nothing that has been written does the Taj any sort of justice, and we may wait another 250 years for a worthy description, unless some one can persuade Mr. Ruskin to come hither and write of it as he has written of the Campanile at Florence. Men who can really tell of such things as they deserve come only at long intervals.

A grand gateway, that would itself be an object of first-rate importance in most great cities, leads into a garden, which is, even in December, supremely lovely—perhaps a quarter of a mile in length by the same in breadth. A long avenue of cypresses, separated by a line of fountains, which only play on great occasions, leads the eye to the foot of the building, which rises from a vast platform of red sandstone. One passes up along the fountains, while the green parrots, perched on the tops of the masses of foliage behind the cypresses, scream to each other, and flash hither and thither in the sun. Arrived at the platform, you see that the Jumna is flowing beneath, and that either side of the platform is bounded by a most beautiful mosque—the one for use, the other, as being improperly placed with reference to Mecca, merely to satisfy the eye. On this first platform stands another of white marble, with a minaret of the same material at each corner, and out of this, more in colour like a snow-peak than anything else I ever beheld, but of the most exquisite finish and symmetry, springs up the wondrous edifice itself.

Its general form is quite familiar to you from photographs or drawings, but I have met with no picture, photograph or drawing which at all conveys the impression which words have equally failed to render.

The queen and her husband are buried, as Akbar is, in a vault below. It is only their monuments that are above ground. These, as well as the screen surrounding them, are, like everything else about the place, in perfect taste, and, like most things about it, in admirable preservation.

The usual adornments of Agra are the adornments here—inlaid and perforated marbles; and here they reach the highest point of perfection which they have reached in India.

The last time we were at the Taj the interior was illuminated by Bengal lights, so that we could see all the texts from the Koran, in the exquisite Arabic character, which are inlaid over the interior.

Perhaps, of all the points of view, that from the centre of the Western Mosque is the most beautiful, if one goes there just as the sunset is flushing the whole of the building, that can be seen from thence.

* * * * *

We spent, the other day, a most instructive morning in going, with a first-rate settlement officer, over a native village, or joint estate, the unit of the country for revenue purposes. Our friend had arranged everything beforehand, so that, when we arrived on the spot, we were met by nearly all the six head men, or Lumberdars, as they are called, and by most of the sixteen Putteedars, or inferior shareholders. There, also, present in the flesh, was a live Putwarree, or village accountant, with the map and all the village books, so that we could have explained to us the whole system by which the Government demand is regulated, and see at a glance the statistics of the place in the English abstract. The village which we examined contained 2,157 acres, of which 935 were quite uncultivable, and 1,222 were cultivable.

We walked over a large part of these last with the people, saw the various kinds of land, varying from wretchedly poor fields, growing *Cassia officinalis* (the true senna of our youth—not the same, by the way, as the Alexandrian senna which we saw in the desert near Cairo), to fields covered with splendid crops of young corn, or old jowarree, worthy of the Nile banks.

These few hours were worth a great deal of reading, even although such reading has to be done in Maine's "Village Communities," which our guide pronounced to be as accurate as some of you know it to be interesting and suggestive.

Another day we went to the gaol, now, unfortunately, rather full—crimes against property always here, as at home, being in

the closest relations to the prosperity or adversity of the country, and the Bengal demand having this year raised the prices of provisions. In no country, it was truly said to me the other day, is there so much poverty and so little destitution as in this, in ordinary times; but the margin between a sufficiency and famine is so small, the people live so much from hand to mouth, that abnormal prices at once produce wide-spread misery.

The most interesting thing in the gaol is the carpet manufactory, which is rapidly improving—this quick-witted, quick-handed people learning to weave with extraordinary facility, and the greatest care being now taken to avoid aniline dyes, and to stick to native patterns.

It is vexatious, though not surprising, to hear that the restrictions of caste prevent any of the liberated prisoners, whose ancestors have not been weavers from time immemorial, carrying on the trade which they have learnt in prison.

The rest of my time in Agra has chiefly gone in long talks with all manner of people engaged in carrying on the business of the country, from the Lieutenant-Governor down to young men who have just landed in India—a large camp like this affording infinite facilities for hearing all kinds of views on all kinds of subjects.

I am struck by the much greater amount of responsibility which is thrown on juniors in the Secretariat here than is thrown on persons of the same age at home. Work is done here by men of seven or eight-and-twenty which no clerk in a Secretary of State's office would be allowed to touch until he was a grey-haired grandsire at the head of his department.

Dec. 23rd.—We started yesterday morning, with Sir John Strachey, on a visit to the Maharajah of Bhurtpore, who had invited to his capital the Lieutenant-Governor and his guests.

The journey was accomplished in about an hour, thanks to the newly-opened state railway—the first railway I have seen on the metre gauge, whose battles I used to have to fight.

Soon after leaving Agra we passed the too famous Salt hedge—a Customs line, which runs some 1,800 miles across India, like another wall of China. It is formed chiefly of close, all but impenetrable masses of thorny plants, and is as effective a barrier as impolicy could desire. I heartily hate it, with all that it represents, and am very glad that no one ever took to attacking the Indian Government on this point, when I had charge of its interests in the House of Commons.

At the frontier of his dominions, some of the Maharajah's officers joined the train, to bring their master's respects to the Lieutenant-Governor, and we moved on through a country exactly like that we had quitted, for the Bhurtpore State was, during the minority of the present ruler, long under British management. Presently

we came to a large jungle. "What are those bushes?" I asked. "Pilu," answered one of my companions, "camels eat it, the cattle shelter under it, and the berries are good for food. When the courtiers at Lahore were exhausted by the dissipations of the capital, they used to go off to the neighbourhood of Mooltan to drink camel's milk and eat pilu berries as a restorative."

It was not till I got home and looked at Brandis's book that I saw that the pilu, which we rushed past, was a plant about which I have a great curiosity—no other than the *Salvadora Persica*, which has been identified with the mustard-tree of the Gospels.

Later in the day, I asked another person about the woodland in which the pilu was growing. "It is," said he, "a preserve of the Maharajah's." "Does he shoot?" I asked. "No," was the reply. "He thinks it wrong to take life, and never shoots. When he sees cattle overworked on the road, he buys them and puts them in there to live happily ever afterwards," holding, apparently, to the good maxim of Jehangeer—"that a monarch should care even for the beasts of the field, and that the very birds of heaven should receive their due at the foot of the throne."

The place is full of cattle, wild, or run wild, and also of deer.

Arrived at the station, Sir John Strachey was met by His Highness, and we all proceeded through the town to the Residency. I looked with great interest on the old mud wall, one of the very few defences in India that ever foiled, even for a time, the terrible Feringhee. Lord Lake's failure before Bhurtpore occurred about the time my father went to India, and I have often heard him say that when, as a boy of twenty, he was returning to camp from the not politically important, but desperately contested capture of Mallia, he first realized that he had been in a rather serious affair, when on his saying to an old officer—"I suppose this was nothing to Bhurtpore," the latter replied—"Faith, I don't know. Certainly not so bad for round shot, but for *sniping* I think this was rather the worst of the two."

I asked, by-the-bye, a week or two ago, a gentleman, who had been employed in Kattiawar, about the Mallia people, and was amused to find that they had retained their bad character to our own times. Quite lately they used to keep horses in their houses, which they treated exactly as members of the family. These trusty little beasts they would mount in the night and be sixty miles off before any one knew they had started, in the true Pindarree fashion. Then, after a reasonable amount of robbery, they used to dash home again, and go about their ordinary business, with an appearance of perfect innocence.

The Maharajah has on paper an army of 5,000, of which, perhaps, 3,000 are efficient troops. The cavalry looked very good, and is, I am assured, very good, but the weapon of the troopers is

a sort of scimitar, which would only be useful for cutting, not for the thrust.

We soon again left the Residency, to pay our respects at the palace, where we were once more presented to His Highness, while all the leading personages of the Court made their obeisance to Sir John. The visit concluded with the attar and pawn, of which I have spoken ere now, but without the engarlanding.

Almost immediately after we had got back came the return visit of the Maharajah, with of course more salutes of heavy guns, and more marshalling of gaily dressed horsemen on very fair horses. That sort of thing, as you may imagine, went on all day. It always does on such occasions, when certain specified forms of courtesy mean a great deal, and must be most rigidly adhered to on both sides.

When the ceremonial was over, I walked up and down the Residency garden with S——, a distinguished Oxford man, steadily rising into importance here. The half wild, half tame peafowl, which swarm in this neighbourhood, were calling all round the country. I could have fancied myself at Hampden.

The shadows lengthened, and a sound of bells floated up from the town. "What is that?" I asked. "Only the priests ringing for evening service," replied my companion. "Dear me," I answered, "we might be back again on the slope over Hincksey."

The sunset faded, and the jackals began their chorus. I complained of having seen so few wild animals—not even an antelope—though I have passed through districts where I know they abound. "That is pure accident," said S——, "you must have been close to many. People, however, have exaggerated expectations as to the number of wild animals they will see in India. Much of the country is far too thickly peopled, and too well cultivated. Have you any curiosity to see a tiger killed?" "Not the least," said I, "for in truth next to being killed by a tiger, the thing I should least like would be to kill one, but I should very much like to spend a night where I could hear the cries of the wild beasts. A friend of mine once enjoyed that pleasure to perfection in the Goa territory, and I wish to be as fortunate as he." "Ah," answered S——, "this is the wrong time of year; your best chance would be in March or April. At present all the wild beasts are off for shelter to the deepest recesses of the forests. Even in the Sewalik Hills, which are full of tigers, you have hardly a chance of seeing one."

"E——," I said, "whom all men know to be proverbial for his accuracy, told me that he knew the case of a tiger in the Central Provinces, at whose door was laid the death of no less than 336 people." "That surprises me," replied S——, "I thought the elephant which killed fifty people, and frightened away the

inhabitants of I know not how many villages, was the most remarkable case of the kind on record." "No," I said, "E—— told me that these 336 cases were authenticated. The same tiger may have killed others whose death was never traced to him."

Later, we drove to the palace to dine. The whole line of streets through which we passed was most effectually illuminated by very simple means—a framework fastened in front of the shops, to which were attached five rows of small earthenware pans, with a little oil in each. Great triumphal arches, at intervals, were covered in the same way, and were really most brilliant. At length we reached the palace, the whole of which was outlined with light. I have never seen a more beautiful illumination, though some present said they had done so, especially at Ulwur, where the lie of the ground is very favourable, and at Benares, where the river lends itself admirably to such displays.

The dinner was in the European manner. Our host, I need scarcely say, did not eat with us, but joined us at dessert, when some toasts were proposed.

After dinner there were fireworks—very pretty, and not too long continued. The blaze of green and red, and blue, contrasted admirably with the black masses of people, which covered the housetops, and filled the open space in front of the Palace garden, the beds in which were all edged with coloured lamps.

This morning we drove some thirteen miles to Futtehpore Sikri—our carriages being drawn sometimes by horses, and sometimes by camels, good draught cattle on sandy roads.

Futtehpore Sikri was a creation of Akbar's, and rose round the dwelling of a saint who is buried in the centre of the splendid buildings which crown the summit of one of the last Vindhya's, just before they sink into the great plain of Rajpootana. On the slopes lay the city, surrounded by a great wall, much of which still remains. High above towered, and still towers, the gateway, one of the grandest in the world, and almost dwarfing the noble mosque to which it leads. It is somewhere, I think, on that gateway that an inscription occurs characteristic of the Broad Church Mahometanism of the great Emperor:—"Jesus, on whom be peace, has said, the world is merely a bridge; you are to pass over it, and not to build your dwellings upon it."

Everywhere, at Futtehpore Sikri, hardly less in the mosque than elsewhere, does one see the influence of Hindu art.

Fergusson says:—

"Akbar's favourite and principal residence was at Futtehpore Sikri, near Agra, where he built the great mosque, and in its immediate proximity a palace, or rather a group of palaces, which, in their way, are more interesting than any others in India. No general design seems to have been

followed in their erection; but pavilion after pavilion was added as residences, either for himself or for his favourite wives. These were built as the taste of the moment dictated, some in the Hindu, some in the Moslem style. The palace has no pretension to be regarded as one great architectural object; but as a picturesque group of elegant buildings it is unrivalled. All are built of red sandstone of the hill on which the palace stands; no* marble and no stucco either inside or out, all the ornaments being honestly carved in relief on the stone, and the roofs as well as the floors all of the same material, and characterised by that singular Hindu-like aversion to an arch, which Akbar alone of all the Moslem monarchs seems to have adopted."

There are some enchanting little bits of domestic architecture at Futtehpore Sikri. The house of Beerbul, the house of the Constantinopolitan princess and others, ought to be quite as famous as the *Ca d'Oro*, and will be when their *vates sacer* appears.

The short summer of this marvellous place did not outlast the reign of Akbar, and it has long been one vast ruin. Let no one imagine, however, that it is being maltreated as it was when Fergusson saw it. "*Nous avons changé tout cela*"—thank God. The present rulers of India are in matters of taste as much in advance of the Marquis of Hastings and Lord William Bentinck as our English Church architecture is now in advance of that of forty years ago.

From Futtehpore Sikri we drove back to Bhurtpore. Here, as at Agra, I see that the *Acacia lebbek* of Egypt is one of the commonest trees. I observe, too, more frequently, I think, than further south, the *Parkinsonia digitata*, which we first met with on the way to Heliopolis, and note in this my first native state, that the intrusive prickly poppy (*Argemone Mexicana*), has taken possession of all waste places as coolly as it does in British territory.

We met many of the country people—a hardy race, reputed to be excellent cultivators. The appearance of the young wheat this year is such as is likely, I hope, to reward their toil. They are Jâts; but, unlike many of their blood who have become Sikhs, hold to Brahminical orthodoxy.

It has got much warmer at night. Clouds are collecting, and the weather-wise prophesy the speedy coming of the Christmas rain. If it comes, say they, the crops in the North-west will be splendid; if it does not come, they will be good.

I stopped at a silversmith's as we drove through the town and bought a silver bracelet, whose pre-eminently barbaric character seemed likely to please one of our friends.

At the station there was more ceremonial—more firing of guns—

* There is a great deal of marble round the tomb of the saint, exquisitely wrought but in the secular buildings I saw none.

and then we rushed over the thirty-one miles which separated us from Agra. I will admit that when we travelled at more than twice the normal rate of speed—at thirty-nine instead of fifteen or sixteen miles an hour—my late client, the metre gauge railway, shook at least as much as was pleasant.

It is agreeable to have to add that this, the first of the new State railways, is turning out well. It cost £6,000 per mile, rolling-stock included, and is paying already £14 per mile a week. They are now building a still cheaper railway in the North-west, from Muttra to the Hattas station of the East Indian Line, which will, it is hoped, not cost more than £4,000 per mile.

I have had a very kind invitation to Dholepore from the Resident in charge of that, the other Jât state of Rajpootana, a smaller place than Bhurtpore, which covers about 2,000 square miles. The present Rana of Dholepore, a nice spirited little boy, came to see Sir John on Saturday, and behaved himself with infinite *aplomb*.

Dec. 24th.—How little do even the most intelligent people at home who have not made a special study of India at all realize what an enormous country it is. I have just been reading an article, obviously by a man of sense and ability, from which it is clear that he believes the one great subject in India at this moment to be the Bengal famine. I landed twenty-seven days ago, yet I have hardly heard it named.

At Allahabad I saw a gentleman who, with a considerable staff, had been engaged in collecting transports for the afflicted districts. In Agra, I heard the failure of rain in Bengal and in some districts of the North-west alluded to as having driven up the grain market. Other mention of the Bengal calamity I have heard none, except when I have introduced the subject. Railways, irrigation, drainage, the best forms of settlement, the relation of the cultivator and the money-lender, the state of the native army, the merits and demerits of our system of education—these are, I think, the matters which seem most talked of where I have been travelling.

The modern system of "special correspondence" is very disturbing to the mental focus, bringing some things into undue prominence, and throwing others far too much into the shade.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE NATION

THE Report of the late Universities Commission, though published last autumn, has attracted less attention than it deserves, and the vague assurances given by the Prime Minister, at the opening of the Session, have not as yet been redeemed by any Parliamentary action. No such action, indeed, could be desired in the interest of the Universities or the Nation, unless preceded by a free discussion on the question of Academical Endowments. Yet no such discussion can be conducted intelligently or profitably without an adequate consideration of facts equally beyond the scope of the Commissioners' inquiry, and the cognizance of the general public. So limited is the range of political memory in these days, that of the few who have scrutinized the gross totals of University and College revenues, now ascertained for the first time, not one in ten has studied, or would care to study, the far more comprehensive Reports of the Commissions issued by Lord J. Russell's Government in 1850. Nevertheless, some knowledge of the results then obtained, and of the changes since effected at Oxford and Cambridge, is absolutely necessary in defining the course of future legislation. Before proceeding to regulate the distribution of Academical Endowments, the country ought to realize distinctly the extent to which the Universities at present discharge their responsibilities to learning and education, as well as the advances which they have made during the last twenty-five years. It is one thing to force reforms on reactionary, ob-

structive, and self-seeking corporations ; it is another thing to aid the spontaneous efforts of corporations on the whole liberal, public-spirited, and progressive. If it should appear that few, if any, public institutions in England can exhibit so good an account of their stewardship as the Universities and Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, it will assuredly be no reason for withholding any measures which may enable them to realize a still higher ideal of efficiency ; but it will be an excellent reason for not dissipating, in the attempt to utilize, resources already so well employed.

In comparing the present with the past application of Academical Endowments, it will be convenient to fix our attention specially on one University—that is, upon Oxford. So far as concerns the main features of their internal economy, what is true of Oxford is, for the most part, true of Cambridge, and little would be gained by dwelling on minute differences of system, which have no bearing on the relation between the Universities and the Nation. There are, however, certain broad distinctions between Oxford and Cambridge, which it may be well for the non-academical reader to bear in mind. Both are essentially collegiate Universities, since the constitution of both alike secures valuable privileges to Colleges, since the vast majority of their students continue to be members of Colleges, and since the aggregate revenues of Colleges are in either case nearly ten-fold greater than the revenues of the University itself. Still, the predominance of collegiate influence and the collegiate spirit has always been greater and more exclusive at Cambridge, owing to a variety of causes, the most obvious of which is the great superiority of Trinity and St. John's, both in numbers and in prestige, over the smaller Colleges. On the other hand, the disproportionate encouragement so long given to mathematical attainments at Cambridge, and the unique importance traditionally attached by its College authorities to the results of the final University examination, have not failed to affect the character of Cambridge as a place of national education. Mathematics are not cultivated at the great public schools with as much zeal or success as classical literature and other cognate studies, which are more liberally rewarded at Oxford. The consequence is, that it is no rare occurrence at Cambridge for the first place in the Mathematical Tripos, carrying with it the certainty of a College Fellowship, to be won by a young man of humble birth from a cheap grammar school in the north of England, who never even held a scholarship or exhibition till he reached the University. At Oxford, on the contrary, though competition is equally free, and though almost every College throws open its Scholarships and Fellowships to members of other Colleges, fewer young men of this class practically succeed in obtaining the highest honours and prizes. Such diversities as these, it is true,

are too slight to impair the marked family likeness which distinguishes Oxford and Cambridge from Scotch and Continental Universities, but they may help to explain some divergent tendencies, which might, otherwise, be somewhat perplexing.

I. When the Oxford University Commission of 1850 was appointed, the University and Colleges were governed respectively by antiquated codes of statutes, which it would have been no less disastrous than impossible to enforce, but which, in the opinion of eminent authorities, they had no power to alter. Their practical management, as it existed but five-and-twenty years ago, would hardly be credited by reformers of a younger generation. The sole initiative power in University legislation, and by far the largest share of University administration, was vested in the Hebdomadal Board, consisting solely of Heads of Colleges with the two Proctors, and well described by Mr. Goldwin Smith as "an organized torpor." There was an assembly of residents, known as the House of Congregation, but its business had dwindled to mere formalities, such as receiving propositions which it was not permitted to discuss, conferring degrees in the name of the University, and granting dispensations, as a matter of course. The University Convocation included, as now, all full (or "Regent") Masters of Arts, and had the right of debating, but this right was virtually annulled by the necessity of speaking in Latin, and Convocation could only accept or reject without amendment measures proposed by the Hebdomadal Board. At this period, no student could be a member of the University without belonging to a College, while every member of a College was compelled to sleep within its walls, until after his third year of residence, instead of being allowed, as at Cambridge, to live in lodgings. Persons unable to sign the Thirty-nine Articles were absolutely excluded, not merely from degrees, but from all access to the University, inasmuch as the test of subscription was enforced at matriculation. It is needless to add that, being unable to enter the University, they could not obtain College Fellowships, which, however, were further protected against the intrusion of Dissenters by the declaration of Churchmanship required to be made under the Act of Uniformity. If Professorial lectures were not at so low an ebb as in the days of Gibbon, when the greater part of the Professors had "given up even the pretence of teaching," they were lamentably scarce and ineffective. The educational function of the University had, in fact, been almost wholly merged in College tuition, but the Scholarships, as well as the Fellowships, of the Colleges were fettered by all manner of restrictions, which marred their value as incentives to industry. Some were confined to natives of particular countries, others were attached to particular schools, in some cases "Founder's Kin" had a statutable preference, and, in

too many, favouritism was checked by no rule of law or practice. The great majority of Fellows were bound to take Holy Orders, and the whole University was dominated by a clerical spirit which directly tended to make it, as it has so long been, a focus of theological controversy.

It is to be regretted that many of the wise and liberal alterations recommended by the Commission of 1850 were not at once adopted by the Legislature. No steps, for instance, were taken for abolishing the invidious privileges of Noblemen and Gentlemen Commoners, students were not relieved from the obligation of belonging to a College and residing within its walls, no University matriculation-examination was established, no order of sub-professors or lecturers was instituted, the Long Vacation continued unreformed and the University examinations continued to be conducted in Term-time, clerical Fellowships were maintained, though on a reduced scale, and the practice of applying College funds to the purchase of advowsons for the clerical Fellows was not suppressed. On the other hand, no one who knows what Oxford was in 1850 can doubt that by the Oxford Reform Act of 1854, and the College Ordinances framed by the Executive Commission under its provisions, a profound and most beneficial change was wrought in the whole spirit and working of the University system. The Hebdomadal Board was replaced by a representative Council, and Congregation was remodelled into a vigorous deliberative assembly, with the right of speaking in English. The monopoly of Colleges was broken down, and an opening made for ulterior extension, by the revival of Private Halls. The Professoriate was considerably increased, reorganized, and re-endowed, by means of contributions from Colleges. The Colleges were emancipated from their mediæval statutes, were invested with new constitutions, and acquired new legislative powers. The Fellowships were almost universally thrown open to merit, and the effect of this revolution was not merely to create ample rewards for the highest academical attainments, but to place the governing power within Colleges in the hands of able men likely to promote further improvements. The number and value of Scholarships were largely augmented, and many, though not all, of the restrictions upon them were abolished. The great mass of vexatious and obsolete Oaths was swept away, and, though candidates for the M.A. degree and persons elected to Fellowships were still required to make the old subscriptions and declarations, it was enacted that no religious test should be imposed at matriculation, or on taking a Bachelor's degree. The University itself had anticipated the results of the Commission by liberal changes in its curriculum and examinations, of which the most important was the assignment of independent "schools" to Law and Modern History and to Natural Science

respectively, simultaneously with the foundation of a new Museum. The permanence of these changes was, however, additionally secured by the clause introduced into the College Ordinances, whereby it was directed that Fellowships should be appropriated from time to time for the encouragement of all the studies recognized by the University.

The necessity of providing for vested interests, and other difficulties incident to so comprehensive a measure, delayed its operation for some years, and its benefits have not even yet been fully reaped. But the most cursory review of University history during the last twenty years will suffice to disclose a progress far greater than had been made during the preceding century, and to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. At the end of 1850, the whole number of Oxford undergraduates, resident and non-resident, was stated at 1,402. It is probable that it was less at the end of the Russian war in 1856; whereas it appears, by the University calendar for the present year, that the number of undergraduates is now 2,440, notwithstanding a concurrent increase at Cambridge. Among these are 187 unattached students, admitted under an University statute passed in 1868, and placed under special regulations for their discipline. Again, the number of those who qualified for the B.A. degree had averaged 287 for the ten years ending with 1850; in the year 1874 it amounted to 399. Similar indications of healthy progress meet us in examining the class-lists. In 1854, fourteen students obtained first-class honours, and seventeen obtained second-class honours, in the School of Literæ Humaniores. In 1874, the corresponding numbers were fifteen and thirty respectively; but while, in the former year, only twenty obtained first-class honours in other Schools, in 1874 thirty-five obtained such honours, including one classed by himself in the new School of Theology. A Professoriate of barely forty members represents, it is true, but one-third of the professorial staff maintained at Leipsic, and one-fourth of that maintained at Berlin, where the Professors are not assisted by a body of College Tutors. Still, it is much larger, and infinitely more efficient than it was twenty years ago, nor have the Colleges failed to supplement it by a system of inter-collegiate lectures which happily combines a proper subdivision of labour in teaching with the advantage of personal superintendence—an advantage entirely lost under a strictly professorial system. One of these Collegiate Unions embraces six of the leading Colleges, another embraces eight Colleges; and the plan has so far succeeded as materially to reduce the demand for private tuition. Upon the whole, it is abundantly certain that, notwithstanding the eager prosecution of athletic sports, and the disturbing influences of theological controversy, the number of reading men in Oxford has

greatly multiplied within the last twenty years, that more first-class degrees are taken in a much greater variety of subjects, and that more students are induced, after taking their degrees, to follow up some line of literary or scientific research. In short, to borrow the impartial testimony of Mr. Goldwin Smith—

“Both as a place of learning and science, and as a place of education, the University has risen rapidly within the last twenty years. In the former capacity, she has regained, or is fast regaining, the place in England and in Europe which she had almost entirely lost. Not only are there illustrious names among the professors, but among the fellows post-graduate study is bearing good fruits. The standard, both of acquirement and of teaching, is far higher than it was in 1854. The superior studies, instead of being merely clerical (if even clerical studies could have been said to exist), are literary and scientific. Oxford science begins to command the respect and gratitude of the country. Open fellowships and scholarships have visibly stimulated industry, though it is too probable that there will always be a mass of incurable idleness in an University to which wealth and aristocracy resort. Better men, on the whole, have been elected to offices of all kinds, including the headships, though these are still fettered by the clerical restrictions, the retention of which was an unavoidable sacrifice to the timidity of the time; and the heads recently elected appear to treat their offices, not as places of dignified ease, but as spheres of active duty. Wealthy colleges, before mere monasteries less the asceticism, with scarcely a tinge of public usefulness, have been restored to learning and education. Some progress has been made in placing University teaching, which before was merely the temporary occupation of fellows waiting for livings, on the footing of a regular profession. . . . The estrangement between Oxford and the nation has been lessened, at all events, if party will not allow it to be entirely annulled; and there is a visible willingness on the part of the promoters of high education everywhere, but especially in the northern cities, to accept the aid and guidance of the progressive element in the University. Any one who remembers the fossil that we were twenty years ago, must be filled with delight at the manifestation on all sides of a comparatively exuberant life.”

It may be added that, instead of drying up the bounty of founders, as had been confidently predicted, the reforms of 1854 have apparently caused the stream of benefactions to flow with renewed abundance. Not to speak of Scholarships, prizes, and building donations, the University has lately been reinforced by the accession of Keble College, erected by private subscription, and already numbering upwards of one hundred undergraduates, as well as by the conversion of Magdalen Hall into Hertford College, with a large new endowment.

But the impulse given to academical education at Oxford by the legislation of 1854, and at Cambridge by that of 1856, is not to be measured solely by the internal growth of the Universities and Colleges. Since that period, three educational movements of national importance have been independently set on foot and carried out by Oxford and Cambridge, either in concert or in friendly rivalry, without the slightest assistance from the Govern-

ment or the Legislature. The first of these was the scheme of local examinations for pupils of middle-class schools, initiated by a statute passed at Oxford in 1857, afterwards adopted by Cambridge, and now exercising a regulative influence on middle-class education throughout England. The report of the Oxford delegation, appointed to conduct these examinations in 1874, exhibits an almost continuous increase in the number of candidates presented within the preceding ten years. In 1865, 920 junior candidates were examined, and 561 passed; in 1874, 1,422 were examined, and 807 passed. In 1865, 301 senior candidates were examined, and 209 passed; in 1874, 466 were examined, and 320 passed. Among the juniors in 1874 there were 184 girls, of whom 107 passed; and among the seniors 150 girls, of whom 88 passed, one girl being placed in the first division of the general list. The Oxford local examinations were held in 1874 at twenty-five centres, most of which are situated in the southern and western counties. Separate local examinations are conducted, under the superintendence of a Cambridge board, on somewhat different principles, and no less than 4,180 candidates presented themselves, at sixty-three centres, for the Cambridge examinations of 1874. The joint result of these efforts has been that middle-class schools, however backward, are fast ceasing to be the stronghold of educational imposture, since the quality of their work is annually checked by the impartial judgment of University examiners.

In the second movement—that for the organization of academical lectures and classes in populous centres—the lead was taken by Cambridge. But two years have elapsed since a Syndicate was appointed for this purpose by the University Senate, yet in February last this body was able to report that sixteen large towns, including Liverpool, Nottingham, Bradford, and Sheffield, had availed themselves of the educational advantages thus offered, and had provided the local committees with the necessary funds to cover all expenses. Nineteen lecturers were already employed in giving instruction on a variety of subjects; the whole number of pupils attending their courses was about 3,500, and the cost of education, apart from the hire of rooms and printing, was not found to exceed nine shillings a head. No similar organization exists at Oxford, but Oxford teachers, of high reputation, have lately been engaged by local committees to give courses of lectures in several West of England towns, and at least two Oxford colleges are known to have voted £300 a year each to aid a local committee at Bristol in founding an academical institute capable of easy development into a local University College affiliated to Oxford. It is now proposed to extend the system of “Cambridge lectures” to the metropolis itself, and for so large an enterprise it will be quite essential to obtain the co-operation of the sister University.

The last movement commenced in the autumn of the same year, 1873, with the appointment of an "Oxford and Cambridge Schools' Examination Board." Mr. Forster's project of a State-inspection of Endowed Schools must doubtless be regarded as the origin of the idea; and it might have been long before head-masters of public schools invited the Universities to undertake the duty of testing the results of school work, had they not been possessed with an excessive dread of State intervention. The Universities, however, deserve the credit of having at once accepted the responsibility thus cast upon them, and for having succeeded not merely in devising, but in working out an elaborate system of examination to which thirty-two schools had actually submitted themselves up to August, 1874. It remains to be seen, indeed, whether Oxford and Cambridge will be able to furnish a sufficient number of examiners capable of thoroughly inspecting all the schools which may apply for this privilege; but there can be no difficulty in finding a sufficient number of persons competent to examine the higher forms, and to award what in Germany would be called leaving-certificates. In the year 1874, fifteen schools presented 259 candidates for certificates, out of whom 155 were successful and 104 failed. The candidates who obtain these certificates gain an exemption, under certain limitations, not merely from matriculation-examinations and "little-go" at the Universities, but also from the preliminary examination at the College of Surgeons, and from certain parts of the examination for the Army and for Woolwich. They may therefore be regarded as supplying a missing link between secondary and University education, and as containing the rudiments of a missing link between secondary and professional education.

In considering the services rendered by the Universities to the Nation since they recovered their liberty of action, it is impossible to pass over the abolition of University tests. This great reform was notoriously brought about, not so much by the pressure of external opinion, either popular or Parliamentary, as by the persistent and disinterested agitation carried on by reformers, mostly Fellows of Colleges, within the Universities themselves. In the year 1862, a petition was presented from seventy-four resident Fellows of Colleges at Cambridge, praying for the repeal of the clause applicable to Fellowships in the Act of Uniformity. In the year 1863, a petition was presented from 106 Heads, Professors, Fellows and ex-Fellows, and College Tutors at Oxford, praying for the removal of theological restrictions on degrees. In the year 1868, a petition against all religious tests, except for degrees in theology, was signed by eighty Heads, Professors, Lecturers, and resident Fellows at Oxford, while a similar petition

was signed by 123 non-resident Fellows and ex-Fellows. In the same year a petition to the same effect was signed by 227 Heads and present or former Office-holders and Fellows of Cambridge. Separate petitions, specially directed against the declaration of Conformity, were signed by thirty-two out of sixty Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, and by the Master and all the Fellows, except one of Christ's College, Cambridge. Assuredly these efforts were ably supported by the Liberal party in Parliament, and by the Nonconformist body in the country; but the motive power which ultimately proved irresistible came from within, and not from without, the Universities. It was Fellows of Colleges, who resolutely insisted on vindicating the national character of the Universities, and not the nation at large which forced upon them an unwelcome obligation.

The University Tests Abolition Act was carried in 1871, and in the following October Mr. Gladstone addressed a letter to the Vice-Chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge, asking whether the Government could rely on the co-operation of the Universities and Colleges, in the event of a Royal Commission being appointed to inquire into academical property and revenues. The reply was favourable, and the Commission was issued in January, 1872. Its functions were strictly limited to investigation, and to matters of finance, no power being entrusted to it either of passing judgment on the present application of University and College endowments, or of suggesting a redistribution of them—much less of entering on general questions of University reform. Many such questions had inevitably arisen at both Universities in the period of rapid growth succeeding the acts of 1854 and 1856. At Oxford, the anomalies chiefly felt were the defective constitution of Congregation, whereby the Professors and working Tutors were liable to be swamped by a mixed multitude of chaplains and other resident Masters, the want of larger resources for Professorial teaching as well as for the maintenance of University establishments, the reservation of nearly half the Fellowships to persons in or about to enter Holy Orders, and the rule of tenure under which the most useless Fellow of a College may retain his position for life by virtue of celibacy, while the most useful must resign it on marriage, even though engaged in College tuition. At Cambridge this last grievance was further aggravated in several Colleges, by the preposterous condition that every Fellow must take orders within a certain term of years, or forfeit his Fellowship. Some of the disabilities which pressed most heavily on particular Colleges had been partially removed by new statutes, with the sanction of the Privy Council, but the Privy Council became reasonably unwilling to legislate piecemeal, at the instance of fluctuating bodies of Fellows, and a demand for a

supplementary Reform Act was gaining strength at both Universities, when Mr. Gladstone consented to appoint a purely financial Commission, as a preliminary step to further legislation. How far this was a politic act, may perhaps be doubted, and it is certain that it would never have been taken, had it been foreseen that it would rest with a new Administration to propose or to resist a redistribution of Academical revenues. However, the statistical facts have now been placed before the public, in a somewhat misleading form it may be, but still with a completeness never before attained. It is these facts which it now remains for us to examine and to interpret.

II. The grand total of University and College revenues, for Oxford and Cambridge together, is stated on page 29 of the Commissioners' Report at £754,405—a very large income, though less than is stated to have been realized by one nobleman in one year from profits on coal and iron. This grand total has sometimes been cited as if it constituted the fund on which Parliament might operate immediately, if it thought fit, with a prospect of having to deal with an additional income of about £120,000, likely to accrue at Oxford, and some £40,000 likely to accrue at Cambridge, by the year 1890. Let us, then, proceed to consider how far the sum of £754,405 represents disposable revenue, in the usual sense. And, first, we must eliminate £38,679, received under the head of "internal income" by the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and about £101,000 received under the head of "internal income" by the Colleges and Halls of Oxford and Cambridge. "The internal income of the Universities," as the Report informs us, "arises almost wholly from taxation," and, as the Synoptical Tables show, it is more than absorbed by University charges of the most legitimate character. Speaking in round numbers, and combining into one account the returns for Oxford and Cambridge, we find that £5,800 is spent on University officers, £9,300 on Professors, £3,600 on Examiners, above £6,000 on libraries, £3,500 on scientific institutions, £1,500 on museums and lecture rooms, and £3,600 on subscriptions, donations, and grants, besides about £16,000 on the maintenance of University churches, servants, police, repairs, building, law charges, printing, and minor items, scarcely one of which the most captious auditor would be disposed to disallow, or even to dispute. Altogether the joint corporate expenditure of the Universities, out of corporate funds, amounts to nearly £50,000, exceeding their "internal income" by some £11,000, which is made up out of their "external income," mainly derived from landed property. "The internal income of the Colleges and Halls arises from rents of rooms or chambers occupied by members of the College or Hall; from fees paid on entrance and graduation; from dues paid by

all members, whether resident or non-resident; from profits of the establishment, chiefly in its buttery and kitchen departments; and from small casual payments." Now, it will at once occur to any one conversant with College economy that such receipts as these are supposed to cover, and no more than cover, such current domestic expenses as the annual repairs of College buildings, the maintenance of the establishment, the salaries of College servants, chapel services, rates, taxes, and so forth. A detailed inspection of the items confirms this inference, and proves that Colleges expend with one hand on the primary necessities of internal management considerably more than they receive with the other under the name of "internal income." It does not, therefore, appear very clear why the "internal income" of Colleges and Halls should have been imported into the account at all. In fact, a glance at the returns from Oxford Halls, which are mere boarding-houses without any endowment whatever, is sufficient to expose the illusory nature of such "internal income." In the £58,883 of "internal income" charged against Oxford Colleges and Halls is included £6,846 raised by the Halls in rents, fees, and dues, which constitutes the whole fund out of which they have not only to pay their Heads, but to keep up their fabrics and staffs of servants for the accommodation of some 200 undergraduates. Thus, from the sum total of £754,405 must be subtracted nearly £140,000 of "internal income" received by the Universities and Colleges, *plus* the subsidies contributed from external income to internal expenditure. It is difficult to estimate these with accuracy, especially as the Synoptical Tables have not been compiled with perfect uniformity as between different Colleges, but they cannot fall short of £30,000; so that we have no longer to deal with £754,405, but with something less than £585,000.

It is next to be observed that £88,803 of this £585,000 consists of trust-funds. Of course, the power of Parliament is as complete over property held in trust as over property held for the corporate use of an University or College; but, on the other hand, the University or College is not equally responsible for its appropriation, which is prescribed by the trust-deed, under the control of Chancery, and may or may not be for the benefit of Academical education. For instance, the annual interest of £10,208, being part of the Sheppard fund of Magdalen College, Oxford, is specifically assigned to charities in certain Hampshire parishes, and the apparent income of the College is fictitiously swelled by £300 a year, which it only receives in the capacity of almoner. No doubt, the great bulk of the whole £88,803, and especially of the £25,845 received by the Universities as trustees, is subject to trusts more or less beneficial to education, and may therefore

be properly counted among the educational resources of Oxford and Cambridge. Still, it appears that as much as £6,500 is devoted to "benefices," and £13,500 to miscellaneous objects; so that, even assuming all the rest to be in the nature of educational or *quasi*-educational endowments, we must deduct £20,000 from the £585,000 previously obtained, and are left with a residue of £565,000.

Let us now examine somewhat more closely this gross residue of £565,000, with a view to ascertain of what elements it consists, and how much of it can be fairly treated as spare income. It will be remembered that we have already accounted for the internal income of the Universities, and for £11,000 of the external income, in our previous summary of University expenditure. As the whole external income of the Universities amounted in the year 1871 to £17,114, there remained a surplus of about £6,000, applicable to general University purposes, and probably appropriated since that year to some of the various improvements or extensions urgently needed in University buildings. There also remained an income of £25,845 from trust-funds administered by the Universities, *minus* £2,180, for which allowance has been made. This sum of £23,665 was devoted, in accordance with the conditions of trust-deeds, to public institutions, University Professors and lecturers, Scholarships and prizes, only £465 being expended in rates, taxes, and management, while a surplus of £1,790 was left over for investment. Turning now to Colleges, we must bear in mind that we have already set off their internal income, and about £20,000 of their external income, against their internal expenditure, but we have still to allow for interest on loans (mostly contracted for building purposes), the management of estates, repairs and improvements on estates, and rates and taxes on estates—all being preliminary outgoings, such as compose the ordinary margin between the gross and net income of individual landowners. These preliminary outgoings amount altogether to above £101,500. Deducting £6,000, £23,665, and £101,500 from the gross residue of £565,000, we obtain a net residue of £433,835, belonging exclusively to Colleges, but partly derived from external corporate income, and partly from trust-funds. The ultimate question is whether this residue is employed as well and wisely as it might be for the proper ends of University education.

It may be stated roughly that somewhat more than one-ninth of this sum (£50,959) is expended in payments to Heads; one-eighteenth (£24,600) in payments to College Officers and Tutors in aid of tuition-fees; one-sixth (£69,951) in payments to Scholars and Exhibitioners; between two-fifths and one-half (£205,758) in payments to Fellows; more than one-twentieth (£25,000) in investments; and the rest in payments for miscellaneous objects.

most of which are conducive to education, such as augmentations of Professorial salaries, and the maintenance of College libraries. An item of £9,837, representing allowances made to resident Fellows, may be considered either as an additional endowment of Fellowships, or as an indirect subsidy to College Tutors and Officers—a body which embraces nearly all the resident Fellows. Another item of nearly £16,000, representing subscriptions and pensions, might perhaps be reduced infinitesimally by a rigid economist, and the £14,000 spent in augmentations of benefices is open to exception, in cases where the grant is made to improve the patronage of the College, and not for the spiritual benefit of the parishioners. Here and there some financial readjustments may be suggested, but it is certainly not easy to find much room for saving on the aggregate of miscellaneous expenditure. Unless it be in respect of payments to College Officers, payments to Scholars, payments to Heads, or payments to Fellows, the Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge must surely be acquitted not merely of extravagance, but of indiscretion in the application of their funds. Let us deal with these items successively.

We may dispose very briefly of the payments to College Officers, which are, after all, very moderate in amount. Under the general name of College Officers are included Tutors and Lecturers, Deans, Chaplains, Librarians and Bursars. The income of Tutors is, in theory, wholly provided, and, in practice, mainly provided out of tuition-fees paid by the students. These fees, however, seldom exceed £21 per year, and the staff of Tutors maintained by the better Colleges is so large in proportion to the number of students, that it is found necessary to supplement tuition-fees out of College funds. The subsidies thus granted amount to £4,411 at Oxford, and to £2,642 at Cambridge, and to this extent the parents of students must be regarded as purchasing University education at less than cost price. Even with this addition, the produce of tuition-fees is not great enough to provide more than about £300 a year, on the average, for each Tutor and Lecturer. A Tutor's salary, it is true, is earned by six months' work in the year; he is usually a Fellow, and there are many advantages incident to his position, which make it more attractive and remunerative than would appear at first sight. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to obtain the services of able men as Tutors unless they were allowed to eke out their incomes by holding petty College offices, the duties of which are perfectly compatible with tuition, and often naturally connected with it. Such is the office of dean, involving the superintendence of College discipline, that of College preacher or chaplain, and that of librarian. The office of Bursar stands on a different footing, and the marvel is that men of sufficient aptitude for business can be induced to undertake it at

a stipend of £100, £200, or £300 a year. The Commissioners justly observe that the charge for management of College estates is "remarkably low," amounting to less than £16,000, and averaging only £2 5s. 10d. per cent. on the whole external income. One explanation of this fact is, that it does not include the salaries of Bursars, and it is worth notice that Bursars holding Fellowships are content to serve their Colleges on terms which no professional land agent would accept.

The £70,000 paid to Scholars is perhaps the one item of College expenditure which no University reformer would desire to reduce. It may, of course, be doubted whether too many local and personal restrictions on Scholarships were not retained by the Oxford Executive Commission, and it is certain that in this respect a more liberal policy was adopted by the Cambridge Executive Commission. It may also be thought desirable that more Scholarships or exhibitions should be offered as prizes for success in the local examinations. But in the main no one can deny that College Scholarships are well bestowed, and form the most important of all the steps in the yet imperfect ladder of educational preferment, enabling promising boys of humble parentage to complete their education, and encouraging schools to cultivate branches of knowledge which are not immediately convertible into ready money. We may therefore dispense with any further discussion of the scholarship-fund, the disposition of which may doubtless be profitably revised, but the aggregate amount of which needs increase rather than diminution, and proceed to consider the £50,000 consumed in payments to Heads of Colleges. This is not the place to compare all the different plans which have been proposed for utilizing the Headships. Whether an ideal Head should be an *ex-officio* senior Tutor or *ex-officio* senior Bursar, or general President of the collegiate society, like the Dean in a Cathedral chapter; whether he should hold office for life, or for a term of years, or up to a certain age; these are points which must be settled in any future comprehensive reform of the Universities, but which scarcely affect the present inquiry. The practical questions are whether it is expedient to abolish Headships, and whether, if they are to be preserved, the sum now allotted for their maintenance is excessive. Both these questions must be answered in the negative by any one who believes in the value, and deprecates the subversion, of the College system. No institution can exist without a Head; and of all institutions Colleges are the least fitted to conduct the experiment successfully, inasmuch as their body corporate is perpetually renewing itself, and the Head is the only element of stability. If a senior Tutor were charged with all the duties of a Head in addition to his own, he would not only require a very large increase of salary, but would

be comparatively inefficient in both capacities. If not appointed for life, he would neither feel the same interest in his College, nor be regarded by its past and present members as its representative; if appointed for life, he would be a Head in all but name, but with the disastrous obligation of continuing to lecture after he had ceased to be competent. But it is useless to pile up objections from a College point of view against a change which is only advocated by those who seek to destroy the integrity and independence of Colleges, transforming them more or less gradually into mere Halls of the University. The position of a Head is, in no reasonable sense of the word, a sinecure, and his life is by no means one of idleness. To say nothing of the purely moral obligations incumbent on him, or of the benefit which learning often derives from his comparative leisure, all Heads are statutorily bound to reside, and to exercise an active superintendence over every department of College affairs. This superintendence may have become ineffective in the case of one or two who have attained a very advanced age, but such instances are quite exceptional; and the great majority of Heads, in addition to College engagements, take a very large share in University business. A reference to the Oxford University Calendar will show that all the Heads, except two disabled by infirmity, hold University offices, very few of which are salaried. Six of them, besides the Vice-Chancellor, must needs be members of the Hebdomadal Council, five are Commissioners under the Local Government Act, and most of them serve on several boards of curators or delegates, which engross a great part of their time. It may well be doubted whether the work of the University could possibly be carried on without their aid by a body of hard-worked Professors and Tutors, and it remains to be shown what advantage would be gained by getting rid of them. The average income of a Head is £1,400 a year with a house. Considering that he must give up all professional emoluments, and that a salutary College tradition requires him to maintain a certain dignified hospitality, this income cannot be regarded as excessive. A few thousand pounds might be saved on the whole £50,000 by amalgamating two or three smaller Colleges under one Head; but so trumpery a result would be dearly purchased if it should entail a disruption of corporate ties and interests capable of becoming the nucleus of more vigorous educational life.

We now approach that which has been denounced, in no measured language, as a ruinous waste of academical resources—the appropriation of some £205,000 (including a very small contribution from trust-property) to College Fellowships. Here, if anywhere, we find a large fund on which Parliament may draw, if it thinks proper, for purposes of University reform or

extension. We have seen how very little reduction can be effected elsewhere in University or College expenditure, and even if it were possible to realize a large surplus by trenchant economy, there would be paramount claims upon it for the better endowment of existing Professorships, and the sustentation of existing institutions. It is upon the endowments now applied to Fellowships that academical reformers of every class rely for the means of carrying out their various schemes; and as the case is often argued upon a very imperfect knowledge of the essential facts, it may be well to state these in a succinct form.

There are, in round numbers, 360 Fellowships at Oxford and somewhat more at Cambridge, so that, allowing for vacancies and temporary suspensions, we may probably take 700 as the extreme number of existing Fellows, and £300 a year as the extreme average value of a Fellowship. The general mode of election, and conditions of tenure, are clearly explained in an able paper read before the last Social Science Congress by Mr. Charles Stuart Parker, formerly a Fellow and senior Tutor of University College, Oxford. "According to the present practice, the new Fellows are elected by the existing Fellows of a College, after open competitive examination, in Oxford conducted always by the College, with the aid of assessors, if necessary, in special subjects. In Cambridge the smaller Colleges elect upon the results of the University examinations. At Oxford a candidate is elected by any other College as freely as by his own; at Cambridge he must be already a member of the College electing. With this exception as regards Cambridge, the Fellows are supposed to be, and speaking broadly they are, the ablest and most distinguished students, selected with great impartiality soon after taking their Bachelor's degree, in general before the age of twenty-five. Once elected, for the most part they have no special duties, but are bound in conscience to the best of their ability and judgment to promote the interests of their College and of their University as a place of religion, learning, and education. Most Fellowships are tenable for life, being vacated only on marriage, or on obtaining a fixed income from other sources of £500 or £600 a year."

It appears, however, from a return furnished to a Committee of the House of Lords in 1870, that half of all the Fellows at Cambridge, and nearly half of those at Oxford were then in Holy Orders, or under the obligation of proceeding to Holy Orders, subject only, in three cases, to an exception in favour of those holding College offices. A larger proportion of clerical than of lay Fellows reside in College and take part in tuition, because they have a more or less remote prospect of settling on a College living, and for the same reason the succession of clerical Fellows is somewhat more rapid. Mr. Parker calculates the average time

for which Fellowships are held at about ten years, from which it follows that above thirty are filled up annually at each University.

It is admitted on all hands that Fellowships are now awarded, with the rarest exceptions, upon the strictest considerations of academical merit; and it may be confidently asserted that no other public appointments are less tainted—if, indeed, there be any so little tainted—with the suspicion of favouritism. Still, there is a vague impression abroad that many of them are carried off by young men of rich parentage, and that, instead of stimulating their possessors to further exertion, they are apt to deter them from embarking on active careers, and to encourage cultured indolence. These are impressions which can only be dispelled effectually by evidence of a kind which it is very difficult to procure. Some light, however, may be thrown upon the matter by the examination of a typical sample; and a careful analysis of a body of forty-nine Fellows belonging to three Colleges, differing from each other in size and character, leads to results which are not devoid of interest. It appears that no less than sixteen of the whole number are sons of clergymen, and two of Dissenting ministers, eight of men engaged in trade or commercial business, five of solicitors, four of landed proprietors, four of yeomen and tenant farmers, three of employés in the Civil Service, two of medical men, one of a member of Parliament, one of a school-master, one of a Scotch factor, one of a military officer, and one of a clerk or accountant. In short, all but a trifling percentage are drawn from the hard-working professional class; and it may be stated with some confidence that not one is in possession of or heir to a considerable fortune. A similar inquiry into the present occupation of the same forty-nine Fellows shows that seventeen are engaged in College tuition, five hold other College offices, three are University professors, two are preparing themselves for College tuition, two are masters of schools, two are parochial clergymen, four are barristers, four are engaged in literary work, one is a physician, and one a medical student, one is in the Civil Service, and one is an artist; while of the six who have no regular occupation, one is travelling for his health, and three at least are *emeriti*, having given their best years to the service of their Colleges and the University.

These facts speak for themselves, and the inference which they suggest is, in the main, a true one. So far as can be ascertained, fully half the Fellows of Oxford Colleges are resident, and nearly all the resident Fellows are engaged in public or private tuition. Even of the non-resident Fellows, very few fail to attend College meetings, many perform useful work for their Colleges, and the vast majority are earnestly and honourably employed, being very often indebted to their Fellowships alone for the means of subsis-

tence during the earlier stages of their professional careers. The class of promising graduates converted into *dilettanti* loungers by the enervating influence of Fellowships has scarcely any existence, except among the delusions of the non-academical mind. Not only so, but it is capable of proof that College Fellowships, instead of enervating those who obtain them, have produced a larger proportion of men eminent in Church and State than most of their defenders would venture to claim for them. In order to become satisfied of this, we have only to inspect the catalogue of Fellows elected during the present century at Oriel College, where open competition was first established at Oxford, and at Trinity College, which is not only the largest College at Cambridge, but virtually the only one which conducts an effective Fellowship examination. The list of Oriel Fellows, dating from 1800 downwards, exhibits but ninety-two names; yet a full third of these are the names of men who have made themselves known in the world, and among them are the names of Davison, Whately, Keble, Hampden, Thomas Arnold, Hartley Coleridge, J. H. Newman, Pusey, Bishop Fraser, and Matthew Arnold, besides others which may yet become famous. The list of Trinity Fellows for the same period, though four times as long, contains a smaller proportion of eminent names, like those of Sedgwick, Whewell, Thirlwall, Macaulay, and Airy, but is still richer in the names of men who have vindicated Fellowships against the reproach of enfeebling moral or intellectual vigour by rising to high stations in various practical callings. It would be easy to multiply similar arguments, as, for instance, by citing the present bench of English archbishops and bishops, twenty-two of whom were educated at Oxford or Cambridge, and fifteen of whom were Fellows of Colleges. If it were possible to lay before the public a list of Oxford and Cambridge Fellows who have attained leading positions in the great educational profession, in the Law, in the various Government offices, and even in the commercial world, little more would be heard of the notion that Fellowships quench ambition, or bar the road to success; and we might, perhaps, have to combat the counter-objection that Fellows of Colleges start with an unfair advantage in the race of life.

But no plea for the utility of collegiate endowments would be complete without a reference to one example, at once the most illustrious in the history of science, and the most representative in the history of the Fellowship system. If ever there was a genuine product of that system, it was Sir Isaac Newton. His biographer tells us that on matriculating at Cambridge in his nineteenth year, as a subsizar of Trinity, he manifested no presage of future greatness, and his transcendent superiority to his University contemporaries was probably unknown even to himself.

"No friendly counsel had regulated his youthful studies, and no work of a scientific character had guided him in his course. In yielding to the impulse of his mechanical genius his mind obeyed the laws of its own natural expansion, and following in the line of least resistance, it was thus drawn aside from the precipitous paths which it was fitted to climb, and the unbarred strongholds which it was destined to explore. When Newton, therefore, entered Trinity College, he brought with him a more slender portion of science than at his age falls to the lot of ordinary scholars. . . . Cambridge was consequently the real birthplace of Newton's genius—her institutions sustained his mightiest efforts, and within her precincts were all his discoveries made and perfected."

He was admitted to a Fellowship at the age of nearly twenty-five, an industrious but obscure mathematician, who must otherwise have sought a livelihood in some profession or trade. He resigned it at the age of fifty-nine, having ennobled his College, his University, and his country, by those immortal discoveries which, viewed across the interval of two centuries, still rank foremost and highest among the achievements of human intellect. To assume that Newton would have become the first of natural philosophers without the aid of a Trinity Fellowship, is as chimerical as to assume that Thomas Aquinas would have become the first of mediæval theologians without having entered a Dominican convent, or Raffaele the first of modern painters without having resided at Florence and Rome. Yet the contributions of Newton alone to science assuredly outweigh in mere pecuniary value all that has been spent on Trinity Fellowships from his day to our own.

It is true that Newton was a resident Fellow, but it is also true that his Fellowship was a pure sinecure, and subject to no conditions of residence; and this was the footing upon which the Oxford Commissioners of 1830 deliberately recommended that all Fellowships should be placed. "We are by no means disposed," they say, "to impair the value of Fellowships as rewards by annexing to them the statutable condition of residence. . . . When the University shall have been put in a condition to offer sufficient inducements to enable it to retain the best men in its service, it may with safety leave them to follow their inclinations. Fellows thus elected may safely be allowed to pursue the career which they deem best for themselves. They will serve the University in their several professions more effectually than they could serve it by residence within its walls." If this judgment is to be reversed, the reversal should at least be founded on a serious consideration of its probable effect on English society. In Germany, we are told, Fellowships are not found necessary; but in Germany the want of Fellowships is partly supplied by a far more complete organization of professorial teaching and a far more effective recognition of literary merit by the State. In the United States that want is keenly felt, and the "waste of resources"

deplored by the most cultivated Americans is the waste caused by the attraction of money-making on the minds of the ablest students, and their premature withdrawal from the University. This is precisely the evil to which the English Fellowship system provides a counterpoise, and it is not too much to say that Oxford and Cambridge endowments operate as incentives to advanced study at the Scotch and London Universities. If a return could be procured of the Scotchmen holding Fellowships at Oxford, and of the graduates of the London University holding Fellowships at Cambridge, it would be seen how much these ill-endowed Universities owe to their wealthier sisters. Even if the Fellowship system were less fruitful in visible results than it can be shown to be—even if the modest competence which it offers to young men of literary and scientific capacity were more frequently thrown away—even if it were not one of the few avenues by which humble merit can attain promotion—its unseen influence in raising the standard of culture throughout all the learned professions, in Parliament, in official life, and, above all, in the Press, would still remain to be estimated. Perhaps, upon taking stock of these and many other collateral benefits which it derives from the Fellowship system, the Nation may arrive at the conclusion that, after all, no other £205,000 of public money is more profitably spent, and that, regarded simply as an experiment, that system does not compare unfavourably with far more costly experiments in gunnery and naval architecture.

III. But it does not by any means follow that no improvements are possible in the collegiate institutions of Oxford and Cambridge, or that what is already bearing good fruit may not, by judicious pruning, be enabled to bring forth more fruit. On the contrary, University reformers, for the most part, agree in holding that all Fellowships, unless attached to College offices or otherwise specially reserved, should be terminable within a fixed period, instead of being tenable for life or during celibacy. Such a change of tenure, especially if coupled with provisions connecting a certain proportion of Fellowships with the professions of Law and Medicine, would appear to secure the maximum of advantage, and the minimum of disadvantage, incident to a system of academical pensions, awarded by competitive examination. It is one of the changes recommended in an important memorial presented to Mr. Gladstone in 1873 by 142 Heads, Professors, Fellows, Tutors, Lecturers, and Office-holders of the University of Cambridge. It is embodied in a series of resolutions passed by the Warden and Fellows of New College in the same year, it has been actually adopted in the new statutes of Balliol College now in force, and it forms part of almost every scheme hitherto proposed for the reconstitution of Colleges. Supposing this change to be carried out, it may be reckoned

broadly that it would liberate about three-tenths of the income now annually received by non-resident Fellows, and perhaps one-tenth of that received by resident Fellows—that is, about £40,000 a year. We may safely add a saving of £10,000 a year or more on such items as augmentations of benefices, and take credit for a present surplus of at least £50,000 a year, to be hereafter increased as leases fall in. What, then, are the claims upon this surplus, and in what order should they be satisfied?

Most certainly the first and strongest claim is that for the development of the highest academical education within the Universities themselves. This claim must equally take precedence of that for the encouragement of original research, and of that for the extension of University lectures to populous towns. It is by concentrating, and not by dispersing, the vital energies of the Universities, by exalting their educational function rather than by reviving the monastic idea of self-culture, that we shall best utilize them for the good of the whole Nation. Accordingly, the Professoriate ought to be considerably but gradually increased, not according to an abstract standard of perfection, nor out of all proportion to the practical demand for professorial teaching, but somewhat in advance of that demand, and with due regard to a proper subdivision of great subjects. In reply to inquiries from the Vice-Chancellor, the various Boards of Studies at Oxford made requisitions amounting in the aggregate to £30,000 or £40,000 a year. Most reformers will, however, be content to dispense for the present with separate Professors of Egyptian and Chinese; a little consolidation and modification of College lectureships would provide for many of the readerships contemplated, and many Professors might be partially endowed by the simple process of annexing College Fellowships to their offices. This union of the collegiate with the professorial system has already been found to work admirably, enlisting the interest of the College in University teaching, and giving the Professor the inestimable advantage of an academical home. On the whole, an assignment of £15,000 at each University would be a liberal contribution from College funds towards the further endowment of Professorships, considering that most of the detailed tuition is and will continue to be supplied by College lectures. In thus increasing the endowment of Professorships, we shall already have provided in the best possible manner for the advancement of “mature study” and “original research.” The most original and productive of German Professors are notoriously men who delight in communicating their knowledge to classes of pupils, and it would be difficult to conceive a life more favourable to independent study than one in which the year is equally divided between term-time and vacations, and the number of lectures required in term-time is very moderate. If

there be a residue of students capable of advancing science and learning, but not installed in Professorships, the case may be met by allowing Colleges to elect them as Fellows without examination, and by a properly regulated system of grants for special undertakings, either literary or scientific. It would be necessary to create a common fund applicable to such objects, as well as to the maintenance of libraries, museums, laboratories, and other University establishments, and we can hardly allot less than £10,000 to each University for such purposes. This £20,000, with the £30,000 to be employed in augmenting the Professoriate, would absorb the whole present surplus of £50,000, and nothing would be left for University teaching in populous towns.


It does not, however, follow that Oxford and Cambridge must turn a deaf ear to applications for aid from the promoters of provincial University Colleges, or insist too pedantically on the sound principle that it is their own business to furnish men, and that of the applicants to furnish money. Mr. Goldwin Smith truly says that "paying for the education of great cities, which are well able to pay for themselves, and, if they were in America, would have done it twice over, is not a proper use of academical funds, at least till all academical purposes have been exhausted;" nor must it be forgotten that Oxford and Cambridge already maintain a reservoir of teachers who, by virtue of holding Fellowships, are able and willing to lecture in great cities on terms far below the market value of their services. Nevertheless, "there is that scattereth and yet increaseth," and it is quite possible to suggest a mode whereby College endowments may be indirectly made available for University teaching in populous towns without being detached from the corporations to which they belong. Ten years ago an influential committee was appointed at Oxford "to frame the details of a scheme for the extension of the University by the affiliation of other places of liberal education." The committee reported in favour of authorizing the University to affiliate Colleges situated in any part of England or Wales, and of allowing residence in affiliated Colleges to count as residence in the University for a period of two years from matriculation, under conditions which they proceeded to define. This plan, with one additional feature, appears exactly adapted to meet the demands of large provincial communities, so ably stated, on behalf of Bristol, in a pamphlet by the Rev. J. Percival, head master of Clifton College. All that is needed to supplement it is a provision that actual service in teaching at one of the affiliated Colleges shall count as service in a College office at the University itself, in order that a Fellow thus engaged may be able to retain his Fellowship beyond the statutable period. This arrangement would be simpler than that proposed by Mr.

Percival, and would afford a guarantee against the risk of short-lived connections between individual Colleges and local institutions too immature to be accredited by the University. It would, moreover, involve no real encroachment on College funds, inasmuch as the number of College Fellowships would remain intact, only the rate of succession being slightly retarded, and one or two Fellows in each College being diverted from professional avocations to more congenial and more useful labours in provincial capitals. The advantage of establishing relations of this kind between the older Universities and the great commercial and manufacturing centres, would not only be reciprocal, as Mr. Parker observes, but in the highest sense national. It is certain, on the one hand, that more and more power is passing, for good or evil, into the hands of the mercantile plutocracy. It is certain, on the other hand, that the mercantile plutocracy is making little, if any, progress in the higher culture, which can alone qualify it for political ascendancy, and is even declining in this respect, relatively, to other classes of society. Since experience has shown that, notwithstanding the abolition of tests and the expansion of the University curriculum, young men destined for business seldom avail themselves of University education at Oxford or Cambridge, the problem is to place University education within their reach, without lowering its essential character. This may be done by means of affiliated Colleges, which shall be virtually local branches of the central University, giving instruction of the best kind to all who attend their lectures, and attracting some to complete their studies at the University itself.

The main results of our inquiry may be summed up in a very few sentences. Though it is possible to alter the present application of Academical Endowments for the better, it would be far easier to alter it for the worse; and a recognition of the great services actually rendered by the Universities to the Nation, is the only sound basis for a new measure of University reform. The leading object of such a measure should be to strengthen the Universities, as fountains of educational and intellectual life, by increasing the professorial staff; by extending the University libraries, museums, galleries, and lecture rooms; by fostering unremunerative study, as well as scientific training for professions, within College walls; by treating both Scholarships and Fellowships as designed to raise up an aristocracy of education; by relieving Colleges of all ecclesiastical trammels; and by making them living parts of the Universities, without destroying their corporate individuality. The secondary object, in order of importance but not of time, should be to bring the Universities into organic connection with local "faculties," or rather with collegiate institutions, in great cities, by means of affiliation or otherwise. To effect these objects

the aid of Parliament will be necessary, inasmuch as even if it were legally possible for the Universities and Colleges to legislate on so large a scale, with the approval of the Crown, it would be morally impossible for so many independent societies to legislate in perfect unison with each other. The recent failure of an attempt to establish a system of self-taxation among Oxford Colleges was not required to prove how vain it is to expect that a complete and harmonious scheme for their own reorganization will be initiated by the Universities themselves. The official responsibility of framing the scheme must be undertaken by a body representing either the Crown or the Legislature, but its details will have to be wrought out, as its principles have already been thought out, by Oxford and Cambridge men of a like spirit with those who for twenty-five years have so earnestly and so unselfishly laboured to nationalize both the endowments and the culture of the old English Universities.

GEORGE C. BRODRICK.



MOHAMMED AND MOHAMMEDANISM.

Mohammed and Mohammedanism : Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in February and March, 1874. By R. BOSWORTH SMITH, M.A., Assistant Master in Harrow School, late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. London : Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

THE first English translation of the Kurân was made from the French of André du Ryer by one Alexander Ross, and published in London in 1649. It is accompanied by an Introduction, styled "A needful Caveat or Admonition," which runs thus : "Good reader, the great Arabian impostor, now at last, after a thousand years, is, by the way of France, arrived in England, and his Alcoran, or Gallimaufry of Errors, (a Brat as deformed as the Parent, and as full of Heresies as his scald head was of scurf), hath learned to speak English." The education of two centuries has chastened the style of our national literature and added much to our knowledge of Eastern subjects generally ; nevertheless, there is good ground for presuming that the foregoing description of the Kurân and of its reputed author is in accordance, substantially, with the views still held by the great majority of Englishmen. Numerous writers subsequent to Ross, albeit in modified language, have amplified his detractions ; few, with the exception of crotchety theorists and recreant eulogists, whose adulations of Muhammad are as exaggerated as the aspersions they assail, have attempted or dared to confront them. Mr. Bosworth Smith is an apologist of a different stamp. He writes as a Christian, and a genuine catholic spirit pervades his lectures, the main object of which he boldly avows is, "if possible, to render some measure of that justice to Mohammed and to his religion which has been

all too long, and is still all too generally, denied to them." He brings to the chivalrous task considerable research among the best European orientalists, and has executed it throughout with a union of candour and reverence befitting a subject of such momentous importance as the religious creed of a sixth of the human race. Naught has been set down by him in malice; and if, as many perchance may be disposed to judge, he has overdrawn the merits and glossed over the defects of his clients, the brief which he holds, and the laudable motives which induced him to take it up, will be held by all generous minds to excuse the undue partiality of the advocate.

The first lecture treats of Comparative Religion, in which at the outset the author lays down the propositions that all the great historical religions of the world—he instances Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity—"have been in the first instance moral rather than theological; have been called into existence to meet social and national needs; have raised man gradually towards God, rather than brought down God at once to man;" and, further, that "a new religion is, in order of time, the outcome and not the cause of a general movement towards a higher life, whether moral or national." These debatable theses are very briefly discussed, and it is just as well that it should be so, for their bearing on the theme in hand is not made so apparent to others as it doubtless was to the mind of the lecturer. He is more to the point when he vindicates the interest which ought to be felt in Islâm, notwithstanding the charge brought against it of its want of originality; and then goes on to show that what it loses on that score it gains in the greater fulness of our knowledge of its origin. Mr. Smith candidly admits that "a vague and hearsay acquaintance with the Old Testament the Talmud, and the New Testament, and the undefined religious cravings of a few of his predecessors, or contemporaries, influenced Mohammed much, and traces of them at second hand may be found in every other page of the Korân;" . . . "But what then?" he asks: "Is a religion less true because it recognises itself in other garbs, because it incorporates in itself all that is best in the system which it expands or supplants?" Not necessarily; and it may further be conceded that "the founder of a religion which is to last must read the spiritual needs of a nation correctly," and that doing so "he need not care about any originality beyond that which such insight implies; he will rather do well to avoid it." But is this insight all that Mr. Smith claims for Muhammad? The reader is at a loss to answer the query, which nevertheless is one of vital importance in connection with this disquisition. He describes the Kurân as "a book absolutely unique in its origin, in its preservation, and in the chaos of its contents . . . There, if in any book, we have a mirror of one of the master-spirits of the world; often inartistic, incoherent, self-contradictory, dull, but impregnated with a few grand ideas which stand out from the whole;

a mind seething with the inspiration pent up within it, 'intoxicated with God,' but full of human weaknesses." And in another place he asks, with implied reference to Muhammad and Islām: "Will any one say that there is no real revelation of God in the noble lives of Confucius and Buddha, and no fragments of Divine truth in the pure morality of the systems which they founded?" It depends on the meaning which the author attaches to the words "inspiration" and "revelation" how far the title of the "Apostle of God" is, in his estimation, applicable to Muhammad, and to what extent the Kurân commands belief. Apart from and beside the scientific aspect of the question, Muslims and Christians generally hold strong opinions on the subject of inspiration. According to the former, the Kurân was "composed by God," "sent down from the Lord of all creatures," "a book of infinite value," a copy from "the original, written in the preserved book," or the volume of decrees kept in the seventh heaven, and as such they claim for it a verbal, literal, and mechanical interpretation. Christians, on the other hand, whilst ready, for the most part, to admit a human element pervading their sacred books, nevertheless regard them as containing a directory, supernaturally revealed, for human faith and practice, as a code of moral laws with divine sanctions of tremendous import attached to their observance and infraction. In which category does Mr. Smith place the Kurân? He certainly leads his readers to infer that he is far from taking the Muslim view, and he explicitly avows that the Christian Scriptures "stand as a whole on a far higher level than any other sacred books, and that the ideal life of Christianity, while it is capable of including the highest ideals of other creeds, cannot itself be attained by any one of them." His theory, indeed, as regards the Kurân, seems to be, that what of truth it contains is "inspired," independently of originality, and of what is commonly understood by "revelation;" but it would have been more satisfactory had he treated this part of his subject with greater precision.

But however much or little inspired, it is undeniable that probably one hundred and fifty millions of the world's inhabitants regard the Kurân as "an explication of everything necessary both as to faith and practice, and a direction, and mercy, and good tidings unto the Muslims," to doubt one jot or tittle of which is to incur the guilt and punishment of apostacy. Mr. Smith's review of the early conquests of Islām and its rapid extension, mainly by the sword, during its infancy, and its subsequent propagation by peaceful means, is as accurate as it is concise. Equally true it is that, at the outset, Islām effected a vast moral and social reformation among the Arabs and other pagan nations, leading them to abjure idolatry with many of its attendant vices, and that its later progress among the negro races of Africa has, on the whole, been followed by similar beneficial results:—"Squalid filth is replaced by a scrupulous cleanliness; hospitality

becomes a religious duty; drunkenness, instead of the rule, becomes a comparatively rare exception. . . . It is idleness henceforward that degrades, and industry elevates, instead of the reverse. . . . The Mosque gives an idea of architecture at all events higher than any the negro has yet had. A thirst for literature is created, and that for works of science and philosophy as well as for commentaries of the Koran."

It is undoubtedly melancholy to contrast this later progress of Islām, not only in Africa but in India and China also, with the comparatively small success achieved by devoted missionaries of the Cross in those countries. How is this to be accounted for? The lecturer says truly enough that the various and often conflicting explanations hitherto given by Christian apologists are far from satisfactory. The "lax morality of the Koran," which is one of the staple solutions adduced, is inapplicable in cases where the converts are from creeds allowedly much inferior in purity to that of Islām. Neither is it probable that the sensual Paradise promised to believers, with its delectable gardens, perennial fountains, beauteous damsels, and eternal repose on green cushions and splendid carpets, has much influence in such conversions. The picture of an immortality such as this, described to them in the glowing poetry of their own tongue, may have exerted a powerful influence on the Arabs of the desert; but as there is no good ground for believing that this sensual reward is prominently held out as an inducement to foreign proselytes—to whom for the most part moreover the language of the Kurān is a dead letter—we cannot regard Muhammad's Paradise as affording a reasonable solution of the modern successes of Islām.

Mr. Smith, whilst admitting the difficulty here presented, evidently hesitates to meet it. It is not within a reviewer's province to supplement his treatise; nevertheless, the importance of the subject prompts me to do so. In the first place, then, the Muslim formula, "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Apostle of God," has this advantage over the Christian, especially with barbarous or half-civilized races, that it is far more simple, is easier to be learnt, and conveys in one utterance all that is necessary to be believed in order to salvation. The New Testament is not wanting in similar brief symbols, *e. g.*, "This is life eternal that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent;" or Acts xvii. 31. The exigencies of Christianity, which in Christendom have led to metaphysical amplifications of these summary professions of faith, have placed a serious difficulty in the way of missionaries to non-Christian peoples, who are incapable at the outset of apprehending complex truths, and find it difficult even to retain them in memory, to say nothing of other rigorous but salutary conditions attached to induction into the Church. A still more potent reason is the fact that Christianity inculcates a far higher morality than the Kurān,

and makes heaven the final reward, not of the bare professors of its tenets, but of the truly penitent and those who love as well as fear God. Granted that in one sense—not “in any sense of the word,” as Mr. Smith avers—“Mohammed’s is not an easy or sensual religion;” nevertheless, the best that can be said of it is, that it inculcates external rectitude only, with the adjuncts of mechanical devotions, the outward performance of which is all that is insisted on. How easy these duties are compared with the requirements of Christianity, and hence, as I venture to suggest, how much more readily accepted by those to whom both are newly presented, I leave to be inferred from this striking contrast by Mr. Smith himself:—

“The religion of Christ contains whole fields of morality and whole realms of thought which are all but outside the religion of Mohammed. It opens humility, purity of heart, forgiveness of injuries, sacrifice of self to man’s moral nature; it gives scope for toleration, development, boundless progress to his mind; its motive power is stronger, even as love is higher than obedience. Its realised ideals in the various paths of human greatness have been more commanding, more many-sided, more holy, as Averroes is below Newton, Haroun below Alfred, and Ali below St. Paul. Finally, the ideal life of all is far more elevating, far more majestic, far more inspiring, even as the life of the founder of Mohammedanism is below the life of the founder of Christianity. . . .” “Nor are the methods of drawing near to God the same in both religions. The Mussulman gains a knowledge of God—he can hardly be said to approach Him by listening to the lofty message of God’s Prophet. The Christian believes that he approaches God by a process which, however difficult it may be to define, yet has had a real meaning to Christ’s servants, and has embodied itself in countless types of Christian character—that mysterious something which St. Paul calls a ‘union with Christ.’ ‘Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God.’”

In the second Lecture Mr. Smith, after a concise notice of the different religions which existed in Arabia, and adverting to the “social and religious upheaving” among the Arabs at that period, proceeds to describe the uneventful early career of Muhammad, his personal piety, and first entrance upon the office of an apostle:—

“He was melancholy in temperament, to begin with; he was also subject to epileptic fits, upon which Sprenger has laid great stress and described most minutely, and which under the name of the ‘sacred disease’ among the Greeks, or ‘possession by the devil’ among the Jews, has in most countries been looked upon as something specially mysterious or supernatural. It is possible that his interviews with Nestorian monks, with Zeid, or with his wife’s cousin Waraka, *may have turned his mind in the precise direction they took.* Dejection alternated with excitement—these gave place to ecstasy or dreams,

and in a dream, or trance, or fit, he saw an angel in human form, but flooded with celestial light and displaying a silver roll. 'Read,' said the angel. 'I cannot read,' said Mohammed. The injunction and the answer were twice repeated. 'Read,' at last said the angel, 'in the name of the Lord, who created man out of a clot of blood; read, in the name of the Most High, who taught man the use of the pen, who sheds on his soul the ray of knowledge, and teaches him what before he knew not.' Upon this Mohammed felt the heavenly inspiration, *and read the decrees of God, which he afterwards promulgated in the Koran.* Then came the announcement, 'O, Mohammed, of a truth thou art the Prophet of God, and I am his angel Gabriel.' "

Attention is called to the two sentences in the foregoing quotation which are not underlined in the original. Taking into consideration what is admitted of Muhammad's hysterical temperament, they do not militate against his sincerity at this juncture; nevertheless, the first is inconsistent with the idea of immediate inspiration, and the second, if true—which it would be impious to suppose,—makes the "decrees of God" directly responsible for the many anachronisms, contradictions, and incongruities contained in the Kurân. "Fairly considered," however, says Mr. Smith, "there is no single trait in his [Muhammad's] character up to the time of the Hegira which calumny itself could couple with imposition." Admitted; but notwithstanding the author's elaborate explanations, and solely on his own showing, few will be disposed to believe that there was "no gradual sapping of moral principle, and no deadening of conscience," in Muhammad's subsequent conduct, when, as he says:—

"The revelations of the Koran are more and more suited to the particular circumstances and caprices of the moment. They are often in the nature of political bulletins or of personal apologies, rather than of messages direct from God. Now appears for the first time the convenient but dangerous doctrine of abrogation, by which a subsequent revelation might supersede a previous one." Again: "The limitations to the unbounded license of Oriental polygamy, which he himself had imposed, he relaxes on his own behalf The public opinion even of the harem was scandalised by his marriage with Mary, an Egyptian, a Christian, and a slave. His marriage with Zainab, the wife of Zeid his freedman and adopted son, divorced as she was by Zeid for the express purpose that Mohammed might marry her, was still worse. It was felt an outrage even upon the lax morality of an Oriental nation, till all reclamations were hushed into silence by a sura of the Koran which rebuked Mohammed, not for laxity, but for his undue abstinence!" Further, "the doctrine of toleration gradually becomes one of extermination; persecuted no longer he becomes a persecutor himself. He is once or twice untrue to the kind and forgiving disposition of his best nature; and is once

or twice unrelenting in the punishment of his personal enemies, especially of the Jews. . . . He is even guilty more than once of conspiring at the assassination of inveterate opponents ; and the massacre of the Bani Koreitza, . . . judged by any but an Oriental standard of morality, was, in all its accessories, an act of cold-blooded and inhuman atrocity."

This is a tolerably long bill of indictment, not so much against one who uniformly confessed that he was full of human weaknesses, but against the man who maintained to the end "that the words he spoke were the very words of God." If such was his sincere conviction he was unquestionably self-deceived ; if it was not—which I neither affirm nor deny—he was an impostor.

"Mohammedanism" is the subject of the third Lecture ; not what that creed is at the present day, but as it is revealed in the Kurân—a distinction of the utmost consequence, on which I shall have a few words to say anon. Its essence is not merely "the sublime belief in the unity of God," but the re-assertion of what had been the life of the old Hebrew nation—"that God not only lives, but that He is a righteous and merciful ruler ; and that to His will it is the duty and the privilege of all living men to bow." Hence it is styled by Muhammad himself "Islâm," or the resignation of self [to God], and believers are "Muslimûn" (*Anglicè*, Muslims), or those who so surrender themselves [to God]. The lecturer, however, proceeds to remark that this assertion of the unity of God was "no mere plagiarism from an older faith." The Jews of that period, notwithstanding their abjuration of idolatry, still clung to their proud religious privileges. To them the Most High was "the God of the Jews only," while "such Christians as Mohammed had ever met had forgotten at once the faith of the Jews, and that higher revelation of God given to them by Christ, which the Jews rejected. Homoosians and Homoiousians, Monothelites and Monophysites, Jacobites and Eutychians, making hard doctrines of things wherein the sacred writers themselves had made no dogma, disputing fiercely whether what was mathematically false could be metaphysically true, and nicely discriminating the shades of truth and falsehood in the view suggested to bridge over the abysmal gulf between them ; turning figures into facts, rhetoric into logic, and poetry into prose, had forgotten the unity of God, while they were disputing about it most loudly with their lips."

It requires no great knowledge of ecclesiastical history to supplement Mr. Smith's list of the controversies touching the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ, and the doctrine of the Trinity, which distracted the Christian Church prior to and at the commencement of the seventh century. The candid inquirer, indeed, who recalls the fierce disputations which gave rise to the title of "Theotokos" will

cease to wonder that the Almighty is represented in the Kurân as inquiring of Jesus the son of Mary, "Hast thou said unto men, Take me and my mother for two Gods, beside God?" or that the same book classes Christians with "Polytheists," when he remembers that the celebrated John Philoponus, who died in 610, taught that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were three distinct Gods. Pictures and images too had been introduced into Christian worship, and their adoration firmly established before the end of the sixth century. One may hesitate to say, in view of the then distractions and corruptions of the Church, which have been barely glanced at, how far contemporary Christianity was answerable for the rise and early progress of Islâm. That they gave point to some of Muhammad's denunciations, and, considering his ignorance of the New Testament scriptures, go far to justify his charges against the form of Christianity of which alone he had any knowledge, no ingenuous critic will deny. Is it not probable, moreover, that the continual prevalence of divisions and corruptions in the Church constitutes a serious drawback to the spread of the Gospel amongst Muslims?

Mr. Smith admits that there is no more originality in the other articles of the faith of Islâm—the written revelation of God's will, the responsibility of man, the existence of angels and Jinn, the future life, the resurrection, and the final judgment—than he had claimed for the doctrine of the unity of God, as proclaimed by Muhammad; neither were the four practical duties thereby enjoined—prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage—more original in their conception. (By the way, I confess myself at a loss to understand the lecturer's remark about the Pilgrimage, that "in theory and in reality it is alien alike to Mohammedanism and Christianity," considering that the Kurân makes the *Hajj* an imperative obligation on all Muslims.) The germ or the development of all these "revelations" and enactments pre-existed in the systems, either of Jews, Zoroastrians, or Christians; but the faith which influenced Muhammad most was Judaism:—"the Koran teems with ideas, allusions, and even phraseology, drawn not so much from the written as from the oral Jewish law, from the traditions that grew round it, and the commentaries on it," namely, from the Talmud. As to the Kurân itself, which in his first Lecture he had described as "often inartistic, incoherent, self-contradictory, dull, but impregnated with a few grand ideas which stand out from the whole," he now aptly says that "it defies analysis," and having himself read it repeatedly throughout,—in a foreign translation—both in the orthodox and chronological order, he frankly admits that even "the importance of the subject it handles, the unique interest attaching to the speaker, and the unaffected reverence with which every utterance is still regarded by so large a portion of the world, are insufficient to redeem it from this general reproach," namely, that of dulness. Of its literary merits—in the

original, of course,—diametrically opposite opinions have been held by the literati of the East as well as the West. My own opinion, if it is worth anything, is—that the diction of the Kurân is faultless; that it contains passages of exquisite sublimity, often marred by unconsonant refrains apparently introduced merely for the sake of rhythm; that sound rather than substance was the chief aim of the author; and that its literary excellencies have been equalled, if not surpassed, by more than one Arabian poet. Although, in one place, Mr. Smith says that, “on its authenticity no one has been able to cast a serious doubt,” nevertheless, taking into consideration the following accurate account of its composition, outside critics may fairly question whether the existing version contains the *ipseissima verba* of the author:—

“Dictated from time to time by Mohammed to his disciples, it was by them partially treasured in their memories, partly written down on shoulder bones of mutton or oyster-shells, on bits of wood or tablets of stone, which, being thrown pell-mell into boxes, and jumbled up together, like the leaves of the Cumean Sybil after a gust of wind, were not put into any shape at all till after the Prophet’s death by order of Abu Bakr. The work of the editor consisted simply in arranging the Suras in the order of their respective lengths, the longest first, the shortest last; and though the book once afterwards passed through the editor’s hands, this is substantially the shape in which the Koran has come down to us. Various readings, which would seem, however, to have been of very slight importance, having crept into the different copies, a revising committee was appointed by order of the Kaliph Othman, and, an authorized edition having thus been prepared ‘to prevent the texts differing, like those of the Jews and Christians,’ all previous copies were collected and burnt!”

One could have wished that, in order to give no place to misconception, the lecturer had stated his views more explicitly on the miraculousness claimed by Muhammad himself and his followers for the Kurân; and that besides giving, as he has done, some specimens of its sublime and vivid descriptions—proofs of the “poetic inspiration” of Muhammad—he had not omitted to point out, otherwise than in general terms, the numerous fables, discrepancies, contradictions, anachronisms, and distorted quotations from pre-existing history, to be met with throughout its pages. Mr. Smith’s remarks on “Mohammed’s attitude to [other] Miracles,” and the doctrine of “Fatalism” attributed to him, are judicious and unbiassed. The same doctrine of God’s foreknowledge on the one hand, and of His actual intervention of human affairs on the other, “inspired the early Mussulmans, in the new burst of life breathed into them by Mohammed, with double energy and double enthusiasm, as in their best days it inspired the Puritans, the Covenanters, and the Pilgrim Fathers. But to their descendants in their more normal

state—the lethargic Soufy, the brooding Sepoy, the insensate Turk, and, I would add, to those religious people who refuse to prevent the miseries and the diseases which Nature they think has attached to guilt—it furnishes with a new excuse for that life of inactivity to which they are already too much disposed, since they believe that they are acquiescing, as in duty bound, in the immutable decrees of God.”

The lecturer labours hard, and with considerable ingenuity, to palliate Muhammad's use of the sword, which he frankly admits to be “an essential part of Islâm.” The admission stamps it not only as inhuman and retrograde, but diametrically opposed to the teaching and example of Jesus, which the “revelations” of its author pretend at one time to confirm, and at another to supersede. The important point to be borne in mind here is not, what is “intelligible and natural” in an ordinary mortal, nor the “exigencies” which may drive such an one to unsheathe the sword, but what we are justified in expecting from one who claimed to be “the Apostle of God and the Seal of the Prophets.” Moreover, the necessity for the continued use of the sword, in order to the maintenance of the integrity of Islâm, which Mr. Smith puts with much force in the subjoined quotation, may well make humanity shudder at the thought of its possible revival :—

“In the middle ages the vitality and energy of Mohammedanism evidenced itself most clearly, not in Arabia, or Persia, or Africa, where its success was most complete, but in the Christian border lands, in Spain, in Palestine, in Asia Minor, where the crusading spirit was most evoked. Where there was no outlet for an active, and even a material warfare, against what was believed to be evil, there corruption crept in, and stealthily paralyzed all the energies of Mussulman society. ‘*Corruptio optimi fit pessima.*’ Ommiade and Abbaside, and Fatimite Kaliphs; Ghaznevide, and Seljukian, and Ottoman Sultans passed through the same dreary stages of luxury and decay; and the government that now represents, or mis-represents, the Kaliphate, has, in the hands of the Ottoman Turks, ever since their faith ceased to be militant, become the most hopeless of despotisms.”

That this picture of the gradual decadence of Islâm is not overdrawn, and that its actual condition, morally and socially, politically and industrially, in countries under Muslim rule, is still more abject and deplorable, none will venture to deny. That Mr. Smith, therefore, should have stopped short in his review of the earlier wars of Islâm, and that in a paragraph immediately succeeding the last quotation, is a grave omission. He writes :—

“But, of the Mohammedan conquests, it would be rather true to say that after the first wave of invasion had swept by, two blades of grass were found growing where one had grown before; like the thunderstorm, they fertilized while they destroyed; and from one

end of the then known world to the other, with their religion they sowed the seeds of literature, of commerce, and of civilization. As these disappeared, in the lapse of years, in one part of the Mussulman world, they appeared in another. When they died out, with the dying Abbaside Kaliphate, along the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, they revived again on the Guadalquiver and Guadiana. To the splendour and civilization of Damascus succeeded Bagdad; to Bagdad, Cairo; to Cairo, Cordova."

Among the subjects discussed in the fourth Lecture are "Polygamy" and "Slavery," the former of which, "next to caste," is described as "the most blighting institution to which a nation can become a prey. It pollutes society at the fountain head, for the family is the source of all political and of all social virtues. Mohammed would have doubled the debt of gratitude the Eastern world owes to him had he swept it away, but he could not have done so, even if he had fully seen its evils. It is not fair to represent polygamy as a part of Mohammedanism, any more than it is fair to represent slavery as a part of Christianity."

To affirm that Muhammad, who abolished the cherished idolatry of the Arabs, could not have abolished polygamy, is a gratuitous assumption. A more reasonable ground for its continued sanction is afforded by Mr. Smith himself, where he points out how Muhammad relaxed on his own behalf, to his indelible disgrace, but with the alleged express approval of God, the limitations to the unbounded license of Oriental polygamy which prevailed at that period. And, considering the laws laid down in the Kurân regulating the number of wives whom a Muslim may have at the same time, and the further unlimited concession to concubinage, the statement and parallel contained in the last sentence of the quotation are, to my mind, equally erroneous. Much may justly be said in praise of Muhammad's enactments in behalf of bondsmen, whereby their former condition was vastly ameliorated. There is no word corresponding to that of "slaves," in the modern sense of that word, to be found in the Kurân, which generally designates such as "those whom your right hand has acquired," evidently indicating captives taken in war; and the system of the slave trade, which until the commencement of the present century was common alike to Christians and Muslims, but now confined almost entirely to the latter, is utterly devoid of sanction in the Muslim scriptures. The orphan, too, and the poor, and dumb animals are made the subjects of compassionate precepts, the due observance of which is reckoned among the highest virtues, whilst gambling and the use of intoxicating liquors are declared to be "an abomination, of the work of Satan," and as such to be avoided "that ye may prosper." These moral counterparts of Christianity contained in the Kurân, as also the reverence with which it speaks of the Prophets and the *Hawwâriyyûn*, or Apostles, and especially of Jesus, whose super-

natural birth, miracles, Messiahship, and second appearing as "a sign of the approach of the last hour," cannot but be regarded as so much common ground between the two religions—as a nearer approach to Christianity than is to be met with in any other existing creed. Nor does it militate against this view that I cannot endorse Mr. Smith's statement that "Mohammedanism is essentially a spiritual religion," simply because "as instituted by Mohammed it had 'no priest and no sacrifice,'" and forbids "the representation of all living things alike, whether as objects of use or of admiration, of veneration or of worship." As "non-sacerdotal" Islâm has an affinity to Christianity as contrasted with Judaism, and as "non-objective" in its prescribed forms of worship it is undoubtedly "less materialistic" even than our own; nevertheless, these epithets which I have used to designate it do not imply "spirituality" in the ordinary acceptance of that word.

Here, before proceeding further, it is important to bear in mind that Mr. Smith discusses the Islâm of the Kurân, not those developments of it which go by that name at the present day—two things so widely different that "Mohammed and the Koran" would have been a more appropriate title for his Lectures. If Christians may fairly be charged with having darkened the divine teaching of the Gospel with human philosophy, with having encumbered the primitive form of Christian worship with an elaborate materialistic ceremonial, and with their endless internal disputes and divisions, much more may with equal justice be urged against the Muslims on the score of their departure from the canon of the Kurân, their endless schisms on the subject of the Divine attributes and other dogmas, traditional innovations, and often puerile ceremonial, the outward observance of which is practically regarded as the quintessence of their religion. The lecturer hints at these departures from the original Islâm, where he says: "By studying the Koran, together with the history of Mohammedanism, we see with our own eyes the precise steps by which a religion naturally and necessarily develops into a mythology;" and, again, where he says of the Persians, although the remarks are more or less applicable to the Muslims at large, that they "corrupted its simplicity with fables and with miracles, and actually imported into it something of saint worship, and something of sacerdotalism."

Next, "has Islam the power of revival?" Mr. Smith judges that it has; but the late reforms in that direction in Asia Minor, and especially among the Abkhasians and exiled Circassians who have taken refuge there, which he quotes from Mr. Gifford Palgrave, go but a very little way indeed towards justifying the inference that the exiles are "forming the nucleus of a new, vigorous, and united Mohammedan nation." The phenomenon of Wahnâbeeism, which is also adduced, is more to the point in a strictly religious sense; nevertheless, when we reflect on the dire antagonism of the creed of 'Abdu'l-Wahnâb to all the prevailing forms of Islâm, whose followers the Arabian

reformer classes with Polytheists, there is, humanly speaking, little chance of its extensive propagation. It may be fairly questioned, indeed, whether the late movement in India, headed by the Sayyid Ahmad, and which went by that name, had any real affinity with the Wahhâbeeism of Nejd. And as to the recent visits of Muslim potentates from the far East to do homage to the supposed representative of the Khalifah at Stambûl, these may have a certain political significance, but augur nothing in favour of a general *Jihâd*—"an outburst of stern fanaticism, which, armed with the courage of despair, obliterating, as in the Circassian war, even the immemorial schism of Sonnee and Sheeah [?] may hurl once more the united strength of the Crescent upon the vanguard of advancing Christendom." *Absit omen!*

But, even if possible, is such a revival as is here contemplated, desirable? Mr. Smith replies: "In the East a revived Islam contains more elements of hope for the future than a corrupt Christianity." This is tantamount to saying that the existing Christians of the East are, as a body, inferior to the Muslims—an opinion not unfrequently expressed by travellers who know them least, and by others who have expected to find virtues, which require liberty for their growth and development, among a people who have for ages been subject to a withering despotism. Making due allowance for this fact, I do not hesitate to affirm, having had as extensive and intimate an acquaintance with Muslims and Christians in the East as most Europeans, and still having many valued friends among both, that the statements relied upon by the lecturer are a libel upon Oriental Christians, whose industry and enterprise, social morality and general acquirements, despite the drawbacks of their political position, are fully equal to, if they do not surpass, the vaunted superiority of their Muslim fellow-subjects. Further, on recalling to mind what Mr. Smith had before stated respecting the necessity of a continued use of the sword in order to the maintenance of Islâm in its integrity, and that its revival means a return to the obligation to wage war on the infidels, I cannot but think that he has said more on this subject than he really meant. On the other hand, philanthropists generally would prefer to see the development among Muslims of the views which the lecturer, notwithstanding the unwisdom of the utterance just taken exception to, places before us in a most attractive light in these words:

"Muslims may yet be brought to see that there is a distinction between what Mohammed said himself, and what others said for him; and that there is a still broader difference between what he said as a legislator and a conqueror, and what he said as a simple Prophet. There are some among them who see now, and there will be more who will soon see, that there may be an appeal to the Mohammed of Mecca from the Mohammed of Medina; that there may be an idolatry

of a book, as well as of a picture, or a statue, or a shapeless mass of stone; and that the Prophet, who always in other matters asserted his fallibility, was never more fallible, though certainly never more sincere, than when he claimed an equal infallibility for the whole Koran alike. Finally, with the growth of knowledge of the real character of our faith, Mohammedans must recognise that the Christ of the Gospel was something ineffably above the Christ of those Christians from whom alone Mohammed drew his notions of Him; that he was a perfect mirror of that one primary attribute of the Eternal, of which Mohammed could catch only a far-off glance, and which, had it been shown to him as it really was, must needs have taken possession of his soul."

Should the "sign of yielding" which is here indicated become more distinct, and the ulterior results prognosticated be realized, the assertion of the lecturer that "Islam is a thing of indestructible vitality" will be invalidated, and it will then be seen whether there is anything in Christianity to prevent its proving as great a blessing to the mingled peoples of Africa and the East as it has proved to the "higher races" of the West; whether, in fine, the Gospel, which its Divine Author commanded should be preached throughout the world, is not suited to the spiritual wants and aspirations of all mankind. Although at first sight the lecturer's views seem to conflict with the idea of such attempts, nevertheless he is by no means averse to missionary efforts among Muslims. What he desires with devout earnestness is, that missionaries should approach them with Christian sympathy, imitating the example of St. Paul, who dropped not a word of scorn against the polytheism of the Athenians, quoted their great authors with respect, and professed only to declare to them more fully, that God whom, unknowingly, they already worshipped:—

"If Christian missionaries are ever to win over Mohammedans to Christianity, they must change their tactics. It will not be by discrediting the great Arabian Prophet, nor by throwing doubts upon his mission, but by paying him that homage which is his due, by pointing out, not how Mohammedanism differs from Christianity, but how it resembles it; by dwelling less on the dogmas of Christianity and more on its morality; by showing how perfectly that Christ, whom Mohammed with his half-knowledge so revered, came up to the ideal which prophets and kings desired to see, and had not seen, and which Mohammed himself, Prophet and King in one, could only half realize. In this way, and this alone, is it likely that Christianity can ever act upon Mohammedanism: not by sweeping it into oblivion—for what of truth there is in it, and there is very much truth, can never die—but by gradually, and perhaps unconsciously, breathing into its vast and still vigorous frame a newer, a purer, a diviner life."

One greater than St. Paul revealed the truth to His disciples as they were able to bear it, and the course here generally recommended to missionaries is in perfect accordance therewith, as it is also with Apostolic usage. Hence few will question the wisdom of the advice that, in their dealings with Muslims, missionaries should dwell less on the dogmas, and more on the morality of Christianity. But in practice, as all must know who have had any experience in the matter, the first objection raised by a Muslim will turn on the dogmas of the Divinity of Christ and the Trinity, and that unless some satisfactory explanation of these is given, all further attempt on the part of the missionary to gain a hearing will be in vain. Now, as these dogmas are of the very essence of Christianity, what is the missionary to do? Reserve them, or slur them over? To say nothing of the moral cowardice and faithlessness of such a course, there is not the least chance of its success. Evasion no less than assertion will be confronted with the *Sûratu'l-Ikhlâs*: "Say, God is one; God the Eternal; He begetteth not, neither is He begotten; neither is there any one like Him." Mr. Smith observes that among a monotheistic people the missionary invariably finds that "the doctrine of the Trinity, however explained, involves Tritheism, and their ears are at once closed to his teaching." This is almost inevitable from the stereotyped formulæ in which it has mostly been presented to them, without any comment calculated to remove their prejudices or to stimulate further inquiry. The writer of these remarks, on the other hand, in friendly discussions with intelligent Muslims, has frequently seen the beneficial results of a different course. He has begun by admitting the truth of the propositions contained in the *Sûrah* above quoted; and has then proceeded to point out that, if directed against the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, Muhammad must have written it under a misconception—excusable in him considering the heresies which prevailed on that and kindred dogmas among the Christians with whom alone he had come in contact—inasmuch as the verb *wâladâ* (peperit, parturivit), used in the active and passive form in the *Sûrah* referred to, is never in the Christian Scriptures applied to God or to the Divinity of Christ; that Jesus is not styled the *wâlad* (noun from the same root), but the *Ibn* of God, from the etymon *bâna*, to build (*i.q.* *bên* from *bânâ* of the Hebrew), and thence a *Son*, "because," as Arabian lexicographers say, "he is of the father's building, made so by God;" that the "Word of God"—a title applied to Jesus by Muhammad as well as St. John, was not "born" in any such sense, but "made flesh;" that the Divine Incarnation implied by that phrase is not so alien to Islâm as may at first sight appear, since it has been adopted by several Muslim sectarians, offsprings of the great Shi'âah schism; and that, considering the previous revelations of the Most High vouchsafed through Moses and the Prophets, there is nothing

contrary to reason, and nothing derogatory to the Majesty of God, that He, as the Divine Word, should take the fashion of a man, in order to exhibit to mankind by example as well as by precept the perfections of the Godhead, which heretofore they knew only as abstractions, and that, as a man, He should seal His testimony with His blood for the redemption of mankind. With regard to the Third Person of the Trinity, there is less difficulty, for although the "holy spirit" mentioned in the Kurân is held by Muslim commentators to indicate the angel Gabriel, nevertheless the true Christian dogma—of which Muhammad was undoubtedly ignorant, as he accused Christians of believing in three Gods, by which he is generally held to have meant God, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary—when rightly expounded, never evokes the same antagonism as the Incarnation, owing doubtless to the non-ascription of human attributes to the Holy Spirit.

A similar mode of procedure—of which the foregoing is but a rough sketch—with regard to other divergencies between the two creeds will seldom fail to arrest the attention and secure the respect of thoughtful Muslims, especially when prompted by that sympathy for what is good and true in Islâm which it is Mr. Smith's object to evoke, and without which bare arguments will be abortive. The motive was a generous one, considering its bearings on the moral and spiritual improvement of so vast a portion of the human race, including many millions of our fellow-subjects in India, and as such is highly commendable. I have not hesitated to point out what has appeared to me defective in his statements, and to express dissent from some of his deductions; none the less, however, do I commend these Lectures to the attentive yet careful perusal of the student, the politician, and the missionary.

GEORGE PERCY BADGER.



THE OPERA.

THE field of dramatic music appears, as yet, scarcely to have been entered by the searcher after the principles of art. While the whole domain of music has had scant attention from the æsthetic student, the department of stage-music has been well-nigh altogether overlooked. In England, at least, the opera has not been of a quality to attract much thoughtful criticism or penetrating research. Not that great and commanding works have not been produced, but that the modes of production, determined as they have been to a large extent by the demands of fashionable society for a not too engrossing after-dinner amusement, have been admirably adapted to shut out from view the artistic nature of the subject. The most soothing kind of influence to a gentle organism under these conditions of post-prandial repletion, was found to be afforded by the recurrence of familiar melody with dulcet cadences and easy rhythms, when rendered by a well-known favourite. Such a form of entertainment was free from the intellectual claims which mar, from a hygienic point of view, even the not excessively intricate contemporary drama. At the same time, it did not presuppose so high a degree of purely musical understanding as the concert. Hence, perhaps, the common tendency in England to overlook the dramatic side of the opera. Others, it may be, besides the present writer, are able to recall the unnatural, ludicrous aspect which the opera first presented to their minds. The forced

awkwardness of the singers' gestures, the unsuggestiveness of the long bravura exercises of vocal skill, the utter dissimilarity of the whole operation to any events in real life, can hardly fail to render our fashionable opera, in the eyes of a novice, as grotesque and amusing as are the laborious symbolic movements of a mysterious ritual to an uninitiated spectator.

In France and in Germany the opera has not remained, as with us, a fragile exotic, born of the light moods of elegant *dilettanti* in Italian courts. In both of these countries attempts have been made to construct a national musical drama, employing the language and reflecting the dominant sentiments of its people. And, as a natural concomitant of this more serious conception of the musical drama, a certain amount of thought has been applied to the principles of the subject. In France, it was Gluck who did most to give clearness and precision to the idea of the opera.* In Germany, the theory of the subject has been very fully elaborated by another composer and practical reformer, Richard Wagner. The doctrine taught by this writer, and illustrated in his works, claims the careful attention of any one who proposes to theorise on the nature and function of dramatic music, and a brief review of it may serve as a suitable starting-point for the present essay.

Let it be clearly understood that in examining Herr Wagner's theory of the opera, we do not propose to enter into another and wholly distinct subject—the composer's peculiar conception of music and its forms. The characteristics of the new order of tone-structure, which claim just now so large a representation in our concerts, are, for the most part, an extension of the forms of absolute music, and must be judged of by the principles of pure musical structure. Whether the style of chord, of sequence of chord, and of modulation—not to speak of rhythm and orchestral co-ordination—which one finds prevailing in Herr Wagner's compositions, and to which he has been in part impelled by a series of powerful traditions, is a real advance on the temperate regularities of the classical writers, is a question which will only receive a satisfactory solution when our general conceptions of music and of art as a whole have become less hazy and unsteady. In so far, however, as the peculiarities of Herr Wagner's musical style obviously result from his interpretation of the mutual relations of music and poetry, our estimate of them will, of course, be affected by our opinion of the theory on which they rest.

Herr Wagner's disciples in England have taken good care that his leading ideas should not suffer the fate of so many German

* Strictly speaking, Gluck's speculations belong to the period of his Italian activity. They may be reckoned as French, inasmuch as their permanent influence showed itself most conspicuously in this country.

speculations, and remain wholly unknown to English readers. We may presume, therefore, on a certain degree of intelligence with respect to his theory of the opera, and may content ourselves with recapitulating the most important heads of the doctrine.*

The opera, says Wagner, is the highest development both of the dramatic and the musical art. On the one hand, the spoken drama suffers from the defect of appealing too much to the understanding and too little to the emotional nature of the spectator. The modern Teutonic drama, from Shakespeare downwards, is, in fact, dramatised narrative, and proceeds by explaining a definite series of actions by help of all the necessary conditions of time and place. The true source of dramatic action is not history, but legend. In this, actions are elevated above the limits of particular circumstances, and are presented as typical. The legend appeals immediately to the spectator's sympathetic comprehension by upholding a single thread of action detached from the many side-threads which serve to hide and complicate it in real life. This simple chain of events is seen to depend on one or two easily apprehended emotional qualities, and the construction of this poetic and legendary kind of action is effected by raising these motives to an ideal intensity: a process which the writer describes as "the poetic miracle." In order that this emotional drama may produce its full effect, it must have recourse to music, which, by virtue of its deep and powerful affinities with the primitive emotional qualities of speech, serves to interpret, in an immediate sensuous impression, the emotional contents of the action.

On the other hand, just as the drama needs the resources of musical art as a medium of expression, so music needs the definite matter of expression which the drama supplies. Absolute music—that is, music separated from words—is vitiated by the radical error of mistaking a means of expression for the thing to be expressed. This error becomes conscious of itself, so to speak, in the works of Beethoven, who, after exhausting every device of analysis and re-combination in the treatment of the dance-rhythm, discovered the impossibility of constructing an art out of a material whose infinite capabilities require to be determined by the presence of a definite poetical theme.†

All previous attempts at opera-construction have suffered, says Herr Wagner, from the non-recognition of this dependence of music on poetry. The fundamental error of the pre-Wagnerian

* The full account of the author's theory is to be found in his *Oper und Drama* published in 1851. A résumé of his doctrine is given in a brochure entitled *Zukunftsmusik, Brief an einen französischen Freund* (1861).

† "Through his endeavour, unterrified in its boldness, to reach what is artistically necessary in something which is artistically impossible, we have proven the unlimited capacity of music for solving every thinkable problem as soon as it wants to be wholly and solely that which it actually is—the art of expression."—*Oper und Drama*, p. 63.

opera may be defined by saying "that a means of expression (music) was made the end, while the end of expression (the drama) was made the means."* The aria, the chorus, and the orchestral part alike illustrate this fatal defect. The dominant aim of the opera was to glorify the composer and the vocalist at the expense of the poet.

Herr Wagner reviews at some length the history of the opera in Italy, France, and Germany, pointing out what he considers to be the ruling defects of the several schools of composition. He is very hard on the luscious melody and ear-tickling rhythm of the Italian style as perfected by Rossini. He appears to attach very little value to the reforms aimed at by Gluck. He sympathises, to a considerable extent, with the endeavours of Weber and his followers to return from the artificial aria-form to the *naïf* Volkslied from which it originally sprang. Curiously enough, to those who have traced the sources of the critic's own style, his fiercest attack is reserved for the historical opera of Meyerbeer, which he characterises as decorative music, and a striving after a merely external effect.

Such being Herr Wagner's estimate of the past opera, and such his conception of the true function of dramatic music, let us see how he proposes to work out his theory, and to what form of structure his proposal has led.

First of all, then, the proper subject for opera is the legend or myth: and this condition has been carefully observed by the composer in all but one or two of his earliest works. Secondly, the music of the drama must resign the pleasing forms of absolute music (aria form, sonata form, and so on), and content itself with shaping itself in the closest conformity to the sequences of the poetical subject. Thus, the sharp distinctions of recitative and aria must be obliterated, and the whole progress of the vocal music assimilated to the unbroken flux of the dramatic movement. The quality of the melody and rhythm must be determined by the primitive "word-tone" of language. That is to say, the musical accent must coincide with the emotional accent, which, in the German language, uniformly falls on the root-syllable of the word.† Thus the composer, instead of adorning the dramatic verse with the graceful turns and movements of a dance-rhythm, must seek patiently to elicit from the verse the melos which is potentially contained in it.‡

* Introduction, p. 9.

† In his later works Herr Wagner has made ample use of the archaic devices of alliteration (*Stabreim*), which element of versification corresponds, he thinks, to a law of natural expression.

‡ It is only fair to add that the author has maintained that "by this procedure melody and its form are conducted to a wealth and an inexhaustibility, of which, apart from this process, one was wholly unable to frame a conception."—(*Zukunftsmusik*, p. 40.) But I have failed to discover any attempt to prove this rather curious assertion.

Similarly, the orchestral accompaniment, instead of being an independent structure, shaped according to the laws of absolute music, must dutifully take its impress from the poetic theme. The orchestral instrument possesses a faculty of speech, and its function is to make known the unutterable (*das Unausprechliche*.) Hence it should, in the introduction (which Wagner would substitute for the elaborately-constructed overture), stimulate a certain vague foreboding (*Ahnung*) of the coming action.* So, again, it should seek to give present reality to the invisible thoughts and recollections which underlie the actors' present emotions. Once more, as a highly idealised dance-rhythm—that is, the concomitant of bodily movement and attitude—the instrumental part of dramatic music has to supply an audible gesture (*Gebärde*), finer, more various, and more impressive than the visible movements of the actors, corresponding to the depth, intensity, and infinite gradation of the dramatic sentiment. Thus the modern orchestra has the significance of the Greek chorus, in so far as this served as a supplementary exponent of the emotional phases of the action.

To sum up the leading ideas of this theory: the opera is simply the perfected drama, and has, as its supreme function, to depict an elevated action with its productive emotional forces. The music of the opera has at all points to subserve the revelation of the dramatic subject, and to shape itself in perfect obedience to the emotional changes of the action. Its unity of form must consequently be derived, not from the laws of absolute music, but from the poetic conditions of the drama itself.

Finally, it should be added that the writer postulates as a condition of this perfect self-devotion of music to poetry, in "womanly passivity" and "receptivity," the production both of the dramatic poem and of the musical composition by one and the same mind. Only when the composer is at the same time the poet, having his mind permeated by the ideas of the drama, will he be competent to elicit from music its fullest capabilities of interpretation.

Such is, in brief, Wagner's conception of the lyrical drama, and no impartial reader can fail to recognise its lofty character. It betrays, in many of its parts, a fine insight into the real nature and capabilities both of the drama and of musical art. The emphatic reiteration of the proposition that the opera is before all things drama, and that its musical structure must bear a close relation to the dramatic intention, is worthy of all praise, though it may be questioned whether at least one earlier writer on the

* This the composer seeks to accomplish by means of the *Leitmotif*, or leading motive, which by its peculiar emotional colouring may serve to indicate indistinctly the general or dominant features of the piece. The introduction of a dominant phrase in the overture is no invention of Wagner's, while his peculiar use of it in frequent recurrence in the body of the opera has been very severely criticised.

subject, Gluck, did not possess an equally clear apprehension of this truth. It is probable that Wagner's most important contribution to the theory of the lyrical drama is contained in his account of the capabilities and function of the orchestra, in the practical treatment of which, moreover, he is acknowledged to be a master.

On the other hand, this theory appears to me to be quite as one-sided and incomplete as those which it aims at controverting. As a reformer's protest against the excessive exaltation of the musical at the expense of the poetical in the opera, Wagner's treatise is admirable. As a philosopher's well-considered doctrine of the principles of the opera, it must be pronounced inadequate.

The radical defect in Wagner's theory of the opera is due to a non-recognition of the fact that in the union of poetry and music in the opera, the latter helps to determine the former no less certainly than the former the latter. If music, when entering the service of dramatic poetry, must dutifully observe the requirements of her mistress, it may be added that dramatic poetry, in order to reap any advantage from the relation, must accommodate her requirements to the capacities of her servant. The author fails to recognise this consideration just because he supposes the drama and the lyrical drama to be co-extensive—that is to say, because he conceives the drama in all its highest forms to be not only susceptible of a musical treatment, but even in need of it. This notion seems to involve a misapprehension both of the real nature of the drama and of the fullest powers of modern musical art. In order to see whether this is so, we must go back to the primitive psychological sources of these arts, more especially to those of music.

The nature of the drama may perhaps be looked on as fairly determined. It is the representation of a single chain of actions, whether grave and impressive, or light and entertaining, fitted to attract and detain the spectator's attention. It appeals to the spectator's sympathies as the imitation of a real action—that is, of a definite series of particular events. In order that the play may be effective it must be understood, and the understanding of it is by no means a trivial intellectual operation. The right apprehension of the characters, with their complex elements of emotional sensibility, habits of thought, and tendencies of will; of the precise nature of the surrounding circumstances (including each person's social relations) in their operation on these characters; of the intricate and prolonged series of results due to any particular event—all this may be regarded as a very respectable intellectual achievement. No doubt, the drama must appeal to the feelings of the spectator, but it can only do this (in all but a few cases) by appealing just as energetically to his understanding. The drama

is not the same thing as the lyrical poem, which, with all its fancies and images, becomes intelligible so soon as the reader or hearer seizes and enters into the central uniting sentiment: it is a group of events, external and internal, united not by the artist's poetic feeling, but by the laws of actual life. Hence it needs the understanding no less than the emotions as its interpreter.

On the other hand, music, pure and simple, has no very palpable relation to the events of life. It seems to derive its materials from no department of natural phenomena, but to shape its new tone-elements in perfect artistic freedom, seeking only that beauty of order which may best delight the ear. In truth, however, these tone fabrics have a deep significance. They form a subtle and potent language for human feelings, describing their most essential characters in grateful symbols. Music alone does not disclose any definite individual sentiment: it reveals rather the broad relations of a feeling, its deepest resemblances and contrasts. Thus the addition of music to a definite sentiment, as in lyric poetry, may be regarded both as a more emphatic utterance of the essential qualities of the sentiment, and as an artistic apotheosis of the feeling by clothing it in a beautiful artistic vesture. A passion poured out in the well-ordered cadences of a modern vocal melody ceases to resemble a familiar daily event, and becomes partially transformed into an utterance from the beautiful unknown world of poetic fancy.

Such being, roughly defined, the characteristics of the drama and music, let us inquire what points of contact—or at least of mutual approach—appear to present themselves to the two arts.

In the first place, the drama may be regarded as the result of the impulse of a powerful feeling to realise in immediate impression the objects and events which stimulate and sustain it. When powerfully affected by the thought of a beautiful or imposing object, the mind desires to see it. In this way, the lyrical outpouring of a feeling naturally passes into the dramatic revival of the feeling. We may see this process illustrated in the growth both of the Greek and of the modern drama. Greek tragedy arose gradually out of the Bacchic song and dance, as the worshippers felt the want of a new perception of the divine glories, which perception was first given them through a recited narrative, then through a visible imitation of the stirring action. Similarly the passion-play of the middle ages, which was the first form of the modern drama, seems to have sprung from the desire of pious hearts, when chanting the praises of the suffering Son and Mother, to seize the reality of the remote events in some immediate objective impression. If the drama may thus be viewed as the direct creation of sympathetic and lyrical emotion, its relation to music is evident. According to this view, the first function of music in

its union with the drama is to give expression not to the feelings of the *dramatis personæ*, but to those of the spectators. It aims at shadowing forth the dominant sentiment or mood of the drama; the emotional condition of mind which remains as the final and least evanescent result of the dramatic impression, such as awe before the mysterious, pity at the spectacle of human error and woe, or amusement at the sight of men's harmless defects.

It is obvious, from this definition of the function of dramatic music, that the more intense and distinctly marked the emotional effect of a drama, the more easily does it lend itself to musical treatment. Plays which appeal less to the deeper emotions of sympathy, and interest us rather as developments of human character, are but little susceptible of this accompaniment.* Such dramas are most successful when they dispense with musical accompaniment altogether, or content themselves with roughly indicating their most prominent emotional aspects in instrumental introduction or *entr'acte*. Sometimes a play may gradually approach a point at which the deep and potent feelings of the spectator seem to ask for the vicarious expression of music, and in this case the introduction of musical strains has a peculiarly fine effect.† On the other hand, when a drama resorts to a continuous musical accompaniment, it needs to be of a deeply affecting character throughout.

It will be obvious to the reader that the function of dramatic music just considered is not its only one. The drama first resorts to music as an interpreter of its emotional effect in the spectator's mind; after this, it seeks from music its aid in interpreting the emotions of the dramatic persons. When it does this, music passes over from the subjective side of the spectator's mind to the objective side of the spectacle itself, and enters as an integral element into the work of art. The basis of this further union between drama and music is the same as before. Music is an artistic form for expressing deep and intense emotions. Hence, in so far as the action is emotional, springing directly out of powerful pulsations of feeling, and involving but little of the quieter intellectual and volitional processes of the mind, it is fitted to assume a musical garb. Here again we may find several degrees of susceptibility of musical treatment answering to various grades of emotional force in the action and its situations. In many cases the course of the story may pass from a region of comparative emotional indifference to one of great emotional agitation; and when this happens, the cold medium of speech

* It would be easy, probably, to point out illustrations of this limitation in some recent operatic productions.

† The introduction of music at the close of Goethe's *Egmont* is a happy example of this art.

may fitly be exchanged for that of song.* It is only when there are powerful under-currents of feeling running throughout an action, when each new development is closely related to half-hidden pulsations of emotion which require to be appreciated by a quick sympathy, that a drama derives a considerable advantage from a complete musical setting.

Under both these aspects, then, the relation of music to the drama is based on the expression of feeling. Music, when wedded to the drama, is significant in so far as it helps to give utterance either to the feeling awakened in the spectator's mind, or to the emotions represented on the stage. In the main, these two functions are fulfilled simultaneously, since the spectator's feeling is in most cases a sympathetic echo of some witnessed emotion. Hence we need not further consider them apart, but may employ the phrase "the emotional character" of a piece or a situation indifferently, either for the feeling displayed in the play, for the feeling occasioned in the spectator's mind, or, finally, for both of these.

Let us now inquire a little more closely into the nature of the dramatic feelings which are best fitted to receive musical expression.

First of all, then, music being a supplementary means of expression added by art to the natural expression of the voice, it should be united only to feelings of unwonted depth and force. Music steps in when language fails, at moments when feeling is too large for utterance. Just as in ordinary life we cease, at moments of the intensest feeling, to employ definite articulate speech, and lapse into interjectional cries, so the dramatist calls in the aid of music when the emotions he would portray defy expression by the ordinary instruments. It is the rare climax of emotion, the invasion of the spirit by a grief which refuses to pass outwards by the narrow channels of words, or its elevation by a delight which seems too pure and precious to be described in every-day symbols, which makes the accents of music welcome. Accordingly the opera should seek its poetic subject in some rare and profoundly impressive manifestation of human feeling, and not in the familiar emotional phases of ordinary human life. This condition of rarity in the subject of the musical drama, serves, it is evident, to remove this form of art from the category of the realistic to that of the idealistic.

Secondly, since musical expression is essentially indefinite and typical, its addition to dramatic sentiment tends to give to this sentiment a certain largeness of aspect, freeing it from

* Herr Wagner seems to be a little unreasonably hard against this mixture of the spoken and the sung in the drama. The form of melodrama, or vaudeville, may not be the highest artistic form, and yet it may have a relative value as the mode of structure most appropriate to a certain order of play.

those peculiarities which make up its individual character, and transforming it into a vaguely circumscribed representative of human feeling in general, under certain of its aspects. In listening to an opera, the hearer is less concerned, than when listening to a spoken drama, to apprehend all the individual aspects and conditions of the characters and sentiments represented. The range of emotional suggestion which characterises music has the effect of transforming the lyrical expression of a definite feeling into the symbolic representation of a whole order of emotion. The expression of a certain variety of feeling in an opera, whether it be the fond childish love of Zerlina, the tenacious wifely affection of Fidelia, or the quick, fierce motherly passion of Norma, is apt to present itself as the manifestation of this kind of emotion, pure and detached from individual surroundings. It is as though the emotion had acquired a distinct substantive existence, and presented itself in a concrete personification.

It is not meant by this that music obliterates the characteristic differences of the *dramatis personæ*; on the contrary, by helping to render prominent the dominant emotional qualities of a particular character,* it directly subserves dramatic characterization.† Only this characterization is of necessity less individual than that of the spoken drama. However carefully music seeks to reproduce the complexity of an individual character, its final image will always preserve something of this typical nature. In this way, then, the action of the musical drama will become still further removed from the particular events of every-day life, and will assume a yet more ideal character.

The effects of music on the drama just considered arise from the peculiarities of music as a medium of emotional expression. We may now consider other effects which are due to the intrinsic qualities of the tone-art.

The first of these consequences flows from the nature of tone-stimulation. Music consists of a series of pleasurable sensations agreeably combined. Through the large amount of sensuous pleasure which it yields, it lifts the mind out of its ordinary condition of quiet indifference into one of general excitability. Apart from any of its emotional suggestions, music stirs the spirit of a listener merely as a mode of sensuous delight. One principal result of this agitation will be the intensified action of the imagination. The mind will seek to anticipate the actual order of events as known to perception, and to fashion realities for itself free from all the limitations of actuality. Hence that

* By "emotional" is here meant not only feeling proper, but also the moral aspects of thought and volition, as calm or turbulent, fitful or constant.

† This result of music is well illustrated in the works of Gluck. In a valuable work entitled *Gluck und die Oper*, Dr. Marx calls attention more than once to Gluck's skill in hitting off in musical language the characteristic qualities of his characters.

readiness to grasp beforehand, in dim foreboding, and to accept, when presented, a "poetic miracle" as Wagner styles it—that is, the construction of a dramatic action in freedom from the strict limits of time and place. Music seems to drug the vigilant critical powers, and to rouse to unwonted activity imagination and fancy. Accordingly the introduction of the fanciful and the mythical into the lyrical drama, so far from displeasing, seems eminently fitting and æsthetically right.*

But this is only one part of the influence of musical pleasure. The delight which flows from melody and harmony not only excites the fancy, but excites it in a particular manner. Delight begets images of delight; and the enjoyment of musical beauty predisposes the listener to expect new revelations of the beautiful. Hence the musical drama is much more restricted than the spoken drama in the use of characters and emotions of a repulsive kind, and has to employ, as far as possible, those varieties which have a certain visible grace and majesty. Although music has a considerable power of suggesting other and less pleasing aspects of human nature, such as the terrible and the weird, its quality as a mode of sensuous beauty imposes a certain limit to its expression. The law of harmony, which is at the basis of all the best art, requires that the sentiments and actions which are to be clothed in a beautiful sensuous drapery, should themselves be beautiful. Hence such disturbing emotions as anger, hatred, and fear, should assume a certain majesty, and the throes of pain sink into something like a chastened grief, before they are admitted to be prominent motives of the lyrical drama. One may say that the opera should, in the main, seek to represent *orderly* emotions—that is to say, feelings which flow on evenly in a steady and comparatively unbroken rhythm. Hence its function differs in a measure from that of tragedy (as understood by the modern world), which necessarily proceeds by means of emotional conflict.†

If we try to gather up the separate threads of the foregoing argument we shall find that they all conduct to one and the same conclusion. Music, it has been said, being an added artistic medium of expression, requires for its subject-matter some rare manifestation of emotion. Again, since musical expression is in its nature typical or generic, it requires in the emotion to be expressed

* This principle was acted on by composers before Wagner. Weber, Marschner, and Meyerbeer—not to mention Schumann and Mendelssohn—appear to have felt the special suitability of the romantic and fantastic for operatic treatment. But, so far as I am aware, Wagner first supplied an adequate reason for this practice.

† One might cite numerous illustrations of the violence done to the spectator's feeling by the excessive use of the painful and repulsive in the opera. To give but one instance. The fierce and spasmodic outbreak of Ortrud's envy and hate in the second act of *Lohengrin* seems to the present writer to be a signal example of the unmusical in dramatic creation. The changes made by Gluck in the treatment of classic story show, as Dr. Marx observes, a fine feeling for the differences between the operatic and the simply dramatic.

a certain breadth and universality. Once more, owing to its characteristic influence on the imagination, music renders necessary a certain degree of fancifulness and ideality in the actions and feelings to be illustrated. Finally, since it is itself a variety of the beautiful, it demands a corresponding degree of beauty in the poetic material. Thus we are led by each route to the conclusion that the musical drama is a certain narrow branch of the drama, and is distinguished from the larger division of the spoken drama by its special degree of ideality or remoteness from the particular events of our daily experience.

We have thus far been considering the conditions imposed by music on the general character of the poetic subject in the musical drama. We may now pass to the inquiry—How far the requirements of music serve to determine the arrangement of parts and the artistic form of the drama? What, it may be asked, are the rights of music, in respect to form and structure, when it enters into union with dramatic poetry?

The art of music pursues aims and conforms to conditions of its own. The attempt of Wagner* to deny all independent æsthetic value to music, apart from poetry, must be regarded as the weakest part of his theory. The very simplest type of melody is determined by conditions which lie wholly beyond the province of poetry—namely, the laws of tone, and its combinations. Herr Wagner's idea of eliciting from poetry the primitive melody that slumbers in it, is, no doubt, a very pretty fancy, but is, when interpreted literally, an absurdity. No natural language of the emotions, whatever may be its analogies to music; no primitive type of speech, however poetic, affords an adequate basis of tonality—which is a condition of the new dramatic melos, no less than of all previous varieties of melody. However appropriate musical form may be to poetic material, it is in no sense the product of this material, but grew up as an independent mode of art. What is true of the conditions of the simplest musical forms, is true of the conditions of the most complex. They are imposed by the laws of tone-impression itself, considered as an element of a discerning and comparing consciousness, and have no immediate connection with the requirements of poetic expression.

Nothing is more curious in Wagner's theory of music than his total inability to recognise the laws which determine the growth of instrumental music. The conception that the separate development of instrumental music was necessary as a temporary process, in order that when it had proved its utmost capacities in this isolation it might dutifully and penitently return to the

* One is glad to see that all the composer's disciples do not endorse his views respecting the value of instrumental music. Dr. Hueffer, in his interesting work on Richard Wagner, appears to reject this article of the composer's creed.

service of poetry, seems to me about as grotesque an idea of art development as one can find, even among the writings of German æstheticians. Whatever value absolute music has attained, is obviously due to the existence of definite musical laws of pleasure. The endless combinations of modern music, the sequences of time and key, of movement and counter-movement, which compose the highest varieties of tone-structure, were not, and could not have been, suggested by poetry, but followed from the laws of pleasurable impression in the domain of tone-sensations. It was the vague anticipation of this pleasurable effect which first suggested the several elements of classical form, and it is the full realisation of this effect which secures to these forms their permanent intrinsic value. If it was worth while inventing the forms of absolute music for their own sake, it is surely worth while retaining them for their own sake.*

We may assume, then, that music, when it voluntarily unites itself to the drama, has a share in determining the form of the whole. Without seeking to fix the precise amount of this effect, we may suggest one or two of its principal elements.

First of all, it may be said that the highest mode of uniting music to a drama is, as Herr Wagner maintains, that of uniting it throughout; accordingly, the whole of the dramatic poem should, as far as possible, possess a certain elevated emotional character. Further, since musical structure always involves a certain degree of unity of emotional character, it follows that the drama should be characterised by a high degree of unity of sentiment. The more complete the harmony of the parts of a drama in their emotional effects on the mind, the better, *cæteris paribus*, is the drama fitted for musical treatment. Hence we find that the best lyrical dramas are always marked by some ruling sentiment or leading emotional idea, which serves as a basis of a double unity—poetic and musical. At the same time, musical form requires picturesque variety as much as organic unity, and, accordingly, the drama, which seeks to be lyrical, must present numerous contrasts of situation, such as are fitted to draw out different orders of musical capability. Skilfully to combine a few well-marked

* It is worth observing that Wagner, while attempting to show the inadequacy of instrumental music, really concedes to it the value it claims. A striking illustration of this incongruity is to be found in a passage of the letter already referred to, which I cannot refrain from quoting: "Here," (in the opening period of Beethoven's symphonies) "we see the proper dance-melody, dissected into its smallest ingredients, each of which, often consisting of only two tones, appears interesting and expressive now through its prominent rhythms, now through its prominent harmonic significance. These parts adjust themselves again to ever-new groups (*Gliederungen*), now collecting in a consistent series stream-like, now scattering themselves as in a whirlpool, always fascinating by so plastic a movement that the listener cannot for a moment withdraw himself from their impression, but, stimulated to the highest interest, is compelled to attribute to every harmonic tone, and even to every rhythmic pause a melodic meaning. The wholly new result of this process was the extension of melody, through the richest development of all its motives, to a large lasting piece of music, which was nothing else than a single closely connected melody."—(*Zukunftsmusik*, p. 43.)

dramatic contrasts in a total unity, so as to provide ample scope to the composer for pleasing and effective co-ordinations of musical phrase and mood, is an art attainable by a few only.

Passing now to the detailed parts of the musical drama, we observe, first of all, that the addition of music to a dramatic subject necessitates a number of definitely lyrical situations, in which feeling may express itself freely and exhaustively. Such moments must stand in marked contrast to the moments of the progressive action. I quite concur with Herr Otto Jahn, who maintains, in opposition to Herr Wagner, that the lyrical drama must not be a perpetual flux, but must contain points of repose. "It is," he says, "according to nature, not only that single feelings should be suggested by leaps (*sprungweise*), but also that this perpetually renewed partial tension should be followed by a complete intensive satisfaction—a pouring out of the excited feeling, which must necessarily spread itself out."* It is this law of our emotional nature which forms the basis of the prolonged aria form, against which Herr Wagner is never weary of directing his attack. The aria is a complete and rounded vocal form, which offers ample scope for a rich, various, yet united melodic structure. It is obvious that there is no room for this musical form amid the rapid progressive movements of a dramatic action; but it constitutes a fit and beautiful mould for a pure emotion when raised above a certain intensity, and needing, as Herr Jahn remarks, a lengthy and satisfying utterance. It may be safely asserted that an opera which is replete with beautiful airs, appropriately united to the drama, will always be esteemed superior to one which lacks these elements.†

A similar line of remark applies to the harmonic forms of the chorus. Whether we regard the function of the dramatic chorus as that of co-actors who enter into the action itself and preserve their individual characters (as Wagner maintains), or as that of impartial sympathetic onlookers (as illustrated in the Greek chorus), or finally as both one and the other—which seems quite as reasonable an idea as the others—the condition of choral song is a sympathetic mass of feeling in a number of minds. Hence the action should offer frequent situations which appeal to the emotions of masses—that is, the comparatively simple and universal feelings of human nature. It is evident that this con-

* *Gesammelte Aufsätze über Musik*, p. 144. Herr Jahn's critiques on *Tannhäuser* and *Lohengrin* should be read by all who are desirous of forming an impartial judgment on the merits of the new German opera.

† It is rather odd that Herr Wagner finds it a positive demerit in an operatic melody that the audience are likely to find it singable and so to carry it home with them. It does not follow that because there are many poor airs, which, thanks to a catching rhythm, are apt to haunt one's musical memory, no worthy melody is thus retainable. There is a pleasurable half-voluntary retention of a melody and a painful involuntary survival of it. No composer can afford to ignore the former, though he may be fully justified in avoiding the latter.

dition will be satisfied whenever the primary feelings of the drama are of the typical character already described. The manifestation in a beautiful form of a broad and elevated human sentiment, such as quiet resignation to an inevitable woe, or pure, devoted love, will always appeal to sympathetic bystanders.

•Once more, the claims of music in the lyrical drama are seen in the demands of the orchestra for moments and circumstances in which it can display its characteristic powers. As a mere support to vocal melody the orchestra is limited.* The full beauty of instrumental music calls for undivided attention, and should reveal itself when the action is *silent*. How fine are the opportunities afforded to the composer by the moments when bodily movement and gesture take the place of speech! When the mind of the actor is cast in on itself in solitary thought, or eye meets eye with an intensity of hope or despair which enthralls speech, the orchestra may seek, by means of its rich and varied colouring and its subtle imitations of vocal tone, to give a beautiful, if a vague, expression to the inaudible movements of the soul. It is possible that a much freer use of this function of orchestral music might yet be made, and that scope might be afforded not only before and between the acts, but in the very midst of a scene, for complete orchestral movements in strict relation to a series of feelings.†

One other point in the effect of music on the structure of the drama needs to be considered—namely, the verbal form which it serves to impress. This is obviously a metric form, as being one which best harmonises in its dignity and beauty with the musical vesture, and at the same time one which most easily lends itself to musical treatment. If prose is often the best medium for a spoken drama which closely imitates the incidents of real life, verse appears to be the medium required by the elevated and ideal subject of the lyrical drama. And, further, the regular and symmetrical structure of the verse, clearly supplies the most fitting verbal mould into which a well-ordered melody can pour itself.

This influence of music on the verbal form will show itself, too, even in those parts of the drama which are least lyrical. In the more rhetorical parts of the dialogue where the musical accompaniment is unobtrusive and restricted—namely, in the recita-

* The overlooking of this limit frequently leads to overloading the vocal part with orchestral adornment. This excess is the natural result of the rapid progress made in the fabrication and use of instruments, and may be found in the works of the best masters of instrumentation.

† Hitherto the chief occasion for orchestral elaboration has been some pageant which seemed to require a rich ornate style of music. It is curious that Wagner, who seeks to extinguish Meyerbeer's art by terming it "decorative music," is particularly strong in this direction. Wagner's fondness for prolonged scenic effects, such as one finds in the processions and assemblings of *Tannhäuser* and *Lohengrin*, seems to indicate a true instinct for the differences between the operatic and the simply dramatic.

tive—the language should not be destitute of a certain poetic beauty, and should be ordered in a pleasing rhythm. The canon laid down above, that the lyrical drama should be emotional throughout, requires that even the dialogue should possess a certain warmth of colouring—should betray, that is, an intensity of belief, an earnestness of purpose, which, though not strictly speaking emotional, is very closely related to feeling proper. And the presence of this attribute, which raises the dialogue of the opera above the discourse of common life, justifies a certain measure of rhythmic, if not metric, regularity of form. When the language is of this form, its investiture by music becomes more easy and natural. The fairly regular distribution of the poetic accent, and the partial division of the discourse into balanced measures, allow of the addition of something like a melodic form, though of one less perfect than that which answers to a finished verse-structure. It follows from what has been said above, that the more musical every part of the lyrical drama can be made (consistently with the preservation of its dramatic force), the higher, in an æsthetic point of view, will be the value of the whole work.*

There are other aspects of the influence of music on the structure of the drama, which, since they are of less importance, or, on the other hand, are sufficiently obvious to one who accepts the general conception of the opera here adopted, do not call for special discussion. As examples, I may name the need of a certain lyrical type of character—that is, of a nature highly emotional, and instinctively demonstrative in the utterances of its feelings, the desirability of a high measure of picturesqueness in scenery, dress, and gesture, so that the visible spectacle may harmonise in its beauty with the audible impression. Other effects of a similar kind may probably suggest themselves to the thoughtful reader.

We have dwelt thus at length and in detail on the influence of the musical on the poetical side of the drama, rather than on the reciprocal influence, because the former seems to have been greatly overlooked by writers on the subject, though it is probably quite as important as the other. It is necessary, however, in order to give something like an adequate account of the musical drama, to recognise the fact that there is this reciprocal action, and that it is of considerable extent. The opera is dramatic before it becomes musical. A dramatic action can effect a good result without the aid of musical accompaniment: a series of musical pieces, vocal and instrumental, such as are required by the opera,

* The history of the recitative, from its first meagre forms as *recitativo secco* in the hands of the early Italian composers, to its rich development in the hands of Wagner, illustrates a growing perception of the essentially poetic character of the opera in all its parts.

becomes unintelligible, apart from the dramatic interpretation. This is so obvious, and has been so frequently insisted on by writers, from Gluck downwards, that we scarcely need to enforce it by lengthy argument.

We may, perhaps, briefly sum up the influence of the laws of the drama on the character of dramatic music in the following propositions :—

(1.) The drama being, even in its most lyrical varieties, the manifestation of a human, or quasi-human action, which, inasmuch as it consists of numerous mental processes, and of a complex series of results, must always make certain demands on the visual perception and the understanding of the spectator, is exposed to the danger of being hidden by music, as by a veil, instead of being interpreted by it as by a new voice. If the composer merely seeks to display all the possibilities of music, all the capabilities of the singer and the instrumentalist, without any reference to the subject-matter of the drama, the whole effect will be discordant and inartistic. Music, while asserting her own inalienable right to be beautiful, must select that order of beauty which best befits the poetic subject. The musical accompaniment should be, not a mere adventitious adornment to the drama, but a beautifully fitting robe, which, instead of hiding, indirectly reveals the form it encloses. That is to say, the composer, while seeking to give proper heed to the inherent laws of musical form, must observe at the same time the emotional and poetic relations of his art.*

(2.) Every drama involves processes and events which are but little emotional, comparatively quiet trains of thought, deliberate executions of plans, and so on; and in relation to these parts music has to exercise a special amount of self-restraint. A quiet passage of a dialogue is simply spoilt by being translated into an elaborate melodic expression, and a comparatively ordinary action, which may be a necessary link in the development of the plot, becomes ridiculous when accompanied by an exquisitely beautiful orchestral movement. In other words, a lyrical drama is never equally musical throughout, and the composer must observe the moments and situations which call for an unobtrusive musical accompaniment.†

(3.) Even in moments of the most intense and the most elevated

* This principle manifestly excludes from the opera the more elaborate forms of music which appeal to the understanding rather than to the emotion of the hearer. An adequate perception of the relations of a fugue, for example, is only possible when the attention is undivided. These laws of structure, moreover, have no close connection with the emotional side of music.

† It is no less obvious that the musical accompaniment must retire from notice when the situation is one of intricacy which calls for the spectator's concentrated attention, and which cannot be interpreted by musical language. Yet, as we have observed, such situations should, as far as possible, be avoided in the lyrical drama.

emotional expression, music has to observe certain obvious limits. The feeling which calls for a full and complete utterance is still an element of a dramatic action, and has bounds set to it by this circumstance. If we loiter too long in the indulgence of a certain train of emotion, and wholly give ourselves up to a dominant mood, we are likely to let slip the dramatic thread, and to lose interest in the evolution of the story. The composer is under peculiar temptation to expand unduly these lyrical effusions, since his art is never more successful than when it has to interpret a single emotional mood. The utterance of a powerful and pent-up feeling in appropriate melody, though a necessary feature of the lyrical drama, must always be characterised by a certain moderation. It must present itself as a natural and temporary pause in the progress of the action—not as an interruption of it. This truth was clearly perceived by Gluck, who sought to shorten the aria structure, and to banish from the opera, once and for all, the bravura figures with which the earlier aria was accustomed to adorn itself in the interests of the singer, who was chiefly bent on astounding his audience by feats of vocalisation. Gluck's own arias are models of the form most appropriate to the dramatico-lyrical order of sentiment.*

From all the foregoing considerations we are led to the conclusion that the relation of music and poetry in the lyrical drama is not, as the Wagnerites say, one of servant and lord, but one of fellow-servants to a common lord. The highest aim of the musical drama is realised when both poetry and music co-operate in producing a large and harmonious whole. In order that it may be large, each must have as free a scope as possible for the employment of its own peculiar agencies. In order that it may be harmonious, each must limit itself in mutual concession. That is to say, each must seek to observe what the other requires as its appropriate function, and learn to regulate its own activity in harmonious relation to this function. Poetry must content itself with being musical, and music with being poetic, and in this manner the two will combine to produce something which is neither poetry nor music, but a product of both.

We say that our line of discussion has led us to this conclusion, and yet we must confess that this theory has been quite as much the assumption as the conclusion of our reasonings. The doctrine that in the opera music is wholly subordinate to the poetic subject cannot be refuted by a demonstrative chain of reasoning. The highest function of any form of art is that which produces

* It may be worth adding that the bravura flight is not universally bad art, as some of the most delicious arias of Mozart sufficiently testify. The temporary lingering on a single word, and even on a single syllable, may be highly natural when the associations of the word or the emotional colouring of the syllabic sound gives it a peculiar preciousness to the singer's mind at the time.

the largest amount of refined and enduring pleasure to a cultivated mind. It is, of course, permissible to say that a drama which is wholly free to pursue its own aims, and to employ music simply as an auxiliary, will yield a purer and larger delight than one which has to limit itself according to the extraneous requirements of musical art. All that one can urge by way of argument against this theory is as follows :—(1.) Music, with its present wealth and complexity of structure, requires a certain amount of liberty to follow out its own laws ; and to tie down the art to a rigid conformity to the poetic theme, supposing this to be possible, is obviously to miss a large part of the effect of musical art. Unless the *full* beauty of musical form is compatible with dramatic spectacle, it seems scarcely worth while to call in the aid of the art at all. (2.) The history of the opera sufficiently establishes the proposition that a high degree of musical beauty is fully compatible with dramatic force. From these premises it seems to follow, at least as a probable inference, that the largest quantum of æsthetic pleasure, and consequently the highest æsthetic value, is realised by that order of opera which seeks both a dramatic and a musical end.

One other question presents itself in this discussion—What rank among the arts must be assigned to the musical drama as it has been here conceived ? Herr Wagner, as is well known, looks on the lyrical drama as the highest development of all the arts, inasmuch as it employs the principal of them, poetry, music, and painting, in one large and harmonious sensuous impression, and subordinates them to the production of a homogeneous emotional effect.


The first thing, perhaps, in this theory which strikes the reader as an objection, is its apparent contradiction to the whole previous development of art. When the arts were in their infancy, combination was their necessary law : they were each too feeble to walk singly. As they grew and became more complex, they were not only able to walk alone, but were, in a sense, compelled to do so. Thus painting outgrew the limits of mural decoration, and music the leading of song and dance. That process of differentiation which characterises the evolution of art, as of all evolution, involved the separation of the individual arts. As each art acquired a more distinctly marked province and aim, it required greater liberty in the fulfilment of its function, and this liberty was only attainable by independence—that is, by separation of activity.

Herr Wagner's doctrine appears to be defective in attaching too high a value to mere quantity of æsthetic impression, and too little to the elements of purity and tranquillity. It strikes one that this error displays itself in the composer's works. With all the

splendour of effect which such works as *Lohengrin* undoubtedly produce, the mind is apt to suffer from a sense of being overladen and satiated. The whole series of effects is too sensuous and too emotional. One longs for moments of comparative repose when each sense, no longer distracted by so gorgeous a simultaneous impression, might enjoy its own world of beauty in perfect purity, and when, too, the quiet play of the understanding (that interloper, according to Herr Wagner) might relieve and supplement the over-stimulated activities of sense and emotion. Herr Wagner seems to think the sole condition of harmony in art is the co-ordination of distinct series of impressions in the closest possible correspondence. He does not recognize that, with the conditions of our modern and highly-developed arts, the most perfect harmony of impression is only attainable by a style of art which, instead of labouring to invade the soul, so to speak, by every avenue of sense, modestly seeks to find a way to its inmost regions by one single avenue. It would seem to be obvious that before the whole nature of man can be thus satisfied at once by one complex work of art, its several parts must become enfeebled and attenuated.

We would assign to the musical drama a very high place among the arts, but certainly not that unique rank claimed by its newest representatives. As we have said, the opera is the result of a *compromise* between two arts which have attained a large amount of independence; accordingly, it cannot exhibit all the powers of music, for these have long ago outgrown the function of distinct poetic expression; neither can it exhibit all the powers of the drama, since these, through their number and complexity, often defy the interpretation of music. The musical drama seeks to represent a comparatively simple and highly emotional action, having a certain beauty, and so susceptible of musical accompaniment. When thus restricted, it is capable of realising a considerable harmony of impression, with a variety which need not distract nor confuse; hence it claims a place among the most delightful forms of art, though æsthetic science has as yet no data for determining its exact altitude.

JAMES SULLY.



OUGHT WE TO OBEY THE NEW COURT?

"Let our strength be the love of justice."

WISE MAN.

THE Year of Grace ungraciously yielded by the Nation to the Church, ere the relations between the latter and the former be changed, has nearly passed away. The twelve months granted by Parliament to the Clergy of the Established Religion, to decide whether or not they will receive at the hands of the State alone decisions upon the doctrine,* ceremonial, and discipline of CHRIST'S Church, has nearly gone. Men have had space for reflection. They have had opportunity of seeing things as they are, not as they have been depicted. They have had leisure to reconsider their opinions, and to estimate the effect of their acts and words. Men's hearts have had time to recover the strain to which they were subjected by justifiable excitement from within and unjustifiable irritation from without. Men's minds have been able to weigh more dispassionately and less angrily the real issues at stake—though formerly they may have failed to realize them. They have been able to study the point in debate, historically as well as a matter of policy, legally as well as by the light of religious controversy, constitutionally as well as under the

* That the Public Worship Regulation Act directly affects matters of doctrine will be proved at length, and is assumed throughout the paper. It is of the chiefest importance that this fact be clearly realised. It suffices here to say that, at the first vacancy in the Court of Arches, the new Judge becomes *ex officio* its Official Principal. Every cause, therefore, which would have come before the legitimate Dean of Arches will now come, either in the first instance or in first appeal, before the new Judge created by Act of Parliament. This is true whether a clergyman be prosecuted under the provisions of the new Act of 1874, or of the old Church Discipline Act; and is unaffected by the postponement of the Judicature Act, or by the renewed vitality temporarily infused into the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

influence of undignified panic—though they once failed to see that any questions of constitution, law, or history were involved. In short, a calm has followed the storm. Persons, on both sides, are calculating the results—what has been gained; what may yet be lost? what is inevitable; what may still be remedied? They are asking—who actually caused the turmoil; what has it already done; what will be its effect in the future?

At such a moment, it is not unfit to ask: What answer to the Nation will the Church return at the close of the year of grace? What reply will the Clergy make to Parliament when the twelve months' reprieve shall have expired? What will they say to their flocks, whom they have taught that CHRIST'S Kingdom is not of this world; and to the World, who knows that they have so taught? What will they say to their own conscience, which believes in the Catholic Church; and to GOD, Who knows they so believe? Are they prepared to witness unmoved the personal and official abandonment of spiritual authority and power, in one word, of Jurisdiction, by their bishops? Are they prepared to accept from the State alone, and in defiance of Church law, a purely secular tribunal for purely spiritual causes? Are they willing to accept, in any case, from a member of the legal profession appointed under the sole authority of Parliament, civil decisions on the mysteries of the faith, the details of worship, the rules of Christian duty; and to obey such decisions, if the truth be thereby compromised? Are they willing to retain office and to exercise sacred functions in a Church episcopal (speaking popularly) in essence as well as in form, with a fundamental element of episcopal jurisdiction withdrawn under one aspect, and with every shred of it torn away under another? Are they content, in a word, to become the servants of an Act-of-Parliament Church—in responsible positions indeed, and highly honoured of the world in their servitude; but yet, in subjection, in all they hold dearest and prize most highly and believe most firmly, to the temporary ruling of an uncertain majority in the House of Commons? Will they teach or cease from teaching; will they act or cease from acting; will they retain GOD'S worship as the Church of CHRIST has ordered, or mould it after some other fashion, according to the decisions of the State-made judge? Will they in morals, in ceremonial, above all in doctrine, now consent to be bound by, where hitherto for countless ages they have been free from, the decisions of an impalpable thing called the National Will, as expressed by the unequivocal votes of a popular assembly largely composed of Jews, Nonconformists, and Infidels? Will they obey man in the place of GOD? For such, stated in plain language, is the alternative placed before the Clergy of the Established Religion. Such is the conflict precipitated, prematurely and unwisely, between the

Church and the World in England. The position here indicated must be mastered before any sober and well-considered answer can be given to the question—Ought we to obey the New Court in Spiritual Causes?

It is fully time to ask these questions distinctly and to obtain a definite answer to them before July, 1875, comes—a date which may be predicted with certainty to be a turning-point in the history of the Church of England. It may possibly prove to be the beginning of a new era in the history also of a Nation hitherto blessed by the union of Church with State. It is fully time at this, the eleventh hour, for two reasons:

Firstly; because it is an unhappy fact, in looking backwards on the past twelve months, that we can point to no declaration from our presumable leaders to help us, the rank and file of the High Church party, to form a judgment on this momentous subject; to no statement of principle to instruct us; to no line of action for us to follow. So far as the present writer can gather, not one of our great men, whom we respect and to whom we would listen, has uttered a sound or made a sign to influence those who look to them for guidance at this juncture. No doubt reasons sufficient to themselves have caused this silence, since the Bill became law—for they spoke with no uncertain sound at S. James's Hall in 1874. Perhaps it indicates that the time for teaching is over, and that the time for passive endurance and suffering resistance has begun. But the silence can be otherwise interpreted, both by friends and enemies. Perhaps it is but the last proof, that the only leaders which the Catholic party acknowledge, and wherein consist its supernatural power and unprecedented success, are Catholic Principles. But, under any hypothesis, the fact remains. The truths which are imperilled and denied have not been enforced afresh upon us, nor defended before the world, nor even stated for discussion or consideration. The course which we ought to adopt as an important and advancing party in the Church, or as units of the party, has not been indicated. Shall we stand or fall together: and how will either alternative be practically possible? Shall we allow the weak to be overpowered or the unpopular to be attacked: and how will the popular and the powerful amongst us (for such there are) assist their brethren? Shall we directly agitate for Disestablishment, and as a step to that end move for the relief of the bishops from their duties in the House of Lords: or patiently await its inevitable, if not quick approach? Shall we, as a last resource and in self-defence, in order to save our conscience, retire into lay-communion—whatever that term may import for us who are priests: or shall we remain at our posts, individually disendowed and disestablished, turned adrift by the power of

the State, but yet ministering as priests to all who shall privately come to us, and laying in each parish the foundation of a Free Church of England of the future : or shall we, as mere spectators, inertly witness the gradual but sure disintegration of the old historical Church of England at the pleasure of a non-Christian Parliament, whose will in spiritual matters is now, for the first time, to be enforced as law ? To some of these questions at least we might reasonably have expected a reply from distinguished men. It is not improbable that some of the questions will find an active solution on the part of many persons, although no verbal response has been made by our leaders.

Secondly ; it is time to ask these questions, because we are face to face with the Act of Parliament which necessitates their answer. It is no matter of antiquarian research. It is no matter of history, legal or constitutional. We know its parentage. We have witnessed its origin and growth. We are conscious of its development—its changes, contradictions, and vacillations. We can conceive its effects ; and have been threatened with its terrors. Moreover, we are aware of the lines of mere temporary policy upon which the measure was based, and the principles of truth ignored by its enactment : of the expediency which will dictate its operation, and the rights and powers invaded when it shall be enforced.

Two facts alone are sufficient to discredit the Act of 1874 with all Church people. 1st : It violates the principle of the English constitution formulated by Lord Coke, but acted upon from time immemorial, that “ecclesiastical laws are to be administered by ecclesiastical judges,” and it may be added, in Ecclesiastical Courts. 2nd : It has destroyed, partially and virtually in one case, wholly and absolutely in another, the legal jurisdiction of the English episcopate, the spiritual authority and power of our bishops. Hence, one may be excused, however feeble the effort, for making an attempt to answer the question of obedience at this crisis of the Church.

For it is a crisis in the Church’s career in this kingdom of England—a crisis of which we of middle age have not seen the like, a crisis of which those who read history and study theology have not heard the like. Theology need hardly be called to supply evidence of the outrage inflicted upon the first principles of the Christian Religion, in the mutual relation of the temporal and spiritual powers. Any elementary catechism of the faith will furnish materials for forming a right judgment. But history, though we have continual evidence in how many ways it may be read, can produce no exact parallel to the present ecclesiastical and civil paradox. Cases may be quoted, indeed, which offer a partial or one-sided resemblance. In the domain of dogmatic truth, the

episcopate of a province may have surrendered the deposit of faith, as in the wide-spread defection during the Arian heresy. Whether or not this may be considered a parallel instance to the action of the English bishops in regard to their spiritual jurisdiction, it may be hoped that the parallel extends to the cure as well as to the disease. For, under episcopal desertion, it was the priesthood and faithful laity who preserved the sacred trust of Catholic truth in the early ages. It may be by the suffering resistance of the clergy and the passive endurance of the people that, in these latter times, the authority and power of the bishops may be regained, and the liberties of the Church may be restored. The present instance, however, is unique in the annals of Christianity. It may be more respectful to those in authority, and it is not less true to fact, to conceive what the historian of the future will be forced to record, rather than to state what contemporary criticism may remark. The events which must appear on the page of history, when relieved of the technicalities of the legist or politician, are these: Firstly; that the entire episcopate, as individual bishops, of a National Church, in the nineteenth century of grace, voluntarily surrendered to a non-Christian popular assembly its own inherent and really inalienable spiritual rights and powers. In other words, the Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874, either virtually or absolutely, destroyed the legal jurisdiction of the English bishops and archbishops. Secondly; that, as a consequence of the parliamentary action of the bishops, again as individuals, spiritual causes were heard and spiritual sentences were pronounced, on and after July 1st, 1875, by a judge who was secular, and in a court that was civil, under the sole authority of the temporal power. In other words, that when the Act in question came into operation, it violated a fundamental principle of the Christian Religion, which had from the first been respected in the corporate union of Church and State.

The latter statement of the future historian needs no explanation. Every lawyer admits its truth. A politician of the eminence of Mr. Gladstone has repeated the dictum of Lord Coke as applicable to these times. The former statement may be annotated, at least in its qualifications. The distinctions aimed at are these. The Public Worship Regulation Act has *virtually* destroyed the legal jurisdiction of the English bishops, because for certain causes, namely, those contemplated by the Act, and at the will and pleasure of three parishioners, the twenty-eight Diocesan Courts of first instance, which synchronise with Christianity, are legally abolished. The Public Worship Regulation Act has *absolutely* destroyed the legal jurisdiction of the English archbishops because, for every cause, of doctrine, discipline, or ritual, it enacts the legal abolition of the two Provincial Courts of first appeal at

Canterbury and York. In the first case, the Act provides for the hearing and decision of the cause by a lay judge appointed under the authority of its own enactment. In the second, the Act distinctly states, that "all proceedings (including necessarily questions of doctrine) thereafter taken before the judge (of its own creation). . . . within the province of Canterbury, shall be deemed to be taken in the Arches Court." The same law applies to the Chancery Court of York. In both provinces "this section shall come into operation immediately after the passing of this Act," and "whenever a vacancy shall occur in the" offices in question. In view, therefore, of the virtual abolition of the twenty-eight Diocesan Courts in certain causes, and of the actual abolition of the two Provincial Courts in every cause—both at the instance of the bishops themselves—is it wide of the mark to affirm that we are passing through a crisis in the Church's career?

Circumstances have made the writer conscious of a wide-spread conviction amongst the clergy of almost every diocese, that the authority claimed for the Court and method of procedure established under the Public Worship Regulation Act is contrary to the first principles of the Christian Religion. There is good reason to believe that this conviction is shared by even a wider range than personal observation has enabled him to take. It is true, that not to an equal extent is there agreement as to the course of action which such a belief necessitates, or suggests. But conviction must precede common action, to be effective; and it is an encouraging fact for the possible future of the Church of England, that a large number of her most faithful and zealous clergy concur on the ecclesiastical illegality of this measure. They hold it to be subversive of the Church's system. It is true, again, that the clergy in question do not all agree in the reasons which lead to the common consent. Some honestly confess that the subject of jurisdiction is one which has not been specially studied by them. Some are loyally unwilling to think that the bishops themselves were really aware of the legitimate consequences of their unadvised action, or that their action will have the fatal consequences which seem to be inevitable. Others, with a matter-of-fact view of the case, conceive that practically we are not much worse off than before, in the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and that it were better to be judged by an impartial barrister than by a bishop whose impartiality might possibly be questioned. And others, again, take a hopeful, not to say a sanguine view, that the New Act will become, under possible contingencies, what many an old law has proved itself to be, a dead letter. But all, more or less firmly, hold that the measure of 1874 legally deprives the episcopate of spiritual authority and power which it is essential for a Christian bishop freely to enjoy

and use. Well may they thus hold, if it be in any wise true that the twenty-eight Diocesan Courts are (for certain causes) virtually abolished, and the two Provincial Courts are (for every cause) absolutely abolished by Act of Parliament; and that henceforth, in the Church of this land, spiritual causes are to be decided by a lay judge in a civil court created by the secular power.

These circumstances have induced the present writer to place on record and to offer for consideration the following thoughts on the new Court for the trial of ecclesiastical offences. Had the question been one of abstract theological truth on deep Christian verities, which required learning for its discussion, he had not attempted to treat it. But the elements of the faith alone are actually concerned, which lie on the surface of religion. Had the question been one of intricate State policy, or of obscure constitutional right, which required professional training for its mastery, he had not ventured to touch it. But the elements of legal and political knowledge only are necessarily involved, which are almost axiomatic. No doubt hard theological propositions and difficult problems of law and politics are, or may be, connected with any full treatment of the subject, in its origin or its results. No doubt both divines and lawyers can import obscurity into the question and display learning in the argument, which will have the effect, if it were not the object, to confuse and blind. But the plain statement of first principles, and their direct application, and the resolute avoidance of collateral details which hide the main issue, will enable any one of average mental power, and ordinary historical and theological acquirement, to form a judgment in this matter if not un-erringly right, at least not seriously wrong.

The writer, with a deep sense of the gravity of the situation and of the responsibility which is inseparable from the task, ventures to address himself to the subject of this paper with confidence: ventures, because many would more effectively plead for the faith; with confidence, because none could be more certain of the premisses, nor more assured of the ultimate result. He approaches it as both priest and citizen. As priest, he has learnt the theological truth which supports the constitutional principle that "ecclesiastical laws are to be administered by ecclesiastical judges," and with regard to recent enactment it may be added, in ecclesiastical courts. As citizen, he has seen the reports day by day, in the public papers, of the origin, growth and completion of a Bill in Parliament which enacts that spiritual causes are to be decided by a secular judge and to be decided in a secular Court. The old constitutional principle is at one with the first principles of the Christian Religion. The new Parliamentary enactment is destructive of them. As both citizen and priest, then, the writer

feels at liberty to ask his brother clergy and fellow-countrymen—Ought we to obey the New Court and method of procedure created before our eyes, which legally violate the fundamental principles of the faith, and unconstitutionally cancel the contract of our ordination vows? A counsel of disobedience to any authority is at all times a dangerous course to adopt. To a clergyman it is a painful one to advocate. It can only be justified when the conscience is absolutely convinced that it has to decide between what is due to GOD, and what is claimed by man. Perhaps it were better in such a case to supply materials for a reply than directly to make answer to the question.

Materials may easily be supplied. But before they are furnished, it may be well to state other and perhaps less important objections to the authority claimed for the Court and method of procedure established under the Public Worship Regulation Act; as well as to its mode of enactment, and to some of its results.

In addition to the two chief objections already urged, namely, I. the legal suppression, whether virtual or absolute, of the spiritual jurisdiction of the bishops and archbishops; and II. the unconstitutional infringement of the principle that ecclesiastical laws are to be administered by ecclesiastical judges, the following may with confidence be affirmed: *There exists no Act of Parliament on the Statute Book, in relation to the Church, comparable to the Act of 1874.* This is beyond controversy, whether the Act be viewed in regard to its subject matter; or to the mode, objects, and results of its operation; or to the authority which either alone created it, or was deliberately ignored by it. Let us define these points of comparison in order. 1. The subject matter of the Act (so far as the present argument is concerned) is the spiritual jurisdiction of the episcopate, in questions of the doctrine, discipline, and ceremonial of the Church. 2. The mode of its operation (under the like limitation) is the unprecedented way, in either Church or State, in which the lay judge of the new civil Court for the trial of ecclesiastical offences is appointed, together with his method of procedure. Its objects, expressed in brief, are the pronouncement of spiritual sentences in a secular Court by a civil judge. Its results, amongst others that may be named, are confusion and intrusion, as well as the abolition of episcopal jurisdiction, in the same or different dioceses and Diocesan Courts. 3. The authority (again with the same conditions) which was ignored, it may be almost said which was defied, was the co-ordinate authority of Convocation; and the sole authority which enacted it was that of Parliament.

There is no wish to deny that one, or more of these elements may be separately predicated of other legislative Acts affecting the Church. But this admission gives additional force to the

assertion, that all of them combined can be affirmed of no other measure. For instance:

Convocation may not have been consulted in relation to Acts of Parliament which bear upon the temporal side of ecclesiastical questions: but, in relation to their spiritual side, legislation similar to that of 1874 has never yet been forced upon the Church in defiance of Convocation. The method of procedure in ecclesiastical causes has no doubt been dealt with by Parliament. But it has only been so dealt with of late years, and since the suppression of Convocation; never to the present extent, nor in the present manner. And our complaint is this, that the new legislation affects much more than mere methods of procedure. The subject matter of the Act has before been the object of legislation: but not before has episcopal jurisdiction been tampered with, much less has it been abolished, either in part or wholly. The last feather turns the scale. It is the cumulating wrong of the Public Worship Regulation Act which makes it intolerable. In the eyes of Churchmen, its sin is cumulative, both in kind and degree. And in its composite wrongfulness consists the force of the question—Ought we to obey the New Court which it has created?

Let us note these points more in detail:

I. We may at once put aside all Acts of Parliament which concern merely testamentary and matrimonial matters, questions of time and money, forms of procedure and punishment, subdivisions of sees or union of parishes, and the creation of suffragan bishops, as clearly without the range of the present enquiry. We may also, of course, disregard all Acts which merely gave legislative sanction to measures which possessed the authority of Convocation, whether directly or indirectly; and those which merely affixed legal penalties to the breach of that which Convocation had already condemned as wrongful. These Acts of Parliament, and there are a large number of them, are essentially different, are different in principle as well as in detail, from the Act of 1874. Their omission from consideration relieves us from a wide field of investigation. Beyond such limits, it has been conclusively proved upon documentary evidence, that “from the Reformation downwards” to the year which witnessed the creation of the Final Court of Appeal, now declared by the voice of the nation to be moribund, there is no legislative action comparable to the Public Worship Regulation Act. The only measure which in any degree resembles the Act of 1874, (after the creation of the Court of Delegates, which will be considered below) was the Act which permitted judges of Ecclesiastical Courts to be married men, or being laymen to exercise, under spiritual authority, legal jurisdiction. But such relaxation from ancient rule did not affect the two points on which our grievance against the New Act is based. It did not

violate the constitutional principle, before mentioned. It did not infringe the legal jurisdiction of the bishops, before named.

Hence, the legislation by Parliament alone on the subject matter of the Act of 1874 vitally affects the question—whether or not we ought to obey the Court and Judge to which the Act gave birth.

II. Again : The mode, objects, and results of its operations are, as an Act of the civil power, without parallel in the history of the Church. Thus :

i. Viewed legally, how is the new judge appointed, to whom we are expected to yield obedience in spiritual matters? Of course, solely under the authority of an Act of Parliament. But, beyond this—by what instrumentality? Before a reply be given, it may be said, by an agency absolutely anomalous in either Church or State. Not by the Archbishops alone; for the civil power must be a consenting element in the appointment. Not by the civil power absolutely; for the Archbishops, under conditions, may nominate, and can in some sort be said to appoint. By what agency then? The Act is clear and decided on this point: By that of the Crown, by Letters Patent in the last resort: at any stage, subject to the approval of the Crown: under certain conditions only, and still with the sanction of the Sign Manual, by the joint action of the two primates. A chain possesses the strength only of the weakest link. The Act of 1874 has only the power of its feeblest clause. Speaking ecclesiastically, the weakest clause is the one which enacts that “her Majesty may appoint,” “the Official Principal of the Arches Court.” Such is the Statute law of England of to-day. The two Archbishops, if they concur in their choice, if they concur within a period of six months, may nominate to the vacant office—to be held “during good behaviour” by—“a person,” “qualified” as we shall see hereafter.

It need not be said, how irreconcilable is this matter of nomination and appointment, even legally, with the constitutional mode adopted from time immemorial in the Church of England. Observe, the constitutional method, by which the Archbishop alone appointed his own Official Principal, was the mode recognized by the State, legislatively, judicially, and executively. The Archbishop’s Official Principal became one of the acknowledged judges of the land. But now, bearing in mind theological differences in high places, and the limited number of persons really competent to act as an ecclesiastical judge, it is not improbable that the two primates might disagree in their choice, or might fail to agree within six months. Even supposing agreement within the allotted period to be possible, the Act still violates fundamental principles on the appointment of an ecclesiastical judge. The judge repre-

sented the mind of the bishop who appointed him. The bishop appointed the judge on his own sole and individual authority. These, heretofore, were common-places in Canon Law. They are now both contravened by Act of Parliament. In no case, in the future, will the judge of the Provincial Court be appointed by the sole authority of the Archbishop. Under favourable circumstances, the new judge will essay, in the north and south respectively, to reflect the opinions of two co-ordinate archiepiscopal nominees. Under hostile, but not improbable circumstances, the new judge will reflect the policy of the leader for the moment of the dominant faction in a popular and non-Christian assembly.

ii. Viewed spiritually, what are some of the objects of the New Court which we are supposed to obey? The objects are at least two-fold. Firstly, to pronounce decisions in spiritual causes. Secondly, to enforce such decisions by spiritual sentences. On the first, it might be enough to say—if we take the weakest link of the chain by which to test its strength—that “a person” appointed as we shall see by Letters Patent from the Crown as “a judge of the Provincial Courts,” does not strikingly fulfil Lord Coke’s canon of constitutional law, nor the requirements of the law ecclesiastical. On the second, it might suffice to note the scandal, which appears to be imminent, of purely spiritual sentences being pronounced on purely spiritual persons in Courts of law, with an ecclesiastical title indeed, but as to origin, authority, “rules and orders,” judge, mode of procedure and sentence, purely secular and civil.

But something more has to be said on a spiritual view of the case.

First: What are the qualifications of the “person” nominated, whether by the sole will of the premier, or by a compromise between the two primates, to the office of “a judge of the Provincial Courts?” Here again, the chain must be tested at its weakest part. The Act itself may reply—“A barrister-at-law who has been in actual practice for ten years.” To a Christian man, not to say a priest; to one who holds the article of the Creed, “I believe in the Holy Catholic Church,” not to say a High Churchman, such an answer is startling. It would have been appalling, could the reply have been made apart from the lowering influences which are inseparable from the agitation connected with such a measure as the Public Worship Regulation Act. Has it then come to this, that the old traditional and historic Church of England is content to see placed as “a judge” in her metropolitan Court of appeal in spiritual causes, “a person” who has practised ten years as an advocate at the common bar? Is the Church of England prepared to submit to the decision of a secular lawyer of ten years’ standing all causes, moral, ceremonial, and doctrinal,

which of right may be brought before her ancient and spiritual Provincial Courts? Are her sons so fatally demoralized as to recognise the judgments of a youthful barrister-at-law on questions which need the mature wisdom of divines even to entertain, or which may actually have divided Christendom into antagonistic schools? GOD grant that neither the Church, nor her loyal sons may be capable of such treachery.

Second: What is the subject matter of the decisions of the new judge of the Provincial Courts? The gravity of this question can hardly be exaggerated. It has been supposed amongst the clergy who may be made the first victims of the new legislation, and it has been widely disseminated, that together with other and even less dignified matters, of the "fabric, ornaments, and furniture" of the Church, questions of "mere ceremonial alone" will be decided in the newly created Court. Passing by the studied affront to Divine Worship which is intended by such a phrase, an affront which is offered to all who believe with the Creed of S. Athanasius that "the Catholic Faith is this, that we worship ONE GOD in Trinity"—it may suffice to say that such a statement falls short of the truth. Ceremonial, indeed, will be adjudicated upon in the New Court; but not ceremonial alone. Every question which might have formerly come in appeal before the old legitimate Provincial Court, may now be taken in the first instance before the newly-made judge. The section which provides for the appointment of the "person" to be "a judge of the Provincial Courts" came "into operation immediately after the passing of the Act." Hence, on the first vacancy which occurs in the office of the Dean of the Arches, any barrister of ten years' standing may be called to decide on the highest verities and deepest mysteries of the Catholic Faith. This point has not received the attention which is due to its supreme importance. It must not be forgotten that, in its mode of operation, the Public Worship Regulation Act directly affects not only the discipline and worship, but also the doctrine of the Church of CHRIST.

iii. Viewed ecclesiastically, what may be the aspect which the newly-created Court and the newly-made judge take, when obedience to them in the matter of jurisdiction is claimed at our hands? Without straining overmuch the ancient theory of the episcopate, it may be asserted with little danger of contradiction as an abstract principle, that the integrity of a bishop's office demands two conditions. Firstly, a bishop must have both authority and power to pronounce spiritual sentences within the limits of his own diocese. Secondly, his diocese must be free from the like sentences being pronounced by any other bishop.

The first condition, it is obvious from a glance at the Act of 1874, is openly disregarded. If it be urged, it is only on questions

of which Divine Worship is the most important, that the bishop's jurisdiction is withdrawn : we reply, Canon Law has ever included the Worship of GOD amongst those questions which are within the province of a bishop to decide. "I speak of canonical judgment" (says De Marca, quoted by Dr. Pusey), "wherein the question was of faith, *ceremonies*, discipline of the clergy, or any canonical question." This is the answer of a Churchman. But there is another answer which a politician will respect. The Act of 1874, in withdrawing the legal jurisdiction of the bishop and placing it in the hands of one appointed by the authority of the State, commits the constitutional blunder of dividing the legislative and judicial powers. It would seem that our legislators, whilst in some instances boastfully ignorant of Church law, were equally forgetful of their own principles in State-craft. What civil government could exist for a day, if the authority for its legislative and judicial powers were divorced? Yet, this is the strange anomaly which the State attempts to force upon the Church. An authority which has no power to make law assumes power to interpret law. In other words, the State, which is powerless to legislate for the Church, has usurped power to adjudicate for the Church, in spiritual matters.

The second condition needs no professional knowledge to enforce. Its import is self-evident in relation to any well-ordered civil community, and much more to the Divinely organized society of the Church. But into what ecclesiastical confusion does the Public Worship Regulation Act precipitate the Church of England, in both its provinces and in all its dioceses? Into a disorder which is chaotic. Not only, for the purposes contemplated by the Act, is the ancient ecclesiastical authority and power of the twenty-eight comprovincial bishops legally abolished, but the modern Parliamentary jurisdiction of the two primatial sees becomes confused in regard to themselves, becomes intruded in regard to others. For, upon what principle, civil or spiritual, it may be asked, does Canterbury combine with York in the appointment (subject to the approval of the Crown) of a perambulating judge to serve in two incongruous capacities? The idea is foreign to every principle of Canon Law. The reality is unknown to the history of Christianity. From time immemorial in this Church and Kingdom there have existed of ecclesiastical right and national sanction, either with or without the official titles, *the* judge of the Provincial Court of Canterbury, and *the* judge of the Provincial Court of York. In the nineteenth century an Act of Parliament has created a new thing in national law which it seeks to graft upon Church law—"a judge of the Provincial Courts of Canterbury and York" united. Such an abortion in legislation is inconceivable to ecclesiastical procedure. It is a worthy product

of a popular assembly widely including Jews, Nonconformists, and Infidels, which aspires to rule the Church of CHRIST by the promptings of a National conscience; of a popular assembly whose action on religious topics an admixture of Greek, Latin, and English Catholicity is insufficient to confine within the limits of even National Christianity. Jurisdiction, then, may be assumed to be confused. It is also intruded. For, even if we can admit the right, as the Act has given power to the two primates to exercise a confused jurisdiction in the appointment of a judge for their own Courts of appeal, two questions may fairly be asked by any of their suffragans. Durham in the north and London in the south may claim to know why the confused jurisdiction of Canterbury and York combined is intruded upon them? Chester and Chichester may seek to learn, upon what principle of Canon Law such intruded jurisdiction is enforced in cases of first instance by means, be it observed in passing, of a Court of first appeal? It may be left to the authors of the ecclesiastical chaos to answer both questions.

Hence, again, the legislation by Parliament alone on the mode, objects and results of the Public Worship Regulation Act, viewed in certain aspects only from a legal or spiritual or ecclesiastical position, materially affects our reply to the question, whether or not we ought to obey the New Court and judge which the Act created?

III. Once more: By the passing of the Act of 1874, the authority of Convocation was not only deliberately ignored; it was over-ruled, and even to a certain extent defied. In this fact is contained another element in any answer to the question of obedience which may be made by a priest, whose ordination vows pledge him, and only pledge him to "the discipline of CHRIST, as this Church and Realm hath received the same." Whatever may be the value of the declaration, (of course it lacked the sanction of the Upper House) the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury decidedly pronounced against the Bill then under debate. A Committee had been appointed to consider the Bill. After proposing a large number of amendments, extending over four closely printed pages, their Report concluded as follows: "The Committee after having . . . carefully considered the provisions of the Bill . . . deeply regret that, even with the amendments suggested, they are unable to recommend legislation in the manner proposed in the Bill." They also add a statesman-like corollary in favour of the Church Discipline Act being repealed, and the existing Consistory Courts being reformed, as suggested in their Report, and as the only legitimate way to meet existing difficulties. It is needless to say that the advice of Convocation was not accepted. It was not even avowedly entertained. The Lower House of the York Convocation indirectly arrived at a like conclusion.

At this stage of the argument it is enough to point out a dilemma in which the temporal power has placed itself. The Public Worship Regulation Act does one of two things. It is a legislative Act which either only regulates ecclesiastical procedure, or effects more than the regulation of procedure. If it does more than regulate procedure, as we hold that it does, from the history both of the Church and Nation of England, it is clear that Convocation as a whole ought not, upon constitutional principles, to have been ignored, nor in one chamber at least to have been defied. If it does less than legislate upon first principles, as some of its defenders assume, *i.e.* if it only regulates procedure, the following facts, brought to light by the research and learning of the Rev. E. S. Grindle, in a recent pamphlet entitled "Canon or Statute," (Hayes) published in the form of a Correspondence with Lord Selborne, have to be met and dealt with. He shows, from documentary evidence:

1st. That (with the exceptions above mentioned) "from the Reformation downwards" to the year 1717 "the discipline of the Church and the constitution of the Ecclesiastical Courts were regarded as within the province of Convocation." This Mr. Grindle proves, not only from the acts and records of Convocation itself and "the claims which that body made on its own behalf, but also by the acts and admissions of the Crown and its responsible advisers." It need only be added, that the State officially recognized such dealing with ecclesiastical procedure by Convocation, by endorsing and acting upon it.

2nd. That "during the period in which legislative enactments affecting the (procedure of the) Ecclesiastical Courts were made by Convocation, the Statute Book is absolutely barren of any such enactments made by Parliament." It is only seventy years after the forcible suppression of Convocation that "we find legislative enactments, directly affecting the internal constitution of the Ecclesiastical Courts, made by Parliament without the assent of the Church." Mr. Grindle well adds: "The system thus begun in 1787 has brought the Church to a state bordering on disruption. It is incompatible with the profession of the Church of England that she is reformed on the model of the Primitive Church."

How will the authors of the Public Worship Regulation Act escape from this dilemma? On the lowest view of the case (one that a Churchman cannot accept) the recognized authority which, in the history of Church and State, had hitherto decided matters of procedure ought not, on constitutional principles, to have been ignored, much less defied. On the highest view, in regard to the exercise of spiritual jurisdiction, which has been suppressed, the case is even stronger.

The last point to be noted in this place is the fact that the Act

of 1874 was passed by the sole authority of Parliament. It would be sufficient to leave this statement to speak for itself, were it not that the ingenuity of some whose minds are ill at ease may seek to elude the force of this plain position. They may be fain to apply a salve to their conscience. The supposititious reasons alleged for obedience to the New Court and judge may be hypothetically combated. For example: Men may say that the Church came to the State and asked for legislation; and that Parliament having legislated at the request of the bishops, the clergy are bound to obedience. Men may say that the fact of the bishops having assisted to pass the Act of 1874, and having secured a veto upon its operation, either positively or negatively supplies a wanting spiritual element in the gross: and that the new judge working in harmony with the bishop of a diocese, or the bishop confirming the decisions of the new judge, supplies the element of spirituality in any given case. Men may say that the old Court of Arches and the old Judicial Committee possessed no real element of spiritual authority, according to ancient precedent; that the new Court of Arches and the new Supreme Court possess none; and hence that if obedience were paid to the one, it is due to the other. Men may say that obedience may be rendered under protest.

Take these reasons in order:

(1.) The weakest of all the stimulants, as the salve really becomes on application, is the last—the argument in favour of protest. To act against conscience, under protest, is a weak device of a feeble mind. But supposing a protest offered—in what terms would it be made? to whom would it be given? who would receive it? where would it be deposited? what would be the effect of it? whom would it benefit in the future? whom would it defend at the present? (2.) The argument against the spiritual authority alike of all the Courts is more difficult to answer. Somewhat will be said on this hereafter. But the true answer is this: Under existing circumstances we cannot wait till perfection be found in the matter of obedience. We must have some source of authority to which to defer. The Arches Court possessed an element of authority. Two wrongs do not make one right. It is bad policy to destroy one authority which some acknowledged by creating another authority which none will acknowledge. (3.) The argument that the bishop, either before or after the decision by a civil officer in a secular Court, can supply an element of spirituality is difficult to grasp. Take the latter case: How can the bishop confirm, or otherwise influence for good or ill, the secular decision? This argument pre-supposes that the bishop's jurisdiction is legally destroyed. In what Court then could the sentence be legally confirmed? If there be no such Court, would a parish priest feel

bound to accept the mere individual expression of his diocesan's private opinion? If the sentence be not binding in conscience before, it could not be binding after, such expression of episcopal opinion.

The negative argument (4.) in favour of submission to the judge, from the fact that the bishops hold in their hands the practical working of the Act, and by their veto, in any given case, can suspend its operation, cuts two ways and proves too much. If credit be claimed for any individual prelate for the absolute suspension of the Act in his diocese, or against any particular priest; what sentence must attach to any other prelate who allows of its being enforced? If credit be claimed for the episcopal body which succeeded in securing the right of veto; what verdict must be passed upon the order itself which made such concession possible, by first voluntarily surrendering to the will and pleasure of Parliament their legal jurisdiction? (5.) The positive argument in favour of obedience to the Court, from the fact that the bishops assisted to obtain the enactment of the Bill, and from the statement that the Church asked the State to legislate upon a spiritual question, is founded partly in truth and partly in fiction. The bishops, as spiritual peers, undoubtedly co-operated in legalizing the New Court. But neither the Church, nor any who represented the Church, sought from the temporal power spiritual authority. Two facts tend to prove this assertion. 1st. In their corporate capacity, as an episcopal college, the bishops took no action whatever in the passing of the Act. To the minds of many, such absence of corporate action is an evidence of providential interference by the Divine Head of the Church. The Bill was not introduced into the Upper House of Convocation. It is clear, then, that the personal concurrence of individual members of a corporate society cannot compromise, or in any way commit, the body as an integral whole. 2nd. The idea which has occurred to some minds, of a council of bishops petitioning Parliament to pass the Act, is unreal. Nothing comparable to a council was held. Nothing comparable to a council, under existing ecclesiastical law could be held outside Convocation, as binding on the Church. Whatever abstract opinion may be entertained on the relations of the two bodies, or upon the privileges and powers of one of them, there actively exist at the present moment, and there have, in fact, existed time out of mind two chambers in the sacred Synod of the Anglican Church, with co-ordinate powers. The voice of the English Church is to be heard in the combined utterance of both Houses of Convocation, not in the separate resolution of either. This is the law of prescriptive right in the Church of England, and is part and parcel of the English constitution. It is not needful to defend the position from a theoretic standpoint. It is enough

to say that in the Anglican Communion the priesthood possesses, and has ever possessed, in the matter of legislation, co-ordinate powers with the episcopate. Even if it could be affirmed that the Upper House of Convocation had petitioned Parliament to the end in view, the Church would not have been compromised. But it cannot be so affirmed. In truth, there was nothing comparable to a council of the bishops taking action in the matter. There was, it may be admitted, something very like a cabal.

Hence, the enactment by the authority of Parliament alone, and the defiance of the rights and privileges of Convocation in the passing, without its concurrence, of the Public Worship Regulation Act, further and most seriously affects our answer to the question—Whether or not in conscience we ought to obey the Court and judge which owe their existence solely to the New Act of 1874?

Materials may now be offered for making a reasonable and consistent reply to the question of this paper. The main position in the argument is now reached, and the two points of leading importance may fitly be discussed under one head. The contention is this: The bishops have been deprived by the authority of Parliament, not only without the consent but against the will of the Church, of the legal jurisdiction which is essential to the due and full performance of their episcopal office. Such jurisdiction involves doctrine, and discipline, and ceremonial. The Church has thereby suffered grievous spiritual wrong. The two grave issues above stated are only the cause and effect respectively of this central position: and both effect and cause are subsidiary to it. The virtual or absolute suppression of the Spiritual Courts is the cause. That ecclesiastical laws are *not* administered by ecclesiastical judges is the consequence. The clergy are intimately, though by no means exclusively, affected by both. It is a matter, spiritually, of far more importance to them than the suspension of *habeas corpus*, or any other constitutional principle affecting the laity. They have been deprived of a prescriptive right which has been enjoyed by the Church, and has been used legally with the support and consent of the State, from time immemorial. The right is one which Parliament did not, in any sense, give; and could not really take away. It is one which existed inherently in the episcopal office before Parliament assigned to it legal sanction. It is one which may still be employed, had we bishops equal to the occasion of choosing between Cæsar and CHRIST, even after Parliament has withdrawn from it the sanction of the law. But the State, though it cannot touch the principle in question, is all-powerful to suppress its legal exercise. And this power it has exerted to the full. The State has withdrawn from the bishops of

the Church legal jurisdiction which the episcopate has from the first both enjoyed and used. This suppression of legal right, consummated without the consent and against the will of the Church, is nothing short of a revolution.

The deprivation of spiritual right was, if the paradox be allowed, parliamentary in form and unconstitutional in essence. It has forced the clergy into an anomalous position whence they can only escape by means which, in consequence of legislative illegality, may appear to be, but are not, lawless. It has left the clergy in a position which has no parallel in the history of English Constitutional principles, in at least three distinct aspects. Even from a political standpoint these aspects are worthy of note.

Firstly: The clergy have suffered deprivation of right by a popular assembly into which they alone, as a class, of all Englishmen are disqualified from entering. As an order entirely without representation in the House of Commons, Parliament has forcibly withdrawn from them the prescriptive right of centuries.

Secondly: The clergy have been thus in a sense outlawed, whilst the legislative Chamber in which they both can sit and are represented has been ignored by Parliament in the conduct of the measure by which they have suffered. As a matter of history, that Chamber had regulated the major part of the procedure now, together with the right, swept away. But in 1874, though the course was urged, Convocation was not constitutionally summoned to initiate, concur in, and confirm the measure of suppression: nor has it had official opportunity to oppose or condemn the Act synodically.

Thirdly: From the operation of these causes, the clergy are placed in a position which they never occupied in the times of Tudor tyranny, which they have not occupied since the days of the great Rebellion. As an unrepresented class and disqualified order, they have been subjected to the jurisdiction of a judge whose creation and tenure of office is based upon one authority, whilst the law that he administers is based, and almost wholly reared, upon another and different authority. This has been effected not only without their consent, but, it may be fairly added in view of the Report of Convocation, against their will. The clergy will now execute their sacred functions under the jurisdiction of a secular judge who interprets spiritual law by the sole authority of the temporal power. With an imperial government, the authority of the legislative and judicial powers have been separated. Can a confusion more perfect, political and ecclesiastical, severally and jointly, into which professional statesmanship has fallen, be conceived? It is one result of the enactment of the Public Worship Regulation Bill.

These anomalies affect, in the first instance and to the largest

degree, the clergy. But they do not affect the clergy only. In a body politic, as in a body spiritual, if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. It is impossible thus to deal with a class, and much more with an order, of men of education, position, and influence, unequalled as a whole in these characteristics, who are located in every parish and collected in every town of the kingdom, and to imagine that the evil will not find you out. In one way at least the sin will come home to the political conscience—perhaps sooner than is expected. It requires neither a prophetic mind to predict, nor a legal mind to perceive, endless and perhaps insuperable difficulties in the mere practical working of a measure avowedly at issue with Canon Law and not in harmony with even Parliamentary legislation for the Church. The New Act was conceived in too secular a spirit, it was too unskilfully drawn, it was too often revised and amended, it was passed too hastily—not to dwell on faults of greater moment—to permit of a smooth course in the future. Any way, the anomalies created by the State alone essaying to rule the Church are not matters of opinion, but matters of fact. It is a fact, that the bishops have been deprived of their spiritual jurisdiction solely by the will of the temporal power, and against the will of the Church. It is a fact, that the clergy are now forced to accept decisions in spiritual matters at the bar of a State-made tribunal of a State-made judge. It is a fact, after every theological subtlety has been urged, after every legal quibble has been exhausted. How ought the Church to meet this last attack of the World? By active disobedience; by passive resistance; or by submission?

The materials at disposal for making answer to this question may conveniently be divided in accordance with the subject matter of them. There are at least two ways in which the whole subject may be considered with a view of obtaining a right reply. Answer may be made in relation to practical action, and in regard to theoretic principle. It is possible that the answer may not be the same in both cases. It is conceivable that a system theoretically vicious may work well; or being indefensible in practice, may yet be sound in principle. And in the various relations between the temporal and spiritual powers, the obscurity of their origin and the difficulties of their adjustment, neither alternative is improbably false in the matter of recent secular legislation on ecclesiastical topics. In either case, any answer which we can give to the question—Ought we to obey the New Court? must be weighted with conditions. But, if neither alternative may be affirmed of the Public Worship Regulation Act, the reply to be returned must be unconditioned. If it cannot be said, that the practice is good though the principle is bad, nor that the theory is good though its action is bad—but rather that action and

principle are both hopelessly wrong and vicious—then, the evidence against the Act of 1874 is cumulative, and the verdict to be pronounced will be unanimous and decided. We should have been fortified in such a verdict had we been enabled to consider the evidence for arriving at it from both these standpoints, the practical and theoretic. Both are of importance: and each without the other is, in a measure, imperfect. The limitations of space, however, prevent the discussion of both; and a choice must be made. The evidence against the New Act from a practical side is shorter, more intelligible, less unattractive, and equally decisive. It need not be said in regard to difficulties in history, theology, law, and constitutional politics, that the practical view is not the harder. But the argument from principle can be sustained, and would be stated, did circumstances permit. Perhaps at another time, if not in another place, the present writer may have an opportunity of facing these difficulties. Indeed some will be incidentally met and answered in the following pages. But in the main, the practical argument only will be discussed; and even upon its merits alone may be confidently demanded a decision hostile to the claims of the Public Worship Regulation Act.

In order to estimate accurately the extent and gravity of the practical change effected in the position of the Church by the passing of the Public Worship Regulation Act, it is necessary to remember definitely what position ecclesiastical jurisdiction occupied prior to its enactment. This may be done, as far as possible, historically, without pledging the present writer to approve of all that he records—specially on three points. 1. It is beside the mark for him to express an opinion upon the ecclesiastical validity of the Arches Court, or its legitimate continuity as a spiritual power from ancient times. When opinions are so much divided on this involved topic, it would be presumptuous to dogmatize. He may add, however, that enthusiasm for the spiritual validity of the Court has been cooled, since the Dean of the Arches has so far acknowledged the jurisdiction of the lay Final Court as to decline to hear questions re-argued before himself which had been ruled by the Judicial Committee: and that, not on principle, but from expediency; not on questions decided after full, but after *ex parte* arguments. 2. It is needless for him to point out all the blots in the principle or details of the Church Discipline Act, or in the working of, or more truly in the absence of work in, the Consistory Courts of the bishops. Convocation itself, in the Report above quoted, having advocated the repeal of the first and the reform of the last, the shortcomings of both need be disguised by no Churchman. Least of all are we committed to the Church Discipline Act which became law during the time when Convocation was

silenced. 3. It would be a work of supererogation for any one to attempt to undervalue in ecclesiastical matters the constitution, mode of procedure; or judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The positive ignorance which its judgments display in questions affecting the Church; the mis-statement of facts, perversion of history, confusion of dates, tampering with formularies of which it has been guilty; and, more than all, the self-contradictions of its pronouncements, and the wide-spread feeling against their absolute impartiality in unpopular cases, have at length produced a re-action. Discredited even with the author of its existence, Parliament has decreed its un-honoured fall and unregretted extinction. In all three instances the writer would fain be free from being supposed to approve because he fails to condemn. But unless ecclesiastical discord be complete in the Church of England, some point of departure must be found or made for our investigation: and the existing order of ecclesiastical jurisdiction supplies the needful basis. Unless we have passed ecclesiastically from one abyss of absolute chaos to another, there must be the possibility of making comparisons between what we were, and what we have become. And without thinking that the former system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was faultless in practice, it may be shown that the present system is infinitely worse. That, at least, was bearable. This is felt to be intolerable.

It is now, as it always ought to have been, an accepted principle with the High Church party, that the decision of a lay Court of Final Appeal cannot itself compromise the Church which does not formally accept its decisions. However ecclesiastically inconvenient, it is possible for a Church to subsist in default of the existence of a Spiritual Court of Appeal higher than that of the Archbishop. In view of the marvellous revival in the Church of England during the past half-century, it might be said that a Church which lacked such authority could rise from a very debased condition. We have reason to know that this was a characteristic of the English mediæval system of appeals—the decision of the Archbishop's Court was, as a rule, final. With ourselves, in any given case, where a Spiritual Court superior to the Archbishop's does not exist, a priest may well be content to suffer wrong for the truth's sake without himself appealing to a lay Court: or being himself taken before the Secular Final Court, to suffer wrong upon the appeal of others. He may elect to be governed by the decision of the highest Spiritual Court of Appeal to which he has access: and observe, without such a Court, a Church is deficient in an essential element of spiritual jurisdiction. This is the true answer to all taunts levelled against those who were content to abide under the legal jurisdiction in ecclesiastical

causes of a lay Court of Final Appeal. It would have been a sufficient answer in regard to the new Supreme Court of Appeal for spiritual causes, had the Act of 1874 *not* been passed. But it is not now. In the former case the clergy had a Bishop's Court in which to appear. They had an Archbishop's Court to which to appeal. If more was denied them, they suffered spiritual loss indeed, but not spiritual death. And this principle was applicable to the old Court of Delegates, is applicable to the more modern Judicial Committee, and would have been applicable to the new Supreme Court, all of which Courts of Final Appeal stand on the same footing, and none of which are spiritual. But the principle can go no further than the present. It cannot be applied in the future, in consequence of the enactment of the Public Worship Regulation Bill of 1874.

At the date at which, by a legislative blunder, the Judicial Committee was, or was supposed to be, entrusted by Parliament with final decisions on appeal in spiritual causes, Convocation was forcibly silenced by the State. This is important to be remembered. Convocation was silenced also when the Church Discipline Act became law—the Act which regulated ecclesiastical procedure until it reached its final stage. In regard to these Acts of Parliament, the priesthood of the Church of England of that day, between five-and-thirty and five-and-forty years ago, could not be credited with much political foresight. They were regardless of the results which might flow from the action of legislation on the Church: and the results which actually flowed were wholly unexpected by them. Those clergy who were ordained before the Bills passed the legislature, had no representative Chamber of their own to which to appeal. They were then the only class of English citizens, Jews alone excepted—and they remain so still without that exception—who were excluded from the assembly which they were expected to obey. And those who were ordained after the Acts came into operation, were unconscious of the power which would be claimed by the State over the Church; how such power would be made to bear on themselves; how such power would be made a fulcrum for the exercise of fresh encroachments. In short, Convocation was in abeyance, and ecclesiastical matters did not then attract the keen interest from without, nor the jealous scrutiny from within, that they secure at present. The clergy ministered as of old, or were newly ordained, in simple faith that they were at liberty to minister “the doctrine and sacraments and the discipline of CHRIST, as the LORD hath commanded, and as this Church and Realm hath received the same.”

But it is otherwise now. Convocation is no longer gagged. It has been revived. It is in active operation, though it is far from being re-organized. The clergy have caught the spirit of

the age. In their measure they have become critically alive to their privileges as an order, to their rights as citizens, and to their influence as a force in the State. Men cannot enter the priesthood unconscious of, or remain in it unaffected by, the fact that, in spite of the remonstrance of one Chamber of the spirituality, and that the representative Chamber, the unconstitutional disregard of both Houses of Convocation has resulted in this catastrophe—that the State alone has legislated for the Church “as this Church and Realm hath *not* received the same.” What answer will the Church make to the World upon this count? Will it passively accept the legislation, or actively oppose it? One consideration ought to have weight. Our decision will affect the Church of the future, whether we are true or false to our principles at this crisis.

There is a further difference between recent ecclesiastical legislation and the legislation to which we, as clergy, have given our assent by entering the priesthood of the Established Church. This difference is obvious over and above the fact that Convocation was in abeyance at an earlier date; and remains after we have been pronounced credulous, un-critical, short-sighted, or stupid. It is obscured or minimized by those who, ungenerously not less than ineffectively, would elevate our silent concurrence with the past into a precedent for inaction now, or compliance in the future. But there is a point of endurance at which a worm will turn. Speaking in general terms, though definite language might be employed, modern legislation in ecclesiastical causes has produced two results. First; leaving untouched the ancient mode of procedure and appeal, in Courts of first instance and first appeal, Parliament legislated on and altered the Court of Final Appeal. This change was made in the years 1832 and 1833. Second; taking the Court of Final Appeal of its own creation as the standard of ecclesiastical procedure, Parliament re-organized from below a system of procedure and appeal, on the summit of which the Court now condemned was placed. This change was made in the year 1840. Now mark the difference. In both cases, although the last stage in the appeal for spiritual causes was of temporal authority only, the Archbishop's Court of First Appeal (the Arches or Chancery Court) escaped secular handling. It was esteemed too venerable, if not too sacred, to be lightly deprived of its prerogative and power. In both cases, again, the Episcopal Courts of first instance (the Diocesan Courts) were maintained in their relative position, either in complete or partial integrity. It was felt by legislators even thirty years ago that Courts which had prescriptive legal rights of many centuries, and in essence were coeval with Christianity itself, ought not to be tampered with, much less suppressed at the will of the House of Commons alone.

In other words, in spite of a lay Court of Final Appeal (which we have seen to be a misfortune, not a crime; to involve spiritual loss, but not death), the Church still retained, under indirect Parliamentary confirmation, her Consistory Courts and her own Court of Appeal from 1832 to 1840. In spite of secular interference with mere modes of procedure, which practically re-confirmed legislatively all that it did not alter; in spite of Parliamentary legislation on the course and limit of appeals, the Church of England still possessed Courts Christian presided over by her prelates, and Courts of appeal presided over by her primates, in every diocese and in both provinces, from 1840 to 1874. Can the like be said now? It cannot, with truth. For certain causes spiritual the Bishops' Courts have been virtually abolished. For every cause spiritual the Archbishops' Courts have been absolutely abolished. Both have been suppressed by the sole authority and power of Parliament alone. Both have been suppressed without the consent and against the will of the Church. Is it too much to affirm of the measure which produced these results, that it has effected a revolution? The Public Worship Regulation Act lays a firm and broad foundation for the future Disestablishment of the Church of England.

In 1874 came the change which materially affects our position as clergy of a Church established by law, who are also priests in the Church of GOD. The change is one which certainly has altered the legal status of the Church in this country in regard to itself, and must alter its corporate relations with the State. Perhaps no agitation from without, on the part of the Liberation Society, has caused such a shock both to those relations and to that status as the convulsion from within, at the will of Parliament. It is no exaggeration to say, that many a staunch and respectable ecclesiastic, not to speak of a large following of the faithful laity, has been converted to opinions which others have been maligned for advocating a little too early in the day. By the change which has ensued from this act of legislation, from a belief in the union of Church and State, they now perceive the absolute necessity of a severance between Church and State. For, to speak again in general terms, the change was this: Whilst adhering to a final appeal to the Crown in Council—though in what form the Act is ominously silent—the legislation of 1874 produced two results, both of which are subversive of the first principles of the faith.

Firstly: For certain spiritual causes it swept away every vestige of episcopal jurisdiction which had time-honoured sanction from the law. It enacted (the reader must forgive the repetition) that, in such cases, the jurisdiction of each of the twenty-eight prelates in his own diocese to try spiritual causes in the first instance should virtually cease. This, of course, involved the correlative

enactment that the clergy were to the like extent removed from the spiritual jurisdiction of their legitimate superiors in the Church. Moreover it ruled that, in the place of the spirituality deciding spiritual suits, a secular "person" should adjudicate upon the things of GOD.

Secondly: In every spiritual cause Parliament swept away the right of appeal to the ancient and legitimate Provincial Court of the Archbishop. It enacted that the individual and personal jurisdiction of the two primates in their own provinces, to hear spiritual appeals from the Courts of their suffragans, should absolutely cease. Moreover it ruled that, instead of ecclesiastical laws being administered by ecclesiastical judges, "the judge" under the authority alone of the temporal power—any barrister of ten years' standing at the least, and appointed in the last resort by the Crown—should preside over both Courts of appeal. In the place, therefore, of the old system of jurisdiction which, with more or less exactness, has obtained in England from the introduction of Christianity, and was preserved throughout the alterations effected from 1832 to 1840, a system novel in itself, without precedent, without example, equally unknown to canon and civil law, equally foreign to all recognized jurisprudence in Christendom—has been forced upon the spirituality by the will and pleasure of the temporality alone.

This is the revolution in Church and State which has been effected by the Public Worship Regulation Act.

At the expense even of repetition, it is needful on behalf of the cause pleaded for to state these points with all possible clearness. It is necessary for two reasons. 1. Because, both in and out of Parliament, members of the legislature have allowed themselves to say, that the New Act merely simplifies procedure in ecclesiastical matters; whereas, in truth, it is legally destructive of spiritual jurisdiction. 2. Because, even amongst our friends some are sufficiently credulous towards a transparent inaccuracy to accept this lame excuse for tampering with divine things; whereas, to judge of the offence by the position of the offended, a humble apology is due, with immediate satisfaction, to an outraged Church. If any point has been proved in the above pages, it is this, that the exercise of lawful spiritual jurisdiction has been suppressed in the Church of CHRIST by the temporal power alone. To a Churchman, nay to a Christian who has any belief in the supernatural and its revelation to men, this suppression involves a *violation of first principles* in the Catholic Faith. To him, and even to unprejudiced men outside the Church, the withdrawal of jurisdiction is more than a *simplification of procedure*. Indeed such language in the ears of either sounds like a deliberate misapplication of terms. The requirements of place and power may necessitate

verbal sophistry, But we need not dispute over language. It is no question of logomachy. Facts, not words, are what we denounce. It is the fact of the abolition of legal jurisdiction of which we complain, not the language employed to convey this fact. If forced to use, in a non-natural sense, which one at least of those who press this argument has in former days condemned, the technical jargon of the Courts, we will say that the so-called "simplification of procedure" in spiritual matters by the secular power alone involves a "violation of first principles." And we ask, with confidence in the answer of all true Churchmen, and of all consistent Nonconformists—Ought we to obey the New Court which by Act of Parliament "simplifies" away the "principles" of the Catholic Faith?

For instance: 1. It is said by those accounted as friends of the Church—Yes: It is true, that the New Act creates a new Court, with a new judge and a new method of procedure; and that the authority of all—procedure, judge, Court, and Act—are based upon the authority of the House of Commons. But still, it is yet possible that the cause may be conducted under the directions of the old procedure. It is possible to appear before the old judge, and to be convicted or acquitted by the old Court: in other words, to be prosecuted under the Church Discipline Act instead of under the Act of 1874. To this argument the rejoinder is obvious. If the apologist for the suppression or abolition of the Church Courts by the State affirms that the victim of persecution can exercise a choice, under which form of procedure his enemy shall attack him, then, the plea may be admitted. But, if the choice rests, as it practically does rest, not with the defendant, but with the prosecutor, then, the plea is fallacious.

2. It will be more respectful to the office of the one, and more modest in regard to the position of the other, if the present writer quotes without remark the words of two persons of exalted rank who, in this matter, can hardly be accounted our friends. The opinions of both are concisely stated in the pithy language of the Bishop (Fraser) of Manchester, in a speech before the Diocesan Synod, November 26th, 1874, "that by this Act, the law of the Church of England, whatever that was, had not been touched in one jot or tittle." This exhaustive statement is a short and easy method of settling the argument. The Archbishop (Tait) of Canterbury and an ex-Lord Chancellor (Selborne) have also pronounced upon the point. In his speech at the Diocesan Conference at Maidstone, held early in the present year, an account of which appears in the *Guardian* of February 3rd, the Archbishop is reported to have said: "The bunkum which was talked about a very harmless measure, which he had the honour of proposing in the Upper House of Parliament, produced the idea that there was

a greater dislike of obeying the law than really existed. His sole object in proposing that measure was to obtain a quiet and expeditious and inexpensive way of having the existing law obeyed." The Archbishop adds, in words which, if not misreported, contain a *naïve* admission of truth: "It was thought, and not unnaturally, that there was more in the Bill than this." Lord Selborne writes thus, in a letter which was published in the *Times*: "The Bill will, if it passes, be merely a measure for shortening and simplifying to a certain extent the legal procedure in a certain class of cases now cognizable under the present cumbrous procedure of the Ecclesiastical Courts." Lord Selborne adds: "All such enactments as to procedure in ecclesiastical causes have, from the Reformation downwards, been made by Parliament." Competent authorities have pronounced that Mr. Grindle's historical demolition of this statement, in the pamphlet above quoted, is complete. If answerable, it has been unanswered. Pending any reply, one would be tempted to inquire of either of these eminent men in Church and State: If the effect of the New Act constitutes a change of procedure only, what would constitute a change of principle?

We shall be able, perhaps, better to realize what changes have been wrought in our system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, if we call to mind how suits were conducted under the Church Discipline Act of 1840. The record of them will more clearly show whether we suffer now from a simplification of procedure, or from a violation of principle. The line of conduct which the Act prescribed was somewhat involved, and it is not easy to give an account of its action at once lucid and full. This confusion arises from the discretionary power vested in the bishop and the alternative course which may be adopted, by either complainant or prosecutor, at different stages of the suit. It will tend to perspicuity, if the discretionary powers on the one hand, and the alternative course on the other, be overlooked; and an average case be described. A beneficed clergyman commits an offence ecclesiastical within the range contemplated by the Church Discipline Act. A complaint is lodged against him before the bishop of the diocese. The bishop consents to investigate the complaint judicially and issues a Commission of Inquiry. The commission sits as a Court, hears counsel, and reports to the bishop that there is ground for further proceedings. Neither party—and this is hardly hypothetical—consents to abide by the decision of the bishop; and the case proceeds judicially. The bishop then hears the cause, the evidence being given upon oath, in his own Consistory Court, with the assistance of three assessors—one of whom "shall have practised not less than five years in the Court of the Archbishop," to secure on the bench one member at least with a

knowledge of ecclesiastical law. In due course, sentence is pronounced by the bishop (the Act is careful to add), "according to the ecclesiastical law." So far as the diocese is concerned, the cause is finished. An appeal in the first instance lies to the Archbishop in the Arches Court, and from thence in the last resort to the Crown in Council, and shall be heard (the Act is again careful to add) before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The present writer simply describes the order of procedure as it existed. He offers no opinion on the ecclesiastical aspect of the working of the Church Discipline Act. A liberal interpretation of the wording of one clause in the Act suffices to bring its procedure into harmony with ancient ecclesiastical precedent. The twenty-third clause enacts that "no proceeding against a clerk in Holy Orders . . . shall be instituted in any Ecclesiastical Court otherwise than is hereinbefore provided." This clause at least is patient of, if it does not necessitate, a meaning which would make the hearing of the cause before the bishop to take place in the old Consistory Court of the diocese. The cause may indeed be heard to some extent differently in detail, but still it is to be heard in the same Ecclesiastical Court. In other words, the procedure is changed, but the principle remains unaltered. On the other hand, the New Act, before it is enabled to legislate according to the requirements of its promoters, is forced to anticipate a preliminary objection. It rules, by clause four, that "proceedings taken under this Act shall not be deemed to be such proceedings as are mentioned" in the above-named clause in the Church Discipline Act. This disavowal seems to point to more than a change only of procedure. The Public Worship Regulation Act absolutely sweeps away the identical spiritual Courts which the Church Discipline Act specially confirmed. If this be a simplification of procedure, it is one which cannot be distinguished from a violation of principle. Two points, however, are beyond dispute in the working of the Church Discipline Act. In the first place, under its provisions, it was possible for a priest to be tried and to defend himself in the Diocesan Court of his own bishop. And in the second place, it was competent for him to appeal, and to abide by the appeal, to the Provincial Court of his archbishop.

Thus, so far as a clergyman was concerned, justice might be had in one Ecclesiastical Court and an appeal lay to another. Beyond this point a priest need not proceed: and resting there he enjoyed the like privileges in trial and appeal that the English clergy of the middle-age Church enjoyed, neither more or less, from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. Neither Court, indeed, as a fact, exactly corresponded with the ancient Courts Christian. In matters of detail and procedure, or in legitimate descent, or in question of appeal, the existing Courts were not identically at one

with their predecessors. But so far as they did represent the Courts whose name they bore—and that was sufficient to satisfy many holy and learned men, and is infinitely more than the new Court and judge can pretend to—the clergy and laity alike were free to use them, were free to be tried by them, were free to appeal to them and from them.

But for certain causes this freedom of priest and people in the first instance has been virtually suppressed, and in the case of appeal has been absolutely abolished. The faithful laity can no longer bring to justice the unfaithful clergy before their common ecclesiastical superior. The priesthood can no longer defend themselves from the interested attacks of a Society, of doubtful legality and undoubted powers for mischief, in the Court of their bishop; can no longer appeal to the Court of their archbishop. In behalf of this enforced powerlessness, it is insufficient to say that practically the Diocesan Courts were unused, and the Arches Court had become a Court of first instance. At the most, this only meets half the difficulty; it does not touch the abolition of the Provincial Courts of appeal. At the least, in regard to the Diocesan Courts, the Report of Convocation furnishes one reply to the argument from practical inaction: let the Consistory Courts be reformed, not suspended. To abolish the Bishops' Courts because they are in abeyance, is to endorse the maladministration of ecclesiastical law which ought to be amended. To consent to the deposition of the bishop from his own spiritual Court in favour of lay usurpation, is to abandon the first principles of Christian jurisprudence on the grounds of expediency only. The question is not whether of the two, the layman or the cleric, will judge most impartially: it is whether of the two is the right judge "as this Church and Realm hath received the same." In short, the principle, at once constitutional and Christian, enunciated by Lord Coke, which, with whatever partial obscurity, could be deciphered in the lines of the Church Discipline Act, has been entirely obliterated by the Public Worship Regulation Act.

How does this New Act practically work? It works in two ways: first, in regard to the Court which takes the place of the twenty-eight Diocesan Courts of first instance: and secondly, in regard to the judge who fills the office (on a vacancy) held by the two provincial judges of first appeal. The earlier mode of action is the only one which need be described at length. The later method may be dismissed in a single period. Every cause which formerly came before the Court of Arches and the York Chancery Court will henceforth (at the first vacancy) be decided in the new Court by the new judge: every cause—including *questions of doctrine*. Taking the same average case as we traced in the Church Discipline Act; and avoiding as before both discretionary power

and alternative courses, in what position are the clergy placed in regard to the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction at the present day? A beneficed clergyman commits an offence, or commits no offence as the case may be, within the range contemplated by the Public Worship Regulation Act. A complaint is lodged against him by three parishioners (who for the purposes of prosecution are termed members of the Church of England) before the bishop of the diocese. The bishop within one-and-twenty days sends a copy of the complaint to the priest complained of. Within a further period of one-and-twenty days the clergyman—and this, again, is hardly hypothetical—declines “to submit to the directions of the bishop touching the matter of the said representation.” Or if the priest consents, the promoter of the suit declines. The reasons which may induce either promoter or defendant to declare himself unwilling to submit, are not hard to imagine. Apart from all secondary and personal reasons the following are valid: because the bishop is not authorized to hear the cause and to give judgment upon it in his own Diocesan Court, according to ecclesiastical usage, but is empowered only to arbitrate privately upon the case; because the judgment he gives is practically a private expression of individual opinion, without any spiritual authority whatever, without appeal in the cause in question, and without influence in any other; because, in opposition to the procedure of the Church Discipline Act, which offers more chance both of equity and legality, the cause may be heard by the bishop alone, without the advice of a preliminary commission, without the actual co-operation of assessors learned in Church law, without the arguments of counsel, without the evidence of witnesses; because the procedure under this clause of the Act is utterly lax and slovenly, the bishop being empowered “to hear the matter . . . in such manner as he shall see fit,” perhaps in the episcopal dining room, and to “issue such monition as he may think proper,” possibly the opposite of “good and effectual in law,” and not “according to ecclesiastical law.”

The prosecutor, or the prosecuted, or both, having declined the mere arbitration of the bishop, the mysterious personage called “the judge” appears on the scene. The mode of his appearance is as irregular, according to judicial usage whether civil or ecclesiastical, as many other provisions of this eccentric Act of Parliament. The non-legal mind would have supposed that, if the arbitration of the bishop were declined, the bishop would be the proper State official to call to his aid the superior powers of the secular judge. Here we meet with what seems to be another instance of the carelessness with which the Bill was drafted, or the haste in which it was amended, or the inconsideration with which it was conceived—inexcusable in any case—for the bishop, whose

Diocesan Court has been usurped, is not the legal official to summon the secular judge, who is intruded into his sacred office. Red-tapeism requires a medium between the episcopal victim and the lay pretender. Whether or not this may be an effort to secure ecclesiastical centralization, the result is the same. The bishop moves the archbishop: and the archbishop moves the judge: and the judge hears the matter "in any place," within certain limits, most convenient to himself. In company with the judge appears the not less mysterious sphere of his labours, termed in the Act, "open Court." A "Provincial Courts" judge, apparently on the authority of the Act of Parliament, even though there be no vacancy in the office of *the* judge of either the Provincial Courts of Canterbury or York, the judge must be called. But even so august an authority fails to create a name for the "open Court" in which "the judge" sits. Speaking ecclesiastically, it clearly is not the Canterbury Court of Arches, for causes from the Archdiocese of York may be taken before it. It is not the Chancery Court of York, for the Archbishop of Canterbury may join in the appointment of the judge. Still less is it a Diocesan Court, even though the cause taken before it is strictly diocesan; for no appeal lies to the archbishop, and the bishop of the diocese, the victim of lay judicial intrusion, is an official who is powerless even to demand the aid of the judge who has usurped episcopal jurisdiction. As the learned editor of the "Handy-book of the Public Worship Regulation Act" tersely expresses it, the reform effected by the measure "sweeps away the unsatisfactory and dilatory processes of the Diocesan Courts." But whatever title may hereafter be assigned to the nameless Court, the issues of the cause now rest in the hands of the judge with unprecedented title who presides in it. In due time the spiritual cause is heard by the lay judge, and a secular judgment is pronounced on a spiritual matter. An appeal from the judgment lies to the Crown in Council, though in what form the Act is discreetly silent. This is a sketch of the way in which the New Act of 1874 will work in ecclesiastical causes.

These changes in our system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it is submitted with confidence, are changes in principle and not only in procedure. So far as our argument is concerned, the variations effected by the Act of 1874 are variations in both procedure and principle from civil law which gave statutable authority to canon law. They directly clash with the provisions of the Act of 1840. They are at issue with the Acts of 1832-33. They are hostile to the spirit and letter of far earlier confirmations of ecclesiastical process by the secular power. As this paper deals with the practical aspect alone of recent legislation, it may be enough to say, that the Public Worship Regulation Act violates the system


which has obtained in the English Realm and Church from time immemorial. It violates the system handed down, even in a partially mutilated form yet so far confirmed, by the Act which created the Judicial Committee. It violates the system handed down, even if unwarrantably extended, yet so far confirmed, by the Act which created the Court of Delegates. It violates the system accepted by Church and State as the exponent of both principle and practice of Canon Law in even earlier ages by Magna Charta and the Constitutions of Clarendon, which were confirmed again and again in the reigns of successive sovereigns. In a century impatient of the claims of antiquity, it is needless to trace the course of ecclesiastical jurisdiction above the date of 1164. The earliest existing charter of the Church's rights, however, was not legislative in character, but declarative of a system which was then time-honoured and respected by the civil power. By the Eighth of the Constitutions of Clarendon, to quote a living authority (Mr. Joyce, in his "Civil Power in its relations to the Church") "we see that as now (the final resort excepted) the first step was from the archdeacon to the bishop; the second, from the bishop to the archbishop; and thirdly, for lack of justice before the archbishop, recourse might be had to the king, by whose orders the controversy was to be *finally settled in the Archbishop's Court*; and neither party might move for any further remedy without leave from the Crown, *i.e.* neither might appeal to Rome from the Archbishop's Court without Royal permission."

This is the system which has practically been the law of the Church, sanctioned by the State, for countless generations. It is true that, in the reign of Henry VIII., the Court of Delegates was established which is supposed to have regulated the course of final appeal to a lay Court of Parliamentary creation. It is true, also, that in the reign of William IV. the Court of the Judicial Committee was established, which inherited all the powers statutably conferred on the Court of Delegates. But it is arguable—and if it may be permitted to refer to the writer's own words, it has been shown in a pamphlet entitled "Secular Judgments in Spiritual Matters" (Masters)—that it is legally doubtful if the Court of Delegates was intended, or possessed statutable power, to decide spiritual cases in the last appeal. It is an historical fact that during a career of three centuries, for the first 156 years of its existence, no purely spiritual cause was brought before it, and for the last 142 years none was decided by it. In short, the Act of Henry, if not intentionally of a provisional character, was, like the Act of Victoria, a legislative miscarriage, a political blunder. If this be more than arguable, the Judicial Committee, which only inherits the statutable powers of the Court of Delegates, can lawfully decide in the last resort on questions

only which are ecclesiastical in character, and not spiritual. But, whether or not this may be proved, the earlier course of appellate jurisdiction from the bishop to the archbishop which has remained intact, as statute law of England for upwards of seven centuries, and which then had a prescriptive right of at least five centuries more, has now been arbitrarily altered without the consent and against the will of the Church, by the sole authority of the temporal power. In such a case as this, the question once more forces itself upon conscientious and loyal Churchmen, and specially upon the clergy who believe in the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church of CHRIST—Ought we to obey the New Court in Spiritual Causes?

This question must now be answered. The reader will remember that one line of argument, the practical, has alone been followed in the present paper. If only a portion of what has been urged against the New Act can be maintained, there can be no doubt of the reply which must be given. As no valid objection can be raised against the argument in its main features, any difference of opinion on minor points may be ignored. On this broad basis the writer takes his stand, whether as Churchman or as citizen. In the latter position he sees that the State has practically abolished the legal jurisdiction of the English Episcopate which the bishops have enjoyed, with the consent of the law, from time immemorial. In the former, he believes that the Church has thereby been practically deprived of rights, the exercise of which are essential to a full adherence to the first principles of the Christian Faith. Both positions are combined in the case of a clergyman of the Established Church. He is forced, as a matter of conscience, to form an opinion and to come to a decision. As the question ultimately resolves itself into one of obedience to GOD or man, the writer can only, with much diffidence, yet with all earnestness, make answer that, We cannot recognise the new judge, we ought not to obey the New Court, created by the authority of the Public Worship Regulation Act.

ORBY SHIPLEY.



COROT AND MILLET.

THÉOPHILE SILVESTRE, in his "Studies of Living Painters," published in 1856, reports a remark uttered by Corot in the presence of a picture by Delacroix. "C'est un aigle," said the landscape painter "et je ne suis qu'une alouette, je pousse de petites chansons dans mes nuages gris." The sentence contains a suggestive truth concerning the nature of Corot's gifts in art. "Mes nuages gris" is recognizable as a rough but fit description of the painter's domain in nature, and the qualification of his painting as a lyric note sent forth from this domain has a precise and real significance. No criticism of Corot's work can be complete, or even vital, which does not take account of these two qualities—the one essential, the other belonging to his chosen system of artistic expression. For at sight of a picture by Corot, the dominion of the clouds is the first thing noticeable. He himself, it is said, began each picture with the painting of the sky; and it is certain that from this point the spectator is compelled to begin his survey. To the sky and its influence all common facts of landscape are made subject. If there is a pool of water, its first function is to image the fleeting forms and uncertain colours of the heavens. The grass at our feet loses its hues of vivid green, and becomes pale to whiteness in obedience to the fleecy clouds that whiten the sky. The forms of trees and the outlines of distant hills are held imprisoned in a mystery of delicate light and floating mist, and even the remote blue of the sky beyond the

clouds loses its intensity, and becomes faint and pale as it passes under the control of "*mes nuages gris*." And having recognized this constant aspect of Corot's painting, we are left to seek its motive. Of what service to the painter are these forms that advance and recede, now penetrating the substantial air so far as to become half-distinct and tangible shapes of nature, and again retreating till they are no more than mere vague symbols in a world of shifting lights and shadows? For what purpose does he thus summon these shapes into momentary existence, leaving all else concealed? and of what beauty are the songs of which these are the few stray notes?

Dealing for the moment only with the method of the painter, and considering his work as the latest phase of landscape art, it is remarkable how strong is the contrast of this with all earlier ideals. In the landscape painting of the early Italian painters nothing is willingly left untold, for the painter's aim is a precise and faultless definition of all that comes within his reach. The sky is clear, and against it the leaves of the trees and the forms of the hills weave an ordered pattern. There is selection but no suppression of truth. The harmony of colour is made up of a number of positive tints, each faithful to nature, and all in beautiful agreement. Here it is not only the scene that fascinates and attracts but all the materials that compose the scene. We know by the faultless imagery that the painter has loved and known the beauty of separate flowers, the individual growth of each single tree, the tracery and network of leaves that preserve their native intensity of green. The light serves to reveal all these things, and therefore it is beautiful: wind and storm only disfigure the exquisite pattern of the landscape, and hence are to be avoided by the painter. The influence of the clouds, if it were admitted, would destroy the natural brightness of grass and leaves and flowers; in mist the firm lines would lose their sharpness, the whole scheme of the design be lost. And thus for the earlier painter the even sunlight of noonday, when the landscape is still and sharply seen, is the best season for his art. Next come the lights of evening or early dawn, but never the seasons of conflicting cloud and changing light. This is altered a little, but only a little, in the landscapes of Titian. The interpretation of scenery is moved one point further from abstract beauty. Titian's spirit is the spirit of portraiture, and his treatment of nature, as his treatment of men and women, was based on the desire of faithful portraiture. With Lionardo and Raphael, men in whom imagination still guided and controlled execution, landscape retained its abstract and unchanging character. But Titian, as he refined less upon the type of the human model before him, so also he refined less upon the types of natural scenery. In his most

poetical compositions he is something of a realist, and we are at leisure to turn from the beauty of the design to own the magic truth of his flesh tints. And the spirit of realistic portraiture he carried into the treatment of landscape as well as of human form. The flowers of the foreground are still represented with the feeling of a master of design, but the general aspect of the landscape suggests not only the likeness of a single scene, but also of a single hour of the day. The earlier design, with all its exactness and precision, did not so forcibly impress us with the conviction that the scene before us is one chosen out of many: it was more abstract, for all its minute detail, than these less certain visions of blue hill and sunlit water that make up the distances of Titian's pictures.

In the work of Titian the modern ideal takes its birth. The study of realistic landscape has begun, and already the painter perceives the dramatic movement of nature and its infinite variety of changing appearances. Just as a face changes from passion to melancholy, and from laughter to tears, so the enduring character of a scene may be merged in its different moods as it passes under the influence of cloud and sunshine and wind and storm. The bright green of the grass may take a sinister hue as a rain-cloud darkens the sun; the even grace of the forms of trees may grow tumultuous in the presence of a powerful breeze. These rapid alternations in the aspect of natural scenery are the opportunities of the modern painter. From Titian to Turner the distance may be measured. There are all shades of increasing fidelity to this particular kind of truth, but the difference between one painter and another is only of degree. I say from Titian to Turner, but it must be remembered that it is only on one side of Turner's art that he belongs to the modern school of landscape: on another he is still seeking to realize the abstract beauty of nature. Where he fails, it is from the conflict of the two ideals. A more complete exponent of the modern spirit may be found in Constable, and from Constable the transition to the landscape painters of France is easy and natural.

But although the French landscape painters acknowledge the power of Constable's work, and even admit its guidance, the distinction between men like Constable and Corot is important. The art of the English painter, though it employs all the moods of nature, employs them in a way that is essentially dramatic. We do not receive from any of his pictures the impression of a distinct personal sentiment in the mind of the painter. All the powers of the air are admitted to set the landscape in motion, but the artist's observation is still fresh and unprejudiced in its sympathy, and the particular moment chosen for artistic expression is like a moment chosen from a drama where the passion, though strong and ener-

getic, is not the passion of the author. Every picture from his hand records some sudden concord in the things of outward nature—some moment when bright blue sky and drifting cloud, the hues of running water and the restless branches of blown trees, meet to register a phase of fleeting beauty. And as a result of this impartial selection from the moods of landscape, the first and most impressive quality of Constable's work is the fidelity of the portraiture. True to a land where fair and foul weather come in rapid succession, his landscape is neither over-bright nor over-gloomy. If we carry away from his pictures the remembrance of heavy clouds and advancing shadows, we may also recall the sharp green of leaves dancing in sunshine, and spaces of sky of bright and laughing blue. The brightness is no longer the brightness of the earlier painters because it belongs to a single moment and is not of the enduring character of the scene. And in this truth of the moment, in the impression of movement and progress, as of drama, lies the strength of Constable's art. The facts of scenery merely as such are neglected or suppressed. No one would seek from the painter of the "Cornfield" or the "Leaping Horse" an exact imitation of separate flowers, or a precise outline of the leaves that seem to rustle in each passing breeze. It is no longer the scene itself, but the appearance of the scene as it yields to passing influences of weather, that the painter strives to interpret; and it is his perception of the appropriate colour of each changing aspect, whether of gloom or gladness, that gives to his work its unapproached merit.

But the later school of landscape, as represented with so much fascination by Corot, goes further than this. To understand the distinctive quality of his work, we must recall his own phrase:—"Je ne suis qu'une alouette; je pousse de petites chansons dans mes nuages gris." The art is no longer dramatic, it no longer registers with impartiality the changing moods of weather, taking the grave and the gay as they alternate in the actual world. If these men were poets instead of painters, we should denote the distinction by saying that it was an exchange of the dramatic for the lyrical faculty; and even in painting these words will serve for a symbol of what we mean. Using this symbol, then, as Corot himself used it, the fitness of his own description of his art becomes very evident. His pictures are in reality songs sent forth from the grey clouds that overspread the world of his art. For, to turn to the first appearance of Corot's pictures, what is it that most distinguishes them? As compared with Constable's painting there is everywhere a failure of local colour. The harmony of colour, not less perfect, is reduced to narrower dimensions; the separate incidents of each scene, grass and flowers, trees, and the sky itself, sacrifice more of their individual character, and take a tone more uniform.

and even personal. As compared with early representations of landscape, these pictures may be roughly said to have the qualities that belong also to Constable; there is in both the record of weather as a principal agent in controlling the appearance of the scene, and in both the consequent neglect of precise form and minute details of colour. But in comparison with Constable himself, new features are revealed in Corot's art. We detect at once the source and the expression of the French painter's originality, we recognize the freshness and distinction of his attitude towards nature. Still keeping to the criticism of his technical method, it may be observed how marked is the increased importance given to the use of tone. At the first sight, Corot's works scarcely suggest the presence of colour; all tints are so far subdued that we recognize scarcely more than their agreement on some neutral ground of grey. On the side of form a similar tendency is manifest. Constable's drawing of a tree is precision itself, compared with what serves for drawing in Corot; his definition of a scene is full and exact by the side of the French painter's timid and tremulous outlines, that lose themselves in a pale uncertain sky. And when these appearances in Corot's painting are taken in connection with the effect they are intended to produce, it is seen at once that they are deliberately given, and are not the results of carelessness or imperfect resource. Outward nature to him is a means of expressing himself. Constable perceived and interpreted the drama of wind and clouds, of sun and shadow. But to Corot these changing aspects of the earth are serviceable only as interpreters of different phases of personal emotion. The artist employs the moods of nature as a musician employs the notes of music, and invests the facts of scenery with particular sentiments, charging them with the colour of his own thoughts. It is because this purpose is the controlling element in his art that his pictures of scenery, merely as pictures, are permitted to be imperfect. From a single scene he selects only a few of the features important to his design—the rest are left half-concealed or wholly hidden. And with this desire to select a few things out of many, to summon here and there as he wills the shapes and colours of the earth, the presence of atmosphere, and the constant control of mist and cloud, are valuable assistants. Behind these clouds the landscape rests under the dominion of the painter. What he needs for the thought he would express may be brought into view—all else may be suppressed without loss of natural truth; for the changes of atmosphere afford all degrees of distinctness, and the painter familiar with all may choose what he will.

From the final impression given by Corot's painting we may turn for a moment to the actual facts of his career. Even in the case of artists endowed with the strongest originality, the product

bears traces of early training as well as of individual impulse, and with respect to Corot there are certain things that can only be explained by a reference to the influences by which he was surrounded in his youth. Born in Paris on the 29th of July, 1796, Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot came of an humble stock. His father was a shopman, his mother a milliner, and the artist himself was at first apprenticed to a woollen-draper in the Rue St. Honoré. But the higher talent quickly asserted itself; Corot studied his art first in secret, afterwards openly, and finally he was placed in the studio of Michallon, a painter without great gifts, and thoroughly infected with the principles of the historical school of landscape painting. M. Paul Mantz has admirably and humorously expressed the traditions of this school, and its attitude towards the things of rustic life. Speaking of the accepted type of peasant at the time, he says, "It is a performer from the Opéra Comique who approaches with his hands full of flowers to warble some delicate romance, or, if Greuze is to be believed, it is a sentimentalist who has had disagreements with his family, who has read Diderot, and who makes grandiose and emphatic gestures." Michallon died, and Corot was transferred to the studio of Bertin, another professor of the grand style, whose system was supposed to be founded on classic models. It is asserted, and probably with truth, that this early training under the classicist Bertin, left lasting traces upon Corot's art. Certainly it would be difficult in any other way to account for the constant recurrence to classic themes, and the fondness of the painter for introducing into a landscape beset with northern mists the figures of Grecian nymphs. If we suppose that he acquired this love of classic themes from his master, it may be very well understood how the sentiment was retained. Corot, with all his originality, was not a strong revolutionist in art. His perception, though true and delicate, was not sufficiently profound to penetrate to the heart of his subject, and his imagination was scarcely of the kind to remodel the whole material of his art. To the end of his days he kept his fondness for historical themes, and he retained his Grecian nymphs as he had inherited them from Bertin; and to the things which he thus possessed by accident he added his own discoveries in the realm of nature. But, although the influence of early training must have been considerable, Corot himself was not very sensible of it. "I had passed," he says, in speaking of his sojourn in Italy, "two winters with M. Bertin, learning so little that on arriving at Rome I could not complete the smallest sketch. Two men would stop to gossip together. I would attempt to draw them in detail, beginning, say, with their heads; they separate, and I am left with only two morsels on my paper. Two children would be seated on the steps of a

church. I make a beginning, the mother summons them, and my sketch-books would be thus left full of the ends of noses and tresses of hair. I resolved not to return home without something complete, and I tried for the first time to design rapidly and in masses, the only possible method, and which, moreover, is to-day one of the chief gifts of our modern artists. I set myself, then, to circumscribe at a glance the first group that presented itself. If it only remained for a moment in position, I had at least seized the general character; if it continued, I could complete the details." Here we find the natural bent of Corot's genius gradually asserting itself. Whether he had learned little or much in the studio of Bertin, it would be of small service to him for the accomplishment of his particular aims in art; the study of classic models would help very little towards the rapid seizure of momentary effects of light and shade, which was, after all, what Corot most desired. M. Bertin could give him the nymphs, but the rest he had no power to give; and it is therefore from this point, when the painter began to feel the need of this gift of rapid interpretation of nature, that we may regard Corot as having undertaken the cultivation of his own talent.

M. Jean Rousseau, writing in *L'Art*, has endeavoured to claim for Corot the spirit of Greek art, and has boldly defended his position by pointing out, in Corot's landscape, these very nymphs that we have supposed the painter to have inherited. But the hypothesis is overstrained, and will not bear consideration. From whatsoever source acquired, these classical figures scarcely belong by any profound tie to the scenes they inhabit. They are not of the essence of the picture; and if they show anything, it is in the way of limitation to the genius that has invented them. If Corot's vision of nature had been more passionate and intense, it would not have tolerated the presence of these unreal images of an antique world; if his sympathy with the spirit of Greek beauty had been powerful, it would have created an appropriate scene in which to enshrine them. But Corot's penetration into the loveliness of nature was guided rather by sentiment than passion, and such tender sentiment as he sought was not disturbed or hindered in its expression by these signs of harmless artifice. The truth is, that Corot's claims do not rest upon these more ambitious efforts. The landscapes, with historical titles, are not those by which he will be best remembered, or that best express the delicate poetry of his art. It is in his smaller and slighter sketches—and, for the purpose, none is too small or too slight—that we get into contact with the artist's personality, and it is the personality of the artist that his art was specially designed to reveal.

Accepting the lyrical or personal quality of Corot's painting as its most noticeable feature, it is worth considering in how far the

general tendency of French art has assisted its successful expression. For some time past the sacrifice of colour to tone has been the recognized rule of French painters. Not only in landscape, but in figure subjects, in the treatment of the most ideal as well as the most realistic themes, this tendency has been remarkable. The artist, brought more and more into contact with the subjects of common life, and having to deal with the coarse and unselected colours of modern costume, has been compelled to devise some means to keep his work artistic if not beautiful. And so far the endeavour has been successful. There probably has never been at any time a school producing work, in certain respects, more artistic than the work of the modern French school. Its professors have successfully dealt with material that would at first sight seem impossible for art, as it certainly is barren of beauty, and this success has been almost entirely dependent upon technical dexterity in handling conflicting elements of colour. There is no longer, under this system, any need for the harmonious arrangement of pure and positive tints; by the potent use of tone any tints may be brought into possible companionship. There is no contrast so hideous but that it may acquire in this way a certain artistic fitness; but at the same time it must be remembered that the system, although it thus avoids vulgarity in appearance, destroys all hope of noble and splendid colouring. The painter who has constantly accustomed himself to reduce all colour to the point at which it becomes harmless, is incapable on a sudden of restoring their purity to bright and beautiful tints. And thus it happens that in all subjects of ideal art, the absence of noble colour is the one constant and invincible defect of French artists. They can force inharmonious tints into agreement, but they cannot, save in a few isolated instances, give to arrangements harmonious in themselves the strength and purity needed for perfect beauty. But although destructive to ideal beauty in colour, this cultivation of the qualities of tone has greatly assisted the progress of realistic art. Specially has it been serviceable in the department of landscape, for here the changing moods of weather by their dominion over the colours of the scene suggest the employment of the painter's device to secure harmony. Such suppression of local colour as Corot indulged, was only the extreme exercise of a control possessed by nature herself. The painter has caught and perfected the device of the storm and the clouds, and although he subdues the facts of scenery to his own purposes, the system he employs is brought into play whenever a cloud passes over the sun.

And thus it is that, although Corot used the moods of nature for the expression of an almost personal sentiment, his pictures are still true to nature. No one has so delicately or so faithfully inter-

preted certain elements of landscape, and in certain effects of light and air he has been the first to attempt and perfect pictorial expression. In looking at one of these landscapes where the colours of the earth and sky curiously unite, the white fleecy clouds above blanching the green of leaves and grass, and turning the pools of water to their own likeness, we feel as if the face of nature were as sensible to passing emotions as the human face. So refined and unobtrusive is the portraiture, that the momentary aspect of the scene seems to have been unconsciously arrested. The painter has caught, in the sudden agreement of changing lights and fitting shadows, a beauty that was almost too delicate for portraiture, and has also given the sense of impending movement and the impression of a shifting and changing world. The swaying, restless trees take an uncertain outline against the white sky, the movement of the leaves blurs their image on the canvas; so that we feel not only that the artist has seized a beautiful moment, but that it is only a moment, and that the scene will pass in the next into some new harmony, wrought by the all-powerful rule of the weather. In admiring these pictorial visions of Corot, and in admitting their fidelity, it is not necessary to estimate the relative value of the truth they reveal. But as affecting the painter's place in the record of contemporary art, it should be said that his is not the only ideal of landscape possible to a modern painter. Since the growth of what was called the Pre-Raphaelite movement, there has existed in England a small school of colourists who have sought to revive the earlier aims of landscape art. A renewal of the taste for decorative beauty in painting has assisted the movement, and it has been found that brilliant arrangements of colour and precision in design can only be gained in the case of landscape by abandoning the attempt to realize the kind of effect that gives their chief charm to so many of Corot's pictures.

But it is not only amongst our own painters that the feeling for design has lately renewed itself. Millet, whose name stands deservedly beside that of Corot, and whose loss is certainly not a less loss to art, possessed gifts of design of a very noble order. His greatest merit was to have brought to the interpretation of rustic themes the profoundest system of artistic expression, and to have translated the rough energy and simple movement of peasant life into the calm and enduring language of art. This kind of serious consideration had never been granted to the particular class of subject with which Millet wholly occupied himself. Peasants had been treated from the purely picturesque or the purely artificial point of view: they had been painted by Wilkie, or by Boucher or Greuze, but no school of painters until quite recently had attempted a complete and serious study of the facts of their existence. The suggestive beauty of their

daily life—suggestive, that is to say, in the invention of grand and energetic attitude, of vigorous and sincere eloquence in form—had escaped notice, and this chiefly because most of the painters who had devoted themselves to the subject were equally ignorant of the principle of great design and of the deepest truths of rustic life. They came, prepared to snatch the peasant from his mean existence, and to grant him the rosy cheeks and the sylvan garment fit, as M. Mantz has said for the *Opéra Comique* or for a *Bal Masqué*, or they were willing to embody him in their landscape in the same way as they would the moss-grown trunk of a tree, but for all other or deeper interpretation their resources were wholly inadequate. It is the special merit of Millet that he was equally prepared in both directions. He possessed both the instinct for style and an intimate knowledge of the peasant's existence; and hence his art has revealed to us new secrets of beauty in a field already well trodden.

Jean François Millet was born on the 9th October, 1815, in the little village of Gréville, near Cherbourg. Brought up amid the simple occupations of the country, he was from the beginning a peasant in spirit, and his sympathy with the hardships and toil of the peasants' lot gave a permanent colour to his work in art. Proceeding to Paris, he entered the studio of Paul Delaroche, and here he found himself in natural opposition to the aims and system of his master. We hear of him that he used to be laughed at by his fellow pupils for talking much and often of Michael Angelo; but for us now the fact that a student of the Romantic school could appreciate the excellences of style is important. It proves that Millet had in his genius something better than mere rebellion: he had the instinct to reconstruct the new materials, as well as to shatter the earlier edifice; to give form to the new vision of nature. In 1840 he exhibited a portrait in the Salon, but immediately afterwards he retired from Paris, dwelling sometimes at his native place, and sometimes in the towns round about. About this time he made a long stay at Havre, where he employed himself in painting the portraits of the sea captains for very small remuneration; but in 1843 he was again in Paris, and we find him then associated with Diaz in pushing forward the new gospels of romantic art. The artist, however, had not yet perfected his individuality. In the Salon of 1847 was exhibited "*Œdipe détaché de l'arbre*," a picture bearing the marks rather of rupture with the laws of others than of obedience to his own. The theme is more orthodox, and the treatment more aggressive than at a later period, showing that the painter was still without the power of selecting his own subject, or of treating it with confidence and calm. The first characteristic work was "*Le Vannneur*," exhibited in 1848, and it is said that Millet's rapid cultivation


of his talent at this time was partly due to the friendship and influence of Théodore Rousseau, a painter full of a genuine love and reverence for nature. Each work now bore the stamp of a firm originality, and from the year 1851, when "*Le Semeur*" was exhibited, his career has been only a succession of artistic triumphs.

We may take this picture of "*Le Semeur*" as representative of the noblest qualities of Millet's art. No one who has seen it can have missed its grandeur or its simplicity, its grace or its truth. As we gaze at the darkened figure broadly scattering the grain, we perceive at once how close and accurate has been the painter's knowledge of the facts of rustic life. There is here neither ignorance nor shirking of common truth; the peasant is not unfit for his place on the hill-side, and his gesture is strictly appropriate to the simple and world-worn duty he has to perform. But although this is a true peasant presented with unerring fidelity, by one who knows the reality of peasant life, it is also something more. Looking at the plan of the picture, the sloping line of the dark hill-side, the space of waning light, and the stress and energy of the sower, we note that the peasant has become a grand figure in a grand design. The movement of his outstretched arm, the almost fierce energy of his progress across the barren landscape, seem to take a new significance. All sense of the individual labourer, all thought of his occupation, are lost in the contemplation of a splendid and majestic picture in which these things serve only as material. We pass with the painter from the obvious appearance of the scene to its deeper beauty. We perceive how out of this simple physical duty, performed again and again, he has drawn new discoveries of the dignity of human form. The very monotony of the employment helps the impressiveness of the picture; the figure of the sower, that by the painter's art is kept for ever in this one attitude of grace, seems to present in grand epic fashion an abstract of all human labour. There is a sadness in his persistent progress, a hopelessness that has been strangely imported into the aspect of this single figure, and which belongs rather to the vision of the painter than to his subject, the expression of a wider truth thrust into individual form. And when the full significance of this profounder motive has been realized we may again return to a simple view of the actual scene to note once more how all this has been expressed without disturbance of the obvious simplicity and direct truth of the view of rustic life. The sense of style and the familiarity with the employments of the country have united without conflict for a single and harmonious effect.

It has already been remarked how Corot retained to the last the traces of the artificial system that influenced his youth. His

imagination was not sufficiently serious or intense to urge him to reform altogether the material of his art. He was satisfied to leave the unreal nymphs, although he transported them to a real landscape. But with Millet all such compromise was impossible. As the exponent of peasant life, Millet was too completely in earnest to admit any of these fairies of the opera; and, moreover, he had other figures more fit to people his stern landscapes. The intense sympathy of the painter with the fortunes of the class to which he devoted himself is a fact never to be forgotten in considering the qualities of his art. Sometimes, even in the figures themselves, it is almost fiercely expressed, and it always exercises a distinct influence over his treatment of natural beauty. In the lot of the peasant, Millet perceived what most other painters have neglected—its hardships and its hopeless uneventful toil. He was never tired of giving emphasis to this side of his subject, and occasionally the influence of this feeling seems to have placed a limitation upon his power of interpreting beauty in nature. Less gifted painters than Millet have avoided altogether all but the appearance of jocund health that the country is supposed to grant to its inhabitants. The French painter, however, took a truer and, therefore, a more tragic view of his subject, and rendered his rustics faithful to life by displaying the sad endurance of their existence. And the qualities that he found in the people he transferred to the scenery. A more impartial vision might have presented as true a picture of toil and hardship in the midst of, and in contrast with, a world of bright flowers and sunny days, but Millet united the two rather harmoniously, and chose for the background of his serious compositions landscapes of sombre and even of savage character. As a master of design, endowed with a feeling for decorative beauty, he seldom made use of the atmospheric effects employed by Corot, but his scenes are nevertheless infected with a deeper sadness of spirit. Sometimes the threatening sky and the traces of bitter wind seem too much like constant accompaniments of field labour, and we are inclined to demand a vision of a brighter world. But the painter kept steadily to the moods of weather most in sympathy with his own; and as his purpose in art was to interpret the more serious side of peasant life he selected the aspects of nature that would best justify and support this purpose.

J. COMYNS CATR.



THE POOR LAWS.

SIR F. EDEN has said* that the class of Poor, as a separate one, dates from the diminution of villeinage and the growth of municipalities and communities not directly connected with the land; the villeins, under the feudal system, having been maintained at the charge of their landlords. This, however, is not quite correct. Even before the formation of parishes, when the whole of the tithes of a diocese was paid to the Bishop, a part is said to have been reserved for the Poor; the same obligation was continued on the parsons of parishes, and there are specific statutes of King Edgar and King Alfred, formally enjoining almsgiving to the Poor. But it seems true that from Alfred to Richard II. the care of the Poor was generally left to the landowners, and to the customary hospitality of religious houses; the first Statute cited after the Conquest being in the third year of Edward I.†

It can hardly be doubted that from the suddenness with which the monasteries were suppressed by Henry VIII. some immediate pressure on the Poor must have followed. But it is very questionable whether it had any very serious effect even then, and still less at the end of the century, the period of the great Statutes of Elizabeth for the Relief of the Poor. Bishop Copleston, in an able Tract which I am obliged to quote from memory, says, what I take to be indisputable, that the maintenance of people in idleness,

* State of the Poor, i. 59.

† Burn's History of the Poor Laws, 2, 3, 4.

which that by monasteries chiefly was,* can never really promote their comfort and well-being; and he attributes the increased importunity of Pauperism at the end of the sixteenth, and again at the end of the eighteenth, centuries, to a much more profound cause, the rapid rise of prices and fall in the value of money—which at *first* tells hardly on the labouring class—produced, in the first instance, by the working of the gold and silver mines of America; in the latter, by the extension of the paper currency and banking systems in England.

The legislation of this country as to the relief of destitution may be regarded in three periods: that previous to the 43rd of Elizabeth; that intervening between that Statute and the New Poor Law of 1834; and that from 1834 onwards. There are, however, other epochs, to some of which I may allude, though somewhat less marked, as in the time of Charles II., of George I., and George III.

The contemplation of the doings of Parliament in this matter before Elizabeth's time, cannot be very gratifying to those who love to dwell on the wisdom, or the amiableness, of our ancestors. As is stated by the Commissioners of Poor Law Inquiry (1834),† the main object of those cases seems to have been the restraint of Vagrancy. But it was so, because the worthy legislators seem to have thought it enough to tell people that they *must* work; that they must not be idle, nor wander about; and if they did, they should be dealt with in a manner, of which the excessive severity in substance was fully matched by the coarse and naked brutality of the language in which it was conveyed. The *onus* thrown on some one or other to find work for all who ought to work, is of a later date. Edward III. tells his poor subjects that they must, each of them, serve, at the accustomed wages, "him which shall so him require." It may a little enliven the subject to quote some of the more whimsical of those early provisions. In the Statute now alluded to, it is referred to the Bishops to command the Curates to "compel their parishioners to labour;" and also, apparently in the same clause, to compel their "stipendiary Priests" to do their duty, "which do now excessively take, and will not serve for a competent salary."‡

Again, he tells them to do the same, and adds that no one shall serve in summer, except at harvest time, in any place other than where he served in winter.§

Again, that all handicraftsmen shall work, and shall never change their work, or "mystery."||

Again, all almsgiving is simply prohibited "to those which may

* So Sir F. Eden, i. 94, 95.

† P. 4. I quote from the original Parliamentary Paper, printed Feb. 21, 1834.

‡ Burn, 7, 8. § Burn, 9. || Burn, 11.

labour;" the inference being that they will then, of course, get a living by work.*

Richard II. prohibited all begging, except by "people of religion and eremites," who were to have testimonials from their Ordinaries; pilgrims with a Royal testimonial given them by "seven good men of the Hundred;" Scholars of the Universities, with testimonials from the Chancellor; and foreigners, under conditions hardly intelligible.†

Henry V. commands that "all Irish clerks, and beggars, called chamberdekins (?) shall be voided out of the realm."

Henry VII., Henry VIII., and Edward VI. have Statutes against Vagrants, constantly increasing in ferocity—the worst in all respects being under that gentle youth and flower of the Reformation, Edward VI. In his first year† he enacts that every idle person shall be deemed a vagabond; shall, after three days, be brought by any person before Justices and (apparently without option to the Justices) branded with a hot iron; and, as if the said person bringing him would be only too glad to keep him, he shall be his *slave* for a year, and fed on "bread and water, small drink, and refuse of meat:" on a first running away, he was to be slave for life; on a second, put to death as a felon.

I do not find that Queen Mary added to her evil repute by enacting similar laws. Queen Elizabeth did; but before her time was the dawn of the present system of State Relief, to which I shall now turn, only reminding you of what is notorious, that all these savage Statutes failed, as is indeed shown by their constant succession—just as much as those other Statutes, not savage, but irrational, failed, which professed to fix the rate of wages and the price of provisions.

The first of the Acts which, while still penal against Vagrants, beggars, and refusers of work, provide, or profess to provide, that work or alms shall be found for them, was in 1536 (27th Henry VIII., c. 25).§ All these acts, down to the end of the century, have a ludicrous mixture—as in some other cases of ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical legislation—of appeals to Christian motives and spiritual influence, with unmistakable indications of the secular law in the background. Thus—"The head officers of every parish *shall* keep the poor people, by way of *voluntary* and charitable alms; *shall* compel them to be kept to labour, on pain that the *parish* shall pay 20s. a month; every preacher, at all times, is to move every one to be liberal in relieving the impotent and setting sturdy vagabonds to work." Edward VI. orders every Curate, every Sunday, to exhort the people to "remember the duty of Christian charity towards"—

* Burn, 22 † Burn, 23. ‡ Burn, 32.

§ Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, p. 4.

whom?—"them which be their brethren in Christ, *born in the same parish*"—a limitation which I do not find in the Gospels, and a new gloss upon the "household of faith." Again, the young King appoints in every parish two Collectors, who are "*gently* to ask every man and woman what of their charity they will give a week to the Poor:" this is to be written in a book: "and if any one able do obstinately and frowardly refuse to give, or discourage others, the Minister and Churchwardens are to gently exhort him;" and if he still holds out, the Bishop is to come on the scene. Nothing is said of *his* gentleness, but it is still by "*charitable ways and means*" that he is to proceed, till ultimately he is to "take order, according to his discretion, for the reformation thereof."*

Greatly would Archbishop Laud, and the High Commission Court, and the officers of the Inquisition, and others who have handed over spiritual offenders to the tender mercies of the secular arm, have admired this provision.

But these makeshifts could not continue long. An Act of the 5th Elizabeth† appears to be the first that has recourse to the obvious and only effectual means of a legal tax. The stingy parishioner is still conducted through various vestibules to the awful presence of the Bishop; but there, if he still recalcitrates, the discretionary engine of reformation entrusted to that dignitary takes the very tangible form of "weekly sess, tax, and limit," to be procured by him for the next Sessions; and, finally, in default of payment, he is sent to prison.

In the 14th Elizabeth another Act was passed,‡ taking the further step of directing certain authorities to "place and settle to work" (how, it is not said) the rogues and vagabonds—thus, for the first time, departing from the earlier stupidity of simply telling people that they must work, without means of knowing where work was to be had. How little, indeed, of real improvement there was in this additional device, we shall see hereafter.

Other Statutes followed in the reign of the Queen, which need not be recited. The last of them, the famous 43rd of Elizabeth (and which is most famous simply as being the last), as is well known, does little more than re-enact the one of the 39th year; and none of them do more than apply in detail the principles previously laid down.§

Here, then, are the two pillars on which the law of England on this subject has now rested for not far from three centuries; relief to the impotent without work, relief to the able in return for

* Burn, 62—71.

† Burn, 72.

‡ Burn, 77. Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, 6, 7.

§ Burn, 79—93.

work. With the help of many subsequent Statutes, and of an indefinite mass of judge-made law, we have rubbed on hitherto, and shall, probably, continue to do so, on these principles. The theory of the Acts of Elizabeth has never been in the slightest degree varied; for the one great reform of the New Poor Law of 1834 was only the constitution of a vigorous and responsible Central Executive, with large and elastic powers of inquiry, inspection, control, prohibition, direction; but still in giving effect to that theory and no other.

I am not yet come to the question, what *ought* to be done. I am still looking at the history; and, in considering what has passed since the time of Elizabeth, let us first ask what has been done in respect of that which is obviously much the more difficult of the above two branches of administration—the providing work, by a legal authority outside the natural course of trade, for those who are able to work, but are, or profess to be, unable to get work. Has it ever been done, with anything like completeness, and as a national system?

To give at all a full answer would require much more research than I have been able to bestow: though it is probable that turning over the leaves of the second and third Volumes of Sir F. Eden's "State of the Poor," which contain mainly what he calls "Parochial Reports," might furnish a good measure of information up to the close of last century. But I will refer to a few bits of evidence, chiefly taken from the Appendix to Burn's History.

Lord Hale,* writing, perhaps, about 1650, says, as what every one knows,† that there is "no provision" for the employment of the Poor. "It is rare to see any provision of a stock" (which is the means indicated in the Statute) "in any parish for the relief of the Poor."‡

Sir Josiah Child, in Charles II.'s time, says,§ "We do not, nor ever did, comfortably employ our Poor."

A Mr. John Cary, in 1700, says, "We encourage our inhabitants in idleness. . . . Our laws to set the Poor at work are short and defective, and do not answer their ends."||

Mr. Hay, in 1735,¶ proposed a *new* law to "provide stock to set the Poor on work."

Sir W. Blackstone, about the middle of last century, said ** that the laws for setting the Poor to work were shamefully neglected in this country.

Fielding, the novelist, who was also a London Magistrate, says, in 1753,†† that the Poor Laws "have not answered their purpose,

* Burn, 135, *seqq.*

† Burn, 175, 176.

‡ Burn, 137.

¶ Burn, 184.

§ Burn, 145.

** Comment. i. 360, 361: Ed. 1825.

†† Burn, 197.

and the tax is absurdly applied ;” and describes the state of the Poor in characteristically forcible language.

Dr. Burn himself says* (1764), that “almost every proposal for the reformation of the Poor Laws hath been tried in former ages and proved ineffectual :” and lastly, Sir F. Eden, in 1797, says,† “I had almost said in every parish in England, persons are found preferring a parish pension and a life of *idleness* to hard work and good wages.”

The epoch of the great relaxation in the administration of the law was about the end of last century ; and the history of work being found for those to whom it did not come naturally, or the pretence of work, culminated in the state of things described by the Commissioners of Inquiry in 1834 : the “roundsman” system,‡ by which the parish “paid the occupiers of property to employ applicants for relief at a rate of wages, *fixed by the parish*, and depending, not on the services, but on the wants of the applicants, the employer being repaid out of the Poor-Rate all that he advanced in wages beyond a certain sum ;” the employment *wholly* by the parish, when “in far the greater number of the cases in which work was professedly required, in fact no work was done”§—(often if there was work it was such as wheeling stones out a mile and back again, digging holes and filling them up again, &c.)—the “labour-rate” system,|| by which the employer agreed to employ men, not according to any real demand, but on some scale of rent, acreage, and the like.

And now, before leaving the historical retrospect, let us ask what is, apart from all questions of classification, machinery, procedure, and the like, the one simple provision, the *direct* provision I mean, of the English Poor Law ? Since the New Poor Law at least there is no question about it. It has been authoritatively stated countless times : it is this, and this only, that no one in the country can by law remain destitute of the actual necessities of life. I must say that no less than this appears to me to be the fair meaning of the ancient Statutes. But I know it has been held on good authority that they are not quite so universal in their scope. I believe this positive right to maintenance is held to date, strictly speaking, from a Judgment of Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough, in 1803,¶ or rather from his *dictum* in it. The question arose as to a destitute foreigner. It was attempted to be argued that because such a man could, of course, have no statutory *settlement*, he could not be a pauper with a legal claim. Lord Ellenborough put aside that point as immaterial, not even hearing it argued out, and said that “the law of humanity,” to which no doubt he assumed that the English Common Law must conform.

* P. 106.

† I. 449.

‡ P. 18.

§ P. 21.

|| P. 24.

¶ 4 East's Reports, 103.

and which he calls "anterior to all positive laws," "obliged us to afford relief," even to aliens, and therefore, of course, *a fortiori* to our own people, "to save them from starving." He said that a reported saying of Lord Holt to the opposite effect, as to foreigners, must be disbelieved from respect to his memory.

He quotes no authority, but the law now is undoubtedly what he stated; and in that broad and simple form I think it can hardly be denied that the opposite would be inconsistent, not merely with the dictates of revealed and even of natural religion; but those of universal instinct, at least among tolerably civilized people. It is well known that the denial, or apparent denial of it by Malthus, in the first Edition of his famous work, was cancelled by himself in the later ones. That the mere admission and statement of the principle but little helps us to the practical construction of the law which is to give it effect, is plain enough, as will soon appear.

For I may now—but now, too, not without reference to the history, the history of opinion, on the subject—state the principle, the inculcation of which is my main object; the most important practical principle, as I conceive, in dealing with Pauperism. I shall have to advert to some particulars hereafter: at present I will only state the principle itself. It is this: that Pauperism, in its most general sense, independent of all particular forms of it, or of relief to be given to it—Pauperism, meaning a state of dependence, not upon charity, that is, voluntary benevolence of any kind, but on a compulsory tax, on which all may draw to a practically unlimited amount, if they are without any of the actual necessities of life—is a condition which ought to be made disagreeable to, and dreaded by, the working class. This is, no doubt, well enough known as the "deterrent principle;" and it may be said that it has been abundantly maintained and enforced of late years. May be so; but, in the first place, as far as I am able to find out, it is of late years, and of late years only; and in the next place, the principle, though often enough applied to certain forms or provinces of Relief, is by no means always so in the breadth in which I have put it.

The first statement, dating the enunciation of the principle from a late period—in fact, from that of the Commission of 1834—is at least of some historical interest. I can find no trace of it in any of the earlier records. Some few, worried by the sight of the evils around them, proposed to prohibit almsgiving;—a totally different thing, to which I shall briefly allude by-and-by, but of which it is enough to say here that it is simply impossible. And so far on the wrong scent, according to our notions, were these very persons, that they advocated this abolition of almsgiving on the very ground that its place was to be taken by a grand and un-

limited system of State employment of the working class, of which they commonly spoke with the utmost hopefulness. There is, in almost all, and in all the best, of the earlier authorities which I have quoted, the strongest contrast between the force and the clearness with which the evil is set forth, and the futility, feebleness, or unsoundness of the remedies which they proposed, even the ablest of them, among whom I may mention Lord Hale, Sir. W. Blackstone, and Dr. Burn himself.* All of these seem to see a perfect Utopia in the prospect of an indefinite amount of public employment to be set up, in pursuance, forsooth, of the Act of Elizabeth, in every parish in the country. John Locke advocated the "roundsman" system.†

Two notable variations may be mentioned. Defoe, in a most remarkable pamphlet,‡ after dwelling on the abuses existing, and the sad state of the Poor, with the vigour to be expected of him, distinctly declines to make any suggestion, which, he says, is for others rather than for him; and Sir. F. Eden, after the most exhaustive investigation of the whole subject, says,§ "I have, purposely, almost wholly abstained from drawing conclusions from the facts."

In 1817 appeared one of the most brilliant productions, considering the uninviting character of the subject, which I believe has ever been written, though I fear but little read now: "Considerations on the Poor Laws," by Mr. Davison, the well-known Author on Prophecy. Here I will only refer to one passage in it, as illustrating what I have said, that the principle of *deterrence*, though not unknown then, was far indeed from being recognized. Mr. Davison alludes to it|| as a sort of peculiar opinion or fancy (in its particular application to what we now so well know as the "workhouse test," but on grounds clearly predicable of the general principle). He says, "Many persons consider the terror of the workhouse to be a salutary check upon the Poor. . . . The degradation of the asylum is to deter the approach to it. The hardship of it is to be the security they would keep in hand against importunate claims." But after stating the principle so well, he goes on to treat it and discuss it very lightly, and evidently has no idea of the important part it was soon to be called upon to play.

Even in Mr. Fawcett's late very able work on Pauperism, though the principle, in its full breadth, no doubt lies under his whole argument, I do not find it explicitly stated.

Mr. Henry Longley, who, in his recent capacity as Poor Law Inspector, has discussed nearly the whole subject of Relief with

* Burn, 215, *seqq.* † Eden, 244, *seqq.* ‡ See Extracts in Eden, i. 261, *seqq.*
§ L. xxviii. || Remains, pp. 544, 545.

great ability,* has not, I think, actually enunciated the principle, though he probably assumed it.

The Commissioners of Inquiry, in at least one passage,† do fully state the rule: "The *pauper's* condition shall not be, really or apparently, so eligible as that of the independent labourer of the lowest class." But the opening sentence in this very Chapter points attention to the particular case of the able-bodied, or of the labourer assumed to be labouring; and I think a general consideration of the Report, and especially of its practical suggestions, will show that the complete application of the principle so stated was not distinctly in their view.

I may now dwell a little on the principle itself, and then pass on to consider the means—I believe there is only one means—of giving it effect. To argue much on the former or abstract question, the principle itself, is hardly needed. Indeed, the Commissioners say‡ that they found it "universally admitted." This certainly shows a great advance above last century, and was no doubt due to the monstrous growth of evil that arose in the first thirty years of the present century; and since 1834 the principle may be found often asserted. Not universally. From whatever reason, the famous Report I have so often quoted, and the Act founded on it, excited a storm of opposition from the *Times*, the *Standard*, Mr. Cobbett, and many other writers, the effects of which have been greatly felt up to this day. But the tide has been turning perceptibly now for some years, aided, no doubt, by the great prosperity of the working class generally; and my object is to help it on a bit, if I could.

Again, then: Pauperism is dependence for necessities, whether in return for real work, for sham work, or for no work, not on a natural demand for work, nor yet on voluntary alms, but on a compulsory tax levied with no positive object at all, but with the sole object of preventing destitution. Pauperism is an evil, and ought to be felt *by all* to be one.

Long since 1834 this has been occasionally denied. I remember an article in the *Standard* upholding "liberal parish employment" in the true spirit of last century; and another in the *Times*, scouting the idea that among the Poor themselves the receipt of *out-door* relief should ever be held a stigma or a disadvantage.

Still, as I said, the abstract question is well worn, and I will only notice a few topics, and dwell a little on one or two which I may have especially noticed in my own long connexion with the administration of the law.

Pauperism poisons the first springs of industry, and reverses the

* 3rd Rep. Local Government Board, 186—207.

† P. 127.

‡ *Ubi sup.*

primeval law, saying, "In the sweat, not of thy face, but that of others, thou shalt have bread to eat."

It removes a very large proportion of the motives which act through wholesome fear—dread of consequences—from the mind of the labourer.

Of the contrast—to my mind a broad and deep one—between Charity and Pauperism, I shall say a little more hereafter. Here I will only say that Pauperism is *not* Charity, except on the intangible ground of the personality of the State. Charity is *individual*, and its essence is individual, personal, tangible willingness and self-offering. Of the dispensation of a Rate, hear the weighty words of Mr. Davison: * "The invisible Corporation of the parish buys its pensioner's ill-will, or his sullen and thankless contentment, with its weekly offerings, which have neither the merit of being free wages nor a pure gift of kindness." And Sir F. Eden has well adapted† the famous profligate couplet against marriage, to compulsory Charity, to which it really does apply. "Charity," he says,

"Free as air, at sight of human ties,
Spreads its light wings, and in a moment flies."

It not only discourages forethought, thrift, and self-denial, but sharply marks them out as folly. According to it, in at least a good measure, "he that provideth not for his own" may, indeed, be "worse than an infidel," but is not very unwise in his generation.

But I need not go on. Those who may wish to see these general considerations set forth with a picturesqueness and force hardly inferior to Burke or Macaulay, may read a few paragraphs in Mr. Davison's Essay.‡

The two points which, in my own experience, perhaps, strike me the most, are these:—

1. In every possible case the Pauper class must inevitably contain a large element of the very worst and most noxious members of the lowest portion of the people. Short of actual crime and criminals there is and can be nothing below it; we touch the very bottom of things. It is therefore self-evident that it must bring the virtuous who yield to Pauperism into contact, fellowship, and contamination with this poisonous matter; by actual necessity they must touch the pitch, and be defiled thereby.

2. That which, I am very sure, is far the worst plague-spot of Pauperism, in the purely moral and social view—that which, after not very far from forty years' experience, fills me with fresh indignation at each fresh instance—and not a day

* 1. 53'.

† Eden, i. 469.

‡ Pp. 557—567.

passes at any Board of Guardians without fresh instances—that which the tender-hearted and sentimental ought peculiarly to feel—is the inversion, the oblivion, the annihilation, caused, or tending to be caused, by a Poor Law, of the family affections, and the sense of family obligations. What would the grave old Prophet, who closes the Old Testament* with the solemn warning that this earth should be smitten with a curse unless the hearts of fathers and children were turned to each other—what would he have felt, if after more than 2,000 years—after more than 1,800 of the Gospel which he heralded—he had been called to revisit the said earth, been made a Poor Law Inspector, and seen what is described in the following fearful passage?—

“It is as difficult to convey to the mind of the reader a true and faithful impression of the intensity and malignancy of the evil, as it is by any description, however vivid, to give an adequate idea of the horror of a shipwreck or a pestilence. A person must converse with paupers, must enter workhouses and examine the inmates, must attend at the parish payable, before he can form any idea of the moral debasement which is the offspring of the present system. He must hear the pauper threaten to abandon his wife and family unless more money is allowed him—threaten to abandon an aged bedridden mother, to turn her out of his house and lay her down at the overseer’s door, unless he is paid for giving her shelter; he must hear parents threaten to follow the same course with regard to their sick children; he must see mothers coming to receive the reward of their daughters’ ignominy, and witness women in cottages quietly pointing out, without even the question being asked, which are their children by their husband, and which by other men previous to marriage; and when he finds that he can scarcely step into a town or parish in any county without meeting with some instance or other of this character, he will no longer consider the pecuniary pressure on the ratepayers as the first in the class of evils which the Poor Laws have entailed on the community.”

I believe these words have been often quoted. They are those of Mr. Cowell, Assistant Commissioner in the Commission of Inquiry.† They may no longer be literally applicable anywhere. But will any of us, familiar with the working of the law, say that the difference is in kind, and not only in degree?

Well, then, if the calamitous character of Pauperism is admitted, simply as such, and under whatever conditions, is not the corollary clear? Is not the evil serious? and is it not manifestly capable of constant and indefinite increase? Without any rigid theory about Population, can any one deny that if the whole working class are told that in no practically conceivable event shall they, and as many children as they may happen to have, be in want of the necessaries of life, there can be, so far, no security that they may not ultimately fall as low as the Irish once were, and the Chinese are now—not to go further? But, then, can we expect to prevent this unless we enlist the working class themselves on our

* Mal. iv. 6.

† Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, p. 54.

side, and on that of the law and its aims? And how can we do so unless we bring to bear on them some of the ordinary motives of human action? We appeal to all the other classes: to legislators, Clergy, philanthropists, Ratepayers, Guardians—to their sense of duty, of interest, of safety. How do we appeal to the actual subjects with whom we are directly and properly concerned?

It is idle to speak of the mere sense of shame and degradation. This is a very interesting part of the subject; but here I will only suggest for careful consideration this question: What is the foundation of this sense? As a fact, I apprehend that this motive does work, powerfully and incessantly, on all classes, beginning immediately above that of the unskilled labourer, and, indeed, with rapidly increasing momentum, till, very little above the said unskilled in the scale, it is perhaps sufficient. But no one who is at all acquainted with the history of the subject will say that for the mass of labourers this safeguard alone will suffice.

Before passing on to the specific practical conclusion, from the principle stated in the administration of the law, I must appeal to the ascertained facts of the case, at least as regards this country, in further vindication of the reasonableness of feeling satisfied to some extent when our immediate object *is* attained, and Pauperism is diminished. Mr. Carlyle,* for example, wholly scouts this simple statement. He says, in his peculiar language, that, no doubt, paupers can be dealt with like vermin—"ground down," "abraded," "abolished;" only, as he says, "arsenic" would be better and simpler still. That means, I presume, to put it definitely, that if, in a given population, there are 500 paupers, and if, by a more stringent administration, that number is diminished, it probably only shows that some of them have died of starvation, and the rest are there still, only more miserable than before, and terrified into comparative silence and quiet. Such ideas can only be met by full investigation, on which I cannot enter. But I believe the facts are all against this inimitable writer; and that, wherever Pauperism has diminished, the condition of the Poor, including the bulk of those who were paupers themselves, has indisputably improved. One existing case, familiar to those who have taken interest in these matters, I will allude to: the case of the Atcham Union, in Shropshire. Under the able and enlightened—no doubt what is commonly called stern and stringent—superintendence of the late Sir Baldwyn Leighton, things in that Union were brought to this: in all England the ratio of paupers to the population in 1872 was 4·2 per cent.; in Atcham, 1·6: in England, the cost per head for relief was 6s. 11d.; in

* "Chartism," p. 17.

Atcham, it was 4s 5½d.: in England, the rate in the pound was 1s. 5½d.; in Atcham, 3d.: in England, the proportion of out-door paupers to in-door was 5 to 1; in Atcham, 1½ to 1.* And these being the statistics of Pauperism, it will be found, on inquiry, that the labouring population in that Union—I do not say in consequence of the administration of the Poor Law, but certainly concurrently with it, and not hindered but aided by it—are exceptionally well-to-do in all respects.

Once more: in comparing our administration, as it is or has been, with what it might be, I will not avail myself of that particular period, the opprobrium, the drunken Helot, of our legal system of Poor Relief, the time between 1796 and 1834: the time when, in the practice (perhaps, indeed, in the intention) of the law, the old landmark of Queen Elizabeth, the broad dyke between the able-bodied and the impotent, was wholly destroyed. But the history of this time is so marvellous, that a slight reference to some of its salient features will be interesting and even amusing.

At the end of last century, it seems that, no doubt from the well-founded anticipation that for years to come there would be an intense and incessant demand in the country for all its strength in the French war, there was an impression among our politicians that it was their business to stimulate population to the utmost in all ways. I believe this was expressly stated by Mr. Pitt: at all events, with reference to our present subject, it is memorable that no less a man than he, after being Prime Minister for thirteen years, deliberately proposed to Parliament, not only that a pauper might possess freehold land, but should be supplied, at the cost of the parish, with a cow.† This was not done; but Sir W. Young's Act, which was passed, (36 Geo. III., c. 23), was to this effect:—It recites,‡ as a basis of legislation, the very opposite principle to that we have dwelt on—viz., that the "comfort and domestic happiness" of the paupers should be specially studied; and its enacting part gives practically unlimited power to the Justices of the Peace to give relief to any one at their discretion. I say, this was its effect: whether this was the right legal construction of the Act is extremely doubtful.§

Magistrates are called the Great Unpaid; and I, as a Lord-Lieutenant, am one of the Greatest and Most Unpaid. And, as such, it would ill become me, nor do I the least wish, to disparage that ancient order, or to question that, on the whole, it has worked very well. But it remains true that at their door lies the blame of a state of things, which those who cannot look back fifty years cannot possibly realize to themselves.

* 2nd Report of Local Government Board, 1873; pp. ix., xiii., 61, 68, 69.

† Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, p. 72.

‡ Ibid. p. 71. § Ibid. pp. 82, 83.

Sydney Smith said,* “We have been calling on the population to beget more children—furnished them with food, clothes, and houses—taught them to lay up nothing for matrimony, nothing for children, nothing for age—and to depend upon Justices of the Peace for the supply of every human want.”

The results of this system may be read in profusion in the Report of 1834, and in countless other publications. I will only notice three specimens.

The first is the case, once notorious, of Cholesbury, a small village in Buckinghamshire. There† “the expense of maintaining the poor swallowed up the whole value of the land: the landlords gave up their rents, the farmers their tenancies, the clergyman his glebe and his tithes; the parish officers threw up their books; the poor assembled in a body at the clergyman’s door, while he was in bed, asking for advice and food:” the extreme remedy of a rate-in-aid from other parishes was actually used for two years; and the Rector recommended that the whole of the land should be simply abandoned, and divided among the able-bodied paupers.

Mr. Benett, Police-Magistrate of Worship Street (he, no doubt, was not an “unpaid”), used to sit on a Saturday evening, from seven to ten or eleven, when “masses of paupers,” sometimes more than 100, were brought before him, who knew nothing of them, nominally under the charge of an overseer, who knew little more, and they were pretty nearly all given money by way of relief.‡

And lastly, I regret to say, in my own county of Worcester,§ the Senior Magistrate of the Pershore division (I could find out who he was, but I had rather not know), gave relief to able-bodied persons without work. The Assistant-Commissioner asked him how that could be legal. “He informed me that he thought every labourer entitled to claim a certain sum per week for every child after the third; that he thought every man who had four children might fairly be held, in the sense of the Act of Elizabeth, to be ‘impotent;’ and, in short, that he considered it impossible for any labouring man to support four children.”

Truly that well-to-do and long-enduring gentleman, Mr. John Bull, can bear anything, as he could stand this system for so many years.

The conclusion to which I am tending has probably been guessed; but before stating it, I will slightly advert to the history of the English Workhouse system. It is a curious history, and I believe far from having been fully told.

There is useful information on this matter in an able Report to the Poor Law Commissioners, by the late Mr. Twisleton, on Local

* Works, Ed. 1840, iv. 200.

† Ibid. 79—82.

‡ Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, p. 37.

§ Ibid. 75.

Acts for Poor Relief, in 1843.* (Incidentally let me observe how strong a case is made against the soundness and efficiency of the general law, by the mere existence of these many Local Acts, including the great permissive Local Act so well known as Gilbert's Act. Whenever there is a matter which is to be found alike in all parts of the country, to be dealt with by a general law, and Local Acts are obtained to supplement or supersede the said general law, it shows how uncomfortable and inadequate that law is, and that the people are trying to ease the burden by a *privilegium* of this sort.)

Mr. Twisleton points out that the Act of Elizabeth gave no power to provide Workhouses; and I suppose this is so, strictly speaking, though I confess it seems to me rather a narrow construction. But, undoubtedly, before the 9th of Geo. I. (1722) there was no express statutory enactment authorizing such provision. That Act, known as Sir E. Knatchbull's Act, did give absolute power to the parish authorities, not only to procure Workhouses, but to confine all relief within them. It was, in several details, a very feeble enactment, as Mr. Twisleton has shown; one only point I will notice, that it gave power only to buy or hire, not to build, Workhouses. But even so I conceive that if it was really expected and intended to have general and lasting operation, it was a measure in advance of its age; and so powerful was the principle, even when so loosely applied as it was, that for a time at least it seems to have had no small effect. Mr. Twisleton, perhaps with some professional readiness to believe well of the rule which his superiors were doing so much to revive and enforce, says that the Workhouses in those days were a real and effective test of need. He produces a goodly list of places where the rate fell from 25 to 65 per cent.; and I have noticed a bit of evidence in Sir F. Eden,† which he calls a "letter from Oxford," in 1726, four years after this Act, which describes the effect of the Workhouse system exactly as we should do—"Some who received alms of the parish strive to work, to keep out of confinement."

Mr. Twisleton tells us that it has often been believed that on the whole the Act of 1722 was fairly operative, down to its virtual repeal in 1795, in keeping down Pauperism; and the Commissioners of Inquiry‡ say, what comes to much the same, that in that period "parochial relief appears to have been given chiefly through the Workhouses, and not to have extended to any besides the impotent." I cannot but suspect that both Mr. Twisleton and the Commissioners somewhat overstate the case. It seems to me difficult to reconcile, in their view, with the series of complaints to which I have above referred, extending through

* Appendix to 9th Report of Poor Law Commissioners, 1848, p. 56, *seqq.*

† L 283.

‡ P. 72.

the whole century; and Mr. Twisleton himself (who has noticed one or two additional cries of distress of this kind) evidently doubts whether his own statement can be applied to more than a short time.

It may, however, be supported to some extent by what has always seemed to me a very curious and significant bit of traditionary evidence. How comes it that it is an expression in universal and immemorial use about a poor man in danger of destitution—"He has no prospect before him but the Workhouse?" A hundred and sixty years ago there were no Workhouses; and, for a long time before the memory of any of us the expression was utterly inaccurate, and perfectly well known to be. The poor man knows perfectly well that of the destitute relieved, whether from idleness, old age, or anything else, not above one in four, or eight, or ten, or even some smaller proportion, is relieved in the Workhouse. My suspicion is, that it is a tradition drawn from the time I have been speaking, the greater part of the eighteenth century, and that it does indicate a tolerably stringent execution of the law; though no doubt even the discretionary power, which always has existed (except in so far as the Magistrates interfered with it under Sir W. Young's Act), to confine relief to the Workhouse, would alone have a perceptible effect on the working class.

I will now at length state the practical conclusion at which I have arrived; viz., that all Poor Relief should be confined by law to the Workhouse. As in the case of the principle on which this rule rests, I doubt whether it will be found expressly recommended in its full breadth, by any direct and superior authority, though I have no doubt with some research it may be found scattered through the writings of the last forty years, and it is occasionally to be noticed, put incidentally and *obiter*, in the Reports of Assistant-Commissioners.* It is often said to be in the Report of 1834, but I do not think it is, except as above mentioned. Mr. Longley† limits himself to hoping that Indoor Relief may become the rule, and Outdoor the exception—the converse of the actual state of things. Mr. Fawcett‡ speaks of the "ultimate abolition of outdoor relief."

My belief is that the rule might be made absolute—I do not say immediate. Mr. George Clive, who was Assistant-Poor Law Commissioner just after the worst days, tells me that in those days so ingrained did the evil appear, that he used to think no real reform could take full effect for thirty or forty years. I believe that now much less would suffice, and that with due notice to all concerned, an interval of about five years would be enough.

* *E.g.* Mr. Culley, 3rd Report of Local Government Board, 1874, p. 75.

† *Uti sup.* p. 142.

‡ P. 50.

It must be remembered that no law can attempt to do what is physically impossible; and again that, as long as the full right to relief exists, there must be occasionally enormous sudden emergencies, such as great inundations, or fires, or famines, which break down all rules. For an instance of the first: a man breaks his leg in his own house, is destitute, and cannot be moved; of course he must be relieved where he is. Of the second class, I need not remind you of many recent instances. But, first, I would distinctly limit the variations to these specific cases; and in the next, I believe much might be done at such times by a diligent application and extension of the method, well known to the law, of relief by way of loan.

Specially do I differ here, and here perhaps only, from Mr. Longley, who* would allow out-door relief to be given as "an indulgence to deserving cases." So sound and complete do his views on the Poor Law seem to me to be, that I suspect these passages in his Report to be interpolations, and that an enemy hath done it; if not, they are to me as from the pen of a fallen angel. I conceive it to be absolutely fatal to right principle to introduce questions of merit into the bare relief of destitution, which, it must be over and over again said, is *the one and sole* object of the law. To say no more, it is plain that when you admit questions of character, you do *pro tanto*, and very powerfully, infringe on your cardinal principle, viz., to lead the working class to look away from the Poor Law, and not to it. Certainly it is a somewhat humanized application of the text, but it is quite true, that this law sends its benefits, such as they are, "on the just and on the unjust."

I believe much illustration may be drawn to this subject, and especially to what I have just mentioned, temporary relaxation in impracticable emergencies, from a most interesting inquiry which might be made, but which I have not been able to attempt, and which would need and well repay a separate and careful effort, that into the Scotch and Irish Poor Laws, compared with the English. The framers of the Irish law, warned by long experience, based it, among other things, on two most efficient principles: the absence of the fettering and unnatural system of parochial or local Settlement, and the absence of Out-door Relief. The potato famine, and I believe other circumstances, have occasionally compelled, and still sometimes and here and there compel, some relaxation; but still the main principle is carefully upheld as a rule. In Scotland, an equally recent Poor Law has been established, on a different, and, I believe, wholly untenable basis. The right to relief was denied entirely to the able-bodied—a view which has

* P. 207, and elsewhere.

been advocated by Mr. Davison* and others, and which has a superficial plausibility, but which is surely absurd. If the law stands on the simple ground of humanity, that no one shall starve or die of cold, how can it admit of any exceptions whatever? For the rest, partial out-door relief is the rule and not the exception. And though I am not able to quote any recent statement, I find, on good authority, that in 1860 the operation of the two systems had led to the following results:—In Scotland, the pauper growth of a few years was about equal in its proportions to the inveterate Pauperism of centuries in England, four per cent. on the population. In Ireland it was one and a half per cent. In England, the cost per head was 5s. 7½d. on the population; in Scotland, 4s. 2d.; in Ireland, 2s. 2½d.†

A Scotch Poor Law was inevitable; as Mr. Carlyle said, "Scotland, too, must have its Poor Law." From whatever cause, destitution there had reached a pitch which disgraced humanity; it was said that an old woman there was sometimes found living on 6d. a week. But it was not the Scotch poor who called for the law; their strong and resolute character made them suffer in silence. "*They had better starve,*" said the late Lord Campbell to me of some Highland famine, "than rush on the relief fund as the Irish do." And most suggestive, most ominous, are the two following passages; the one from Evidence given by Mr. Briscoe, Superintendent under the Scotch Poor Law: "Out-door relief in the Highlands has deteriorated truth, industry, morality, self-respect, self-reliance, the natural affections, independence of character; it appears as if the whole of the humbler classes had completely changed their character. There is no shame whatever in demanding relief, even among some of higher station. The state of things in the Highlands is perfectly deplorable, and every person admits it."‡ And this, after a few years of any Poor Law at all! It may almost remind one of the lines in the "Christian Year"§—

"Twas but one little drop of sin
We saw this morning enter in,
And lo! at eventide the world is drowned."

The other is from the recent Report of the Friendly Societies Commission:¶ "There is a growing class in Scotland who feel that they need not insure in any friendly society, as the Poor Law provides them with a certainty of sick pay."

I say then the Workhouse; and, I must add, the Workhouse on

* P. 601.

† Mr. Chadwick: "Comparative Results of Poor Law Administration in England, Ireland, and Scotland," (1864), pp. 7, 8, 13. This is sufficient authority for the early working of the new laws, and that is enough for my purpose. But I believe that, since the date of the pamphlet, matters in Ireland have got worse, and in Scotland I hope they have improved.

‡ Chadwick, p. 13.

§ Sexagesima.

¶ P. cxv.

the same general principle to all its inmates. I have often been astonished to hear intelligent advocates of sound principle in the Poor Law say that the Workhouse should be an engine of a mongrel character—nay, of two opposite characters—deterrent to the able, inviting and encouraging to the old and infirm. I hold, without disguise, that it should be repellent to all. The Pauperism of the able has no doubt its peculiar malignancy; but to every one whatever most of its evils, as above detailed, apply equally, and, indeed, some more peculiarly to the old and infirm—the discouragement of industry and forethought, the *extortion* of what one needs from others often nearly as poor as oneself—above all, the destruction of the sense of duty among kindred.*

Now, I wish to keep as near as may be to my main staple, and I must not be tempted to dwell on many important advantages of the Workhouse system: the extreme simplification of administration—and, no doubt, those who have to administer the law must guard themselves against being too much biassed by this, by the prospect of relief at a blow from the endless perplexities and puzzles of the present state of things; the immediate and total elimination of many difficult, indeed, almost insoluble questions, such as how to deal with cases of voluntary pensions to which the recipient has no claim at all, but which he is certain always to receive, the question of paupers' membership of Benefit Societies, and many others. One only I will more particularly notice, chiefly to draw attention to the very able treatment of it in Mr. Longley's Report.† In a well-ordered Workhouse alone are you sure of giving exclusive relief, and exclusive relief is the only relief which you can be sure is neither inadequate nor excessive. There the work is all in your own hand, and under your own eye; you can tell exactly what each inmate should have, and you can be sure that he gets it, and that he gets no more than it. In out-door relief, you order relief to A; in itself, it is almost certain to be unequal as between him and B, C, D, &c.; you cannot tell how far it is supplemented by alms, or by secret hoarding; it is nearly sure to be too much or too little; and lastly, as we well know in practice, there is too much reason to fear that the relief given is not always enjoyed, but is abstracted from the supposed recipient by others, generally members of his own family.

But to return. I conceive that it is plain in itself, and long ago demonstrated by experience, that the Workhouse alone enables us to comply with the full requirements of the law, while attaining the object that Pauperism shall be distasteful to the pauper. As for those who cannot work, surely this is self-evident; you must

See Report of Poor Law Commissioners, 1839; quoted by Mr. Longley, p. 187
Pp. 168, 169, and elsewhere.

give enough to support life and health, and, in unconditional relief, what means have you of combining that with the deterrent principle? For those who can work, of course there is the plausible-looking expedient of *finding* work by the public. To this large chapter in the history of the subject I have already referred. I will barely allude to the well-known objections to the attempt, such as that long ago indicated by Defoe:* “For every skein of worsted spun” (by paupers) “a skein the less is spun by some poor person that spun it before.”

Perhaps the most respectable-looking of these plans for an artificial supply of work is that known as the “Labour-Rate” system; and it shows how false notions had become inveterate on these subjects, that the Commissioners of Inquiry thought it necessary, through nearly twenty folio pages, to oppose arguments in favour of Labour-Rates which seem to us mere fallacies, by arguments which seem to us mere truisms.† But I must just point out that the labour-test, as it is called, simply in itself, and not combined with the Workhouse, plainly cannot fulfil the indispensable condition of relative distastefulness compared with ordinary labour: not in quality, for many fully adequate forms of livelihood are already as unpleasant as possible; not in amount of pay, for if the parish pay were put *materially* below the market rate, it would obviously not be enough to live upon.

Objections to the Workhouse on the ground of hardship, such as were incessant in and out of Parliament thirty years ago, I can but slightly notice. But I may point out how absolutely necessary it is, if the law is to give effect to the principle I have been maintaining, that there *should* be such objections. The law is to provide the physical necessities of life. Now, what are they? Only three—food, lodging, clothing. The law does, in fact, provide much more than these physical things: but take these alone. Is it not manifest and inevitable that in all these respects, *apart from other circumstances*, the pauper in the Workhouse shall be *better*, and not worse, off, than the average of independent labourers outside? If, then, that were all, our principle would simply break down. It follows therefore that the *adjuncts* of these mere necessities must be that in which the repellent element shall be found. And we must clearly recognize the fact that it is so, and that it is well that it is. If ever, according to the insane wish we sometimes hear expressed, the Workhouse were to be made, as a legal tender of relief, attractive, or not *unattractive*, to the unskilled labourer, I know not to what we could have recourse.

It is *unattractive*; and we know how it is so. The mere fact of

* Quoted by Sir F. Eden, i. 261.

† Pp. 108—126.

confinement, the common rules of discipline and good order, the prescribed regularity, ay, the compulsory cleanliness, are distasteful to the population from which paupers are drawn. More serious hardship may be found in such special points as used to be so continually dwelt upon—the breaking-up of homes, and, above all, the separation of families. But before dwelling a little on these, let me recall what used to be a most hackneyed saying, What! do you treat poverty as a crime?

I believe the saying is a most fallacious one. For the moment setting aside the vital difference between Poverty and Pauperism, I conceive the accurate statement to be this—and we must bear in mind that we are only speaking of what the *law* does—not that we treat poverty as a crime, but that we *find* it a *misfortune*, and *leave it so*.* By poverty I do not mean anything relative, but actual distress. Now, no doubt, poverty, in all its forms, has its promise of special blessing under conditions. But that is equally true of all suffering whatever; and it has never been inferred from that that sufferings are not evils, or that we do not well to avert them as far as we can. We are thus brought back to where we were, and say that we are going against the order of Providence if we guarantee by law, to those who are peculiarly liable to distress, that it shall not be distress, and exempt them from all stimulus to keep themselves from it.

And, of course, all this is only strengthened when we apply it to Pauperism, which is not simply the extreme form of poverty, but poverty charged with the peculiar mischiefs which we have described—mischiefs artificially impressed upon it by express enactment, inherent in all forms of the legal claim to relief and subsistence.

To revert, then, to such privations as separation of husbands and wives, I admit that there are some such which are beyond the region of merely salutary discipline, and, as *permanent* arrangements, we could not look on them as admissible. But we must remember that the law does not require that separation in the case of the aged; and that its whole intent is that such a state of things shall *not* be permanent, but only temporary. I do not think the law can do more; and if still such hardships should remain, or any other incidental to a severe administration of the Poor Law, I believe we must have recourse to that other, non-legal, provision, upon which I must still detain the reader for a short time before concluding this Paper.

For, long as it has been, I am sure any one would be surprised if I left the subject here. I certainly do not suppose that the time will

* Since writing this I have found in a forthcoming Memoir of Lord Althorp, that he used the same expression in introducing to Parliament the Poor Law of 1834.

ever come when our Poor will be in two classes only, the independent, and the inmates of Workhouses. I believe there will always be a large number between these classes; and I look—I should expect that all would look—for needful aid to these, to voluntary benevolence. The Commissioners of Inquiry have sometimes been unjustly accused of meaning to prohibit almsgiving. They and others have spoken of preventing *mendicancy*—quite another thing. The operation of Charity, as concurrent and, indeed, co-operating, with the Poor Law, has been expressly recognized by them and by their best followers.*

But it is true that almsgiving has been denounced, in almost unqualified terms. Mr. Fawcett does not go this length, while ably showing† the danger there would be in leaving the whole care of distress to voluntary effort, without any legal provision. But Mr. Greg,‡ for instance, denounces almsgiving with hardly any qualification. I say “hardly any,” for, like so many writers of his school, it is not always easy to pin him to a perfectly consistent statement. Almsgiving means simple giving, “hoping for nothing in return;” and Mr. Greg says, “Almsgiving is a mischief and a sin;” “almsgiving is bad;” Scripture “distinctly prohibits almsgiving.” But elsewhere he *hedges*, thus—“The *more literally* the precept ‘give’ is obeyed, the more harm it does;” “*nearly all* charity, *popularly so called*, is noxious;” “*charitable endowments* diffuse pauperism;” “*indiscriminate and systematic* charity” are wrong.

Here is a considerable difference. But, however, we have in this to meet the obvious answer, when we speak of consigning a large region of relief to private charity, What have you gained? How is that better than out-door relief?

Now I have not left myself time to go very fully into this, nor does it seem necessary in the view of this Paper. I desire to recognize a considerable amount of truth in such statements and arguments as Mr. Greg’s. If we look at his more guarded words, “*indiscriminate*” almsgiving—indeed, indiscriminate almost anything—is self-condemned *ex vi termini*. But I fully admit the special hazard that exists in *systematic* charity simply for the relief of poverty. One particular form of it I have been called on to be very conversant with for some years—permanent endowments for simple relief—what are often called “Dole Charities.” I cannot but hope that public opinion will more and more be in favour of varying the application of these, as the law now specially allows us to do, to some more enlightened and really useful purpose for the lower classes.

I also admit that there is much of what Mr. Greg terms “stupid

* Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, 147. Mr. Longley, 144-6, 185-6, 200.

† Pp. 50-56.

‡ “Creed of Christendom,” 3rd Ed. i. lxi-lxvi.

literalism" in our way of dealing with some well-known texts. It is quite true that if a man could give up time, labour, money, to Charity of any kind, of which the effect would be to elevate the condition of the Poor in any real way, though he gave nothing at all in direct alms, he would be obeying the Gospel precepts in their spirit.

But the truth is, that all this, pushed to any great length, is very unmeaning and unreal. Mr. Greg will never persuade Christendom to give up almsgiving, any more than he will get them to accept the riddled and sifted *residuum* of the Gospel which he calls the pure essence of Christianity, and of which it seems that he and a few others have the exclusive possession.* Nor, I fear, as long as men are men—still more, as long as women are women—shall we ever get rid of a good deal of misdirected and mischievous almsgiving.

All we can really do is to *regulate*, as well as we can, voluntary relief, as we have done and are doing with compulsory relief. But I say *regulate* as a very general term. In some respects the principles of the two are not only different, but opposite. And it is no paradox to say that, in some important senses, strict regulation is the object in legal relief, the absence of it in individual and voluntary relief.

The more any funds, and the system of administering them, for simple charitable relief, approach to being hardened and stiffened into a formal and legal system like that of a Poor Law, the worse. The more the Poor are allowed to believe that there is somewhere at hand a fund on which they can ultimately be virtually *sure*, each one of them, to be able to draw for the supply of what it is their own primary duty to provide for themselves, the worse. *Necessity* is the basis of a Poor Law; *discretion* to give or to withhold, with the uninviting prospect of the bare legal provision in the background, ought to be one vital principle of voluntary charity.


In short, though it may not be all we could wish, we may be content as long as we bear in mind this broad fact as the ground of the whole distinction, and constituting the need that such distinction should be maintained, between a Poor Law and all other systems of Relief, that under the one there is an absolute, legal, universal, claim of *right* to maintenance, in the other there is not.

* I must take this opportunity of saying that having lately, in this REVIEW, spoken in unqualified admiration of Mr. Greg's tone of writing, and having since become acquainted with his book called the "Creed of Christendom," I must, not indeed withdraw, but modify that expression. See, for instance, i. cvii., where he calls the doctrine of the Deity of Christ an "unworthy puerility" (1). It would, indeed, matter little what that doctrine was called, if, as Mr. Greg suspects (ii. 169, note), no one believed it. These are specimens of the gentle "assurance" which often occurs in the book.

If a new system, as I have suggested, were announced as to come in force after five years, I should fully expect that that interval would give rise to much further organization, and preparation for the development, of private charity. I could only hope that such organization would follow the lines of such as the Charity Organization Society and the Parochial Mission Women Fund; and that the great mass of individual and unorganized benevolence that would exist besides might more and more be guided by care, judgment, and intelligence.

The principle of compulsory relief is negative, of voluntary is positive; of the one to avert evil, of the other to produce good; the one is corporate, the other personal; the one is and ought to be, in its essence, hard, inflexible, grudging and of necessity, with but little to evoke the better and tenderer feelings on either side; the other can bless both him who gives and him who receives, calls forth the gratitude which the other deadens, is of gentle and loving aspect; the one deters, the other attracts; the one is human, the other Christian.

LYTTELTON.



IS THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND WORTH PRESERVING?

De vitâ et sanguine certant."

J.E.N. XII. 762.

A PAPER contributed to the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October, 1874, under the title of "Ritual and Ritualism," elicited, together with many expressions of interest and approval, many also of disappointment. There seemed to have been an expectation that the essay might untie, or cut, the knot of the questions which had been so warmly, if not fiercely, agitated during the preceding session of Parliament. But it had no such ambitious aim. Its object was, within the limited sphere of my means, simply to dispose men towards reflection, to substitute for the temper of the battle-field, good as in its place that may be, the temper of the chamber, where we commune with our own hearts, and are still. And this was done for two reasons: the first, because all true meditation is dispassionate, and a dispassionate mood is the first indispensable condition for the resolution of controversies; the second, because there seemed to me to be real dangers connected, in the present day, with the merely fashionable accumulation of ritual, more subtle and very much more widely spread than the pronounced manifestations which had recently been so much debated.

The season is now tranquil; the furnace, no longer fed by the fuel of Parliamentary contentions among the highest authorities, has grown cool, and may be approached with safety, or, at least, with diminished risk. Those who opposed the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, in 1851, in some cases had for their reward (as I have reason

to know) paragraphs in "religious" newspapers, stating circumstantially that they had joined the Church of Rome. Those who questioned the Public Worship Act, in 1874, were more mildly, but as summarily, punished in being set down as Ritualists. In the heat of the period, it would have been mere folly to dispute the justice of the "ticketing," or classification. Perhaps it may now be allowed me to say, that I do not approach this question as a partisan. Were the question one between historical Christianity and systems opposed to or divergent from it, I could not honestly profess that I did not take a side. But as regards ritual, by which I understand the exterior forms of Divine worship, I have never, at any time of my life, been employed in promoting its extension; never engaged in any either of its general or its local controversies. In the question of attendance at this church or that, I have never been governed by the abundance or the scantiness of its ritual, which I regard purely as an instrument, aiming at an end; as one of many instruments, and not as the first among them. To uphold the integrity of the Christian dogma, to trace its working, and to exhibit its adaptation to human thought and human welfare, in all the varying experience of the ages, is, in my view, perhaps the noblest of all tasks which it is given to the human mind to pursue. This is the guardianship of the great fountain of human hope, happiness, and virtue. But with respect to the clothing, which the Gospel may take to itself, my mind has a large margin of indulgence, if not of laxity, both ways. Much is to be allowed, I can hardly say how much, to national, sectional, and personal divergences, and to me it is indeed grievous to think that any range of liberty which was respected in the storm of the sixteenth century should be denounced and threatened in the comparative calm of the nineteenth. Reverence, indeed, is a thing indispensable and invaluable; but reverence is one thing, and ritual another; and while reverence is preserved, I would never, according to my own inclination individually, quarrel with my brother about ritual. Nothing, therefore, would be easier than for me, after the manner of those who affect impartiality, to censure sharply the faults which, from our elevated point of view, we detect on both sides. Nothing easier, but few things more mischievous; for what is impartiality between the two, is often gross partiality and one-sidedness in the judgment of each, by reason of its ruthlessly shutting out of view those kernels of truth which are probably on both sides to be found under the respective husks of warring prejudice.

Without, however, any assumption of the tone of the critic or the pedagogue, there is one recommendation which may be addressed to both parties in the controversy of ritualism. They should surely be exhorted to cease altogether, or at least to reduce

to its minimum, the practice of importing into questions concerning the externals of religion the element of devotional significance. The phrase is borrowed from a pamphlet by Dr. Trevor,* which bears the stamp, not only of ability, but of an independent mind. The topic is, in my belief, of deep moment. It cannot, perhaps, be more effectively illustrated than by a reference to the particular article of ritual which has been, more than any other, the subject of recent contest—namely, the question whether, during the prayer of consecration in the Office of Communion, the priest shall stand with his face towards the east, or towards the south.

By some mental process, which it seems difficult for an unbiassed understanding to comprehend, a controversy, which may almost be called furious, has been raised on this matter. It of course transcends—indeed, it almost scorns—the bounds of the narrower question, whether the one or the other posture is agreeable, or, as may perhaps better be said, is more agreeable, to the legal prescriptions of the rubrics. For it is held, and held on both sides by persons not inconsiderable either in weight or number, that, if the priest looks eastwards at this point of the service, he thereby affirms the doctrines of the Real Presence and the Eucharistic Sacrifice, but that, if on the contrary he takes his place at the north end of the altar or table, he thereby puts a negative on those doctrines. If the truth of this contention be admitted, without doubt the most formidable consequences may then be apprehended from any possible issue of the debate. It is idle to hope that even judges can preserve the balance of their minds when the air comes to be so thickly charged with storm. We may say almost with certainty that there are many now reckoned as members of the Church of England, whom, on the one side, the affirmation of those principles would distract and might displace, while, on the other, their negation would precipitate a schism of an enduring character. But if this be even partially true, does it not elevate into an imperious duty, for all right-minded men, that which is in itself a rule of reason—namely, that we should steadily resolve not to annex to any particular acts of external usage a special dogmatic interpretation, so long as they will naturally and unconstrainedly bear some sense not entailing that consequence?

Now, it seems quite evident that, in the present instance, the contentions of each of the two parties are perfectly capable of being explained and supported upon grounds having no reference to the doctrines, with which they have been somewhat wilfully placed in a connection as stringent as that of the folds of the *boacconstrictor*. Take, for example, the case in favour of what we may be allowed to call orientation. The bishops at the Savoy Con-

* "Trevor's Disputed Rubrics" (Parker), pp. 13 and *seqq.*

ference laid down the principle, as one founded in general propriety and reason, that when the minister addresses the people he should turn himself towards them, as, for example, in preaching or in reading the lessons from Holy Scripture; but that when, for and with them, he addresses himself to God, there is solecism and incongruity in his being placed as if he were addressing them. The natural course, then, they held to be, that congregation and minister, engaged in a common act, should, unless conformity between the inward and the outward is to be entirely expelled from the regulation of human demeanour, look together in a common direction. When this is done by a clergyman reading the Litany at a faldstool, he commonly turns his back on part of the congregation, and part of the congregation on him. When the same rule is followed in the prayer of consecration, the back of the clergyman is turned towards the entire congregation only from the circumstance that he officiates at the extreme east end of the church. The proper idea of the position is, not that he turns his back on the congregation, but that, placed at the head of the congregation, and acting for as well as with them in the capacity of the public organ of the assembled flock, he and they all turn in the same direction, and his back is towards the whole only as the back of the first line of worshippers behind him is towards all their fellow-worshippers. He simply does that, which every one does in sitting or standing at the head of a column or body of men. And if he be a believer in the Real Presence and the Eucharistic Sacrifice, woe be to him in that capacity, unless he has some other and firmer defence for these doctrines than the assumed symbolism of an attitude that he shares with so many Protestant clergymen of Continental Europe, who are known to be bound but little to the first, and are generally adverse to the second of these doctrines. Thus, then, we have, in a particular view of the mere proprieties of the case, a perfectly adequate explanation of the desire to assume the eastward position, without any reference whatever to any given doctrinal significance, be it cherished or be it obnoxious. Let us now turn to the other side of the question, and see whether similar reasoning will not hold good.

It does not follow, upon the expulsion of this transcendental element from the discussion, that the objector to the plan of facing eastwards is left without a case, which again is one of simple policy and expediency, from his own point of view. He may, like many of his countrymen, be so wanting in the rudiments of the æsthetic sense, as to think that the most advantageous position for a Christian pastor towards the people is that in which he speaks all the prayers straight into their faces, and the best arrangement for the flock that of the double pews, in which they are set to look at one another through the service, in order to

correct, by mutual contemplation, any excessive tendency to rapt and collected devotion. But it is not necessary to impute to him this irrational frame of mind. He may admit that in the act of prayer, as a rule, minister and people may advantageously look in the same direction. He may renounce the imputation upon his adversaries that, by facing eastwards, they express adhesion to certain doctrines. And he may still point out that there is more to be said. The prayer of consecration is a prayer not of petition only, but of action too. In the course of it, by no less than five parenthetical rubrics, the priest is directed to perform as many manual acts; and, quite apart from the legal argument that the reference in the principal rubric to breaking the bread before the people requires the action to be performed in their view, he may contend, if he thinks fit, that for the better comprehension of the service, it is well that they should have the power of seeing all that is required of the priest respecting the handling of the sacred elements, and that this cannot be seen, or cannot so well be seen, if he faces eastwards, as if, standing at the north end of the holy table, he faces towards the south. I do not enter into the question whether this argument be conclusive, either as to the legal interpretation of the rubric, with which at present we have nothing to do, or as to the advantage of actual view and the comparative facilities for allowing it. It is enough to show that arguments may be made in perfect good faith, and free from anything irrational, against as well as for the eastward position, without embracing the embittering element of doctrinal significance; that both from the one side and the other the question may be reasonably debated on general grounds of religious expediency. For if this be so, it becomes in a high degree impolitic, and injurious to the interests of religion, to fasten upon these questions of position, whether in the sense of approval or of repudiation, significations which they do not require, and which they will only so far bear that, by prejudice or association, we can continually give to words and things a colour they do not of themselves possess. There are surely enough real occasions for contention in the world to satisfy the most greedy appetite, without adding to them those which are conventional—that is to say, those where the contention is not upon the things themselves, but upon the constructions which prejudice or passion may attach to them. Surely if a Zuinglian could persuade himself that the English Communion Office was founded upon the basis of Zuinglian ideas, he would act weakly and inconsistently should he renounce the ministry of the Church because he was ordered to face eastwards during the prayer of consecration; and at least as surely would one, believing in the Catholic and primitive character of the office, be open to similar blame if he in like manner repu-

diated his function as a priest upon being required to take his place only on the north. Preferences for the one or the other position it is easy to conceive. To varying ideas of worship—and in these later times the idea of worship does materially vary—the one or the other may seem, or may even be, more thoroughly conformable; but strange indeed, in my view, must be the composition of the mind which can deliberately judge that the position at the north end is in itself irreverent, or that facing towards the east is in itself superstitious. Both cannot be right in a dispute, but both may be wrong; and one of the many ways in which this comes about is when the thing contended for is, by a common consent in error, needlessly lifted out of the region of things indifferent into that of things essential, and a distinction, founded originally on the phantasy of man, becomes the *artificialis stantis aut cadentis concordia*.

It sometimes seems as though, even in the tumult of the Reformation, when the fountains of the great deep were broken up, the general mind must yet have been more solid and steadier—perhaps even more charitable—than now; though the edge of controversies at that epoch was physical as well as moral, and involved, at every sweep of the weapon, national defence and the safety or peril of life and limb. Members of the Church of England, even now somewhat irreverent as a body with reference to kneeling in ordinary worship, are nevertheless all content to kneel in the act of receiving the Holy Communion; a most becoming, most soothing, most fraternal usage. General censure would descend upon the man who should attempt to disturb it by alleging that this humble attitude of obeisance too much favoured the idea of paying worship to the consecrated elements. No less certainly, and even more sharply, would he be condemned who, himself believing in the Real Presence, should endeavour to force it home on others as the only key to the meaning of the usage. But who can fail to see that for minds, I will not say jaundiced, but preoccupied with the disposition to attach extreme constructions to outward acts in the direction in which they seem to lean, nothing is more easy than to annex to the kneeling attitude of the receiver in the Holy Eucharist the colour and idea of adoration of the consecrated elements? So, also, nothing would be more difficult than, when once such a colour has been so annexed, again to detach it effectually, and thus to bring the practice to an equitable judgment. Yet the Church of England, which has unitedly settled down upon the question of kneeling at reception, has resolutely thrust aside the extreme construction through which a baleful concurrence of opposing partisans, might have rendered it intolerable. And this she did, carrying this practice without shock or hesitation through all

the fluctuations of her Liturgy, during times when theological controversy was exasperated by every mundane passion which either the use of force, or its anticipation, can arouse. It will indeed be strange—should we not rather say it will indeed be shameful—if, after conducting the desperate struggles of the Reformation to their issue, and when we have realized its moral and social fruits for three centuries and a half, we prove to be so much less wise and less forbearing than our less civilized and refined forefathers, that we are to be led, by an aggravated misuse of this practice of gratuitous construction, to create a breach upon a question so much less difficult, so much less calling for or warranting extreme issues, than that which they proved themselves able to accommodate?

It may indeed be said, and not untruly, that in a certain sense both the friends and the adversaries of the practice I have been considering are agreed in attaching to it the meaning I presume to deprecate. Where both parties to a suit are agreed, it is idle, we may be told, to dispute what they concur in. Now the very point I desire to bring into clear view is that this is not a suit with two parties to it, but that many, perhaps most, of those who are entitled to be heard, are not before the court; many—aye, multitudes—who think either this question should be let alone, or that if it is not let alone, it should be decided upon dry and cold considerations of law, history, and science, so far as they are found to inhere in it; not judged by patches of glaring colour, the symbols of party, which are fastened upon it from without. If this be a just view, the concurrence of the two parties named above in their construction of the eastward position is no better a reason for the acquiescence of the dispassionate community, than the agreement of two boys at a public school to fight, in order to ascertain who is the strongest, is a reason against the interference of bystanders to stop them if they can.

There is in political life a practice analogous, as it seems to me, to the practice of importing doctrinal significance into discussions upon ceremonial. It is indeed a very common fashion to urge that something, in itself good and allowable, has become bad and inadmissible on account of motives imputed to those who ask it. The Reforms proposed in 1831 and 1866 were not to be conceded, because they would be used as levers for ulterior extensions of the franchise. The Irish Church was not to be disestablished, because the change would serve as an argument for disestablishing the Church of England. Irish public-houses must not be closed on Sunday where the people desire it, for fear the measure should bring about a similar closing in England, where public opinion is not ripe for it. But then, in the secular world, this very practice is taken as the indication of an illiberal mind, and a short-sighted policy.

The truly liberal maxim has ever been that by granting just claims you disarm undue demands: that things should be judged as they are in themselves, and not in the extraneous considerations, and remote eventualities, which sanguine friends and bitter foes oftentimes agree in annexing to them. It is, therefore, with unfeigned surprise, that I read in the work of no mean writer on this rubrical controversy, that in May last he "prayed" that the priest might be allowed to face eastwards, but that he would now refuse it, because "this eastward position is claimed for distinctively doctrinal purposes." I am reluctant to cite a respected name, but it is necessary to give the means of verifying my statement by a reference to Dr. Swainson's "*Rubrical Question of 1874*,"* pp. 1, 5. I might, I believe, add other instances of the same unfortunate line of thought, but it is needless.

What, then, is the upshot of this extraordinary preference of the worse over the better, the more arbitrary over the direct and inherent construction? It is this, that it heats the blood and quickens the zeal of sympathizing partisans. But then it has exactly the same effect upon the partisans of the two opposite opinions. So that it widens breaches, feeds the spirit of mutual defiance, and affords, like abundant alcohol, an intoxicating satisfaction, to be followed by the remorse of the morrow when the mischief has been done. It enhances the difficulties of the judge's task, and makes hearty acquiescence in his decisions almost hopeless.

Wherever this importation of doctrinal significance, I care not from which side, has been effected, it powerfully tends to persuade the worsted party that the law has been strained against him on grounds extraneous to the argument, and to drive him either upon direct disobedience, or upon circuitous modes of counteracting the operation of the judgment. Those against whom the letter of the law seems to be turned invidiously, are apt to think they may freely and justly avail themselves of it wherever it is in their favour. Supposing, for example, that, by a judgment appearing to rest on considerations of policy and not of law, the eastward position were to be condemned, who does not see that those who thought themselves wronged might discover ample means of compensation? Some have contended that the clergy, sustained by their flocks, might retrench the services of the parish church; and, offering within its walls a minimum both of ritual and of the opportunities of worship, might elsewhere institute and attend services which, under a recent Statute (18 & 19 Vict. c. 86), many believe they might carry on without being subject to the restraints of the Act of Uniformity.

Or again, in the churches themselves, where the clergyman was

* But, at p. 70, Dr. Swainson, with great candour, states that, if the law be declared adversely to his view, he will at once renounce this imputation of doctrinal significance.

forbidden to adopt a position construed as implying an excessive reverence, not he only, but, with certain immunity from consequences, his congregation might, and probably would, resort to other external acts, at least as effectual for the same purpose, much more closely related to doctrinal significance, much more conspicuous in themselves, and, perhaps, much more offensive to fellow-worshippers, than the position which had been prohibited. What, upon either of these suppositions, would have been gained by the most signal victory in the courts, either for truth or for peace, or even for the feelings and objects of those who would be called the winners?

I have dwelt at length on this particular subject, not because I imagine the foregoing remarks to offer a solution of a difficulty, but in order to point out and to avert, if possible, what would make a solution impossible. The very first condition of healthy thought and action is an effort at self-mastery, and the expulsion, from the controversies concerning certain rubrics, of considerations which aggravate those controversies into hopelessness; and which seem to dwell in them, as demons dwelt in the bodies of the possessed, till they were expelled by the beneficent Saviour, and left the sufferers at length restored to their right mind. If we cannot fulfil this first condition of sanity, it is, I fear, hopeless to expect that the day of doom for the Church of England can be long postponed. It is bad enough in my opinion that we should have to adjust these difficulties by the necessarily rude and coarse machinery of courts. I do not disguise my belief, founded on very long and rather anxious observation, that the series of penal proceedings in the English Church during the last forty years, which commenced with the action of the University of Oxford against Bishop Hampden, have as a whole been mischievous. I make no accusation, in speaking thus, against those who have promoted them. I will not say that they have been without provocation, that they could easily have been avoided, that they have been dishonourably instituted, or vindictively pursued. I do not inquire whether, when they have been strictly judicial, they have or have not generally added to the fame of our British Judicature for power or for learning. Unhappily they came upon a country little conversant with theological, historical, or ecclesiastical science, and a country which had not been used for three hundred years, with the rarest exceptions, to raise these questions before the tribunals. The only one of them, in which I have taken a part, was the summary proceeding of the Council of King's College against Mr. Maurice. I made an ineffectual endeavour, with the support of Judge Patteson and Sir B. Brodie, and the approval of Bishop Blomfield, to check what seemed to me the unwise and ruthless vehemence of the majority which dismissed that gentleman from his office. It may be that, in this or that particular case, a balance of good over

evil may have resulted. It could not but be that in particular instances some who would not have wished them to be instituted, could not wish them to fail. But I have very long been convinced that, as a whole, they have exasperated strife and not composed it; have tempted men to employ a substitute, at once violent and inefficient, for moral and mental force; have aggravated perils which they were honestly intended to avert; have impaired confidence, and shaken the fabric of the Church to its foundations.

The experience of half a century ago may, in part, serve to illustrate an opinion which may have startled many of my readers, but which long ago I entertained and made known in quarters of great influence. Nothing could be sharper than was at that time the animosity of Churchmen in general against what are termed Evangelical opinions. There was language used about them and their proposers in works of authority—such, for instance, as certain tracts of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge—which was not only insolent, but almost libellous. But it seems that the Church took to heart the wise counsel, which Athene offered to Achilles, that he should abuse Agamemnon, but not touch him. “Fall foul of him with words, as much as you have a mind: but keep your sword within the scabbard.”* The sword at that period was never drawn; and the controversy settled itself in an advantageous way. Are we driven to admit that there was, among the rulers and the ruled of those days, more of patience, or of faith in moral force, or both; more of the temper of Gamaliel, and less of the temper of Saul?

At a later date, it is true that Bishop Philpotts broke the tradition of this pacific policy in the case of Mr. Gorham. But all who knew that remarkable prelate are aware that he was a man of sole action, rather than of counsel and concert; and it was an individual, not a body, which was responsible for striking the blow, of which the recoil so seriously strained the Church of England.

While frankly avowing the estimate I form of the results which have flowed from these penal proceedings in matter which is of law undoubtedly, but of conscience as well as law, I am far from believing that the public fully shares my views. I must suppose, especially after the legislative proceedings of last year, that my countrymen are well satisfied with the general or average results, and have detected in them what my eyesight has not perceived—a tendency to compose the troubles, and consolidate the fabric, of the Church. My ambition does not, then, soar so high as to ask for a renunciation of the comforts and advantages of religious litigation. All that I am now contending for is that the suits which may be raised ought not to be embittered by the opening of sources of

exasperation that do not properly belong to them; that contribute absolutely nothing to the legal argument on either side for the elucidation of the rubrics; and that, on the contrary, by inflaming passion, and suggesting prejudice, darken and weaken, while they excite, the intellect of all concerned.

If, as I hope, I may have carried with me some degree of concurrence in the main proposition I have thus far urged, let us now turn to survey a wider prospect. Let us look for a while at the condition of the English Church—its fears and dangers on the one hand, its powers and capacities on the other; and let us then ask ourselves whether duty binds and prudence recommends us to tear it in pieces, or to hold it together.

It is necessary first to free the inquiry from a source of verbal misunderstanding. In one and the same body, we see two aspects, two characters, perfectly distinct. That body declares herself, and is supposed by the law of the country to be, the ancient and Catholic Church of the country, while it is also the national establishment of Religion. In the first capacity, it derives its lineage and commission from our Saviour and the Apostles; in the second, it is officered and controlled by the State. We may speak of holding the Church together, or of holding the Church and the State together. I am far from placing the two duties on the same ground, or assigning to them a common elevation. Yet the subjects are, in a certain form, closely connected; and the form is this. It may be that the continuing union of the Church within herself will not secure without limit the continuing union of the Church with the State. But it is certain, nevertheless, that the splitting of the Church will destroy its union with the State. Not only as a Church, but as an endowed establishment, it is, without doubt, still very strong. Sir Robert Peel said, over a quarter of a century ago, in discussing the emancipation of the Jews, that the only dangers of the Church consisted in its internal divisions. Within that quarter of a century the dangers have increased, but with them has probably increased also the strength to bear them. Menace and peril from without, against the Church as an Establishment, have made ground, but are still within measure; still represent a minor, not a major, social force; though they are seconded by a general movement of the time, very visible in other countries, and apparently pervading Christendom at large, yet with a current certainly slow, perhaps indefinitely slow. But though the Church may be possessed of a sufficient fund of strength, there is no redundancy that can be safely parted with. Any secession, if of sensible amount, constituting itself into a separate body, would operate on the National Church, with reference to its nationality, like a rent in a wall, which is mainly important, not by the weight of material it detaches, but by the discontinuity it leaves.

It is not, indeed, only the severance of the Church into two bodies which might precipitate disestablishment. Obstinacy and exasperation of internal strife might operate yet more effectively towards the same end. The renewal of scenes and occurrences like those of the session of 1874 would be felt, even more heavily than on that first occasion, to involve not only pain, but degradation. The disposition of some to deny to the members of the National Church the commonest privileges belonging to a religious communion, the determination to cancel her birthright for a mess of pottage, the natural shrinking of the better and more refined minds from indecent conflict, the occasional exhibition of cynicism, presumption, ignorance, and contumely, were, indeed, relieved by much genial good sense and good feeling, found, perhaps, not least conspicuously among those who were by religious profession most widely severed from the National Church. But the mischief of one can inflict wounds on a religious body, which the abstinence and silent disapproval of a hundred cannot heal; and, unless an English spirit has departed wholly from the precincts of the English Church, she will, when the outrage to feeling grows unendurable, at least in the persons of the most high-minded among her children, absolutely decline the degrading relation to which not a few seem to think her born. I pass these to consider whether it be a duty or not to keep the Church united, with the negative assumption implied in these remarks, that without such union there cannot be a reasonable hope of saving the Establishment.

But it may be said, what is this internal union of the Church, which is professed to be of such value? We have within it men who build, or suppose themselves to build, their religion only upon their private judgment, unequally yoked with those who acknowledge the guiding value of Christian history and witness; men who believe in a visible Church, and men who do not; men who desire a further Reformation, and men who think the Reformation we have had already went too far; men who think a Church exists for the custody and teaching of the truth, and men who view it as a magazine for the collection and parade of all sorts of opinions for all sorts of customers. Nay, besides all this, are there not those who, with such concealment only as prudence may require, question the authority of Holy Scripture, and doubt, or dissolve into misty figure, even the cardinal facts of our redemption enshrined in the Apostles' Creed? What union, compatible with the avowed or unavowed existence of these diversities, can deserve the name, or can be worth paying a price to maintain?

Now, before we examine the value or no value of this union, the first question is—does it exist, and how and where does it exist, as a fact? It does; and it is to be found in the common law,

common action, common worship, and probably, above all, the common Manual of worship, in the Church. Though, it is accompanied with many divergences of dogmatic leaning, and though these differences are often prosecuted with a lamentable bitterness, yet in the law, the worship, and the Manual, they have a common centre, to which, upon the whole, all, or nearly all, the members of the body are really and strongly, though it may be not uniformly nor altogether consistently, attached, and which is at once distinctive, and in its measure efficient. Nay, more, it has been stated in public, and I incline to believe with truth, that the rubrics of the Church are at this moment more accurately followed than at any period of her history since the Reformation. Twelve months ago I scandalized the tender consciences of some by pointing out that in a law which combined the three conspicuous features of being extremely minute, very ancient, and in its essence not prohibitive but directory, absolute and uniform obedience was hardly to be expected, perhaps, in the strict meaning of the terms, hardly even to be desired. I admit the scandals of division, and the greater scandals of dissension; but there are, as I believe, fifteen millions of people in this country who have not thrown off their allegiance to its Church, and these people, when they speak of it, to a great extent mean the same thing, and, when they resort to it, willingly concur in the same acts; willingly, on the whole, though the different portions of them each abate something from their individual preferences to meet on common ground, as Tories, Whigs, and Radicals do the like, to meet on the common ground of our living and working constitution. This union, then, I hold to be a fact, and I contend that it is a fact worth preserving. I do not beg that question: I only aver that it is the question really at issue; and I ask that it may be dispassionately considered, for many questions of conduct depend upon it.

The duty of promoting union in religion is elevated by special causes at the present day into a peculiar solemnity; while these causes also envelop it in an extraordinary intricacy. The religion of Christ as a whole, nay, even the pallid scheme of Theism, is assailed with a sweep and vehemence of hostility greater probably than at any former period. While the war thus rages without the wall, none can say that the reciprocal antagonism of Christian bodies is perceptibly mitigated within it, or that the demarcating spaces between them are narrower than they were. Most singular of all, the greatest of the Christian communions, to say nothing of the smaller, are agitated singly and severally by the presence or proximity of internal schism. The Papal Church has gone to war with portions of its adherents in Armenia, in Germany, in Italy, in Switzerland; besides being in conflict with the greater number of Christian States, especially of those where the Roman

religion is professed. The relations of the Church of England beyond St. George's Channel, however euphemistically treated in some quarters, are dark, and darkening still. Even the immovable East is shaken. The Slavonic, and the Hellenic, or non-Slavonic, elements are at present, though without doctrinal variance, yet in sharp ecclesiastical contention; and a formidable schism in Bulgaria, not discountenanced by Russian influences, disturbs at its own doors the ancient and venerable See of Constantinople and its sister Patriarchates. This is a rude and slight, but I believe an accurate outline. I do not say it carries us beyond, but it certainly carries up to this point: that now, more than ever, our steps should be wary and our heads cool, and that, if we should not disguise the true significance of controversies, neither should we aggravate them by pouring Cayenne pepper into every opened wound.

I do not say that, in circumstances like these, it becomes the duty of each man to sacrifice everything for the internal unity of his own communion. When that communion, by wanton innovation, betrays its duty, and aggravates the controversies of Christendom, the very best friend to its eventual unity may be he who at all hazards, and to all lengths, resists the revolutionary change. But it would seem that, in all cases where the religious body to which we belong has not set up the *petra scandali*, the presumptive duty of the individual who remains in its communion, to study its peace, is enhanced. Nowhere, in my view, does this proposition apply with such force as to the case of the English Church. This Church and nation, by an use of their reforming powers, upon the whole wonderfully temperate, found for themselves, amidst the tempests of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a haven of comparative tranquillity, from which, for more than two centuries, they have not been dislodged. Within this haven it has, especially of late years, been amply proved that every good work of the Divine Kingdom may be prosecuted with effect, and every quality that enlarges and ennobles human character may be abundantly reared. I do not now speak of our Nonconformists, for whom I entertain a very cordial respect: I confine myself to what is still the National Church; and I earnestly urge it upon all her members that the more they study her place and function in Christendom, the more they will find that her unity, qualified but real, is worth preserving.

I will dwell but very lightly on the arguments which sustain this conclusion. They refer first to the national office of this great institution. It can hardly be described better than in a few words which I extract from a recent article in the *Edinburgh Review*:—

“The crown and flower of such a movement was the Elizabethan Church

of England. There the watchword was never destruction or innovation; there a simple, Scriptural, Catholic, and objective teaching, has preserved us from superstitious and dogmatic vagaries on the one hand; and from the subjective weakness of many of the Protestant sects on the other. To the formation of such a Church the nation gave its strength and its intelligence, viz., that of the idea of More(?), of Shakespeare, and of Bacon; and what is more, the whole nation contributed its good sense, its sobriety, its steadfastness, and its appreciation of a manly and regulated freedom."—*Edinburgh Review*, April, 1875, p. 574.

There are those who think that bold changes in the law and constitution of the Church, in the direction of developed Protestantism, would bring within its borders a larger proportion of the people. My own opinion is the reverse of this. I look upon any changes whatever, if serious in amount and contentious in character, as synonymous with the destruction of the National Establishment. But the matter is one of opinion only, and I fully admit the title of the nation to make any such changes, if they think fit, with such a purpose in view.

But, besides her national office and capabilities, the Church of England, in her higher character as a form of the Christian religion, has a position at once most perilous and most precious (I here borrow the well-known expression of De Maistre) with reference to Christendom at large. She alone, of all Churches, has points of contact, of access, of sympathy, with all the important sections of the Christian community. Liable, more than any other communion, to see her less stable or more fastidious members drop off from her now in this direction and now in that, she is, nevertheless, in a partial but not an unreal sense, a link of union between the several fractions of the Christian body. At every point of her frontier, she is in close competition with the great Latin communion, and with the varied, active, and in no way other than respectable, forms of Nonconformity. Nor does this represent the whole of the danger which, as to her sectional interests, she daily suffers in detail. She inhabits a sphere of greater social activity than is found in any other country of Europe; she is in closer neighbourhood, throughout her structure, than any other Church, with the spirit of inquiry (I do not say of research), and is proportionably more liable to defections in the direction of unbelief, or, if that word be invidious, of non-belief or negation. But this great amount of actual peril and besetting weakness is, in at least a corresponding degree, potential force and usefulness, for others as well as for herself; and no philosophic observer, whatever be his leanings, can exclude her from a prominent place in his survey of Christendom.

These things, it seems to me, are not enough considered among us. If they were enough considered, we should be less passionate

in our internal controversies. We should recollect that we hold what all admit to be a middle place; that the strain, as in a wheel, is greatest at the centre, the tendency to dislocation there most difficult to subdue. So we should more contentedly accept the burdens of the position, for the sake of the high, disinterested, and beneficent mission with which they seem to be allied. Even if I am wrong in the persuasion that much ought to be borne rather than bring about a rupture, I can hardly be wrong in claiming the assent of all to the proposition that we had better not prosecute our controversies wildly and at haphazard, but that we should carefully examine, before each step is taken, what other steps it will bring after it, and what consequences the series may as a whole involve.

I am quite aware of the answer which will spring to the lips of some. "The object of the long series of prosecutions, and of the Act of 1874, is to cut out a gangrene from the Church of England; to defeat a conspiracy which aims at reversing the movement of the Reformation, and at remodelling her tenets, her worship, and her discipline, on the basis of the Papal Church: aye, even with all the aggravations of her earlier system, which that Church has in the later times adopted." But the answer to this answer is again perfectly ready. If there be within the Church of England a section of clergy or of laity, which is engaged in such a conspiracy, it is one extremely, almost infinitesimally small. I do not now deal with the very different charge against doctrines and practices which are said to *tend* towards the Church of Rome. This charge was made against Laud by the Puritans, and is made against the Prayer-Book at large by our Nonconforming friends, or by very many of them.* My point is that those, who *aim* at Romanizing the Church, are at worst a handful. If, then, the purpose be to put them down, attack them (as you think it worth while) in the points they distinctively profess and practise. But is this the course actually taken? Are these

* These allegations did not commence with the revivals of our time. See for example the following extract from "The Catholic Question: addressed to the Freeholders of the County of York;" on the General Election of 1826: p. 24:—

"All these things, however, are visible in the Church of England: go to a cathedral, hear and see all the magnificent things done there; behold the regiments of wax tapers, the white-robed priests, the mace-bearers; the chaunters, the picture over the altar, the wax-lights and the burnished gold plates and cups on the altar; then listen to the prayers repeated in chaunt, the anthems, the musical responses, the thundering of the organ and the echoes of the interminable roof; and then say, is not this idolatry? it is all the idolatry that the Catholics admit; it is the natural inclination that we have to those weak and beggarly elements, pomp and pride; and which both Catholics and the High Church party think so important in religion. I boldly assert that there is more idolatry in the Church of England than amongst the English Catholics; and for this simple reason, because the Church of England can better afford it. Two-thirds of the Church service is pomp and grandeur; it is as Charles II. used to say, 'the service of gentlemen.' It is for show, and for a striking impression: the cathedral service is *nothing more or less than a mass*, for it is all chaunted from beginning to end, and the people cannot understand a word of it."

points the subjects of the recent prosecutions, of the present threats, of the crowd of pamphlets and volumes upon ritual controversy, which daily issue from the press? On the contrary, these prosecutions, these menaces, these voluminous productions, have always for their main, and often for their exclusive, subject the two points of Church law which relate to the position of the consecrator, and to the rubric on ecclesiastical vestments. But now we arrive at a formidable dilemma. Upon the construction of the law on these two points, the prosecuting parties are at variance, not with a handful, but with a very large number, with thousands and tens of thousands, both of the clergy and the laity of the Church of England, whose averments I understand to be these: first, that the law of 1662, fairly interpreted, enjoins the vestments of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI., and the eastward position of the consecrating priest; secondly, that it would be inequitable and unwise to enforce these laws, and that the prevailing liberty should continue; thirdly, that it would be inequitable and unwise to alter them. Are these propositions conclusive evidence of a conspiracy to assimilate the Reformed religion of England to the Papal Church? If they are not, why is the war to be conducted mainly, and thus hotly, in the region they define? If they are, then our position is one of great danger, because it is well known that a very large and very weighty portion of the clergy, with no inconsiderable number of the laity, proceeding upon various grounds—love of ritual, love of liberty, dread of rupture—are arrayed on the side of toleration against the prosecuting party. It is said to have been declared by persons in high authority, that a large portion of both clergy and laity do entertain the desire to Romanize the Church. I am convinced it is not so; but if it be so, our condition is indeed formidable, and we are preparing to “shoot Niagara.” For I hold it to be beyond dispute that, whether minor operations of the knife be or be not safe for us, large excisions, large amputations, are what the constitution of the patient will not bear. Under them the Establishment will part into shreds; and even the Church may undergo sharp and searching consequences, which as yet it would be hardly possible to forecast.

For the avoidance of these dangers, my long cherished conviction still subsists that the best and most effectual remedy is to be found in forbearing to raise contentious issues, and to aim at ruling consciences by courts. I say this is the most effectual remedy. For the next best, which is that the parties shall, after full and decisive exposition of the law, submit to the sentence of the tribunals, is manifestly incomplete. The prosecuting party, in the two matters of the Rubric on Vestments and the position of the consecrating minister, will doubtless submit to an adverse

judgment; but will as certainly, and not without reason from its own point of view, transfer to the legislative arena the agitations of the judicial forum. The Dean of Bristol, who has argued these questions with his usual force and directness, wishes that no alterations should be made in the rubrics, if what is called the Purchas judgment be maintained; but, with his acute eye, he has perhaps shrewd suspicions on that subject; and accordingly he says, if that judgment be not maintained, he is "for such wide agitation, such strong and determined measures, as shall compel [*sic*] the Legislature to give back to the Church its old and happy character of purity."* A pleasant prospect for our old age! But the Dean has this advantage over me. He does not object to the *voies de fait*, and if only the judgment goes his way will be quite happy. I am one of those who have the misfortune of being like Falkland in the war of King and Parliament: I shall deplore all disturbing judgments, wholly irrespective of my own sympathies or antipathies. If (which I own I find it very difficult to anticipate) the prosecutors are defeated, who are strongly (to use a barbarous word) establishmentarian, we shall have agitation for a change in the law, too likely to end in rupture. If they succeed, we shall have exaggerated but unassailable manifestations of the feeling it has been sought to put down; and, while this is the employment of the *interim*, the party hit, who are by no means so closely tied to the alliance of the Church with the State, will, despairing of any other settlement, seek peace through its dissolution.

It may now perhaps in some degree appear why I have pressed so earnestly the severance of these rubrical suits from "doctrinal significance." Could we but expel that noxious element from the debate, could we but see that the two conflicting views of the position and the vestments are just as capable, to say the least, of a large and innocuous as of a specific and contentious interpretation, then we might hope to see a frame of mind among the litigators, capable of acquiescence in any judgment which they believe to be upright, and to be given after full consideration of the case. Soreness there might be, and murmuring; but good sense might prevail, and the mischief would be limited within narrow bounds. But unhappily men of no small account announce that they care not for the sign, they must deal with the thing signified. They desire the negation by authority of the doctrine of the Real Presence of our Lord and Saviour Christ, and of the Eucharistic Sacrifice; negations which, again, are synonymous with the disruption of the English Church.

When prudent men, or men made prudent by responsibility, are associated together for given purposes, whether in a cabinet, or

* Letter to Rev. Mr. Walker, pp. 23—26.

a synod, or a committee, or a board, and they find their union menaced by differences of opinion, they are wont first to test the minds of one another by argument and persuasion; and, failing these instruments, both the instinct of self-preservation and the laws of duty combine in prompting them to put off the evil day, and thus to take the benefit of enlarged information, of fresh experience, of the softening influences of association, and of whatever other facilities of solution the unrevealed future may embrace. Why can we not carry a little of this forbearance, founded upon common sense, into religion, and at least fetch our controversies out of the torrid into the temperate zone?

The time may, and I hope will, arrive, when a spirit of more diffusive charity, a wider acquaintance with the language and history of Christian dogma, and a less jealous temper of self-assertion, will enable us to perceive how much of what divides us in the Eucharistic controversy is no better and no worse than logomachy, and how capable men, ridding themselves of the subtleties of the schools and of heated reactions, may solve what passion and faction have declared insoluble.

But that time has not yet arrived; and, if the doctrine of the Eucharist must really be recast, there are no alternatives before us except on the one hand disruption, on the other postponement of the issue until we can approach it under happier auspices. The auspices are not happy now. There are even those in the English Church who urge with sincerity, and with impunity, the duty of preaching the "Real Absence,"* and, though these be few, yet many who shrink from the word may be nearly with them in the thing. On the other side, wholly apart from the energy of partisanship, from a Romanizing disposition, and from a desire for the exaltation of an order, there are multitudes of men who believe that the lowering of the sacramental doctrine of the English Church, in any of its parts, will involve, together with a real mutilation of Scriptural and Catholic truth, a loss of her Christian dignity, and a forfeiture of all the hopes associated with her special position in Christendom. Of all sacramental doctrine, none is so tender in this respect as that which relates to the Eucharist. The gross abuses of practice, and the fanciful excesses of theological speculation in the Western Church before the Reformation, compelled the Anglican Reformers to retrench their statements to a minimum, which can bear no reduction whether in the shape of altered formulæ or of binding constructions. If, in these times of heat, we abandon the wise self-restraint which in the main has up to a recent time prevailed, it is too probable that wanton tongues, prompted by ill-trained minds,

* Rev. Mr. Wolfe on the "Eastward Position," p. 4.

may reciprocally launch the reproaches of superstition and idolatry on the one hand, of heresy and unbelief on the other. Surely prudence would dictate that in these circumstances all existing latitude of law or well-established practice, should as a rule be respected; that no conscience be pressed by new theological tests, either of word or action; and that we should prefer the hope of a peaceful understanding, in some even distant future, to the certainty of a ruinous discord as the fruit of precipitancy and violent courses. One of the strangest freaks of human inconsistency I have ever witnessed is certainly this. We are much (and justly) reminded, with reference to those beyond our pale, to think little of our differences and much of our agreements; but at the same time, and often from the same quarters, we are taught and tempted by example if not by precept, within our own immediate "household of faith," to think incessantly of our differences, and not at all of our much more substantial and weighty agreements.

The proposition, then, on which I desire to dwell as the capital and cardinal point of the case is, that heavy will be the blame to those, be they who they may, who may at this juncture endeavour, whether by legislation or by judicial action, and whether by alteration of phrases or by needlessly attaching doctrinal significance to the injunction or prohibition of ceremonial acts, to shift the balance of doctrinal expression in the Church of England. The several sections of Christendom are teeming with lessons of all kinds. Let us, at least in this cardinal matter of doctrinal expression, wait and learn. We have received from the Almighty within the last half-century, such gifts as perhaps were hardly ever bestowed within the same time on a religious community. We see a transformed clergy, a laity less cold and neglectful, education vigorously pushed, human want and sorrow zealously cared for, sin less feebly rebuked, worship restored from frequent scandal and prevailing apathy to uniform decency and frequent reverence, preaching restored to an Evangelical tone and standard, the organization of the Church extended throughout the empire, and this by the agency, in many cases that might be named, of men who have succeeded the Apostles not less in character than in commission. If we are to fall to pieces in the face of such experiences, it will be hard to award the palm between our infatuation and our ingratitude; and our just reward will be ridicule from without our borders, and remorse from within our hearts.

This highly-coloured description I desire to apply within the limits only of the definite statement with which it was introduced. But I am far from complaining of those who think the evils of litigation ought to be encountered, rather than permit even a handful of men to introduce into our services evidences of a design to Romanize the religion of the country; and I have always thought

that effective provision should be made to check sudden and arbitrary innovation as such, even when it does not present features of intrinsic mischief. To me this still appears a wiser and safer basis of proceeding than an attempt to establish a cast-iron rule of uniform obedience to a vast multitude of provisions sometimes obscure, sometimes obsolete, and very variously understood, interpreted, and applied. But this preference is not expressed in the interest of any particular party, least of all of what is termed the High Church party. For the rubrics, which the Public Worship Act is to enforce, may, with truth, be generally described as High Church rubrics; and the mere party man, who takes to himself that designation, has reason to be grateful to the opposing party for having so zealously promoted the passing of the Act. For my own part, I disclaim all satisfaction in such a compulsory enforcement of rubrics which I approve; and I would far rather trust to the growth of a willing obedience among those who are called Low Churchmen, where it is still deficient. I am far, however, from asserting that all enforcement of the law, beyond what I have above described, must of necessity produce acute and fatal mischiefs. Much folly both of "reges" and "Achivi" has been borne, and may yet be borne, while Judgments are such as to carry on their front the note of impartiality, and as long as we avoid the rock of doctrinal significance, and maintain the integrity of the Prayer-Book.

But I must endeavour, before closing these remarks, to bring into view further reasons against free and large resort to penal proceedings in regard to the ceremonial of the Church. The remarks I have to offer are critical in their nature, for they aim at exhibiting the necessary imperfections even of the best tribunal; but they do not require the sinister aid either of bitterness or of disrespect.

The first of these remarks is that the extinction of the separate profession of the civilian, now merged in the general study and practice of the bar, and the consolidation of the Courts of Probate and Admiralty with those of Equity and Common Law, have materially impaired the chances, which have hitherto existed, of our finding in our judges of ecclesiastical causes the form of fitness growing out of special study. Any reader of the learned Judgments of the Dean of Arches may perceive the great advantages they derive from this source. It may be thought, with some reason, that episcopal assessors will, in doctrinal cases, help to supply the defect; but it would not be easy to arrange that the most learned bishops should be chosen as assessors; and the general standard of learning on the bench cannot, under the hard conditions of modern times, be kept very high. The number of individuals must at all times be small who unite anything like

deep or varied learning with the administrative and pastoral qualities, and the great powers of business and active work, which are now more than ever necessary in a bishop. But in questions of ceremonial, the difficulties are greater still.

Let any one turn, for example, to the decision on appeal in the *Purchas* case, as it is the most recent, and seems to be the most contested, of the rubrical decisions. He will find, perhaps with surprise, that it does not rest mainly on considerations of law, but much more upon the results of historical and antiquarian study. Though rightly termed a legal judgment, and though it of course has plenary authority as to the immediate question it decides, it is in truth, and could not but be, as to the determining and main portion of it, neither more nor less than a purely literary labour. Now, the authority of literary inquiries depends on care, comprehensiveness, and precision, in collecting facts, and on great caution in concluding from them. There is no democracy so levelling as the Republic of Letters. Liberty and equality here are absolute, though fraternity may be sometimes absent on a holiday. And a literary labour, be it critical, be it technical, be it archæological, when it has done its immediate duty in disposing of a cause, cannot afterwards pass muster by being wrapped in the folds of the judicial ermine. It must come out into the light, and be turned round and round, just as freely (though under more stringent obligations of respect) as Professor Max Müller's doctrine of solar myths, or Professor Sylvester's fourth dimension in space, or Dr. Schliemann's promising theory that Hissarlik is Troy. It is, I believe, customary, and perhaps wise, that a prior judgment of the highest court of appeal should govern a later one. It is alleged, nor is it for me to rebut the allegation, that the *Purchas* judgment contradicts the judgment in the case of *Liddell v. Westerton*; but, if so, this is accidental, and does not touch the principle, which seems to be generally acknowledged. Now, however well this may stand with respect to interpretation of law, yet with respect to historical and antiquarian researches, and to judgments which turn on them, it would evidently be untenable, and even ludicrous. And then comes the question, what right have we to expect from our judges, amidst the hurry and pressure of their days, and often at a time of life when energy must begin to flag, either the mental habits, or the acquisitions, of the archæologist, the critic, or above all of the historian? Why should we expect of the bishop, because he may be assumed to have a fair store of theology, or of the judge, because he has spent his life in pleading and hearing causes, that they should be adepts in historical research, or that they should be imbued with that which is so rare in this country, the historic sense and spirit, abundant, in this our day, nowhere but in Germany?

It may be said that judges can and will avail themselves of the labours of others; but they are unhappily not in the ordinary condition of courts of first instance, who can collect evidence of all kinds at will. They are confined to published labours, when they go beyond the *ex parte* statements with which counsel may supply them. Still they are sure to do their best, and they may get on well enough, if the subject happens to be one of those which have been thoroughly examined, and where positive conclusions have been sufficiently established. But what if, on the contrary, it has been one neglected for many generations? if the authorities, so far as they go, are in serious if not hopeless conflict? if the study of the matter has but recently begun, and that only amidst the din and heat, and for the purposes, of the actual controversy? What is the condition of a judge who has to interpret the law by means of *data*, which only the historian and the antiquarian can supply and digest respectively, when they have not digested or supplied them? For example, what if he have to investigate the question how a surplice is related to an alb, how far the use of either accompanies or excludes the cope or the chasuble (as a coat excludes a lady's gown), or in what degree the altarwise position of the Holy Table had been established at the time when the Commissioners at the Savoy were engaged in the revision of the Liturgy? In this country a barrister cannot be his own attorney; yet a judge may not only have to digest his own legal apparatus, but may also be required to dive, at a moment's notice, into the *tohu-boku* of inquiries which have never yet emerged from the stage of chaos; and the decision of matters of great pith and moment for Christian worship and the peace of the Church comes to depend upon what is at best, by no fault of his, random and fragmentary knowledge.

Any reader of the Purchas Judgment on Appeal will perceive how truly I have said that it rests mainly, not on judicial interpretations, but on the results of literary research. In such interpretations, indeed, it is not wanting; but they are portions only of the fabric, and are joined together by what seems plainly to be literary and antiquarian inquiry. The Judicial Committee decide, for example, with regard to sacerdotal vestments, that the Advertisements of 1564 have the authority of law; and to this decision the mere layman must respectfully bow.* But they also rule that the Advertisements in prescribing the use of the surplice for parish churches, proscribe the use of the cope or the chasuble, and that the canons of 1603-4 repeat the prohibition.† Now, this is a

* Brooke's Reports, p. 171, 176.

† *Ibid.* p. 178. "If the minister is ordered to wear a surplice at all times of his ministration, he cannot wear an alb and tunicle when assisting at the Holy Communion; if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion in a chasuble, he cannot celebrate in a surplice."

proposition purely antiquarian. It depends upon a precise knowledge of the usages of what is sometimes termed "ecclesiastical millinery." Can judges, or even bishops, be expected to possess this very special kind of knowledge, or be held blameable for not possessing it? I think not. But when even judges of great eminence, of the highest station, and of the loftiest character, holding themselves compelled to decide, aye or no, on the best evidence they can get as to every question brought before them; that the use of the surplice excludes the use of the chasuble, this is after all a strictly literary conclusion, and is open to be confirmed, impaired, or overthrown, by new or wider evidence which further literary labour may accumulate. And, indeed, it appears rather difficult to sustain the proposition that the surplice when used excludes all the more elaborate vestments, since we find it actually prescribed in one of the rubrics at the end of the Communion Office in the Prayer-Book of 1549, that the officiating minister is ordered to "*put upon him a plain alb or surplice with a cope.*"

Again, the Judicial Committee, in construing the rubrics as to the position of the minister, states that before the revision of 1662, "the custom of placing the table along the east wall was becoming general, and it may fairly be said that the revisers must have had this in view." This, of course, is a pure matter of history. Before and since the judgment was given, it has been examined by a variety of competent writers; and I gather from their productions, that had these been before the tribunal in 1871, it must have arrived, on this point, at an opposite opinion. The conclusion of Mr. Scudamore indeed is that the present position of the altars is the work of the eighteenth century.

The literary conclusion with respect to the surplice appears to be the foundation-stone of the Purchas judgment with reference to vestments. But it seems to be also collaterally sustained by three other propositions: one, that the articles of visitation, and the proceedings of commissions, in and after the reign of Elizabeth, prescribe the destruction of vestments, albs, tunicles, and other articles, as monuments of superstition and idolatry; the second, that the requisitions of bishops in these parochial articles are limited to the surplice; the third, that there is no evidence of the use of vestments during the period. All these are matters, not of law, but of historical criticism.

The critics of the Judgment are numerous, and few of them, perhaps, make due allowance for the difficulties under which it was framed. Their arguments are manifold, and far beyond my power fully to cite. Among other points, they admit the second of these three propositions, and consider that the attempts of the ruling authorities were limited, as regards enforcement, to the surplice;

but hold that in those times what the law prescribed was one thing—what it enforced, or attempted to enforce, was another. Mr. MacColl* cites a remarkable example; namely, that while the rubric required the priest to read daily four chapters of Holy Scripture, the Advertisements aimed at enforcing only two. The orders of destruction raise a point of great importance, which demands full inquiry. As far as I have noticed, they seem uniformly to include “crosses” as “monuments of superstition and idolatry;” yet the Judicial Committee in *Westerton v. Liddell*, and in *Hebert v. Purchas*, decide that crosses for decoration of the building are lawful. As regards the actual use of vestments, Mr. MacColl (while presuming that in a penal case it is evidence of disuse, not of use, that is demanded) supplies what he thinks ample proof;† and it is noticed that in the judgment itself there is evidence, viz., that of *Dering* (1593), and *Johnson* (1573), sufficient to impede an universal assertion. But into these matters I do not enter. I confine myself to urging the necessity of further historical and archæological inquiries, as absolutely necessary in order to warrant any judgments restrictive, in whatever sense, of the apparent liberality of our laws and practice; and I rejoice to see that for this end so many persons of ability, beside those I have named, are bringing in their respective contributions.‡

I suppose it to be beyond doubt that in our times the acts of the officers of the law may be taken as evidence of what the law is, or is reported to be. The burning of printed editions of English books by the Customs would prove that the importation of such works was prohibited. But history seems to show that this apparently obvious rule cannot be applied to times like those of the Reformation without much caution and reserve. For example: The *Purchas* judgment states that the law required the use of copes in cathedral and collegiate churches, and generally treats authorized destruction as evidence of illegality; but it appears§ that the Queen’s Commissioners at Oxford, in 1573 (when the anti-papal tide was running very high), ordered in the College Chapel of All Souls that all copes should be defaced and rendered unfit for use.

There are three cautionary remarks, with which I shall conclude.

The first is that, unless I am mistaken, the word evidence is sometimes used, in judgments on ceremonial, in a mode which involves a dangerous fallacy. It seems to be used in a judicial sense, whereas it is really used in a literary sense. As respects the

* “Lawlessness, Sacerdotalism, and Ritualism,” p. 76.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 59—70.

‡ For example, Mr. Beresford Hope and Mr. Morton Shaw. Mr. Droop has produced some useful illustrations.

§ Droop on *Edwardian Vestments*, p. 26.

testimony given in a case, the judge deals judicially, and with his full authority as a judge; but the illustrative matter he collects in these suits from books or pamphlets, laborious as he may be, and useful as it may be, is not evidence except in the sense in which Dr. Schliemann thinks he has plenty of evidence as to the site of Troy; it is historical inquiry, or literary or learned speculation.

The second is that, if I am right in laying down as the grand requisite for arriving at truth in these cases the historian's attainments and frame of mind, the judge, and the lawyer, labour in these cases under some peculiar difficulties. It is almost a necessity for the judge, as it is absolutely for the advocate, that every cause be resolved categorically by an Aye or a No. But the historical inquirer is not conversant with Aye and No alone: he is familiar with a thousand shades of colour and of light between them. The very first requisite of the historic mind is suspense of judgment. Judicial business requires, as a rule, a decision between two—it is the judgment of Solomon; but the historian may have to mince the subject into many fragments, according to the probabilities of the case; he deals habitually with conjectures and likelihoods, as well as positive assertions. The judge has to give all where he gives anything, and his mental habit forms itself accordingly; but the "I doubt" which was so much criticized in Lord Eldon, is among the most prominent characteristics of the philosophic and truth-loving historian.

Lastly; after the famous judgment Mr. Burke has passed upon the immense merits, and besetting dangers, of the legal mind, with direct relation to the character of Mr. Grenville, that great master proceeds to state that "Mr. Grenville thought better of the wisdom and power of human legislation than in truth it deserves."* Most eminently does this seem to me to be true, in observing the manner after which our judges sometimes deal with ancient laws. Such as the character and efficacy of law is now, such they are apt to assume it always must have been. It has not been their business to consider the enormous changes in the structure of society, on its toilsome way through the rolling ages, from a low to a high organization. The present efficiency of law presumes the full previous inquiry and consultation of the deliberative power, and the perfect strength of the executive. But that strength depends on the magistracy, the police, the judiciary, the standing army, upon the intercommunication of men and tidings by easy locomotion, upon a crowd of arrangements for the most part practically unknown to the loosely compacted structures of mediæval societies. The moral force, which abode in them, had little aid, for the purposes of the supreme power, except on the most pressing emer-

* Speech on American Taxation. Works, vol. ii. p. 389.

gencies, from material force; partial approximations were then only possible, in cases where the modern provisions for obedience are nearly complete. The law of to-day is the expression of a supreme will, which has, before deciding on its utterance, had ample means to consult, to scrutinize the matter, to adapt itself to practical possibilities; and it is justly construed as an instrument which is meant to take, and takes, immediate and uniform effect. But the laws of earlier times were to a great extent merely in the nature of authoritative assertions of principle, and tentative efforts towards giving it effect; and were frequently, not to say habitually, according to the expediencies of the hour, trampled under foot, even by those who were supposed to carry them into execution. Take the great case of Magna Charta, in which the community had so vast an interest. It was incessantly broken, to be incessantly, not renewed, but simply re-affirmed. And law was thus broken by authority, as authority found it convenient: from the age when Henry III. "passed his life in a series of perjuries," as is said by Mr. Hallam,* to the date when Charles II. plundered the bankers, Magna Charta was re-asserted, we are told, thirty-two times, without ever having been repealed. But we do not therefore, from discovering either occasional or even wholesale disobedience, find it necessary to read it otherwise than in its natural sense. The reign of Elizabeth bisects the period between Magna Charta and ourselves. But very little progress had been made in her times towards improving the material order of society; and, from religious convulsion, they were in truth semi-revolutionary times. Acceding to the throne, she had to struggle with an intense dualism of feeling, which it was her arduous task to mould into an unity. The clergy, except a handful, sympathized largely with the old order, and continued very much in the old groove throughout the rural and less advanced districts. To facilitate her operations on this side, she wisely brought in the Rubric of Ornaments. But there had also sprung up in the kingdom, after the sad experience of Mary's reign, a determined Puritanism, lodged principally at the main centres of population, and sustained by the credit of the returning exiles (several of them bishops), and by the natural sympathies of the Continental Reformation. Where this spirit was dominant, the work of destruction did not wait for authority, and far outran it. In truth, the powers of the Queen and the law were narrowly hedged in, on this side as well as on the other. What could be more congenial to her mind and to her necessities, than that, for all this second section of her people, she should wink hard at neglect in a sore point like that of vestments, and that in pro-

* Middle Ages, ii. 451-3.

ceeding to the Advertisements of 1564, though obliged to apply a stronger hand, she should confine herself to expressing what she thought absolute decency required, namely, the surplice, and leave the rubric and the older forms to be held or modified according to the progressive action of opinion? Considering the violent divergences with which she had to deal, would it not have been the ruin of her work if she had endeavoured to push to the extremes now sometimes supposed the idea of a present and immediate uniformity throughout the land? This I admit is speculation, on a subject not yet fully elucidated; but it is speculation which is not in conflict with the facts thus far known, and which requires no strain to be put upon the language of the law.

"England expects every man to do his duty;" and this is an attempt at doing mine, not without a full measure of respect for those, who are charged with a task now more than ever arduous in the declaration and enforcement of the law. To lessen the chances of misapprehension I sum up, in the following propositions, a paper which, though lengthened, must, I know, be dependent to a large extent upon liberal interpretation.

I. The Church of this great nation is worth preserving; and for that end much may well be borne.


II. In the existing state of minds, and of circumstances, preserved it cannot be, if we shift its balance of doctrinal expression, be it by an alteration of the Prayer Book (either way) in contested points, or be it by treating rubrical interpretations of the matters heretofore most sharply contested on the basis of "doctrinal significance."

III. The more we trust to moral forces, and the less to penal proceedings (which are to a considerable extent exclusive one of the other), the better for the Establishment, and even for the Church.

IV. If litigation is to be continued, and to remain within the bounds of safety, it is highly requisite that it should be confined to the repression of such proceedings as really imply unfaithfulness to the national religion.

V. In order that judicial decisions on ceremonial may habitually enjoy the large measure of authority, finality, and respect, which attaches in general to the sentences of our courts, it is requisite that they should have uniform regard to the rules and results of full historical investigation, and should, if possible, allow to stand over for the future matters insufficiently cleared, rather than decide them upon partial and fragmentary evidence.

W. E. GLADSTONE.



THE ECHO OF THE ANTIPODES.

F*AS est et ab hoste doceri.* Still more permissible and appropriate must it be to profit by the experience of our children, because still closer must be the analogy between the characters and the circumstances of those so nearly allied by blood, and probably identical in so many of their antecedents. I cannot but believe, therefore, that much interest will attach to the following contribution to some of our most imminent political and social problems, which reached me a few days ago, from one of a group of colonies which, no doubt, is destined to a future of great prosperity and power. The writer holds a position of eminence and wealth in New South Wales, has made his home in that colony, intends to live and die there, is a man of influence among his fellow-citizens, and much concerned with commercial and industrial undertakings, and, consequently, well qualified to give us reliable information on the subject in question.

“SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES,
10th March, 1875.

“DEAR SIR,—If I venture to intrude myself upon you in this letter, it is that, having perused with great interest your latest work, “Rocks Ahead,” I considered that it might be gratifying to you to hear “A Voice from the Antipodes” echo by an example the truth of your vaticinations. We have in New South Wales an Anglo-Saxon community, with all its energy and doggedness, with all its virtues and its prejudices; and, as far as we can judge from its wealth, its population, and its influence upon the markets of the world, one that, though still a colony, has placed its foot upon the first round of the ladder of nationality; and it is a worthy study

for the philosopher to see how that nationality is shaping its future. In the year 1853 a constitution was granted to the colony, creating two Houses of Parliament—the Senate, or Upper House, nominated by the Crown, and an Assembly elected by the people. As the result of continual amendment, the qualification for election to the Assembly, being only a six months' residence in the electorate, becomes almost universal suffrage—more particularly as the franchise attaches to lodgers as well as householders. Inasmuch as the proposal that the University should return a member has been always rejected, it is fair to assume that the numerical majority have no desire that education (simply as education) should have a voice in their councils. The members of the Assembly are not chosen on account of their pre-eminent talent, or commanding wealth, or individual worth, but entirely from personal influence, or their expressed accordance with the popular cry of the day. But it would be vain for any one, however talented, influential, or wealthy, to seek to obtain a seat in the Assembly, unless he bowed down before the Juggernaut of the sovereign people, and avowed his sympathy with the "working man;" and yet, properly so called, the working man does not exist in New South Wales. The hours of labour are but eight, and wages vary according to the skill employed, from 1s. to 2s. (occasionally 2s. 6d.) per hour. These extreme rates, in a country where bread is plentiful and cheap, meat only 4d. per lb., and clothing not dearer than in Europe, are maintained by the efforts of powerful trades-unions, with the knowledge that Parliament dare not propose any scheme of immigration, the effect of which would be to bring competition to the colony and reduce the rate of labour. It must not be imagined that the climate will not permit of more than eight hours' daily labour, for most men work on their own account after hours, and will occasionally deign to do so for their employers, under the temptation of extra pay. Land in the suburbs being cheap, a very large proportion of the labouring classes are their own landlords, and many, by the aid of building societies, have erected neat and pretty cottages, surrounded by well-cultivated gardens. Of course a large proportion of the amount received for wages is handed over to the union, and I will venture to quote a few examples as indicative of the despotic power these associations exercise:—The owner of one of our coasting steamers will not employ men who are members of the union, and very recently when the steamer arrived into port she commenced discharging cargo at a wharf where union men were employed; very shortly after, the secretary of the union went to the wharf, and forbade the men on shore to receive cargo from the vessel. Again, the steamer *Rapide* being under repairs, the captain observed that one of the men employed was an habitual idler, and one day on finishing his work desired him not to return: the following morning all the rest of the men were absent, and intimated their intention of not returning until their fellow-unionist was taken on again. In the iron trade, the men, after compelling the eight hours' concession upon their employers (without diminution in the rate of wages), determined that the eight hours should be broken, one for breakfast and one for dinner, instead of having only one break as formerly. The masters were aware that the continual blowing off furnaces would entail a certain loss, declined to concede, and all the works were closed; the strike lasted about three months, and was friendly arranged by an agreement that, during six months in the year the men should have only one break in the day, and two breaks in the day during the other six months. Some time since the coal miners struck work, and the strike, it was arranged by the delegates of the union, should be terminated by all the collieries in the country (irrespective of the greater or less facilities of any one colliery) agreeing to charge the public an uniform price of 14s. per ton for screened coal, of which 5s. per ton should be paid to the coal-getter, his wages rising or

falling 3d. per ton as the price of coal to the public varied by a shilling a ton. I might multiply instances innumerable to show that in the capital, where the unions exist in greatest force, all real power is in their hands, and at the last general election they returned one of their body to parliament, and who sits as their paid delegate. It is not then extraordinary that in constituencies thus constituted, the educated classes should as a rule (though there are many worthy exceptions) hold themselves aloof from the political arena. The result is exactly what you have predicted, that there is no party but merely a struggle between the Ins and Outs as to who shall enjoy power, and the parliamentary loaves and fishes, both sides rivals in personal abuse, but both following exactly the same policy. The State is certainly doing its utmost to place within the reach of all the advantages of education, but in consequence of religious dissensions that education is of a very elementary character, for the study of history and all cognate subjects upon which differences of opinion exist are prohibited. It is quite absurd, therefore, to consider that the colony is educating the rising generation up to the extent of its political power, for it is left in the most complete ignorance of all economic questions, which are not even attended to in the addresses of the candidates for legislative honours, for the best of all reasons, that but few understand them. As might be expected, the Assembly are exceedingly impatient at the control of the Upper House as a co-ordinate branch of the legislature; and when a measure has been rejected by the voice of the Senate, often resort to popular clamour to compel the Upper House to give way; but the innate vigour in the life of the young colony is such that it continues to advance and prosper, not aided by, but in spite of its despotic democracy. All contractors and heads of departments acknowledge that there is ample work at the present moment for at least eight thousand able-bodied men, which means an immigration of about thirty thousand souls; but notwithstanding the urgent requirements of the colony, not one member of the Assembly can be found to raise his voice in favour of immigration. The colony exports over a million tons of coal, the supply of which, appears to be absolutely inexhaustible, the best hematite iron ore, lime and clay are found in close proximity to some of the pits; copper and tin ores abound, capital is abundant, but the capitalist is afraid of investing in manufacturing industries, as he would be completely at the mercy of the men in his employ. To give an example: a shipbuilder has now a vessel on the stocks, and was offered a very handsome price for it if he would engage to complete it by a fixed date. The shipbuilder knew that the work could and would be done by the date required, but dared not make the contract, feeling sure that if it came by any chance to the ears of the union they would take advantage of the circumstance to raise the rate of wages upon him. I believe that what I have written will be quite sufficient, without further occupying your valuable time, to show that you have certainly not exaggerated your prognostications of England's future."

The above communication needs no commentary, but I may perhaps be allowed to supplement it by a reference to one or two events which have occurred since the publication of the first edition of "*Rocks Ahead*," which, if I am not mistaken, are gradually leading thoughtful minds to believe that there may be more sober truth and less flighty fancy in the gloomy prognostics of that volume than most of its readers were originally inclined to admit.

In a note at p. 80, I ventured to predict that "the year 1874 bade fair to be a year of conflict and of strikes, which would waste

a vast amount of capital and of earnings, teach us many lessons, and clinch many of the arguments of this paper." Whether it has taught us many lessons may be questioned, but assuredly it has done everything else that was anticipated from it. It has been pre-eminently a year of strikes, and of hopeless, gigantic, and wasteful ones, in this country; and in others also, so differently situated as, one might have fancied, to have been exempted from our troubles. The Sydney letter just quoted shows us the operation of trades unions—just as selfish, just as cruel, just as anti-social, short-sighted, and suicidal, in a new country lacking labour, cramped and kept back for want of labour, and where labour in consequence can, in a great measure, command its own terms—as in an old country like England, where labour is, or is alleged to be, redundant, and therefore the *soi-disant* "slave of capital." America has been suffering from strikes so menacing and so prolonged that the troops, even in that land of democracy, have been called out to repress disturbances. The Philadelphia correspondent of one of the New York journals writes:*

"Scarcely any other topic has been prevalent in business circles during the past week than the all-absorbing one of the coal strike, the situation at the mines, the departure of troops from this and other points to the scene of trouble, and the conflicting rumours constantly received by wire as to the actual condition of affairs. Probably at no period since the war has there been so gravely serious a position of affairs in our country as that now existing between the various labour unions and the industries with which they are connected. Here we have the largest manufacturing city in the world, with positively no more than three weeks' supply of coal on hand, even for household uses. From the interior the most reliable information exists that few if any of the furnaces and other ironworks have any fuel, even for present uses, while their previous production has been seriously interfered with. It is estimated that not less than one hundred thousand persons, and even *five hundred millions of capital*, in this commonwealth alone, are to-day producing nothing. At the ordinary price of skilled labour, 2 dollars per day, this number of persons unemployed represents a daily loss of 200,000 dollars, a loss which no community can stand. The additional loss to capital by injury and deterioration of idle machinery, and loss of interest, will swell the aggregate damage to one of frightful proportions, and one which must soon be sensibly felt by the general public. The settlement of the labour troubles of the country is now the subject which should and must engage the earnest attention of all classes of citizens, or we are inevitably drifting into a condition of anarchy and lawlessness, which will be followed by a more serious financial panic than that from which we had hoped we were recovering. There are grave wrongs on both sides to be settled, and nothing seems more likely to secure any permanent relief than a well-digested plan of arbitration in all labour disputes, which shall be compulsory on both parties. The latest reports as to the coal strike indicate a possibility of a settlement, but in other branches—among ironworkers, weavers, glass-blowers, and the very numerous tradesmen on strike—there seems no greater prospect of improvement than

* Other papers add the calculation that the value of the capital lying idle in Pennsylvania is about five hundred millions of dollars, and the loss of interest not less than 75,000 dollars per day.

a month since. To the capitalist and manufacturer the situation is, therefore, one of extreme concern, and through them reflected on the entire business community."

Lastly (to pass over several struggles of a similar character, but of slighter dimensions, which have taken place in Belgium, Germany, and France), the great South Wales conflict in the iron and coal trade, which has absorbed so much public attention this spring, has presented features unusually disheartening. We have no desire to enter upon any points which might excite or renew controversy or painful feeling, or to express opinions on subjects on which, perhaps, only those on the spot, and who have followed the subject in all its details and antecedents, are qualified to pronounce. The lock-out may have been an injudicious and possibly an unwarrantable step; more patience might have been shown at the outset, and fuller information might have been vouchsafed even to unreasonable men; the conduct of the union leaders may have been less condemnable than appears. But three or four features stand out, and have stood out, undisputed from the outset. It was obvious to all qualified outside observers from the first that the men had no case and no chance of success; the essential facts were patent to the whole world; it is difficult to believe that the colliers or their leaders really disbelieved the statements of the masters as to prices and profits; the subject was one on which (if on any) the working men were especially qualified to judge; not a single organ of the independent press failed to point out the mistake of the colliers, and to prove that they were hopelessly in the wrong. Yet all this was of no avail. The struggle was one of singular obstinacy. Numbers wished to return to work on the offered terms; but whenever a meeting was held to pass a resolution and to open negotiations to this effect, the windy oratory of some voluble speaker re-fanned the flame, re-awakened the flagging passions, and overpowered the awakening good sense of the auditors, and the meeting ended by determining to return to another period of distress and idleness. This went on week after week, in spite of the efforts of Lord Aberdare, Mr. Brassey, and other tried friends of the colliers, to guide them to a wiser sense of their own interests, and a truer view of facts—every week sacrificing £90,000 to the workers, and incalculable sums to their employers, plunging the labourers deeper and deeper into suffering and debt; and it was not till the retail traders could no longer give credit; till the masters had been forced to announce that any return to work must be at 15 per cent., and not at 10 per cent. reduction, that the conflict was given up, and then only gradually, slowly, and partially. From the first there was no aid (or none worth speaking of) from union funds, given or promised; from the first there was no hope of victory; from

the first the workmen could quote no facts or calculations to afford even a colourable justification of their proceedings; from the first there was the experience of two years ago to warn and to instruct them; yet from first to last did every public meeting held allow itself to be turned aside from the obviously wise and inevitable course, by exhortations addressed solely to the feelings. The millions wasted constitute the least sad feature of this sad history;* the only bright feature is the singularly orderly and peaceful behaviour of the workmen out of employ—behaviour so different from what it has often been elsewhere, and from what it used to be in similar circumstances in former years. But for those who hoped that the labouring and well-paid poor—the masses of the new constituencies—would prove in real emergencies their fitness to exercise the franchise, to recognize their true friends, to manifest the courage of individuality, and to withstand the misrepresentations of fluent declaimers—the lessons of the conflict just ended have been dispiriting indeed.

We see nothing in all this wherewith to reproach the Welsh miners, no reasonable matter for surprise. Reproach should be reserved for the stump orators and union leaders who so successfully excited and misled them; surprise, and perhaps some specific condemnation, for the politicians, of whatever party, who, in 1867

* The conflict lasted nearly twenty-two weeks, and the number of miners, &c., directly out of work was upwards of 58,000, besides many more, probably 12,000, employed in subsidiary labour—in all 70,000. We have now lying before us more than one careful calculation of the loss of earnings to the men, and of interest on capital to the masters resulting from this disastrous contest. The following, from the *Merthyr Express*, includes all collateral losses, and may perhaps be regarded as extreme if not extravagant:—

Coalowners in sale of coal	£2,100,000
Ironmasters in iron and steel	2,150,000
Railway companies	264,000
Waggon hire	100,000
Royalties	150,000
Dock dues	100,000
Maintenance of pits, plant, horses, &c.	250,000
Local trade	1,000,000
Workmen's wages, direct	3,000,000
Relief administered by Guardians	25,000
Total	<u>£9,189,000</u>

Lord Aberdare, in a letter to the *South Wales Daily News*, shows that the loss of wages to the men must have reached £3,000,000. The loss to capitalists is, he says, incalculable.

The ordinary estimate to all parties is £5,000,000, and this will probably be found not far from the truth.

and afterwards, so resolutely maintained that working men everywhere were now far too sober-minded and enlightened to be excited by stump oratory, or led astray by fallacious misrepresentations, and were capable of standing firm to their own knowledge and judgment against the swaying sympathy of surrounding and shouting numbers. Partisans now are heard to express surprise and dismay at the results of the late elections at Stoke, Stafford, Merthyr, Stroud, and other boroughs, who were among the foremost to insist a very few years ago upon quadrupling or sextupling their constituencies. Blind guides! to affect amazement at the first fruits of their own work! In what country, I would ask, would an uneducated and unprepared class, thus suddenly invested with potentially supreme power, have acted with so much discretion, or wrought so little mischief? Let us look a little in detail at what *was* done by the Act of 1867. In nearly every one of the boroughs whose elections have caused disappointment and anxiety to the nation the constituency was not *enlarged*, but wholly changed. The former electors included (to speak broadly) the whole of the educated classes:—the great mass of the new electors must therefore have consisted of the wholly or comparatively uneducated classes. *Yet the new ones are four or five to one of the old.* That is, the electoral supremacy was virtually wrested from the men of trained political intelligence, and given over, by a vast preponderance, into the hands (to express the fact as guardedly as possible) of men who had not had any such intelligent training. To say that the borough electors of England and Wales were suddenly raised from 514,000 in 1866 to 1,452,000 in 1875 (or nearly 200 per cent.), is only a most inadequate and disguising statement of the case, for that only says that every elector had two fresh ones placed on the register to countervail his vote. We must look at individual instances, where the working classes are strongest and most concentrated; and here often the new out-number, eclipse, and neutralize the old *in the proportion of five, six, sometimes eight and nine to one.* We append a table giving the proportions in which the electors have been multiplied by what my readers will, I think, now admit I had a right to call “the revolution” of 1867.

RATE AT WHICH THE ELECTORS HAD INCREASED BETWEEN 1866 AND 1875.

Under 50 per cent. in 5 Boroughs.	50 and under 100 per cent. in 38 Boroughs.	100 and under 300 per cent. in 107 Boroughs.	300 and under 500 per cent. in 22 Boroughs.	500 per cent. and above in 14 Boroughs.
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To those who look at the matter from a purely party point of

view, it may be a sufficient sedative with alarmist temperaments to reply, that, of two Parliaments elected under household franchise, one returned a large Liberal and the next a large Conservative majority. To others, whose uneasiness lies in the direction of diminished reverence for property, it is enough to remark that probably no Parliament ever contained so many plutocrats as that of 1875. But we may explain our meaning without personality (except, perhaps, one which will be with most people its own excuse) by reference to a few special returns. The constituency of *Merthyr Tydvil* sprung up from 1387 to 15,866, or about *twelve-fold*, and Merthyr returned Mr. Richards, an eminently respectable Nonconformist minister, in the place of Mr. Bruce, an eminent and experienced statesman and Cabinet minister. *Morpeth* increased its constituency from 485 to 5,559 or upwards of *eleven-fold*, and has exchanged another Home Secretary, veteran and popular, for a working-men's candidate, thoroughly respectable and trustworthy, we believe, but as yet untrained. *Wolverhampton*, indeed, has *quintupled* its number of electors, but retains its old representatives, and so in the main has *Wigan*. But poor *Stroud*, with more than a *four-fold* augmentation of the electorate, is so disorganized, that, since the lamented Mr. Winterbotham's death, it has never been able to get a representative at all. While, to crown the list, *Stoke-upon-Trent*, on the retirement of Mr. Melly (a member of sufficiently advanced political opinions), has replaced him by Dr. Kenealy, who was certainly not elected on account of any political opinions at all. But then the Stoke which Mr. Melly represented had 3,500 electors, while the Stoke which is contented to be represented by Dr. Kenealy has 19,500—and, therefore, in no rational sense can the two electorates be said to be the same. It may very well be that the whole of the 6,110 who voted for Kenealy may have been made by Mr. Disraeli's Reform Act.

Now, what does Dr. Kenealy's return indicate and prove? Circumstances in this case happily enable us to speak with perfect plainness, and at the same time without offence. EITHER the electors of Stoke (by no means a peculiarly uneducated or unintelligent set; perhaps rather the reverse) really believed the Claimant to be Tichborne, and his advocate the gallant defender of an oppressed man—that is, they were convinced of the truth of a position which two Courts of Justice, after investigations of unequalled searchingness and duration, had pronounced to be unquestionably false—a pronouncement which the House of Commons confirmed with a unanimity quite unparalleled, for the only dissentients were Dr. Kenealy and his seconder—a conclusion which, after the summing up of the Lord Chief Justice, it seems impossible for rational minds to withstand. In this case it is not too much to assume that men who believe such a position are not

unlikely to believe anything in spite of any evidence and any arguments; their intelligence and fitness for the franchise must be far below the level which their friends have hitherto maintained. OR, as no doubt was the case with many, they supposed, with the rest of us, that the Claimant was Orton; but his defender was popular just because his cause was bad—because, in fact, here was a daring lawyer who had stood up against the world for a butcher against a baronet—in short, Dr. Kenealy's election was the result of a class feeling of the very worst sort. OR, the real pervading impression assigned by *Punch* to the mass was the correct one, however dim and self-contradictory:—"I don't care whether he was Tichborne, or Castro, or Orton, or who he was; but I don't like to see a poor man kept out of his rights." OR, finally, and with too many, the motive impulse for their vote was simply that they had found a man (not himself of too spotless antecedents) with audacity and pluck to assail, on behalf of one of their own order, judges, juries, gentlemen, nobles, hostile witnesses, an outvoting Parliament—any one, in short, however high in reverence and station—in a foul-mouthed fashion, which almost sanctioned or threw into the shade their own too customary language. In a word, the popularity and success of Dr. Kenealy at Stoke, whether regarded as the product of deficient intelligence or distorted sentiment, are almost equally of evil omen; for there is not the faintest reason for supposing the Stoke constituency to be an exceptional one, or that any large borough might not do as Stoke has done;—and if we are right in this assumption, then we have no security whatever that on any question—class, personal, religious, international, or other—the vast majority of the constituency may not, swayed by a coarse species of oratory, arrive at decisions utterly at variance with evidence, sound sense, wise policy, and the national interest, or even safety. There is no reason in the world why half a dozen topics (more naturally stimulating than the Tichborne case) might not, under the management of a skilful declaimer (and there are scores far abler than Dr. Kenealy), get extraordinary hold upon the popular mind, be selected as the crucial question at elections, sweep over the length and breadth of the land, and throw all others into the background. Nor, obviously, if we are to judge by Stoke, is there any reason why, on each one of these, the great body of the working classes—the new electorate—should not be misled into a decision as absurd as the one just sent us as a warning. Nor, in the last place, is there the slightest doubt that if they should be so misled, they will be able to place the representative of their delusion at the head of the poll.

It appears to me that not one of these positions can be gainsaid or weakened, and that, as a whole, they are full of evil omen.

In 1867 you placed in the hands of the uneducated masses the power of returning whatever members of Parliament they please: in 1875 they showed you that, under excitement, not of the fiercest or grandest order even, they may exercise that power in a fashion that seemed incredible to all men of intelligence—may endorse enthusiastically a monstrous delusion which no subsequent delusion can surpass or even match. It will be said, "This was a purely accidental and abnormal phrenzy: the artisans are not as a rule given to such aberrations; look how few candidates of their own class they returned." True, I reply, they do not and will not usually go so far astray, and they have not very great trust in their own leaders; but grant that a man arises among them with character to gain their confidence, and eloquence to command their allegiance and sway their minds—and the supposition is possible enough—and where will be your antidote to the supremacy which you have given them at the poll? "You are conjuring up imaginary dangers," others will allege; "the mass of the householders admitted by the Act of 1867 are far shrewder than those at Stoke; and, after all, where are the questions on which they will listen to the nonsense of damaged and extravagant orators?" Again I answer: Do you not in your heart believe that if by any legal flaw the Claimant had escaped his doom and been set free, he might have been returned to Parliament by fifty constituencies at least—more than Lamartine in 1848, or Thiers in 1872, across the Channel? And as to questions regarding which the majority of borough electors might on occasions be aroused to an excitement at once discreditable, ignorant, irrational, sweeping, and pernicious, what do you think of No Popery, the Contagious Diseases Act, Masters and Servants Act, the Conspiracy Act, and the like? What would be the prospect of a general election, if the country were adequately harangued by itinerant declaimers, when a second Trent affair was the uppermost topic in the public mind? And, to conclude, who can be blind to the fact that a vast majority of our population are far less well off than they fancy they have a claim to be, and than they are satisfied that certain social, legal, or political changes, or hazardous anti-economical experiments might make them,—that they are dangerously prone to listen to eloquence of the shallowest sort on these topics, and that skilful and plausible orators might easily, in periods of distress, combine all this floating feeling into a focus, and perhaps even drive it into united action? "Struggles where the very framework of modern society is threatened are as ominous for ourselves as for our neighbours. The history of trade unionism, for example, is the history of a gradually spreading organization which tends to unite the working classes of the country against the capitalists. The ideal at which it aims

would be one in which the labourers of all countries should be united in one vast alliance. The workmen who begin to see the danger of foreign competition answer, not by abandoning their own combinations, but by endeavouring to bring foreign workmen into harmony with themselves. The attempts made in that direction have hitherto been feeble; but they have a tendency to extend. However much we may laugh at the nonsense talked at Geneva conferences, they indicate the spread of a discontented feeling beyond the limits of any one country, and a disposition in the working classes throughout the world to regard themselves as natural allies in a struggle with their employers. Questions, such as we have been recently discussing, about extension of the franchise and the disestablishment of the Church, may amuse workmen for a time; but they naturally feel that they could use the power of which they are becoming conscious for purposes much more closely affecting their own interests. The belief that a man can get better food and lodging as the reward of a successful agitation is much more exciting than any prospect of purely political changes."

Dangers, that are comparatively insignificant when single, magnify enormously in dimensions when two or three come upon us simultaneously or in combination. Given two bad harvests in succession, a dull or failing trade in many branches, a couple of leaders moderately fluent and skilled in organization, and unions with treasury chests tolerably full, and we may then begin to see with some amazement what we did when we gave over the electoral supremacy of England to a majority of householders, of whom the 6,110 who voted for Kenealy are not unfair samples.

Our parochial and municipal representative bodies are not usually regarded as models of enlarged or enlightened wisdom. Yet if only we voted for the empire on as safe and sagacious a principle as that which we follow in voting for a parish!—if only we elected our House of Commons as rationally as we elect our vestries!—we might escape some grave perils and some startling anomalies. I never like giving arguments in my own words when I can avail myself of better and weightier words by others. I will therefore crave permission here to quote (largely abridged) a letter which appeared several weeks ago in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and which seems to me to need no addition, and to admit of no refutation.

"SIR,—To study my countrymen, I often go to that assembly which Sir Henry Maine tells us is far older than either Parliament or Monarchy—the parish vestry. I there can become acquainted with the lowest class of voters, and see what sort of men our future masters are likely to prove. Scarcely less instructive, perhaps, are those elections to the local boards of health which from one end of the country to the other have just been held. In these great weight is given to wealth and to wisdom, for, in spite of all the rich fools and poor saints that can be brought forward to refute me, wisdom is, I maintain, the companion of wealth, and not of poverty. For

the most part, the man who has saved a pound is wiser than the man who has not saved a penny; the man who has a good coat on his back is wiser than the man who is in rags; the man who has a good roof above his head is wiser than the man who lives in a hovel. We may carry it further, and say that there is more wisdom to be found in a house of eight rooms than in a house of four; and that he who can afford to pay a rent of £60 is likely to be a wiser man than he who can only afford to pay a rent of £30. In a local board of health election, then, it would be reasonable to expect that the more intelligent classes would, without much trouble, carry the day; for while in the parliamentary election a man of wealth has but one vote, in a board of health election he may have no fewer than twelve. It so happens that I have myself just taken an active part in one of these elections, and though we fought under the most favourable circumstances, and though there was a singular agreement among the larger householders, yet our victory was but a narrow one. Had we voted for men to provide us with pure water and well-ventilated sewers on the same plan as that on which we vote for men to provide us with those trifling matters an army, a navy, or laws, we should have been hopelessly defeated.

"All growing villages and towns are, I hold, in one of three states. They have either had a visitation of typhoid fever, or they are having it, or they are going to have it. We, happily, have had our visitation. The lesson was a very sharp one, but it has left us—those of us who are left, that is to say—better citizens, and far more alive to the duties which attach to us as members of a community. A few years ago it was with us a reproach to a man to take part in parish matters. It is now an honour. For years the elections to the board of health had excited no interest. Their proceedings, indeed, from time to time amused us, as we read in our local paper that one member had threatened to punch another's head or pull his nose. Meanwhile, this ignorant board was quietly turning all the streams into open sewers, and, to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population, had half poisoned the pure supply of water which we got from the chalk by mixing with it the landspring water drawn from beneath a large market-garden highly dressed with London manure. If London half poisoned us, we, in our turn, did our best to poison London. An ingenious market-gardener was allowed to tap the drain that came from our hospital—a hospital in which our fever cases are nursed—and to turn the sewage on to his watercress beds. But I need not go into further details. The death-rate steadily rose, rents as steadily fell, houses stood empty, the cemetery was enlarged, the undertakers looked cheerful; we talked of mysterious dispensations, but for a time we blamed the board but little, ourselves not at all. We had, indeed, at last begun to make a stir, and had done something, when there came upon us an outbreak of typhoid fever. In a few weeks over 300 persons were struck down with it, and in that year fevers carried off between forty and fifty. The Local Government Board sent down one of their medical inspectors. He did not confine his attention to our foul ditches, our unventilated sewers, our impure water supply. Bad though these were, he was bold enough to show us that we ourselves were almost worse. We had neglected our plainest duties by so long leaving to the ignorant the care of the health of the whole community. He gave us some lessons in sanitary matters as admirable as they were simple, and urged us to form a sanitary association. This we at once did. We instructed ourselves, and by means of pamphlets and broad-sheets we did all we could to instruct our neighbours. When the next election came round, we carried in two of the best members of our association.

"The opposition that had been organized now for the first time looked formidable, and the publicans, with one bright exception, were to a man against us. If I am not mistaken in my numbers, we had an embattled ~~balanx~~ ^{balanx} of no fewer than fifty-one publicans to fight. Each side worked hardest. The enemy took to prophesying, and we took to facts. The

parish was canvassed from house to house as it had never been canvassed before. In the course of the canvassing I happened to come across a French refugee who lives in the parish. He flatly refused to vote at all, as the voting was not by universal suffrage. In vain I pointed out that as the occupier of a house he was surely entitled to secure for his house a good supply of pure water. He did not recognize, he loftily replied, houses or property. He knew of nothing but men. As he did not vote as a man, he would not vote at all. Well, sir, to cut a long story short, we carried three out of four seats, but we carried them by very hard work and by small majorities. *Had we been voting not for members of a local board, but for members of the great council of the empire, we should have been hopelessly beaten.* We fought with success in a great measure because we fought with confidence, and we fought with confidence because we knew that intelligence would not be swamped by mere numbers. We had left, indeed, nothing undone to win the votes of the smallest voters, and not a few we did secure. We put a plain statement of facts before them, but we found that the printing-press was no fair match for the pot-house.

"Now, sir, if the scene of this contest had been at Stoke, and if Dr. Kenealy had chosen to put himself forward as a candidate for the board of health of that town, I have no doubt that neither his resemblance to Cromwell and Milton nor his own impudence would have saved him from utter defeat. The men of property, the men of character, the men of sense, the men who had shown strength of mind to overcome the temptations of the present, and to lay up for the future, the men who had not eaten or drunk up to their earnings, but had begun with small savings, and had seen these small savings grow into large savings, would have all gone eagerly and heartily into a contest where their worth and their knowledge would not be swamped by the ignorance of a mob. The day may come when some monstrous delusion, some lie gross as a mountain, open, palpable, may throughout England seize on the lowest and largest body of voters as a class, as it has lately seized on the new voters of Stoke. Should such a storm of passionate prejudice sweep over the land, the men of common sense, the men who have made England what it is, would, if they tried to stem it, find themselves clean swept away. Parish politics have often been a byword among us. I, for my part, in my search after political wisdom, would rather watch the people voting in their parishes than study all the works of all the philosophers who have begun by studying, not men, but Man.—I am Sir, your obedient servant,

"April 20th."

"A PARISH POLITICIAN."

For dangers such as those to which I have for the second time ventured, Cassandra-like, to call the attention of my countrymen, there are obviously but two safeguards, the spread of education and of property extensively among the labouring classes. But are those safeguards adequate? Are they coming? and will they come in time? Is the education we are giving of the right sort, and given to the people who need it? And is the accumulation of property becoming the characteristic of our well-paid artizans? For my part I can scarcely rely on the timeliness or efficacy of a medicine gingerly administered in 1875, and not even expected to operate till 1890; and how far have the extraordinary wages paid for the last few years gone to turn our mechanics and operatives into capitalists? What proportion of the millions distributed has gone with the savings banks, and what to the publican and sinner?

W. R. GREG.



A NEW THEORY OF THE HOMERIC QUESTION.

THE Homeric controversy has engaged the energies of many and powerful combatants for nearly a century, with varying success, and, though the issues have seemed from time to time so complicated as to be inextricable, the interest of scholars, instead of diminishing, deepens with every new phase of the contest. Ever since the great assault on the unity of either poem, by Fr. A. Wolf ("Prolegomena," 1795), the fortune of the field has wavered; for while certain hostile positions have been made good by both parties respectively, the entrenchments of each remain uncaptured; and so the struggle over Homer has been like one of his own battles—

πολλὰ δ' ἄρ' ἔθθα καὶ ἐνθ' ἴθυσε μάχη πεδίοιο.

On its first appearance, the Wolfian theory carried everything before it in Germany, and the startling doctrine which the great critic promulgated, that the Homeric poems were a congeries of originally independent lays, gathered together and moulded into a unity in the time of Pisistratus (about B.C. 560), was received with favour not only among scholars, such as Heyne and Niebuhr, but also in the general circles of literature, where Herder hailed it as opening up new and important aspects of popular poetry, and the Schlegels followed in the same vein. The easy and rapid acceptance of the theory seems to us, even in these changeable days, difficult to understand. A number of predisposing causes, however, contributed to this result—partly the spirit of the century itself, which gloried in paradox, partly the remarkable evidence,

which had been appearing everywhere with more or less conclusiveness, as to the extraordinary vitality of popular poetry, even under its most anonymous and uncertified character, and that, too, as if to exemplify the Wolfian theory, without the aid of literary appliances to preserve it. The Ossianic controversy, in particular, had opened up large vistas of vague possibility in this direction, and, in a fortunate hour, by a most dexterous handling of the evidence and a masterly marshalling of the phenomena, Wolf was able to forge the thunderbolt that shattered, in the view of Germany, the unity of the Homeric poems.

The war, so grandly begun by Wolf, was continued by Godfrey Hermann, and William Müller, who carried on a vigorous polemic, more especially against the unity of the *Iliad*. The former, it is true, attempted to take up separate ground of his own, in his doctrine of an "Ur-*Iliad*" and an "Ur-*Odyssey*"—an original nucleus to each poem, around which the congeries of lays had been accumulated. Substantially, however, he stands on the Wolfian basis. Next to him in importance among the later Wolfians, and, in the opinion of many, the greatest of the Wolfian school after Wolf himself, stands Lachmann, who (in his "*Betrachtungen*," 1843) gave a new direction, as well as a new impetus, to the controversy, and from him the modern Wolfians are often styled "*die Lachmannianer*." His work was especially an attempt to exhibit the actual sutures between the supposed originally component lays; and the dissection of the "*Iliad*" was carried forward by him with much minuteness, in the same way as the comparatively *vile corpus* of the "*Nibelungen Lied*" had been operated upon in his earlier days by his apprentice-hand. The result was that the *Iliad* was resolved into a group of eighteen lays, and the Lachmann view is known as the "*Klein-lieder-Theorie*."

A reaction, however, arose, and a school of critics sprang up of a more conservative character, who were able, by a more thorough survey of the historical conditions of the case, to reconquer many of the apparently lost positions. Among these may be named especially Ottfried Müller, Welcker, and Gregor W. Nitzsch,* the last of whom, by his voluminous and weighty works, has dealt very powerful blows at the Wolfians, so that he may well be called "*Malleus Wolfianorum*."

The great authority of Goethe—on a question as to organic unity of immense weight—was on the whole in the anti-Wolfian scale. In a letter to Schiller, immediately after the appearance of the "*Prolegomena*," he characterized the theory as arbitrary and subjective, and he seemed to resent the intrusion of this wild boar

* Düntzer (*Abhandl.*, 1872, p. 409), although himself a Wolfian, puts a high value on Nitzsch's labours in a scientific point of view, and adds, regarding him, *Si Pergamæ dextra defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent*.

into what he called the "fairest gardens of the æsthetic world." The most interesting utterance which he has given upon the point is the view expressed in his little sketch, "Homer noch einmal," which represents his matured opinion, when, at the period of the reaction, he was able to realize a "Homer once more," after "the sundering and dissecting process of the eighteenth century" was over, and the *harmonizing* spirit, as he calls it, of the nineteenth had begun.

Of late years, however, notwithstanding the powerful reaction a generation ago, Germany has again gone over largely to the Wolfian camp. The stream of opinion is flowing, according to Nutzhorn,* strongly in that direction, and there is a whole school of "Lachmannianer" (among whom is included the distinguished name of Georg Curtius, a Wolfian on philologic grounds), who, in divers ways, not always very accordant with either of their great masters or themselves, parcel out the primary lays of the "Iliad," and even of the "Odyssey," with the most confident precision. Foremost among these may be named Arminius Köchly, who is usually looked on as the most pronounced exponent of the dominant Wolfian theory. In particular he has, with more of valour than discretion, put in type a text of the "Iliad" upon Wolfian principles, in which, by the ejection of the line containing the $\Delta\omega\varsigma \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta$ of the Exordium, and by other similar operations, the "Iliad" falls asunder into sixteen independent lays.† The influence of this school, however, cannot in the nature of things be permanent. It might have been otherwise if the Köchly doctrine had been confirmatory of the Lachmann, so as to exhibit exactly the same cleavage of strata as prevailing in the structure of the poems; but when each leading champion exhibits sections of his own, and there is no approach to unanimity in their own camp (witness the extensive and very effective polemic of the Wolfian Düntzer against both Lachmann and Köchly), it is not likely that the school will be in the end victorious.

It is evident, however, from the immense hold which the Wolfian view has obtained of the patient and honest and persevering mind of Germany, that there must be a considerable amount, at all events, of *prima facie* evidence in its favour;‡ and, in point of fact, the difficulties involved in the Homeric question

* "Zwar haben Nitzsch und Bäumlein auch ihre Anhänger, aber der Strom geht doch immer in der von Lachmann angegebenen Richtung." Nutzhorn, p. 143. (*Die Entstehungsweise der Homerischen Gedichte*, 1869.)

† "Iliadis Carmina XVI." "Restituta edidit Arminius Köchly, Turicensis." Teubner, 1861.

‡ Nitzsch has left a remarkable confession of his experiences in the whirlpool of Homeric controversy ("Sagen-poesie," p. 293). After having composed a laborious work, which had for its object to establish the separate authorship—a view which commends itself as tending to lighten the difficulty of accounting for two Epics of such magnitude—he at a later period wrote a refutation of himself, and pronounced in favour of the joint authorship of both poems.

are greater than is, in our country, commonly supposed. There is not only the question as to the organic unity of either poem taken separately, but there is the further question of the relation of the one poem to the other, whether they are of the same age, and can be pronounced to be of the same authorship; and both of these questions have to be determined solely from the poems themselves, which are on all hands admitted to contain the only sufficient and final evidence available upon the question. Unfortunately, they are all but dumb as to themselves. They are so purely *objective* that they seem projected, as it were, into this visible diurnal sphere with hardly a subjective trace adhering to them, and are silent as the stars concerning their own genesis and mutual relation.

Such is a brief history, on German soil, of the celebrated theory which, when applied to the twin stars of the Homeric poems, by a reverse operation from that of the astronomers who resolve nebulae into stars, has converted stars into nebulae. How has it fared in other countries, and specially in our own?

The Wolfian theory has not moved, so powerfully as it has in Germany, the learned world either in England or in France. In the latter country, the chief fruit of any scientific value which can be traced to it is the ingenious though not satisfactory essay of M. Burnouf, in the *Revue de Deux Mondes*, 1866, in which a "chorizontic" or separatist position is adopted, and an attempt is made to differentiate the "Iliad" from the "Odyssey," by classing the former with the *chanson de gestes* of mediæval French literature, and the latter with the *roman d'aventures*. The analogy is interesting and important, but it is not sufficient to justify the separation from each other, under different genera, of two poems so cognate in tone and structure,* when the differences that exist can be satisfactorily accounted for on a different hypothesis.

In our own country opinion has not departed much or far from the old traditional belief, not only that each poem is a unity, but that both have come from one author. The most important exposition in its defence has been that of Colonel Mure, who has endeavoured, not unsuccessfully, to meet the Wolfian positions point by point, and whose examination of the question is of importance, as it produced a *conversion* in his own opinions from an early belief in the Wolfian theory. Mr. Gladstone, who has done much for the study of Homer, and who, in spite of the insinuations of Düntzer, has added not a little to our scientific knowledge of the Homeric poems, with a lofty indifference to such questions of criticism, seems seldom or never to be moved

* Wolf may be claimed as a witness in favour of the unity of tone and colouring. "Immo congruunt in iis omnia ferme in idem ingenium, in eosdem mores, in eandem formulam sentiendi et loquendi." ("Prolegomena," p. cclxv.) He elsewhere speaks of this as a "*mirificus concentus*," though he endeavours to convert it into an argument for his theory of an artificial unity.

by a single, just or unjust, Wolfian scruple. Perhaps he is right. It is better to enjoy the full bloom and aroma of the Eden of Greek song, asking no questions, and accepting in implicit faith where we have not the means or power to prove. Professor Blackie, on the other hand, has discussed the question largely, and he even pronounces the discussion of it essential to a right understanding of the nature of the Homeric poems as the flower of early popular poetry. With strong Wolfian leanings, and an immense appreciation of Wolf's work and genius, he yet substantially sums up against his doctrine of a congeries of lays.

The greatest name among our English scholars that can be quoted on the Wolfian side is that of Grote.* Not that he is a Wolfian—on the contrary, no one has shown more clearly and powerfully the difficulties inherent in the extreme Wolfian position; but he has also shown, in the fairest and most judicial of statements, the difficulties of the traditional view, in so far as the "Iliad" is concerned. The case which he has made out against the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, as not belonging to the original poem, is remarkably complete; and he errs chiefly in this, that he performs excision on some of the most splendid portions of the poem, and assigns these loose gems to no author in particular. He has, however, pointed out the path in which the solution of the question seems to lie, and he has, in particular, familiarized the English mind with the notion of an "Achilleid," as distinct from the "Iliad"—a view to which the whole evidence seems more and more to converge.

While rejecting the Wolfian principle in its most pronounced form, partially regarding the "Iliad," entirely regarding the "Odyssey," Mr. Grote accepts, though somewhat doubtfully, the chorizontic view of the separate authorship, and to this view the English "Left," if we may so call it, has generally inclined. As early as 1820, Richard Payne Knight, though strong against the Wolfian doctrine, pronounced in favour of the chorizontic view, and the arguments which he used produced a certain effect on English opinion. They moved Henry Nelson Coleridge, in his work on Homer, to adopt that position, and the usual chorizontic arguments have been recently presented again in a new and expanded form, in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* (April, 1871). It purports to be a review of the treatise of Thiersch, who, though a "chorizon," held the poems to be of the same age, but the reviewer attempts to make a great gulf of time between the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," and, against all the probabilities of the case, assigns only the "Iliad" to Homer. That is to say, the poem, which is considered not only anterior, but, in the view of many, much more ancient than the

* Düntzer (Abhandl. pp. 46, 492) claims to have anticipated Grote in his view as to Books ii.—vii. of the "Iliad."

other, whose structure has been the subject of the most serious disputation, is the one about which we are supposed to know most; whereas the other, which is nearer to us, and comes closer to the dawn of history, is the one about which we know least—being thus attributed to an unknown rhapsodist, at a time when much less remarkable poems of a kindred order, known as the cyclic poems, were confidently assigned each to a separate author, historically determinable. This form of the chorizontic doctrine involves the reduction of the “*Odyssey*” to the rank of a cyclic poem, and, what is more, a cyclic poem at the extremity of the series of the cyclus, when the Sagas were fading away in the approaching dawn of history, and yet the only cyclic of the Trojan series that does not come before us with a fairly accredited designation of authorship. The presumption is entirely the other way, that the name of Homer is more likely to belong specially to the poem which has passed through fewest changes, is artistically more perfect in its structure, and constitutes a unity, than to the poem which is on good grounds considered more remote, has passed through greater changes, bears marks of a less harmonious structure, and contains the complex elements—if complex elements are to be assumed as existing in either poem—in the most pronounced and extensive form.

We may remark further, as tending to show the weakness of this chorizontic notion, in so far as it assigned the “*Iliad*” to “Homer” and left the “*Odyssey*” without an author, that although the ancients had their chorizontes, as we now know from the Venetian Scholia, these produced no real impression on ancient thought. In the long array of ancient authorities in Clinton’s “*Fasti Hellenici*” as to the date of Homer, it is curious to note that among all the investigators (and they include such names as Aristotle and Eratosthenes), there is not one that ventures on a double date, which, however, ought to be a necessity if the “*Iliad*” and “*Odyssey*” are to be separated, as is done in the elaborate article to which we have referred, by a period of two or even three generations.

In this rapid review of the leading phases of English opinion, it would be unfair to omit notice of the peculiar position occupied by one of our greatest living scholars upon the question. Frederick A. Paley has accumulated a considerable amount of argument, of no ineffective kind, to show the precarious condition of the Homeric text philologically; and the view he has found himself compelled to adopt goes to affirm that the Homer that we now have is a comparatively late production,* that it can be

* Donaldson, in his “*Cratylus*” (p. 71), uses similar language, without stating his reasons, implying that “the ‘*Iliad*’ and ‘*Odyssey*,’ as we have them, are little more than a *refacimento* of the original works.”

discerned as existing only from about the time of Herodotus, that the Homer of Pindar was a different Homer from ours, with other and more varied legends, and that the poems as we now have them must have been put into their present shape in or about the Periclean time. The scepticism of Wolf did not proceed to this extremity. He allowed to the Homeric poems a duration in their present shape of at least a century longer; from the time, namely, of Pisistratus. Mr. Paley, however, considers the poems to have been in a molluscos condition down to the period when the Athenian drama had already reached its culmination.* Linguistically he has a considerable amount of evidence to show, and great concessions might be made as to the state of the text under such changes as the loss of the Digamma and other metamorphic influences during the process of adaptation to the new alphabet of B.C. 403. As for the bone and sinew of the poems considered as an organic structure, a higher antiquity, in respect not only of the subject matter, but of the form, must be assigned than Mr. Paley has allowed.†

After thus indicating in outline the leading phases of opinion on this question, the writer proceeds to state the conclusion to which long and careful study of the subject has brought him as to the authorship and mutual relation of the Homeric poems. It is one that appears to him to throw an important light on their structure, and to supply a hope of co-ordinating the various phenomena, explaining the most formidable discrepancies, which the Wolfian doctrine undoubtedly does, and explaining unity as well, which the Wolfian doctrine fails to do. It is, in brief, that Homer was the author of the "Odyssey," but that he was not in the same sense the author of the "Iliad;" that he found a previously existing

* Yet, in spite of the accidents of time, and after passing through the crucible of Athenian editing and Alexandrian recension, is there any text of an early ballad poet that is in a better state than Homer's? After three thousand years it stands, in the main; as clear and firm as the other after as many hundreds. It is singular, but it is true, that the text of Euripides, and perhaps of Sophocles, is in a better state than Shakespeare's at this hour. When the Tripodes of the future turn upon the ballad poetry of England instead of Homer, and Shakespeare instead of Euripides, we can fancy some future Mr. Lowe raising the wall of woe over the sea of versions of "Oll Morice" and "Chevy Chase," and the heaps of "shot rubbish" calling itself Shakespearian criticism.

† The famous expression of Æschylus, as to his dramas being "fragments" (*ῥεμάρτυρα*), from the great banquet of Homer, would lose much of its significance if Homer were considered to be in his time in the nebulous condition supposed. Also, the "sour grape" style in which Pericles, in his great oration (Thuc. ii. 41), professes to despise and dispense with any reflected glories from Homer, shows conclusively that the poems were long ere then a rounded "orb of song," beyond the power of any one to tamper with as to their integrity. The Athenians of the historic time felt sore at the poor figure which they made in the Homeric poems, and if the office performed by Solon and Pisistratus in the work of setting right the poems had been the architectonic one supposed by Wolf, the Athenian rhetoricians and sophists would have made much more of that service than they have done; for the probability is, we should never, in the period of the Decadence at all events, have heard the end of it. Again, if the poems had been still under process of evolution, such as Mr. Paley's theory supposes possible, it is difficult to understand how the profession of the Rhapsode had sunk into such contempt in the Socratic times (cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10) if a certain halo of genius, or at least extensive discretionary powers, had so lately appertained to him.

"Achilleid" which he has expanded, enlarged, and partly worked over, so that it has been transformed into an "Iliad."

In proceeding to state the grounds on which this conclusion rests, I start from the following preliminary propositions, which may be taken as scientifically proved, inasmuch as the evidence in support of them is, both in amount and kind, completely satisfactory. They are—

1. The unity and homogeneous structure of the *Odyssey*.*
2. The complexity and heterogeneous structure of the "Iliad."
3. The anteriority of the "Iliad" to the "Odyssey" in execution.
4. The European origin of the *mythology* on which the poems proceed.
5. The Asiatic origin of the *poems*, at the most distant period when we can detect historically their existence.

A glance at the leading points in connection with these positions will show the evidence on which they rest. Taking them in the reverse order, we hold it to be satisfactorily established that the first appearance of the poems must be assigned to the eastern shore of the Egean, either to the islands or to the mainland on the Asiatic shore. Without laying any weight on the traditional traces of the poet's *personalia*, it is yet remarkably significant that they connect themselves entirely with *Æolis* and *Ionian*; that Pindar and Simonides, who are among our oldest and best testimonies, associate the poet with that region; and that Lycurgus was believed, according to Plutarch, to have brought from the same quarter to European Greece the poems of Homer. Further, when we take into account (1) the close filiation of the elegiac poetry (which is of *Ionian* growth) to the epic poetry of Homer; (2) the historical fact of a set of men called "Homerids" having existed at Chios, who, on grounds more or less valid, claimed actual descent, or, according to others, genuine poetical succession from a poet of the name of Homer; and especially (3) the internal evidence furnished by the dialect—Ionic with a mixture of *Æolian* forms—we find the conclusion irresistible that it was among the islands or shores of *Ionian* or the borderland of *Æolis* that the Homeric poems took permanent shape and form. With regard to the "Odyssey" in particular, it is only among the maritime communities of the *Ionian* and *Æolian* coast that we can discover, during the early days of the Greek people, those social conditions of life in the *ἀγορά* and life on the ocean wave, which were necessary to form the *nidus* for a romance dealing so largely with maritime adventure.

The objections to this view are not many nor are they weighty.

* This does not exclude the possibility of accretions having become attached to or inserted in it, such as the doubtful portions of the *Nekyia*, in Book xi. and the after-part subsequent to the *dénouement*, viz., Book xxiv. and a part of Book xxiii.

They consist chiefly in the apparently special familiarity which the author of the "Odyssey" shows with the Peloponnesus—not greater certainly than the author of the second "Iliad;" in the interest which he shows in Sparta* and the mountains of the Peloponnesus (Od. vi. 103); and in the circumstance that the sun is made to rise in the sea (Od. iii. 1), which is certainly favourable to an insular origin, though not necessarily to a Peloponnesian. These and other arguments used by Thiersch in his work on "The Age and Fatherland of Homer," and apparently accepted as conclusive by Mr. Gladstone, have been effectually disposed of by Thirlwall (Hist. i. p. 276) with this remark, that—

"This is not a case where we have to balance two arguments of a similar kind against one another, but where we have on the one side a mass of positive testimony; on the other some facts which, through our very imperfect knowledge of the poet's life and times, we are unable to account for. Where this is so, there can be little doubt which way the principles of sound criticism require us to decide."

But here we are met by the undoubted fact that, while the Homeric poems took shape and form on the Asiatic coast of the Egean, the *incunabula* of Greek mythology was not Asiatic but European. The localization of the legends as to the gods and heroes is entirely European, and there is evidence to show that the author or authors of the Homeric poems "served themselves heirs" to the traditions, and availed themselves of the imaginative creations, of poets who had appeared previously on European soil. The position of Olympus as the recognized abode of the gods, even when their activities are described as concentrated around the plain of Troy, proves convincingly that the Homeric poetry had its roots in Europe; for there can be no question that the Olympus of the Homeric poems, wherever it can be identified as a *mountain*, is the mountain of that name in the land of Thessaly. So much is this the case, that even Trojans or Asiatics are represented as sharing the belief in Olympus as the seat of the gods; and Chryses, the priest of Apollo, in the first "Iliad," and Hector in the twenty-second, are represented as conforming to the Greek tradition. To prove this point at length, and to show that the Olympus of the "Iliad" is the European mountain, and not any Asiatic mountain—not even the "Olympus high and hoar" which Byron speaks of as a noble object from Constantinople and the Golden Horn—would, however, lead us far beyond our present limits, and to Homeric scholars is entirely superfluous. Further, any indications of prior poets found in the Homeric poems connect themselves with European localities, and all the traces of the *doctoi* (leaving out of view

* Bergk, in his "History of Greek Literature," accounts for some of these features by supposing the "Odyssey" to have undergone retouching for a Spartan audience.

the case of Demodocus as depending on the doubtful localization of Phœacia) belong to the western side of the Egean. Phœmius in Ithaca, also the unnamed minstrel who had the guardianship of Clytemnestra, and Thamyris* are clear instances to this effect. The last, in fact is conclusive, inasmuch as the notice concerning him seems to be decidedly realistic, and to embody a nucleus of actual personal history of a pathetic kind. Moreover, his *locale* is not only European, but Thessalian, the *Echalia* with which his name is associated being certainly in Thessaly. The conclusion to which we are conducted by these facts is confirmed by the following considerations derived from the poems themselves. These assume a previous acquaintance with the heroes they portray. The opening line of the "Iliad," for example, implies that Peleus was a familiar hero; Patroclus is first introduced to us by his patronymic; and Achilles is described by a series of epithets which must have been traditional, being no longer intelligible from existing lays. The various epithets designating him as the "swift-footed" presuppose a substratum of Thessalian tradition and poetic lore regarding the Thessalian hero, and probably refer to some early Pierian lay as to the youthful feats of the hero under the training of Chiron among the wilds of Pelion. It may therefore be assumed as scientifically certain, that while the poems had their rise on the shore of Asia Minor, they had their roots in the mythology and poetic lore of Thessaly.

The third proposition, as to the anteriority of the "Iliad" in point of execution, is all but self-evident. The portion of the "Iliad" which has excited most suspicion as of more recent origin than the rest is the "Doloneia" or tenth book, but there is reason to believe that even it was executed before the greater part of the "Odyssey." The investigations of Düntzer ("Abhandlungen," pp. 465—470) have served to render this highly probable. Moreover, certain formulæ common to the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" have been shown by him to have been shaped primarily for the "Iliad," before they were adapted to the "Odyssey." Thus, the precept to Penelope in Book i. 356—9 and in Book xxi. 344 is couched in the same terms as the precept to Andromache in "Iliad," Book vi. 490, but the expression *eis oîkon lōssa* is most appropriate in the latter, Andromache being then on the public way. This serves to mark the passage in the "Iliad" as the original location.

Regarding the remaining two propositions, it may be necessary to enter more into detail. And first, in regard to the younger

* The name of Thamyris is connected with *θαμνὴ* by Welcker. If so, he presents an analogy to *Ὀμῆρος* himself, as derived from *θεός*, and is at once sublimed, in the cremation-furnace of some critics, into an *appellativum* or *symbol* indicative of *aggregation*. It is not unimportant to note, that in the *Life of Homer* attributed to Herodotus, in which undoubtedly old traditions are preserved, Thessaly is made the cradle of his ancestry; for Melanopsus, of Magnesia, in Thessaly, is the colonist of Cumæ, from whom Homer was traditionally sprung.

poem : that the "Odyssey" is in its structure one and indivisible; that it is fairly uniform in tone, with remarkable continuity of subject and sustained consistency of conception; that it has come from the mind of its author "moulded at one projection,"* are facts that only extreme scepticism can deny. Even Wolf admitted that the framework of the "Odyssey," with its elaborate adjustment of parts and exquisite preparation for the *dénouement*, was most skilful, and he speaks in high praise of the architectonic skill which it displays, as "the most splendid monument of Greek genius."† This perfection of structure he endeavours to turn into an argument in his favour, by representing it as an artificial unity super-induced in cultivated times, such as those of Pisistratus. The fact remains, that, if the "Odyssey" had come down to us alone, the question of unity could not have arisen, and the Wolfian theory would have had no room for existence.‡ The marvellous marshalling of gathered circumstance to bring round the great result—the hero's restoration to home and kingdom; the skilful arrangement by which the double stream of action, carried on by father and by son, converges to the point of junction, when they meet at the hut of Eumæus; the absurdity of supposing that any large part of it (such as the books where Telemachus is the main character) had any independent existence except as a part, it might even be, an after-part, of a great whole, Telemachus being only a *neben-person*, not a central figure, and always implying either the expectation of the presence or the actual presence of a greater—all unite to render the "Odyssey" impregnable against disruptive assaults, as they conspire to render it the most perfect and finished story ever told in verse through all the ages of the world.

But is there no *per contra*? Is the "Odyssey" such a perfect chrysolite that no flaw can be found in its structure and proportions? None that will avail to affect materially the evidences of unity. The chronological difficulty, as to how the reckoning of days in the case of the one hero can be made to square with the reckoning in the case of the other, is, at first sight, startling (twenty-eight days unaccounted for, according to Colonel Mure, in the case of Telemachus), but it disappears, or at least diminishes greatly, on second considerations. It does appear that, through oversight, or more probably because of the infancy of arithmetical calculation

* The above is Mr. Grote's expression regarding the "Odyssey." *Ἀντοξύωνος*, like the *εἶδος*, in the games, expresses, not unhappily, the idea.

† "Odyssee admirabilis summa et compages pro præclarissimo monumento ingenii Græci habenda est." (Wolf, *Proleg.* p. cxviii.) In like manner, Mr. Grote, in his chapter on the Greek Drama, declares the "Odyssey" to be equal to the most symmetrical of the plays of Sophocles in architectonic skill.

‡ Grote, *Hist.* ii. p. 221. "If it had happened that the 'Odyssey' had been presented to us alone, without the 'Iliad,' I think the dispute respecting Homeric unity would never have been raised."

(a point on which several illustrations* might be given), the poet has allowed a discrepancy to creep in, which nine-tenths even of his present readers never perceive, and probably none of his auditors in his own time ever observed. In point of fact, it is no paradox to say that the oversight referred to is, in some respects, a proof of the genuineness and antiquity of the "Odyssey," as belonging to a time when the lynx eye of science had not begun to suggest awkward questions as to numbers, as it certainly would have done if the poems had received shape in the colder and more critical times of Pericles, when the sophists were abroad, or even in the times of Pisistratus, when prose literature was beginning to appear. The *diaskeuastæ*, or *rédacteurs*, employed by the latter, if their functions had extended to the formation of an organic unity, would have been certain to make the numbers right, but they would have made much else wrong, for we should have looked in vain for the delightful simplicity and fresh redolence of nature breathing from every part of this pre-eminently

"Speciosa locis morataque recte fabula."

If we turn to the "Iliad," do we find the same unity discernible? Not in the same sense as the unity of the "Odyssey." The repeated invocations of the muse at different stages suggest, if they do not imply, complex origin. Of these there are at least six of a more or less formal kind; the "Odyssey" knows but one. We also find large cantos of the poem easily separable, without leaving a gap in the plan, and not provided for, to all appearance, in the poem of the poem. Instead of organic unity as in the "Odyssey," we meet in the "Iliad" with juxtaposition. The extensive section, from Book ii. to the end of Book vii., seems to be not so much a continuation as an engrafting on the primary stem. The Greeks seem to be nowise depressed for want of Achilles, and the Trojans, by Antenor's confession (in vii. 350), are inclined to yield. Moreover, one of the Greek heroes is represented as so far supplying the absence of Achilles that he performs feats such as Achilles himself cannot boast of performing in the climax of his glory. A special supplication to the gods is decreed by the Trojan leaders to ward off the tremendous Diomed, "who has put them in greater terror even than Achilles" (Il. vi. 99), and Hector expresses doubts whether he shall ever again see his home (vi. 367), since the Greeks press him sore. It is, to say the least, strange that one who is not the chief hero should be thus surrounded with such splendour before the time; and though some explanations have been given—such as the retardation theory of Nitzsch, that the action is prolonged and the real

* It is worth noting that the notion of number in the abstract is familiar only in the "Odyssey," and in one of the books of the "Iliad" which we consider to be of the same age and authorship. ἀριθμός, ἀριθμέω, ἐναριθμεύω, are limited to the "Odyssey" and to Book ii. (B) of the "Iliad."

business of the epic delayed, until the patriotism of the poet has meted out measures of glory to the various Greek chiefs besides Achilles, or the view that it was contrived to vary the episodes of the war and to complete the full gallery of war pictures—yet there is none that fully meets the difficulty how, if it was all the work of *one* poet, the measure of glory should have been heaped so high for Diomed in the fifth book that he is the vanquisher of gods, whereas the crowning exploit of Achilles in the crisis of the poem is that he was the vanquisher of a man. The sort of anticlimax thus produced is at least explained, though it is not justified, by the supposition that the books referred to were of after-origin, that they are pervaded by a special feeling toward Ulysses, and that the glory given to Diomed arose from the desire of the poet, which he has somewhat largely indulged, to magnify the companion-in-arms of Ulysses.

It is not necessary to enlarge further on the proofs, which have been well handled by Grote, showing that the original ground-plan of the "*Iliad*" has been in some form interfered with and enlarged, either by the original poet himself or by another poet—proofs that embrace the case of the ninth and tenth books, which are also extrinsic to the main action. The latter or "*Doloneia*," though expressly said by the ancient critics to be composed "by Homer," was yet confidently pronounced to have been a separate composition and an after-addition (see Venetian Scholia, Book X 1); and the former book, or the "*Embassy*," is saved by Colonel Mure, chiefly by the excision of three lines of a subsequent book (xvi. 84—86), which he admits to be inconsistent with the transactions of Book ix., and he therefore summarily pronounces them an interpolation. The embassy of the chiefs and the laboured supplication to the hero to return, form a most impressive scene, but it is somewhat strange that the action and speech of Achilles for ten books after it imply that no offer of satisfaction has been made.

The case regarding Books xxiii. and xxiv. is of another kind. They form a most natural sequel, and can hardly be said to disturb the original ground-plan, as presented in the Exordium, though they develop and expand it. They, nevertheless, lie outside the plan of the Exordium, and they differ in many important respects in tone and language from the books immediately preceding them, and their special vocabulary will be found to have much in common with that of the Books ii.—vii., ix., x., that is to say, with the books whose structure appears not to belong to the primary nucleus of the poem.

On the whole, therefore, it appears that we may assume the two propositions formerly laid down, that the two poems stand to each other in a distinct contrast as to unity of plan. Long before Wolf appeared, a dim sense of this fact had begun to show

itself in the estimates of the "Iliad" given by less lynx-eyed critics. Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric, gave expression, in a mild, vague way, to the peculiarity, if not deficiency, of the "Iliad," in respect of unity. Accordingly Colonel Mure, notwithstanding the bravery of his defence, is constrained to admit that the "Iliad" is unlike other epics, inasmuch as there is no great event *within* the poem towards which the whole progression moves.* The fall of Troy would no doubt form a catastrophe worthy of being the subject of an epic poem, but it is an event that lies outside and beyond the range of the horizon, however near it may be felt to be, when Hector, the bulwark of the city, falls. Hence he has to devise a special theory for the "Iliad," which we give as follows in his own words:—

"In the 'Odyssey' the restoration of Ulysses to his home and royal authority, in the 'Æneid' the establishment of the Trojan dominion in Latium, in the 'Jerusalem' the reconquest of the Holy Sepulchre, in the 'Paradise Lost' the fall of our first parents, offer each a distinct historical object on which the action is from the first steadily advancing, by however tortuous a course. In the 'Iliad' no such object can be discovered. Although the limits of the action are as clearly marked out as in any of the above cases, yet its progress cannot be said to have in view, nor does its conclusion involve any distinct historical consummation. The fall of Troy, the grand catastrophe of the whole train of events celebrated in the poem, is extraneous to its own narrative. As little does the reconciliation of the chiefs, or the death of Hector, form its definitive scope. The selection, therefore, of this particular series of events was owing obviously to its moral rather than its historical importance; to the opportunities it afforded for portraying the great qualities of one extraordinary character, with the conception of which the poet's mind was teeming. The genius of the 'Iliad,' consequently, is superior to that by which those other heroic poems are animated, in so far as the mind of man, in all the depth and variety of its passions and affections, is a more interesting object of study than the vicissitudes of human destiny or worldly adventure."—*Mure, H. of Gr. Lit., i. p. 293.*

In order to obtain a satisfactory theory of the "Iliad," we have, therefore, a strategic movement backward towards high ethical ground, or rather the question has been carried up into the region of the invisible; and so (as with Hecateus, Herod. ii. 23), there can be no elenchus—no possibility of either proof or disproof. Colonel Mure has, however, virtually left the "Iliad" without an adequate *dénouement*, and we are now prepared to understand, when it is thus disboned, how all manner of paradoxical theories as to the purpose of the "Iliad" could be put forth with a show of probability, such as that of Schubarth's ("Ideen über Homer," Breslau, 1821), that it is not Achilles but Hector that is the hero (just as some have thought that Satan, and not Adam, was the hero of "Paradise Lost"), and, as a corollary, that Homer was a

* Jean Paul expressed a wish for a twenty-fifth canto of the "Iliad," as far at least as to the death of Achilles. A similar feeling has produced a thirteenth *Æneid*, and Goethe thought there was room and material for another epic before the death of Achilles; and hence his *Torso* of the "Achilleis."

court poet at the court of the descendants of Æneas, and was consequently a Trojan!

It is worthy of remark that Aristotle, in his "Poetics," chap. viii., when dealing with this point of unity, although he mentions the "Iliad," as a matter of form, in the background of his survey, yet draws his actual illustrations from the "Odyssey." This he evidently considered the model epic, inasmuch as it was concentrated around a single person, and moved onward with full sweep of complicated and gathered circumstance to a single great and imposing action. In like manner the fine instinct of Horace, not less true than the sagacious intellect of Aristotle, when he is bestowing on Homer the encomium of *Qui nil molitur inepte*, seeks its illustration not from the "Iliad" but from the "Odyssey." The compactness and symmetry of the "Odyssey" are, in fact, indicated in the *title* of the poem, no matter whether we consider that title as old as the poem itself, or to be of no earlier origin than the days of Herodotus, in whose chapters, like the sister name of "Iliad" also, it first emerges into view. It marks at all events the conscious feeling, in the minds of the Greek race, that here there was a poem with a single hero, according to its opening line—

"Sing to me, O Muse, the Man;"

and that with no appendage of "arms" or any other fulcrum or pedestal whatsoever. What is more notable is the circumstance that he is not named in his own Exordium, as if he were "the man" pre-eminent, not needing to be named.

On the other hand the "Iliad," as we have it, consists of a series of pictures from a certain limited period of the war of Ilium, and the unity which it possesses is rather like that of a rich and brilliant historical play of Shakspeare, with many centres of interest, a Cæsar, a Brutus, and an Antony, or a Henry, a Hotspur, a Glendower, as contrasted with the unity of his "Hamlet" or "King Lear," where there is but one protagonist.

The name *Ἰλιάς* is, in fact, an indefinite appellation (as it is in form simply a *collective noun*) for what was felt to be a less well-defined aggregate, and hence the poem in honour of Achilles has to share its lofty honours with the cyclic poem of Lesches, which told of the end and fall of Ilium, and was known as the "Little Iliad." Eustathius,* it is true, in the opening sentence of his elephantine commentary, speaks of the "Iliad" in different terms,

* His predecessors, the ancient critics, had a more just perception of the state of the case, for we find in the Venetian Scholia (Il. A, l. 1) that it was a question raised and discussed in the schools, why it was that, if the one poem was called an *Odysseia*, the other was not called an *Achilleia*. The answer commonly given was one flattering to the Greek race, that Greece was so rich in heroes with splendid individuality, that no single one could be allowed to fill the canvas, and Achilles was only *primus inter pares*. It would thus appear as if the great war poem were premonitory of the fortunes of the Greek race itself, where each branch was to have its turn of ascendancy, but no enduring pre-eminence.

as throughout a *σῶμα εὐάρμοστον*, "a well-organized body," which is true, but only relatively, and is not true when compared with the "Odyssey." Without going so far as to accept Mr. Paley's comparison ("Iliad," vol. ii. p. xxiv.), that the "Iliad" produces the impression of a stained glass window that has had a long history, filled up with materials of different ages, some old, some new, and all dovetailed into a kind of unity of design, we are compelled to pronounce the "Iliad" a formation, in respect of unity, of a different kind from the sister poem.

From the above considerations it will not seem a startling or absurd proposition, that it is worth inquiring regarding those cantos of the "Iliad" that are less firmly attached to the original framework of the "Wrath of Achilles," whether any link of connection can be discerned, attaching them to each other. We have therefore singled out those books which bear this extrinsic character, and which, by their Greek designations (henceforth used for convenience), are the following:—

B	Γ	Δ	E	Z	H	I	K	Ψ	Ω.
Otherwise, Books ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii.	ix. x.	xxiii. xxiv.							

The result of our investigation is to show that there is a large amount of evidence, of considerable force and variety, to prove that there is a close connection subsisting between these books; and further, that they are also nearly related to the "Odyssey," and belong to the same age—in all probability, to the same authorship.

Of the remaining fourteen books, which contain the original nucleus of the "Achilleid," certain episodes seem, by the linguistic as well as other evidence, to belong to the same source. In particular may be mentioned, as probable instances, the scene in "Olympus," at the end of the first book, where Zeus and Here have their altercation appeased by the mirth-making of Hephæstus; the long discourse of Nestor in the eleventh book; and the episode of the "Shield," the scenes of which suggest, in language and tone, the stiller life and artistic calm of the "Odyssey."

The books of the "Iliad" enumerated above are those which have always attracted attention—we may say, excited suspicion—as having little direct adherence organically to the main structure. They are, in fact, the quarry from which the weapons of the Wolfians have been mainly drawn; in them the *liantes commissuræ* and the *juncturæ parum callidæ* are chiefly to be found. The reason we believe to be that the author of the "Odyssey" has engrafted on the primary stock of an "Achilleid" splendid and vigorous saplings of his own; but the junction is not absolutely complete: the sutures are still visible.

In indicating the lines on which the proof of such a proposition

must move, we first appeal to certain broad characteristics of the "Odyssey," and these we venture to say are predicable in much the same measure and degree of the books of the "*Iliad*;" and these we shall therefore speak of, provisionally, for the sake of brevity, as the *Ulyssean* portion of "*Iliad*." These characteristics are—

1. A large outlook to and acquaintance with the outside world, and a considerable familiarity with the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, including Egypt and Phœnicia.
2. Pathos and humour in large measure—the humour in the case of the gods falling occasionally into the burlesque.
3. High appreciation of conjugal honour and affection.
4. Lofty estimate of intelligence, and of Ulysses as its highest impersonation.

I. The author of the "Odyssey" has obtained a tolerably accurate and extensive knowledge of the Eastern Mediterranean. Within the Greek domain he knows of Delphi and Delos, as well as the older oracle of the Greek race, Dodona. The two former are, as it were, only emerging above the horizon, for Delos is named only once, and Delphi still bears its primitive name of "Pytho." The Dorians are named as an element in the population in connection with Crete. Outside the Greek domain he knows of the Solymi, who must be placed near Lycia, in the south of the Asiatic foreland;* he makes familiar mention of Phœnicia and Egypt. The mother city of the former, Sidon, the then capital of the latter, Thebes, are both well known. The products of the one country, in textile and metallic fabrics, pass current, and the "Zeus-descended river" of the other, with "its very fair fields" (*Od.* xiv. 263), is spoken of in a way that implies some knowledge, more or less direct, of the peculiar agriculture of ancient Egyptian civilization. The Pharos-island is vaguely spoken of, with much the same measure of accuracy as an ordinary British ship-captain might use in describing, on the impression of a single visit, the entrance to Nagasaki or Tahiti. A man of the name of "the Egyptian" (*Αἰγύπτιος*) is a speaker in the *agora* at Ithaca (*Od.* ii. 15). Further, the author of the "Odyssey" has some knowledge of the west and south; he tells us of the *Sikels* in the west, and, although Niebuhr would find a place for them in Epirus, the most natural interpretation is that they belong to Italy or Sicily.

He knows also of Libya, which he twice names, and has heard of

* It is generally assumed by Thiersch and other modern chorizontes, that the author of the "Odyssey" is not so well acquainted with Asia Minor as the author of the "*Iliad*." The *locale* of the action in the one poem being Asiatic, while that of the other is mainly European, is a fact sufficient to account for any difference in this respect, but the singer of the third "Odyssey" (see lines 169—172) is not behind the author of the "*Iliad*" in familiarity with the Asiatic coast.

a delicious country, which must be placed in its neighbourhood, where life is under easy conditions, and men can live on "flowery food" in the land of the Lotus-eaters. Finally, along with his knowledge of these outer lands, he has acquired a vague sense of the variety of the human race, of the complexity of human speech, and a disposition to criticize or estimate its quality, according as it was pleasing or otherwise.

Precisely the same extent and kind of knowledge may be predicated of the author or authors of those books of the "Iliad" which we have, on other grounds, set apart for examination. The mental horizon on every side is at every point (with the exception of the Sicilian area, which lies outside the scope of the "Iliad") in both cases concentric, and measures the same circumference. Delphi appears only under its ancient name of "Rocky Pytho," and it is in Books B and I where it is found, just as often as it is mentioned in the "Odyssey." Delos happens not to be mentioned in the "Iliad," and a certain priority may be given to the "Iliad" on this ground; but the interval is not capable of measurement in the face of other considerations. Though the Dorians are not named, the name "Dorium" (in B 594) seems to indicate that they had begun to make their mark in Greece; and, if the "Dorian irruption" was known to him, he maintains an obstinate silence regarding it, just as does the singer of the "Odyssey," and as we should expect an Ionian singer would, who would probably ignore a chapter in the history of his race for which he had no favour.* As to the circumference, point after point revolves and comes into view in exactly the same way. The Solymi appear in Z. Libya, though not named, is implied in Γ, where the cranes are described as winging their way from the showery lands to the "land of the Pygmies," which recent researches tend to show can be no other than the heart of Africa.† As for Phœnicia and Egypt, the former is familiar from the products of Sidonian skill in forge and loom, the evidence appearing in the Ulyssean books Z and Ψ; and the latter is known (in Book I, also Ulyssean), as possessing the most splendid and brilliant civilization, and stores of accumulated wealth in its then capital of Thebes.

At this point it is interesting to note, what has been recently remarked on by high authority in this REVIEW, that the references

* Shakspeare's silence as to the Norman Conquest, as Mr. Gladstone has remarked, is in some respects parallel. A cursory reader of his plays would hardly imagine that France, or rather a province of France, had once conquered England.—The supposed allusion to the Heracleide conquest in the mouth of Heré, in A 53, is too vague to found upon, and it is rather contradicted by the impression conveyed by the "Sceptre" passage of B, especially when the Sceptre of Pelops is elsewhere spoken of (B 186) as "imperishable ever," which is an awkward compliment, if the poet had fully in his view the Heracleide or Dorian ascendancy, which obliterated the rule of the Pelopidae.

† The late Italian traveller Miani is believed to have found a race of dwarfs in the heart of Africa, which goes far to yield an historical nucleus for the story of the "small infantry warred on by cranes."

to Egypt and Phœnicia are determinable as lying within a certain chronological area, and mark a period which must be considered recent in the history of the one country, ancient on the scale of the history of the other. The "Odyssey" and the cognate books of the "Iliad" may be said to be locked chronologically into a period antecedent to the ascendancy of Tyre in the one country, and subsequent to that of Memphis in the other. Thebes has obliterated the earlier glory of Memphis; but in Phœnicia, Sidon holds the precedence, as it does also in the books of the Pentateuch. The hegemony of Sidon, according to Movers (Phœn. Alterth. vol. iii. p. 21) extends from B.C. 1600—1100; and without assuming that the Homeric poems can bear so high a date, inasmuch as poetical fame and the halo of antiquity might preserve the name *Sidonian* in currency for a considerable period subsequent to 1100 B.C. (just as the name *Median* for Persian survived familiarly in Greece down to the days of Aristophanes, long after the true relations between Medes and Persians had become known to the Greek people), yet the absence of all mention of the rival city Tyre is in favour of an early date to even the youngest of the Homeric poems.

Along with the mention of *Sidonians* may be coupled, as indicating Oriental influence, that of *Cadmeans* and *Cadmus*. The most feasible explanation of the name *Cadmus* that has yet been given is that which connects it with the Hebrew *Kedem*, "the East;" in which case *Cadmus* would be a Grecized form meaning simply the "Easterling," or "man from the East." It is remarkable that these *Cadmeans* and *Cadmus* should be found coming up solely in the "Odyssey" and in those books of the "Iliad" which we consider Ulyssean (Δ 385, Ε 804, Κ 288, Ψ 680).

And here it naturally falls to be remarked that the only passage in either poem which can with any fairness be interpreted to indicate a knowledge of the art of writing, occurs in a section of the "Iliad" where the mention of *Cadmeans* and *Sidonians* is more than usually rife. In Book Ζ, where the *Sidonians* are mentioned for their cunning works (Ζ 290), and which cannot be separated in authorship from Books Δ and Ε (where *Cadmeans* appear), occurs the much-debated passage concerning the "baleful signs" (*σήματα λυγρὰ*, l. 168), described as a means of communication between persons at a distance. What were these "signs?" On the one hand, there is the silence elsewhere as to the art of writing, throughout both "Iliad" and "Odyssey;" there is the silence also of Hesiod, but as the Boeotian poet represents a more primitive, though not necessarily a more ancient, condition of things, than the author of the "Odyssey," who knows of more advanced appliances than are within the knowledge of the Boeotian farmer, such as the *manuring* (Od. xvii. 299) of fields and the use of the *mill* for grinding corn

instead of the *mortar* and *pestle*, the silence of Hesiod is less significant and important than the reticence, if it is so, of the singer or singers of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey." What renders the reticence still more remarkable is the fact that there is no allusion to writing, or any cognate memorial, in circumstances that might seem to call for it, such as in the erection of pillars or monuments to mark the resting-places of the dead. Further, the term afterwards employed in the literary period of the tongue to denote the art of writing (*γράφω*) is familiar in this ancient time, but it belongs not to the Muse but to Mars, and signifies, in the peaceful "Odyssey" (cf. x 280), just as much as in the warlike "Iliad," to *scratch* or *graze*. This is one of Wolf's strongholds from which, in fact, he has never been dislodged, and it was from this, as a sallying point, that he directed his assaults against the fabric of the poems, which therefore, he concluded, must have been not only preserved for a long period without the aid of writing, but must have been also—a more formidable difficulty—memorially composed. Of course, we are not permitted to introduce any extraneous considerations, such as the familiar ascription of the art of writing to the heroic ages by the Attic tragedians, nor even, what has better right to count as an argument, the apparently ancient cyclic story of the death of Palamedes being communicated to his friends by "scratchings" on oars which were tossed overboard to drift ashore (see Aristoph. Thesmoph. 770). The Wolfians may fairly claim to have the question decided on the ground of their own choosing—the Homeric poems alone—and, therefore, the view limits itself to the passage of the "baleful signs." These "signs" purport to have been "scratched on a folded tablet," and are afterwards to be shown in order to "get the bearer killed." They are carried from a country on one side of the Egean to a country on the other; and after being exhibited in the new country to the person to whom they were sent, they produce this effect, that though at first the bearer was welcomed and feasted, immediately on their exhibition he is put in the way of "being killed." They were thus intended as a message or sentence of death; and the conclusion seems irresistible that here was a communication made at a distance between two parties by what is tantamount to the art of writing. The more candid Wolfians give up the point, and say the episode to which it belongs is an interpolation of a later date. On Wolfian principles, it is difficult to understand what is an "interpolation," if the *whole* is a mere congeries; but it is unfortunate that this so-called interpolation should be one of the most finished portions of the poem. Those Wolfians, however, who perceive that, among documents of presumably equal antiquity, they are not entitled, on their own principles, to presume upon interpolations, explain it as some kind of picture-writing, like the Mexican,

or as the exhibition of some kind of *tessera hospitalis* (one half of an *δωραγαλός* or the like, according to the account of Scholiast in Eur. Med. 613), by which, as by a species of freemasonry, a friend could be introduced and treated accordingly. Neither of these suggested analogies will suit the conditions of the case. What is wanted is a species of freemason sign that will indicate, not a friend, but a foe; or rather that will suddenly convert one received at first as a friend into an object of aversion. There is not only information to be conveyed, which is all that either of the above-suggested explanations will cover; but there is a message *to do* this or that, which neither the picture writing nor the freemason or other conventional sign is capable of conveying. The whole description of the affair is mysterious,* precisely as we might expect the first mention of alphabetic writing to appear to an unlettered people. Dr. Hayman has ingeniously suggested, as showing the peculiar mysteriousness, that the tablet was conceived to work upon the mind of its receiver as a spell, and that the "signs" were supposed to possess some occult talismanic property similar to poison. The question further recurs, why is the tablet said to have been *folded*? Is not the reasonable explanation simply this, that it was to prevent the bearer from looking into it, and getting a notion of the contents, that is, *reading* it, and that it was therefore a message conveyed by *writing*, whether in the early and rudimentary stage of hieroglyphics, after the manner of Egypt, or in the more advanced form of alphabetical writing, after the fashion of Phœnicia?

On the whole, therefore, this the natural interpretation,† suits all the circumstances of the case, a view that becomes irresistible when we take into account the position of the Greek race, according to the evidence of both poems, alongside of the two nations of Phœnicia and Egypt. It is easy, and even necessary, to admit, from the timid way, for instance, in which a single initial letter (a *Koppa* on early Corinthian coins or ϕ on Phocæans) was edged in upon the Greek coinage, that the art of writing was practically unknown, at all events for common literary purposes, for a considerable period after the Homeric poems had been composed; but it is hardly possible to admit that, in the extensive intercourse carried on with Phœnicia and Egypt, the inquisitive and penetrating Greeks should have caught no glimpse of the alphabetic writing of the one

* Mr. Gladstone ("Juventus Mundi," p. 180), suggests that the art of writing may have been an occult possession of a few Phœnician families settled in Greece. The affinities of Proetus, who sends the mysterious *tablet* in the "Iliad," seem accordingly to be Eastern. He has married a princess from Lycia, and, if we may rely on the traditional though post-Homeric genealogies, he is himself connected with Egypt by his descent from Danaus, who is brother of Egyptus.

† Colonel Mure (H. of Gr. Lit. i. p. 512) goes beyond the probabilities of the case, when he attributes to Homer not only a knowledge of writing, but acquaintance with the Phœnician, that is, the Hebrew, tongue!

country, or the hieroglyphics of the other.* The mariners who brought from Egypt the drug of "Nepenthe" (Od. iv. 220), who handled ropes made of the papyrus (Od. xxi. 391), and who were able to report of the river of Egypt and its "very fair fields," must have obtained some notion of the art of writing in viewing the monuments on its banks, and may have described the same with a vague sense of wonder, much as some descendant of Hiawatha would describe the doings of the electric wire.

The only other points which we advance under this head concern the poet's attitude to the outer nations and to the Hellenic race. We have already said a vague feeling of the complexity of human speech possesses the author of the "Odyssey," when he speaks of mingling *ἐν ἄλλοθρόους ἀνθρώπων*. His statement as to the variety of tongues spoken in Crete (Od. τ 175) is paralleled by similar statements in the "Iliad," but, as we might expect, the parts are Ulyssean (B 804, Δ 438, K 420). Also, if the author of the Trojan catalogue in "Iliad" B is offended by the quality of the speech of the Carians, who are to him *βαρβαρόφωνοι*, the author of the "Odyssey," is repelled by the Sintians, whom he styles *ἐγρίοφωνοι*. This brings us to the evidence of the latent feeling of nationality. Thucydides, it is true, tells us that in Homer's time the line is not yet formally drawn between Greeks and Barbarians. There is, however, a preparation for it in the appearance of such aggregations as *Πανῶλλεις* and *Παναχαιοί*. The former occurs in "Iliad" B 530, a line to which we shall immediately refer. The latter appears about eleven times in "Iliad" and "Odyssey," and with one doubtful exception they are all Ulyssean.†

Conformably with this view, we may expect a change to be passing over the name "Hellas," so that it should show symptoms of being restricted no longer to its original area—a corner of Thessaly—but be seen to be widening its domain. Accordingly, most critics, including Bergk, Ebeling, and Gladstone, hold that Ἑλλάς in the "Odyssey" has obtained this more extended application, and that it there embraces Northern Greece as far as to the Gulf of Corinth. The range of fame is spoken of as extending

* The word *σῆμα* itself is worthy of mention in this question. There appears to be as yet no Aryan etymon for it, and neither Bopp nor Curtius includes it in his Glossarium. It would be strange if it were to turn out to be itself Oriental, and to have some affinity with the Hebrew *Shem* (= a name), or, more probably the Egyptian *Sem* = "la figure, la forme" (Brugsch, "Grammaire Hieroglyphique," p. 14). The chief difficulty that I feel in accepting this etymon is the very considerable development in *secondary* senses, which *σῆμα* has already attained in the Homeric poems. The early intercourse between Greece and the East must, however, have been greater than is commonly supposed. The sojourn of Antimenidas, the brother of Alcæus, in the valley of the Euphrates, in the beginning of the sixth century (about 589 B.C.), as shown by the fine fragment of Alcæus, is an interesting fact in connection with questions that have been raised—he being a member of a musical family—as to the Greek musical instruments in the Book of Daniel.

† The occurrences are—Il. B 484; H 78, 159, 301, 327; K 1. [T 193.] Ψ 286. Od. α 339; ε 800 [and α 82]. That in T belongs to a part of the poem which has been generally the subject of dubitation. It happens to be in a speech addressed to Ulysses.

καθ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος (Od. α 344, and ο 80), equivalent to saying "in Northern Greece and in the Peloponnesus;" that is, "famous on either side of the gulf," as we say, "on either side of the Tweed." Is there anything parallel in the "Iliad?" There is, in Ulyssean parts, viz. II. I (ix.) 447, where "Hellas" is spoken of as *outside* the dominions of Peleus, and therefore not continuous with the primitive "Hellas." Also, in the catalogue in B 530, we find as a universalising expression, Πανέλληνες καὶ Ἀχαιοί, for which reason the line was doubted in ancient times. Fäsi, however, remarks justly that here we have a distribution of people parallel to the territorial one, in the "Odyssey," of καθ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος, and both Fäsi and La Roche retain the line unbracketed, notwithstanding the scruples of the ancient Alexandrians.

Thus there is a remarkable convergence on various lines of evidence to show an identity of mental horizon between the author of the "Odyssey" and the author of those books of the "Iliad" which, for shortness, we style Ulyssean. It would be in vain to prove from the books of the "Achilleid" any such width of vision for their author. We turn to the other points, which we can review only very briefly.

II. The next point for consideration was the presence of the allied elements of pathos and humour. If the "Odyssey" is distinguished by an infusion of these elements, we may expect the cognate books of the "Iliad," if they are cognate, to show a certain influence of the same kind. This we find to be actually the case, with this difference, that the pathos culminates in the Ulyssean part of the "Iliad," the humour in the "Odyssey" itself. Under the head of pathos, we naturally turn to Book Z, to the parting of Hector and Andromache, and, as a kindred scene, the supplication of Priam for the dead body of his son, in Book Ω. It is difficult in the face of the internal evidence to separate the authorship of these two books. One of them, however—viz., Ω, from the linguistic evidence, must belong to the same author as the "Odyssey," and therefore, if Book Ω is Ulyssean, Book Z must be so also: In the "Odyssey," it is true, there is no pathetic scene on such a scale as in these books, but, in its own limited range, the picture of the death-scene of the 'dog Argus, in its tender tone and its touches of glorious power, reveals to the full the master's hand.*

In dealing with the pathetic element in Book Z, it falls to be remarked how in this way, upon what we may call a Ulyssean theory, we obtain a clue to the explanation of the somewhat difficult and inconsistent character of Hector. That hero awakens sometimes

* Colonel Mure (H. of Gr. Lit. i. p. 858) has remarked on the funeral lamentation in Book Ω (l. 723 seq.) by the three dames of Troy as worthy of being classed with the debate in the tent of Achilles for the felicity with which different veins of oratory are adapted to different speakers. Book Ω would thus come into close connection with Book Z for pathos, and Book I for oratorical power.

the strongest sympathy, and at other times a feeling of repulsion akin to aversion. He is now boastful even to arrogance, and again, as conscious that he is fighting under a cloud of doom, tender and melancholy. It tends to explain the duality in the character of Hector—arrogant, in Book N (l. 823 seq.), pensive, even to melancholy, in Book Z—when we discover that the tender and faint-hearted Hector belongs to the Ulyssean, the boastful and loud-tongued Hector to the Achillean, portion of the "Iliad."

In like manner, the gentle plaintiveness with which the bloom and evanescence of the generations of man are touched, in the same Book Z, with no inferior power—a plaintiveness which drew forth the admiration of the greatest master of pathos in the ancient world, Simonides—harmonizes with the tones of the "Odyssey," where symptoms appear of the rise of that melancholy view of life which culminated afterwards in the doctrine of the *φθόνος θεῶν*, the "envy of the gods." The lament over the vanity of human life is put appropriately into the mouth of Glaucus, who inherits a touch of the melancholy of his ancestor, Bellerophon, the man on whom the blight fell, so that he was looked on as "hated by all the gods."*

Yet, alongside of this plaintiveness there also occurs a touch of the never very distant quality of humour, humour and pathos being twin aspects of the same emotional faculty. The same poet who puts into the mouth of Glaucus the lament over the fading existence of man winds up the description of his adventure with an account of the bad bargain he made in the exchange of arms, as if with a knowing smile of satisfaction that the cunning Greek had got the better of the lordly Asiatic. In point of fact, this gleam of quiet humour at the close of the episode is one of the features that has drawn against it the arrows of certain Wolfians, and, along with the *σήμετα λυγρὰ* and the reference to the cultus of Dionysus, elsewhere almost unknown to either poem, has caused that exquisite episode to be pronounced by many an interpolation. It is a magnificent bit of painting, however, mainly in honour of Ulysses' brother-chief, Diomed, and will be found, on examination, to contain in small compass the pathos, somewhat of the humour, and much of the spirit of adventure distinguishing the epos consecrated to Ulysses.

Under the head of humour proper, the two examples that most readily occur to the mind from the Homeric poems are, of course, the companion pictures of the scene with Thersites in B of the "Iliad," and that with Irus in the eighteenth of the "Odyssey."

* The occurrence in the "Odyssey" of *ζηλήμονες* (Od. ε 118), and *ἀγασσάτο* (Od. ψ 211), with reference to the gods in their dispensations, favours the idea that the doctrine of the *φθόνος θεῶν*, which appears as early as the story of Bellerophon, was at work also in the "Odyssey."

Ulysses is the protagonist in both, and, with the exception that there is somewhat of a severer tone in the handling of the Thersites* scene—as befits the general surroundings where it is placed—the same powerful pencil may be detected at work in both pictures.

• Once, in the “Odyssey,” the humour overflows into the burlesque, in the case of the scene in the eighth book of the “Amour of Ares and Aphrodite.” Stronger exception has been taken to this scene on ethical grounds than to almost any other in either poem, from the freedom with which the gods seem to be treated, and the levity that appears to prevail. It is to be observed, however, that it has a certain relevancy to the whole poem, where it appears as the obverse side of the picture of conjugal faithfulness, which is a main subject of the song. The most important point, however, for observation is the fact that it is the same two deities figuring disreputably here, that are subjected to disgrace from the spear of Diomed in the Ulyssean book (E) of the “Iliad.”

Other two portions of the “Iliad” may be mentioned as characterized by a strong infusion of humour. The one is the scene in Olympus, at the end of the first book, where Hephæstus makes mirth as the limping cupbearer. This occurs, no doubt, on the borders of a Ulyssean book; yet, as the first book is one that must be pronounced in the main Achillean, we are not entitled to claim it as an illustration, although the treatment of the gods suggests the free handling to which they are subjected in the eighth book of the “Odyssey.” The other is the misadventure of Ajax the Less when, in the contest of the foot-race (and Ulysses, be it noted, is his fellow-competitor), he stumbles and meets with mishap among “cow-dung,” and the crowd “laughs merrily o’er him.” This occurs, significantly, in a canto which is included among the Ulyssean (viz., ψ 777).†

We have thus shown a considerable amount of congruity in the allied elements of pathos and humour between the “Odyssey” and those books of the “Iliad” which are external to the main structure of the “Achilleid.” The “Achilleid” itself presents no analogous features; and we think there is a justification in this respect for establishing a difference between the two divisions of the “Iliad.”

III. The third point of reference will not detain us long, and

* The tradition that Thersites, who was chastised by Ulysses, was a kinsman of Diomed, has no warrant in the Homeric poems. The Scholiast (B L. in Venetian Scholia on II. B 212) says, “If he had been in fact a kinsman of Diomed, Ulysses would not have struck him,” a remark that shows his sense of the relation subsisting between Ulysses and Diomed.

† In support of this view it is important to note that the attitude of the crowd in this case of Ajax is described in the same phrase as in that of Thersites: *ἐν ὄχρῳ ἔειπεν γέλασαν*. The phrase *γέλασεν ἐν τινι* occurs six times in the Homeric poems—in B 270, ψ 784 and 840, and Od. ν 358, 374, and φ 376, and therefore all Ulyssean. In fact, the peculiar vocabulary of “Humour” seems confined to the “Odyssey” and the Ulyssean area, as an examination of *γέλοιος*, *γελῶδες*, *ωλίζω*, and, to a certain extent, *κρυχάδω* will show.

though of minor moment, it is still of value. It concerns an important feature of the "Odyssey," and one of so great prominence that its appearance may be looked for in any cognate poems—the appreciation of conjugal honour and affection. The "Odyssey" might be styled the romance of wedded love, in marked and emphatic contrast to the modern romance of pre-nuptial love. In modern times the "feverish tie" has usurped to itself the whole, or almost the whole, arena of imagination, to the exclusion of other emotions and affections. It is otherwise with Homer, who has bent the whole force of his genius to portray the constancy and patience, the endurance and the triumph of a queenly lady faithful to her lord. It is no doubt a one-sided picture, inasmuch as the poet, who is so careful of the honour of Penelope, is not equally careful of the fealty of Ulysses towards her. On this matter we do not touch, but simply note in passing that modern morality has no right to reproach ancient morality on the score of a looser rule of honour for the one sex compared with that exacted of the other. It is enough for our purpose to be able to appeal to the "Odyssey" as presenting a noble ideal of the female character, and to present such an ideal we may presume to have been a ruling motive in the mind of its author.*

Now, we may look in vain in the "Iliad" for any parallel portrait of female tenderness and devotedness, unless it be in one of those cantos which we have found, on other grounds, cognate in character to the "Odyssey," and there we are met by the picture of Andromache. It is with good reason that Colonel Mure (H. of Lit., i. p. 432) dwells on this similarity as an anti-Wolfian argument; and he calls attention to the fact that the mild rebuke administered to them both, to mind their own domestic matters, and not meddle with the affairs that belong to men, is couched in almost identical terms for both princesses in both poems. There is, therefore, a certain amount of evidence for the affirmation that, if the hand of Walter Scott might be traced by the frequency with which he has sketched the group of a father with an only daughter, Homer might be known similarly by his double picture of the wife and mother with an only son, Andromache and Astyanax being a companion pair to Penelope and Telemachus.

IV. The fourth point remains, viz., the attitude towards Ulysses as the impersonation of intelligence. A full discussion of it would carry us very far: we may, however, briefly indicate the leading features which lead us to believe that a special vein of admiration for Ulysses runs through those books of the "Iliad" which we have ventured to call Ulyssean, strongly suggestive of the more pro-

* Mr. Gladstone (Juv. Mundi, p. 406), in one of his many happy illustrations, which often throw more light than the most laboured dissertations, remarks that the law of England authorizes re-marriage after a shorter period of absence than that assigned to Ulysses.

nounced admiration that has poured itself forth in that most splendid of poems ever consecrated to a single name—the *Odyssey*.

In the roll of Ulyssean cantos, we shall proceed backwards, because the prominence of Ulysses seems rather to diminish as we approach, and to increase as we retire from, the neighbourhood of the “*Odyssey*.” In Book Ω we do not find any homage or reference to him, and the proofs whereby that book appears to be Ulyssean, though we believe sufficient, are mainly linguistic. It is as if the poet felt that there was no need to decorate one who was so near the horizon as the rising sun. Going backward among these cantos, we find, however, a change. In Ψ , the canto of the games, Ulysses is represented as entering the foot-race (that he is not in the chariot-race, competing with the grander kings, is in accordance with his humble position in the camp, without an equipage), and he wins the prize. This may not mean much, but when we consider that it is through the special favour of Athene, who is the only deity that interposes in these games, and that she limits her favour to Ulysses and Diomed, we are disposed to argue that this is a forecasting of the scene in the eighth canto of the “*Odyssey*,” when Ulysses astonishes the minds of the Phæakians in their games, through the help of the same goddess.

Passing to Cantos ix. and x., or I and K of the roll, we find Ulysses coming into greater prominence.* He is selected to be the spokesman of the Greek chiefs in the Embassy to Achilles, and is therefore in a position for the time second only to that of Achilles—the hero of the “*Odyssey*” addresses the hero of the “*Iliad*.” This position, it may be said, is nowise peculiar: he owed it to the reputation he enjoyed in epic tradition as an adroit speaker; and it does not mean much, though it is in favour of our argument; but it will be difficult to explain, on any other theory than that which we are unfolding, the peculiar honour bestowed on him in K, or Book x., especially when it is remembered that this canto was regarded in ancient times as being external to the nucleus of the poem. The special care with which Ulysses is drawn in that book (for we consider Mr. Gladstone right in accounting it the true *ἀπὸρρέα* of Ulysses, that is, the canto celebrating his prowess), the mode in which the real direction of the night adventure is bestowed on the sharp-eyed Ulysses, the manner in which the poet invests him with interest by the long history of the casque,† which he dons for the occasion, com-

* Fäsi, in the opening of Book x., takes it as one of the difficulties attaching to the position of these cantos (ix. and x.) in the poem, that Ulysses has in them the *Hauptrolle*, or chief rôle!

† The account of the descent of the “Helmet” (K 260—271) is a characteristic piece of minute description, paralleled in the Homeric poems only by the descent of the Sceptre in “*Iliad*” B, and the bow of Eurytus in the “*Odyssey*.” The moment chosen for the minute word-painting descriptive of these instruments, is when *Ulysses handles them*,

bine to render him the hero of the hour. Moreover, the remarkable relation in which he stands to Diomed in this book is important when we take into account the very different relation in which he stands in a neighbouring but not Ulyssean canto (viz. Θ), a point to which we shall afterwards refer.

Proceeding now to the mass of continuous cantos which extend from Book ii. to vii. inclusive, and which are generally considered, even by those inclined to the Wolfian view, to be a fairly uniform sequence, we inquire what the position of Ulysses is in these; and on the assumption of a unity between them, it follows that if the author of any one of these cantos can be shown to have intended special homage to Ulysses, the whole may be fairly pronounced Ulyssean. Here, again, the prominence seems to increase as we ascend toward the earlier cantos. In the last of these, or H, there is no special mention, except that he is one of the nine worthies that start forth ready to accept Hector's challenge. That he is a marked personage is indicated by the mode in which his name is introduced, namely, at the close of the list, so that he is not, as it were, lumped in with the rest, but, since he could not be named first, or take precedence of Agamemnon, the next place of note is assigned to him, that his name comes last, and is therefore the climax (H 168). That this interpretation is the correct one, rather than another which might explain Ulysses as coming last on prudential principles, is shown by the manner in which he elsewhere resents the imputation of "coming last" (in Δ 354). The slowness he seems to show in "Iliad" B (l. 170) is altogether of a different kind, and the circumstances there are entirely different, so that no fair argument can be thence drawn against our view of the incident in Book H (168).

In Cantos Γ , Δ , E, Z, he appears in a position of prominence second only to his companion Diomed, with whom we have found him associated so closely in Book K; and the same association is apparent in E (cf. l. 519 and 669—676), where he shares with Diomed the special favour of Athene, and slays seven Lycian warriors, in lines that seem intended to parallel the similar exploit of Achilles over the seven Pæonians (Φ 211). This guardianship of Athene, which runs through the whole of the "Odyssey," is an especial accompaniment of Ulysses in several of the Ulyssean books of the "Iliad," particularly in B, E, K, and Ψ . In Δ 500 he is represented as performing the exploit that turns the fortune of the day, and it rouses Apollo's indignation, so that the god addresses reproaches to his baffled Trojans. That he was a favourite hero of the poet of these books appears still more clearly from the evidence of the

and we can almost trace the same keen and loving eye in the description as that with which our nearest compeer to Homer in modern times, Walter Scott, would fasten on and kindle over some piece of ancient armour that had passed through many a hand and known many a field.

Ἐπιπάλῃσις in Book Δ, where he is placed alongside of Menestheus, the Athenian leader, and is the mouthpiece of the Athenians, as well as of his own insular troops, in replying to the taunts of Agamemnon. The Ionian poet, if we are justified in assuming an Ionian poet as the author of this part of the "Iliad"—a point which is clear from many considerations—has thus brought Ulysses into close connection with the Athenians, the ancestors of the Ionian race, and has made him, in fact, the representative and spokesman of the great sea-people of the historic time. Contrast the position of the Athenians in this book, under the wing of Ulysses, with the position which they hold in Book one of the Achillean books, where they are mere "food for powder," and we discern the difference between the Ionian and the Thessalian, or, in other words, the Ulyssean and Achillean portions of the "Iliad." It has always been found to be a difficulty how Athens should have so great apparent prominence in the catalogue in B, and why Menestheus, their commander, should be praised as a good tactician, and at the head of troops who are called "inspirers of flight," whereas there is not only no exploit of any note ascribed to the Athenians, but in more than one place they are represented as inferior warriors. Mr. Gladstone has stated this difficulty in the following terms:—

"These Ionians were, as it should seem, the ruling class of the Athenians, the Ἀθηναίων προλελεγμένοι, or, it may be, their picked men. The praise awarded to Menestheus in the catalogue, even if the passage be genuine, is only that of being good, to use a modern phrase, at putting his men into line. (B 554.) The Athenian soldiers, indeed, are declared in II. iv. 828 to be valiant, μέγιστους ἀνδρῶν; but the character of the commander is worse than negative. Though of kingly parentage, he nowhere appears among the governing spirits of the army and on the only occasion when we find him amid the clash of arms—namely, when the brave Lycians are threatening the part of the rampart committed to his charge, he shudders and looks about him for aid (xii. 831). The inferiority extends to the other Athenian chiefs—Pheidias, Stichios, Bias, and Iasos (xiii. 691, xv. 337, &c.); of whom all are undistinguished, and two—Stichios and Iasos—are 'food for powder,' slain by Hector and Æneas respectively. Here, then, there seems to have been bravery without qualities for command; and all this tends to exhibit the Athenians as in a marked degree Pelasgian at this epoch, stout but passive, without any of the ardour or the κίεσις of the Hellenic character."—*Juventus Mundi*, pp. 81, 82.

The difficulty is, however, entirely removed, not by referring it to any slippery distinction between a Hellenic and a Pelasgian element, which Mr. Gladstone seems to prefer, but by referring it to the influence of Ionian partiality in the case of the Ionian bard, who has embroidered the lay of the "Achilleid" with ornaments in honour of his own nationality, not native originally to the poem. In this point of view the connection of Ulysses with Menestheus in Book Δ comes appropriately to clinch the argument. The position of Athene as the patron goddess of Athens is another

point which gives Mr. Gladstone trouble, and he is at a loss to reconcile this fact with the absence of any special protection to an Athenian hero. The passages in which this special relation is indicated between Athene and Athens are, however, Ulyssean—viz., Il. B 547—551, Od. ε 81 and λ 332, and the first of these is easily explained as part of the embroidery which the Ionian poet has worked in, upon a texture of an originally different character.

In regard to the Book Γ, there are several notable circumstances to adduce—(1) that Ulysses is *singled* out as standing alongside of Agamemnon in the scene of the Oaths (l. 269); (2) that he is conjoined with Hector in measuring the lists, as if acting as *lieutenant* to the king of men; and (3) that we have the full-drawn portrait of him as the man of eloquence presented to us (l. 216—224) in the beautiful scene where Helen appears on the Trojan wall. Two things are to be noted here: that he is by far the most prominent person in this portrait-gallery of the *Teichoskopy*; for, while Ajax, Idomeneus, and even Agamemnon, are dismissed with a few lines, Ulysses is introduced *second* after Agamemnon, and, though expressly said to be smaller in stature and king of only a barren rock, he yet fills the field of vision so fully that out of seventy lines appropriated to the description of the Greek chiefs, the little Ithacan occupies thirty-four, or about half the space. The second point is, that in the description of his eloquence the palm is bestowed in so marked a manner that it seems to clash with or endanger the pre-eminence in this respect of Achilles himself. Here, again, we think we can trace the unconscious partiality of the Ionian bard for the insular hero in whom the genius of the Ionian race is more or less consciously prefigured.

If the position of Ulysses is thus notable in Books Γ and Δ, it is perhaps still more notable in Book B, in which several facts of importance combine to place him in a focus of splendour. The old Saga had represented him as the last of the chiefs who found his way home, and accordingly the *Nóστος*, or Return, so much desired, was cared for by him only in the event of its being obtained with duty and honour. He is accordingly the opponent of any dishonourable *Nóστος*, and in the area of the Achillean poem (Ξ 82, &c.), a scene is now found in which he has to rebuke Agamemnon for faint-heartedness and for the proposal of an inglorious return. What relation this has to the scene in Book B, we do not now inquire; the one scene is, however, probably the origin or suggesting cause of the other; it is at all events pretty clear that Ulysses was known as the determined opponent of a *dishonourable* return. It is therefore to him that the prime rôle is assigned of opposing the proposal for such a *Nóστος* in B, although that proposal comes from the mouth of Agamemnon, and seems, at all events tentatively, to have

his sanction. Through the greater part of this book, Ulysses is the most prominent person in the camp, and is invested with special insignia as the bearer of the "Sceptre," which he receives from the hand of Agamemnon, and which is described with such state and splendour of surroundings.

And wherefore should the task of staying the Νόστος, and repressing the seditious movements in the assembly, be entrusted to Ulysses? Not merely because of his character for eloquence and wisdom, or because of the possible reflection from the scene in E 82, above referred to, where he opposes the notion of a Νόστος, but because he was pre-eminently the chosen hero who has to vindicate the cause of order in his own country on his return. In no mouth, therefore, does the Homeric maxim of order—*οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοφανίη*—find itself placed with more appropriateness; and the swift and sharp stroke rebuking the insolence of Thersites is dealt by the same hand that administers just vengeance to the crew of the suitors. If anything were needed to crown the argument as to the eminent position assigned to Ulysses, it would be the circumstance that he has the honour of being conjoined with Achilles in the hatred of Thersites—*ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ μάλιστα ᾗν ἢδ' Ὀδυσῆϊ*—a line that marks out the two heroes as standing apart and alone, yet *together*, and the full import of it can only be understood if we appreciate the hand of the author of the "Odyssey" as at work in this portion of the "Iliad." A similar argument might be drawn from the epithet "sacker of cities," *πολιόπορος*, assigned him in this same connection (B 278), a title which, among the various heroes present at Troy, he alone shares with Achilles. The same epithet recurs in a more advanced portion of the "Iliad"—viz., K 363, also Ulyssean—so that these two occurrences are premonitory of its coming bestowal, as a not unfrequent epithet, in the "Odyssey."*

A fact still more striking yet remains. Without attaching much importance to the premonition of the "Odyssey," where Ulysses (B 292) alludes to the hardships of separation from home and spouse, or the occasional cropping up of the mainly Ulyssean word *νόστος* and *νέσθαι* in the passage (155 and 251)—as it does also in I and K—we cannot but claim importance to the singular title by which in this book (B) the hero chooses to designate himself, and which is premonitory of the "Odyssey." It is a title that marks a peculiar relation in respect of those home affections which the "Odyssey" is intended to celebrate, and on which the whole *dénouement* of it turns. While other heroes have their

* A similar fact attaches to the localization of another striking epithet, *θεός*. Ulysses, as remarked by Mr. Gladstone, is the only *living* hero that receives it, except Achilles, who receives it four times, all Achilleian. It is assigned to Ulysses upwards of twenty times in the "Odyssey," and in the "Iliad" four times. They are B 335, I 218, K 243, A 806, and are all, including the last, certainly Ulyssean.

titles drawn from their paternal ancestors, nearer or more remote, and while there are some traces in the heroic time of designation after a *maternal* ancestor, such as *Ἀηροΐδης* in Hesiod, and, in the "Iliad," the problematical case of the *Μολίωνε*, Ulysses chooses as the title by which he would be designated an appellation, neither patronymic nor matronymic, but, if we may so style it, a pædonymic, *from his son*, viz. (l. 260), "the father of Telemachus." The same designation is assumed by him in Il. Δ 354, one of the minor links binding these two cantos together, and binding both to the framework of the "Odyssey."

It is singular that the hero who, more than any other, prefigures the *future* character of the Greek race, and especially of the Athenian, should thus be represented as the only one not gazing backward upon the past, but, as it were, looking down the vista of the future; and we cannot help thinking that, whatever might be the poet's view over the distant future, his vision comprehended the immediate future, and already gave note of the important *rôle* to be played by Telemachus in the coming drama of the "Odyssey."

To attempt further proof would be in all probability only a weakening of the case, but there is one consideration that must be added which seems to convert the argument into a demonstration, viz., the position of Ulysses in the books which cannot be claimed to be otherwise than mainly Achillean. In the Achillean or primary "Iliad," the treatment of Ulysses, while generally respectful, is by no means noble, and in more than one instance it is difficult to reconcile it with the just honour of the hero of the "Odyssey." That hero is represented more than once as being worsted, and in the eleventh book (l. 404) he is not only wounded, as Diomed also is, but he comes before us—in an appalling moment, no doubt—as having difficulty in screwing his courage up, and he lets fall an *ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω*, which is not rendered with any false *nuance* when it is translated, "O, woe is me, what is to become of me?" This, in the midst of a battle, has a very awkward sound, compared with the same utterance when he is cast famishing and naked on the unknown shore (in Od. ε 465), where the words are both natural and honourable, and imply no shade or slur on his courage. Passing from this, however, which may be at least a doubtful case, we can come to only one conclusion as to the figure Ulysses makes in the eighth book. In the thick of the battle there has been a portent from Zeus which scares the Greek chiefs; and, among other misadventures, old Nestor is in danger, his equipage having got entangled. Diomed observes and calls out to Ulysses by name to come and rescue Nestor. In spite of his loud appeals to stop, and not turn his back *like a coward*, but stay to shield the old man's head, Ulysses is represented as "rushing

away past," and "pays no heed" to the appeal (viii. l. 97).^{*} Other heroes, such as the Ajaxes, are, it is true, represented as giving way also, but they do so without being appealed to by Diomed. Nor does Ulysses emerge from his retreat for a long period, for he is not mentioned among the heroes who sally forth a little later in the same book, to restore the fortune of the day (l. 261-6), whereas all the others who are spoken of as having retreated before are mentioned as returning, *except* Ulysses. The strangest thing remains—strange indeed, if all these cantos are from the same author, and "at one projection"—namely, that on the next occasion when there is anything of dangerous duty ahead, viz., in Book x. (or K), this same Diomed has not only no recollection of the awkward incident in the case of Ulysses related two books before, but without any apology on the part of Ulysses for his behaviour, or any explanation on the part of the poet, bestows unnecessarily lavish praise on him as the most trusty of comrades (K 240-7), and selects him as his companion-in-arms out of the whole company of the chiefs. The whole matter becomes plain, and order is at once restored into these complicated relations, when we remember that while Book K is decidedly Ulyssean, the part of Book viii. (Θ) describing the *queer* conduct of Ulysses, belongs to the "Achilleid," which, in his recasting of the poem, the Ulyssean singer has left untouched.

Such is a *prima facie* view of the case in favour of a Ulyssean origin to nearly one-half of the "Iliad," leaving an "Achilleid" over, whose origin is more remote, and therefore more obscure. This palæozoic portion can still be determined with tolerable accuracy, though occasionally at the points of junction the lines of demarcation may be difficult to determine. The evidence adducible in favour of this conclusion from the mythology, ethical views, and especially from the linguistic features which still survive after all the processes that have passed over the original lay of the "Wrath of Achilles," is very remarkable, but our limits, and the nature of this paper, forbid entrance on this part of the subject, or any allusion to possible objections and difficulties, none of which, however, will be found very formidable in the face of the large mass of countervailing evidence.

One thing remains. An objection will occur *in limine*, that our theory involves a *hysteron proteron* in dealing with the Homeric

* "Das ist kein ruhmvoller Moment," says Nutzhorn, (p. 211), in dealing with this incident, and he adds that the words *καλὴν δὲς Ὀδυσσεύς*, of Il. viii. 97, sound in this connection almost like a parody—a remarkable admission from a defender of the unity. Making all allowance for "the fears of the brave, and the follies of the wise," it is difficult to reconcile the Ulysses of the eighth "Iliad" with the Ulysses of the "Odyssey," impossible to reconcile him with the Ulysses of the tenth "Iliad." We accept, of course, Aristarchus's interpretation of *οὐδ' ἰσχυροῦς*, viz., "gave no heed," in preference to the untenable one, which seeks to save his honour, that, perhaps owing to the throng, "he did not hear."

poems, inasmuch as it gives the critical precedence to what is assumed to be the secondary and inferior poem. A few remarks are therefore due regarding the relative importance and significance of the two poems, with a view to putting the matter in a light more accordant with the facts than the common opinion implies. I am aware that Mr. Gladstone has expressed himself in favour of the "Iliad" as the poem of vaster scope and profounder genius; but there are not a few considerations that move me to call for a different verdict, if assent to that proposition involves a belief that the "Iliad" is the greater poem. It may be freely admitted that the "Iliad" has unrivalled *passages*, and the theory propounded in this paper supplies a clue to understand the genesis of many of the most notable of them; yet it remains true that the "Odyssey" is the greater *poem*, as being (1.) the more finished work of art, and (2.) the poem of the Greek race, *par excellence*, in its best and most typical characteristics. If we inquire what it is that distinguishes Greece in the annals of the world, the reply will embrace two things—that she is the mother of that inquiring intelligence which has given the world Science; and that she is, further, the fountain of Art. Looked at from this point of view across the ages of history, which of the two poems possesses most significance? We can hardly doubt that the verdict would be in favour of the "Odyssey," whose hero is the incarnation of that spirit of eager inquiry that Greece awakened on the earth, and which in its structure—so sharp and clear of outline, and yet so broad and grand—is itself a prefiguration of that art whose glory was bestowed on the people of Greece. For, however great may be the character of Achilles—and we cannot be blind to the glory with which he is invested as gaining the victory, not only over foes and friends, over Greeks and Trojans, but finally over himself and his own impetuous passion—it yet remains true that Achilles is *not* the representative of the Greek race; Achilles is not *καλὶς* as was the Greek people, along with their typical hero Ulysses; and to accept him in that character would involve our looking to Sparta instead of Athens as the glory of Greece, and installing Alexander over Pericles in the temple of Greek fame. That would be an entire inversion of the justice of the case, and would involve a *hysteron proteron* from which the historical conscience must recoil.*

* Plato touched on this point in the Symposium, observing that, with all his accomplishments, Achilles was not *καλὶς*. The most brilliant of these, his love of music and his eloquence, it may be remarked, depends on one of the Ulyssean cantos (1 or the ninth); and, indeed, the softening touches in his portraiture are mainly Ulyssean. Ulysses, again, is pre-eminently *καλὶς*, and a curious enumeration of his accomplishments (to the number of sixteen), is found in the Venetian Scholia on Il. vii. 93. The enumeration is almost as interesting in what it omits as in what it inserts. There is no reference to *equestrian powers*. To enter on this, however, touches on a point that goes deep into the structure and mutual relations of the "Achilleid" and the "Odyssey."

Other, and not less powerful, considerations might be adduced in the same direction, as to the ethical import contained in, and the immense influence flowing from, the "Odyssey," but space forbids the inquiry at present.

Our theory, therefore, is that the only Homer we know, or, indeed, can know, is the author of the "Odyssey;" that, although his personality is, by the nature of his poetry, more veiled from us than that of Hesiod, yet, as no one doubts the personal existence of Hesiod, or disbelieves that we have in the "Works and Days" genuine utterances of an actual historic man, so we have in the solitary *μοι* of *ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε* in the "Odyssey" a trustworthy trace of Homer as a single great personality.*

Our oldest and best authority as to the Homeric poems unites together the names of Ulysses and Homer in a way that shows that *he*, unlike the chorizontes of ancient or of modern times, believed the "Odyssey" to have a special right to be considered the work of Homer:—

ἐγὼ δὲ πλεόν' ἔλπομαι
λόγον Ὀδυσσεύς ἢ πάθεν διὰ τὸν ἄδυες ἡ γενέσθ' Ὀμηρον,
ἐπεὶ ψευδεσί οἱ ποταγὰ τε μηχανᾷ
σεμνὸν ἔπειστί τι.—*Pindar, Nem. vii. 21.*

"For my part, I deem Ulysses' fame exceeds his toils, all because of the sweet-voiced Homer, for in his fictions and aery chariot of song there dwells a majestic spell."

WILLIAM D. GEDDES.

* It is somewhat curious to find that the traditional traces of the *personalia* of Homer, supposed to be imbedded in his poetry, such as the links of connection with *Phemius*, *Tychius*, *Mentor*, &c., fall within the area of the "Odyssey" or the Ulyssean part of the "Iliad." The Pierian or Thessalian poet, to whom is due in all probability the lay of the "Wrath," retires further back into invisibility, for he gives in the exordium of his poem not even a *μοι* to fasten on.



THE BEGINNING OF THE CO-OPERATIVE TROUBLE.

CO-OPERATION is one of the troubles of the time. It cannot be said to be a disturbing influence, since it seeks unity, and has always been pacific ; but society has been disturbed concerning it for fifty years. The first revolt of the grocers against it took place before the days of the first Reform Bill. At present it is a greater trouble than ever to tradesmen. Politicians are perturbed about it. When Mr. Baliol Brett, now Mr. Justice Brett, went down to Rochdale to wrest Mr. Cobden's seat from him, his great charge against Mr. Cobden was that he was friendly to Co-operators. At the last election, candidates were very shy of showing any sympathy with these views. To two candidates, who had held seats in the previous Parliament, the knowledge that they had stood up for fair play for Co-operation proved fatal to their claims. Co-operation has been the perplexity of two Governments. Chancellors of the Exchequer have a terror of deputations praying to have it put down. The last Government carefully abstained from saying anything in its favour, and this Government carefully abstains from doing anything against it. The general opinion is that Co-operation is absurd and impossible ; and if not impossible, impracticable. Nevertheless it exists, and it becomes a question of some interest—how did this Co-operative trouble begin ? It can do no harm, and may be information to many persons, to explain it. The originator of that Co-operation which attracts so large a share of perturbed attention, and which

already requires a History to be written of it, was undoubtedly one Robert Owen, who was born so far back as in 1771, a year before Fourier. Nature was in one of her adventurous moods at that period. In the four years from 1769 to 1772 there appeared Napoleon, Wellington, Goethe, Owen, and Fourier—all historic men in their separate lines; bane and antidote, war and art, world-destroyers and world-makers. Robert Owen, who was born in Newtown, Montgomeryshire, was afterwards known as Owen of New Lanark. It is not alluring to tell the reader this, as many will consider that he is not a proper kind of person to be brought forward in legitimate history, and that it was a want of taste in him to intrude improvements upon the world which would necessitate his being accorded some kind of acknowledgment. But history is an unceremonious and brutal thing. Its natural food is facts, and when it gets them it has no choice, no scruples, and no remorse. The truth is that, in Mr. Owen's days, "proper persons" had no faculty of improvement in them of the kind the world most wanted, and therefore an astute Welshman took it into his benevolent and fertile head to do what he could. And thus it came about that Co-operation was really a Welsh invention. In no literature before the active days of this social devisor does any trace of this new industrial shibboleth appear.

In these happy and latitudinarian times, anybody may improve society who can, and society is very glad when anybody gives signs of the capacity of doing it. His services are accepted, and no questions are asked. But in Co-operative times no one was allowed to attempt any good, unless he commanded prelatical concurrence. The "pastors and masters" of the period held then the exclusive patent for improving the people, and though they made poor use of it, they took good care that nobody infringed it. Improvement, like the sale of corn, was a monopoly then; but we have free trade even in humanity now—though the business done is not very great yet.

Mr. Owen was an unusual man. His career has been found one of instruction and interest to many who had no thought of imitating it. By patience, industry, sagacity, and kindness, he raised himself to eminence and opulence. His life illustrates how much knowledge a man of observation may acquire without books. He attained distinction by two things—the observance of truth in conduct and of experience in practice. He was known from the first as a man of veracity and reflection. From being a draper's assistant, he became a manager of cotton mills at Manchester. He afterwards entered into the employ of Mr. David Dale, a cotton spinner of Glasgow, who had mills at New Lanark. In due course, after the manner of other clever heroes of romance and real life, he married his master's daughter,

became a partner in the business, and ultimately owner of it in conjunction with others. Previously, Mr. Owen had a large population of the working class under his direction in Manchester from 1791 to 1799, and a still larger number for many years afterwards at New Lanark, where, in 1810, he planned an institution unheard of before his time, but at which statesmen and prelates are hammering now, an "Institution for the Formation of Character." He built in it commodious school-rooms (one of them 90 feet by 40) for the separate instruction of persons from the time when as infants they were able to walk alone until they were intelligent. What School Board now, half-a-century later, with a town rate to aid it, would venture upon such spacious provision for little children? These proceedings being too far in advance for his money-wishing partners, they differed with Mr. Owen about it, and the building was suspended when the walls were half up. In 1814, he separated from these school-fearing colleagues, and made arrangements for new partners, and purchased the whole establishment. Assent to his measures for the improvement of the population, and the finishing of the institution, were the conditions on which he accepted his new allies into partnership. The new institution was completed, fitted up, and furnished in the year 1815. On the first day of the following year, namely on January 1, 1816, the "Institution" was formally opened, amidst an assemblage of all the adult villagers with their children, exceeding two thousand in number. There were present also the principal nobility and gentry in the neighbourhood, with some of the clergy of various denominations. The parents present were astonished at being called upon to send their children to school the very next day. This was the first infant school ever established. Lord Brougham (then Henry Brougham) visited it twice. It was by Mr. Owen's aid in supplying to them teachers that Mr. Brougham, Mr. James Mill, and others, were able to open the first infant school set up in England in Brewer's Green, Westminster. The first little scholars met there in February, 1819.

It was in these kindly and skilfully devised and long-continued Co-operative arrangements, for uniting intelligence with industry, and industry with working-class competence, that Co-operation, as a practical scheme, was first generated. Of course, it was not at the outset a very definite contrivance, nor was it self-acting, as it subsequently became. It was at first an administration by the thoughtful manufacturer who planned it. It was partly a benevolent, but mainly a well-considered economic device. The originator wanted to see in his work-people more skill, better conduct, and improved condition. To attain these ends, he knew there must be diffused among them intelligence, and the cost of

imparting this intelligence he believed would be refunded by commercial results. He acted on the principle that intelligence would prove a good investment. It did prove so, and thus it came to pass that education of members has always been deemed a part of the Co-operative scheme, among those who understood it.

Though Mr. Owen earned an honourable name for benevolence, he was not a man who played at philanthropy. The working people among whom he found himself were in ignorance—(viciousness begot of distrust, precariousness, and discomfort)—a sorry set. Their great employer's object was to show them how much could be done by mutual arrangement to improve their condition and prospects. If, like all ignorant persons, they did not care for knowledge for themselves, they would see it was good for their children, and would care for it for them; and Mr. Owen provided it; and the attractions of the school-room in the appliances for teaching, and in the extent and quality of what was taught, have not been exceeded by the provisions made for popular education in the most generous State in America, and have never yet entered into the imagination of any English minister to offer, or of any work-people to ask in Great Britain. The weavers and their wives at New Lanark, who witnessed this more than princely concern for their children's welfare, knew that he who showed it meant them well, as was manifest also in a thousand acts of thoughtfulness and respectful treatment towards them, the like of which had never been seen before—nor since in any manufacturer's establishment. Had Mr. Owen lived in happier and more appreciative days, such as our own, he would have been offered a baronetcy. However, grateful work-people offered him what he was prouder of—their confidence and co-operation, and their will and their skill were new elements of profit in the concern. Their goodwill, born of their regard for their employer, and their skill and honesty in their work, arising from increased intelligence and pride, meant money. These were new elements of gain to the company, and thus labour and capital worked together as it had never worked before; and thus the foundations of Co-operation were laid by Mr. Owen and his associated capitalists sharing with the labourers and their families an equitable portion of the common gain, of which the portion falling to their employers was made greater, and greater than it otherwise could have been, by their confidence and co-operation.

These facts were detailed by Mr. Owen in his letter to the *Times* newspaper, in 1834. In the same letter, addressing his early friend, who had then become Lord Chancellor Brougham, he said:—

“It is, I believe, known to your lordship, that in every point of view no experiment was ever so successful as the one I conducted at New Lanark,

although it was commenced and continued in opposition to all the oldest and strongest prejudices of mankind. For twenty-nine years we did without the necessity for magistrates or lawyers, without a single legal punishment, without any known poor's rate, without intemperance or religious animosities. We reduced the hours of labour, well educated all the children from infancy, greatly improved the condition of the adults, diminished their daily hours of labour, paid interest of capital, and cleared upwards of £300,000 of profit."

Lord Brougham, in reply, stated in the *Times* what he many years afterwards repeated in the House of Lords—that Mr. Owen was the originator of infant schools in England. Lord Brougham said:—

"I have not the least hesitation in stating that the infant school system never would, in all probability, have been established but for Mr. Owen's Lanark schools. I most distinctly recollect Mr. Mill (the father of John Stuart Mill), Sir C. Grey (afterwards Chief Justice of Calcutta), and myself, discussing for some weeks what name we should give these new schools, and . . . after rejecting various names, we fixed upon that of infant schools. The thing, as well as the name, was equally unknown till then in England."

Mr. Owen added, in a further letter to the same journal, that in 1799 he purchased the New Lanark Mills for £60,000, and entered upon the premises on the 15th of August of that year; that he published a very full and detailed account of the new institution, which included the infant schools, in the third Essay on the Formation of Character; and that a mutual friend of his and Lord Brougham's corrected the press for him. It was equally candid of Mr. Owen to make this acknowledgment of the assistance of Mr. Mill. The reader is conscious of a vigour and directness of statement in those Essays never attained in any other work of Mr. Owen's.

Co-operation, in its earlier and inchoate forms, traversed a wide area, and commanded respectable countenance. Its fertile and energetic founder caused it to be tried in various forms. It was at his instigation that Fellenberg commenced an infant school at Hofwyl, which subsequently, uniting industry with education, became celebrated. Mr. Owen had the sagacity to make, and the influence to get carried out, numerous schemes of social and co-operative reform. The self-supporting pauper colonies of Holland were owing to his suggestion. He originated the short-time agitation, on behalf of children in factories; he assisted Fulton with money to try his inventions in steam navigation. He purchased the first bale of Sea Island cotton imported into England, foreseeing at once the future importance to the spinning trade of England of encouraging the foreign supply of raw material. The great "Utopian" (as persons call him who, following the bent of their own faculties, believe nothing which is not commonplace) was a practical man, and knew how to make money as

well as to agitate great projects. His son has related instances of the splendid recognition accorded to him in his day.

He had, Dale Owen states, "been received respectfully, and sometimes with distinction, by those highest in position ; by Lords Liverpool, Sidmouth, Castlereagh, and by Mr. Canning ; by the Royal Dukes of York, Cumberland, Sussex, Cambridge, and especially by the Duke of Kent, her Majesty's father ; by the Archbishop of Canterbury (Sutton), and by the Bishops of London, St. David's, Durham, Peterborough, and Norwich ; besides Bentham, his partner, he was more or less intimate with Godwin, Ricardo, Malthus, Bowering, Francis Place, Joseph Hume, James Mill, O'Connell ; with Roscoe, Clarkson, Cobbett, Sir Francis Burdett, the Edgeworths, the statistician Colquhoun, Wilberforce, Macaulay (father of the historian), and Nathan Rothschild (the founder of the house). He had received as guests, at his own house at Braxfield, Princes John and Maximilian of Russia, the Duke of Holstein Oldenburg, Baron Goldsmid, Baron Just, the Saxon ambassador, Cuvier, Brougham, Sir James Mackintosh, and Lord Stowell (father-in-law to Lord Sidmouth). When he visited Paris, he took letters from the Duke of Kent to the Duke of Orleans (Louis Philippe), and from the French ambassador to the French minister ; and he was invited to the Visitor's Chair by the French Academy. In Europe, he made the acquaintance of La Place, Humboldt, La Rochefoucault, Camille Jourdain, Pastor Oberlin, Pestalozzi, Madame de Stael, and many other eminent persons."*

All these illustrious intimacies show that Robert Owen carried Co-operation into good company, and that in a far more radical and ambitious form than this generation knows. It was known and considered by persons of great influence in Europe, for the knowledge or discussion of this subject was the sole reason why they sought Mr. Owen, or he sought them.

The gains and economies of the Lanark Mills had taught them that the working class could, if they had sense to unite in it, make something by shop-keeping. His practical schemes of life were always recommended on the ground of their saving arrangements. One oven, he pointed out, might suffice to bake for one hundred families with little more cost and trouble of attendance than a single household cook, and set free a hundred fires and a hundred domestic cooks. One commodious wash-house and laundry would save one hundred disagreeable, screaming, steaming, toiling washing-days in common houses. It was not far to go, to infer that one good, well-stocked shop would, properly served, supply the wants of one hundred families, and

* Robert Dale Owen, *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1878, pp. 735, 736.

supersede twenty smaller shops, and save to the customers all the cost of the twenty shopmen and twenty shop rents and rates, in addition to the economy in prices and advantage in quality of buying wholesale in a way small shops could not compass.

When the grandeur of Mr. Owen's plans for the reconstruction of society first dazzled the imaginations of men who suffered and men who thought, hope begat belief that the day of great change was nigh. Many middle-class men and gentlemen, as well as the poor, had a sense that society was a mass of confusion and cruelty as far as competition went, and were excited at the new scheme of life. Princes, prelates, even monarchs, had lent heeding ears to the inspired Welshman's story of what might be done for the formation of the character of mankind if those who wielded national influences would use them to this end. The novelty of the dream is over now. Science has taught men that the improvement of mankind is an affair of a million influences and unknown time. None now, save the survivors of that period, can tell the fascination of that vision of improvement, in which progress was considered to be reduced to a simple problem of State mechanism, of which all the conditions had been discovered.

This tireless Newtown Utopian instituted a magnificent publicity of his Co-operative projects. He made speeches, held meetings, published pamphlets and books, bought innumerable copies of all newspapers and periodicals which gave any account of his proceedings, and distributed them broadcast over the world.* The very day on which he opened his celebrated schools at New Lanark for the formation of character, he despatched to Lord Sidmouth the manuscript copy he had made of all he said; so that the Government might have the earliest and most authentic knowledge of what was going forward. Where a great Co-operative Society now spends shillings in diffusing a knowledge of its principles, Mr. Owen spent thousands and thousands of pounds. It was this wise, costly, and generous publicity that led the public to attach value to the new social ideas. Mr. Owen may be said to have impressed mankind with them; for he travelled all over Europe, and made repeated visits to America, to personally spread the information of the new system of society which he contemplated establishing. Simultaneously with his efforts in Europe, he spent a fortune in America, in endeavours to found communities there. But up to 1820, no periodical was started to advocate those views.

To the comprehensive plan of reconstructing society many naturally objected, as involving a great interruption to business. But the ardent remodeller of all things thought very little of the

* He paid the full price for all newspapers he bought, and the price was considerable then; and he posted copies to every clergyman in the kingdom.

difficulty. Things were so bad that few saw any hope of amending them. The conclusion of most who thought upon the subject was that of the link boy who, when Pope, stumbling, cried out, "God mend me," answered, "I think, sir, God had better make a new one." Political reformers oft repeated this reply, and said it was better to make the stumbling world over again, if it could possibly be done. Mr. Owen had made up his mind to it, and in the *Economist* of that day, the first of the name, which contains the most animated writing which ever came from his pen, he thus announced the resolution to which he had come:—

"Though far from entertaining a very exalted opinion of my own powers, yet, from the mere conviction that the duty ought to be performed by some one, however humble, I have had the boldness to take upon my shoulders the burden of examining the whole affairs and circumstances of mankind. The ponderous load is greater than I could sustain, but that I feel a strength beyond my own, which shall enable me to bear it from obscurity into the full light of day, where the effulgent blaze of truth, darted from millions of quick and inquiring eyes, shall finally penetrate and pervade every portion of the mass. I summon to my aid all the friends to humanity. Would that I possessed the power to call around me on the instant the choicest spirits of the earth and the air—that with a magic touch I could at once dissolve the delusions of error and of prejudice, and, awing to obedience the genii of the lamp and the ring, transport mankind, in a moment, into that new world of delights which is opening upon my enraptured sight.

"But I must be content to toil my way through the intricacies of a laborious, though pleasurable work, by the ordinary exertion of human faculties. My lamp serves but to remind me of that feeble ray of reason and of knowledge which has played upon my mind. My being is the narrow, darkling circle which bounds and confines my powers. Yet, if that feeble ray be a ray of truth, it shall go forth increasing in eternal splendour. If this little circle be drawn from the immovable centre of justice and of wisdom, it shall be extended, until it encompass the whole earth. If my feeble voice be at first scarcely heard amid the noisy contention of the world, yet, if it be joined by the full chorus of the sons of truth, swelling into the clarion shouts of countless multitudes, and caught with joyous acclaim from nation to nation, the harmonizing strain shall resound through the globe.

"But I am indulging in anticipation of joy, before the battle is won. The song of triumph must be reserved for the hour of victory. The lyre must be relinquished for Ithuriel's spear. We lay down the pencil for the pickaxe and the spade. The region of fancy, with all its gay and glittering fascinations, must be abandoned for the sombre gloom of the cloistered grave. We descend into the caverned mysteries of nature for the inestimable gems of which we are in search. We have not to run the career of genius, but to dig the quarries of knowledge and of experience. The fervour of imagination must yield to the rigour of philosophic research; and the flashy coruscations of wit must be extinguished, till, in the darkness which surrounds us, we steadily discern the first dawn of the mild and sober light of reason and of truth.

"We must strip, then, for our work. We go down into our mines, where, if my readers will accompany me, and will assist to penetrate the strata which have hitherto concealed our treasures, and to remove the rubbish—the accumulations of ages—in the unskilful excavations of former workmen, we shall find the bright reward of our fondest hopes."

The enchanted philosopher came in the end, as a philosopher should, to the dreary realities of the way which leads to a new order of progress. But common people caught the enchantment and not the insight of the great dreamer.

Was it possible that men poor and ardent could decide upon a policy as men may who are at once opulent and cool? A new world of hope and effort was opening to many eyes which hitherto had found no outlook beyond the poor-house. Yet those who were able to think found that each must come to some conclusion as to what he would attempt. No Englishman can go on dreaming all his days. The new social innovator felt that he must do something. The British public, in business, believe only according to results; and the social propagandist soon felt that he must clear his mind of confusion, and get some definite idea of the course before him. Should he clear the world, or take it as it is? Should he create new conditions for mankind, or accept what he finds, and work from them to the higher thing he aims at? Many men had never thought at all in a systematic manner on any subject, and were prepared to put their trust in anything new, because they were well-nigh sick of the world as it was. Others were discontented with all things—were never to be reconciled either to the old or the new, and would die in a state of protest. Those who had resolved on action had an alarming leader to follow. Mr. Owen, like his French prototypes, was a world-clearer, though his methods were milder. He would make a clean sweep of all existing institutions. There was a prospect, indeed, of full employment for disciples of this thorough-going school; and a Broom party of Reformers was actually formed, who undertook to sweep Error up and cart it away; and an enterprising and disastrous party they proved to be, standing for a generation in the way of all those not less resolute, but more practical, men who intended to build where they could, and with the scant and poor materials which alone were at hand. The day at length came when the most ardent paused. The world admired, but did not subscribe; and it was left to cheque-less enthusiasts to find funds to diffuse a knowledge of the new views. It was then that some practical-minded persons advised the formation of Co-operative Stores, where money might be made without subscribing it, and proposed that shareholders should give their profits to a fund for propagandism.

It was in 1821 that the first journal appeared in the interests of Co-operation. It bore the name of the *Economist*. It was thought, in 1868, an act of judgment, and believed to be an original designation, to take the name of *Social Economist* as the title which would best recommend to public sentiment a Co-operative periodical, economy being that commercial feature in which society is most readily interested, and which is most easily

proved as an advantage of Co-operation. The title was the same as the one subsequently adopted by Mr. James Wilson, the founder of the *Economist* newspaper, who was likely to have seen Mr. Owen's publication; for there was much early knowledge of Co-operation in the house in Essex Street, where might be seen piles reaching to the ceiling of Mr. Wilson's unsold *Economists*, before it became the organ of the commercial classes; and Mr. Wilson had ample leisure left him to wonder whether they would ever make up their minds to buy it. The first number of Mr. Owen's *Economist* appeared in January, 1821. It was preceded by a prospectus, after Mr. Owen's manner, as elaborate as an essay, and as long as a pamphlet. The title-page of the volume declared that the *Economist* was "a periodical paper, explanatory of the new system of society, and a plan of association for improving the condition of the working classes during their continuance at their present employment." The time was clearly foreseen when an entirely new order of things would take the place of that then existing; but in the meantime temporary improvement was to be attempted in the condition of the "working classes." "Working people" was the better phrase Francis Place used in his addresses to them. In the very first number of this *Economist* mention was made of a "Co-operative and Economical Society," which is the earliest record of a name now so familiar to the public ear. There was no want of emphasis in announcing the discovery of Co-operation when the idea had taken a definite form in the minds of its originator and his friends. For some time the public had been told, in abounding phrases, that human affairs were henceforth to be based on some new principle, to which no definite name was given. It does not appear whether anybody had asked what it was, but there was a general expectation that the improvers of the social state would soon hear of something to their advantage. At length, one day in the autumn of 1821, the editor of the *Economist* broke in upon his readers with an air of importance and small capitals, and said to them, "THE SECRET IS OUT: it is unrestrained CO-OPERATION on the part of ALL the members for EVERY purpose of social life."* Undoubtedly this was big intelligence. There was no want of comprehensiveness in it. Co-operation of this description looked a long way forward, and spread very far around. Clearly it meant communism, and whoever expressed it in the words quoted knew very well what he meant, and said it in well-chosen terms, never used subsequently, and never in those days improved upon. It was a very small, eager, active, manifold thing, which issued in the name of Co-operation, then for the first time distinctly announced, but during the next ten years it spread wondrously over the land.

* *Economist*, August 27, 1821.

It was some journeymen printers in the Strand, of whom Henry Hetherington was one, who commenced the first Co-operative Society in 1821. They took a motto from Milton of singular fitness for their modest and adventurous purpose—


“—Our greatness will appear
Then most conspicuous, when great things of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
We can create.”

The term Co-operation was at first, and for several years, used in the sense of communism, as denoting a general arrangement of society for the mutual benefit of all concerned in sustaining it. Later, the term Co-operation came to be restricted to the humbler operations of buying and selling provisions. From implying concert of life in community, it sank into meaning concert in shop-keeping. It seems now, as it seemed then, a ridiculous thing that the commencement of the reformation of the world should consist in opening a cheese and butter shop. It was a great descent from the imperial altitude of world-making to stoop to selling long sixteen candles and retailing treacle. Doubtless, if we only knew it, the beginning of civilized society was not less absurd. There were, in all probability, dreamers who stood on the verge of savage life, and contemplated with poetic exultation the splendid future of civilization, when men should abandon their reckless and murderous habits, and master methods of thrift and peace. And when that new order of life began, which is now described as the dawn of civilization, there must have been persons with a fine sense of contempt, and words of sharp ridicule for those petty hoards and miserable transactions of barter, out of which capital and commerce grew, which have finally covered the earth with palaces, and raised private individuals to an opulence surpassing that of monarchs. Had there been, in those days, leading articles and reviews, parliaments, and reporters, and political economists, who see nothing in human destiny save supply and demand, how these Utopians, who brought about modern society, would have been held up to derision, and have been glad to hide their confused and abashed heads!

In a way that the originator of Co-operation never foresaw, a practical part of his views was destined to obtain a strange ascendancy. Who would have dreamed that flannel weavers and tinkers, shoemakers, and cotton-spinners of Rochdale, noisome with wax, and carbon, and oil, who recommenced their petty and absurd stores in 1844, were founding a movement, the voice of which would pass like a cry of deliverance into the camps of industry throughout what Sir Charles Dilke calls all “English-speaking peoples?” Who dreamed that these obscure mechanics

who had no means but pence, and no sense but common sense, would, in 1872, cause every shop-keeper, in every high street of every town and city of the British empire, to scream with an unknown dread, and cry to Members of Parliament, and crowd the offices of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, praying to be delivered from the deluge of Co-operation which they suppose threatens to submerge them? This new power of industry, which has grown up in this generation, Mr. Owen no more constructed than George Stephenson did that railway system which a thousand unforeseen exigencies had suggested, and a thousand brains matured. But as Stephenson the elder made railway locomotion possible, so Owen set men's minds on the track of Co-operation; and time and need, failure and gain, faith and thought, and the good sense and devotion of multitudes, have made it what it is.

GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.



WIND MYTHS.

MR. MAX MÜLLER has made us all tolerably familiar with the expression "sun myth." In throwing out his brilliant hints towards a reconsideration of many questions touching the origin of mythology, he was led to dwell almost exclusively on those myths which arise from the daily course of the sun through heaven. This was a confinement of view, though perhaps, under the circumstances, a necessary one, and has caused many people, to whom the study of comparative mythology was a novelty, to suppose that this series of myths began and ended the whole subject. We thus find many people speaking of the "sun-myth theory," or even of the "dawn-myth theory," as if these expressions were synonymous with the science of Comparative Mythology. It is rather to be regretted that, when Mr. Cox came to treat the subject in a more complete, or, at any rate, in a more lengthy manner, he should have followed too closely in the steps of his predecessor.

In India and Greece the most important of all natural phenomena is the sun, and the most interesting event of the day his course through heaven; if, then, Mr. Max Müller has laid such special stress on the myths arising from this phenomenon, it was doubtless with the object of giving emphasis to the true understanding of the nature of a myth. And this true nature may be best expressed by saying what a myth is *not*. It is not, in the first place, the story of the adventures of a fabled being, to

whom has been given (as in some Cabinet Council of Olympus) the *portfolio* of the sun, of the wind, or of the sea; still less is it an allegory, in which the workings of nature are told under the guise of a pretty tale; but it is a record of the observed phenomena of nature—that is, of *facts* which are as true now as they were then, but with that added personality which it must have been as impossible for our ancestors to separate from these appearances in their thoughts as we know it was in their language.*

We thus see that myths may arise out of any of the appearances of nature which are strong enough to take fast hold of the imagination. If the sun plays by far the largest part in the mythic dramas of India and Greece, in northern countries his importance is rivalled by that of the wind. Sitting, through the long nights, under the boughs of their primeval forests, or by the shores of their stormy seas, it was natural that the sound of the wind should be a strong spur to the fancy of our northern ancestors, and should have given rise to many curious myths.

Odinn himself, the chief god of the northern pantheon, bears most of the attributes of a wind god. His name comes from the verb *vadha*,† “to go,” or, like the Latin *vadere*, especially “to go quickly, to rush.” One of Odinn’s favourite by-names is *Gangleri*, “the Ganger;” and this, too, is his character, that he is always wandering over the world, and having adventures with men. His three possessions are his sword, his mantle, and his horse, Sleipnir. With the first we have here nothing to do. The second, which corresponds to the *tarn kappe* (cap of concealment, from *ternen*) of the Nibelungen Not, and the *wishing-hat* of the later folk-tales, as well as to the helmet of Hades and the *petasos* of Hermes, is doubtless the darkness—what Macbeth calls the “blanket of the dark.” It belongs to a larger part of Odinn’s nature than as a mere wind god, to that part in which he approaches the character of Zeus, as the heavens, or the all-containing atmosphere. Saxo, in his “*Historia Danica*”—wherein the mythological beings of the Eddas reappear as seen through medieval glasses, in a quasi-historical guise—tells us how, when a certain Hadding, a favourite of Odinn’s, was wounded in battle, Odinn came to his help, wrapped him in his mantle, and carried him home through the air; and one of Saxo’s commentators discusses whether Odinn did this by the help of the Devil, or whether Odinn was himself the Prince of

* This is, I think, the definition of a myth, which is always implicitly adopted by those patriarchs of comparative mythology, Grimm and Welcker. Mr. Max Müller has given it a new force by the light which a completer study of the Aryan languages has been able to shed. He sometimes, it must be confessed, rather obscures his subject by speaking of language too much as if it had an independent growth, apart from the thoughts of those who employed it.

† The name comes directly from the pret. *vodh* or *odh*. Is not this to express very rapid motion, in the same way as we find in Greek such an expression as ὁ δ' ἔχευ μίσηται?

Darkness. We know how that riding through the air was one of the peculiar powers of witches, and we shall see, when we come to discuss the myth of the Valkyriur, Odinn's "shield maidens," that these Valkyriur were the ancestresses of medieval witches. In popular tales this mantle reappears as the "wishing-cloth," or the "magic cloth," so familiar to all readers of fairy-stories, which has originally the power of transporting the possessor *wherever* he wishes, and afterwards of giving him *whatever* he wishes. Of this we have an interesting example in one of Abjörn'sen and Mœ's Norse Folk-tales.* Here the hero goes to the North Wind to get back some meal which the wind had stolen.

"So off he went, but the way was long, and he walked and walked ; but at last he came to the North Wind's house.

" ' Good-day ! ' said the lad, ' and thank you for coming to see us. '

" ' Good-day, ' answered the North Wind, for his voice was loud and gruff, ' and thanks for coming to see me. What do you want ? '

" ' Oh, ' answered the lad, ' I only wished to ask you to be so good as to let me have back that meal you took from me on the safe steps, for we haven't much to live on ; and if you're to go on snapping up the morsel we have, there'll be nothing for it but to starve. '

" ' I haven't got your meal, ' answered the North Wind ; ' but if you are in such need, I'll give you a cloth which will get you everything you want if you only say, ' Cloth, spread yourself, and serve up all kinds of good dishes ! ' "

This present is unfortunately stolen from him by the landlord at the inn where he sleeps on his way home, and a like fate befalls the North Wind's second present, a ram which could coin golden ducats ; but they are both recovered by means of a stick which, "when you say, ' Stick, stick, lay on, ' lays on till you say, ' Stick, stick, now stop, ' " with which the hero beats the landlord till he has restored cloth and ram.

The especial interest of this story lies in the fact that the part of Odinn is here played by the North Wind. We shall afterwards see other instances of the way in which a nature-myth may lie for a long time, as it seems, dormant and hidden, and then spring into life again, or, so to say, step back again into a state of nature when a character is found to suit it.

Odinn's eight-legged horse Sleipnir, " the best of all horses, " is the wind *purely and simply*, which, it is to be remembered, Odinn is not. The story of his birth is thus told in the younger Edda : †—

" Once upon a time, when the town of the gods was a-building, when the gods had set Midgard and made Valhall, there came a certain smith, and bid to make them a burg in three half-years so good that it should be true and safe against the Rimegiants and Hillogres, though they should

* "Norske Folke-eventyr." Translated by Dr. Dasent, with the title of "Popular Tales from the Norse."

† Dasent's translation.

come in by Midgard. But he asked for his hire that he should have Freyja* for his own, and (beside) he would have the Sun and the Moon."

This the gods after consultation grant.

"But if aught of the burg was undone, then his bargain should be off, and (beside) he should get help of no man towards the work. And when they had told him these terms, then prayed he that he might have help of his horse who Svathilföri (i.e., 'Snowbringer') hight; and by Loki's rede that was also granted to him. He set to work the first day of winter to make the burg, but by night he went to draw stone for it with his horse; but it seemed a great wonder to the Asa how great stones that horse drew, and the horse did one-half more of the toilsome work than the smith; but to their bargain there was strong witness and much swearing, for that it seemed not safe to the giant to be among the Asa truceless if Thorr came home; but then he was faring eastward to fight Trolls."

And so the gods threaten Loki with death unless he invent some way to stop the building.

"And the same evening, when the smith drove out after stone with the horse Svathilföri, there ran out of a wood a mare to the horse, and neighed at him: but when the steed knew what kind of horse that was, then he grew mad and burst asunder the rope, and ran to the mare, and she away into the wood; and the smith after them, and will catch his horse; but these horses ran all night, and the smith tarried there the night, and afterwards at dawn so much was not smithied as had been wont before. And when the smith sees that it will not be ended with the work, then falls he into the giant-mood. But when the Asa saw surely that it was a hill-ogre that had come in thither, they spared not for their oaths but called on Thorr; and quick as thought came he (and) next of all lifted the hammer Miöllnir aloft, and so paid the smith's hire, and not with the Sun and Moon; but forbad him even to dwell in Jölimheim; and that was easily done by the first blow, that broke his skull into small bits, and sent him beneath under Niflhel. But Loki had run such a race with Svathilföri that some time after he bare a foal; it was grey and had eight feet, and that is the best horse with gods and men."

This is a distinct and curious *wind myth*, in which we easily recognize Svathilföri as the north wind, who with the help of the giant winter, can pile up an insurmountable barrier of ice and snow. Loki has generally been considered in this myth to be the warm wind of the south.† His name means fire (*logr*); and why fire should be changed into a wind one does not quite see. Supposing wind to be intended by the horse-nature, Loki's assuming this form must mean heat entering into the wind, far-fetched though the idea seems. When we come to examine another wind myth, that of Idun, we shall again see Loki as the warm wind, bringing the return of spring.

This myth of Svathilföri is no doubt the origin of the many stories of "master-builders," or "the devil as builder," of which

* The goddess of spring and of love. But no doubt, originally, simply the earth, and the same as Frigg.

† Simrock, "Handbuch der Deutschen Mythologie," 3rd ed. p. 54.

the Cologne Cathedral legend is the best-known example. These tales are, indeed, so common that there is scarcely a cathedral or old church in Germany which has not its peculiar legend. The best connecting link between such stories and the myth we have just been relating is found in the legend of the building of Drontheim Cathedral. St. Olaf had vowed to build to God the largest cathedral in the world, and while he was pondering how the work should be set a-going, there came to him a certain builder who promised to build him such a church if he might have as his reward the sun and the moon, or else the person of the king, unless Olaf can discover the name of the builder. As the work is almost completed, Olaf is wandering disconsolate among the hills, when inside one of them he hears a mother quieting her child, with the words, "Hush, hush, to-morrow comes back father Wind-and-Weather, and brings with him the sun and moon, or else King Olaf himself." Then Olaf returns to the church, and finding it just completed, he calls out to the giant, "Vind och Veder! du har satt spiran sneder" (Wind-and-Weather, you've set the steeple awry), or otherwise, "Bläster, Bläster, satt spiran väster" (Blast, blast, set the spire west), and thereat the troll falls down and bursts. Here the master-builder, as Odinn in the tale of "The Lad who went to the North Wind," reappears in a pure nature garb.

There is a modern Greek folk-tale of the lady Aphrodite, who is wooed by two neighbouring kings. She dare not give a refusal to either, but she imposes tasks upon them. To the one she likes she orders to find her water on the Acrocorinth, where she is building a castle; and to the other one to build her a castle on this steep eminence. But, alas for her cunning! the building proceeds rapidly while her lover is unable to find water anywhere. Already the palace is almost finished; still Aphrodite is not wanting to herself. She calls to the builder, "Come, sit with me awhile; is not your task finished? are you not sure of your reward?" The foolish knight allows himself to be beguiled from his work, and in his intoxication forgets that it is not already finished. Meanwhile, his rival redoubles his efforts; at length the rock is pierced, and the disappointed builder finds out too late the trick which has been played upon him. Here we see the character of winter, stopping the streams as well as piling up the ice and snow. Aphrodite is of course Freyja, whom she much resembles, and the favoured knight is the summer. M. Georges Perrot, who relates the story in the *Revue Archéologique* for 1860, professes himself unable to explain its origin. We shall be inclined to attribute to it a northern birth.

Mounted on Sleipnir, and equipped with sword and javelin, Odinn might often be heard on those northern shores riding to the chase or to the battle-field, and accompanied as he always was by his

Valkyriur,* who, like Mohammad's houris, choose out from the slain those who are worthy to live with them in Valhall, the abode of heroes. The description of these maidens in one Eddaic † poem leaves little doubt of their origin :

" Three troops of maidens,
Though one maid foremost rode,
Their horses shook themselves,
And from their manes there fell
Dew in the deep dales,
And on the high trees hail."

From which we may conclude that these Valkyriur were the clouds mounted upon their steeds, the winds.

It is worth while to pause a moment over these "cloud maidens," for they belong not to the northern mythology alone, but to every Aryan myth-system, and even to some which are not Aryan. Besides being "shield maidens," they are also "swan maidens"—that is, they have the power of changing themselves into swans. If these Valkyriur were the only mythological beings to whom this power was given, we should have no great difficulty in ascribing to this particular feature of the myth a very simple origin. We might suppose that the voices of wild swans, or of any wild sea-birds—for swan must originally have meant any bird that could *swim*—in giving intensity to the sound of the wind had given rise to the myth of the *swan maidens*. But this cannot be so, for the same notion runs through the whole Aryan mythic lore, and often without any connection with the wind. One of the earliest instances of this idea occurs in the story of Urvasi and Pururavas in the Yagur Veda. This story, without doubt the parent of Apuleius' well-known story of "Cupid and Psyche," as well as of the still more familiar "Beauty and the Beast," relates how an immortal woman falls in love with a mortal man, but makes it a condition of their union that he shall never see her against her will, or without her royal garments on. This condition he breaks, as Psyche disobeys Cupid, and he is thus for a long time separated from his bride. One day he chances to be wandering by a lake on which Urvasi and her companions are playing in the shape of birds.

"And Urvasi said, 'This is the man with whom I dwelt so long.' Then her friends said, 'Let us appear to him.' She agreed, and they appeared before him;"† and Urvasi and Pururavas are at length again united.

Mr. Max Müller gives us the best reasons for believing this to be a "dawn myth," wherein is portrayed the separation of the

* "The choosers of the elect," from *val* (Germ. *Wahl*) "choice," from which we get *valr* "a hero" (the same word which occurs in Valhall), and *kjosa* "to choose."

† "Helgakvitha Hjorvardssonar," ver. 28.

‡ Max Müller: "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. "Comparative Mythology."

twilight of dawn from the sun (which is feminine here), and their reunion at the end of day. I think, then, that by the birds upon the lake are meant the clouds at sunset, which often conceal the face of the sun.

Now, one of the Eddaic poems relates how a certain Völund, a mighty smith (the origin of our Wayland Smith), and his brothers find three Valkyriur bathing by a lake, who have left their swans' plumage on the shore. Völund and his brothers seize these swans' dresses, and by so doing compel the Valkyriur to become their wives. After a while, however, the swan maidens resume their birds' plumage and fly away, never to be seen again.

This story is reproduced in a modern Swedish popular tale,* in which the hero is set to watch at a certain spot, and, just before sunrise, three doves descend, and presently change into three beautiful maidens. In the story of the Six Swans in "Grimm," it will be remembered that their transformation takes place at *sunset*; so that both these stories retain a recollection of the old "dawn myth."

It is unnecessary to multiply stories in which the same idea appears, especially as the subject of swan maidens has already been treated, both by Mr. Baring Gould and Dr. Dasent. Two instances, however, are worth mention. One, an Irish legend, in which, instead of birds, we have mermaids transformed into seals, shows how the character of a tale gets more or less altered as the people to whom it belongs sooner or later left their old Aryan home; and the second, a Persian folk-tale,† wherein a merchant constrains a Peri by seizing her clothes while she is bathing, sufficiently shows the wide area over which this class of stories has spread.

As this myth is transformed in Christian times, Odinn appears as the Wild Huntsman, who is either a fiend or a damned human soul, or as the Wandering Jew, and the Valkyriur are turned into witches. In Saxo Grammaticus' account of Baldur and Hother (or Hödur) some wood maidens appear, who, though they partake most of the Valkyriur nature, are evidently in a transition state. There is one scene especially, where Hother meets them in a forest-cave, and they advise him how he may kill Baldur, if he obtain the food made from the spittle of serpents, which reminds us strangely of the witches' caldron in "Macbeth." It is curious to reflect on the metamorphosis which has changed beautiful warrior-maidens, who scatter from their horses' manes "dew in the deep dales, and on the high trees hail," into old hags riding to the Witches' Sabbath on broomsticks. It is not unlike that

* Thorpe's Yuletide Stories: "The palace east of the sun, and north of the earth."

† Behar-Dancoosh of Ynayet-Allah, ch. xx. Translated by Scott.

which has created the hideous *Ogre* of our nursery tales out of the metaphor of *rapax Orcus*, such as we find it in Horace's lines:—

"Nulla tamen certior
Rapacis Orci fine destinata
Aula divitem manet,
Hærem."

When a bird occurs in the Eddas the wind is generally meant. The northerns imagined the wind to be caused by a giant called Hraesvelgr* (corpse-devourer), who sits at heaven's end in eagle plumage. We may compare with this notion the likeness between the words *aquila* and *aquilo*, "the north wind."† The name of the giant shows the sad experience these sea-faring people had of the effects of the wind, and the Sirens may, I think, be most reasonably interpreted in the same way; so that their enticing music is the soft sighing of the wind, so often the prelude to a storm.

This Hraesvelgr seems to reappear under another name in the myth of Idun and Thiassi. Thiassi (whose name cannot be satisfactorily cleared up) carries off Idun by the help of Loki. Then Loki is threatened by the gods with death unless he bring her back again. So he borrows Freyja's falcon-plumage, and flies to Thrymheim (thunder-home) Thiassi's abode. He finds Thiassi away and Idun at home. Then he changes Idun into the form of a nut, and flies back with her, closely pursued by Thiassi. As, however, the giant comes close to Asgard, the gods kindle a great fire, into which he falls and is burnt. Idun, whose name comes from the root *id*, "again," with a feminine termination, means the return of the year or of the spring. Thiassi is the winter, or perhaps especially the *autumn* wind, as this is the most thunderous; and Loki must be the warm south wind which is at first in league with autumn to dry up the grass, but afterwards brings back the green again in spring.

These are the principal wind myths in the northern system; and if I have dwelt on them at some length, it was both because many of them may be unfamiliar to the reader, and because the north is the peculiar home of this kind of myth. In the other great Aryan myth-system, the Greek, they fill a less conspicuous place, and require less attention. An article on wind myths would, however, be incomplete without some consideration of the character of Hermes. Hermes has often been called an earth god; but I do not know any good reason for this supposition. The etymological signification of his name is similar to that of Odinn's,‡ and I think a great part of his nature may be explained on the

* *Yafthrôdnismál*, 37.

† The common root *ac* (cf. Greek *ἀκός*), is surely not a sufficient explanation of this resemblance.

‡ Hermes from *ὀρμίζω*, "to move" (violently); Odinn from *vadha* (pret. *vodh* or *odh*), "to go" (rapidly).

theory that he is a wind god. His stealing the cattle of Apollo, which are of course the clouds, and his invention of the lyre, are the strongest instances, and have already received their proper explanation at the hands of mythologists. His title of Argeiphontes, a word which, as Welcker * reminds us, means not only the slayer of Argos (the night), but also "the bright shining one," of course points him out as the bringer-on of day. But this is quite consistent with his being a wind or air god, as the close connection between *ἥως* and *ἄηρα* and between *aurora* and *aura*, abundantly testifies. He is, in fact, the breeze which ushers in the day, and, by an extension of ideas, he may also be the breeze which accompanies the sunset.† This gives him his first relationship with the under or outer world, the abode of spirits, a relationship which is strengthened by the connection which our ancestors fancied between the soul and the breath, and to which all languages bear witness.‡


These considerations may help us to understand his three possessions, which have their exact counterparts with Odinn. For Odinn and his representatives in the folk-tales often travel with a staff having magic powers, such as are possessed by the staff of Hermes; the hat or *petasos* belongs, as has been said, to the same class as the mantle of Odinn; while the ankle-wings or sandals of the Greek god correspond to the horse Sleipnir, but of course more closely to the seven-leagued boots of the folk-tales. All are the proper attributes of a god who is the wind not only in its concrete sense, that is, not only as some particular wind, but also in something of an abstract sense as of air in motion, and thus shows some of the characteristics of a pantheist's god.

C. F. KEARY.

* "Griechische Götterlehre," vol. i. p. 336.

† The winds which blow over the *Ægean* are remarkable for their regularity. Every morning a breeze arises from the coasts of Thrace, and blows all day southward. At evening it goes down, and for a while the sea is calm; then almost imperceptibly a gentle wind springs up from the south. *Vide* Curtius "Griech. Geschichte," *ad init.*

‡ Mr. Herbert Spencer sees in this connection of ideas one origin of the belief in a soul. This is a metaphysical question which would require a very full discussion. I would suggest, however, that language never keeps pace with thought, but always attaches itself to the thought's material side. For instance, we need not suppose that our ancestors were entirely devoid of *ideas*, because they very likely called them—as we still do—"things seen."



THE TORY PARTY AND THE CATHOLICS.

THE political opinions of most public men are modified more or less by their views on religion. No doubt some appear to be very indifferent to such an influence, whilst others are constantly under its control. There are times, too, in our history, when the aggregate effect of this influence is hardly noticed, and other times when it is general and active. In Mr. Disraeli's last published writing—the Preface to his Collected Works—he says:—

“It cannot be denied that the aspect of the world and this country, to those who have faith in the spiritual nature of man, is at this time dark and distressful. They listen to doubts, and even denials, of an active Providence; what is styled materialism is in the ascendant. To those who believe that an atheistical society, though it may be polished and amiable, involves the seeds of anarchy, the prospect is full of gloom.

“This disturbance in the mind of nations has been occasioned by two causes: first, by the powerful assault on the Divinity of the Semitic literature by the Germans; and, secondly, by recent discoveries of science, which are hastily supposed to be inconsistent with our long-received convictions as to the relations between the Creator and the created.”

He has also announced his conviction that a great contest is impending between ecclesiastical influences on the one hand, and hard secularism on the other, and that theological politics will occupy a prominent place in the immediate future.

From Mr. Gladstone's recent writings, and especially from the prefatory letter in which he introduced to the British public a few days ago M. Emile de Lavelaye's elaborate denunciation of the

Catholics and covert attack on the Anglican Church, it is clear that he concurs in the latter statement of the Prime Minister, and a glance abroad shows that there is nothing very exceptional in English politicians thinking so. The present time therefore may not be inopportune for attempting to note some facts bearing on the relations of one of the religious bodies of the empire—the Catholics—to the two great political parties—the Liberals and the Conservatives.

In addition to any abstract speculations on this subject of a mere student of history, there are some practical considerations involved in it. England is governed by party. The strength and security of the nation may possibly turn on the safety with which the foremost statesmen at either side may be able to truly estimate the relative force of political parties. It might be a national calamity if, at some great crisis, a miscalculation occurred which, by embarrassing the leaders of the country, interfered with a prompt and firm decision.

Another practical consideration, of more immediate interest, is that the question seems to throw some light upon the causes that determine the rise and fall of religious animosity in Ireland. Any attempt to expose the source of that long-existing evil, and to check it, may be excused—even though the effort be made by one who is not now mixed up in the struggles of party, and who has no longer the slightest pretensions to speak with the authority of a politician.

The history of the Catholics, in relation to the two great parties in this country, is but little known. Indeed, the ignorance of those more immediately concerned in the question is remarkable, and has led to many misconceptions.

The origin of our political parties has been traced to the Great Rebellion. That the Catholics should have fought for Charles I., and supported the Church of England against the Puritans, is not surprising. The faith that is associated with loyalty to the crown, and an aversion to Puritanical tenets, compelled them to do so. But it was not merely a theoretical question.

"At that period," says the highest living authority on political parties, "there was a Parliament in Dublin, called by a Protestant King, presided over by a Protestant Viceroy, and at that moment there was a Protestant Established Church in Ireland; yet the majority of the members of that Parliament were Roman Catholics. The government was at that time carried on by a Council of State, presided over by a Protestant Deputy; yet many of the members of that Council were Roman Catholics. The municipalities were then full of Roman Catholics. Several of the sheriffs also were Roman Catholics, and a very considerable number of magistrates were Roman Catholics. . . . The King of England, through Glamorgan, entered into a treaty for the settlement of Ireland with the Convention of Kilkenny, in the secret articles of which were laid down the principles upon which the pacification of Ireland was then to

take place. The secret articles of that treaty were merely that the Roman Catholics should enjoy the same civil and political equality which they had done previously to the breaking out of the Civil War, viz., that they should not be called to take the oaths of supremacy; and, with reference to the Protestant Church, that there should be a recognized equality between the two Churches. These were the articles which Charles I., by his word of honour, ratified.*

When Cromwell had upset the throne, and disendowed and disestablished the Church of England, the Royal standard was still kept flying by the Irish Catholics. Even after the scenes of Drogheda and Wexford, and the Catholic army of the King had been scattered, there were still numerous bands of loyal men, who never submitted to the rule of the Puritan Government, and who maintained a guerilla warfare till the Restoration. In the wood and mountain fastnesses of the south and west, these loyalists still fought to the Irish cry of "Tor Re," "Up for the King."

Dr. Lingard says:—

"It was during the reign of Charles II., that the appellations of Whig and Tory became permanently affixed to the two great political parties. The first had long been given to the Covenanters in the west of Scotland, and was supposed to convey a charge of seditious and antimonarchical principles. The second originally designated those natives of Ireland who had been deprived of their estates, and was employed to intimate a secret leaning towards Popery and despotism."

He adds that in a short time each party willingly adopted its respective appellation.

That most interesting contemporary record, Grey's Reports of Debates in the House of Commons during the reign of Charles II., shows that the Puritan Parliament was constantly quarrelling with the King on account of his attempt to protect the Catholics. Indeed, no period of English history has been so misrepresented as the reign of Charles II.: even Catholic writers have blindly copied the Whig calumnies against the King. A reference, however, to the authentic and original documents of his reign, establishes beyond doubt that he is not open to the charge of political ingratitude. He, and the Tory party of the day, in their attempts to serve the Catholics, had to encounter a zealous Puritan majority in the House of Commons.

When, in the following reign, the Whigs succeeded in substituting a foreign sovereign for an English king, the ancient Royal standard again sought refuge in Ireland, and under it Sarsfield defeated the Whig usurper at Limerick, and exacted highly favourable terms for his country and religion.

To the credit of the Tories it is to be said that, though almost destroyed as a political party, they protested against the deliberate violation by the triumphant Whigs of the Treaty of Limerick. In

* Mr. Disraeli's speeches, specially corrected by himself, p. 31.

the reign of Anne, Bolingbroke and Oxford were friendly to the Catholics, and were abused by the Whig pamphleteers for their tolerant policy. One of the Catholic writers on this period and that of the early Georges says:—

“Of the two parties the Whigs were the most implacable enemies of the Catholics; the enmity of the Irish Whigs proceeded from a consciousness of injustice and a dread of retaliation; that of the English was the result of a spirit of freedom and ill-judged patriotism. They cherished liberty as the first of blessings. They abhorred Popery as the parent of servile and passive obedience, and viewed Ireland as the rival and competitor of England. To extirpate the one and keep down the other became a principal object of the policy of the Whig administration under George I. The annals of this reign are stained by frequent persecutions of the Catholic gentry and clergy, by disgraceful additions to the code, by iniquitous decisions of the courts of law, by unconstitutional encroachments on the charter of Irish independence, and by the frequent recurrence of famine.” *

Year after year, during the long tenure of power by the Whigs, laws were passed “for the further suppression of the growth of Popery.” The Act of 1709, which publishes a scale of rewards for the detection of Popish bishops, priests, or schoolmasters, and made it unlawful for a Catholic to sit on a jury, was passed at the instance of the Whig Lord-Lieutenant, the Earl of Wharton, a man whom Swift describes as “a Presbyterian in politics and an atheist in religion.”

In the next generation the free-thinking Lord Chesterfield, so often lauded as a Liberal politician, insensible to prejudices, and described, even in our day, as a model Whig Lord-Lieutenant, in his speech to the Irish Parliament, urged an extension of the Wharton Acts, and suggested, “whether nothing further can be done, either by new laws, or the more effectual execution of those in being, to secure the nation against the great number of Papists, whose speculative errors would only deserve pity, if their pernicious influence on civil society did not both require and authorize restraint.”

Speculative errors unworthy of notice if their pernicious influence on civil society did not authorize retaliation from the State! Lord Chesterfield is certainly not the last Liberal statesman who has said this.

How strange it is that the words of the insincere freethinker of the last century should find so faithful an echo in the utterances of one of the most sincere and religiously-minded statesmen of to-day! But beyond the fact that both were leading Liberals, it is difficult to see anything in common between the author of the famous “Letters to his Son,” and the author of the “Expostulation.”

It must give sincere satisfaction to every Catholic student of

* O'Connor's “History of the Irish Catholics,” p. 188.

history to note that the intolerant advice of the Liberal Governor of Ireland was rejected, owing to the arguments and votes of the Bishops of the Anglican Church. Dr. Smiles says :—

“The Earl of Limerick, in 1746, adopted Lord Chesterfield’s idea of keeping down the Catholic religion, and he brought in a Bill which struck at its very root. The introduction of this Bill caused a general consternation throughout Ireland. The bench of Bishops, however, strongly resisted it; the Primate opposed it on the third reading in an eloquent speech; three Archbishops and nine Bishops voted against the measure, and it was rejected by a majority of two!”

Nor was this the only instance in which the Christian spirit of the Irish Protestant Bishops tended to defeat or mitigate the Penal Code. The journals of the Irish House of Lords show that, over and over again, the Prelates of the Anglican Church interposed between their oppressed countrymen and the Whig philosophy that kept forging fresh chains for the Catholics. Those who, a few years ago, drove their successors from the House of Lords, did not choose to remember these facts. On the contrary, indeed, groundless historical calumnies were used to compass the needless insult.

Soon after the accession of George III., says Mr. Charles Butler, began the first indication of a tolerant or friendly feeling in high quarters for the Catholics. Lord Bute and his colleagues had many private friends amongst the Catholic gentry. They lost no opportunity of discouraging the vexatious application of the Penal Laws. Macaulay thus refers to Lord Bute’s administration:—

“A new system of Government came into full operation. For the first time since the accession of the House of Hanover, the Tory party was in the ascendant. The Prime Minister was a Tory. Lord Egremont, who had succeeded Pitt as Secretary of State, was a Tory and the son of a Tory. Sir Francis Dashwood was a Tory, and had been a Jacobite. The Royal household was filled with men, whose favourite toast a few years before had been ‘The King over the water.’”

The Conservative administrations that succeeded Lord Bute’s maintained, without much public notice, the same satisfactory relations with the Catholics, until at length a parliamentary incident of great moment occurred which aroused the keenest party spirit on a Catholic question. Though it was the real prelude to emancipation, it has almost escaped attention, and is little known except to those who choose to study for themselves the parliamentary history of the country. A century ago a Tory minister succeeded in passing through Parliament a measure for securing tithes to the Roman Catholic clergy in Canada, and, in fact, for establishing by law the Roman Catholic religion in that part of the British Empire. This measure was vigorously opposed by Mr. Fox, Mr. Thomas Townsend, Colonel Barré, Mr. Serjeant

Glynn, and the other leading Liberals of the day. The Liberal arguments that were then used against Lord North's Bill appear to be based on the same principle that animates the recent "Expostulation;" and even the violent language of the Liberals of 1774 is now reproduced occasionally by the Liberal member for Peterborough. Mr. Fox strenuously "objected to the provision for securing tithes to the Romish clergy." Throughout the debates he always spoke of "the Romish clergy." Mr. Thomas Townsend, who has been described as a model Liberal and a rising hope of the Liberal party of that day, said:—

"He could not but allow that the noble lord had an amazing foresight in ordering, above all days in the year, the 10th of June for the finishing of a Bill to establish Popery. He said the day was truly characteristic to the business, and he made no doubt but the noble lord and his party would come to the House with white roses* in their breasts."

Colonel Barré said:—

"By this Act you establish the Roman Catholic religion where it never was established before, and you only permit the practice of your own.' He said the Bill had originated with the Lords, who were the Romish priests that would give his Majesty absolution for breaking his promise. He was certain, by the noble lord (Lord North) and his dependents' proceedings, that after their death people might say, as they did after the death of King Charles: 'that by papers found in their closets, they appeared to have died in the Roman Catholic belief.'"

Serjeant Glynn wound up a long attack on the Bill and its Tory promoters by saying:—

"The 10th of June, 1774, would be handed down to posterity as a day when the members of a British House of Commons preferred Popery and French laws to the established religion and the laws of their own country."

The Bill, however, passed the House of Commons by a majority of 76. The division was a strictly party one, none but Tories voting for the Catholics, and none but Liberals against them, the tellers for the Liberals being Mr. Fox and Mr. Thomas Townsend. In the other House of Parliament, the great Whig, Lord Chatham, was as decided in his opposition to the Bill as his lieutenants

* The present Lord Halifax, when in the House of Commons, about twelve years ago, asked a Tory Catholic, on the 10th of June, why he wore, on that particular day only, a white rose in his button-hole; adding, "My gardener in the North of England always speaks of bringing out the white roses for the 10th of June. What is there peculiar about the date?" The Tory M.P. explained that it was the birthday of King James III.; and he reminded the Cabinet minister of Lord Chesterfield's oft-quoted impromptu to the Catholic lady who attended the Drawing Room at the Castle in 1745, with an orange lily hypocritically displayed on her bosom:—

"Say, lovely Tory, where's the jest
Of wearing orange on thy breast,
When that breast upheaving shows
The whiteness of the rebel rose?"

in the Lower House. His concluding sentences, as reported in the Parliamentary history of the time, are as follows:—

“He exposed the train of fatal mischiefs attending the establishment of Popery and arbitrary power in that vast and fertile region now annexed to Quebec. He deduced the whole series of laws from the supremacy first revindicated under Henry VIII. down to this day as fundamentals constituting a clear compact that all establishments by law are to be Protestant. He further maintained that the dangerous innovations of this Bill were at variance with all the safeguards and barriers against the return of Popery and of Popish influence so wisely provided against by all the oaths of office and of trust from the constable up to the members of both Houses, and even to the Sovereign in his coronation oath. He pathetically expressed his fears that it might shake the affections and confidence of his Majesty’s Protestant subjects in England and Ireland, and finally lose the hearts of all his Majesty’s American subjects.”

A member of the Tory Administration, Lord Lyttelton, in replying to the great Whig, argued (as he might to-day against the “Expostulation”), “To oblige Catholics to deny the supremacy of the Pope, was to compel them forcibly to abjure their religion.” The contrast between the Liberals and the Tories was not confined to their arguments and votes. Their very language was characteristic. Mr. Fox, Colonel Barré, Mr. Dunning, Mr. Townsend, and the other Liberals, spoke of “Romish clergy,” “Romanists,” and “Popery;” Lord North, Lord Lyttelton, and the Tories, spoke of “Catholics” or of “Roman Catholics.” The good effect of those debates and of the Canada Act, was soon seen both abroad and at home.

“Protestant bigotry,” says an American writer in 1872, “probably lost us Canada, by the anti-Catholic manifesto issued by the colonial Congress of 1774.” This is, however, a very limited view of the subject. Perhaps the anti-Catholic attitude of the Republicans may have indirectly assisted in strengthening the fidelity of the Canadians, but it was undoubtedly to the natural alliance between the Tory principles of Lord North’s Government and the Conservative politics of the Catholics, whom he wisely befriended, that the result was really due. The principles of loyalty and religious reverence associated with the ancient faith saved Canada, and prevented any further disruption of our colonial empire a century ago.

But the preservation of what is to this day his finest province of the Queen’s colonial empire, was not the only result of Lord North’s wise legislation and conciliatory language. It was the prelude to the first legislative relaxation of the Penal Laws. In four years after the memorable debates of 1774, an Act was passed enabling Catholics to hold land. The only whisper of opposition came from a “Liberal” quarter. Other relaxations of the Whig code followed, and year by year the Catholics obtained relief till the termination of the Tory Government.

The short Liberal *régime* that followed, when the Whig patriots held office, was not fortunate for the Catholics either in England or Ireland.

Lord Charlemont and Mr. Flood re-echoed the language of the Liberals in England: the Roman Catholics were unfit for political power because of their arbitrary tenets, their principles of divine right, and their submission to ecclesiastical influence in civil society; a body that tamely yielded to such influences required and authorized restraint. The language of the Liberal patriots in 1782 was a repetition of the Liberal Lord-Lieutenant's speech of a preceding generation, and a curious foretaste of the language heard by the present generation from the Liberals of Germany and of England. A popular historian* thus describes the policy of the Liberal party during their temporary triumph ninety-three years ago:—

“The Whig Lord Charlemont was throughout the vehement opponent of the Catholic claims. The patriots saw not beyond themselves and their own interests. They were content still to keep the Catholics a slave class, holding them to be unfit for the enjoyment of freedom. All attempts to extend to them the exercise of the elective franchise were treated with contumely and scorn. The patriots still persevered in maintaining a disgraceful penal code, which imposed civil and political disabilities on the great mass of the people. Surely this was a narrow-minded and one-sided patriotism!”

Lord Stanhope, in his *Life of Pitt*, also says:—

“The Convention of the volunteers at Dublin had two contending leaders: first, the Earl of Charlemont, and, secondly, the Earl of Bristol, who was also Bishop of Derry. This prelate was son of the famous Lord Hervey, in the days of George II., and a singular character, recalling the feudal bishops of the Middle Ages. He proposed to the volunteers that in the new Reform Bill which they were seeking to frame, the franchise should be granted to Roman Catholics. To this proposal Lord Charlemont gave his decided opposition, and by far the greater number of delegates sided with Lord Charlemont. Accordingly Flood, as their spokesman, brought forward, in the Irish House of Commons, a measure of reform for the benefit of Protestants only.”

With the return of the Tories to office in 1783, the hopes of the Catholics again revived. The contrast between Lord Chatham and his son, between the great Whig and the great Tory, is one of the favourite themes of modern historians. No part of that striking contrast is more remarkable than their respective attitude to the Catholics.

Those students of history who follow the growth of Mr. Pitt's sentiments respecting the Catholics, from his own account of his interviews with the Abbé de Lagaard, in the palace of the Archbishop of Rheims, in 1783, to the indirect support (for they had no

* Dr. Smiles' *History of Ireland*, p. 369.

votes themselves then) the Catholic leaders gave him in the decisive elections of 1784, and to the time when he applied to the Universities on the Continent for those authoritative expositions of Catholic principles with which he showed that his clients were the best friends of order and of a Conservative monarchy, cannot fail to see that it was no mere temporary expediency, but the sympathy of a natural alliance, that created and fostered his Catholic policy. When, in 1791, he carried that which Mr. Lecky truly describes as a far more important Emancipation Act than the one of 1827—the Act which gave the parliamentary franchise to the English Catholics—and when, in 1792, he intimated his intention of passing a similar Reform Bill for Ireland, which in the following year he accomplished, in spite of the Whig cry that “the minister was destroying the ascendancy established in 1688,” at that time ample justice was done to his high motives by the Catholics both of England and Ireland, who had direct conferences with him, and who witnessed his successful labours on their behalf. It was left to the following generation to find Catholics who could attempt to underrate and misrepresent his policy.

“Mr. Pitt,” says Mr. Charles Butler, the secretary of the Catholic Association of the last century, “watched over the Catholic Relief Bill of 1791, during its passage through the House, with the greatest assiduity: sometimes by energy, sometimes by conciliation, he removed the obstacles which opposed it; and he unfeignedly participated in the joy of the Catholics at its ultimate success. For this they were indebted to none more than to him.”

The language of O’Connell, written half a century after the event, and when the Catholics were in alliance with Whigs and Liberals, is different:—

“It should be recollected that these concessions were made more in fear than in friendship. The revolutionary war was about to commence, the flames of republicanism had spread far and near. It was eagerly caught up amongst the Protestant, and especially among the Presbyterian, population of the North of Ireland. Belfast was its warmest focus; it was the deep interest of the British Government to detach the wealth and intelligence of the Catholics of Ireland from the republican party. This policy was adopted. The Catholics were conciliated. The Catholic nobility, gentry, mercantile, and other educated classes, almost to a man, separated from the republican party.” *

That it was not fear that actuated Pitt in making the concessions which O’Connell says conciliated the Catholics, and separated them from the republicans, is evident from the fact that at the very time he was maturing and carrying his plans of emancipation, he was refusing to repeal the Test Act that pressed only on the Protestant Dissenters. The latter constituted a formidable body. Yet in 1790 he opposed Fox’s Bill for their relief; and

* O’Connell’s “Memoir of Ireland,” p. 24.

in his successful opposition to it, he was supported by Burke and Wilberforce. When he was able to give the elective franchise to the Catholics by an overwhelming majority, he was able to defeat the repeal of the Test Act by a majority of three to one. He repeated in substance the argument he had used in 1787:—

“There are some Protestant Dissenters who declare that ‘the Church of England is a relic of Popery;’ others that ‘all Church establishments are improper.’ This may not be the opinion of the present body of Dissenters, but no means can be devised of admitting the moderate part and excluding the violent: the bulwark must be kept up against all.”

He treated with indifference the taunt that he was pushing the Catholics ahead of the Protestant Dissenters. Thirty-six years afterwards a similar debate, with almost identical language, occurred. The successor of Mr. Fox, Lord John Russell, moved, and this time successfully, to repeal the Test Act. He carefully explained that his Bill relieved only the Protestant Dissenters, and did nothing for the Roman Catholics; whereupon two leading Conservatives, Mr. Huskisson and Lord Palmerston (the latter did not join the Whigs till five years subsequently) declared their opposition to Lord John Russell’s scheme, on the ground that he was “unfairly running the Dissenters ahead of the Catholics in the race for toleration.” Nor is it quite accurate to say that Pitt’s emancipation measures separated the Catholics from the republican party. They had never joined that party. Pitt knew the truth of Montesquieu’s aphorism, “The Catholic religion is best suited to a monarchy.”

That Pitt was really moved by his genuine friendship for a body with whom he had an intense community of political sentiment, can be seen by his own letters and his speeches, as well as by the letters of contemporary Catholics. A striking proof of this is likewise to be found in the ascendancy tone of the patriots who opposed his Catholic Relief Bill.

The Liberals of Dublin who, under Flood and Charlemont, nine years before had raised the cry of “Protestant ascendancy in danger!” addressed their Liberal representatives, Henry Grattan and Lord Henry Fitzgerald, against the contemplated extension to Ireland of Pitt’s Act for giving votes to the Catholics. They said:—

“We entreat of you, our representatives, that you will oppose with all your influence and great abilities any alteration that may tend to shake the security of property in this kingdom, or subvert the Protestant ascendancy in our happy constitution.”

To that address of the turbulent and intolerant “patriots” of Dublin Grattan replied:—

“MY LORD MAYOR AND GENTLEMEN,—Whatever attack has been made on your ascendancy has proceeded from your ministers.

"The Roman Catholics, whom I love, and the Protestants, whom I prefer, are both, I hope, too enlightened to renew religious animosity.

"I do not hesitate to say I love the Roman Catholic—I am a friend to his liberty—but it is only inasmuch as his liberty is entirely consistent with your ascendancy, and an addition to the strength of the Protestant community.

"These being my principles, and the Protestant interest my first object, you may judge that I shall never assent to any measure tending to shake the security of property in this kingdom, or to subvert the Protestant ascendancy.

"(Signed) HENRY GRATTAN."

Looking back upon the past, Catholics can readily pardon the Floods and Charlemonts, and the convention of Patriot-Liberals who struggled in vain against the emancipation policy of Pitt. They acted honestly, and in accordance with their life-long principles and the true principles of their party. But it is difficult for an Irishman to forgive the intolerant Liberals who induced Henry Grattan to leave upon his reputation the stain of signing that answer to the address of 1792. In using such language, Lucas, Flood, and Charlemont in Ireland, and the Revolution Liberals in England, were perfectly sincere. But was Grattan sincere? He was right when he said that the only attack that had come upon religious ascendancy had been made by the King's minister. Did he not in his heart approve of that attack? In fact, he separated from the "Liberal Patriots" on the subject, and supported Pitt's scheme; and in a few years the most scathing sentences that were heard in Parliament fell from his lips as he denounced "religious ascendancy."

The first general election in Ireland after Pitt's Emancipation Act of 1793 showed that a vast political power had been recalled to life. Face to face with the strength of Catholic votes, the anti-Catholic tone of the Whigs began to alter.

Pitt's subsequent plan of the Union, accompanied by the admission of Catholics to Parliament, and the restoration of a portion of Church property to the Catholic clergy, has been described by Lord Macaulay as the most beneficent scheme that any English minister ever devised for Ireland. The Premier, who seemed to care for nothing in this world except political power, and the honourable fame that follows the faithful discharge of official duty, broke up his Cabinet and resigned when the King refused to allow him to complete emancipation and establish concurrent endowment. Forced, after a few years, to return to office by the grave disasters that seemed to threaten England, he died before the brief tenure of his second administration enabled him to influence the King.

The most successful party organizer that the Conservatives of England have ever known has pointed out that the mediocrities

who succeeded Pitt had no claim to be called Tories. Between the triumphant Tory party of our day and the Tories of the beginning of the century, there is a long interval, filled partly with an administration of incapables, and partly with a reign of active and distinguished Liberals. For a brief interval, when Canning (an ally of the Catholics) came upon the scene, there was a return to Tory principles. This year Mr. Disraeli has republished the remarkable Preface he wrote in 1870 to his *Collected Works*. He therein announces that "*Coningsby*" contains the true programme of Toryism, and that it sets forth the real origin and condition of political parties.

The sentences in which the present Premier deals with these topics are amongst the most remarkable and instructive that he has ever written :—

"If we survey the tenor of the policy of the Liverpool Cabinet during the latter moiety of its continuance, we shall find its characteristic to be a partial recurrence to those frank principles of government which Mr. Pitt had revived during the latter part of the last century from precedents that had been set us, either in practice or in dogma, during its earlier period, by statesmen who then not only bore the title, but professed the opinions of Tories. Exclusive principles in the constitution, and restrictive principles in commerce, have grown up together; and have really nothing in common with the ancient character of our political settlement, or the manners and customs of the English people. Confidence in the loyalty of the nation, testified by munificent grants of rights and franchises, and favour to an expansive system of traffic, were distinctive qualities of the English sovereignty, until the House of Commons usurped the better portion of its prerogatives. A widening of our electoral scheme, great facilities to commerce, and the rescue of our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects from the Puritanic yoke, from fetters which have been fastened on them by English Parliaments in spite of the protests and exertions of English sovereigns; these were the three great elements and fundamental truths of the real Pitt system, a system founded on the traditions of our monarchy, and caught from the writings, the speeches, the counsels of those who, for the sake of these and analogous benefits, had ever been anxious that the sovereign of England should never be degraded into the position of a Venetian Doge.

"It is in the plunder of the Church that we must seek for the primary cause of our political exclusion, and our commercial restraint. That unhallowed booty created a factitious aristocracy, ever fearful that they might be called upon to regorge their sacrilegious spoil. To prevent this they took refuge in political religionism, and, paltering with the disturbed consciences or the pious fantasies of a portion of the people, they organized them into religious sects. These became the unconscious Prætorians of their ill-gotten domains. At the head of these religionists, they have continued ever since to govern, or powerfully to influence this country. They have in that time pulled down thrones and churches, changed dynasties, abrogated and remodelled parliaments; they have disfranchised Scotland, and confiscated Ireland. One may admire the vigour and consistency of the Whig party, and recognize in their career that unity of purpose that can only spring from a great principle; but the Whigs introduced sectarian religion, sectarian religion led to political exclusion, and political exclusion was soon accompanied by commercial restraint."

It is not surprising that under the administration of such pseudo-Tories as Percival and Peel, the Catholics of the United Kingdom should have separated from the Conservative party; though it is difficult to understand how at any time they could have committed the folly of guiding their conduct by the most pronounced principles of Liberalism. As long as the Tory party was broken up or disorganized, there was an obvious excuse for many of the errors of Catholic politicians. But giving them the benefit of every excuse, it is still evident that the temporary and unnatural alliance between the Liberal party and the Catholic party has compromised the principles of the one, and the religious interests of the other. How different it has been in other countries!

In the United States of America, the political party that seems to be most influenced by Conservative principles receives the support of the Catholics. So it is on the Continent of Europe. In France, in Germany, in Belgium, in Holland, in Italy, wherever Liberals and Conservatives are found, the Catholic party as such works with the latter. Not many months ago one of the leading Republicans of the United States said:—

“Of course the Roman Catholic party supports the Democratic or Conservative party because they both favour religious education, and cherish in common certain old-world notions which we Liberals have repudiated.”

The recent triumph of the Democratic party was to a great extent secured by the cordial union, for such objects, of the Episcopal Protestants and the Catholics from Boston to New Orleans.

More than thirty years ago the Catholic party in France and in Belgium gave religious education the foremost place in the political programme. They worked side by side with M. Guizot and the orthodox Protestants of France, and with the Conservative Protestants of Belgium. They have not failed. The Conservative reaction in Western Europe, that the Liberals so much deplore, is taking a practical shape in the steady growth of religious education. The Liberals of Belgium are in despair at their failure to permanently establish secular seminaries. Mr. Gladstone's literary protégé, M. de Lavelaye, in his sweeping attack on the Conservative reaction of his own country and of France, shuts his eyes to the fact that it is a reaction coincident with the greatest commercial and material prosperity. Belgium never was so prosperous. The rapid recovery of France alarms the Liberals of Germany. The Bishop of Orleans is justified in saying that the Bill for the Liberty of Superior Teaching, which has now passed its third reading in the French Chamber, is the most truly Conservative measure of his time. M. Laboulaye congratulates the Church that in future the consciences of her children cannot be threatened by irreligious education.

The Conservative reaction that is doing so much for religious

education is not confined to the United States or to the Continent of Europe. It has saved the remnant of religious education that was left in Great Britain. The powerful party of the Church of England, and the small but compact party of Catholics in England, made an open alliance on the 8th of April, 1870, in St. James's Hall, when the Duke of Norfolk and the Marquis of Salisbury, the Duke of Northumberland and the Chairman of the Catholic School Committee, Lord Sandon, Mr. Beresford Hope, and a crowded meeting of the leaders of both Churches, assembled in support of religious education. They voted together at the Parliamentary elections in 1874, and they can now be seen every week assisting each other most cordially at the School Boards. Hence they have checked the secular policy of the Liberals. But if the Catholic prelates of the United States, of France, of Belgium, of England, have some cause to be satisfied with the present state of future prospects of the education question, what is to be said of the Catholic prelates of Ireland?

For a quarter of a century and more, the Irish Catholic prelates have actually wielded political power. During all that time they never ceased to dwell, either in pastorals to their flocks or in petitions to Parliament, on the one great necessity that the Catholics of Ireland required—Religious Education.

They described the paramount object to be achieved in terms identical with those used years ago by Cardinal Wiseman and Father Newman, and so often employed by the American, French, and Belgian bishops. But though they professed to have the same object, they endeavoured to accomplish it by entirely opposite means. With one or two exceptions, the Catholic bishops of Ireland united themselves openly with the great Liberal party. The invaluable services of the Tory Father Newman were dispensed with by the Episcopal Board of the Catholic University. Cardinal Wiseman's published letters, in support of the Conservative party, at a general election, were denounced as an undue interference with the Liberal policy of the Irish prelates.

When the Rev. Justin McCarthy, the parish priest of Mallow, proposed Mr. Longfield, a Protestant Conservative, and succeeded in securing for him the representation of that borough in 1859, he was likewise taunted with opposing the Liberal policy of Dr. Cullen and the majority of the Irish bishops, whereupon the parish priest observed:—

“I am proud, however, to be able to reply that the course I have struck out for myself has the sanction of the highest and most venerated authority in the Catholic Church.”

But neither the authority of the Pope, nor the intellectual supremacy of a Wiseman or a Newman, nor the respectful remon-

stances of many independent parish priests, could induce the majority of the Irish prelates to break with the Liberal party. In such matters they preferred their own authority and their own wisdom. With what result? With the result of keeping the Liberals in office for many years, and, at the same time, of utterly failing to accomplish one single iota of their own religious education programme. No wonder that a Catholic prelate should have recently said :—

“We began our alliance with the Liberals before the Queen’s Colleges were established, with their unanimous support and that of the Peelites; when the alliance was at its height, the model schools were established by them; and now that the Liberals have broken with us, we find ourselves worse off than when the partnership commenced. In short, we have done everything for them, but they have done nothing for us!”

Though Catholic prelates, whose political influence has been persistently expended in promoting the cause of Liberalism, progress, and modern civilization, may have some reason to bemoan the result of their labours, there are in Ireland many Catholic Liberals who are at heart content with everything that has happened, except the change of Government last year. These are honest, intelligent gentlemen, whose religion exercises little or no influence on their political views, and who, by sincere conviction and sympathy, are members of the great Liberal party. They are not very numerous in the rural districts, but in the centres of influence, such as Dublin and Cork, they constitute a powerful section of what are called the educated Catholics. As politicians, they regard the organization of the Catholic Church very much as they do the organization of the Anglican Church. They object to ecclesiastical influences in State affairs. In the Stephen’s Green Club of Dublin some of these gentlemen may be heard enforcing Mr. Gladstone’s attack on Vaticanism. Indeed, Mr. Gladstone has received from such quarters much more sympathy than is generally supposed.

But it is sympathy not announced to the public. The Catholic party, as such, are indignant with Mr. Gladstone. They began by openly charging him with inconsistency and ingratitude. A little reflection, and the good example of the gentle words, but vigorous arguments, that have fallen from the Oratory at Birmingham, have done much to modify the angry tone. They have begun to discover that the charge of inconsistency rests rather on themselves than on Mr. Gladstone. They have recollected that he never lost an opportunity for the last twenty years of denouncing Vaticanism; and that his recent attacks upon the Syllabus and Encyclical were but somewhat more elaborate repetitions of his public utterances in 1868. They now remember that in October, 1868, when he was a candidate for their support,

he boldly proclaimed his views and policy about the Encyclical and Syllabus. It has also oozed out that, in 1870, when he was Prime Minister, he gave the Catholic prelates fair notice that it might be the duty of Liberal statesmen to adopt retaliatory measures if the dogma then under the consideration of the Church were adopted.

On the other hand, Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal party can truly say to the Catholics, "Why should you charge us with ingratitude? No doubt you kept us in office for many years, but did we not give you fair notice that nothing would induce us to yield to your religious education programme? We gave you plenty of places, more perhaps than you were entitled to, but did we not gratify you by secularizing Church property, and depriving the famous University of Dublin of its religious character?"

In fact, the more each side discusses the past, the more clearly a permanent divergence is seen between the Liberals and the real Catholic party. But it may be fairly questioned whether the numerical loss the Liberals may thus sustain will not be compensated for in another way. Since the disestablishment of the Church, Presbyterianism has become more powerful in Ireland. The future policy of the Liberal party, in endeavouring to secularize education in England and to destroy the English Church, meets with great favour from the Irish Presbyterians, and from that not inconsiderable section of the disestablished Church that is moving in the Presbyterian direction. In addition to these new recruits, the Liberal Catholics who remain with their party will always be men of intelligence and active political zeal.

But it must not be forgotten that there are economic considerations also affecting the relation of the two great parties to the Catholic population of Ireland. Of late years, the Liberal party have found themselves in a difficulty with their Irish contingent, on such questions as mail-packet subsidies, and grants for material improvements. The people of Ireland have taken very much to heart an instructive incident which occurred nearly thirty years ago.

The brilliant and accomplished Irish Protestant lawyer who now leads with genial tact the Irish Catholic party in the House of Commons has at least one historical claim on the gratitude of an agricultural population. Nearly thirty years ago he foretold that Manchester principles would be found to be inconsistent with the agricultural interests of Ireland. He earnestly supported Lord George Bentinck, Mr. Disraeli, and Lord John Manners in pointing out that Free Trade, unaccompanied by large and just compensations to the agricultural classes, meant the destruction of the Irish people. He quoted the grave admission of Sir Robert

Peel that, "if there were to be any part of the United Kingdom which was to suffer by the withdrawal of Protection, it would be Ireland;" and, as an Irishman, he bore testimony to the accuracy of Lord George Bentinck's famous prophecy: "If you pass these Free Trade measures, you deliberately ruin five hundred thousand small farmers in Ireland." No one denies it now. The five hundred thousand, with their families and their labourers, are gone. Free Trade, unrestricted and uncompensated for, was carried, and the tourist can see to-day in every country town, and by the road-sides, the evidences of Lord George Bentinck's prescience—broken gables, silent villages, half-a-million of moss-grown hearth-stones! He can contemplate the evidences of what is a thousand times worse than absentee landlords—an absentee tenantry! Mr. Butt can honourably boast that though the Liberal Irish members assisted in bringing this destruction to their country, he was not one of them. He was then a Conservative. The Catholics, to a man, voted against the agricultural interest. Every Liberal representative of Catholic electors went into the lobby with the Free Trade party, and assisted in sealing the fate of Ireland. Catholic electors influenced at that time far more than fifty votes in the House of Commons. That number could have turned the scale and saved the Irish farmers. If even the Catholic vote had been divided between the Manchester school and the agricultural party, the Free Traders would have been compelled to make a compromise by which certain reasonable compensations might have accompanied the measure—such compensations as would have mitigated, if not entirely prevented, the blow that fell upon the only real industry of Ireland.

When Mr. Butt, and other Conservatives of that day, urged the Catholic members to break with the Manchester school, at least on a question so vital to Ireland, they answered, "No, we are members of the Liberal party. At all hazards we shall stand by our party."

Not many months passed, and again Lord George Bentinck and Mr. Disraeli gave the Catholic members an opportunity of saving the Irish people. At the last supreme moment, when the famine was closing upon the land, the Conservative party proposed a vote of £16,000,000, to be spent on reproductive work in Ireland; a vote which would have enabled the people to purchase the food which, day by day, was being shipped from Ireland to England. It was the last chance of the poor. "I am a Protectionist," said Lord George Bentinck, "and I believe my first duty is to protect the lives of the people;" but he was answered, by the Liberal administration of the day, "Our principles are opposed to such schemes; we must act according to the rules of political economy;

we can make no exception in favour of Ireland." Again Irish Catholic members said;—"We are members of the Liberal party: at all risks we must keep the Liberals in office: we would not be sorry to see this money sent to Ireland, but Lord John Russell says the question is so serious that it amounts to a vote of confidence, and that he will resign if Lord George Bentinck's plan is carried; therefore we, as Liberals, must vote against the plan."

A generation has passed since the Irish Catholic leaders thus showed their devotion to the Liberal party. They have expended a good deal of energy in the intervening years, in agitating for denominational education for the lower classes, and a chartered Catholic University for the upper classes. How utterly trivial, from a National point of view, is all their agitation of later years, and their failures, compared with their conduct in 1846 and 1847!

Those who remember that period admit that the poor farmers themselves distrusted the Free Trade cry, and that it taxed all the energy of their lay and clerical leaders to get them to take the fatal step of supporting the Free Trade candidates at the elections. The Liberal agitators said to the Catholic farmers—"Your interests have nothing in common with the interests of the gentry. The landlords may be injured by Free Trade, but you will not be harmed. Vote against your landlords." The evil counsels of Liberalism prevailed—though not without some forebodings. The tradition is still preserved of how the farmers, in many county contests, went up in sullen silence to the poll to vote their own annihilation.

It is an instructive fact that some of the very men who were driven from Ireland across the Atlantic by Free Trade are to be found in the ranks of the successful Protectionists in the United States, and in Canada. In Australia, too, the Irish emigrants are active members of the Protectionist party. The president of the conference of Australian colonists, that repudiated a few years ago the economic theories of the Manchester school, was an Irishman. The remarkable and well-argued despatch, in which the conference announced to Lord Kimberley their resolve to maintain Protection, was from the pen of Sir Gavan Duffy.

But whatever lesson the history of the past may teach, as to the possible gain or loss of political parties, from the altered relations of the Catholics and Liberals, a far more important result than any mere party one can already be observed. It is a fact that religious animosity in Ireland has always been most bitter when the Catholics were ranged exclusively on one side. In 1859 there was a remarkable improvement in this respect.

At the general election of 1859 the Tories had a net gain of thirty seats, or sixty votes on a division. Sir James Graham, and other astute politicians of the time, attributed this entirely to the

effect of Catholic votes. The *Times*, in commenting on the result of one of the English contests, said:—"There is a further cause for the result, and in this instance a very potent one, the influence which the Roman Catholic clergy have throughout the whole of this election thrown into the scale of the Tories." When the party division took place on the vote of want of confidence in the Government, moved by the present leader of the Liberals, out of the hundred and one Irish members who voted, sixty-three went into the lobby with Mr. Disraeli and thirty-eight with Lord Hartington. But the mere party result of the Irish elections of 1859 is of little interest or importance compared to the social and national consequences of the good feeling that sprang up at the time between Protestants and Catholics. More than a dozen ultra-Catholic constituencies returned local Protestant Conservatives. The letter which the Bishop of Elphin published in the County of Roscommon, was a type of the sort of Catholic influence that assisted the Tory reaction. The contest for the second seat was between Mr. Goff, a Protestant Tory landlord, and Mr. Tenison, a Liberal landlord. The bishop said:—

"1. The clergy and I approve of the opinions and promises set forth in Mr. Goff's address.

"2. We think, however, that electors may vote either for him or Mr. Tenison consistently with the political and religious interests of the country.

"3. But where their landlord is decidedly against one of the two, we think the tenants should not oppose their landlord."

Mr. Goff was returned, and for some years there remained, as the result of a contest so conducted, a sympathy, and almost friendly union, between the Catholic tenants and the Protestant gentry. In another county a Catholic Tory was placed at the head of the poll by a combination which he thus described:—

"He pointed to his supporters. Instead of dividing, he had united parties. The memory of the oldest politician there could not carry him back to a day like the present, when the parish priest and the parson, the landlord and the tenant, fought side by side for the same candidate. He regarded this circumstance as the happiest in the contest."

For some years in that county, also, the social effect was felt, of a fair proportion of the Catholic priests and tenants having worked side by side in politics with the Protestant landlords.

No doubt the Tory Catholic party that was formed in 1859 was very inadequately represented in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, the support which its solitary representative gave to the Church of England against the attacks of the Dissenters and of some of his Liberal co-religionists—his votes on Church Rates, the Oxford University Bill, the Burials Bill, the Endowed Schools Bill, and the other measures in which the Liberals assailed ecclesi-

astical authority, attracted some attention, and may, perhaps, be said to mark a turning-point in the recent history of the Catholic party. But, however feebly the Conservative Catholics may have been represented in the House of Commons, they commanded high authority out of the House. Cardinal Wiseman was not only imbued with the Conservative principles of his Church, but he did not shrink, when necessary, from the arena of active politics. He openly exerted his electoral influence whenever it could be useful in favour of the Tories. In public and in private he expressed his sympathy with Mr. John Edward Wallis, the conductor of what was then a Catholic-Conservative journal, the *Tablet*. The great Oratorian taught then, what he has recently printed, that "Toryism—that is, loyalty to persons—springs immortal in the human breast;" and that it is possible to "unite what is free in the new structure of society with what is authoritative in the old, without any base compromise with Progress and Liberalism."* Cardinal Wiseman's example, and Father Newman's teachings, are not lost on the rising generation of Catholics. The premier Duke and hereditary Earl-Marshal of England is no longer in the ranks of the Liberals. From the highest to the lowest the change can be observed. Perhaps, in an attempt like the present to connect together a few historical incidents, it may not be out of place to note a significant fact: that three Prime Ministers of England since the Revolution of 1688, are at this moment represented by Catholic Tories. Sir Robert Walpole, the great Whig, who framed so many penal laws, is now represented by the Tory Catholic, Lord Orford. The present Lord Bute is a Tory Catholic; and so is the heir apparent to the title of Lord North.

As long as Catholics did not range themselves exclusively on one side or the other, religious bitterness appeared to be declining in Ireland.

In a few years, however, a great party cry was raised, and the Liberals managed to drag over the whole of the Irish Catholic body again to their side. Religious animosity became the order of the day. The present paper does not propose to deal with current controversies, but one cannot help remarking that the history of the agitation of 1868-69 is in itself an exposé of the strange hallucinations about Vaticanism, of which so much is heard now. The Catholics were arrayed in bitter hostility against the Protestants. This was done not for a Catholic object. It was not done in accordance with any suggestion from the Vatican; on the contrary, it was done in opposition to the principles of the Catholic Church and the declared wishes of the Vatican. Mr. Gladstone himself, with characteristic honesty and

* Dr. Newman's Letter to the Duke of Norfolk on Mr. Gladstone's "Expostulation," p. 72.

courage, did not conceal this then. In one of his speeches, previous to the general election at that time, he quoted from the authoritative Papal organ published in Rome the disapproval of his projected Church Disendowment in Ireland. Even some of his Liberal Catholic supporters openly boasted that on this subject they were acting in direct antagonism to the expressed sentiments of Rome. But the leading Catholic prelates in England and Ireland resolved, nevertheless, on the grave step of zealously supporting Mr. Gladstone and the Liberals in secularizing Church property. After his public announcement that Rome disapproved of his Irish Church scheme, and after his denunciation of the Encyclical and Syllabus, in 1868, these prelates still urged Catholic voters to support him as a "great Liberal statesman."

The event is too close on the present day for a student of history to venture to touch on the political consequences of that anti-Catholic policy. One result—that of intense religious bitterness—became at once evident. But, unhappily, religious animosity in Ireland means the antagonism of the two classes on whose cordial co-operation the real prosperity and, indeed, the whole National future of the country depends. As a rule the landlords belong to the Anglican Church, and the tenants to the Catholic Church. It is idle to talk of Irish prosperity or of National aspirations as long as those two classes are in hostile camps; and hence it is that religious animosity, which is an evil everywhere, is peculiarly destructive to Ireland.

Of late a change for the better has been noticed; and this change, as in 1859, is coincident with the breaking off of one set of Catholics from the ranks of the Liberal party, and at the same time with an open concurrence of opinion between some of the prelates of both Churches in reprobation of the leading features of the Liberal programme. The "powerful assault on the divinity of the Bible by the Germans," and the spirit of materialism, which seems to be guiding the Liberal party everywhere, have been encountered in almost identical arguments by Anglican and by Catholic bishops. But whatever may be the cause that brings them together—whether it be partly their resistance to the attack upon a common Christianity, or partly in consequence of the inevitable break-up of Catholic Liberalism—in any event, the result should not be regretted if it tends to establish a better feeling between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland. Such a result is infinitely more important than any mere question of gain or loss to the Conservative or Liberal parties.

POPE HENNESSY.



NOTES OF AN INDIAN JOURNEY.

III.

UMBALLA, *Dec. 25th.*—Christmas day. A long journey of some sixteen hours brought us, about 3 a.m., to this place, whither we had been bidden by the Commander-in-Chief, and where we found the most delightful tents ready to receive us. We passed Allygurh, and at Ghazeeabad left the East Indian system for that of the Scinde, Lahore, and Punjab line. Night fell there, and we continued our journey past Meerut, with its sinister memories of 1857, Mozuffernugger, and Saharunpore.

The country, as long as the light lasted, was of the same character as that through which we travelled from Cawnpore to Agra. Often we observed the good effects of irrigation; sometimes we saw land on which had fallen, as far as I could judge, the same calamity as that we had observed in Oudh—a Reh efflorescence on the surface of the soil, indicating the presence of chemical substances fatal to vegetation.

The most conspicuous plant of cultivation was the tall Urrah (*Cajanus Indicus*), now covered with its yellow leguminous flower, always a precarious crop so far north, as it cannot stand much frost, but very valuable when it does succeed.

Up very early to see the Himalayas; which, however, obstinately remained in the mist, and the only faint glimpse of them which I obtained was much later in the day, on the way to church. The church is handsome, very handsome if judged by an Indian standard, and filled with a large, chiefly military, congregation.

Dec. 26th.—Rode with the Commander-in-Chief round the cantonment, which he himself laid out some thirty years ago, and admirably laid out it is. These cities of villas, inhabited by Europeans, outside and often far away from the native cities of the same name, each villa standing in its park, or compound, as it is called, from, I believe, a Portuguese word having the same root as *coupon*, are one of the most curious features of India, and utterly unlike anything at home. This one is purely military, the small civil station being some miles off. We saw the general arrangement of the place, and stopped to go through as well a native hospital as the hospital of the rifle brigade. The latter seemed to be what it should, but I cannot say quite as much for the former; the rule that the native soldier should receive so much pay, and find himself in all things, producing rather questionable results when it is applied to hospital management. The subject, however, thanks to the peculiarities of native habits, is surrounded with difficulty.

During our ride, and later in the day, I had an opportunity of hearing Lord Napier's views on all the points in connection with the native army which we have heard most talked of in the last four weeks, and highly reassuring these views were, formed as they had been from a far wider survey of the whole subject than any to which we had listened.

Some interesting types presented themselves amongst the Commander-in-Chief's visitors to-day, as for instance, sons of Dost Mahommed; a Sikh landed proprietor; two Afghans who had sided with us in the war, and had done excellent service in the mutiny, &c., &c.

LAHORE, Dec. 31st.—We have been moving about so rapidly that I have had no time to write.

First I must tell you of Pattiala, whither we were invited by the Maharajah, who sent his carriages for us. On the way I caught a glimpse of the Indian jay, by far the most beautiful bird I have ever seen in a wild state. Then came, as we hurried at racing pace along the excellent road, the grand Serais built by the Moguls for the reception of travellers. One of these, that of Rajpooora, "firm as a fortress, with its fence of stone," stands close to the humble posting bungalow, and the still humbler railway station.

How curiously, I thought, would a voyager from another planet be apt to mistake the relative power of the people who raised these edifices!

At Rajpooora and other places we found officers of His Highness and bodies of horsemen, some of whom galloped on to convey the news of our coming from post to post.

About two miles from the capital the Maharajah met us, where-

upon we immediately left the carriage in which we were, and joined him. After some 300 yards we all got down again and entered the state carriage, in which we remained till we reached a point of the road at which some fifty elephants were drawn up on one side of the way, and a large number of led horses on the other. The elephants had gilded or silver-plated howdahs, and the led horses, beautiful animals, thoroughly conscious of their own beauty, were splendidly caparisoned.

Leaving the state carriage, I followed the Maharajah up a ladder into the howdah of his elephant, while my two companions ascended another, and the procession moved forwards. First came the standard of Pattiala, borne on a great elephant attended by two smaller ones; then followed a body of cavalry; next came the state carriage; then a company of musicians playing, and playing excellently well, Scotch airs on the bagpipe.

After these went men on foot in scarlet dresses and armed with silver spears, while the line was closed by the elephants in double column.

As we entered the town a salute was fired, and we passed on through streets and under housetops crowded with spectators.

As soon as we had got beyond the further gate, we came on two long lines of extremely smart-looking troops, horse and foot. These lined the way till we reached the gate of the "Pearl Garden," where, under a second salute, we descended from the "huge, earth-shaking beast," who did not particularly like the firing, though he behaved with great dignity. A man then advanced and presented us with bouquets of a very fragrant narcissus, near the jonquil, the Maharajah meantime taking my hand, and leading me along a row of fountains, and under the shade of oranges and loquats, to the door of the lovely little garden-house which he put at our disposal.

There, after a few moments, we were left to instal ourselves and to dine. As soon as dinner was over, we set forth to visit our entertainer at his great palace in the town. Stopping at the foot of a long flight of stairs, we ascended them into a wide open space, while the band played "God Save the Queen;" and the Maharajah, advancing to the door, led me into a magnificent hall, blazing with innumerable lights, and filled with people in gorgeous dresses. It was exactly the kind of thing a child imagines when it first hears of kings and courts. Sitting there in the centre of the durbar, we assisted at our first nautch, an entertainment with which, in the days of Runjeet Singh, even the greatest affairs of state used to be mingled. Only one of the performers was pretty; and as for propriety, the ceremony was grave enough to have been a religious service at the funeral of a bishop.

That over, there were fireworks with, of course, many admirable little bits of Rembrandt amidst the crowd.

This, however, was not all of Pattiala. Workshops, with steam machinery; an admirably managed gaol; a school, where I made the boys read Napier's account of the battle of Albuera, which they did very well; the state jewels; a court jester; a wrestling tournament, in which the knights who contended were elephants; and a long visit to the palace, which contains at least one room which might be the boudoir of the queen of the fairies—a room which is the *ne plus ultra* of all that exquisite artistic feeling can do with colour and gold—were only some of the other occupations and amusements which our thoughtful host had provided for his visitors from the West, who were only able to stay a few hours instead of the days for which his hospitable kindness would fain have detained them.

From Pattiala we transferred ourselves to Deyrah, between the Sewalik range and the outer Himalaya, having on the way back to Umballa much pleasant talk of Eastern Europe and Western Asia with Colonel M——, our companion in the Pattiala visit, who knew India as well as the Levant, and the Levant as well as India.

If you look to the north from any piece of open ground in Deyrah, you see what seems to be a little snow close to the top of the outer Himalaya. When you have looked a moment, you find out that it is not snow but white houses dotted about. Those houses are the sanitarium of Landour and Mussoorie.

We were bound for the first, and I was soon on the back of a charming little Arab, whose arm-chair canter was highly favourable to botanizing, and under the guidance of Dr. Brandis, the Inspector-General of Indian forests. Within the first four miles of our ride, he brushed away a fearful heresy which I cherished about the Neem; having four weeks ago—will you believe it?—been led by some corrupter of the true faith to confound *Melia Azadirachta* with *Melia Azedarach*. Then he confirmed my orthodox but hesitating opinions about the Sissoo, showed me *Cedrela Toona*, with its *Ailanthus*-looking leaf, and the soapnut *Sapindus emarginatus*, now yellow, like so many of our own trees in autumn. Then came *Bombax ceiba*, the silk-cotton tree, covered with its scarlet flowers, and *Rottlera tinctoria*, which furnishes an important dye, with much else.

As we drew near the base of the hills, our friend cried, "Now look to the left, and you will see your first Sâl forest. The young Sâl always takes that cylindrical shape." I looked, and saw what might have been to my bad eyes a Thuringian pinewood, so closely does the huge-leaved Sâl ape in its early stage the growth of needle-leaved trees. Soon we were on the Himalayan slope, and I had then to change my Arab for a mountain pony. Ere

long we heard a familiar sound which had not reached my ear since I heard, at Carolside, the Lauder "singing down to the vale of Tweed." It was a mountain brook making its way to the Ganges. Soon came another familiar sight, a toll-bar; but close to it another, less familiar one, the flower-adorned shrine of a Hindu ascetic. On we went with fine views of the plains—the kind of views one has from the Apennine looking to the west—and gradually rose from one belt of vegetation to another. On the lower slope *Euphorbia Royliana* was everywhere, a huge plant, of thoroughly tropical appearance. Then came *Bauhinia Retusa*, *Justicia Adhatoda*, and *Hamiltonia Suaveolens*.

At length our guide, plucking something, said—"You know this." It was a maple—*Acer oblongus*. We had reached the region where European genera become pretty numerous, and soon saw *Alnus Nepalensis*, *Pyrus variolosa*, *Ilex diphyrena*, *Quercus incana*, *Andromeda ovalifolia*, &c. The two trees, however, which interested me most were the Deodara and Rhododendron, neither of which were very numerous. Still, there they were, in their own home. At about 7,500 feet I gathered *Sonchus oleraceus*, a familiar British species, which is, however, I believe, to be found in the plains, and a Euphorbia, which was either the *Amygdaloides* of our spring woodlands, or something quite close to it. Other plants which I was particularly glad to see on this excursion were *Mahonia Nepalensis*, *Cupressus torulosa*, *Benthamia fragifera*, and *Leycesteria formosa*, dear to the British pheasant.

We had clambered a long time over the pathways of Landour, when a glimpse told us that the great view we had come so far to see would not be denied us, and we were soon on the top of Lallteebea, the Red Hill, and in presence of the grandest mountain chain in the whole world. Our friend, with that care and exactitude which took his countrymen to Paris, had provided himself with a compass and the most accurate maps, so that he could check his local knowledge in the best way.

Well, then, look with me due north. You will see a range of snow mountains about sixty-eight miles off, and 17,000 feet high. Behind them flows the Sutlej, making its way down to the plains. Then, as the eye moves eastward, it is shut out from a view of the snow by the Snakes' Hill, Nagteebea, an eminence of about 9,000 feet. Still further round towards the east the snow begins again, and is continuous. First comes a mighty mass some fifty miles off, and 20,000 feet high, which rises behind the sacred Jumnootri; then the still higher mass of Banderpanch and a horn like the Pic du Midi, south of Pau; then a mass of about 22,000 feet beyond the line of the Bagaruttee, which feeds the Ganges. The highest point of this mass is Mount Moira. Still further to the east, and sixty miles off, is the mighty Kidernath, 22,832 feet in height, quite a

little hill compared to Everest or Kinchinjunga, but higher than any mountain out of the Himalayas, looking down on Chimborazo and Kilimanjaro, and equal to Mont Blanc with Skiddaw and Snowdon on the top of it. Still further east, near the headwaters of the Alaknanda, another feeder of the Ganges, the chain sinks, and one sees no more snow. Somewhere between the eye and the Mount Moira range lies Gangootri. It is the fact of Jumnootri and Gangootri both lying between the eye and these mountains which has made people erroneously apply to some of their dizzy heights the names of these two sacred spots.

Now turn to the south. Right in front you will see the valley of the Doon, one of the prettiest bits of country in India or anywhere else. Slightly to the west you will remark a stream making its way to the Jumna, and a good deal to the east another making its way to the Ganges; while beyond the Doon, and shutting out from it the hot winds of summer, as the Himalayas shut out the cold winds of winter, is the Sewalik range. Away to the west of it, but out of sight, is another hallowed place, Hurdwar, where the Ganges issues from the hills. I thought of the fine sentence (I think, Bishop Thirlwall's) which lingers somewhat imperfectly in my mind—

“The fulness of the stream is the glory of the fountain, and it is because the Ganges is not lost amidst its parent hills, but deepens and widens till it reaches the sea, that so many pilgrimages are made to its springs.”

And again of the words in Mackintosh's paper on Lord Cornwallis—

“His remains are interred on the spot where he died, on the banks of that famous river which waters no country not either blessed by his government or visited by his renown, and in the heart of that province, so long the chosen seat of religion and learning in India, which under the influence of his beneficent system, and under the administration of good men whom he had chosen, had risen from a state of decline and confusion to one of prosperity probably unrivalled in the happiest times of its ancient princes. ‘His body is buried in peace, and his name liveth for evermore.’”

We started betimes on the 30th, and rode rapidly towards the Eastern Doon, through lanes full of the large sweet-scented *Jasminum hirsutum*, which was covered with a heavy dew. In the immediate neighbourhood of Deyrah the *Pinus longifolia* and the larger bamboo, plants of very different climates, meet and flourish. Except at Jubulpore, I had never seen the latter in anything like its natural state, and very beautiful it is in that state. Yesterday I observed several other bamboos, amongst them a small species occurring at a high elevation.

We dismounted at the bottom of a hill, and proceeded slowly across an orchard of mangoes to the edge of the Sâl forest. As we advanced, I saw that the branches of the mangoes were

covered by two species of orchids—both, I believe, Cattleyas, but I speak with some hesitation.

And what was the Sâl forest like? Well, at the point where we entered it, and passed the Government pillars marking off the reserved from the village woodland, it was very like the broken ground between the Missenden road and the great avenue at Hampden. When we had entered it, however, the totally different look of the soil struck the eye at once. Here, there was neither the grass of an English park, nor the bed of dry leaves which you find in a close beechwood. The surface, swept by frequent fires, was as hard as stone, and dotted only with plants which had grown up since the last of these had passed that way. Conspicuous amongst such plants were a dwarf palm (*Phoenix acaulis*) and an asparagus, said to have lovely white flowers at the proper season. Amongst the trees, I was most interested by the Sâl itself, by the *Eugenia Jambolana*, by the *Lagerstroemia parviflora*, a near relation of that lovely *Lagerstroemia* which so much delighted us at Venice, recalling, as it did, in autumn the spring glories of the lilac. I had no idea to what an extent the creepers of these regions are the enemies of the forester, and it went to my heart to see the heavy Nepalese knife applied to the *Butea superba*, the *Derris scandens*, the *Loranthus longifolia* a handsome cousin of our common mistletoe, and other plants of an equally attractive appearance and equally encroaching disposition.

From the Eastern we hurried to the Western Doon, at a pace which would hardly have permitted the grass to grow under our feet, and were soon among the plantations of the Deyrah Tea Company, where unhappily we were only able to stay a very short time, during which, however, thanks to the courtesy and intelligence of the superintendent, I learned more about tea than I had ever known before. First, I saw the plant in flower. You know, or don't know, that it is a camellia, and very like a miniature copy of the well-known ornament of our winter conservatories.

Then I was told the distinction between the Chinese plant and its taller relative, which is wild in Assam. It is not grown in the Deyrah plantation, but a hybrid between it and the Chinese plant is.

Then I learned the difference between black tea and green. Both come from the same plant, but the former is fermented and the latter is unfermented.

I asked about the half-fabulous teas one has heard of, which never come into the market, "tea of the Wells of the Dragon," for instance. Such things, I was told, if ever made, would be the young unexpanded leaf plucked and prepared separately.

Then I asked about Flowery Pekoe, which, in my ignorance, I supposed to contain portions of the flower. Flowery Pekoe, I was

told, is the very finest kind of black tea, and has its name from the soft down of the young unexpanded leaf which may be perceived upon it. A little of it is sometimes prepared separately. Orange Pekoe, which is much the same, has its name from the colour of the unexpanded leaf when dried. Its orange colour enables it to be easily distinguished and picked out. You must understand that save and except the half mythological teas I have alluded to, all black tea, from Orange Pekoe down through Pekoe and Souchong to Bohea, which last is made of the largest and oldest leaves, and all green tea from Young Hyson down to Hyson-skin, are plucked and prepared together. The sorting is an after process, done partly by sieve, partly by hand. We saw the initial process; and it will please you to know that the curled and shrivelled form in which all tea appears is entirely due to its being first heated, and then most carefully rolled between the hands of the operator and a kind of rough matting. Further we could not follow it, for we had to hurry away, and I am at the end of my Latin as far as tea manufacture is concerned, except that I saw the sorting process going on, and would be, I think, qualified to pick out the Orange Pekoe.

I had to leave Deyrah without seeing the establishment of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, for which I was very sorry, and I had to leave Saharunpore without seeing the Botanical Garden, but one cannot put the work of thirty-six hours into twenty-four.

The first part of our way from Deyrah to Saharunpore, where we joined the railway, was through the pretty Sewalik Hills, to explore which I would most willingly have given some days. At one of the places where we changed horses, I got down to gather some leaves of Sâl. This had the good effect of betraying me to one of the young forest officers, whom you may remember seeing at Nancy when I went to have a look at our Indian students there in 1872. He came with us to the point where the cultivated land meets the forest, and named for me *Colutea Nepalensis*, a superb sister of the Bladder Senna, said to be hardy in England, and a great ornament to the Sewalik at this season.

In Saharunpore, I had much conversation with Dr. Jameson, the honoured founder of the tea industry in North-Western India, at his house in or close to the Botanical Garden, which was tantalizing to a degree, but it was, alas! in the middle of the night.

When we awoke this morning, we were at Kurtarpore, on the farther side of the Sutlej, in the Jullunder Doab. Soon we crossed the huge bed of the Beas, and ran on to Umritsur—i.e., Amrita Saras, the fountain of Immortality, which is the great emporium of this part of India and the sacred city of the Sikhs.

We soon started, under the auspices of General Reynell Taylor, to see the Golden Temple, which stands in the middle of a great

tank, and is connected with the land by a marble causeway. It is called golden because the upper part of it is gilt all over, like the dome of the Isaac's Church in Petersburg. We put on slippers, as one does at St. Sophia, a ceremony rarely insisted on in the mosques of India, and followed our guide along the edge of the tank, which is set with a few trees, amongst which I observed the Jujube, and so across the causeway to the graceful little temple. Several men were busy decking out the small baldacchino under which the sacred book of the Sikhs, the Adee Granth, is kept. Three others were playing on musical instruments, and singing rather noisily. There is a great deal of mosaic work on the marble of the temple, and nothing can be prettier than the gilding of the interior, which is more like what people in England associate with the Alhambra than anything else which occurs to me. It is very small, little more than a chapel. The *Capella palatina* at Palermo comes into one's mind, but the feeling of the Golden Temple is quite different, very *riant* instead of being very gloomy. We returned across the causeway, and went to another building where the initiatory rites of the Sikh religion are performed, and where we found one of the officiating priests reading the Granth. He sat under a marble canopy, with groups of the faithful standing on either side—exquisite architecture behind and above. We stood in a court-yard slightly below. I have seen nothing in India which would have made such an historical picture. Form, colour, everything was there. Paul Veronese never painted anything, I dare venture to say, that would have delighted his eye so much.

* * * * *

Umritsur is a busy, well-ordered, and extremely picturesque place. Here and there stand up from amidst the green of its gardens the towers of the old nobles, making one think of Florence, but most of the houses are only of two stories. I was glad to see many quite recently built, of great architectural merit, and charmingly adorned with wood carving.

Before we left, we did some business with the shawl merchants. By the way, I never knew till the other day, that the Rampore shawls took their name, not from the Rampore with whose name one is familiar, but from Rampore, the capital of the mountain state of Bussahir, high up the Sutlej. They are now, however, chiefly made in the plains.

We paid a visit to the Fort of Govindghur, over which I walked with the very intelligent commanding officer, to whom I put many questions as to what he would do under such and such circumstances, and was pleased to find that he had thought of all contingencies.

It was at Govindghur that, as I heard, not on this, but on

another occasion, a very significant conversation took place, some years ago.

Sikh nobleman: "Why is that mortar inclined in that direction, which does not seem the natural one?"

British Artillerist: "Sir, it is pointed at your Holy of Holies. The distance is — yards. The proper charge is — of gunpowder. It will drop a shell within twenty feet."

Happily our relations with the Sikhs have long been as friendly as possible, and there is, please God, as little likelihood of a shell from Govindghur ever finding its way to the Golden Temple as there is of its finding its way to St. Paul's.

My conversation at this place, and several others which I have had lately, have been so far useful, that they have called my attention to certain aspects of our military position in India, which had not come much to my notice when at the India Office.

* * * * *

Jan. 1st, 1875.—Indian stations—the European quarters, that is, of Indian towns—are built in contempt of the saying, "What a pity it is that life is so short when everything else is so long!" but of all Indian stations Lahore must, I think, be the one in which that true saying is held in least honour. The distances are quite awful.

Early, however, this morning we set forth under the care of the Senior Judge of the Chief Court and the Commissioner to visit the native city—an object which was effected partly in carriages, partly on foot, and partly on the "huge earth-shaking beast," who is most useful in narrow and crowded streets, as it never enters into his head to tread on or hurt any one.

The things most worth seeing were the Great Mosque, the Fort, the Tomb of Runjeet Singh, that of Gooroo Govind, the Mosque of Wazir Ali, the Gardens, and the Tomb of Jehangeer.

The Great Mosque was built by Aurungzebe out of the confiscated estates of his brother Dara, whose fate, in spite of his great and many failings, excited a good deal of compassion. Hence it has never been popular, and even to this day the faithful prefer other buildings of very inferior pretensions.

It is a stately pile, whether seen from near or far, but not of first-rate merit. In its noble quadrangle I observed far the largest Banian I have yet seen—the first, indeed, which gives me any conception of what that tree is when it begins to get on in life.

The Fort is of little military importance, and has been much injured both by the Sikhs and ourselves, but it contains many beautiful bits, and commands an admirable view as well of the city as of the dusty wilderness which spreads around it. At one

time the Ravee ran close under its walls when it must have presented an appearance not unlike its brethren in Agra and Allahabad.

Much of the exterior is ornamented with a coating of what one can only call porcelain plaster—a style of decoration I have never seen before, and the art of which is said to be lost. Kashi is the technical term for it. The effect produced is exactly that of the most brilliant Spanish *azulejos*, or blue encaustic tiles, but it must have been very much cheaper, and it is extremely to be wished that the process should be rediscovered. The decorations on the outside of the Fort belong to the age of Jehangeer, and bear witness to his well-known eclecticism. Numerous figures of animals abhorrent to true Mussulman feeling, are very visible. Mithraic emblems are said to occur, and there are some figures which are suspiciously like the European devil—the occurrence of which is referred by some authorities to the teaching of the Jesuits, who are known to have had some influence at Jehangeer's court.

The tomb of the old lion has not much architectural merit, and, like that of Gooroo Govind, the tenth supreme pontiff of the Sikhs, who gave a political turn to their religion, is chiefly important historically. Some of Runjeet's wives, who burnt themselves on his funeral pyre, lie round him, and bear testimony to a curiously different state of society from that which now exists at Lahore, after the lapse of little more than a generation.

Speaking of a similar practice, that of Johar or self-devotion, the author of a remarkable pamphlet on the "Antiquities of Lahore" observes—

"The suicide of Calanus, the Indian, at Pasargadæ, and that of Zarnochegas at Athens (Strabo, lib. xv., chapter 1), are other instances of the performance of this rite. But we need not go back to antiquity for examples; only the other day a peasant of the Kangra district, a leper, deliberately burnt himself to death. According to the official report, 'one of his brothers handed him a light and went away, a second brother watched the burning, and a third thought it a matter of such small interest that he went about his usual avocations.'"

We looked through a small but rather interesting armoury in the Fort. One of my companions showed me a strangely-shaped bow. "How long is it since they have used that in actual warfare?" said I. "Not so long," replied he. "I myself had an arrow fired at me during the siege of Mooltan."

The Mosque of Wazir Ali is chiefly interesting as being the best specimen, or one of the best, of the Kashi work, to which I have already alluded, while the tomb and garden of Jehangeer are more or less in the style of those of the Taj. They are situated far to the west of the city, beyond the Ravee, and must have been very striking indeed before later rulers took to plundering them for their own constructions. The tomb of the

great Noor Jehan, who sleeps hard by, has suffered very much more than that of her husband. Now the authorities are devoting a very little money to keeping the antiquities of Lahore in something like order, but there is still much to be done.

On our way back from the tomb of Jehangeer we saw a polo match, which was being played between the young Nawab of Bhawalpoor's people and some English officers. The boy rode extremely well, and the whole scene, backed as it was by the buildings of the city, was striking and characteristic.

Jan. 2nd.—A true Punjab day—the whole air full of dust; the sun represented by a pale disc, like the moon seen through clouds. This, with the thermometer at 90° Fahr. in the coolest room, and anything you please out of doors—no uncommon occurrence in the hot weather—must be delectable. At present it is chilly. The glass has been down at 21° or 22° Fahr. in the night lately: but, not being in tents, we feel the cold less than we did at Agra.

We drove in the afternoon to the Great Shalimar Gardens. The fountains played; but there was no great head of water on, and the weather was most unpropitious.

We adjourned to a grove of Sissoo, under which the boys from six neighbouring village schools had been collected—Sikhs, Hindoos, and Mahometans. Some of them were very intelligent. I asked one youth of about fourteen which was the most powerful country in Europe after England. "Germany," he replied. "And the next to Germany?" "Russia," he said. I demurred, and asked him what he thought of France. "Oh, France," he said, "was once very powerful; but her disasters in the late war were so great that she is no longer so." Then I asked him what was the ecclesiastical capital of his religion. He was a Hindoo. "Benares," he answered. "And what is the ecclesiastical capital of the most numerous body of Christians?" I inquired. "Rome," he replied. "Do you know what is going on in that country?" I said, pointing to Spain. "A war between the people who want a republic and those who want a monarchy," was the answer.

Having seen a village in the North-west, we wished to see one in the Punjab under the guidance of the Deputy Commissioner; so the accountant of the one in which Shalimar is situated attended with his maps and books.

This village, unlike the one I have described near Agra, belongs almost wholly to one family and there is only a single Lumberdar, the head of that family. He is absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca; but his son came, and we had a long conversation with him and others as to the amount of the Government demand, the rent paid by the cultivators, the nature of their occupancy rights, and so forth. There was present also the Tehsildar, a most important officer in the Punjab—this one, for instance, having 363 villages

under him—the Cancoogoe, or superintendent of accountants in the Tehsil, and, as I have said, the accountant, or Putwarree, himself, besides numerous villagers.

With these we went off to visit the village; saw its mosque, built near the tomb of a holy man, with the hereditary guardian of the tomb; went into a house, due notice having been given to the women of our approach; noticed the stable or cow-house below, the sleeping and sitting room above with a little goat tied up in them—the cooking-apparatus—the household vessels, chiefly earthenware, not as in apparently wealthier houses, which I had seen at Ahmedabad, of brightly polished brass or copper. Then we tasted the parched Indian corn, which was admirably good, and the *chupattee* (or ordinary bread), exactly like the scone of Northern Scotland, which you remember finding also in the Troad. We saw, too, the village weighman, an important personage, who manages, *inter alia*, the public entertainment of strangers by the village, and levies a rate for that and other purposes, with which Government never interferes.

We stopped at a draper's shop, and examined the goods. Most were English; some, however, were native cottons, but of no great merit. Lastly, we had the village bard produced, who sang hideously, to a sort of lyre. We had been led specially to desire to see him from having examined a village pedigree (an admirable institution, recently, if I mistake not, made an official village record), to which was prefixed a short account of the foundation of the village by its common ancestor. The one we saw, which was not that of the village I have been describing, went back for four hundred years, and rested, to some extent, on the authority of the village bard, whose business it is to know all about genealogies. It was an elaborate document, I know not how many feet in length, but long enough, as it seemed to me, to have recorded even the history of that great French house which is said to have on its pedigree a representation of the Duc of that day going, hat in hand, to congratulate the Blessed Virgin on the birth of her Son, and being addressed by her with the words: "*Couvrez-vous, mon cousin ?*"

There was a large tree in the village which I did not recognize, and of which I asked the name. It was my friend the Pilu (see my note on Bhurtpore), whose acquaintance I then succeeded in making.

The old moat which we found round Runjeet Singh's Lahore has been turned into gardens, and the whole of the adjoining county, which—except so far as a few very ancient trees formed an exception—was a howling wilderness, is now swathed in wood. I observe in some abundance a familiar form, which I came upon for the first time in these lands as I passed through Mussoorie—

the weeping willow. It seems odd to see a tree which I always associate with Stratford-on-Avon—the most English spot in England—amidst such un-English scenery. I note, by-the-bye, that the last accredited guess as to the tree of the 137th Psalm connects it, not with the *Salix Babylonica*, but with the *Populus Euphratica*.

Mrs. ——— has shown me a large number of flower-paintings. She first obtains an exact outline of the living plant by a very simple process of nature-printing, and then colours the outline carefully. The results are minutely accurate and very beautiful. One portfolio illustrated a journey through Cashmere, and made one long for a summer there.

As I drove yesterday with ———, I asked him if he knew the scientific name of the tall grass which I heard called tiger-grass at Ahmedabad, and which is very abundant here. I think it is a *Saccharum*, but am not quite sure. "No," he said, "but the people in this neighbourhood call it Sikunder's grass, as they still call the main branch of a river Sikunder's Channel. Strange—is it not?—how that great individuality looms through history—

"On parlera de sa gloire,
Sous le chaume bien longtemps
L'humble toit dans cinquante ans
Ne connaîtra pas d'autre histoire."*

You remember ———'s maintaining, half seriously, that the villagers in the plain between Hampden and Oxford, when they speak of the Prince, still mean Prince Rupert.

How long impressions remain, and how quickly details fade away! "It is a thousand pities," said a resident here to me yesterday, "that no one wrote down the table-talk of Runjeet Singh, who was always saying noteworthy things. A few years ago there were men alive who could have done it, but now it is too late."

I still see very few animals—a pair of hoopoes, and the mungoose, the hereditary enemy of the cobra, at this place; the lammageyr at Landour; several birds of the hawk kind, including a large ugly kite, which acts as a scavenger; a fine tiger in confinement at Pattiala; another just caught, and *vincla recusans* very much indeed, poor beast; a little lynx also, there, nearly as pretty, and somewhat more amiable than the one who used to live in that house in the Zoological Gardens, of which the keeper observed when ——— asked him if the Suricate bit, "Bites, sir? everything bites here!"

Will you have a wild beast story, of which you may believe as much as you please?


A tigress who lived in captivity at Lahore made her escape one

* "Cinquante ans" in France is 2,200 here.

day, and not unnaturally startled the station pretty considerably. At length the gardener in whose domain her cage was situated went to the proper authority, and begged to be ordered to take the runaway back. "Order you to take it back!" was the reply—"I'll give you no such order—it would be ordering you to be killed." "Not at all, sir," said the man. "Only give me the order, and I will take the tigress back." "I'll give you no such order, but you may do as you please," was the rejoinder. Hereupon the man, taking off his turban, walked up to the creature, which was lying in a shrubbery which it had probably mistaken for a jungle, and after a courteous salutation, said to her, "In the name of the powerful British Government, I request you to go back to your cage." At the same time he put his unfolded turban round her neck and led her back.

The poor fellow lost his life not long afterwards, while trying the same experiment on a bear, whose political principles were not equally good.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS TO "LITERATURE AND DOGMA."

VI.

TO any fair judge of evidence, the external evidence is in favour of the belief that the Fourth Gospel had its source in the Apostle John. But what is relied on, as above all fatal to this belief, is the internal evidence. The internal evidence is supposed to lead us with overpowering force to the conclusion that the Fourth Gospel is a fancy-piece by a Gnostically disposed Greek Christian, a consummate literary artist, seeking to develop the Logos-idea, to cry up Greek Christianity and to decry Jewish, and taking for the governing idea of his composition the antithesis between light and darkness. Everything in the Fourth Gospel, we are told, is profoundly calculated in this sense. So many miracles, and in such a gradation, as were proper to bring out fully the contrast between light and darkness, life and death, Greek willingness to believe, and Jewish hardness of heart, so many miracles, and no more, does the Fourth Gospel assign to Jesus. The whole history of the last supper and of the crucifixion is subtly manipulated to serve the author's design. Admirable as is his art, however, he betrays himself by his Christ, whose unlikeness to the Christ of the Synoptics is too glaring. His Christ "is a mere doctor; morality has disappeared, and dogma has taken its place; for the sublime and pregnant discourses of the Sea of Galilee and the Mount of Olives, we have the arid mysticism of the Alexandrian schools." So that the art of our Greek Gnostic is, after all, not art of the highest character, because it does not

manage to conceal itself. It allows the Tübingen critics to find it out, and by finding it out to pull the whole of the Fourth Gospel to pieces, and to ruin utterly its historical character.

Now here, again, in what these critics say of the internal evidence offered by the Fourth Gospel, the external evidence in some respects makes it hard for a plain man to follow them. The Gnostic author, they say, governed by his idea of the antithesis between light and darkness, assigns to Jesus no more miracles than just what are required to bring out this antithesis. Therefore the last two verses of the twentieth chapter, which speak of the "many other signs which are not written in this book," are spurious. Like the whole twenty-first chapter which follows, they are a later addition by some one ignorant of the artist's true design. Well, but in the seventh chapter we find the Jewish people asking:* "When the Christ comes, will he do more miracles than this man does?" and in the sixth chapter it is implied† that the miracles of Jesus were, as the Synoptics represent them, numerous. Did the artist forget himself in these places; or is it the Tübingen critics who have forgotten to tell us that in these places too the text is spurious? In the eleventh chapter we have a like oversight on the part of somebody, either the artist or (which is hardly likely) his German interpreters. The chief priests and Pharisees are, by some mistake, allowed to say: "This man doeth many miracles."‡ In the twelfth chapter matters are even worse; it is there said§ that the Jews would not believe in Jesus "though he had done so many miracles before them." No doubt this is spurious, and in omitting to tell us so the critics fail a little in vigour and rigour. But, on the whole, what admiration must we feel for the vigour and rigour which, in spite of these external difficulties can see so far into a millstone, and find such treasures of internal evidence there, as to be able to produce a theory of the Fourth Gospel like Baur's?

The internal evidence, then, is what the rejectors of the Fourth Gospel confidently rely on. But to us the internal evidence seems to point by no means to a speculative genius, a consummate artist, giving to Christianity a new form of his own, adopting a certain number of sayings and doings of the real Jesus from the Synoptics, but inventing for Jesus whatever he did not thus adopt. Much more it seems to us to point to a sincere Christian, a man of literary talent certainly and a Greek, but not a consummate artist; having traditions from John, having, above all, *logia* from John, sayings of the Lord, and combining and presenting materials in the way natural to him. The Evangelist's literary procedure is that of a Greek of ability, well versed in the philosophical speculation of his time, and having the resources of

* Verse 31.

† Verse 2.

‡ Verse 47.

§ Verse 37.

Greek style and composition at his command. But when one hears of a consummate artist, an idealizing inventor, when one hears of a gifted writer arranging his hero's life for effect, freely making discourses for him, one thinks of Plato; and the writer of the Fourth Gospel is no Plato. The redaction and composition of this Gospel show literary skill, and indicate a trained Greek as their author, not a fisherman of Galilee. But it may be said with certainty that a literary artist, capable of inventing the most striking of the sayings of Jesus to Nicodemus or to the woman of Samaria, would have also made his composition, as a whole, more flawless, more artistically perfect, than the Fourth Gospel actually is. Judged from an artist's point of view, it has blots and awkwardnesses which a master of imaginative invention would never have suffered his work to exhibit. Let us illustrate this by examples, taking, as our rule is, no case which is not clear, and where the plain reader may not be expected, if he will only take the trouble to look carefully for himself at the passages we quote, to follow us without doubt or difficulty.

Our Evangelist has, we say, to place and plant records of Jesus supplied to him by John. He has to place them without a personal recollection of the speakers and scenes, and without a Jew's instinct for what with such speeches and scenes was possible and probable. He combines and connects, but his connection is often only exterior and apparent, not real. No artist of Plato's quality would have been satisfied with the connection in the discourse of Jesus reported at the end of the fourth chapter, from the thirty-fifth verse to the thirty-eighth: "Say not ye, There are yet four months, and then cometh harvest? behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes and look on the fields, that they are white already to harvest; and he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal, that he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together. *For herein is that saying true, One soweth and another reapeth. I sent you to reap that whereon ye have bestowed no labour; other men have laboured, and ye are entered into their labours.*" Surely there are here two parts, of which that one which we have given in italics has a motive quite different from the motive of the other which precedes it. The motive of the first is the ripeness of the harvest and the guerdon of the reapers; the motive of the second is the admission of the disciples to reap what they had not sown. Both have all the character of genuine sayings of Jesus, but there is no real connection between them, only they coincide in pairing a sower with a reaper. Jesus did not make long, continuous speeches, jointed and articulated after the Greek fashion; he uttered pregnant sentences, gnomic sayings; and two sets of such sayings, quite distinct from each other, which were among the Greek editor's store of *logia*, we have here. But to this editor the

continuous and jointed form of Greek discourse seemed the natural one; and therefore, caught by the verbal coincidence, he blends the two sayings into one, and claps a *for* in between them to establish a connection. It is a matter of no great importance; the two *logia* of Jesus are safely there, and the real relation between them was sure to be brought out by time and scrutiny. It is only of importance as a gauge of the Evangelist's artistic faculty. A consummate artist, inventing for Jesus, could not have been satisfied with such a merely seeming and verbal connection.

More striking is the artistic failure at the beginning of the tenth chapter. We will remark that on any supposition of a consummate artist and of perfect motiving, the mode of introducing all the lovely group of sayings about "the good shepherd" and "the door" is quite unaccountable. But let that pass, and let us look at the sayings themselves. Who can doubt that here again we have two separate sets of *logia* of Jesus, one set which have *I am the good shepherd* for their centre, and another set which have for their centre *I am the door*; and that our Evangelist has thrown the two together and confused them? Beautiful as are the sayings, even when thus mixed up together, they are far more beautiful when disentangled. But the Evangelist had a doorkeeper and a door and sheep in his first parable; and he had another parable, in which was "a door of the sheep." Catching again at an apparent connection, he could not resist joining the two parables together, and making one serve as the explanation of the other. To explain the first parable, and to go on all fours with it, the second ought to run as follows: "I am the door of the sheep. All that *climb up some other way* are thieves and robbers; but the sheep *do not hear* them. I am the door; by me if any man enter, *he is the shepherd of the sheep*." The words in italics must be substituted for the words now in the text of our Gospel;* and Jesus must stand, not as the door of salvation in general, but as the door by which to enter is the sign of the true teacher. There can be no doubt, however, that the words now in the text are right, and that what is wrong is the connection imposed on them. The seventh and ninth verses are a *logion* quite distinct from what precedes and follows them, and ought to be entirely separated from it. "I am the door of the sheep. I am the door; by me if a man enter he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and find pasture." The eighth verse belongs to the first parable, the parable of the shepherd; not to the parable of the door. It should follow the fifth verse, and be followed by the tenth. Jesus says of the sheep: "A stranger will they not

* See John x. 8, 9. Instead of ἡλθον πρὸς ἐμοῦ we must read ἀναβαλόντων ἀλλαχόθεν, instead of ἔκουσαν we must read ἀκούουσιν, and ποιῆν ἵνα τῶν προβάτων instead of εὐθίσεναι, καὶ εἰσελεύσονται καὶ ἐξελεύσονται, καὶ νομὴν εὐρήσονται.

follow, but will flee from him, for they know not the voice of strangers. All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers, but the sheep did not hear them. The thief cometh not but to steal and to kill and to destroy; I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. I am the good shepherd." Piecing his *logia* together, seeking always a connection between them, the Evangelist did not see that he was here injuring his treasures by mixing them. But what are we to think of a consummate artist, inventing freely, and capable of producing, by free invention, such things as the most admirable of the sayings attributed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel;—what are we to think of such an artist combining in cold blood his sayings of Jesus so ill that any one with eyes in his head can detect a better combination for them?

The reader, probably, will follow us without much difficulty here; but certainly he will have no difficulty in following us if we take the last words of the fourteenth chapter, *Arise, let us go hence*, and assert that no consummate artist, no Plato, would ever have given us that. Beyond all manner of doubt, Jesus never said in one connection: "As the Father gave me commandment, even so I do. Arise, let us go hence. I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman," and so on, without the least sign of rising or going away, but with the discourse continuing throughout three more chapters. How the Evangelist could have come to make him say it, is the question. Probably, with the commencement of the fifteenth chapter, the writer passed to a fresh set of notes, containing another set of sayings of Jesus; and he marked the transition by inserting between the end of one set and the beginning of the next the words: "Arise, let us go hence." They were traditional words of Jesus, as we see from the "Rise, let us be going," of St. Matthew; and the composer of the Fourth Gospel may have thought they would come in serviceably at this point. What he thought, we can only conjecture; but that no man freely inventing, not arranging and combining, and above all that no consummate artist, would ever have dreamed of placing those words at that point, we may affirm with the utmost confidence. Certainly there needed an imaginative intellect not less fine than Plato's to invent for Jesus such a saying as: "The hour cometh and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." But conceive a Plato ordering the march of his composition thus: "Arise, let us go hence. I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman!"

To the same category of defects of composition, inexplicable on the theory of a consummate artist freely inventing, but quite intelligible if we suppose a literary arranger sometimes embarrassed in dealing with his materials, for which he has the profoundest

veneration, belong those curious jolts in the narrative which are occasioned, as we believe, by the author having John's very words in his memory, and being determined to preserve them. Such a jolt occurs in introducing the dialogue with the woman of Samaria. "Jesus, tired with his journey, sat thus* by the well." Thus? how? There has not been a word to tell us, and the expression as it stands is an incongruity. But the writer had in his mind John's own words: "Jesus, tired with his journey, sat, *as I have been telling you*, by the well;" and he could not forbear using them. The same formula appears in two other places, and in both it probably is a relic of John's own narrative. "He, lying *as I am telling you* on Jesus' breast, saith unto him: Lord, who is it?"† And again: "After these things, Jesus manifested himself again to his disciples at the sea of Tiberias; and he manifested himself *as I am going to tell you*."‡ In these two cases to preserve John's words does not create any awkwardness, but the writer still preserves them even when it does. He preserves them, again, without duly adjusting the context to them, in the forty-fourth verse of the fourth chapter. "After the two days he departed thence into Galilee. *For Jesus himself testified that a prophet hath no honour in his own country.*" That was a reason for staying away from Galilee, not for going there. But the writer has John's words about the testimony of Jesus in his mind, and hastens to give them without preparing their way by saying: "And this he did, notwithstanding his own testimony." The embarrassed sentences about the return to Capernaum, in the sixth chapter, owe their embarrassment, not improbably, to the same cause: to John's words sticking in the writer's memory, and not being properly fused by him with his own narrative.

In like manner, who can read without a shock of surprise, in the relation of the feeding of the five thousand among the hills beyond the Sea of Galilee, that abrupt and motiveless sentence: "Now the passover, the feast of the Jews, was nigh?"§ The most fanciful and far-fetched explanations are offered; but who would not prefer the simple and natural explanation that the words are a relic of John's original narrative, which had been brought in by him to date his story, that they were fast lodged in our Evangelist's memory, and that he was loath to lose them? They are a little touch of detail, just like: "These things he said in the treasury as he taught in the temple;" or like: "It was then the feast of dedication at Jerusalem; it was winter, and Jesus walked in the temple in Solomon's porch."¶ They are exactly the expressions which a man telling a story would be likely to use, but our author preserves them in his regular composition, whether they suit the context or no. And a

* *cf.* *cf.* John iv. 6.
 § John vi. 4.

† John xiii. 25.

‡ John xxi. 1.

¶ John viii. 20; x. 22.

consummate artist, freely following his invention, does not compose thus negligently.

These are grounds for the improbability of Baur's theory which suggest themselves from a defectiveness of artistic construction in the Fourth Gospel. Other grounds of improbability are suggested by defects of philosophical grasp. It is alleged that our Evangelist improves on the Jesus of the Synoptics, invents his profoundest things for him. But it can be made as clear as light, to any unbiassed and attentive reader, that this wonderful inventor does not always himself fully understand the very things he is supposed to be inventing, obscures them by unintelligent comment on them. One instance of this we have given in "Literature and Dogma." Jesus says: "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink."* Then, with a reminiscence of a passage in the Second Isaiah he adds: "He that believeth in me, as the Scripture saith, there shall flow out of his belly rivers of living water." Who can doubt that Jesus here meant to say that the believer's faith—the faith of the follower of Christ—should be an eternal source of refreshment? But the Evangelist proceeds to comment on the saying of Jesus, and to give what is, in his view, the proper explanation of it; and the explanation he gives is as follows:—"But this spake he of the Spirit (*Pneuma*) which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Nothing can be more natural than that a Christian of the first or second century should wish to date all comforts of the Spirit from after the famous effusion of *Pneuma* subsequent to Christ's death. But surely the sense of this saying of Jesus is clear; and it is clear, too, that it is a narrowing and marring of his words to put this mechanical construction upon them. The reporter who put it fails to grasp the words fully, deals with them unintelligently. And how incredible that a writer should fail to seize rightly the clear sense of a saying invented by himself!

Again, take a like case from the eighteenth chapter. Jesus had said of his disciples: "None of them is lost but the son of perdition."† Then comes the arrest,‡ and the speech of Jesus to the band which arrested him: "I have told you that I am he; if therefore ye seek me, let these go their way." He gives up himself, but puts his disciples out of danger. His speech is just what we might have expected; but instantly our Evangelist adds that he made it "*in order that the saying might be fulfilled which he spake, Of them whom Thou hast given me have I lost none.*" Can anything be more clear than that the two sayings have nothing at all to do with one another, and that it is a mechanical and narrowing

* John vii. 37—39.

† John xvii. 12.

‡ John xviii. 5—9.

application of the first which makes it lead up to the second? In the first, eternal salvation is the theme; in the second, safety from a passing danger. And could the free and profound inventor of the first have been so caught by the surfaces of things as to make it the mere prophecy of the second?

Jesus over the heads of all his reporters!—this idea is for us our constant guide in reading the Gospels; and it is, we are convinced, the only safe one. But the Tübingen professors reverse the idea, and say that in the Fourth Gospel it is the reporter who is over the head of Jesus. In the concluding chapters of this Gospel the philosophical author, they say, so frames the discourse of Jesus that his resurrection is presented "as an internal phenomenon continually being accomplished in the believer's conscience." No doubt this view of the resurrection is indicated in the Fourth Gospel, as it is indicated also by St. Paul; but the question is, does it come from Jesus himself, or was it invented by the more spiritual among his followers to give a profounder sense to the physical miracle of his resurrection? We confine ourselves at present to the Fourth Gospel, and we say: True, the resurrection of Christ is there suggested as a phenomenon accomplishing itself in the believer's conscience. "The idea is a profound one; it needed a great spirit to conceive it. If the author of the Fourth Gospel conceived it, we may allow that he carries the significance of the resurrection higher than the Synoptics carry it; higher than the Jesus of the Synoptics carries it. But if he is the author of this idea, he will present it firmly and clearly; if he presents it confusedly, then he probably got the idea from Jesus, and did not quite understand it." How, in fact, does he present it?

All through the discourses of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, the attentive reader may perceive that there are certain fundamental themes which serve as *nuclei* or centres, appearing repeatedly and in several connections, with a form sometimes shorter, sometimes more expanded. It is of great importance to a right understanding of the Fourth Gospel that we should discover in such cases the primitive theme, the original *logion* of Jesus; and this, or at least the nearest approach to it, will in general be given by the theme in its shorter and less expanded form. Very likely Jesus may himself have used a theme on several occasions, and himself have sometimes given to it a more expanded form; still, from the theme in its simplest and shortest form, we probably get our best clue to what was said by Jesus.

Two such primitive themes in the long discourse of Jesus before his arrest are these: *I go to the Father,** and, *I go away, and*

* *ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, John xvi. 17. This is probably the primitive theme; we have also: *ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με* (xvi. 5), *πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου ἐγὼ* (xvi. 10), *ἀφίμι τὸν κόσμον καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα* (xvi. 28).

come again to you.* Let us add to these a third: *A little while and ye see me not; and again a little while, and ye shall see me.*† These three sayings appear and reappear, they come in different connections, they take forms somewhat varying. But they are primitive themes; they give us probably the nearest approach possible to the words actually uttered by Jesus.

This, then, is what we have: *I go to the Father. I go, and come again to you. A little while and ye see me not, and again a little while and ye shall see me.* Now, it is alleged; and truly, that the Fourth Gospel suggests a view of the resurrection of Jesus as an internal phenomenon accomplishing itself in the believer's conscience. The basis on which this allegation must rest is supplied by the three *logia* which we have quoted.

But the three *logia* lead themselves either to the announcement of a physical resurrection or to the announcement of a spiritual resurrection. Everything depends on their context and connection. And by piecing things together, by putting these *logia* in the front, by connecting them immediately with other *logia* given by our Evangelist, by dropping but things he inserts between, we can get at a resurrection announced by Jesus which is clearly spiritual. "I go to my Father; I go, and come again to you. A little while and ye see me not, and again a little while and ye shall see me. I will not leave you desolate; I will come to you. Yet a little while and the world seeth me no more; but ye see me, because I live and ye shall live." A disciple asks how it is that they shall see him and that the world shall not. Jesus answers: "If a man love me, he will keep my word; and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our abode with him. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid; *I go away and come again to you.*"‡ And this resurrection of Jesus is connected by him with the coming of the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, the new light, who should bring out in the hearts of the disciples the real significance of Jesus and of what he had said.§

Thus placed and connected, the primitive *ἔρχομαι*, the *I come again* of Jesus, gives us, no doubt, the resurrection of Christ as "an internal phenomenon accomplishing itself in the believer's consciousness." It gives it us as being this in Jesus Christ's own view and prediction of it. The same idea is preserved for us by the First Epistle of St. John, an epistle which cannot well have been written by our Evangelist, its style is so unlike his. But the Epistle deals with many of the ideas dealt with by our Gospel,

* *ὑπάγω καὶ ἔρχομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.* John xiv. 23.

† *μικρόν, καὶ οὐ θεωρεῖτέ με, καὶ πάλιν μικρόν, καὶ ὄψεσθε με.* John xvi. 17.

‡ John xvi. 10; xiv. 28; xvi. 16; xiv. 18, 19, 23, 27, 28.

§ John xiv. 23—26.

and it presents the *abiding* in Jesus and in his Father, as the accomplishment of the promise of eternal life made by Jesus to his followers.* The idea is so fruitful and profound an one, that if our Evangelist had ever fairly grasped it, still more if he had conceived and invented it, he could hardly have so dealt with it that he left us in doubt whether he himself entertained it or not. He could no more do this than Paul could leave us in doubt whether he himself entertained his great idea of the *neerosis*—of the dying and resurrection of Jesus accomplishing themselves in this life in the believer's conscience. The mind which, while fully accepting the physical miracle of the resurrection, could yet discern that the phenomenon to be made fruitful must have a spiritual significance given to it—such a mind would certainly have been impressed deeply by such an idea, and have had it distinct and firm. But our Evangelist so arranges his materials as to make the reference of *ἐρχομαι* and *ὀψεσθε* to a spiritual resurrection very dubious, to overlay it with other things, and to obscure it; while their reference to a physical resurrection is brought out distinctly. "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you. For I go to prepare a place for you, and if I go, I will prepare a place for you. I come again, and will take you unto myself, that where I am ye may be also."† There can be no doubt that the primitive theme of *ἐρχομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, *I come again unto you*, is here so used and connected as to make it point decisively to a physical resurrection. And this key for the whole strain being once given, the impression left by the other primitive theme, *μικρὸν καὶ ὀψεσθέ με*, *a little while and ye shall see me*, is in the main an impression to the same effect. "A little while and ye see me not, and again a little while and ye shall see me. Ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice; ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy. Ye have sorrow now; but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man shall take from you."‡ The *ye shall see me* of the primitive theme here finishes by becoming *I will see you*; and the whole wording and connection are such that it seems clear the commentators have rightly interpreted the mind of the Evangelist, when they make this passage and the theme *μικρὸν καὶ ὀψεσθέ με*, a prophecy of the approaching physical resurrection of Jesus.

Must we then suppose that to a spiritual resurrection such sayings as the three primitive themes we have quoted do not really refer, but may be made to signify it only as a secondary and after meaning, brought in for purposes of edification, and originally hidden in them, perhaps, for these purposes? This, no

* 1 John ii. 24, 25.

† John xiv. 2, 3. The text followed is that of the Vatican manuscript.

‡ John xvi. 19, 20, 22.

doubt, will be the character assigned to the words by official theology, and by popular religion. To us, however, it seems certain that to a spiritual resurrection the words primarily and really point, and that our Evangelist has obscured their true scope. For him, as for Christendom long after him, Christ's physical resurrection stood, and could not but stand, a phenomenon fixed, immense, overpowering, a central sun attracting everything to it. But experience slowly and inevitably reveals that phenomena of this kind do not actually happen. Romulus does not mount into heaven, Epimenides does not awake, Arthur does not return; their adoring followers think they do, think they have promised it,—but they do not, have not. We have then to account for the firm belief of the first Christians in the physical resurrection of Jesus, when this resurrection did not actually happen. We can only account for it from things really said by Jesus, which led them to expect it. That Jesus was a fanatic, expecting and foretelling his own physical resurrection, deceived like his followers, but so filling them with his own belief that it prevailed and triumphed with them when he died, is an explanation which the whole account we have of Jesus, read seriously, shows to be idle. His disciples were misled therefore, by something Jesus said, which had not really the sense that he should physically rise from the dead, but which was capable of lending itself to this sense, and which his disciples misunderstood and imagined to convey it.

And, indeed, they themselves tell us that this is what actually happened; only that which was in truth *misunderstanding* they call *understanding*. They themselves tell us that they unconsciously exercised a creative pressure, long after the time when they were going about with Jesus and hearing him, on sayings and doings of their Master. "When he was risen from the dead," they tell us, after recording one of his prophetic speeches, "*his disciples remembered that he had said this.*"* Even if one had not known beforehand that, from the nature of the case, it was impossible for the records of Jesus in our Gospels to have been notes taken down day by day, as by a Saint-Simon or a Boswell, here is an Evangelist himself telling us in so many words that they were not. "These things understood not his disciples at the first," he tells us again, after relating an incident which afforded a remarkable fulfilment of prophecy, "but when Jesus was glorified *then remembered they that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him.*"† They recorded, then, the sayings of Jesus about his resurrection long after they had been uttered, and when the belief in his physical resurrection was

* John ii. 22.

† John xii. 16.

firmly fixed in their minds. But even after his death, "as yet," they tell us of themselves, "they knew not the Scripture that he must rise again from the dead."* This affords the most irrefragable proof that the sayings of Jesus about his resurrection cannot originally have been just what our Gospels report; the sayings, as they now come to us, must have been somewhat moulded and accentuated by the belief in the resurrection. If Jesus had said to the Twelve the very words our Gospels report him to have said, the Twelve could have been in no ignorance at all of "the Scripture that he must rise again from the dead," and in no doubt at all that they were to count on his rising. "He took unto him the Twelve, and said unto them: Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things that are written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man shall be accomplished. For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked and spitefully entreated, and spitted on; and they shall scourge him, and put him to death; and the third day he shall rise again."† It is in vain that the Evangelist adds: "And they understood none of these things, and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken."‡ If Jesus had spoken exactly as he is reported, if he had really thus laid down in black and white, as the phrase is, what was going to happen, the disciples could not have helped understanding him. It would have been quite impossible for them to make that astounding declaration, which yet is evidently the simple truth, that even up to the days which followed his death, "as yet they knew not the Scripture that he must rise again from the dead." Something was no doubt said by Jesus not unlike what the Evangelist reports, something which easily adapted itself to the character of a literal prophecy of the resurrection, when that event had, as was believed, taken place; but the precise speech put into the mouth of Jesus he cannot have uttered.

The Third Gospel, which reports the speech just quoted, is the Gospel which guides us to the discovery of what Jesus can have originally and actually said about his rising again on the third day. He was told that if he did not leave Jerusalem Herod would put him to death. He made answer: "Go ye and tell that fox, Behold I cast out devils and I do cures to-day and to-morrow, and the third day I shall be perfected."§ Having for ever before his mind the humble and suffering Servant of our fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, and labouring for ever to substitute this in his disciples' minds as the Messiah-ideal, instead of the brilliant and triumphing Conqueror of popular Jewish religion, Jesus here, beyond all doubt,

* John xx. 9.

† Luke xviii. 31—33.

‡ Luke xviii. 34.

§ τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτῶμαι. Luke xiii. 32. The text of the Vatican manuscript is followed.

following the prophet,* spoke of his violent and ignominious end as his perfection and victory. That violent end he, as was natural, could plainly foresee and often predicted. Here he predicts it in this wise: "On the third day I shall be perfected." What made him say: *On the third day*? We know how he loved to possess himself of locutions of the prophets and to use them; as, for instance, in that well known saying, "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me that I am mild and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls," the concluding phrase, *Ye shall find rest unto your souls*, is a locution of Jeremiah.† And in like manner his phrase, *On the third day I shall be perfected*, is a reminiscence of the prophet Hosea. Amid the ruin of Israel, in the eighth century before Christ, Hosea had said: "Come and let us return unto the Eternal; for he hath torn and he will heal us; *after two days will he revive us, on the third day he will raise us up.*"‡ "We shall be restored *presently*," Hosea means; and, "I shall be perfected *presently*," is what Jesus means.

Here we lay one finger almost certainly upon the central *logion*, serving as foundation for the belief that Jesus had himself announced he would rise from the dead on the third day. Let us combine the scattered *logia*, transposed some of them to the time after his death, which in some degree enable us, through the cloud of his disciples' inadequate apprehension, and of legend and marvel, to follow the line of light of the Divine Master. The root of everything with him is, as we just now said, the effort, the eternal effort, to substitute, as the Messias-ideal in the mind of his followers, the Servant, mild and stricken, for the regal and vengeance-working Root of David. And he knew, that the victory of the right Messias-ideal his own death, and that only, could found. "O fools and slow of heart at taking in all that the prophets have spoken! *must not* the Messiah suffer these things, and enter into his glory? Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests and scribes, and they shall deliver him to the Gentiles to crucify; nevertheless, I do cures to-day and to-morrow; we must work the works of him that sent me while it is day, the night cometh when no man can work; I must walk to-day and to-morrow and the day following, and the third day I shall be perfected. As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so shall the Son of

* See Isaiah liii. 10, 11. "It pleased the Eternal to bruise him, he hath put him to grief. When he hath made his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Eternal shall prosper in his hand; he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied."

† Jer. vi. 16.

‡ Hos. vi. 1, 2. In the Greek Bible of the Seventy the words are—*ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ ἀναστήσόμεθα*, on the third day we shall rise again. Compare this with the words in Luke, *τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσωμαι*.

Man be lifted up; and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me."*

Yes, *thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day.*† Inevitably the disciples materialized it all, wrested it all into a prophesying of bodily reappearance and miracle. So they did also with the words: "I go away and come again to you; a little while and ye see me not, and again a little while and ye shall see me." To these words the disciples gave a turn, they placed them in a connection, to suit the belief which alone after the death of Jesus could reassure and console them,—the belief in his resuscitation and bodily reappearance on earth, his temporary re-withdrawal and ascension into heaven, to be followed soon by his triumphal bodily advent to avenge and judge. It could not but be so. *It behoved that in his name should be preached to all nations repentance unto remission of sins;*‡ and only in this way could the work proceed. Only in this way, through profound misapprehension, through many crude hopes, under the stimulus of many illusions, could the method and secret, and something of the temper and sweet reason and balance, of Jesus, be carried to the world. Only thus, through natural and national *extra-belief* reinforcing their real love to their Master and zeal to propagate his doctrine, could the weak arm of the disciples acquire energy enough to hold aloft the word of life, set up the kingdom of Christ, found the true Israel, and bring in everlasting righteousness. But the promises and predictions of their Master were nevertheless not what they fancied. He had said: "Ye shall see me again, because I live and ye shall live; if a man keep my saying he shall never see death. If ye love me and keep my words, I will come unto you and make my abode with you."§ They construed this into: "Ye shall see me, because I will come again and take you unto myself to reign in the kingdom of the saints in the New Jerusalem."|| The genuine promise of Jesus was the promise of a spiritual resurrection; and this promise his disciples misapprehended, misconnected, and obscured. Only on this supposition is even their own version of the history intelligible.

Far, therefore, from inventing the idea of the resurrection as an internal phenomenon accomplishing itself in the believer's consciousness, the author of the Fourth Gospel transmits the idea, indeed, but obscures it. He saved it for us, as in that second harvest of the *logia* of Jesus he saves for us so much that is precious; he saved it from being lost, and added it to the indications which

* Luke xxiv. 25, 26; Matt. xx. 18, 19; Luke xiii. 32; John ix. 4 (in the Vatican manuscript); Luke xiii. 33; John iii. 14, and xii. 32.

† Luke xxiv. 46.

‡ John xiv. 19; viii. 51; xiv. 28.

§ Luke xxiv. 47.

|| John xiv. 8; Matt. xix. 28.

survive for us of the line truly taken by Jesus. But from his very mode of delivering it, we can see that he is not an artist inventing it, but a reporter transmitting it imperfectly.

Once more. Baur's theory of the consummately artistic Greek Christian inventing all things with a deep-laid design to damage Jewish Christianity, and to exalt Christ's divinity, is upset by the admission of things contrary to the alleged design. A free inventor, inventing with the express aim of doing damage to Jewish Christianity, would never have made Jesus say: *Salvation is of the Jews.** A free inventor, inventing to impair the credit of Peter and the original apostles, would never have made Peter enter the sepulchre first, or throw himself into the sea, or receive the charge: *Feed my sheep.*† A free inventor, inventing from a zeal to establish the dogma of Christ's personal divinity, would never have made Jesus give the turn to his calling himself *the Son of God* which is given in the tenth chapter, when Jesus appeals to the authority of the Old Testament for those being called *Gods* to whom the word of God came, and asks why he, then, may not call himself the Son of God?‡ "Why haggle about words and definitions in these matters?" he in fact asks; "all you can say about them is approximate merely." But the whole question of the dogma of Christ's personal divinity is a question of words and definitions in the very sphere where Jesus pronounced such questions to be vain. All these things may be ingeniously explained by Baur now that they stand there in the Gospel, and challenge explanation from him; but had his theory of the Gospel been true, they would never have stood there for him to explain.

Finally, the theory of the consummate artist implies that the Fourth Gospel is a work proceeding from the imaginative intellect. But we deny (and here, too, the attentive reader will not, we think, find it hard to follow us), we deny that the Fourth Gospel has the character of a work proceeding from the imaginative intellect. It has the character of a work proceeding from the soul; it is profoundly and solemnly religious. It is the work of a man who, we grant, like all the reporters of Jesus, understood him but imperfectly; who gives us much which is not Jesus, much which comes from himself and his time, much which is addition and legend. But it is the work of a man who gives us this seriously and in good faith, and whose attitude of mind is not that of a freely inventing artist. He is too much subjugated by Jesus to feel free to deal with him in this fashion, as an instrument whom he might use for his own purposes and his own ideas. He does sometimes attribute his own ideas to Jesus, but unconsciously, and we

* John iv. 22.

† John xx. 6; xxi. 7, 16.

‡ John x. 34—36.

can perceive that he is doing so; if he had attempted it consciously all through his Gospel, he would have produced something quite different from what we have, and we should easily have found him out. He would have given us a work where Jesus would have spoken all through as he speaks from the sixteenth verse of the third chapter to the twenty-first, a passage in which our theological lecturer evidently lectures us through the mouth of Jesus. For his mind did not hold itself so easily and independently towards Jesus—no serious Christian's did or could—as to suffer him to play freely with Jesus, to throw himself, more or less, into his character, to use him as a vehicle for saying, but in character and with verisimilitude, whatever the user wanted to convey. Plato might do this with Socrates, but the author of the Fourth Gospel could not do it with Jesus. And the safe analogy to take, in considering what for our Evangelist in dealing with his subject could and did happen, is the analogy, not of Plato, but of Paul.

The old school of apologists was fond of urging that the Fourth Gospel could only have been the work of one of the original chief apostles, it is so excellent. Baur has no difficulty in replying that in Paul we have a Christian who had probably never even seen Jesus, who was certainly not one of the original chief apostles, and who yet is at least equal to any of them, and whose productions surpass theirs. Why, therefore, may we not have, he argues, in the author of the Fourth Gospel a second gifted outsider like Paul, but whose name has remained unknown, because it was essential for his purpose that it should do so, and that his work should point mysteriously to the Apostle John as its author? Certainly we, for our part, feel no backwardness in admitting that outside of the primitive circle of the apostles there might arise Christians, like Paul, capable of making invaluable contributions to the New Testament. But we think that none of them could have done what Baur's theory supposes the author of the Fourth Gospel to have done; St. Paul himself could not have done it. The attitude of their minds towards Christianity and its founder was too earnest and reverential to allow it. When Paul quotes a *logion* like that exquisite *logion* quoted by him at Miletus, but not found in any one of our Evangelists, *It is more blessed to give than to receive,** he is clearly quoting Jesus, as he says he is, not artistically inventing for Jesus, not original. His manner when he is original we know, and it is quite different: *I try not mine own self (for I am conscious of nothing to myself, yet am I not hereby justified), but he that trieth me is the Lord.†* Imagine St. Paul sitting down to recommend the dogma of justification by faith, through means of a

* Acts xx. 35.

† 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4.

fancy Gospel composed of *logia* invented for Jesus, and suiting his character as *It is more blessed to give than to receive* suits his character! Paul could not have done it; any sound critic will feel that he could not. So, too, with the author of the Fourth Gospel. Where the *logia* are suited to the character of Jesus, they come from Jesus; where they are not, there we have the theological lecturer merely expanding a theme given by Jesus, developing or thinking that he develops it. But he remains himself in doing so. To possess himself as a dramatist of the personage of Jesus, to fix his sentiments and his whole part for him, as would be implied by inventing the fundamental themes instead of merely developing them, he would not have felt himself free.

The question for us will be, then: *Are there fundamental themes discoverable in the Fourth Gospel, and peculiar to it, which are quite according to the character of Jesus, and to his recognized habit of speech?* Because, if there are, our Evangelist has not invented them, but they must come from Jesus. Now that there are *logia* peculiar to the Fourth Gospel, which entirely suit the character and the habit of Jesus, as these are known to us from the Synoptics, we can hardly conceive any one denying; except, indeed, he have a thesis to make good which constrains him. Let us bring forward a few of them: "*A prophet has no honour in his own country.—My kingdom is not of this world.—In my Father's house are many mansions.—The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep.—Other men laboured, and ye are entered into their labours.—The poor ye have always with you, but me ye have not always.—The servant abideth not in the house for ever, the son abideth for ever.—A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow because her hour is come; but as soon as she is delivered of the child she remembereth no more her anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world.*"* Except a man be, we say, in the clutches of some tyrannous theory, we can hardly conceive his denying that these *logia* are as perfectly and naturally in the character of Jesus as are the most characteristic *logia* found in the Synoptics, such as: *Render Cæsar's things to Cæsar, and God's things to God; or, No man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God; or, Foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head.*†

Yet the Tübingen professors and our Liberal newspapers must surely have something to go upon, when they declare that the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel speaks quite differently from the Jesus of the Synoptics, and propound their theory of the Gnostic artist inventing, with profoundly calculated art, his fancy Gospel. No doubt they have. Jesus never can have made the long connected harangues, or entered into the formal development of his

* John xviii. 36; xiv. 2; x. 11; iv. 33; xii. 8; viii. 35; xvi. 21.

† Matt. xxii. 21; Luke ix. 62; Matt. viii. 20.

own nature and dignity, or made the endless repetitions, which are in the Fourth Gospel attributed to him. All this is so absolutely contrary to his manner, which we know both from his sayings in the Synoptics and from express testimony, that every rule of criticism bids us suspect it. The sayings in the Synoptics will be present to every one's mind; two or three of them, indeed, characteristic specimens, we have just brought forward. Justin's famous sentence has been again and again quoted: "Short and concise are the sayings that came from him, for he was no sophist, but his word was power divine."* And equally express is the following testimony, by no means so familiar, given by the pseudo-Clementine Homilies: "His wont was to make concise utterances touching the things of concernment to the truth."† A better description of the style of his sayings could hardly be given; they were *concise utterances touching the things of concernment to the truth*. The character of his parabolic and figured teaching tells its own story, and needs no describing; what distinguished his direct teaching was this its *gnomic* or maxim-like character.

These gnomic sayings of Jesus the Evangelists had to place in their narrative, and to provide for them a setting and a connection. The Greek editor of the Fourth Gospel provides this setting in a very different style from the Synoptics, just because he is a Greek, a man of literary skill and philosophical acquirements, and with an intellect trained in the Greek fashion. The gnomic form of teaching was not unknown in Greek philosophy, but at the Christian era this form was to Greek writers an archaic one. They had come to dovetail their thoughts into each other, join their sentences by articulations, and so frame their matter into one continuous discourse, just as we do now with ours; and, indeed, it is from the Greeks that the world learnt to do it. The author of the First Gospel was a Hebrew, and to the Semitic people the gnomic form, the delivering one's thought in detached sentences, was natural. To the author of the First Gospel, therefore, this form was natural, as it was to Jesus himself; and the form of the utterances of Jesus there can be no doubt that the First Gospel reproduces more faithfully than the Fourth. Still it is incredible that the Sermon on the Mount, or the prediction in the twenty-fourth chapter of the final troubles and of the coming of the Son of Man, should have been spoken straight off by Jesus just as they are given in the First Gospel. No sane critic will maintain that they were. In both passages the Evangelist has had a number of *logia* to place, and has given to them, as well as he could, a setting and connection in accordance with their subject-matter, and with the

* *Βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν, οὐ γὰρ σοφιστὴς ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν.*

† Hom. xvii. 6. *περὶ τῶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διαφερόντων συντόμως τὰς ἀποφάσεις ἐποίητο.*

occasion to which he knew them generally to belong. But he, for the most part, gives them their setting and connection simply by juxtaposing them; the editor of the Fourth Gospel, having to give this setting and connection to his *logia*, gives it by articulating them. Therefore he changes the look of the *logia* which he reports more than either of the three Synoptics changes it; he less faithfully reproduces the fashion in which each separate *logion* was originally said by Jesus.

Furthermore, the editor of the Fourth Gospel had to deal with a second harvest of *logia*, gathered from John after the first harvest of sayings had been reaped, and had made men eager for what might yet remain. The mass of the first harvest was sure to consist of the more picturesque, simple, and practical sayings of the Lord. In the nature of things it was probable that this should be so; from the character of the first reporters it was certain that it would be so. There remained a number of *logia* somewhat profounder and more obscure, more over the heads of the disciples than the simpler *logia*, and therefore less interesting to them. Of this kind were sayings in which Jesus spoke of his relation to the Father, and of life and death in the sense that he loved to give to those words. *I came forth from the Father; the Father sent me; my doctrine is not mine but his that sent me; the Father is greater than I; I can of mine own self do nothing; the Son can of himself do nothing, but only what he seeth the Father doing; he that hateth me hateth my Father also; I and the Father are one; he that believeth on me hath everlasting life; if a man keep my word he shall never see death; I am the resurrection and the life.** That sayings of this kind were from the first known and reported is proved by our finding in the First Gospel such a *logion* as the following: "All things are delivered unto me by my Father, and no one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any one the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."† We need hardly say that here the Tübingen professors smell *tendence*, and affirm that a piece of Greek Gnosticism must have got thrust into the Gospel of the old Jewish Evangelist. But these solutions we do not permit to ourselves; and the *logion*, famous in the history of the criticism of the New Testament text, is given by two out of the three Synoptics, by St. Luke‡ as well as St. Matthew. We receive it, therefore, as giving clear proof of the existence of sayings of the Lord on that class of subjects which the *logia* of the Fourth Gospel touch so frequently, subjects such as the relation of Jesus to the Father, and the like. Indeed, we do not see how Jesus could have pursued his design of transforming the popular ideal of the Messiah,

* John xvi. 27; xvii. 8, 18, 21, 23, 25; vii. 16; xiv. 28; v. 30; v. 19; xv. 23; x. 30; vi. 47; viii. 51; xi. 25.

† Matt. xi. 27.

‡ Luke x. 22.

who was announced by prophecy as the Son of God, without touching on such subjects. And it is in part to the prominence in the Fourth Gospel of sayings on them that the tradition points, when it so early distinguishes this as the *spiritual* Gospel.*

To the Greek editor of John's materials these *logia* naturally assumed a transcendent interest and importance. He was plainly a man, as we have said, of philosophical acquirements. True, religion was uppermost with him, not speculation; the tone of his prologue, though from Jesus such a performance is inconceivable, is profoundly religious, penetrated by the grace and truth of the religion of Jesus. Whoever compares it with what remains to us of the great Greek Gnostics, of Basileides or Valentinus, will feel that the difference between them and the writer of the Fourth Gospel lies here: that while they are above all men of speculative thought, he is above all a man of religion. Still, in this world of speculative thought he had lived, in this world of ceaseless questions, as Tertullian says, "*Unde malum et quare, et unde homo et quomodo, et unde Deus?*—whence and why is evil, and whence and how is man, and whence is God?" Such questions had in his eyes an infinite interest and importance; sayings of Jesus which bore upon them could not but rivet and fascinate his mind. In his redaction of John's materials we see that he cannot make too much of such *logia*; he returns to them again and again, and avails himself of every occasion for re-introducing them.

Well, then, to change the gnomic form of his fundamental themes, the sayings of Jesus, and to connect these into an articulated and flowing discourse, was a rule, as we have seen, of our Evangelist's redaction, and of itself necessitated a considerable change in his primitive data. A further change was caused by affection for certain themes, leading him to present these themes again and again, slightly varied. Moreover, in his whole redaction, in his presentment of sayings of Jesus as well as of incidents in his life, he laboured, in spite of his superiority to the Synoptics in literary skill and in philosophical thought, under one disadvantage. He had the disadvantage of a foreigner who presents manners, locutions, localities not his own, but alien to him. He could not be warned by that instinct which perpetually, on points of detail, keeps a native straight, and makes him feel certain things to be improbable and impossible.

We have seen that the internal evidence to be drawn from the Gospel itself contradicts Baur's theory of the consummate artist, at the end of the second century, freely inventing it all. But the internal evidence suits very well with the supposition of a Greek Christian editing a second harvest, for which the materials were fur-

* πνευματικὸν εὐαγγέλιον. See Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 14.

nished by John, of sayings and doings of the Lord, arranging them in his own fashion, and giving to the *logia* an interdependence and connection which originally they had not; moreover, amplifying and repeating certain *logia*, and making developments from them. Now, the tradition gives us John, in Asia, supplying the materials of this second harvest, but not himself editing them. If another edited them in Asia, for the benefit of the Asiatic Churches, this other was surely a Greek Christian; and if a Greek Christian edited them, he was likely to proceed in the way alleged, and of which the Gospel bears, surely, strong marks.

For, according to all the rules, we will not say of criticism, but of common sense—according to all rules of probability, and of speakers speaking in character, and not violently and unaccountably deserting it—can anything be more incredible than that Jesus should have actually spoken to Nicodemus, or John the Baptist to a disciple, the latter part of the speeches attributed to them in the third chapter of our Gospel? Let us take first the speech to Nicodemus. It is probable that the real end of the dialogue is to be found in the tenth verse: “Art thou Israel’s teacher, and knowest not these things?” But our Evangelist had two other *logia* of Jesus: “We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen, and ye receive not our testimony;”^{*} and, “If I tell you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things?”[†] which admitted of being placed in this connection; so here he places them. This, we say, is probable; but what is certain is, that Jesus did not speak the verse which follows these two *logia*, the thirteenth: “And no man hath ascended up into heaven save he that came down from heaven, the Son of Man.” That is a variation on a primitive theme of Jesus, *I am the bread that came down from heaven*,[‡] inserted here by our theological lecturer, because he knew that it was a theme dwelt upon by Jesus, and thought that he saw here a natural place for it. A genuine *logion* of Jesus follows, bearing every mark of being still quite or almost in its original form, but woven into this context by our lecturer, and owing its connection with what precedes simply to his conjunction *and*: “As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth on him may have everlasting life.” Then enters the theological lecturer, and continues (one may almost say) lecturing in his own proper person till the end of the speech, from the sixteenth verse to the twenty-first. For who, that has studied the sayings of Jesus well, can ever believe that Jesus said: “For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, to the end that whosoever believeth in him should

^{*} John iii. 11.

[†] John iii. 12.

[‡] John vi. 41.

have everlasting life,"* and the rest? Our Evangelist does not, however, in these verses, think he is inventing; for he is going all the time upon three primitive themes of Jesus: *He that believeth on me hath everlasting life; I came not to judge the world, but to save the world; I am come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness.*† On these genuine *logia* he is going, and he merely amplifies and repeats them, developing them, in his own judgment, naturally, and as it was to be supposed Jesus himself did.

Let us now pass to the speech of John the Baptist, at the end of the same chapter. The real sayings assigned to John the Baptist by our Evangelist's tradition ended, one can hardly doubt, with the words: "He must increase, but I must decrease."‡ The rest, down to the end of the thirty-sixth verse, is our theological lecturer. Only a criticism which sees no impossibility in Jesus having spoken the sixteenth verse of this chapter will see no impossibility in John the Baptist's having spoken the thirty-sixth. But again our Evangelist is not inventing, but developing. He has certain genuine *logia* of Jesus as his basis, the chief of them being that which we have already quoted: "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life."§ He has these *logia* with several variations of phrase, indicating that they were used more than once, in more connections than one, perhaps by more than one speaker. The speech of John the Baptist seems to him a connection eminently proper for them. The Baptist's real words appear to him to imply their adoption and addition; it appears to him natural and certain that the Baptist adopted and added them. So we come to have John the Baptist saying: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; but he that believeth not the Son hath not life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."||

All that is said of "the dogmatic mysticism and artificial, prolix discourses" of the Fourth Gospel, all the complaints of its substituting "for the sublime and pregnant discourses of the Sea of Galilee and the Mount of Olives the arid mysticism of the schools of Alexandria," will be found, we think, so far as they are just, to be best met by the supposition of a Greek editor connecting, repeating, and amplifying themes of Jesus, not by the supposition of a consummate artist inventing the whole Gospel. The kernel of the work, the fundamental themes of Jesus, we maintain to be no "arid mysticism" at all, but to be in profound unison with "the sublime and pregnant discourses of the Sea of Galilee and

* The text of the Vatican manuscript is followed.

† John xii. 47; vi. 47; xii. 46.

‡ John iii. 30.

§ John vi. 47. The true sense is given by Jesus in a *logion* quoted v. 24; but the theme itself in its most concise and authentic form is probably the verse at vi. 47, in the reading of the Vatican manuscript, which omits *on me*, and has simply, *ὁ πιστεύων ἐν ἐμοὶ αἰώνιον ἔχει τὴν αἰώνιον*.

|| John iii. 36.

the Mount of Olives." And we do not see who was capable of uttering them but Jesus. Unless our Evangelist invented them, we do not see from whom he can have got them, except from Jesus; and, indeed, it is not even contended that he got them from any one else. But it is contended, in defiance of all the tradition, that he himself invented them. But to us it seems incredible, even on grounds of literary criticism solely, that the man who was such a consummate artist as to invent for Jesus the first part of his conversation with Nicodemus should have followed it up by the second. It seems incredible that a dramatic genius capable of inventing for John the Baptist: "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom, but the friend of the bridegroom, who standeth and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice; this my joy therefore is fulfilled,"*—it seems incredible that such a genius should have finished the Baptist's speech by making him say: "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."† And the question, whether this is incredible or no, we would cheerfully consent to submit to the judgment of any competent tribunal; only the judges constituting the tribunal ought not to be the professors of the theological faculties of Germany, but Germans like Lessing, Herder, and Goethe.

It is certain that what is theological lecture in the speeches of Jesus comes not from him but from his editor. But a treasure of *logia* remains, which have all the characters of genuine sayings of Jesus, and which are invaluable as indicating the line really taken by him. The *bread of life*, the *true vine*, the *good shepherd*, the *light of the world*, are all of them images from the Old Testament, such as the hearers of Jesus were familiar with and gladly heard, such as Jesus himself loved naturally, and used instinctively, and such as he could and did make admirably helpful to his main design. That design was, it cannot be too often repeated, to change the popular Messias-ideal; and what stroke towards such an end could be at once more happy and more characteristic of Jesus than when, for example, calling himself *the light of the world*,‡ he in a moment identified for his followers his ideal of mildness and self-renouncement with the famous world-light of Messianic prophecy: "It is a small thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a *light of the Gentiles*, that my salvation may be unto the ends of the earth?"§ Strokes like these belong essentially to Jesus, and it is an unsound criticism which can think of assigning them to our theological lecturer.

Many, too, of the objections brought against *logia* of the

* John iii. 29.

† John viii. 12.

‡ John iii. 36.

§ Isaiah xlix. 6.

Fourth Gospel are frivolous, and merely show the bringer's want of imagination. It is objected that Jesus cannot have said: "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so shall the Son of Man be lifted up,"* because he could not have foreseen the manner of his own death. But he fixed on the most miserable kind of death as his fitting and sure climax; and Plato, following up a supposed sufferer to his climax of misery, fixes, we shall find, upon the very same:—"Finally," says he, "we will suppose him crucified."† It is objected that Jesus cannot have said to his disciples things like: *He that eateth me shall live by me*,‡ because the disciples were certain to misunderstand them, and he would not have said things they must misunderstand. This is a most extraordinary objection; one can account for it only by the strong reluctance of mankind to recognize the gulf between every great spirit and themselves. Half of what any great spirit says is sure to be misapprehended by his hearers; nine-tenths of what Jesus said was sure to be misapprehended by his disciples. If he talked to them at all, he could not but talk to them as he did; and if he talked to them as he did, taking their language about God, the Messiah, life and death, and translating it into that of his higher ideal, they could not but misunderstand him. Yet he could not but talk to them, and they could not but reap some benefit from it. What Christianity has done up to this time is the measure of the benefit which Jesus, even imperfectly apprehended, could produce; and that benefit has been something immense. But such are the necessary conditions on which a great spirit speaks to those who hear his word; they appropriate what they can of it, and get helped along by it somehow.

Let us look closer at the very *logion*, the famous *logion*, last quoted, and observe how in itself it is an entirely probable saying of Jesus, and how its improbability all comes from its editor's treatment of it. The *logion* is exactly what we call a primitive theme, a nucleus. Our Evangelist composed, of course, his sixth chapter with the institution of the Last Supper full in his view, and with the words, *This is my body*, *This is my blood*, ever present to his thoughts. But he had anterior incidents and words to go upon. He had a story of John how the Jews, with the multitude's faith in miracles, and desire to get them worked for its benefit, had required Jesus, as the alleged "prophet like unto Moses," to feed them miraculously as Moses did. Was it not written in the Scriptures: "He gave them bread from heaven to eat?"§ Our Evangelist had a tradition from John of sayings and answers which this demand of the Jews had called forth. Jesus had

* John iii. 14.

† John vi. 57.

‡ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. xxviii.

§ Ps. lxxviii. 24.

said: "Labour not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life."* He had said: "Not Moses gave you the bread from heaven, but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven."† "Give us then this bread,"‡ was the Jews' rejoinder. Jesus had answered: "He that believeth hath everlasting life; he that heareth my word and believeth him that sent me hath everlasting life. I am the bread of life! I am the bread that came down from heaven! He that cometh to me shall never hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst! Not as your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness and are dead; he that eateth this bread shall live for ever."§ The Jews, with their keen sensuousness, were familiar with the image of God's word as something to feed on, something good to eat and pleasant to taste. It is written in the Psalms: "How sweet are thy words unto my taste, yea, sweeter than honey unto my mouth!"|| But they exclaimed, when Jesus called himself the bread from heaven: "Is not this Jesus the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how saith he that *I am come down from heaven?* how can he give us his flesh to eat?"¶ Jesus answered: "As the living Father sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, he also shall live by me."***

These we may take as the primitive themes out of which our Evangelist's sixth chapter is built up. Other genuine *logia* are worked into it. But they are worked into it; they are not its essential elements. Most probably, too, the primitive themes were several times reiterated by Jesus, not without some variation. But we shall hardly err if we take the primitive themes above given, as our nearest possible approach to what Jesus and his interlocutors did actually say. 'And this substratum being committed to our combining and amplifying Greek editor, how natural and explicable becomes the apparition, in the chapter, of those sayings which now stagger every serious critic! It is almost inconceivable, if one thinks of it, that Jesus should have actually said in the conversation in question: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in yourselves; he that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up in the last day; for my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed."†† But it is perfectly conceivable that he should have said, the image of the bread from heaven being once started: "*I am the bread of life! he that eateth me shall live by me!*"‡‡ and that our editor, being such a man

* John vi. 27.

† John vi. 32.

‡ John vi. 84.

§ John vi. 41, 47 (compare v. 24), 48, 58, and 49.

|| Pa. cix. 103.

¶ John vi. 42, 52.

** John vi. 57.

†† John vi. 53–55.

‡‡ John vi. 48, 57.

as we suppose, and having the words of institution of the Last Supper swaying his mind, should, by his mode of combining, re-iterating, and developing these primitive themes, when he had them to place, have turned them into such speeches of Jesus as now stagger us.

Again, it is almost inconceivable that Jesus should have really said: "For the bread of God is he *that cometh down from heaven*, and that giveth life unto the world;" or that he should have said: "*I am come down from heaven*, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me."* But it is most natural that our editor, having such primitive themes of Jesus as, "I am the bread that came down from heaven! I am the bread of life! I came not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me!"† should have combined them and developed them in the way he does. It is utterly inconceivable that after saying, "Labour not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life," Jesus should have added, "which the Son of man will give unto you, for him hath the Father sealed, even God."‡ It is utterly inconceivable that after saying, "It is written in the prophets: *And they shall be all taught of God!* Every one that heareth and learneth from the Father cometh unto me,"—he should have subjoined the remark: "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he who is from God; he hath seen the Father."§ These additions are inconceivable from Jesus, because both the matter and the manner of them are the clean opposite of his. But it was in entire conformity with our theological lecturer's notions and style, after giving the genuine *logia* of Jesus, to complete and guard the sense of them, as he fancied, by the amplifying clauses.

We have been far longer than we could wish; nevertheless let us be allowed to trace in yet one or two more instances this way of proceeding by the combination, the repetition, the amplification and development of his data, which is so characteristic of our Evangelist, and so necessary to be seized by whoever would read his Gospel aright. Then we will sum up and conclude.

MATTHEW ARNOLD.

* John vi. 33, 38.

† John vi. 27.

‡ John vi. 41, 48, 38.

§ John vi. 45, 46.



ON ANIMAL INSTINCT:

IN ITS RELATION TO THE MIND OF MAN.

THE very old question whether animals are "automata" was raised by Professor Huxley in the *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1874. It has been since pursued here in successive papers of much ability by Dr. Carpenter, and Mr. Mivart. I find myself in partial agreement sometimes with one, sometimes with another of these writers, and yet on some important matters dissenting from them all. Approaching the subject from a different point of view, I cannot better explain the aspect in which this question presents itself to me than by discussing it in connection with certain exhibitions of animal instinct which I had occasion, to observe during the spring and summer of last year. They were not uncommon cases. On the contrary they were of a kind of which the whole world is full. But not the less directly did they suggest all the problems under discussion, and not the less forcibly did they strike me with the admiration and the wonder which no familiarity can exhaust.

The Dipper or Water-ousel (*Cinclus aquaticus*) is well known to ornithologists as one of the most curious and interesting of British birds. Its special habitat is clear mountain streams. These it never leaves except to visit the lakes into which or from which they flow. Without the assistance of webbed feet it has extraordinary powers of swimming and of diving—moving about upon and under the surface with more than the ease and dexterity of a fish—hunting along the bottom as if it had no power to float—

floating on the top as if it had no power to sink—now diving where the stream is smooth, now where it is quick and broken, and suddenly reappearing perched on the summit of some projecting point. Its plumage is in perfect harmony with its “environment”—dark, with a pure white breast, which looks exactly like one of the flashes of light so numerous in rapid streams, or one of the little balls of foam which loiter among the stones. Its very song is set to the music of rapid waters. No bird, perhaps, is more specially adapted to a very special home, and very peculiar habits of life. The same species, or other forms so closely similar as to seem mere varieties, are found in almost every country of the world where there are mountain streams. And yet it is a species having no very near affinity with any other bird, and it constitutes by itself a separate genus. It is therefore a species of great interest to the naturalist, and raises some of the most perplexing questions connected with the “origin of species.”

A pair of these birds built their nest last year at Inverary, in a hole in the wall of a small tunnel constructed to carry a rivulet under the walks of a pleasure ground. The season was one of great drought, and the rivulet, during the whole time of incubation, and of the growth of the young in the nest, was nearly entirely dry. One of the nestlings when almost fully fledged, was taken out by the hand for examination, an operation which so alarmed the others that they darted out of the hole, and ran and fluttered down the tunnel towards its mouth. At that point a considerable pool of water had survived the drought, and lay in the path of the fugitives. They did not at all appear to seek it; on the contrary, their flight seemed to be as aimless as that of any other fledgling would have been in the same predicament. But one of them stumbled into the pool. The effect was most curious. When the young bird touched the water there was a moment of pause, as if the creature were surprised. Then instantly there seemed to wake within it the sense of its hereditary powers. Down it dived with all the facility of its parents, and the action of its wings under the water was a beautiful exhibition of the double adaptation to progression in two very different elements, which is peculiar to the wings of most of the diving birds. The young Dipper was immediately lost to sight among some weeds, and so long did it remain under water that I feared it must be drowned. But in due time it reappeared all right, and, being recaptured, was replaced in the nest.

Later in the season, on a secluded lake in one of the Hebrides, I observed a Dun-diver, or female of the Red-breasted Merganser, (*Mergus serrator*) with her brood of young ducklings. On giving chase in the boat, we soon found that the young, although not above a fortnight old, had such extraordinary powers of swimming

and diving, that it was almost impossible to capture them. The distance they went under water, and the unexpected places in which they emerged, baffled all our efforts for a considerable time. At last one of the brood made for the shore, with the object of hiding among the grass and heather which fringed the margin of the lake. We pursued it as closely as we could, but when the little bird gained the shore, our boat was still about twenty yards off. Long drought had left a broad margin of small flat stones and mud between the water and the usual bank. I saw the little bird run up about a couple of yards from the water, and then suddenly disappear. Knowing what was likely to be enacted, I kept my eye fixed on the spot; and when the boat was run upon the beach, I proceeded to find and pick up the chick. But on reaching the place of disappearance, no sign of the young Merganser was to be seen. The closest scrutiny, with the certain knowledge that it was there, failed to enable me to detect it. Proceeding cautiously forwards, I soon became convinced that I had already overshot the mark; and, on turning round, it was only to see the bird rise like an apparition from the stones, and dashing past the stranded boat, regain the lake,—where having now recovered its wind, it instantly dived and disappeared. The tactical skill of the whole of this manoeuvre, and the success with which it was executed, were greeted with loud cheers from the whole party; and our admiration was not diminished when we remembered that some two weeks before that time the little performer had been coiled up inside the shell of an egg, and that about a month before it was nothing but a mass of albumen and of fatty oils.

The third case of animal instinct which I shall here mention was of a different but of an equally common kind. In walking along the side of a river with overhanging banks, I came suddenly on a common Wild Duck (*Anas Boschas*) whose young were just out. Springing from under the bank, she fluttered out into the stream with loud cries and with all the struggles to escape of a helplessly-wounded bird. To simulate the effects of suffering from disease, or from strong emotion, or from wounds upon the human frame, is a common necessity of the actor's art, and it is not often really well done. The tricks of the theatre are seldom natural, and it is not without reason that "theatrical" has become a proverbial expression for false and artificial representations of the realities of life. It was therefore with no small interest that on this, as on many other occasions, I watched the perfection of an art which Mrs. Siddons might have envied. The laboured and half-convulsive flapping of the wings, the wriggling of the body, the straining of the neck, and the whole expression of painful and abortive effort, were really admirable. When her struggles had carried her a considerable distance, and she saw that they produced

no effect in tempting us to follow, she made resounding flaps upon the surface of the water, to secure that attention to herself which it was the great object of the manoeuvre to attract. Then, rising suddenly in the air, she made a great circle round us, and returning to the spot renewed her endeavours as before. It was not, however, necessary; for the separate instinct of the young in successful hiding effectually baffled all my attempts to discover them.

Let us now look at the questions which these several exhibitions of animal instinct cannot fail to suggest; and first let us take the case of the young Dipper. There was no possibility of imitation here. The rivulet beneath the nest, even if it had been visible to the nestlings, had been dry ever since they had been hatched. The river into which it ordinarily flowed was out of sight. The young Dippers never could have seen the parent birds either swimming or diving. This, therefore, is one of the thousand cases which have driven the "experience" school of philosophy to take up new ground. The young Dipper here cannot possibly have had any experience, either through the process of incipient effort, or through the process of sight and imitation. Nature is full of similar cases. In face of them it is now no longer denied that in all such cases "innate ideas" do exist, and that "pre-established harmonies" do prevail in nature. These old doctrines, so long ridiculed and denied, have come to be admitted, and the new philosophy is satisfied with attempts to explain how these "ideas" came to be innate, and how these harmonies came to be pre-established. The explanation is, that, though the efficiency of experience as the cause or source of instinct must be given up as regards the individual, we may keep it as regards the race to which the individual belongs. The powers of swimming and diving, and the impulse to use them for their appropriate purpose, were indeed innate in the little Dipper of 1874. But then they were not innate in its remote progenitors. They were acquired by those progenitors through gradual effort—the trying leading to success, and the success again leading to more trying—both together leading first to special faculty, then to confirmed habit, and then, by hereditary transmission, to instinct "organized in the race." Well, but even if this be true, was not the disposition of the progenitors to make the first efforts in the direction of swimming and diving, and were not the organs which enabled them to do so, as purely innate as the perfected instinct and the perfected organs of the Dipper of to-day? Did there ever exist in any former period of the world what, so far as I know, does certainly not exist now—any animal with dispositions to enter on a new career, thought of and imagined for the first time by itself, unconnected with any organs already fitted for and appropriate to the purpose? Even the

highest acquirements of the Dog, under highly artificial conditions of existence, and under the guidance of persistent "interferences with nature," are nothing but the special education of original instincts. In the almost human caution of the old and well-trained pointer when approaching game, we see simply a development of the habit of all predatory animals to pause when close upon an unseen prey—a pause requisite to verify the intimations of smell by the sense of sight, and also for preparing the final spring. It is true that man "selects," but he can only select out of what is already there. The training and direction which he gives to the promptings of instinct may properly be described as the result of experience in the animal under instruction; and it is undoubtedly true, that within certain limits (which, however, are after all very narrow) these results do tend to become hereditary. But there is nothing really analogous in nature to the artificial processes of training to which Man subjects the animals which are capable of domestication. Or if there be anything analogous—if animals by themselves can school themselves by gradual effort into the development of new powers—if the habits and powers which are now purely innate and instinctive, were once less innate and more deliberate—then it will follow that the earlier faculties of animals have been the higher, and the later faculties are the lower in the scale of intelligence. This is hardly consistent with the idea of evolution, which is founded on the conception of an unfolding or development from the lower to the higher, from the simple to the complex, from the instinctive to the rational. My own belief is, that whatever of truth there is in the doctrine of evolution is to be found in this conception, which so far as we can see, does seem to be embodied in the history of organic life. I can therefore see no light in this new explanation to account for the existence of instincts which are certainly antecedent to all individual experience—the explanation, namely, that they are due to the experience of progenitors "organized in the race." It involves assumptions contrary to the analogies of Nature, and at variance with the fundamental facts which are the best and, indeed, the only basis of the theory of evolution. There is no probability—there is hardly any plausibility—in the supposition that experience has had, in past times, some connection with instinct which it has ceased to have in the present day. The uniformity of nature has, indeed, often been asserted in a sense in which it is not true, and used in support of arguments which it will not sustain. All things have certainly not continued as they are since the beginning. There was a time when animal life, and with it animal instincts, began to be. But we have no reason whatever to suppose that the nature of instinct then or since has ever been different from its nature now. On the contrary, as we have in

existing nature examples of it in infinite variety, from the very lowest to the very highest forms of organization, and as the same phenomena are everywhere repeated, we have the best reason to conclude that, in the past, animal instinct has ever been what we now see it to be, congenital, innate, and wholly independent of experience.

And indeed, when we come to think about it, we shall find that the theory of experience assumes the pre-existence of the very powers for which it professes to account. The very lowest of the faculties by which experience is acquired is the faculty of imitation. But the desire to imitate must be as instinctive as the organs are hereditary by which imitation is effected. Then follow in their order all the higher faculties by which the lessons of experience are put together—so that what has been in the past is made the basis of anticipation as to what will be in the future. This is the essential process by which experience is acquired, and every step in that process assumes the pre-existence of mental tendencies and of mental powers which are purely instinctive and innate. To account for instinct by experience is nothing but an Irish ball. It denies the existence of things which are nevertheless assumed in the very terms of the denial: it elevates into a cause that which must in its nature be a consequence; and a consequence, too, of the very cause which is denied. Congenital instincts; and hereditary powers, and pre-established harmonies, are the origin of all experience, and without them no one step in experience could ever be gained. The questions raised when a young Dipper, which had never before even seen water, dives and swims with perfect ease, are questions which the theory of organized experience does not even tend to solve; on the contrary, it is a theory which leaves those questions precisely where they were, except in so far as it may tend to obscure them by obvious confusions of thought.

Passing now from explanations which explain nothing, is there any light in the theory that animals are "automata?" Was my little Dipper a diving-machine? It seems to me that there is at least a glimmer shining through this idea—a glimmer as of a real light struggling through a thick fog. The fog arises out of the mists of language—the confounding and confusing of meanings literal with meanings metaphorical—the mistaking of partial for complete analogies. Machine is the word by which we designate those combinations of mechanical force which are contrived and put together by Man to do certain things. One essential characteristic of them is that they belong to the world of the not-living; they are destitute of that which we know as life, and of all the attributes by which it is distinguished. Machines have no sensibility. When we say of anything that it has been done by a machine, we mean

that it has been done by something which is not alive. In this literal signification it is therefore pure nonsense to say that anything living is a machine. It is simply a misapplication of language, to the extent of calling one thing by the name of another thing, and that other so different as to be its opposite or contradictory. There can be no reasoning, no clearing up of truth, unless we keep definite words for definite ideas. Or if the idea to which a given word has been appropriated be a complex idea, and we desire to deal with one element only of the meaning, separated from the rest, then, indeed, we may continue to use the word for this selected portion of its meaning, provided always that we bear in mind what it is that we are doing. This may be, and often is, a necessary operation, for language is not rich enough to furnish separate words for all the complex elements which enter into ideas apparently very simple; and so of this word, machine, there is an element in its meaning which is always very important, which in common language is often predominant, and which we may legitimately choose to make exclusive of every other. This essential element in our idea of a machine, is that its powers, whatever they may be, are derived, and not original. There may be great knowledge in the work done by a machine, but the knowledge is not in it. There may be great skill, but the skill is not in it; great foresight, but the foresight is not in it; in short, great exhibition of all the powers of mind, but the mind is not in the machine itself. Whatever it does is done in virtue of its construction, which construction is due to a mind which has designed it for the exhibition of certain powers, and the performance of certain functions. These may be very simple, or they may be very complicated, but whether simple or complicated, the whole play of its operations is limited and measured by the intentions of its constructor. If that constructor be himself limited, either in opportunity, or knowledge, or in power, there will be a corresponding limitation in the things which he invents and makes. Accordingly, in regard to Man, he cannot make a machine which has any of the gifts and the powers of life. He can construct nothing which has sensibility or consciousness, or any other of even the lowest attributes of living creatures. And this absolute destitution of even apparent originality in a machine—this entire absence of any share of consciousness, or of sensibility, or of will—is one part of our very conception of it. But that other part of our conception of a machine, which consists in its relation to a contriver and constructor, is equally essential, and may, if we choose, be separated from the rest, and may be taken as representative of the whole. If, then, there be any Agency in Nature, or outside of it, which can contrive and build up structures endowed with the gifts of life, structures which shall not only digest, but which

shall also feel and see, which shall be sensible of enjoyment from things conducive to their welfare, and of alarm on account of things which are dangerous to the same,—then such structures have the same relation to that Agency which machines have to Man, and in this aspect it may be a legitimate figure of speech to call them living machines. What these machines do is different in kind from the things which human machines do ; but both are alike in this—that whatever they do is done in virtue of their construction, and of the powers which have been given to them by the mind which made them.

Applying now this idea of a machine to the phenomena exhibited by the young Dipper, its complete applicability cannot be denied. In the first place the young Dipper had a physical structure adapted to diving. Its feathers were of a texture to throw off water, and the shower of pearly drops which ran off it, when it emerged from its first plunge, showed in a moment how different it was from other fledglings in its imperviousness to wet. Water appeared to be its “native element” precisely in the same sense in which it is said to be the native element of a ship which has been built high in air, and of the not very watery materials of wood and iron. Water which it had never seen before seemed to be the native element of the little bird in this sense, that it was so constructed as to be and to feel at home in it at once. Its “lines” had been laid down for progression both in air and water. It was launched with a motive-power complete within itself, and with promptings sufficient for the driving of its own machinery. For the physical adaptation was obviously united with mental powers and qualities which partook of the same pre-adjusted harmony. These were as congenital as the texture of its feathers or the structure of its wing. Its terror arose on seeing the proper objects of fear, although they had never been seen before, and no experience of injury had arisen. This terror prompted it to the proper methods of escape, and the knowledge how to use its faculties for this object was as intuitive as the apparatus for effecting it was hereditary. In this sense the Dipper was a living, breathing, seeing, fearing, and diving machine—ready made for all these purposes from the nest—as some other birds are even from their first exclusion from the egg.

The case of the young Merganser is still more curious and instructive with reference to the same questions. The young of all the *Anatida* are born, like the gallinaceous birds, not naked or blind as most others are, but completely equipped with a feathery down, and able to swim or dive as soon as they see the light. Moreover the young of the Merganser have the benefit of seeing from the first the parent bird performing these operations, so that imitation may have some part in developing the perfection with which they are executed by the young. But the particular manoeuvre

resorted to by the young bird which baffled our pursuit, was a manoeuvre in which it could have had no instruction from example—the manoeuvre, namely, which consists in hiding not under any cover but by remaining perfectly motionless on the ground. This is a method of escape which cannot be resorted to successfully except by birds whose colouring is adapted to the purpose by a close assimilation with the colouring of surrounding objects. The old bird would not have been concealed on the same ground, and would never itself resort to the same method of escape. The young, therefore, cannot have been instructed in it by the method of example. But the small size of the chick, together with its obscure and curiously mottled colouring; are specially adapted to this mode of concealment. The young of all birds which breed upon the ground are provided with a garment in such perfect harmony with surrounding effects of light as to render this manoeuvre easy. It depends, however, wholly for its success upon absolute stillness. The slightest motion at once attracts the eye of any enemy which is searching for the young. And this absolute stillness must be preserved amidst all the emotions of fear and terror which the close approach of the object of alarm must, and obviously does, inspire. Whence comes this splendid, even if it be unconscious faith, in the sufficiency of a defence which it must require such nerve and strength of will to practise? No movement, not even the slightest, though the enemy should seem about to trample on it: such is the terrible requirement of Nature—and by the child of Nature implicitly obeyed! Here again, beyond all question, we have an instinct as much born with the creature as the harmonious tinting of its plumage—the external furnishing being inseparably united with the internal furnishing of mind which enables the little creature in very truth to “walk by faith and not by sight.” Is this automatism? Is this machinery? Yes, undoubtedly, in the sense explained before—that the instinct has been given to the bird in precisely the same sense in which its structure has been given to it—so that anterior to all experience, and without the aid of instruction or of example, it is inspired to act in this manner on the appropriate occasion arising.

Then, in the case of the Wild Duck, we rise to a yet higher form of instinct, and to more complicated adaptations of congenital powers to the contingencies of the external world. It is not really conceivable that Wild Ducks have commonly many opportunities of studying each other's action when rendered helpless by wounds. Nor is it conceivable that such study can have been deliberately made even when opportunities do occur. When one out of a flock is wounded all the others make haste to escape, and it is certain that this trick of imitated helplessness is practised by

individual birds which can never have had any such opportunities at all. Moreover there is one very remarkable circumstance connected with this instinct, which marks how much of knowledge and of reasoning is implicitly contained within it. As against Man the manœuvre is not only useless but it is injurious. When a man sees a bird resorting to this imitation, he may be deceived for a moment, as I have myself been; but his knowledge and experience and his reasoning faculty soon tell him from a combination of circumstances, that it is merely the usual deception. To Man, therefore, it has the opposite effect of revealing the proximity of the young brood, which would not otherwise be known. I have repeatedly been led by it to the discovery of the chicks. Now, the most curious fact of all is that this distinction between Man and other predacious animals is recognized and reflected in the instinct of birds. The manœuvre of counterfeiting helplessness is very rarely resorted to except when a dog is present. Dogs are almost uniformly deceived by it. They never can resist the temptation presented by a bird which flutters apparently helpless just in front of their nose. It is, therefore, almost always successful in drawing them off, and so rescuing the young from danger. But it is the sense of smell, not the sense of sight which makes dogs so specially dangerous. The instinct which has been given to birds seems to cover and include the knowledge that as the sense of smell does not exist to the like effect in Man, the mere concealment of the young from sight is ordinarily as regards him sufficient for their protection: and yet I have on one occasion seen the trick resorted to when Man only was the source of danger, and this by a species of bird which does not habitually practise it, and which can neither have had individual nor ancestral experience. This was the case of a Blackcap (*Sylvia Atricapilla*) which fell to the ground as if wounded from a bush, in order to distract attention from its nest.

If now we examine, in the light of our own reason, all the elements of knowledge or of intellectual perception upon which the instinct of the Wild Duck is founded, and all of which, as existing somewhere, it undoubtedly reflects, we shall soon see how various and extensive these elements of knowledge are. First, there is the knowledge that the cause of the alarm is a carnivorous animal. On this fundamental point no creature is ever deceived. The youngest chick knows a hawk, and the dreadful form fills it with instant terror. Next, there is the knowledge that dogs and other carnivorous quadrupeds have the sense of smell, as an additional element of danger to the creatures on which they prey. Next, there is the knowledge that the dog, not being itself a flying animal, has sense enough not to attempt the pursuit of prey which can

avail itself of this sure and easy method of escape. Next, there is the conclusion from all this knowledge, that if the dog is to be induced to chase, it must be led to suppose that the power of flight has been somehow lost. And then there is the farther conclusion, that this can only be done by such an accurate imitation of a disabled bird as shall deceive the enemy into a belief in the possibility of capture. And lastly, there are all the powers of memory and the qualities of imagination which enable good acting to be performed. All this reasoning and all this knowledge is certainly involved in the action of the bird-mother, just as certainly as reasoning and knowledge of a much profounder kind is involved in the structure or adjustment of the organic machinery by which and through which the action is itself performed.

There is unquestionably a sense, and a very important sense, in which all these wonderful operations of instinct are "automatic." The intimate knowledge of physical and of physiological laws—the knowledge even of the mental qualities and dispositions of other animals—and the processes of reasoning by which advantage is taken of these,—this knowledge and this reasoning cannot, without manifest absurdity, be attributed to the birds themselves. This is admitted at least as regards the birds of the present day. But surely the absurdity is quite as great if this knowledge and reasoning, or any part of it, be attributed to the birds of a former generation. In the past history of the species there may have been change—there may have been development. But there is not the smallest reason to believe that the progenitors of any bird or of any beast, however different in form, have ever founded on deliberate effort the instincts of their descendants. All the knowledge and all the resource of mind which is involved in these instincts is a reflection of some Agency which is outside the creatures which exhibit them. In this respect it may be said with truth that they are machines. But then they are machines with this peculiarity, that they not only reflect, but also in various measures and degrees partake of, the attributes of mind. It is always by some one or other of these attributes that they are guided—by fear, or by desire, or by affection, or by mental impulses which go straight to the results of reasoning without its processes. That all these mental attributes are connected with a physical organism which is constructed on mechanical principles, is not a matter of speculation. It is an obvious and acknowledged fact. The question is not whether, in this sense, animals are machines, but whether the work which has been assigned to them does or does not partake in various measures and degrees of the various qualities which we recognize in ourselves as the qualities of sensation, of consciousness, and of will.

On this matter it seems clear to me that Professor Huxley has seriously misconceived the doctrine of Descartes. It is true that he quotes a passage as representing the view of "orthodox Cartesians," in which it is asserted that animals "eat without pleasure, and cry without pain," and that they "desire" nothing as well as "know" nothing. But this passage is quoted, not from Descartes, but from Malebranche. Malebranche was a great man; but on this subject he was the disciple and not the master; and it seems almost a law that no utterance of original genius can long escape the fate of being travestied and turned to nonsense by those who take it up at second hand. Descartes' letter to More of the 5th Feb., 1649, proves conclusively that he fully recognized in the lower animals the existence of all the affections of mind except "Thought" (*la Pensée*), or Reason properly so called. He ascribes to them the mental emotions of fear, of anger, and of desire, as well as all the sensations of pleasure and of pain. What he means by Thought is clearly indicated in the passage in which he points to Language as the peculiar product and the sole index of Thought—Language, of course, taken in its broadest sense, signifying any system of signs by which general or abstract ideas are expressed and communicated. This, as Descartes truly says, is never wanting even in the lowest of men, and is never present even in the highest of the brutes. But he distinctly says that the lower animals, having the same organs of sight, of hearing, of taste, &c., with ourselves, have also the same sensations, as well as the same affections of anger, of fear, and of desire—affections which, being mental, he ascribes to a lower kind or class of Soul, an "*âme corporelle*." Descartes, therefore, was not guilty of confounding the two elements of meaning which are involved in the word machine—that element which attaches to all human machines as consisting of dead non-sentient matter—and that other element of meaning which may be legitimately attached to structures which have been made, not to simulate, but really to possess all the essential properties of life. "*Il faut pourtant remarquer*," says Descartes, emphatically; "*que je parle de la pensée, non de la vie, ou de sentiment.*"*

The experiments quoted by Professor Huxley and by other Physiologists, on the phenomena of vivisection, cannot alter or modify the general conclusions which have long been reached on the unquestionable connection between all the functions of life and the mechanism of the body. The question remains whether the ascertainment of this connection in its details can alter our conceptions of what life and sensation are. No light is thrown on this question by cutting out from an organism

* Œuvres de Descartes (Cousin), vol. x. p. 203 et seq.

certain parts of the machinery which are known to be the seat of consciousness, and then finding that the animal is still capable of certain movements which are usually indicative of sensation and of purpose. Surely the reasoning is bad which argues that because a given movement goes on after the animal has been mutilated, this movement must therefore continue to possess all the same elements of character which accompanied it when the animal was complete. The character of purpose in one sense or another belongs to all organic movements whatever—to those which are independent of conscious sensation, or of the will, as well as to those which are voluntary and intentional. The only difference between the two classes of movement is that in the case of one of them the purpose is wholly outside the animal, and that in the case of the other class of movement the animal has faculties which make it, however indirectly, a conscious participant or agent in the purpose, or in some part of the purpose, to be subserved. The action of the heart in animals is as certainly “purposive” in its character as the act of eating and deglutition. In the one the animal is wholly passive—has no sensation, no consciousness, however dim. In the other movement the animal is an active agent, is impelled to it by desires which are mental affections, and receives from it the appropriate pleasure which belongs to consciousness and sensation. These powers themselves, however, depend, each of them, on certain bits and parts of the animal mechanism; and if these parts can be separately injured or destroyed, it is intelligible enough that consciousness and sensation may be severed for a time from the movements which they ordinarily accompany and direct. The success of such an experiment may teach us much on the details of a general truth which has long been known—that conscious sensation is inseparably connected with the mechanism of an organic structure. But it cannot in the slightest degree change or modify our conception of what conscious sensation in itself is. It is mechanical exactly in the same sense in which we have long known it to be so—that is to say, it is the result of life working in and through a structure which has been made to exhibit and embody its peculiar gifts and powers.

Considering, now, that the body of Man is one in structure with the body of all vertebrate animals—considering that, as we rise from the lowest of these to him, who is the highest, we see this same structure elaborated into closer and closer likeness, until every part corresponds, bone to bone, tissue to tissue, organ to organ—I cannot doubt that Man is a machine, precisely in the same sense in which animals are machines. If it is no contradiction in terms to speak of a machine which has been made to feel and to see, and to hear and to desire, neither need there be any contradiction in terms in speaking of a machine which has been made to think,

and to reflect, and to reason. These are, indeed, powers so much higher than the others that they may be considered as different in kind. But this difference, however great it may be, whether we look at it in its practical results, or as a question of classification, is certainly not a difference which throws any doubt upon the fact, that all these higher powers are, equally with the lowest, dependent on special arrangements in a material organism. It seems to me, that the very fact of the question being raised whether Man can be called a machine in the same sense as that in which alone the lower animals can properly be so described, is a proof that the questioner believes the lower animals to be machines in a sense in which it is not true. Such manifestations of mental attributes as they display are the true and veritable index of powers which are really by them possessed and enjoyed. The notion that, because these powers depend on an organic apparatus, they are therefore not what they seem to be, is a mere confusion of thought. On the other hand, when this comes to be thoroughly understood, the notion that Man's peculiar powers are lowered and dishonoured when they are conceived to stand in any similar relation to the body must be equally abandoned, as partaking of the same fallacy. If the sensations of pleasure and of pain, and the more purely mental manifestations of fear and of affection, have in the lower animals some inseparable connection with an organic apparatus, I do not see why we should be jealous of admitting that the still higher powers of self-consciousness and reason have in Man a similar connection with the same kind of mechanism. The nature of this connection in itself is equally mysterious, and, indeed, inconceivable in either case. As a matter of fact, we have precisely the same evidence as to both. If painful and pleasurable emotions can be destroyed by the cutting of a nerve, so also can the powers of memory and of reason be destroyed by any injury or disease which affects some bits of the substance of the brain. If, however, the fact of this mysterious connection be so interpreted as to make us alter our conceptions of what self-consciousness, and reason, and all mental manifestations in themselves are, then, indeed, we may well be jealous—not of the facts, but of the illogical use which is often made of them. Self-consciousness and reason and affection, and fear, and pain and pleasure, are in themselves exactly what we have always known them to be; and no discovery as to the physical apparatus with which they are somehow connected can throw the smallest obscurity on the criteria by which they are to be identified as so many different phenomena of mind. Our old knowledge of the work done is in no way altered by any new information as to the apparatus by which it is effected. This is the bungle committed by those who think they can found a new Psychology on the knife. They seem to think that sensation and

memory, and reasoning and will, become something different from that which hitherto we have known them to be, when we have found out that each of these powers may have some special "seat" or "organ" in the body. This, however, is a pure delusion. The known element in psychology is always the nature of the mental faculty; the unknown element is always the nature of its connection with any organ. We know the operations of our own minds with a fulness and reality which does not belong to any other knowledge whatever. We do not know the bond of union between these operations and the brain, except, as a sort of external and wholly unintelligible fact. Remembering all this, then, we need not fear or shrink from the admission that Man is a reasoning and self-conscious machine, just in the same sense in which the lower animals are machines which have been made to exhibit and possess certain mental faculties of a lower class.

But what of this? What is the value of this conclusion? Its value would be small indeed if this conception of ourselves as machines could be defended only as a harmless metaphor. But there is far more to be said for it, and about it, than this. The conception is one which is not only harmless, but profoundly true, as all metaphors are when they are securely rooted in the Homologies of Nature. There is much to be learnt from that aspect of mind in which we regard its powers as intimately connected with a material apparatus, and from that aspect of our own bodies in which they are regarded as one in structure with the bodies of the brutes. The significance of it as establishing Man's place in the unity of Nature is altogether independent of any theory or conclusion as to those processes of creation by which his body has been fashioned on a plan which is common to him and to so many of the animals beneath him. Whether Man has been separately created out of the inorganic elements of which his body has been composed, or whether it was created out of matter previously organized in lower forms, this community of form must equally indicate a corresponding community of relations with external things, and some antecedent necessity deeply seated in the very nature of those things, why his bodily frame should be like to theirs.

And, indeed, when we consider the matter, it is sufficiently apparent that the relationship of Man's body to the bodies of the lower animals is only a subordinate part and consequence of that higher and more general relationship which prevails between all living things and those elementary forces of Nature which play in them, and around them, and upon them. If we could only know what that relationship is in its real nature, and in its full extent, we should know one of the most inscrutable of all secrets, for that

secret is no other than the ultimate nature of life. The great matter is to keep the little knowledge of it which we possess safe from the effect of deceptive definitions. Attempts to define life are generally worse than useless, because they almost always involve a deliberate attempt to shut out from view some one or more of the elements which are essential to our own knowledge of its attributes. The real unities of Nature will never be reached by confounding her distinctions. It may be legitimate to reduce the phenomena of life to its lowest terms, in order the better to conceive its relations with other things. But in doing so we must take care not to drop out of those terms anything really essential to the very idea of life. It is very easy to deceive ourselves in this way—very easy by mere artifices of language to obliterate the most absolute distinctions which can exist in thought. Between the living and the not-living there is a great gulf fixed, and the indissoluble connection which nevertheless exists between them is, like the other unities of Nature, not founded upon sameness, but, on the contrary, rather upon difference, and even upon antagonisms. Only the forces which are thus different and opposed are subject to a power of co-ordination and adjustment. But this is the fundamental conception of a machine. For we must not fail to notice the kind of unity which is implied in the words co-ordination and adjustment; and, above all others, in the special adjustments connected with organic life. There are many unions which do not involve the idea of adjustment, or which involve it only in the most rudimentary form. The mere chemical union of two or more elements—unless under special conditions—is not properly an adjustment. We should not naturally call the formation of rust an adjustment between the oxygen of the atmosphere and metallic iron. When the combinations effected by the play of chemical affinities are brought about by the selection of elements so placed within reach of each other's reactions as to result in a given product, then that product would be accurately described as the result of co-ordination and adjustment. But the kind of co-ordination and adjustment which appear in the facts of life is of a still higher and more complicated kind than this. Whatever the relationship may be between living organisms and the elements, or elementary forces of external nature, it certainly is not the relationship of mere chemical affinities. On the contrary, the unions which these affinities themselves produce can only be reached through the dissolution and destruction of living bodies. The subjection of chemical forces to the maintenance of a separate individuality is of the very essence of life. The destruction of that separateness is of the very essence of death. It is not life, but the cessation of life, which, in this sense and after this manner, unites the elements

of the body with the elements around it. There is indeed an adjustment—a close and intricate adjustment—between these and the living body; but it is an adjustment of them under the controlling energy of a power which cannot be identified with any other, and always presents phenomena peculiar to itself. Under that power we see that the laws and forces of chemical affinity, as exhibited apart from life, are held, as it were, to service—compelled, indeed, to minister, but not allowed to rule. Through an infinite variety of organisms, this mysterious subordination is maintained, ministering through an ascending series to higher and higher grades of sensation, perception, consciousness, and thought.

And here we come in sight of the highest adjustment of all. Sensation, perception, consciousness, and thought, if they be not the very essence of life, are at least in their order its highest accompaniment and result. They are the ultimate phenomena, if they be not the final realities, to which all lesser adjustments are themselves adjusted. For as the elementary substances and the elementary forces of Nature which are used in the building of the body are there held by the energies of life under a special and peculiar relation to those same elements outside the body, so also are they held in peculiar relations to those characteristic powers which are the rudimentary faculties of mind. It is the unity which exists between the living organism and the elements around it which renders that organism the appropriate channel of communication with the external world, and a faithful interpreter of its signs. And this the organism is, not only by virtue of its substance and composition, but also and especially by virtue of its adjusted structures. All the organs of sense discharge their functions in virtue of a mechanical adjustment between the structure of the organ and the particular form of external force which it is intended to receive and to transmit. How fine those adjustments are can best be understood when we remember that the retina of the eye is a machine which measures and distinguishes between vibrations which are now known to differ from each by only a few millionths of an inch. Yet this amount of difference is recorded and made instantly appreciable in the sensations of colour by the adjusted mechanism of the eye. Another adjustment, precisely the same in principle, between the vibrations of sound and the structure of the ear, enables those vibrations to be similarly distinguished in another special form of the manifold language of sensation. And so of all the other organs of sense—they all perform their work in virtue of that purely mechanical adjustment which places them in a given relation to certain selected manifestations of external force, and these they faithfully transmit according to a code of signals the nature of which is one of the primary mysteries of life, but the truth-

fulness of which is at the same time one of the most certain of its facts.

For it is upon this truthfulness—that is to say, upon a close and efficient correspondence between the impressions of sense and the realities of external nature—that the success of every organism depends in the battle of life. And all life involves a battle, for though it comes to each animal without effort of its own, it cannot be maintained without individual exertion. That exertion may be of the simplest kind, nothing more than the rhythmic action of a muscle contracting and expanding so as to receive into a sac such substances as currents of water may bring along with them; or it may be the more complex action required to make or induce the very currents which are to bring the food; or it may be the much more complex exertions required in all active locomotion for the pursuit and capture of prey: all these forms of exertion exist, and are all required in endless variety in the animal world. And throughout the whole of this vast series the very life of every creature depends on the perfect correspondence which exists between its sense-impressions and those realities of the external world which are specially related to them. There is therefore no conception of the mind which rests on a broader basis of experience than that which affirms this correspondence to be real—a unity which constitutes and guarantees the various senses, each in its own sphere of adapted relations, to be exact and faithful interpreters of the truth.

Nor is it the least wonderful and striking proof of the trustworthiness of Nature to observe how far-reaching these interpretations are: how they are true not only in the immediate impressions they convey, but true also as the index of truths which lie behind and beyond, but which are not expressly included in either sensation or perception. This, indeed, is one main function and use, and one universal characteristic, of all sense-impressions, that over and above the pleasure they give to sentient creatures, they lead and guide to acts which are in conformity with the requirements of natural laws—these laws not being themselves objects of sensation at all—being, on the contrary, truths which the creatures most concerned in the requisite conformity being obeyed cannot themselves either feel or comprehend. It is thus that the appetite of hunger and the sense of taste, which in some form or other, however low, is perhaps the most universal sensation of animal organisms, is true not only as a guide to the substances which do actually give rise to the appropriate pleasure derivable from the sense concerned, but true also in its unseen and unmet relations with those profound and still mysterious correlations of force which render the assimilation of new material an indispensable necessity in the maintenance of animal life.

The wonderful instincts of the lower animals, the precision and perfection of their work, is a glorious example of the accurate adjustment between the rudimentary perceptions of mind and the laws which prevail in the external world. Narrow as the sphere of those perceptions may be, yet within that sphere they are almost absolutely true. And although the sphere is indeed narrow as regards the very low and limited intelligence with which it is associated in the animals themselves, it is a sphere which beyond the scope of that intelligence can be seen to place them in un-conscious relation with endless vistas of co-ordinated action. The sentient actions of the lower animals involve not merely the elementary perception of the differences which distinguish things, but the much higher perception of those relations between them which are the foundation of all voluntary agency, and which place in the possession of living creatures the power of attaining ends through the employment of appropriate means. The direct and intuitive perception of the necessity of doing one thing in order to attain to another thing, is in itself one of the very highest among the pre-adjusted harmonies of Nature. For it must be remembered that those relations between things which render them capable of being used as means to ends are relations which never can be the direct objects of sensation, and therefore a perception of them is an intuition of something which is out of sight. It is a kind of dim mental seeing of that which is invisible. And even if it be separated entirely in the lower animals from anything comparable with our own self-consciousness, it does not the less involve in them a true reflection of and correlation with the order of Nature and its laws. The spinning machinery which is provided in the body of a spider is not more accurately adjusted to the viscid secretion which is provided for it, than the instinct of the spider is adjusted both to the construction of its web and also to the selection of likely places for the capture of its prey. Those birds and insects whose young are hatched by the heat of fermentation have an intuitive impulse to select the proper materials, and to gather them for the purpose. All creatures, guided sometimes apparently by senses of which we know nothing, are under like impulses to provide effectually for the nourishing of their young; and it is most curious and instructive to observe that the extent of prevision which is involved in the process, and in the securing of the result, seems very often to be greater as we descend in the scale of nature, and in proportion as the parents are dissociated from the actual feeding or personal care of their offspring. The mammalia have nothing to provide except food for themselves, and have at first, and for a long time, no duty to perform beyond the discharge of a purely physical function. Birds have more to do—in the building of nests, in the

choice of sites for these, and after incubation in the choice of food adapted to the period of growth. Insects, much lower in the scale of organization, and subject to the wonderful processes of metamorphosis, have to provide very often for a distant future, and for successive stages of development not only in the young but in the *nidus* which surrounds them. Bees, if we are to believe the evidence of observers, have an intuitive guidance in the selection of food which has the power of producing organic changes in the bodies of the young, even to the determination and development of sex, so that, by the administration of it under what may be called artificial conditions, certain selected individuals can be made the mothers and queens of future hives. These are but a few examples of facts of which the whole animal world is full, presenting, as it does, one vast series of adjustments between bodily organs and corresponding instincts. But this adjustment would be useless unless it were part of another adjustment—between the instincts and perceptions of animals and those facts and forces of surrounding nature which are related to them, and to the whole cycle of things of which they form a part. In those instinctive actions of the lower animals which involve the most distant and the most complicated anticipations, it is certain that the prevision involved is a prevision which is not in the animals themselves. They appear to be, and beyond all doubt really are, guided by some simple appetite, by an odour or a taste, and, in all probability, they have generally as little consciousness of the ends to be subserved as the suckling has of the processes of nutrition. The path along which they walk is a path which they did not engineer. It is a path made for them, and they simply follow it. But the propensities and tastes and feelings which make them follow it, and the rightness of its direction towards the ends to be attained, do constitute an adjustment which may correctly be called mechanical, and is part of a unity which binds together the whole world of life, and the whole inorganic world on which living things depend.

Surely, then, it would be a strange object of ambition to try to think that we are not included in this vast system of adjustment; that our nobler faculties have no share in the secure and wonderful guarantee which it affords for the truthfulness of all mental gifts. It is well that we should place a high estimate on the superiority of the powers which we possess; and that the distinction, with all its consequences, between self-conscious reason and the comparatively simple perceptions of the beasts, should be ever kept in view. But it is not well that we should omit from that estimate a common element of immense importance which belongs to both, and the value of which becomes immeasurably greater in its connection with our special gifts. That element is the element

of adjustment—the element which suggests the idea of an apparatus—the element which constitutes all our higher faculties the index and the result of a preadjusted harmony. In the light of this conception we can see a new meaning in our “place in Nature;” that place which, so far as our bodily organs are concerned, assigns to us simply a front rank among the creatures which are endowed with life. It is in virtue of that place and association that we may be best assured that our special gifts have the same relation to the higher realities of nature which the lower faculties of the beasts have to the lower realities of the physical world. Whatever we have that is peculiar to ourselves is built up on the same firm foundation on which all animal instinct rests. It is often said that we can never really know what unreasoning instinct is, because we can never enter into an animal mind, and see what is working there. Men are so apt to be arrogant in philosophy that it seems almost wrong to deprecate even any semblance of the consciousness of ignorance. But it were much to be desired that the modesty of philosophers would come in the right places. I hold that we can know, and can almost thoroughly understand, the instincts of the lower animals; and this for the best of all reasons, that we are ourselves animals, whatever more;—having, to a large extent, precisely the same instincts, with the additional power of looking down upon ourselves in this capacity from a higher elevation to which we can ascend at will. Not only are our bodily functions precisely similar to those of the lower animals,—some, like the beating of the heart, being purely “automatic” or involuntary—others being partially, and others again being wholly, under the control of the will,—but many of our sensations and emotions are obviously the same with the sensations and emotions of the lower animals, connected with precisely the same machinery, presenting precisely the same phenomena, and recognizable by all the same criteria.

It is true that many of our actions become instinctive and mechanical only as the result of a previous intellectual operation of the self-conscious or reasoning kind. And this, no doubt, is the origin of the dream that all instinct, even in the animals, has had the same origin; a dream due to the exaggerated “anthropomorphism” of those very philosophers who are most apt to denounce this source of error in others. But Man has many instincts like the animals, to which no such origin in previous reasoning can be assigned. For not only in earliest infancy, but throughout life, we do innumerable things to which we are led by purely organic impulse; things which have indeed a reason and a use, but a reason which we never know, and a use which we never discern, till we come to “think.” And how different this process of “thinking” is we know likewise from

our own experience. In contemplating the phenomena of reasoning and of conscious deliberation it really seems as if it were impossible to sever it from the idea of a double Personality. Tennyson's poem of the "Two Voices" is no poetic exaggeration of the duality of which we are conscious when we attend to the mental operations of our own most complex nature. It is as if there were within us one Being always receptive of suggestion, and always responding in the form of impulse—and another Being capable of passing these suggestions in review before it, and of allowing or disallowing the impulses to which they give rise. There is a profound difference between creatures in which one only of these voices speaks, and Man, whose ears are, as it were, open to them both. The things which we do in obedience to the lower and simpler voice are indeed many, various, and full of a true and wonderful significance. But the things which we do, and the affections which we cherish, in obedience to the higher voice, have a rank, a meaning, and a scope which is all their own. There is no indication in the lower animals of this double Personality. They hear no voice but one; and the whole law of their Being is perfectly fulfilled in following it. This it is which gives its restfulness to Nature, whose abodes are indeed what Wordsworth calls them—

"Abodes in which Self-disturbance hath no part."

On the other hand the double Personality, the presence of "Two Voices," is never wholly wanting even in the most degraded of human beings—their thoughts everywhere "accusing or else excusing one another."

Knowing, therefore, in ourselves both these kinds of operation, we can measure the difference between them, and we can thoroughly understand how animals may be able to do all that they actually perform, without ever passing through the processes of argumentation by which we reach the conclusions of conscious reason and of moral obligation. Moreover, seeing and feeling the difference, we can see and feel the relations which obtain between the two classes of mental work. The plain truth is, that the higher and more complicated work is done, and can only be done, with the material supplied by the lower and simpler tools. Nay, more, the very highest and most aspiring mental processes rest upon the lower, as a building rests upon its foundation-stones. They are like the rude but massive substructions from which some great Temple springs. Not only is the impulse, the disposition, and the ability to reason as purely intuitive and congenital in Man as the disposition to eat, but the fundamental axioms on which all reasoning rests are, and can only be, intuitively perceived. This, indeed, is the essential character of all the axioms or self-evident

propositions which are the basis of reasoning, that the truth of them is perceived by an act of apprehension, which, if it depends on any process, depends on a process unconscious, involuntary, and purely automatic. But this is the definition, the only definition, of instinct or intuition. All conscious reasoning thus starts from the data which this great faculty supplies; and all our trust and confidence in the results of reasoning must depend on our trust and confidence in the adjusted harmony which has been established between instinct and the truths of Nature. Not only is the idea of mechanism consistent with this confidence, but it is inseparable from it. No firmer ground for that confidence can be given us in thought than this conception,—that as the eye of sense is a mechanism specially adjusted to receive the light of heaven, so is the mental eye a mechanism specially adjusted to perceive those realities which are in the nature of necessary and eternal truth. Moreover, the same conception helps us to understand the real nature of those limitations upon our faculties which curtail their range, and which yet, in a sense, we may be said partially to overpass in the very act of becoming conscious of them. We see it to be a great law prevailing in the instincts of the lower animals, and in our own, that they are true not only as guiding the animal rightly to the satisfaction of whatever appetite is immediately concerned, but true also as ministering to ends of which the animal knows nothing, although they are ends of the highest importance, both in its own economy, and in the far-off economies of creation. In direct proportion as our own minds and intellects partake of the same nature, and are founded on the same principle of adjustment, we may feel assured that the same law prevails over their nobler work and functions. And the glorious law is no less than this—that the work of Instinct is true not only for the short way it goes, but for that infinite distance into which it leads in a true direction.

I know no argument better fitted to dispel the sickly dreams of the Philosophy of Nescience. Nor do I know of any other conception as securely founded on science, properly so called, which better serves to render intelligible, and to bring within the familiar analogies of Nature, even those highest and rarest of all gifts which constitute what we understand as inspiration. That the human mind is always in some degree, and that certain individual minds have been in a special degree, reflecting surfaces, as it were, for the verities of the unseen and eternal world, is a conception having all the characters of coherence which assures us of its harmony with the general constitution and course of things.

And so, this doctrine of animal automatonism—the notion that the mind of Man is indeed a structure and a mechanism—a


notion which is held over our heads as a terror and a doubt—becomes, when closely scrutinized, the most comforting and reassuring of all conceptions. No stronger assurance can be given us that our faculties, when rightly used, are powers on which we can indeed rely. It reveals what may be called the strong physical foundations on which the truthfulness of reason rests. And more than this—it clothes with the like character of trustworthiness every instinctive and intuitive affection of the human soul. It roots the reasonableness of faith in our conviction of the Unities of Nature. It tells us that as we know the instincts of the lower animals to be the index and the result of laws which are out of sight to them, so also have our own higher instincts the same relation to truths which are of corresponding dignity, and of corresponding scope.

Nor can this conception of the mind of Man being inseparably connected with an adjusted mechanism cast, as has been suggested, any doubt on the freedom of the will,—such as by the direct evidence of consciousness we know that freedom to be. This suggestion is simply a repetition of the same inveterate confusion of thought which has been exposed before. The question what our powers are is in no way affected by the admission or discovery that they are all connected with an apparatus. Consciousness does not tell us that we stand unrelated to the system of things of which we form a part. We dream—or rather, we simply rave—if we think we are free to choose among things which are not presented to our choice,—or if we think that choice itself can be free from motives,—or if we think that we can find any motive outside the number of those to which by the structure of our minds and of its organ we have been made accessible. The only freedom of which we are really conscious is freedom from compulsion in choosing among things which are presented to our choice,—consciousness also attesting the fact that among those things some are coincident and some are not coincident with acknowledged obligation. This, and all other direct perceptions, are not weakened but confirmed by the doctrine that our minds are connected with an adjusted mechanism. Because the first result of this conception is to establish the evidence of consciousness when given under healthy conditions, and when properly ascertained, as necessarily the best and the nearest representation of the truth. This it does in recognizing ourselves, and all the faculties we possess, to be nothing but the result and index of an adjustment contrived by, and reflecting the Mind which is supreme in Nature. We are derived and not original. We have been created, or—if any one likes the phrase better—we have been “evolved;” not, however, out of nothing, nor out of confusion, nor out of lies,—but out of “Nature,” which is a word for the

Sum of all Existence,—the source of all Order and the very ground of all Truth,—the Fountain in which all fulness dwells.

Thus the doctrine which at first sight seems so terrible turns out to be nothing but one intellectual aspect of the many-sided moral truth which of old found expression in the *Non nobis, Domine*.

ARGYLL.



“SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.”

V.—PAPIAS OF HIERAPOLIS.

TWO names stand out prominently in the Churches of proconsular Asia during the age immediately succeeding the Apostles—Polycarp of Smyrna, and Papias of Hierapolis. Having given an account of Polycarp in my last article, I purpose now to examine the notices relating to Papias. These two fathers are closely connected together in the earliest tradition. Papias, writes Irenæus, was “a hearer of John and a companion of Polycarp.”* On the latter point we may frankly accept the evidence of Irenæus. A pupil of Polycarp, at all events, was not likely to be misinformed here. But to the former part of the statement objections have been raised in ancient and modern times alike; and it will be my business in the course of this investigation to inquire into its credibility. Yet, even if Papias was not a personal disciple of St. John, still his age and country place him in more or less close connection with the traditions of this Apostle; and it is this fact which gives importance to his position and teaching.

Papias wrote a work entitled, “Exposition of Oracles of the Lord,” in five books, of which a few scanty fragments and notices are preserved, chiefly by Irenæus and Eusebius. The object and contents of this work will be discussed hereafter; but it is necessary to quote at once an extract which Eusebius has preserved from the preface, since our estimate of the date and posi-

* Iren. v. 33. 4 Ἰωάννου μὲν ἀκουστής, Πολυκάρπου δὲ ἐταῖρος γεγονώς.

tion of Papias will depend largely on the interpretation of its meaning.

Papias then, addressing (as it would appear) some friend to whom the work was dedicated, explains its plan and purpose as follows: *—

But I will not scruple also to give a place for you along with my interpretations to everything that I learnt carefully and remembered carefully in time past from the elders, guaranteeing their truth. For, unlike the many, I did not take pleasure in those who have so very much to say (τοῖς τὰ πολλὰ λέγουσιν), but in those who teach the truth; nor in those who relate foreign commandments, but in those [who record] such as were given from the Lord to the Faith, and are derived from the Truth itself. And again, on any occasion when a person came [in my way] who had been a follower of the elders (εἰ δέ που καὶ παρηκολουθήκως τις τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ὄθοι), I would inquire about the discourses of the elders—what was said by Andrew, or by Peter, or by Philip, or by Thomas or James, or by John or Matthew or any other of the Lord's disciples, and what Aristion and the Elder John, the disciples of the Lord, say. For I did not think that I could get so much profit from the contents of books as from the utterances of a living and abiding voice (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων τοσοῦτὸν με ὠφελεῖν ὑπελάμβανον, ὅσον τὰ παρὰ ζώσης φωνῆς καὶ μενούσης.)

This passage is introduced by Eusebius with the remark that, though Irenæus calls Papias a hearer of John,

Yet Papias himself, in the preface to his discourses, certainly does not declare that he himself was a hearer and eye-witness of the holy Apostles, but he shows, by the language which he uses, that he received the matters of the faith from those who were their friends.

Then follows the extract which I have given; after which Eusebius resumes:—

Here it is important to observe, that he twice mentions the name of John. The former of these he puts in the same list with Peter and James and Matthew and the rest of the Apostles, clearly intending the Evangelist; but the second John he mentions after an interval (*διαστείλας τὸν λόγον*), and places among others outside the number of the Apostles, putting Aristion before him, and he distinctly calls him an "elder;" so that by these facts the account of those is proved to be true who have stated that two persons in Asia had the same name, and that there were two tombs in Ephesus, each of which, even to the present time, bears the name of John.

Then, after speculating on the possibility that this second John was the author of the Apocalypse, he continues:—

Papias avows that he has received the sayings of the Apostles from those who had been their followers (*τῶν αὐτοῖς παρηκολουθηκότων*), but says that he himself was an immediate hearer of Aristion and the Elder John. Certainly he mentions them many times in his writings, and records their traditions.

* Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 39 Οὐκ ὀκνήσω δέ σοι καὶ ὅσα ποτὲ παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καλῶς ἔμαθον καὶ καλῶς ἐμνημόνευσα συγκατατάξαι [v. l. συντάξαι] ταῖς ἐρμηνείαις, διαβεβαιούμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν, κ. τ. λ. This same reference will hold for all the notices from Eusebius which are quoted in this article, unless otherwise stated.

The justice of this criticism has been disputed by many recent writers, who maintain that the same John, the son of Zebedee, is meant in both passages. But I cannot myself doubt that Eusebius was right in his interpretation, and I am glad for once to find myself entirely agreed with the author of "Supernatural Religion." It will be observed that John is the *only* name mentioned twice, and that at its second occurrence the person bearing it is distinguished as the "elder" or "presbyter," this designation being put in an emphatic position before the proper name. We must therefore accept the distinction between John the Apostle and John the Presbyter, though the concession may not be free from inconvenience, as introducing an element of possible confusion.

But it does not therefore follow that the statement of Irenæus was incorrect. Though this passage in the preface of Papias lends no support to the belief that he was a personal disciple of John the son of Zebedee, yet it is quite consistent with such a belief. Irenæus does not state that he derived his knowledge from this preface, or indeed from any part of the work. Having listened again and again to Polycarp while describing the sayings and doings of John the Apostle,* he had other sources of information which were closed to Eusebius. Nor indeed is there any chronological or other difficulty in supposing that he may have derived the fact from direct intercourse with Papias himself. But the possibility still remains that he was guilty of this confusion which Eusebius lays to his charge; and the value of his testimony on this point is seriously diminished thereby.

It will have been noticed that in the above extract Papias professes to derive the traditions of "the elders," with which he illustrated his expositions, from two different sources. He refers *first*, to those sayings which he had heard from their own lips, and *secondly*, to those which he had collected at second-hand from their immediate followers. What class of persons he intends to include under the designation of "elders" he makes clear by the names which follow. The category would include not only Apostles like Andrew and Peter, but also other personal disciples of Christ, such as Aristion and the second John. In other words, the term with him is a synonyme for the Fathers of the Church in the first generation. This meaning is entirely accordant with the usage of the same title elsewhere. Thus Irenæus employs it to describe the generation to which Papias himself belonged.† Thus again, in the next age, Irenæus in turn is so designated by Hippolytus.‡ And, when we descend as low as Eusebius, we find

* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for May, 1875, p. 833.

† *Har.* iv. 27. 1, 3; iv. 30. 1; iv. 31. 1; v. 6. 1; v. 33. 3; v. 36. 1, 2.

‡ *Ref. Har.* vi. 42, 55, "The blessed elder Irenæus." Clement of Alexandria uses the same phrase of Pantænus; Euseb. *H. E.* vi. 14.

him using the term so as to include even writers later than Irenæus, who nevertheless, from their comparative antiquity, were to him and his generation authorities as regards the traditions and usages of the Church.* Nor indeed did Papias himself invent this usage. In the Epistle to the Hebrews for instance, we read that "the elders obtained a good report;"† where the meaning is defined by the list which follows, including Old Testament worthies from Abel to "Samuel and the prophets." Thus this sense of "elders" in early Christian writers corresponds very nearly to our own usage of "fathers," when we speak of the Fathers of the Church, the Fathers of the Reformation, the Pilgrim Fathers, and the like.

Thus employed therefore, the term "presbyters" or "elders" denotes not office, but authority and antiquity.‡ It is equivalent to "the ancient" or "primitive worthies."§ But at its last occurrence in the extract of Papias, where it is applied to the second John, this is apparently not the case. Here it seems to be an official title, designating a member of the *order* of the presbyterate. Though modern critics have stumbled over this two-fold sense of the word *πρεσβύτερος* in the same context, it would create no difficulty to the contemporaries of Papias, to whom "the Presbyter John" must have been a common mode of designation in contradistinction to "the Apostle John," and to whom therefore the proper meaning would at once suggest itself. Instances are not wanting elsewhere in which this word is used with both senses, official and non-official, in the same passage.||

Of the elders with whom Papias was *personally* acquainted, we can only name with certainty Aristion and the Presbyter John; but as regards these Eusebius is explicit. To them the Apostle John may perhaps be added, as we have seen, on the authority of Irenæus. Beyond these three names we have no authority for extending the list, though there is a possibility that in very early life he may have met with others, more especially Andrew and Philip, who are known to have lived in these parts. But, however this may be, it seems to follow from the words of his preface that his direct intercourse with these elders or personal disciples of the Lord had not been great. It was probably confined to the earlier

* H. E. iii. 8; v. 8; vi. 13.

† Heb. xi. 2.

‡ Weiffenbach, *Das Papias-fragment* (Gießen, 1874), has advocated at great length the view that Papias uses the term as a title of office throughout, pp. 84 seq.; but he has not succeeded in convincing subsequent writers. His conclusions are opposed by Hilgenfeld, *Papias von Hierapolis*, pp. 245 seq. (in his *Zeitschrift*, 1875), and by Leimbach, *Das Papias-fragment*, pp. 68 seq. Weiffenbach supposes that the elders are distinguished from the Apostles and personal disciples whose sayings Papias sets himself to collect. This view demands such a violent wresting of the grammatical connection in the passage of Papias, that it is not likely to find much favour.

§ In illustration of this use, it may be mentioned that in the Letter of the Gallican Churches (Euseb. H. E. v. 1) the term is applied to the Zacharias of Luke i. 5 seq.

|| 1 Tim. v. 1, 2, 17, 19.

part of his life, before he had any thought of writing his book; and the information thence derived was in consequence casual and fragmentary. When he set himself to collect traditions for this special purpose, he was dependent on secondary evidence, on the information collected from scholars and followers of these primitive elders.

We are now in a position to investigate the age of Papias; but, as a preliminary to this investigation, it is necessary to say something about the authority for the one definite date which is recorded in connection with him. In my article on Polycarp, I pointed out that recent investigations had pushed the date of this father's martyrdom several years farther back, and that some chronological difficulties attaching to the commonly received date had thus been removed.* A similar difficulty meets us in the case of Papias; and it disappears in like manner, as I hope to show, before the light of criticism. The *Chronicon Paschale*,† represents Papias as martyred at Pergamum about the same time when Polycarp suffered at Smyrna, and places the event in the year 164. If this statement were true, we could hardly date his birth before A.D. 80, and even then he would have lived to a very advanced age. But there is a certain difficulty‡ in supposing that one born at this late date should have been directly acquainted with so many personal disciples of our Lord. No earlier writer however mentions the date, or even the fact, of the martyrdom—not even Eusebius, who has much to say both about Papias and about the martyrologies of this epoch; and this absence of confirmation renders the statement highly suspicious. I believe that I have traced the error to its source, which indeed is not very far to seek. The juxtaposition of the passage in this Chronicle with the corresponding passage in the History of Eusebius§ will, if I mistake not, tell its own tale.

CHRONICON PASCHALE.

In the 133rd year of the Ascension of the Lord *very severe persecutions having dismayed* (ἀνασθηνάτων) *Asia, many were martyred, among whom Polycarp.* . . .

EUSEBIUS.

At this time *very severe persecutions having disturbed* (ἀνασθηνάτων) *Asia, Polycarp is perfected by martyrdom* . . . and in the same writing concerning him were attached other martyrdoms . . . and next in order (ἑξῆς) *memoirs of others* (ἄλλων) also, who were

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 338.

† See Clinton, *Fast. Rom.* II. p. 335.

‡ This difficulty however cannot be regarded as serious. At the last (the sixtieth) anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, the *Times* gave the names of no fewer than seventy-six Waterloo officers as still living.

§ *Chron. Pasch.* pp. 481 seq. (ed. Bonn.); Euseb. *H. E.* iv. 15.

and in *Pergamum* others (ἄλλοι), among whom was PAPIAS and many others (ἄλλοι), whose martyrdoms are extant (φέρονται) also in writing. . . .

Justin, a philosopher of the word received among us (τοῦ κατ' ἡμᾶς λόγου) having presented a second book in defence of the doctrines received among us to Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Verus, the emperors, is decorated not long after with the divine crown of martyrdom, *Crescens* accusing (?) him.

martyred in *Pergamum*, a city of Asia, are extant (φέρονται), *Carpus* and PAPHYLUS, and a woman Agathonice. . . .

And at the same time with these (κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς) *Justin* also, who was mentioned shortly before by us, having presented a second book in defence of the doctrines received among us to the afore-mentioned rulers, is decorated with divine martyrdom, a philosopher *Crescens* . . . having hatched the plot against him, &c.

The sequence of events, and the correspondence of individual phrases, alike show that the compiler of this Chronicle derived his information from the History of Eusebius.* But either he or his transcriber has substituted a well-known name, *Papias*, for a more obscure name, *Paphylus*. If the last letters of the word were blurred or blotted in his copy of Eusebius, nothing would be more natural than such a change. It is only necessary to write the two names in uncials, ΠΑΠΙΑΣ ΠΑΠΥΛΟΣ, to judge of its likelihood.† This explanation indeed is so obvious, when the passages are placed side by side, that one can only feel surprised at its not having been pointed out before. Thus the martyrdom of Papias, with its chronological perplexities (such as they are), disappears from history; and we may dismiss the argument of the author of "Supernatural Religion," that "a writer who suffered martyrdom under Marcus Aurelius (c. A.D. 165) can scarcely have been a hearer of the Apostles."‡

Thus we are left to infer the date of Papias entirely from the notices of his friends and contemporaries; but these will assist us to a very fair approximation. (1.) He was a hearer of at least two personal disciples of Christ, Aristion and the Presbyter John. If we suppose that they were among the youngest disciples of our Lord, and lived to old age, we shall be doing no violence to probability. Obviously there were in their case exceptional circumstances which rendered intercourse with them possible. If so, they may have been born about A.D. 10 or later, and have died about A.D. 90 or later. In this case their intercourse with Papias may be referred to the years A.D. 85—95, or thereabouts. (2.) He was acquainted with the daughters of Philip, who dwelt with

* There is no indication that the author of this Chronicle used any other document in this part besides the History of Eusebius and the extant Martyrology of Polycarp which Eusebius here quotes.

† The martyrdom of Papias is combined with that of Polycarp in the Syriac Epitome of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius (p. 216, ed. Schöne). The source of the error is doubtless the same in both cases.

‡ I. p. 448.

their father at Hierapolis, where they died in old age. Whether this Philip was the Apostle, as the earliest writers affirm, or the Evangelist, as others suppose,* is a question of little moment for my immediate purpose—the date of Papias. In the latter case these daughters would be the same who are mentioned at the time of St. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem, A.D. 58, apparently as already grown up to womanhood.† On the former supposition they would belong to the same generation, and probably would be about the same age. As a very rough approximation, we may place their birth about A.D. 30, and their death about A.D. 100—110. (3.) Papias is called by Irenæus a “companion” of Polycarp, whose life (as we saw) extended from A.D. 69 to A.D. 155.‡ The word admits a certain latitude as regards date, though it suggests something approaching to equality in age. But on the whole the notices affecting his relations to Polycarp suggest that he was rather the older man of the two. At all events Eusebius discusses him immediately after Ignatius and Quadratus and Clement, *i.e.*, in connection with the fathers who flourished in the reign of Trajan or before; while the notice of Polycarp is deferred till a much later point in the history, where it occurs in close proximity with Justin Martyr.§ This arrangement indicates at all events that Eusebius had no knowledge of his having been martyred at the same time with Polycarp, or indeed of his surviving to so late a date. Otherwise he would naturally have inserted his account of him in this place. If it is necessary to put the result of these incidental notices in any definite form, we may say that Papias was probably born about A.D. 60—70.

But his work was evidently written at a much later date. He speaks of his personal intercourse with the elders, as a thing of the remote past.|| He did not write till false interpretations of the Evangelical records had had time to increase and multiply. We should probably not be wrong if we deferred its publication till the years A.D. 130—140, or even later. Our author places it at least as late as the middle of the second century.¶

The opinions of a Christian writer who lived and wrote at this

* I had taken the latter view in an article on Papias which I wrote for this REVIEW some years ago; but I think now that the Apostle is meant, as the most ancient testimony points to him. I have given my reasons for this change of opinion in *Colossians* pp. 45 seq.

† Acts xxi. 9.

‡ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 828.

§ The chapter relating to Papias is the thirty-ninth of the third book; those relating to Polycarp are the fourteenth and fifteenth of the fourth book, where they interpose between chapters assigned to Justin Martyr and events connected with him.

|| It is true that he uses the present tense once, *ἔτε Ἀριστάρῳ καὶ ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἰωάννης . . . λέγουσιν*, and hence it has been inferred that these two persons were still living when the inquiries were instituted. But this would involve a chronological difficulty; and the tense should probably be regarded as a historic present introduced for the sake of variety.

¶ I. p. 444, “About the middle of the second century.” Elsewhere (II. p. 320) he speaks of Papias as “flourishing in the second half of the second century.”

early date, and had conversed with these first disciples, are not without importance, even though his own mental calibre may have been small. But the speculations of the Tübingen school have invested them with a fictitious interest. Was he, or was he not, as these critics affirm, a Judaic Christian of strongly Ebionite tendencies? The arguments which have been urged in defence of this position are as follows:—

1. In the first place we are reminded that he was a millennarian. The Chiliastic teaching of his work is the subject of severe comment with Eusebius, who accuses him of misinterpreting figurative sayings in the Apostolic writings and assigning to them a literal sense. This tendency appears also in the one passage which Irenæus quotes from Papias. But the answer to this is decisive. Chiliasm is the rule, not the exception, with the Christian writers of the second century; and it appears combined with views the very opposite of Ebionite. It is found in Justin Martyr, in Irenæus, in Tertullian.* It is found even in the unknown author of the epistle bearing the name of Barnabas,† which is stamped with the most uncompromising and unreasoning antagonism to everything Judaic.

2. A second argument is built on the fact that Eusebius does not mention his quoting St. Paul's Epistles or other Pauline writings of the Canon. I have already disposed of this argument in an earlier paper on the "Silence of Eusebius."‡ I have shown that Papias might have quoted St. Paul many times, and by name, while nevertheless Eusebius would not have recorded the fact, because it was not required by his principles or consistent with his practice to do so. I have shown that this interpretation of the silence of Eusebius in other cases, where we are able to test it, would lead to results demonstrably and hopelessly wrong. I have pointed out for instance, that it would most certainly conduct us to the conclusion that the writer of the Ignatian Epistles was an Ebionite—a conclusion diametrically opposed to the known facts of the case.§

3. Lastly, it is argued that Papias was an Ebionite, because he quoted the Gospel according to the Hebrews. In the first place however, the premiss is highly questionable. Eusebius does not say, as in other cases, that Papias "uses" this Gospel, or that he "sets down facts from" it,|| but he writes that Papias relates "a story about a woman accused of many sins before the Lord" (doubtless

* Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 51 seq. (pp. 271 seq.), 80 seq. (p. 307); Irenæus, *Hæc.* v. 31 seq. Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* iii. 24, *de Resurr. Carn.* 25.

† C. 15.

‡ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January, 1875, pp. 169 seq.

§ *Ibid.* p. 176.

|| These are the expressions employed elsewhere of this Gospel; *H. E.* iii. 25, 27; iv. 22.

the same which is found in our copies of St. John's Gospel, vii. 53—viii. 11), and he adds "which the Gospel according to the Hebrews contains."* This does not imply that Papias derived it thence, but only that Eusebius found it there. Papias may have obtained it, like the other stories to which Eusebius alludes, "from oral tradition" (ἐκ παραδόσεως ἀγράφου). But, even if it were directly derived thence, the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. The Gospel according to the Hebrews is quoted both by Clement of Alexandria and by Origen, though these two Fathers accepted our four Gospels alone as canonical.† It may even be quoted, as Jerome asserts that it is, and as the author himself believes,‡ by the writer of the Ignatian letters, a most determined anti-Ebionite. If Papias had cited the Gospel according to the Hebrews only once, Eusebius would have mentioned the fact, because he made it his business to record these exceptional phenomena; whereas he would have passed over any number of quotations from the Canonical Gospels in silence.

As all these supposed tokens of Ebionite tendencies have failed, we are led to inquire whether any light is thrown on this question from other quarters.

And here his name is not altogether unimportant. Papias was bishop of Hierapolis, and apparently a native of this place. At all events he seems to have lived there from youth; for his acquaintance with the daughters of Philip, who resided in this city, must have belonged to the earlier period of his life. Now Papias was a designation of the Hierapolitan Zeus;§ and owing to its association with this god, it appears to have been a favourite name with the people of Hierapolis and the neighbourhood. It occurs several times in coins and inscriptions belonging to this city and district.|| In one instance we read of a "Papias, who is also Diogenes," this latter name "Zeus-begotten" being apparently regarded as a rough synonyme for the Phrygian word.¶ We find mention also in Galen of a physician belonging to the neighbouring

* ἢ τὸ κατ' Ἑβραίων εὐαγγέλιον περιέχει.

† Clem. *Strom.* ii. 9 (p. 453). Our author says, "Clement of Alexandria quotes it [the Gospel according to the Hebrews] with quite the same respect as the other Gospels" (*l.* p. 422). He cannot have remembered, when he wrote this, that Clement elsewhere refuses authority to a saying in an Apocryphal Gospel because "we do not find it in the four Gospels handed down to us" (*Strom.* iii. 13, p. 553). "Origen," writes our author again, "frequently made use of the Gospel according to the Hebrews" (*l.c.*). Yes; but Origen draws an absolute line of demarcation between our four Gospels and the rest. He even illustrates the relation of these Canonical Gospels to the Apocryphal by that of the true prophets to the false under the Jewish dispensation. *Hom. I. in Luc.* (III. p. 982). Any reader unacquainted with the facts would carry away a wholly false impression from our author's account of the use made of the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

‡ S. R. I. pp. 272 seq., 332 seq. The fact that Eusebius did not know the source of this quotation (*H. E.* iii. 36), though he was well acquainted with the Gospel according to the Hebrews, seems to me to render this very doubtful.

§ Boeckh. *Corp. Inscr.* 3817, Πάσις Διὶ σὺντι.

|| Boeckh. 3930, 3912a App.: Mionnet IV. p. 301.

¶ Boeckh. 3817.

city of Laodicea, who bore this name.* Altogether it points to a heathen rather than a Jewish origin.

But more important than his name, from which the inference, though probable, is still precarious,† are his friendships and associations. Papias, we are told, was a companion of Polycarp.‡ The opinions of Polycarp have been considered in a previous article;§ and it has there been shown that the hypothesis of Ebionite leanings in his case is not only unsupported, but cannot be maintained except by an entire disregard of the evidence, which is of different kinds, and all leads to the opposite conclusion. As regards Papias therefore, it is reasonable to infer, in the absence of direct evidence, that his views were, at all events, in general accordance with his friend's. Moreover, the five books of Papias were read by Irenæus and by Eusebius, as well as by later writers; and, being occupied in interpretation, they must have contained ample evidence of the author's opinions on the main points which distinguished the Ebionite from the Catholic—the view of the Mosaic law, the estimate of the Apostle Paul, the conception of the person of Christ. It is therefore important to observe that Irenæus quotes him with the highest respect, as an orthodox writer and a trustworthy channel of Apostolic tradition. Eusebius again, though he is repelled by his millenarianism, calling him “a man of very mean capacity,” and evidently seeking to disparage him in every way, has yet no charge to bring against him on these most important points of all. And this estimate of him remains to the last. Anastasius of Sinai for instance, who wrote in the latter half of the sixth century, and who is rigidly and scrupulously orthodox, according to the standard of orthodoxy which had been created by five General Councils, had the work of Papias in his hands. He mentions the author by name twice; and on both occasions he uses epithets expressive of the highest admiration. Papias is to him “the great,” “the illustrious.”||

But indeed Eusebius has left one direct indication of the opinions of Papias, which is not insignificant. He tells us that Papias “employed testimonies from the First Epistle of John.” How far this involves a recognition of the Fourth Gospel I shall have to consider hereafter. At present it is sufficient to say that this Epistle belongs to the class of writings in our Canon which is the most directly opposed to Ebionism.

* Galen. *Op.* XII. p. 799 (ed. Kühn).

† One Rabbi Papias is mentioned in the Mishna *Shabath* iv. 7; *Eduoth* vii. 6. I owe these references to Zunz, *Namen der Juden*, p. 16.

‡ See above, p. 377.

§ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 827 seq.

|| *Ὁ μέγας, ὁ καλός*. The first passage will be found in the original Greek in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* I. p. 15 (comp. Migne, *Patr. Græc.* lxxxix. p. 860, where only the Latin “clarissimus” is given); the second in Migne, *ibid.* p. 961 (comp. Routh, *l. c.* p. 16, where again only the Latin “celebris” is given).

It may be said indeed, that Papias was foolish and credulous. But unhappily foolishness and credulity are not characteristic of any one form of Christian belief—or unbelief either.

The work of Papias, as we saw, was entitled, "Exposition of Oracles of the Lord," or (more strictly), "of Dominical Oracles."* But what was its nature and purport? Shall we understand the word "exposition" to mean "enarration," or "explanation?" Was the author's main object to construct a new Evangelical narrative, or to interpret and explain one or more already in circulation? This is a vital point in its bearing on the relation of Papias to our Canonical Gospels. Our author, ignoring what Dr. Westcott and others have said on this subject, tacitly assumes the latter alternative without attempting to discuss the question. Yet, if this assumption is wrong, a very substantial part of his argument is gone.

The following passage will illustrate the attitude of the author of "Supernatural Religion" towards this question:—

This work was less based on written records of the teaching of Jesus than on that which Papias had been able to collect from tradition, which he considered more authentic, for, like his contemporary Hegesippus, Papias avowedly prefers tradition to any written works with which he was acquainted.†

I venture to ask in passing, where our author obtained his information that Hegesippus "avowedly prefers tradition to any written works with which he was acquainted." Certainly not from any fragments or notices of this writer which have been hitherto published.

After quoting the extract from the preface of Papias which has been given above, our author resumes:—

It is clear from this that, even if Papias knew any of our Gospels, he attached little or no value to them, and that he knew absolutely nothing of Canonical Scriptures of the New Testament. His work was evidently intended to furnish a more complete collection of the discourses of Jesus from oral tradition than any previously existing, with his own expositions; and this is plainly indicated by his own words, and by the title of his work, *Λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*. ‡

"The natural and only reasonable course," he adds in a note,

* Whether the first word should be singular or plural, "Exposition" (*ἐξήγησις*) or "Expositions" (*ἐξηγήσεις*), I need not stop to inquire. The important points are (1) that Papias uses *λογίων*, not *λόγων*—"oracles," not "words" or "sayings;" (2) that he has *κυριακῶν λογίων*, not *λογίων τοῦ κυρίου*—"Dominical Oracles," not "Oracles of the Lord." I shall have occasion hereafter to call attention to both these facts, which are significant, as they give a much wider range to his subject-matter than if he had used the alternative expressions.

† S. R. I. pp. 444 seq.

‡ So again, I. pp. 484 seq., "Whatever books Papias knew, however, it is certain, from his own express declaration, that he ascribed little importance to them, and preferred tradition as a more reliable source of information regarding Evangelical history," &c. See also II. pp. 320 seq.

"is to believe the express declaration of Papias, more especially as it is made, in this instance, as a prefatory statement of his belief." He has appealed to Cæsar, and to Cæsar he shall go.

What then is the natural interpretation of the title "Exposition of Oracles of" (or "relating to") "the Lord?" Would any one, without a preconceived theory, imagine that "exposition" here meant anything else but explanation or interpretation? It is possible indeed, that the original word *ἐξηγήσεως* might, in other connections, be used in reference to a narrative, but its common and obvious sense is the same which it bears when adopted into English as "exegesis." In other words, it expresses the idea of a *commentary on some text*. The expression has an exact parallel, for instance, in the language of Eusebius when, speaking of Dionysius of Corinth, he says that this writer introduces into his letter to the Church of Amastria "expositions of Divine Scriptures" (*γραφῶν θεῶν ἐξηγήσεις*), or when he says that Irenæus quotes a certain "Apostolic elder" and gives his "expositions of Divine Scriptures" (the same expression as before).* It is used more than once in this sense, and it is not used in any other, as we shall see presently, by Irenæus.† Moreover Anastasius of Sinai distinctly styles Papias an "exegete," meaning thereby, as his context shows, an "interpreter" of the Holy Scriptures.‡

"The title of his work" therefore does not "indicate" anything of the kind which our author assumes it to indicate.§ It does not suggest a more authentic narrative, but a more correct interpretation of an existing narrative. And the same inference is suggested still more strongly, when from the title we turn to the words of the preface; "*But I will not scruple also to give a place along with my interpretations* (*συνκατατάξαι ταῖς ἐρμηνείαις*) to all that I learnt carefully and remembered carefully in time past from the elders." Here the sense of "exegesis" in the title is explained by the use of the unambiguous word "interpretations." But this is not the most important point. The interpretations must have been interpretations of something. Of what then? Certainly not of the oral traditions, for the interpretations are presupposed, and the oral traditions are mentioned subsequently, being introduced to illustrate the interpretations. The words which I have italicised leave no doubt about this. The "also," which (by the way) our author omits, has no significance otherwise. The expression "along with the interpretations" is capable only of one meaning. In other words, the only account which can be given of the passage, consistently with logic and grammar, demands the

* *H. E.* iv. 23, v. 8.

† See below, p. 391.

‡ The references will be found above, p. 386.

§ The proper word, if the work had been what our author supposes, was not *ἐξηγήσεις* but *ἀνέκδοτα*, which Eusebius uses several times of the anecdotes related by Papias; *H. E.* iii. 39.

following sequence:—(1.) The text, of which something was doubtless said in the preceding passage, for it is *assumed* in the extract itself. (2.) The interpretations which explained the text, and which were the main object of the work. (3.) The oral traditions, which, as the language here shows, were subordinate to the interpretations, and which Papias mentions in a slightly apologetic tone. These oral traditions had obviously a strong attraction for Papias; he introduced them frequently to confirm and illustrate his explanations. But only the most violent wresting of language can make them the text or basis of these interpretations.*

A good example of the method thus adopted by Papias and explained in his preface is accidentally preserved by Irenæus.† This father is discoursing on the millennial reign of Christ. His starting point is the saying of our Lord at the last supper, “I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of this vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom.” (Matt. xxvi. 29.) He takes the words literally, and argues that they must imply a terrestrial kingdom, since only men of flesh can drink the fruit of the vine. He confirms this view by appealing to two other sayings of Christ recorded in the Gospels—the one the promise of a recompense in the resurrection of the just to those who call the poor and maimed and lame and blind to their feast (Luke xiv. 13, 14); the other the assurance that those who have forsaken houses or lands for Christ’s sake shall receive a hundredfold now in *this present time* (Matt. xix. 29, Mark x. 28, 29, Luke xviii. 30),‡ which last expression, he maintains, can only be satisfied by an earthly reign of Christ. He then attempts to show that the promises to the patriarchs also require the same solution, since hitherto they have not been fulfilled. These, he says, evidently refer to the reign of the just in a renewed earth, which shall be blessed with abundance.

As the elders relate, who saw John the disciple of the Lord, that they had heard from him how the Lord used to teach concerning those times, and to say, “The days will come, in which vines shall grow, each having

* This attempt has recently been made by Weiffenbach, *Das Papias-Fragment*, pp. 16 seq.; and it is chiefly valuable as a testimony to the real significance of the words, which can only be set aside by such violent treatment. Weiffenbach is obliged to perform two acts of violence on the sentence: (1.) He supposes that there is an anacoluthon, and that the *καὶ ὁσα ῥαὶ* here is answered by the words *εἰ δὲ τοῦ καὶ παρακολούθησας*, which occur several lines below. (2.) He interprets *ταῖς ἐρμηνείαις* “the interpretations belonging to them.” Each of these by itself is harsh and unnatural in the extreme; and the combination of the two may be safely pronounced impossible. Even if his grammatical treatment could be allowed, the fact will still remain that the *interpretations* are *presupposed*. Weiffenbach’s constructions of this passage are justly rejected by the two writers who have written on the subject since his essay appeared, Hilgenfeld and Leimbach.

† *Her. v. 88. 1 seq.*

‡ It may be observed in passing, as an illustration of the looseness of early quotations, that this passage, as given by Irenæus, does not accord with any one of the Synoptic Evangelists, but combines features from all the three.

ten thousand shoots, and on each shoot ten thousand branches, and on each branch again ten thousand twigs, and on each twig ten thousand clusters, and on each cluster ten thousand grapes, and each grape when pressed shall yield five-and-twenty measures of wine. And when any of the saints shall have taken hold of one of their clusters, another shall cry, 'I am a better cluster; take me, bless the Lord through me.' Likewise also a grain of wheat shall produce ten thousand heads," &c. These things Papias, who was a hearer of John and a companion of Polycarp, an ancient worthy, witnesseth in writing in the fourth of his books; for there are five books composed by him. And he added, saying, "But these things are credible to them that believe." And when Judas the traitor did not believe, and asked, "How shall such growths be accomplished by the Lord?" he relates that the Lord said, "They shall see, who shall come to these [times]."

I shall not stop to inquire whether there is any foundation of truth in this story, and, if so, how far it has been transmuted, as it passed through the hands of the elders and of Papias. It is sufficient for my purpose to remark that we here find just the three elements which the preface of Papias would lead us to expect: *first*, the saying or sayings of Christ recorded in the written Gospels; *secondly*, the interpretation of these sayings, which is characteristically millennial; *thirdly*, the illustrative story, derived from oral tradition, which relates "what John said," and to which the author "gives a place along with his interpretation."*

So far everything seems clear. But if this be so, what becomes of the disparagement of written Gospels, which is confidently asserted by our author and others? When the preface of Papias is thus correctly explained, the "books" which he esteems so lightly assume quite a different aspect. They are no longer Evangelical records, but works commenting on such records. The contrast is no longer between oral and written Gospels, but between oral and written *aids to interpretation*. Papias judged rightly that any doctrinal statement of Andrew or Peter or John, or any anecdote of the Saviour which could be traced distinctly to their authority, would be far more valuable to elucidate his text than the capricious interpretations which he found in current books. If his critical judgment had corresponded to his intention, the work would have been highly important.

The leading object of Papias therefore was not to substitute a correct narrative for an imperfect and incorrect, but to counteract a false exegesis by a true. But where did he find this false exegesis? The opening passage of Irenæus supplies the answer. This father describes the Gnostic teachers as "tampering with the oracles

* The view that Papias took *written* Gospels as the basis of his interpretations is maintained by no one more strongly than by Hilgenfeld in his recent works; *Papias von Hierapolis* (*Zeitschrift*, 1875) pp. 238 seq.; *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (1875), pp. 53 seq., 454 seq. But it seems to me that he is not carrying out this view to its logical conclusion, when he still interprets *βίβλος* of Evangelical narratives, and talks of Papias as holding these written records in little esteem.

of the Lord (τὰ λόγια κυρίου), showing themselves bad expositors of things well said" (ἐξηγηταὶ κακοὶ τῶν καλῶς εἰρημένων γινόμενοι).* Here we have the very title of Papias' work reproduced. Papias, like Irenæus after him, undertook, we may suppose, to stem the current of Gnosticism. If, while resisting the false and exaggerated spiritualism of the Gnostics, he fell into the opposite error, so that his Chiliastic doctrine was tainted by a somewhat gross materialism, he only offended in the same way as Irenæus, though probably to a greater degree. The Gnostic leaders were in some instances no mean thinkers; but they were almost invariably bad exegetes. The Gnostic fragments in Irenæus and Hippolytus are crowded with false interpretations of Christ's sayings as recorded in the Gospels. Simonians, Ophites, Basilideans, Valentinians, Gnostics of all sects, are represented there, and all sin in the same way. These remains are only the accidental waifs and strays of a Gnostic literature which must have been enormous in extent. As by common consent the work of Papias was written in the later years of his life, a very appreciable portion of this literature must have been in existence when he wrote. More especially the elaborate work of Basilides on "the Gospel," in twenty-four books, must have been published some years. Basilides flourished, we are told, during the reign of Hadrian† (A.D. 117—138). Such a lengthy work would explain the sarcastic allusion in Papias to those "who have so very much to say" (τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγουσιν),‡ and who are afterwards described as "teaching foreign commandments."§ There are excellent reasons for believing this to be the very work from which the fragments quoted by Hippolytus, as from Basilides, are taken.|| These fragments contain false interpretations of passages from St. Luke and St. John, as well as from several Epistles of St. Paul. But, however this may be, the general character of the work appears from the fact that Clement of Alexandria quotes it under the title of "Exegetics."¶ It is quite possible too, that the writings of Valentinus were in circulation before Papias wrote, and exegesis was a highly important instrument with him and his school. If we once recognize the fact that Papias wrote when Gnosticism was rampant, the drift of his language becomes clear and consistent.

* *Her. Præf.* 1; see also i. 8. 6: "Not only do they attempt to make their demonstrations from the Evangelical and Apostolic [writings] by perverting the interpretations and falsifying the expositions (ἐξηγήσεις), but also from the law and the prophets; as . . . being able to wrest what is ambiguous into many [senses] by their exposition" (ἐκ τῆς ἐξηγήσεως).

† *Clem. Alex. Strom.* vii. 17, p. 898.

‡ Compare also the language of Hippolytus respecting the books of the Naassenes; *Her.* v. 7, "These are the heads of very numerous discourses (πολλῶν πόνου λόγων), which they say that James," &c.

§ This same epithet "foreign" (ἀλλότριος) is applied several times in the Ignatian Epistles to the Gnostic teaching which the writer is combating; *Rom. inscr., Trall.* 6, *Philad.* 3.

|| Reasons are given by Dr. Westcott in the fourth edition of his *History of the Canon*, p. 288.

¶ *Strom.* iv. 12, p. 599.

This account of the "books" which Papias disparages seems to follow from the grammatical interpretation of the earlier part of the sentence. And it alone is free from difficulties. It is quite plain for instance, that Eusebius did not understand our Gospels to be meant thereby; for otherwise he would hardly have quoted this low estimate without expostulation or comment. And again, the hypothesis which identifies these "books" with written Evangelical records used by Papias charges him with the most stupid perversity. It makes him prefer the second-hand report of what Matthew had said about the Lord's discourses to the account of these discourses which Matthew himself had deliberately set down in writing.* Such a report might have the highest value *outside* the written record; but no sane man could prefer a conversation repeated by another to the immediate and direct account of the same events by the person himself. Nor again, is it consistent with the language which Papias himself uses of the one Evangelical document about which (in his extant fragments) he does express an opinion. Of St. Mark's record he says that the author "made no mistake," and that it was his one anxiety "not to omit anything that he had heard, or to set down any false statement therein." Is this the language of one speaking of a book to which "he attached little or no value?"†

But, if Papias used written documents as the text for his "expositions," can we identify these? To this question his own language elsewhere supplies the answer at least in part. He mentions Evangelical narratives written by Mark and Matthew respectively; and it is therefore the obvious inference that our first two Gospels at all events were used for his work.

An obvious inference, but fiercely contested nevertheless. It has been maintained by many recent critics, that the St. Mark of Papias was not our St. Mark, nor the St. Matthew of Papias our St.

* The following passage in "Supernatural Religion" is highly instructive, as showing the inconsistencies involved in the author's view (L. p. 485): "It is not possible that he [Papias] could have found it better to inquire 'what John or Matthew, or what any other of the disciples of the Lord . . . say,' if he had known of Gospels such as ours, actually written by them, deliberately telling him what they had to say. The work of Matthew which he mentions being, however, a mere collection of discourses, he might naturally inquire what the Apostle said of the history of the Master." Here the author practically concedes the point for which I am contending, and which elsewhere he resists; for he states that Papias as a sane man must, and as a matter of fact did, prefer a book to oral tradition. In other words, he allows that when Papias disparages books (meaning Evangelical records, such as the St. Matthew of Papias was on any showing), he cannot intend all books of this class, but only such as our author himself arbitrarily determines that he shall mean. This point is not at all affected by the question whether the St. Matthew of Papias did or did not contain doings, as well as sayings, of Christ. The only escape from these perplexities lies in supposing that a wholly different class of books is intended, as I have explained in the text.

† S. R. I. p. 445. It is not likely that our author would appreciate the bearing of these references to St. Mark, because (as I pointed out in my first article) he mistranslated *οὐδὲν ᾤμαρτε* "did no wrong," instead of "made no mistake," thus obscuring the testimony of Papias to the perfect accuracy of the result of St. Mark's conscientious labours. The translation is altered in the last edition, but the new rendering, "committed no error in thus writing," is ambiguous, though not incorrect.

Matthew; and as the author of "Supernatural Religion" has adopted this view, some words will be necessary in refutation of it.

The language then, which Papias uses to describe the document written by St. Mark, is as follows:—

And the elder said this also: "Mark, having become the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately everything that he remembered, without however recording in order what was either said or done by Christ. For neither did he hear the Lord, nor did he follow Him; but afterwards, as I said, [attended] Peter, who adapted his instructions to the needs [of his hearers] but had no design of giving a connected account of the Lord's oracles [or discourses]" (ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστερ σύνταξιν τῶν κυριακῶν ποιούμενος λόγιον or λόγον). So then Mark made no mistake, while he thus wrote down some things as he remembered them; for he made it his one care not to omit anything that he heard, or to set down any false statement therein.

Eusebius introduces this passage by a statement that it "refers to Mark, the writer of the Gospel;" and the authority whom Papias here quotes is apparently the Presbyter John, who has been mentioned immediately before.

Now it will be plain, I think, to any reader of common sense, that Papias is giving an account of the circumstances under which the Evangelical narrative in question was composed. There were two phenomena in it which seemed to him to call for explanation. In the first place, it is not a *complete* narrative. In the second place the events are not recorded in *strict chronological order*. These two phenomena are explained by St. Mark's position and opportunities, which were necessarily limited. His work was composed from reminiscences of St. Peter's preaching; and, as this preaching was necessarily fragmentary and adapted to the immediate requirements of his hearers (the preacher having no intention of giving a continuous narrative), the writer could not possess either the materials for a complete account or the knowledge for an accurate chronological arrangement. Papias obviously has before him some other Gospel narrative or narratives, which contained sayings or doings of Christ not recorded by St. Mark, and moreover related those which he did record in a different order. For this discrepancy he desires to account. The motive and the treatment have an exact parallel, as I shall show hereafter, in the account of the Gospels given by the author of the Muratorian Canon.

This is the plain and simple inference from the passage; and we have only to ask whether this description corresponds with the phenomena of our St. Mark. That it does so correspond, I think, can hardly be denied. As regards *completeness*, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that any one of our Canonical Gospels records many doings, and above all, many sayings, which are

omitted in St. Mark. As regards *order* again, it may, I believe, safely be said that no writer of a "Life of Christ" finds himself able to preserve the sequence of events exactly as it stands in St. Mark. His account does not profess to be strictly chronological. There are indeed chronological links in the narrative here and there; but throughout considerable parts of our Lord's ministry the successive incidents are quite unconnected by notices of time. In short, the Gospel is just what we should expect, if the author had derived his information in the way reported by the Presbyter. But our author objects, that it "does not depart in any important degree from the order of the other two Synoptics," and that it "throughout has the most evident character of orderly arrangement."* Persons may differ as to what is important or unimportant; but if the reader will refer to any one of the common harmonies, those of Anger and Tischendorf for instance, he will see that constant transpositions are necessary in one or other of the Synoptic Gospels to bring them into accordance, and will be able to judge for himself how far this statement is true. "Orderly arrangement" of some sort, no doubt, there is; but it is just such as lay within the reach of a person obtaining his knowledge at second-hand in this way. Our author himself describes it lower down as "*artistic* and orderly arrangement." I shall not quarrel with the phrase, though somewhat exaggerated. Any amount of "artistic arrangement" is compatible with the notice of Papias, which refers only to historical sequence. "Artistic arrangement" does not require the direct knowledge of an eye-witness. It will be observed however, that our author speaks of a comparison with "the order of the other two Synoptics." But what, if the comparison which Papias had in view was wholly different? What, if he adduced this testimony of the Presbyter to explain how St. Mark's Gospel differed not from another Synoptic narrative, but *from St. John*? I shall return to this question at a later point in these investigations.

Our author is no stranger to the use of strong words: "If our present Gospel," he writes, "cannot be proved to be the very work referred to by the Presbyter John, as most certainly it cannot, the evidence of Papias becomes fatal to the claims of the second Canonical Gospel."† The novelty of the logic in this sentence rivals the boldness of the assumption.

Yet so entirely satisfied is he with the result of his arguments, that he does not consider it "necessary to account for the manner in which the work to which the Presbyter John referred disappeared, and the present Gospel according to Mark became substituted for it."‡ But others are of a more inquiring turn of

* I. p. 456.

† I. p. 460.

‡ I. p. 453.

mind. They will be haunted with this difficulty, and will not be able thus to shelve the question. They will venture to ask how it is that not any, even the faintest, indication of the existence of this other Mark can be traced in all the remains of Christian antiquity. They will observe too, that if the date which our author himself adopts be correct, Irenæus was already grown up to manhood when Papias wrote his work. They will remember that Irenæus received his earliest Christian education from a friend of Papias, and that his great authorities in everything which relates to Christian tradition are the associates and fellow-countrymen of Papias. They will remark that, having the work of Papias in his hands and holding it in high esteem, he nevertheless is so impressed with the conviction that our present four Gospels, and these only, had formed the title-deeds of the Church from the beginning, that he ransacks heaven and earth for analogies to this sacred number. They will perhaps carry their investigations further, and discover that Irenæus not only possessed our St. Mark's Gospel, but possessed it also with its present ending, which, though undoubtedly very early, can hardly have been part of the original work. They will then pass on to the Muratorian author, who probably wrote some years before Irenæus, and, remembering that Irenæus represents the combined testimony of Asia Minor and Gaul, they will see that they have here the representative of a different branch of the Church, probably the Roman. Yet the Muratorian writer agrees with Irenæus in representing our four Gospels, and these only, as the traditional inheritance of the Church; for though the fragment is mutilated at the beginning, so that the names of the first two Evangelists have disappeared, the identity cannot be seriously questioned. They will then extend their horizon to Clement in Alexandria and Tertullian in Africa; and they will find these fathers also possessed by the same belief. Impressed with this convergency of testimony from so many different quarters, they will be utterly at a loss to account for the unanimity of these early witnesses—all sharing in the same delusion, all ignorant that a false Mark has been silently substituted for the true Mark during their own lifetime, and consequently assuming as an indisputable fact that the false Mark was received by the Church from the beginning. And they will end in a revolt against the attempt of our author to impose upon them with his favourite commonplace about the "thoroughly uncritical character of the fathers."

Indeed, they will begin altogether to suspect this wholesale denunciation; for they will observe that our author is convicted out of his own context. They will remark how he repels an inconvenient question of Tischendorf by a scornful reference to "the frivolous character of the *only* criticism in which they [Euse-

bis and the other Christian Fathers] *ever* indulged.”* Yet they will remember at the same time to have read in this very chapter on Papias a highly intelligent criticism of Eusebius, with which this father confronts a statement of Irenæus, and which our author himself adopts as conclusive.† They will recall also, in this same context, a reference to a passage in Dionysius of Alexandria, where this “great Bishop” anticipates by nearly sixteen centuries the criticisms of our own age concerning the differences of style between the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse.‡

From St. Mark we pass to St. Matthew. Papias has something to tell us of this Gospel also; but here again we are asked to believe that we have a case of mistaken identity.

After the notice relating to St. Mark, Eusebius continues:—

But concerning Matthew, the following statement is made [by Papias]: “So then Matthew (*Ματθαῖος μὲν οὖν*) composed the Oracles in the Hebrew language, and each one interpreted them as he could.”

The assumption that this statement, like the former, was made on the authority of the Presbyter, depends solely on the close proximity in which the two extracts stand in Eusebius. It must therefore be regarded as highly precarious. In Papias’ own work the two extracts may have been wide apart. Indeed the opening particles in the second passage prove conclusively that it cannot have followed immediately on the first. Just as the *ὡς ἔφη* in the extract relating to St. Mark showed that it was a fragment torn from its context, so we have the similar evidence of a violent severance here in the words *μὲν οὖν*. The ragged edge is apparent in both cases.§ This fact must be borne in mind in any criticisms which the passages suggest.

In this extract then Papias speaks of a state of things in which each man interpreted the original Hebrew for himself. There can have been no authoritative Greek Gospel of St. Matthew at that time, if his account be correct. So far his meaning is clear. But it is equally clear that the time which he is here contemplating is not the time when he writes his book, but *some earlier epoch*. He says not “interprets,” but “interpreted.” This past tense “interpreted,” be it observed, is not the tense of Eusebius reporting Papias, but of Papias himself. Everything depends on this distinction; yet our author deliberately ignores

* I. p. 460.

† I. p. 447. This criticism is given above, p. 378.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ The manner in which Eusebius will tear a part of a passage from its context is well illustrated by his quotation from Irenæus, ii. 22. 5:—“A quadragesimo autem et quinquagesimo anno declinat jam in statem seniore, quam habens Dominus noster docebat, sicut Evangelium [et omnes seniores testantur, qui in Asiâ apud Ioannem discipulum Domini convenerunt] id ipsum [tradidisse eis Ioannem. Permansit autem cum eis usque ad Trajani tempora]. Quidam autem eorum non solum Ioannem, sed et alios Apostolos viderunt, et hæc eadem ab ipsis audierunt et testantur de huiusmodi relatione.” Eusebius gives only the part which I have enclosed in brackets: *H. E.* iii. 23.

it. He does indeed state the grammatical argument correctly, as given by others :—

Some consider that Papias or the Presbyter use the verb in the past tense, *ἡμῖν*, as contrasting the time when it was necessary for each to interpret as best he could with the period when, from the existence of a recognized translation, it was no longer necessary for them to do so.*

Yet a few lines after, when he comes to comment upon it, he can write as follows :—

The statement [of Papias] is perfectly simple and direct, and it is at least quite clear that it conveys the fact that translation was requisite ; and, as each one translated “as he was able,” that no recognized translation existed to which all might have recourse. There is absolutely not a syllable which warrants the conclusion that Papias was acquainted with an authentic Greek version, although it is possible that he may have known of the existence of some Greek translations of no authority. The words used, however, imply that, if he did, he had no respect for any of them.

Our author has here imposed upon himself by a grammatical trick. Hard pressed by the argument, he has covered his retreat under an ambiguous use of tenses. The words “each one translated as he was able” are perfectly clear in the direct language of Papias ; but adopted without alteration into the oblique statement of our author, they are altogether obscure. “Translation *was* requisite.” Yes, but at what time ? The fact is that no careful reader can avoid asking why Papias writes “interpreted,” and not “interprets.” The natural answer is that the necessity of which he speaks had already passed away. In other words, it implies the existence of a recognized Greek translation, *when Papias wrote*. Whence our author got his information that Papias “had no respect for” any such translation, it is difficult to say. Certainly not from “the words used ;” for Papias says nothing about it, and we only infer its existence from the suppressed contrast implied in the past tense.

But, if a Greek St. Matthew existed in the time of Papias, we are forbidden by all considerations of historical probability to suppose that it was any other than our St. Matthew. As in the case of St. Mark, so here the contrary hypothesis is weighted with an accumulation of improbabilities. The argument used there might be repeated *totidem verbis* here. It was enough that we were asked to accept the theory of a mistaken identity once ; but the same demand is renewed again. And the improbability of this double mistake is very far greater than the sum of the improbabilities in the two several cases, great as this sum would be.

The testimony of Papias therefore may be accepted as valid so far as regards the recognition of our St. Matthew in his own age.

* L p. 474.

But it does not follow that his account of the origin was correct. It may or may not have been. This is just what we cannot decide, because we do not know exactly what he said. It cannot be inferred with any certainty from this fragmentary excerpt of Eusebius, what Papias supposed to be the exact relation of the Greek Gospel of St. Matthew which he had before him to the Hebrew document of which he speaks. Our author indeed says that our First Gospel bears all the marks of an original, and cannot have been translated from the Hebrew at all. This, I venture to think, is far more than the facts will sustain. If he had said that it is not a homogeneous Greek version of a homogeneous Hebrew original, this would have been nearer to the truth. But we do not know that Papias said this. He may have expressed himself in language quite consistent with the phenomena. Or on the other hand he may, as Hilgenfeld supposes, have made the mistake which some later fathers made, of thinking that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was the original of our St. Matthew. In the absence of adequate data it is quite vain to conjecture. But meanwhile we are not warranted in drawing any conclusion unfavourable either to the accuracy of Papias or to the identity of the document itself.

Our author however maintains that the Hebrew St. Matthew of which Papias speaks was not a Gospel at all—i.e., not a narrative of our Lord's life and ministry—but a mere collection of discourses or sayings. It is urged that the expression, "Matthew compiled the oracles" (*ἐνεγράψατο τὰ λόγια*), requires this interpretation. If this explanation were correct, the notice would suggest that Papias looked upon the Greek Gospel as not merely a translation, but an enlargement, of the original document. In this case it would be vain to speculate how or when or by whom he supposed it to be made; for either he did not give this information, or (if he did) Eusebius has withheld it. This hypothesis was first started, I believe, by Schleiermacher, and has found favour with not a few critics of opposite schools. Attempts have been made from time to time to restore this supposed document by disengaging those portions of our First Gospel, which would correspond to this idea, from their historical setting. The theory is not without its attractions: it promises a solution of some difficulties; but hitherto it has not yielded any results which would justify its acceptance.

Our author speaks of those critics who reject it as "in very many cases largely influenced by the desire to see in these *λόγια* our actual Gospel according to St. Matthew."* This is true in the same sense in which it is true that those who take opposite

* I. p. 465.

views are largely influenced in very many cases by the opposite desire. But such language is only calculated to mislead. By no one is the theory of a collection of discourses more strongly denounced than by Bleek,* who apparently considers that Papias did not here refer to a Greek Gospel at all. "There is nothing," he writes, "in the manner in which Papias expresses himself to justify this supposition; he would certainly have expressed himself as he does, if he meant an historical work like our New Testament Gospels, if he were referring to a writing whose contents were those of our Greek Gospel according to Matthew." Equally decided too is the language of Hilgenfeld,† who certainly would not be swayed by any bias in this direction.

Indeed this theory is encumbered with the most serious difficulties. In the first place, there is no notice or trace elsewhere of any such "collection of discourses." In the next place, all other early writers from Irenæus onwards, who allude to the subject, speak of St. Matthew as writing a Gospel, not a mere collection of sayings, in Hebrew. If they derived their information in every case from Papias, it is clear that they found no difficulty in interpreting his language so as to include a narrative: if they did not (as seems more probable, and as our author himself holds ‡), then their testimony is all the more important, as of independent witnesses to the existence of a Hebrew St. Matthew, which was a narrative, and not a mere collection of discourses.

Nor indeed does the expression itself drive us to any such hypothesis. Hilgenfeld, while applying it to our First Gospel, explains it on grounds which at all events are perfectly tenable. He supposes that Papias mentions only the *sayings* of Christ, not because St. Matthew recorded nothing else, but because he himself was concerned only with these, and St. Matthew's Gospel, as distinguished from St. Mark's, was the great storehouse of materials for his purpose.§ I do not however think that this is the right explanation. It supposes that only λόγοι ("discourses" or "sayings") could be called λόγια ("oracles"); but usage does warrant this restriction. Thus we are expressly told that the Scriptures recognized by Ephraem, Patriarch of Antioch (about A.D. 525—545), consisted of "the Old Testament and the Oracles of the Lord (τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια) and the Preachings of the Apostles."|| Here we have the very same expression which

* *Introduction to the New Testament*, I. pp. 109 seq. (Eng. Transl.), where there is more to the same effect.

† *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, pp. 456 seq. "An eine blosse Aufzeichnung der Reden Jesu hat er nicht einmal gedacht . . . Nicht eine blosse Redensammlung, sondern ein vollständiges Evangelium lässt schon Papias den Matthäus hebräisch geschrieben haben." See also pp. 54 seq., 454 seq.

‡ I pp. 470 seq., "That Irenæus did not derive his information solely from Papias may be inferred," &c. . . . "The evidence furnished by Pantænus is certainly independent of Papias."

§ *Einleitung*, pp. 54 seq., 456 seq.

|| Photius, *Bibl.* 228.

occurs in Papias; and it is obviously employed as a synonyme for the Gospels. Our author does not mention this close parallel, but he alleges that "however much the signification [of the expression "the oracles," τὰ λόγια] became afterwards extended, it was not then at all applied to doings as well as sayings;" and again, that "there is no linguistic precedent for straining the expression, used at that period, to mean anything beyond a collection of sayings of Jesus which were oracular or divine." * This objection, if it has any force, must involve one or both of these two assumptions; *first*, that books which were regarded as Scripture could not at this early date be called oracles, unless they were occupied entirely with divine *sayings*; *secondly*, that the Gospel of St. Matthew in particular could not at this time be regarded as Scripture. Both assumptions alike are contradicted by facts.

The first is refuted by a large number of examples. St. Paul, for instance, describes it as the special privilege of the Jews, that they had the keeping of the "oracles of God" (Rom. iii. 1). Can we suppose that he meant anything else but the Old Testament Scriptures by this expression? Is it possible that he would exclude the books of Genesis, of Joshua, of Samuel and Kings, or only include such fragments of them as professed to give the direct sayings of God? Would he, or would he not, comprise under the term the account of the creation and fall (1 Cor. xi. 8 seq.), of the wanderings in the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 1 seq.), of Sarah and Hagar (Gal. iv. 21 seq.)? Does not the main part of his argument in the very next chapter (Rom. iv) depend much more on the narrative of God's dealings than of His words? Again, when the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews refers to "the first principles of the oracles of God" (v. 10), his meaning is explained by his practice; for he elicits the divine teaching quite as much from the history as from the direct precepts of the Old Testament. But, if the language of the New Testament writers leaves any loophole for doubt, this is not the case with their contemporary Philo. In one place he speaks of the words in Deut. x. 9, "The Lord God is his inheritance," as an "oracle" (λόγιον); in another he quotes as an "oracle" (λόγιον) the narrative in Gen. iv. 15, "The Lord God set a mark upon Cain, lest any one finding him should kill him."† From this and other passages it is clear that with Philo an "oracle" is a synonyme for a "scripture." Similarly Clement of Rome writes "Ye know well the sacred Scriptures, and have studied the

* I. p. 464.

† *De Conj. erud. grat.* 24 (p. 538); *de Profug.* 11 (p. 555). Elsewhere he says that all things which are written in the sacred books (of Moses) are oracles (χρησμοί) pronounced (χρησθίσκτες) through him; and he proceeds to distinguish different kinds of λόγια (*Vit. Moys.* iii. 28, p. 163).

oracles of God,"* and immediately he recalls to their mind the account in Deut. ix. 12 seq., Exod. xxxii. 7 seq., of which the point is not any divine precept or prediction, but *the example of Moses*. A few years later Polycarp speaks in condemnation of those who "pervert the oracles of the Lord."† How much he included under this expression, we cannot say, but it must be observed that he does not write τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια "the Dominical oracles," or τὰ λόγια "the oracles" simply—the two expressions which occur in Papias—but τὰ λόγια τοῦ κυρίου, "the oracles of the Lord," which form of words would more directly suggest the Lord as the speaker. Again Irenæus, denouncing the interpretations of the Scriptures current among the Gnostics, uses the very expression of Papias, τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια;‡ and though he does not define his exact meaning, yet as the "oracles of God" are mentioned immediately afterwards, and as the first instance of such false interpretation which he gives is not a saying, but an incident in the Gospels—the healing of the ruler's daughter—we may infer that he had no idea of restricting the term to sayings of Christ. Again when we turn to Clement of Alexandria, we find that the Scriptures in one passage are called "the oracles of truth," while in another among the good deeds attributed to Ezra is the "discovery and restoration of the inspired oracles."§ Similarly Origen speaks of the teachings of the Scripture as "the oracles," "the oracles of God."|| In the context of the latter of the two passages to which I refer, he has clearly stated that he is contemplating the histories, the law, and the prophets alike. So too St. Basil uses "sacred" (or divine) "oracles," "oracles of the Spirit,"¶ as synonymes for the Scriptures. And this catena of passages might be largely extended.

This wide sense of the word "oracles" therefore in itself is fully substantiated by examples both before and after the time of Papias. But our author objects that it is not consistent with the usage of Papias himself elsewhere. The examples alleged however fail to prove this. If Papias entitled his work "Exposition of Oracles of the Lord," or rather "of Dominical Oracles," there is nothing to show that he did not include narrative portions of the Gospels, as well as discourses; though from the nature of the case the latter would occupy the chief place. On the contrary, it is certain from the extant notices that he dealt largely with incidents. And this he would naturally do. By false allegory

* C. 54 ἐγκύβητε εἰς τὰ λόγια τοῦ [Θεοῦ]. Elsewhere (C. 45) he uses the expression ἐγκύβητε εἰς τὰς γραφάς.

† Phil. 7.

‡ Her. i. 8. 1.

§ Coh. ad Gent. p. 84 (Potter), Strom. i. p. 392.

|| De Princ. iv. 11 (I. p. 168, Delarue), in Matth. x. § 6 (III. p. 447).

¶ Hom. xi. 5 (II. p. 96); ibid. xii. 1 (p. 97).

and in other ways, Gnostic teachers misinterpreted the facts, not less than the sayings, of the Gospels; and Papias would be anxious to supply the corrective in the one case as in the other. The second example of its use in Papias certainly does not favour our author's view. This father, as we have seen,* describes St. Mark as not writing down "in order the things said or done by Christ" (οὐ μέντοι τάξει τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα). This, he states, was not within the Evangelist's power, because he was not a personal disciple of our Lord, but obtained his information from the preaching of Peter, who consulted the immediate needs of his hearers and had "no intention of giving a consecutive record of the Dominical oracles" (οὐχ ὥσπερ σύνταξιν τῶν κυριακῶν ποιούμενος λόγιον). Here the obvious inference is that τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια in the second clause is equivalent to τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα in the first, just as the σύνταξιν in the second clause corresponds to the τάξει in the first. Our author however, following the lead of those who adopt the same interpretation of "the oracles," explains it differently.†

There is an evident contrast made. Mark wrote ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα, because he had not the means of writing discourses, but Matthew, composed the λόγια. Papias clearly distinguishes the work of Mark, who had written reminiscences of what Jesus had said and done, from that of Matthew, who had made a collection of discourses.‡

This interpretation depends altogether on the assumption that the extracts relating to St. Mark and St. Matthew belonged to the same context; but this is only an assumption. Moreover it introduces into the extract relating to St. Mark a contrast which is not only not suggested by the language, but is opposed to the order of the words. The leading idea in this extract is *the absence of strict historical sequence* in St. Mark's narrative. Accordingly the emphatic word in the clause in question is σύνταξιν, which picks up the previous τάξει, and itself occupies the prominent position in its own clause. If our author's interpretation were correct, the main idea would be a contrast between a work relating deeds as well as sayings, and a work relating sayings only; and λογίον, as bringing out this idea, would demand the most emphatic place (οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν λόγιων σύνταξιν ποιούμενος); whereas in its present position it is entirely subordinated to other words in the clause.‡

The examples quoted above show that "the oracles" (τὰ λόγια) can be used as co-extensive with "the Scriptures" (αἱ γραφαί) in the time of Papias. Hence it follows that "the Dominical

* See p. 393.

† I. p. 466.

‡ Our author has not mentioned the various reading λόγων for λογίων here, though Hilgenfeld speaks of it as the reading of the "best editions." If it were correct, it would upset his argument; but the most recent critical editor, Laemmer, has adopted λογίων.

oracles" (τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια) can have as wide a meaning as "the Dominical Scriptures" (*Dominicæ Scripturæ*, αἱ κυριακαὶ γραφαί)—an expression occurring in Irenæus and in Dionysius of Corinth*—or, in other words, that the Gospels may be so called. If any difficulty therefore remains, it must lie in the *second* of the two assumptions which I mentioned above—namely, that no Evangelical record could at this early date be invested with the authority implied by the use of this term, or (in other words) could be regarded as Scripture. This assumption again is contradicted by facts. The Gospel of St. Matthew is twice quoted in the Epistle of Barnabas, and in the first passage the quotation is introduced by the common formula of Scriptural reference—"as it is written."† To what contortions our author puts his argument, when dealing with that epistle, in the vain attempt to escape the grip of hard fact, I shall have occasion to show when the proper time comes. At present it is sufficient to say that the only ground for refusing to accept St. Matthew as the source of these two quotations, which are found there, is the assumption that St. Matthew could not at this early date be regarded as "Scripture." In other words, it is a *petitio principii*. But the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, on any showing, was written before the date which our author himself assigns to the Exposition of Papias. Some place it as early as A.D. 70, or thereabouts; some as late as A.D. 120; the majority incline to the later years of the first, or the very beginning of the second century. If therefore this Gospel could be quoted as Scripture in Barnabas, it could *à fortiori* be described as "oracles" when Papias wrote.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

(To be continued.)

* Iren. *Hær.* v. 20. 2; Dion. Cor. in Euseb. *H. E.* iv. 23.

† Cf. 4, 5. The bearing of this fact on the testimony of Papias is pointed out in an able and scholarly article on "Supernatural Religion" in the April number of the *Dublin Review*, p. 403.



THE ADVANCE NOTE

WHAT IT IS, AND WHY IT OUGHT TO BE ABOLISHED.

THE abolition of the Advance Note, as proposed in the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Bill of the present Session, has raised some opposition among shipowners. The objection comes chiefly from the owners of sailing ships, the majority of steam-ship owners having already abandoned this objectionable system. The Advance Note is retained in sailing ships chiefly as a bounty to induce sailors to accept lower wages.

Resolutions have also been passed at meetings of seamen declaring that the Advance Note is indispensable.

To the shipowner there can be little inconvenience from the proposed alteration in the law; but for the sailor a change in the mode of paying his wages might reasonably be supposed to be more serious. Public opinion would condemn arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of contract of a large body of working men. It is important, therefore, that the question should be examined in all its bearings, and that the practical effect of the abolition of the Advance Note should be properly understood.

What, then, is an Advance Note? This elementary question can be most completely answered by an extract from the memorandum prepared by Mr. O'Dowd for the information of the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships:—

“The shipowners at the several ports of the United Kingdom have felt it necessary to give seamen engaged for their ships an advance for every voyage of, generally speaking, one month's wage, to enable the latter to pay debts contracted by them for board and lodging ashore while waiting

employment, and for the purchase of clothes and outfit requisite for the voyage. This is done, not by a money payment, but by an Advance Note in the following terms, delivered to the seamen generally by the shipping master at the port at the time the seamen sign the ship's articles in the presence of that officer.

“Glasgow, 6th July, 1873.

“Ten days after the departure of the ship—from the last port or place in the River or Firth of Clyde, in which from any cause she may be, before finally leaving for the voyage for which this note is issued, pay to the order of (*seaman's name*) the sum of £3 17s. 6d., provided the said seaman sails in, and continues in the said vessel, and duly earns his wages, being advance of wages according to agreement.

“(Signed) ROBERT DOUGLAS, Master.

“To MESSRS. HENDERSON and Co.,
Hope Street, Glasgow.”

“The seaman endorses and gets this note discounted, sometimes by the keeper of the boarding-house, at other times by the clothier or dealer who supplies the goods, the discounter deducting 2s. per pound discount, and the amount due to himself for board and clothes.”

This system of Advance Notes was strongly condemned in the Report of the Commission. It was proved by the testimony of many witnesses that, while wages are paid in advance to seamen, presumably in order to enable them to provide the necessary outfit for a long voyage, in practice the Advance Note is rarely used for this purpose.

Colonel Hill, the president of the Chamber of Commerce at Bristol, told the Commission that he had frequently seen sailors going on board the ships belonging to his firm in such a destitute condition that the police would have been justified in apprehending them for passing through the streets insufficiently clad. His captains had often told him that, in bad weather, they have given their own clothes to the man at the wheel, to enable him to remain at his post. Captains, as a private speculation of their own, are obliged to take out a supply of clothing. Considering that the Advance Note was so rarely used for a legitimate object, Colonel Hill was of opinion that little inconvenience and much good would follow from its abolition.

Mr. Munro, the chairman of the General Shipowners' Society of London, told the Commission that sailors, finding themselves in possession of loose money at a time when it is especially difficult for them to resist temptation, give way to dissipation, and seldom join their vessels at the docks. Ships sailing from the port of London are almost always detained at Gravesend. The crews, when they join, are often quite helpless from intoxication, and a further interval of twenty-four hours must be allowed before attempting to weigh the anchor. If, from any cause, the ship puts into a port in the Channel, the seamen, having had a month's advance, desert, or demand their discharge, on the alleged ground of the unseaworthiness of the ship or the tyranny of the master.

Even when their complaint has been heard by the magistrates and pronounced to be frivolous, some men will still refuse to return to their duty, preferring the alternative of thirty days' imprisonment. For the greater part of the term of punishment they have been already paid full wages in advance.

The Advance Note is not only a temptation to dissipation, but a direct encouragement to improvident habits on the part of sailors. In the debate on the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, Mr. Lindsay said: "Sailors will not become more provident and thoughtful until they find that they cannot get a supply of money to fit them out for their next voyage if they waste what they have received from the last. They will then be forced to learn habits of economy, and to retain from each voyage at least as much as would be required to fit them out for another."

Many artisans, and even unskilled labourers, to whom it is a hard struggle to make any provision for the future out of their scanty earnings, have to travel through the country, at their own expense, in search of employment. The railway navvy does not command the wages of a skilled workman. He is not pre-eminently distinguished for prudence and forethought. The nature of his occupation demands a liberal diet. But, with all these difficulties, whether arising from defects of character, or the force of circumstances, the navvy does make provision for intervals of enforced idleness, and for the expenses of his periodical migration from one railway contract to another.

By comparison with most other workmen, the seaman enjoys exceptional advantages. He need not travel from port to port in search of employment. He is engaged almost invariably in the same port and at the same shipping office at which he was paid off from his last voyage.

The only people who derive any substantial benefit from the Advance Note are the crimps, who discount the notes at extortionate rates. The sailor, on landing from a long voyage, surrenders himself, a too ready victim, into the hands of these harpies, whose corrupting influence upon our seamen is one of the dark blots in our civilization. Those whose occupation takes them frequently to the vicinity of the docks are familiar with the painful spectacle of a ship, just returned home from India, China, or the antipodes, surrounded, even before she has been moored to the quay, by a band of jackals, ready to pounce upon the seamen as they come ashore, and to lead them away to some miserable haunt, where the hard earnings of many months are consumed in a few days of vicious indulgence.

According to the evidence of Mr. Duncan, the shipping-master from Glasgow, sailors in a boarding-house are rarely inclined to ship until they are almost obliged to do so. "A hint from the

boarding-house keeper at last tells the seaman that he has been there long enough, and that it is time for him to look out for a ship. Perhaps he owes the boarding-house keeper two or three weeks' board, and there is money due for slops; and when he gets his Advance Note, Jack has very little to receive out of it in cash."

When there is no longer any prospect of extorting money from his victim, the crimp puts the sailor on board ship penniless and unprovided with an outfit.

It has been contended that, should Advance Notes be abolished, an almost insuperable difficulty will be experienced in manning ships. Under the present system, the crimp who has cashed an Advance Note has a direct personal interest in seeing that the seaman fulfils his engagement; for, if he fails to join his ship, the lodging-house keeper is unable to recover from the shipowner the advance he has made.

It is not probable that such a consideration would have great weight with the Legislature; but, assuming the case to be argued from that point of view, it might be suggested that, if Advance Notes were abolished, the boarding-house keeper would give no credit, and that thus the sailor, as soon as his past earnings were exhausted, would be obliged to go to sea.

It will be seen from the report and the evidence taken by the Duke of Somerset's Commission, that the Advance Note has been condemned by many most experienced authorities. Mr. O'Dowd has said that of all the evils connected with the merchant service, the very worst is the Advance Note.

The system was condemned also by the Liverpool Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of our Merchant Seamen, both in their preliminary report in 1870, and in their latest report in 1874.

The Liverpool Committee has led the way in the path of inquiry, and in the more difficult task of contriving remedial measures for the improvement of the seamen.

The members of the Committee were men of experience in maritime affairs, including, among others, Messrs. Allan, Balfour, Beazley, Forwood, Ismay, MacIver, and Williamson, with whom were associated two ship-captains, eminent in their profession—Captain Ballantine, sometime Commodore of the Allan line, and Captain Judkins, sometime Commodore of the Cunard service.

In their original report, the Committee quoted, with full approval, certain observations made by a well-known shipowner of the port of Liverpool. "We think," they said, "the Advance Note is one great cause of the deterioration of our seamen; without it the crimp's occupation would be gone; there would be no inducement for him to get worthless scamps to sign articles. He now ships these men for the Advance Notes alone, and the man gets little or

no benefit from it. To the sailor by profession the want of an Advance Note would be no hardship : he would be free from the competition of these worthless fellows. Without the Advance Note, a better average of men would be kept up, and the objections now existing with the parents of decent boys, who have a taste for the sea, against their entering that profession, would be removed, or, at any rate, modified."

The Committee admitted that there might be cases where the abolition of Advance Notes would press hardly ; as, for example, in the case of poor shipwrecked seamen. For such cases, however, it could not be doubted that a remedy would be provided ; and the hardships that might possibly occur in these rare instances would be as nothing when compared with the great good that would certainly be obtained by making the Advance Note illegal.

It has been urged that, even if Advance Notes be prohibited at home, they must be retained in foreign ports.

But (if we may rely on the evidence of Mr. Balfour, a most competent witness,) there is no sufficient ground for such apprehension before the recent Commission. "I consider," he said, "Advance Notes a very great evil. If they did not exist, the inducement to desert would almost entirely cease. The profit of the runner or crimp, abroad, is brought about in the following manner. He induces ships' crews, on arrival in port, to desert ; and, as it is evident that these deserted ships must be supplied with their complement of men before sailing, there is always a ready demand for the victims he has secured. The seaman, when once he has deserted, is almost helpless in the hands of the crimp who has detained him, and who indulges him in every debauchery for a time until his own ship has sailed. The crimp then takes him to a consul, to be shipped in another vessel, from which the crew has, perhaps, been in a similar manner enticed away. His debts to the lodging-keeper are paid by the Advance Note which is given by the captain. It is evident that the high wages paid abroad are chiefly due to the system pursued by the crimp, who alone is benefited by them, and not the poor sailor who earns them. The instances which have come before me, especially in Callao and San Francisco, would, if brought to public notice, create universal astonishment and indignation. The evils of desertion cannot be too strongly dwelt upon. The seaman seldom ships again in his own name, and this is too often the first step to recklessness and ruin. If the seaman had certificates of character and proficiency, duly registered in England, to lose, he might perhaps hesitate before taking this step towards forfeiting everything. My conviction is that, ultimately, the only real losers by the abolition of the system of Advance Notes would be the crimps."

In the recommitted Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Bill,

as originally introduced, there was a proposal on the subject of Advance Notes.

While the prohibition of Advance Notes in the home ports was continued, the prohibition against the advance of wages to seamen in British ships in a foreign country was withdrawn, except where it was forbidden by the municipal law of the country. The statements quoted from the evidence of Mr. Balfour do not favour this exemption, though it may be assumed that, if advances were no longer given, it would be necessary to pay to seamen shipped in certain foreign ports a higher rate of wages than they are at present induced to accept. To the lodging-house keeper abroad, the rate of wages is a matter of indifference. He cares not how little the seaman will receive when he arrives in England. His sole object is to secure the payment, in advance, of as large a proportion as possible of the earnings of his unfortunate victim.

It has already been stated that objection has been raised to the abolition of Advance Notes in English ports. To this opposition, as represented in the House of Commons, the Government have surrendered without an attempt at resistance. In the debates in Parliament the advocates of the Advance Note insisted chiefly on the injustice which would be done to the sailor if he were deprived of the means of procuring an outfit. But this difficulty would have been effectually removed by providing on every ship bound on a long voyage a supply of clothing of approved quality, which it should be the duty of the shipowner to sell to the seamen at prices to be regulated by the Board of Trade. Proper clothing is not less essential than a supply of lemon-juice. If it had been provided that the quality and the price of the stores of clothing supplied to ships should be the subject of Government regulation, the abuses incidental to the system of truck payments would have been effectually excluded from the Merchant Service.

The Advance Note is not necessary to enable married seamen to make provision for their families. Masters of ships can send orders from abroad for the payment to the wife and family of a seaman of any sum certified to be due to him from the shipowner. At many foreign ports the money-order system is established, and it has been largely used by seamen.

I have always entered into arrangements with married seamen who have sailed with me on foreign voyages for the payment monthly of any sum they thought fit to appropriate to the use of their families. Little inconvenience is caused to the employer in carrying out these arrangements, while a great boon is conferred on the seaman.

The Liverpool Committee, while recommending that Advance Notes be rendered illegal, point out that, by means of the Allot-

ment Note, a sailor can make provision for those dependent upon him for support.

Seeing, then, that there is no necessity for the Advance Note—that it benefits none but the boarding-house keepers, who live upon gains ill-gotten by plundering and debauching improvident seamen, Parliament should no longer hesitate to put an end to a system susceptible of so much abuse.

Those who accept the views put forward in the preceding pages as just and reasonable would probably give their unreserved approval to the abolition of Advance Notes. That such a decision should ultimately be reached is, in the true interest of the sailor, most devoutly to be desired. But where a particular custom has been long established, hasty legislation may sometimes bear harshly on the individuals more immediately affected. The proposal for the abolition of the Advance Note may therefore be modified. It may be expedient to allow time to elapse before the seamen, brought up in dependence on future earnings, are required to surrender an established custom. The more convinced we are of the enervating tendency of the practice we seek to disturb, the more desirous we shall feel to act in a considerate spirit.

These arguments point to the expediency of proceeding with the abolition of the Advance Note by a gradual process. In the first instance, Parliament might place a limit on the amount of the advance which the shipowner should be authorised to give to the seaman. A sensible compromise has been proposed by Mr. Wilson, the member for Hull. The amendment he has introduced provides that Advance Notes for crews shipped for long voyages round the Horn and the Cape, or through the Suez Canal, should be limited to one month's wages, and that, for voyages of less extent, a fortnight should be the limit. As a moderate step in the right direction, such a proposal would probably commend itself to Parliament. A judicious compromise would be a convenience to those seamen, probably few in number, who have been in the habit of relying on their Advance Notes for making provision for their wives and families before embarking on a voyage. It need scarcely be pointed out in this connection that, in the long run, married men derive no real gain from the system of Advance Notes. The seaman, if he draws a month's wages in advance, has so much the less to receive on his return home.


The promoters of the mass meetings to protest against the abolition of the Advance Note are not the chosen and trusted representatives of the seamen, but the crimps who alone make a profit by this evil custom. Is it right that we should be deterred by the remonstrances of a giddy and heedless crowd from pur-

suing the course which the wisdom of the statesman and the practical experience of the sailor alike approve ?

“ We, ignorant of ourselves,
Beg often our own harms, which the wise powers
Deny us for our good.”

It may be that the abuses arising from the practice of giving Advance Notes are of secondary consequence when compared with the greater issues raised by Mr. Plimsoll. Many who now feel a passing though an earnest interest in our shipping legislation have been drawn to the subject solely by the desire to lessen the loss of life at sea, and they may view with indifference any proposals for reforms which do not directly tend to promote the security of life. It may, however, be asked whether the moral condition of the seaman is not an object worthy the care of those who are so zealous to protect him from personal suffering and danger. The improvidence of seamen has long been proverbial ; and the system of payments in advance has done harm to a class of men brave and true-hearted, but, by natural disposition, careless of the future. The sailor has been deprived of the same inducements to self-denial in prosperous times which operate on the minds of other men, and have exercised a potent influence in elevating and strengthening the character of the operative and industrial classes.

THOMAS BRASSEY.



THE ROMAN CATHOLIC MARRIAGE LAWS:

FROM A ROMAN CATHOLIC POINT OF VIEW.

NO apology can be needed for calling attention to the Laws of Marriage in the Catholic Church. They form part of a great question, which every day is assuming larger proportions. In almost all the States of the Continent, the spirit of what is called modern progress is urgent in pressing on a separation between matrimony and the Christian religion. It denies, of course, the sacramental nature of marriage. It is jealous that the Church should exercise control over the bond of matrimony. And it does not wish religion or religious rites to be in any way mixed up with it. Even in England, which still retains some strong religious feelings, marriage between Christians is placed, by recent legislation, in such a position that all Christian recognition of it as a religious and sacramental action is either optional, or is completely set aside. Men may get married at the Registrar's office with as little sense of religion, and with as little ceremony, as if they were merely signing a contract for the purchase of a new house. The more respectable classes of English society, it is true, are loath to dis sever the marriage ceremony from Christian rites; but then, they too have inflicted a fatal wound upon matrimony, by admitting the right of divorce. Moreover the civil laws of marriage, it must be acknowledged by all, are in an unsatisfactory state. They proceed on no common principle. They are wanting in unity and consistency. There is one law for England, a second for Scotland, and a third for Ire-

land. In a United Kingdom, such things ought not to be. Lord Chelmsford has lately directed the attention of the House of Lords to these anomalies. He calls for some "unification" of these laws. And no doubt, before many years have gone by, a more consistent scheme will be adopted. Now, in the event of any modification of the civil law being proposed, it would be desirable that the Catholic Laws of Marriage should receive an impartial consideration. They have many claims on our attention. They possess that unity of aim and purpose which our lawgivers find to be wanting in their own enactments. They form the most ancient code of Christian Marriage Laws in the world. They were promulgated for the use of the greatest Christian community on earth. These laws regulated the marriages of our ancestors in good old Catholic times. They formed the public, social, and domestic life of Christendom, and they left behind them so strong a mark upon every Christian nation wherein they once had force, that it is only now, after three centuries of revolt against the Catholic religion, that they are beginning practically to lose their hold. They come before us, therefore, with the weight of ancient authority, and with the wisdom of a long experience. They are at once a witness and a testimony. They formed Europe in the olden time. They may not be permitted to form the Europe of the present day, but still no legislature can refuse to give them a patient investigation. They must be a guide worth consulting, even if they be not acknowledged as a rule worth obeying. And in legislating for an empire wherein a large minority are members of the Catholic Church, it must be well to remember (1) that these Catholic laws are, in many respects, immutable; and (2) that they must ever continue binding on the consciences of thousands within the empire, anterior to and notwithstanding any merely civil enactments. Conscience is a troublesome subject to deal with. You may rule it by respecting it, and by harmonizing with its judgments. You cannot compel it by coercion. Or if you succeed in doing so, you thereby at once destroy it. And, conscience being destroyed, on what can you rely for obedience to all just laws? Law in its nature is a rule and guide to conscience. They have an intimate and necessary connection, the one with the other. Deaden the conscience, and you render the law useless: honour and respect it, and you have the best security for obedience.

For these reasons, therefore, it is desirable to consider the principal and essential features in the recognized Laws of Marriage, as they are received in the Catholic Church.

I. The first point that claims our attention is its indissolubility. The Catholic Church teaches that the *vinculum matrimonii rati et consummati* is, by the Law of God, indissoluble. No dispensation

can reach it. No power of the Church can dissolve it. No act of sin, on the part of husband or wife, can disunite what God has joined together. In unmistakable language, the Council of Trent teaches that, as instituted by God in Paradise, before the fall, marriage had attached to it a perpetual and indissoluble bond. Adam expressed the real nature of the union between man and wife when he said, "This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh."* Our Lord Himself inculcates the same truth in His reply to the question asked by the Pharisees, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" "Have ye not read that He who made them from the beginning made them male and female? And He said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together let not man put asunder."† And when they pressed him further and said, "Why, then, did Moses command to give a bill of divorce and to put away?" He saith to them, Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives, but from the beginning it was not so." It is, then, the express and unmistakable teaching of Christ, that in the institution of marriage God designed it to be the most intimate union possible between man and woman. In the words of the Tridentine Catechism, matrimony is "*naturalis conjunctio*," "*officium naturæ*," holy and pure, for the diffusion of the human race, for the care and education of children, and for the mutual solace, comfort, and support of husband and wife. Nor was it intended to be an accidental conjunction, lasting only for a time. It was to be perpetual; unbroken and indissoluble until death. This "bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh," implied a union that could only be dissevered when "flesh and bone" had returned to the dust. Consequent upon the first sin, man "was changed for the worse, both in body and soul."‡ He became a degraded creature, and along with himself he degraded the dignity of marriage, as God had instituted it. After the expulsion from Paradise, it became not only an "*officium naturæ*," but a "*remedium*" against sin; and in consequence of this adaptation to the altered condition of human nature, that natural bond (*vinculum*), which was indissoluble at its institution, became enfeebled, and liable to be severed. Consequently, for a time, by reason of "the hardness of men's hearts," both polygamy and divorce were tolerated even among the chosen people. This, however, was the corruption of the marriage state. Human nature itself had become corrupted, and the most essential institution of human nature became tainted by its fall.

* Gen. ii. 23.

† St. Matt. xix. 3, et seq.

‡ Conc. Trid. Sess. V.

The Christian economy is called the Reparation of Mankind. The death of Adam has made way for the life of Christ; and as man rises through Christianity to newness of life, in like manner he raises along with himself the most essential institution of nature, which thus necessarily regains its pristine dignity and honour. It becomes once more what God designed it to be at the first. It recovers its unity and its indissolubility. It becomes a sacrament of the new law, being thus invested with a still higher sanctity than it had in the days of man's innocence; and as a sacrament it recovers its oneness, and its perpetual bond of union. It had these at its primæval institution. Under the Gospel it has more. It possesses the grace of Christ, in order to elevate to a supernatural platform the natural love of man and wife, and to impart to the married state an aim more exalted than that of the continuation and education of the human race. It becomes the symbol and visible representation of that never-to-be-broken unity which exists between Christ and His Church. St. Paul says of this signification of marriage—*τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστίν*—and the common meaning of *μυστήριον* is a sacrament.

We have here the grounds upon which the Catholic religion regards divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* as contrary to the Law of Christ. In all ages this doctrine has been declared by the Church in union with the See of Rome. Over and over again the greatest Pontiffs of the Roman Church have taught and insisted upon the inviolability of the marriage contract. There is a universal consent among the doctors of the Church on this subject. The most ancient Councils of early Christianity* have in the strongest terms forbidden divorce. The Council of Florence reaffirmed the doctrine of the Church as to the indissolubility of marriage. The Council of Trent has done the same; and her Canon, the 7th of the 24th Session, is the law of the Church at the present day.

“Si quis dixerit Ecclesiam errare, cum docuit et docet juxta evangelium, et apostolicam doctrinam, propter adulterium alterius conjugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi, et utrumque, vel etiam innocentem, qui causam adulterio non dedit, non posse, altero conjugis vivente, aliud matrimonium contrahere, mœcharique eum qui dimissâ adulterâ aliam duxerit, et eam quæ dimisso adultero alii nuperit, anathema sit.”†

This Canon is remarkable for more reasons than one. It affirms that the doctrine of the Church declaring marriage to be indissoluble is the doctrine of the Gospel and of the Apostles. But instead of being adopted in the form in which it was at first prepared, *Si quis dixerit matrimonia consummata ob adulterium posse dis-*

* See Perrone, *de Matrim. Christiano*, tom. iii. cap. 3, and Bellarmine, *de Matrimonio*, cap. 16.

† Conc. Trid. Sess. XXIV. C. 27.

*solvi, anathema sit,** an unusual form was deliberately chosen, and the anathema consequently falls on those who say that the Church errs in thus teaching. So that the heresy condemned by this Canon is the denial of the infallibility of the Church in teaching that marriage cannot be dissolved even on account of adultery. Only indirectly does it condemn the contrary doctrine, as not being in accordance with the Gospel and Apostolic teaching. There was a reason for adopting this modified form of condemnation. It was represented to the Fathers of the Council that if a more stringent Canon were enacted, the Greeks, amongst whom the practice of divorce for adultery existed, might be exasperated, and rendered more averse than they were to reconciliation with the Catholic Church. It was important to put no needless stumbling-block in their way, by stirring up feelings of irritation, or by offending national prejudices; and consequently the Fathers of the Council, acting in a spirit of caution, moderation, and benignity, avoided any direct allusion to the Greeks by the form in which the Canon was ultimately framed. Still it must not be supposed that the Council regarded this question as merely a matter of discipline. The Canon is, and was intended to be, dogmatic. It teaches (1) that the Church has not erred in maintaining the indissolubility of marriage; and (2) that her doctrine upon this point is in strict conformity with the teaching of our Lord and of His Apostles. Therefore any opinion contrary to this doctrine must be unchristian, inasmuch as it cannot be—in the mind of the Council—in accordance with the doctrine of the Gospel. It is indeed true, and moreover worthy of special notice, that the Greeks have no formal doctrine opposed to the Catholic teaching on this subject. The Greeks are either those who are in union with the Apostolic See, or those who continue in schism. The former are bound by the Council of Trent in the same way as all other Catholics. The latter have never enunciated a different dogma. They have fallen away from Apostolic strictness, as is always the case with those who cast off the unity of the faith. They have gone aside into evil ways; they have framed for themselves a corrupt practice in permitting divorce. At first this divorce was limited to cases of adultery. Now it is allowed on many grounds of a frivolous nature. If the Greeks were to seek readmission into the Church, they would be obliged to renounce their practice of divorce, but they would have no dogma to alter, for if you except the Protestant communities, the rest of Christendom theoretically agrees that divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* is forbidden by the Law of the Gospel.

That law is comprised within a few passages of Holy Writ.

* Pallavicini, *Istoria del Conc. Trid.* lib. xxii. cap. 4, n. 27 and n. 29. The 7th and 8th Canons are the only ones drawn up in this form.

There are three in which marriage is absolutely declared indissoluble. No exceptional case is mentioned, and no intimation is given of the existence of any such exception. In St. Mark,* we are told, that "in the house again His disciples asked Him concerning the same thing. And He saith to them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery." St. Luke† represents our Lord as saying, "Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery." The third passage is in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians.‡ "But to them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife." In these three passages, the indissolubility of marriage is promulgated with sufficient plainness. Separation *a vinculo matrimonii* is absolutely forbidden. No exception is made, nor is it intimated that any such exception exists in the Christian law. St. Matthew,§ indeed, in two places, likewise records our Lord's prohibition of divorce, and his words are almost identical with those of Mark and Luke. He, however, inserts the clause "excepting the cause of fornication." Now the Gospel of St. Matthew was written and published before those of the other Evangelists. They must have seen it, and in all probability had it before them while compiling their own. Yet they omitted the clause inserted by St. Matthew. What can we infer from this omission? It is no part of our business at present to inquire into the meaning of St. Matthew's exceptional clause. Very various interpretations have been suggested; some of them fanciful, some plausible, scarcely any of them satisfactory.|| But whatever St. Matthew's exception may imply, this much at least is proved from its omission by the other Evangelists—namely, that it in no way affects the general law. Their omission may have implied that the exception was a local one, connected with the Jews alone; or, as most theologians maintain, that it gave permission for separation *a thoro et mensâ*. But, as if to obviate any incorrect deduction from this exceptional clause, the two other Evangelists and St. Paul—all of whom had seen St. Matthew's Gospel—purposely enunciated the law of Christ

* St. Mark x. 10, 11, &c.

† St. Luke xvi. 18.

‡ 1 Cor. vii. 10.

§ St. Matt. v. 32; xix. 3—9.

|| See a variety of these interpretations given by Perrone, *de Matrimonio Christ.*, tom. iii. cap. ii. art. 2. The late Mr. Badeley, Q.C., published an ingenious exposition of this celebrated text, in a pamphlet called "Considerations on Divorce a Vinculo Matrimonii, in connection with Holy Scripture. By a Barrister. London, 1857." An interpretation not altogether dissimilar is given in the second Appendix to Dr. Dollinger's "First Age of the Church."

in the most absolute manner, that all might know that the dissolution of Christian marriage, on account of adultery, or of any other cause, is plainly forbidden in the dispensation of Grace.

II. So far as the New Testament has laid down principles, or enunciated laws, respecting Christian marriage, they may be summed up in the following propositions:—

1. Marriage is honourable in all men.

2. But celibacy, as a religious state, is higher. "I say to the unmarried and to the widows: it is good for them if they so continue even as I." "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and spirit."*

3. "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and, in like manner, the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife."† The Christian Law implies perfect equality between husband and wife. The sin of unfaithfulness is just as heinous in the man as it is in the woman.

4. The *vinculum matrimonii* is indissoluble. What God has joined together no man can put asunder.

5. Matrimony is one, by reason both of its primitive institution in Paradise, and of its significance as a symbol of the union between Christ and the Church. Polygamy, therefore, is absolutely unlawful.

6. The husband who puts away his wife causeth her to commit adultery.

7. He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.

8. The husband that puts away his wife and marries another committeth adultery.

These laws are founded on the indissolubility of the marriage bond. The woman, even when put away, is still the wife. Otherwise it would be impossible to commit adultery with her *after* she was put away.

9. Separation from a wife on account of sin is allowable, though not commanded, because there must always be the right of forgiveness on repentance, which a Christian, of all men, cannot disregard.

10. The principle is laid down from which it follows that the Church has the right to judge matrimonial causes, to punish violations of the natural law, and to create impediments.‡

11. No cognisance is taken in the New Testament of the Roman, Jewish, or heathen laws of marriage, as if they in any way bound the consciences of Christians.

* 1 Cor. vii. 8, 34.

† 1 Cor. vii. 4.

‡ 1 Cor. v. 1.

12. On the contrary, the Jewish laws are expressly abolished.

13. Matrimony among unbelievers, i.e., non-Christians, is true and valid marriage, though not a sacrament.

14. In one case, such marriages can be dissolved;* namely, if on the conversion of one of the parties, the other refuses to live peaceably without contempt of religion. "For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such case. But God has called us in peace."†

15. If, on the other hand, both parties agree, and live in peace together, the marriage becomes indissoluble. "For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband; otherwise your children should be unclean, but now they are holy."

16. Mixed marriages are condemned. St. Paul, speaking of widows, uses these words—"Let her marry to whom she will, *only in the Lord.*"‡ These words directly forbid marriages with the unbaptized, but indirectly they extend to marriages between those who are in the unity of the Church and those who are not.

17. The husband is the head of the wife, and he ought to love her, "as Christ loveth the Church." "He that loveth not his wife loveth not himself."

18. "Let the wife reverence her husband." "As the Church is subject to Christ, so let wives be to their own husbands in all things."§

These are the fundamental principles which have regulated the marriages of Christians from the time of Christ and His Apostles until the era of the Reformation. With all their boastful devotion to the Scripture, the Reformers commenced their career by directly setting aside its teaching on this subject of matrimony, so essential to the purity and happiness of the human race. In no one way have they taken the laws of the New Testament as their guide. And yet these laws are what I may call the "Magna Charta" of the rights of the Church over marriage. They regard matrimony as being altogether a sacrament of the new law, for which the Church alone has the right to legislate. They exhibit the Apostles as legislating about marriage without the least reference to that mighty civil power under which they lived. These laws, moreover, give no intimation that our Lord or His Apostles contemplated marriage between Christians as in any way a *civil contract*. It is a religious act and a sacrament—an action to be performed "in the Lord," which could not be said of a public contract in the Pagan Courts. They exhibit the Church in its very infancy as forbidding divorce, where the laws of the land

* This is not of faith in the Church, but the doctrine is what theologians call "Certain." From the fact that in one particular instance, the marriage can be dissolved, it follows that where this case does not occur, the marriage is indissoluble.

† 1 Cor. vii. 15.

‡ 1 Cor. vii. 39.

§ Ephes. v. 23 et seq.

allowed it—as abrogating a whole code of laws that had existed from the days of Moses: as annulling an incestuous marriage, subjecting the offender to the severest censures;—thereby asserting both the principle of *impedimenta dirimentia*, and her claim upon the obedience of the baptized, without any reference whatever to the civil jurisdiction either of Jerusalem or of Rome. In a word, these fundamental laws of marriage breathe throughout a spirit which is only to be found in the Apostolic See. Pius IX. is in harmony with St. Paul. It is the Catholic Church alone that we find engaged in consistently carrying out the development of these primary laws. Her laws are framed in the same spirit. They speak with the same decision. They exercise the same authority over the baptized. They jealously guard the same essential principles—the unity of marriage, its indissolubility, and its sacramental sanctity.

III. When St. Paul excommunicated the incestuous Corinthian, he exercised the spiritual power inherent in the Apostolic office over matrimonial cases. He set the example, which the Church has ever since followed, of pronouncing on the validity of the marriage bond, and declaring the circumstances under which it becomes null and void. St. Paul may be regarded as having instituted *impedimenta dirimentia*, though the particular impediment he declares was in reality a law of nature. At all events he led the way in instructing the Church that it is her special business to protect matrimony from abuse, since it is a Christian sacrament, in which the contract or consent of the parties, expressed by suitable words or signs effecting the marriage bond, is its very essence.* As the Church is “the steward of the mysteries of God,” she is the steward of this sacrament of marriage. Consequently in the execution of her office, she has created or renewed *impedimenta* by which she determines that a marriage is in its nature, either unlawful only, or unlawful and invalid besides. Obviously, so important a step in life as is involved in the marriage state ought not to be entered upon in a thoughtless, irreligious, or reckless way. “There is,” says Solomon, “a time to marry and a time to abstain from marriage:” and the Church determines for her children what those times may be. She declares, therefore, that marriages at certain times, or under certain conditions, are unlawful according to her discipline, though they are not, on that account, invalid. But she goes a step further, and in the exercise of her sacred right, she annuls and makes void the contract itself, if it be attempted in violation either of the primary laws of nature, or in contempt of those *impedimenta dirimentia* which she has from time to time instituted, for the protection of the family, and of

* Cat. Conc. Trid.

society. It is of faith * that the Church has the right to institute these impediments, which are of ecclesiastical and not Mosaic authority. That is, the impediments inherent in the law of nature, the Church reaffirms and sanctions. They are in themselves immutable, and no ecclesiastical authority can dispense with them. But all others, of whatever kind, exist by the authority of the Church, and by that authority alone. For the law of Moses is not binding on Christians. It is done away with in Christ, and therefore its prohibited degrees of kindred are binding only so far as the Church has renewed and confirmed them.

On this subject I would refer my readers to Father Harper's second volume on "Peace through the Truth," which enters deeply into all the questions connected with Ecclesiastical Law as distinguished from the divine, with the law of Moses, and all the impediments connected with marriage. It is a work of very deep research, and so exhaustive of the subject on which it treats, that no lawyer who wishes to understand the legal principles of Catholic law ought to be without it. Avowedly undertaken in order to confute the errors of Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon," and to prove that such unions as those with a deceased wife's sister are forbidden only by ecclesiastical law, he discusses fully the obligation of the Mosaic law; he shows how it is done away altogether by the liberty of the Christian Church, and how, in the new law of Christ, everything rests upon the reaffirmation of the law of nature and the statutes of the Church. In this he is, of course, only following out the general theology of the Catholic religion, as taught by St. Thomas and the theologians. But he brings every kind of learning to bear upon the subject. He moreover writes with great facility, with a freshness that such difficult subjects seldom receive; and though the book is bulky and closely printed, once it is taken up it really is not easy to lay it aside, so much heart and spirit and life has he succeeded in throwing into an abstruse and intricate subject. As bearing upon the general principles of Christian Law, to which I have already referred, I will make one short quotation:—

"If then," he says, "we have regard to the moral precepts of the new law exclusively, forasmuch as the Decalogue, and the other precepts of the Levitical law which spring from, and, to a certain extent, specificate the former, are but the divine and supernatural confirmation of the natural law, and, seeing that the Law of the Gospel includes these, not as invested with the sanctions of Mount Sinai, or with the authority of their divine promulgation under the old economy, but because they are the expression of the eternal and unchanging principles of right and justice, it may truly be said that in the dispensation of Grace the precepts of God are the precepts of the natural law, which are in their very nature necessary to salvation; while the statutes of the Church do not embrace those matters which are

* Conc. Trid. S.^{ss}. XXIV. Can. 3 and 4.

necessary to salvation of their own nature, but only because of their positive enactment by the Church.'”*

But if the Church has the power to create impediments, she must also have the power to grant dispensations. A law from which there can be no dispensation is either one of inherent and necessary truth and morality, or else there are cases in which it becomes a tyranny. And therefore all the laws enacted by the Church alone, and which are not purely and inherently divine in their authority, such as the law of nature and the Ten Commandments, admit of dispensation, for which the Church has provided under certain circumstances. It is here that the civil power so conspicuously fails, especially in matrimonial causes. It adopts a hard and fast line, from which legally there can be no exemption. The consequence is that in some cases it is too lax, and in other cases too stringent. Take, for example, the vexed question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Most people agree that such marriages are, as a rule, undesirable, and if there were no prohibition against them, the liberty to marry a deceased wife's sister would be productive of grave inconveniences. The Catholic Church has put an *impedimentum dirimens* in the way of such marriages. She therefore provides for the peace of family life. She also protects the honour and respect due to the living wife. But under special circumstances she dispenses with her own law. And in doing so, she thereby provides for those rare circumstances which sometimes render a marriage of this kind advisable. The State exercises no such dispensing power. In England the marriage is absolutely unlawful, and there are consequently numerous cases where grave practical wrong is done, arising from the operation of a hard and fast law. When I was a Protestant clergyman at Bristol, many years ago, I was called on to visit the wife of a labouring man, who lived, with his wife's sister and three or four children, in a single room. The wife died. What was to be done with the sister-in-law? She was needed for the care of the children. She was young and healthy, and yet there was only this one room for the widower, herself, and the children to occupy. A marriage between them was illegal, and there was no way of making it legal. I felt then pretty well convinced of the wisdom of the Catholic Church, which would have known how to act under such circumstances.

It is similar with the marriages of cousins, especially of first cousins. Most medical experience is against the healthy results of such marriages. Imbecility of mind, or physical deformities, too often owe their origin to such near intermarriages. Yet there are few marriages which in one sense are more natural. Young

* Harper's "Peace through the Truth," with quotation from St. Thomas, vol. ii. p. 382.

people thrown together in very early life are apt to form attachments so strong in their character that neither time nor absence can alter them. The pure affections of boyhood and girlhood become so closely entwined in one another, that a rude severance would blast the happiness of an entire lifetime. The parents, no doubt, are to blame, who allow engagements of this kind to grow up, when they might have been checked before it was too late. But in cases where the alternative is marriage or misery, the Church, as a thoughtful mother, grants her dispensation. It is against her sacred character to destroy with a cold, withering hand, the most pure affections of nature. Therefore, although as a rule such marriages are forbidden, yet in this or that case the rule is relaxed. The State, at least in this country, errs in the opposite direction, for it permits these very near marriages without let or hindrance.

Father Harper has some pertinent remarks on the evil resulting from marriages between near relations, from which I cannot forbear to take the following extract. The whole chapter, however, which he calls "Doctrinal Postil," is full of interest; and it is doubtful whether it is more remarkable for genuine religious feeling than for its broad view of life, and its great learning.

"There is an altar erected in the midst of each household, which is exclusively dedicated to domestic piety. On it burns a never-dying, ever-sacred fire, fed and guarded by a Vestal band. The flaming torch of sensual and inordinate desire would fill the sanctuary with smoke, quench the heaven-aspiring flame, and cause estrangement, distance, suspicion, ceremony, where before dwelt only the confiding familiarity of the purest affection. There are sweet symbols of love—caresses and a thousand innocent endearments—recognized sacraments in the ritual of the family, which would be at once transformed into sources of distrust, doubt, scruple, temptation, if home were not hedged round with nature's vow of chastity, the moral instincts of mankind, and the prohibitions of the law. Once admit the bare idea of marriage into the innocent delights of home, and the unrestricted intercourse of near relationship, you transform a consecrated Church into a menagerie of wild beasts, and thereby create a sad necessity for cages, iron bars, and watchful keepers. In a word, the family circle would be broken up, and they of one house must consent to learn the formality, and submit to the isolation of strangers."*

There is another diriment impediment which has lately attracted more than ordinary attention. To guard against the grave abuse arising from secret marriages, which led in many cases to a desertion of the true wife, denial of the marriage, and adulterous cohabitation with another, the Council of Trent created the impediment of clandestinity, by which all marriages not celebrated in the presence of the parish priest or his substitute, and of two witnesses, were henceforth to be null and void. It also renewed the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council enjoining the publication of banns

* Harper's "Peace through the Truth," vol. ii. p. 593.

on three Feast Days during Mass in the parish church, and by the proper parish priest of the contracting parties. If no legitimate impediment be alleged, they were to proceed to the celebration of the marriage *in facie Ecclesie*; where the parish priest, having questioned the man and woman, and having understood their mutual consent, is directed to say, *Ego vos in matrimonium conjungo, in nomine Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti*, or other words, according to the use of each province. In cases where there may be a reasonable suspicion that the marriage will be interfered with maliciously, the banns may be published once only, or the marriage may be solemnized before the parish priest and two or three witnesses, and the denunciations or banns afterwards published [in the church before the consummation of the marriage, unless the Ordinary should think fit to expedite matters, and to grant a dispensation from the publication of the banns which the synod left to his discretion. If the parish priest be present at a marriage with a fewer number of witnesses than there prescribed, or if the witnesses, without the parish priest, are present at a contract of this kind, they are to be severely punished by the Ordinary. And if any priest, regular or secular, bless the marriage of persons belonging to the parish of another parish priest, he is to be suspended until he be absolved by the Ordinary of the parish priest to whom the parties belong. Lastly, the parish priest is to keep a book, in which the names of the man and wife, and of the witnesses, as well as the day and place of the marriage, are to be entered; of which book he is to take diligent care.

Such are the provisions of the law framed for the purpose of putting a stop to clandestine marriages. Of its necessity, its wisdom, and its practical good sense, no competent man can have any doubt. It combines the old law of the Lateran Council with the additions deemed necessary by the Fathers at Trent. It was enacted at a period when the nations of Europe were still, for the most part, Catholic, and when the law of the Church was still honoured and recognized by every Christian State. The Council was most solicitous that the law should be promulgated as soon as possible. There are theologians who talk of "the mind of the Council" as if it meant delay; but I do not see how this opinion can be sustained. For in the first place, the law was intended to put a stop to scandalous and immoral proceedings; and the sooner these immoralities were repressed the better. And secondly, this opinion is contrary to the language of the decree, which expressly says that, lest these wholesome precepts, *salutaria precepta*, be concealed from any, all Ordinaries were to publish the decree to the people, as soon as possible—*cum primum potuerint*—and to cause them to be explained in each parish church in their dioceses, for the first year as often as possible—*quam sepiissime fiat*—after-

wards as often as might seem expedient. Moreover, the decree was to come into operation in each parish after thirty days, to be reckoned from the first day of publication in the same parish. We see here evidence of great solicitude that every man and woman in each parish should be made acquainted with the terms of the law, the Council not wishing to take them unawares; and being careful not to invalidate a marriage until all parties had the fairest opportunity of knowing the existence, the nature, and the penalties of the law.

This impediment of clandestinity was enacted at a time when troubles were fast falling upon the Church. The Protestant Reformation was making rapid strides throughout Europe, so that the impediment was no sooner created than difficulties arose about its promulgation. As the law was to be published in each parish church, there were many places where this could not be done. Then there arose wars, and rumours of wars, and revolutions, and apostacies from the Church. Her power seemed falling away from her, her authority was set at nought; so that there were several places, and whole countries, where the law could not be proclaimed. No doubt, as I have said, the Fathers of Trent wished the decree to be made known universally, and to be obeyed universally; but in a period of public disturbance, this could only be partially effected.

Owing to these causes, important questions have arisen, some of which have lately stirred up angry controversy. It has been asked if Protestant marriages are valid according to the laws of the Catholic Church; if they are valid in countries where the Law of Trent has been published; and, lastly, if their validity would be affected, supposing the publication of the impediment of clandestinity in places where it has not hitherto been promulgated. The first inquiry is easily set at rest. For (1) marriage is valid between persons unbaptized, provided there be no violation of the law of nature. Such marriages are called, in ecclesiastical language, *vera*, to distinguish them from the sacramental marriages of Christians, which are called *rata*. (2) All baptized persons are Christians. Consequently, their marriages are not only *vera*, but *rata*; that is, they are the Christian sacrament of marriage. These marriages, as being Christian, are subject to the laws of the Church, and, consequently, to the impediments created by the Church. The marriages of Protestants, as such, celebrated by their own ministers, are true marriages and sacramental. Even if clandestinely performed, they are still valid and sacramental marriages in all places where the impediment of clandestinity has not been published, or where it has fallen into disuse, or where it has been suspended in their regard. It must be remembered that the parties themselves are the ministers of the sacrament, and that the presence of the parish priest is not necessary, except (since the decree of the

Council of Trent was passed) to give publicity to the marriage. Consequently, before the impediment of clandestinity was created, all clandestine marriages were valid, and no question was ever raised about the sect to which the parties may have belonged. If they were baptized, their marriages were Christian, valid, and sacramental. And what was the general law then is the general law now, where the decree of Trent does not extend. That decree, as we have seen, is a fair one, and was prepared for a just purpose—namely, to protect young women from seduction and desertion. It would have been co-extensive with Christendom, and in full force at the present day everywhere, if the Reformation had not broken out, and withdrawn so many nations from the Faith. But the Popes showed their desire that marriages should not be invalidated in consequence of that decree, by expressly exempting from its provisions one country after another, as occasion arose. They could not do more; and if the Popes were not the Popes, they would be judged in this matter with the fairness and courtesy that is not withheld from ordinary men occupying positions of responsibility. Mr. Gladstone* imputes it to the Popes that, for some purposes of their own, they reserve all cases as matters of discretion, “*to the breast of the Curia*” (whatever that means), instead of laying down “intelligible principles” applicable to all. Would he speak in this way if he were writing about the laws of England? Nothing can be more plain than the laws enacted by the Council of Trent. But does Mr. Gladstone believe that there cannot, without some bad purpose on the part of Popes, be intricate and delicate matrimonial causes? Are Acts of Parliament so “intelligible” that they do not stand in need of judges to interpret them, and that they cannot lead to litigation? Are all laws, except the laws of the Church, so plain that they never induce lawsuits, nor ever cause appeals to the House of Lords or to the Privy Council, which, I suppose, is the “breast of the English Curia?” In all fairness, why should not the same measure be meted out to the Catholic Church, which is meted out to the Parliament of England? Both, we may presume, have, in their own way, much the same object in view—namely, to make men happy and peaceful, good citizens and good Christians. The laws of both are generally “intelligible” enough, and if the balance must incline one way or other, an impartial mind must acknowledge that the Canons of Trent are more “intelligible” than Acts of Parliament. Yet so long as the world lasts, law will need interpretation, whether in Rome or England; and difficult cases will arise, requiring individual application, special decision, and final appeal to the highest tribunal. Few

* “Vaticanism,” p. 80.

causes are more intricate than those which are connected with matrimony, and if it be no proof of the injustice of English Laws, as it certainly is not, that the law is not plain enough to prevent questionings and appeals, it is not asking too much, that the same measure of fair play should be ceded to the laws of Rome.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Gladstone should have hazarded assertions about the Catholic doctrine of marriage which are absolutely erroneous. And it is the more to be regretted, because he had in his hands Father Perrone's elaborate work on "Christian Marriage," which he can hardly have taken the trouble to read. For example: without the least foundation for such an assertion, he says that, in the eyes of the Pope, Protestant marriages are "purely civil contracts." The assertion is erroneous, with respect to the marriage, both of baptized persons whether Protestant or not, and of the unbaptized—such as Jews and non-Christians of every kind. For the marriages of all baptized persons, validly contracted, are sacraments, as valid and as binding as if they had been solemnized in the presence of the Pope himself. And although the marriages of the unbaptized—of Quakers, Jews, and all others—are not sacraments, still they are valid. "In the eyes of the Pope," they are religious actions, and not "mere" civil contracts, in virtue of the primitive institution of marriage by God himself. Nay, St. Thomas goes still further, and says that such marriages—*i.e.*, the marriages of the unbaptized—are true marriages, *utpote officium naturæ*, and are sacraments *habitualiter*, though not *actualiter*—*i.e.*, they partake of the significance of a sacrament, on account of the sacred institution of matrimony in Paradise, and, on conversion to the Christian faith, they pass into a sacrament—"Et tamen etiam matrimonium tale est aliquo modo sacramentum habitualiter, quamvis non est actualiter, eò quod actu non contrahunt in fide Ecclesiæ."* There can be no plainer statement than this, and Mr. Gladstone could have known it, if he had taken the trouble to have read any approved Catholic author on the subject.

It is equally erroneous that the Popes have ever represented even the invalid marriages of non-Catholics in regions where the law of clandestinity prevails, and where no exception has as yet been made for non-Catholics, as "filthy concubinage." If two Catholics marry in such regions, before a civil officer, in contempt of the laws of their own Church, or in culpable ignorance of it, their marriage is null and void, and the Apostolic See has declared that such unions are concubinage.† But it has never asserted anything of the kind with respect to the *bonâ fide* marriages of non-Catholics in those countries. Its practice has been altogether in a contrary

* St. Thomas, p. iii. q. 5, art. 2.

† Syllabus, lxxiii. and Lettera a Vittorio Emmanuela.

direction—namely, (1) to extend the exemptions from the decree of Trent, wherever there was a real necessity; (2) to condemn those who taught that such marriages were universally invalid; (3) to respect the good faith of such as never doubted of the validity of those marriages, and not on any such ground to restrain them from communion on their conversion; and (4) lastly, to require, in all cases where a real doubt existed, that the consent should be renewed, and the informality or the invalidity of the marriage cured *in radice*.* It is difficult to see what more could be done by a great society like the Church, whose legislation extends into all lands, which has to deal directly with conscience and the inner man, whose movements must necessarily be slow, lest more harm than good be the result, and which, as “steward of the mysteries of God,” before all things is bound to guard, with jealous eye, the purity, sanctity, and validity of the sacraments. The real source of all the practical evils affecting marriages at the present day is to be traced to the action of the civil power in breaking off all legislative relations with the Christian Church. The spirit of the times is bent on separating from religion that institution which, of all others, needs the control of religion. The Church insists that matrimony appertains to God, the founder and institutor of human society, the State refuses to see the hand of God in it at all. It has broken its divinely-ordained limits. It admits divorce—it renders marriage practically an uncertain and temporary engagement. It has no fixed rule about the lawful impediments to marriage, being stringent where it ought to be lenient, and lax where it ought to be stringent. It has made marriage a mere civil contract, although the Church does not cease to protest that neither in Christians, nor in the unbaptized, can it be a mere civil contract.† The consequences are serious—the lowering of the standard of public morals—the disruption of family ties—the confusion of blood—the corrupting the minds of the young with a base knowledge of the sin and dishonour of their parents‡—the drying up of the purest and most hallowed affections of our nature—and the wide-spread diffusion of that sensual indifferentism which, having uprooted the most sacred relations of domestic life, is not likely, in the long run, to show much respect for the social and political rights of society.

* Perrone, *de Matrim. Christ.* tom. ii. cap. vi.

† “Treating of what are called civil marriages, it is necessary to observe that according to Catholic teaching, marriage contracted between persons who are not baptized cannot be considered a mere social contract; but should be regarded as a contract which derives its force from the law of nature, and not from the civil law. As to marriage between those who are baptized, it is either a sacrament, or not a marriage at all.”—Letter of Archbishop Cullen; Royal Commission Report, 1868, p. 28.


‡ In a recent divorce case in New York, in which a well-known popular clergyman was the party proceeded against, it was mentioned in some of the principal papers that his sons were present at the trial, and that one of them, especially, regarded the whole affair as a good joke.

Nor can there be any remedy for this state of things, except the State give up its jealousy of religion. The State has its rights with respect to marriage, as well as the Church, and it is in the interest of both that "marriage should be honourable in all." But this end cannot be attained by the degradation of marriage to a civil contract, and by unholy tampering with sacred things. We must seek, in the interests of society itself, for a reconciliation between the spiritual and temporal powers; and there are no other means of effecting this reconciliation than that—to quote the words of Pius IX.—

"Cæsar, retaining what is his own, should leave to the Church what belongs to her. Let the civil authorities arrange effects which are derived from marriage, leaving to the Church to determine when it is valid between Christians. Let the civil law start from the validity or invalidity of the marriage, as it shall be determined by the Church, and, proceeding from this fact, which it is out of its sphere to establish, let it dispose of the civil effects."*

W. G. TODD.

* *Lettera a Vittorio Emanuele.*



SAXON STUDIES.

VI.—TYPES CIVIL AND UNCIVIL.

I.

WITH an inward glow of satisfaction due to the assurance that, at last, I am echoing the belief of my most intractable critic, do I record my conviction that the German army is the finest in the world; and of that army, that the Saxon division is the most commendable. The world is ancient; there have been many ages and races of men; but of all, the Saxon soldier is the flower. It were rash to affirm that the future may not produce a warrior better yet than he; the automatic theory holds out high hopes of possible progress in this direction. When we shall have disembarassed ourselves of the notion that we live as we please, a rigid system of discipline will become our dearest comfort; for it will tend most strongly to put us out of the way of fancying our actions self-willed. The new gospel shall be the manual of drill and tactics. What a humiliation to man's conceit—the thought that soldiers are nearer the eternal verities than any other bodies! Let the fools of sentiment hasten to range themselves on the winning side. But, whatever our haste, the Saxons are still ahead of us. Though they may not, as yet, have put in words the awful truth of automatism, they have nevertheless done more to verify it in nature and conduct than have the philosophers who set the theory going.

It must not be forgotten, however, that their pre-eminence is owing quite as much to the age they live in as to their intrinsic quality. In short, we are called on to admire an exquisite

harmony of times and traits. These sons of the drill-book would scarcely have suited the days when personal prowess was an essential soldierly requirement. Their best recommendation to the modern, and still more to the future, recruiting-sergeant, must be their unlikeness to the old Greek and Roman giants of sword and spear. Not hot blood and youthful fervour is wanted; rather a thin, colourless, meek, mechanical habit. What has been called soul and individuality is to be got rid of: an unbounded stomach for discipline is the desideratum. We may look forward to the time when the best soldier will be the least man—I speak to consenting ears, and need not, therefore, pause to explain the paradox—and already Napoleons and Hannibals are at a discount, and the cry is for Moltkes. As for Prince Bismarck, he is still too much himself to be put in charge of the army.

It was observed the other day, in regard to the boat-race, that such was the minuteness and accuracy wherewith the result was foretold, there was really little use in rowing it: it was won and lost long before it started; and will, a while hereafter, be calculated before an intellectual audience on the blackboard, instead of being uncomfortably proved a foregone conclusion on the river. Thitherward, likewise, tends war. When the soldiers have become unmixed puppets, and so afford as secure a base for calculation as other mechanical material; when the officers have grown to be incarnations of subtle scientific foresight, fed on statistics; shall we not be beyond the folly of shedding blood and burning towns otherwise than on paper? It may take a little more time to write a campaign than to fight it; but after one side has mathematically proved the superiority of its potentialities, the other will find it all the easier to pay its indemnity. In fine, the incubus from which it is our glorious destiny to emancipate ourselves is action—vulgar, physical action. Brahma shall be the one true God, and Saxony his chosen Israel. Far off his coming shines—very far, perhaps; but prognostics favour him.

Meanwhile, I take pleasure in repeating that Saxon soldiers are the best in the world. They can swallow most discipline. They submit to so much stuffing with rules and regulations, great and small, that little of the original creature is left save organic life and uniform. They are a docile sort of Frankensteins. This is well, so long as they remain in the service; but picture the sad plight of a being thus drained of his proper entrails, and inspired solely by the breath of Mars, when Mars no longer needs him! Mars re-creates men showily enough; but he lacks the constancy of an original maker, and by-and-by leaves his re-creatures dismally in the lurch. Even the uniform is bereft them. Let who becomes a soldier reflect that he enlists for life; and whether he be killed in his first battle, or honourably discharged

after half-a-dozen campaigns, his life still ceases with his soldier-ship.

It would be edifying to contrast Saxon soldiers with other nations, point by point, and so arrive at a practical comprehension of their superiority. Much is signified in the fact that their captains address them as "children," while we Americans, and our English friends, try to inspire our warriors by appeals to their "manhood." Men, forsooth! Such is the fruit of illogical sentiment. But persist in calling a person child, and treating him so, and presently he will share our view of the matter, and thus become fit for the camp. But my business is not so much with comparisons as with the incomparable Saxon soldier himself.

II.

Even his uniform is admirable, and, after the shabby productions worn by our Seventh Regiments, and still more by English Guards and Grenadiers, truly refreshing. It is mainly dark, the darkness enhanced by narrow lines of red adown the leg and round throat and wrist. His headgear, though called helmet for lack of a better name, is not imposing, but eminently practical; while as to his cap, it is positively made and worn to cover the head, and scarcely inclines more to one ear than to the other. What a pregnant subject for analysis, by the way, is that matter of wearing the hat aslant instead of upright! Some seer, one of these days, will draw a deep moral from it.—The head itself is not propped fiercely up in unrelenting collar, but sits as easily as the heads of ordinary men. We look in vain for the stiff-kneedness, out-chestedness, square-elbowedness, high-mightiness, which we are accustomed to associate with the thought of things military. This model child of battle seems so comfortable in his uniform, he might have been born in it. He can stoop, kneel down, run, or vault a fence, without bursting a button. His belt is leathern—no pipeclay on his conscience. He can be very dirty without much showing it. Padding and lacing are unknown—at least to the private. His short sword seems as natural an appendage as a monkey's tail; he would look maimed without it. He walks the streets—with measured tread, indeed, for he is drilled to the marrow, but—with an infantile self-unconsciousness subversive of all precedent. He looks of a race distinct from the civilian, it is true, but quite at home in his distinction.

Soberness of uniform is so far from being a trifling matter (things being as they are) that, should the English be beaten in the next war, they may safely lay the blame on their own red coats. In the time of Marlborough or of Wellington these may have had their use; but nowadays, scarlet, added to the vicious my-soul's-my-own doctrine which even yet obtains but too widely,

gives the private soldier too much of an opinion of himself. He esteems himself too grand a being to be cuffed by corporals, and unceremoniously bidden to right-about-face and present arms. Moreover, his ruddy splendours attract the feminine eye and heart, and women are not wholesome for modern warriors. Such individual inspiration as they may once have given is not needed in battles fought out of sight of the enemy. That army will be found most efficient whose uniform is least seductive to the female mind. I am far from asserting that the Saxon uniform is perfect in this respect. No; it has a dapper appearance, a snug neatness, a sparkle of helmet-spike and sword-hilt greatly to be deplored. Still there is none homelier, so far as I am aware; and we may cheerfully trust to the natural instincts of the Saxon mind, to make it uglier yet.

To be rid of woman, however, we must take thought not of the uniform only; there is the traditional heroism of the soldier to be done away with. Women persist in loving those who make a business of getting killed, more fondly than those who get killed in the way of business. Such preference is not only irrational—it was always that—it is now foundationless. When will our wives and daughters learn to believe that he who, with unfaltering resolution, takes the train to the city every morning, or calmly spends the day in his confined study, and trembles not at the dinner-bell, is more valiant than the man who leads a healthy life in camps, and goes to battle with a telescopic rifle once in twenty years? But no, to her mind the soldier is engaged in daily hand-to-hand encounters; his life is ever next door to a violent end; there is something heroic and perilous to himself in his own sword and gun. I am compelled to admit that even Saxon soldiers have their sweethearts, who lavish upon the lucky dogs such looks as the poor Kellner or shop-tender can never hope to obtain; and the necessity of being in barracks by a certain hour adds a romance to the daily parting which makes it worth a dozen optional ones.

The infantry are all uniformed more or less alike, but the cavalry are more gaudily attired in blue and white, and the lancers are the dandies of the army—greatly bedizened in front, with knowing little helmets cocked on one side. This is perhaps not wholly inadvisable; lances and sabres suggest close fighting or nothing, and a man on horseback is not liable to so much bullying from the drill-master as is his comrade on foot. The horse helps him, makes him more respectable and respected, and the cavalry is in higher consideration than the infantry, while the artillery, I believe, ranks higher than either. A little self-esteem is not amiss with a man who may be called on to use muscles and courage of his own in attack and defence; and it

will take a long time to make ideal soldiers out of horsemen. It may be observed, meanwhile, that the Saxon cavalry, though superbly mounted, are inferior in horsemanship and individual efficiency to either Sheridan's troopers or the English horseguards, which can be taken as a sign that the knightly element in the coming army will gradually be refined away, unless we succeed in starting a breed of scientific horses, on the principle of hobbies.

But the real efficient Saxon uniform is the uniformity of the men themselves. Of a regiment, one man can scarcely be told from another; it is one man a thousandfold multiplied. Height, breadth, features, wonderfully correspond. There are few men either so well or so badly made as many in our own and English regiments; but, such as they are, they are alike. They have none of the ruddy freshness of aspect which one sees in the best English soldiers, and little of the compact briskness of their French friends; they are coarse-skinned, pallid, big-boned, inelegant, almost undersized; but—as I have been more than once assured, and never either doubted or denied—they have shown themselves equal to all demands made upon them in the late wars; and I will add of my own motion, that, were a given number of Saxon troops to encounter an equal body of picked French, English, or Americans, the former would dispose of the latter with a facility which would leave nothing to be desired—or everything. They are the best soldiers in the world, this year; and unless the farm-women break down sooner than is expected, they may be so in years to come.

III.

When I say that I have observed these war-children a good deal, I am only intimating that I kept my eyes open. Every third man, every other woman, is a soldier. Fortunately they are not the least agreeable part of the population to look at. Once used to them, their uniformity soon makes them our old friends; they pleasantly fill all gaps and pauses; we do not exactly see them after a while, but we should greatly miss them, were they absent. They never call for a new thought, the same old thought does for all. There is no extravagance in their look or behaviour. They seem quite serene and undemonstrative, and yet there is a fantastic skeleton underlying this outward calm.

This may be seen any morning by repairing to the barracks and watching the drill. The drill looks absurd enough, but it is tremendous, and it works wonders. Not a drop of the man's blood, not an ounce of his flesh, not a breath of his body, but feels the impress of the manual. What a stretch of the leg was that! and now what sharp angles, short corners, starts, jerks, dead

pauses, sudden veerings, dashes, halts, thumpings, clankings! The man is beside himself, and that grotesque caperer is some puppet whose strings the sergeant is pulling. This periodic fit or seizure—they may call it drill, but in fact it is possession of seven devils, recurring at a certain hour every morning, lasting a fixed while, and then the devils depart, and presently the victim appears, rehabilitated: but we know his secret now, and all his quietness fails to impose on us; we discern his mad-pranks ill concealed beneath the most innocent actions. The mark is on him; the Seven will rend him again to-morrow. Skeletons are seldom attractive spectacles; but this skeleton of Drill, once seen, is not lightly forgotten. The discovery of so grisly a sub-structure to the pomp and circumstance of war is impressive in its way. It is kept discreetly secluded within the barrack walls, only venturing thence in the guise of commonplace marching and rifle exercise. To the barracks, too, are confined the more flagrant tyrannies of the drill-master, whose cuffs, shoves, and beratings make the on-looker's blood to boil, and him to marvel at the silent, unretaliating meekness of the berated one. It is odd to see that one of mankind whose avowed business in life is retaliation thus outdoing the forbearance of the mildest country clergyman. But a soldier's spirit is bound strictly to the rules of the manual; when not required in the way of business, it must remain prostrate in the mire. Soldiers are generally credited with elasticity of spirits, and from this point of view it is no wonder. But in many cases, I fancy, the spirits are broken betimes, and what afterwards passes as such is merely a kind of galvanization produced by fear. Doubtless galvanism is better than courage, being mechanical, and a safer factor in calculations.

Besides their elemental training, the men are taken off on daily morning tramps of eight or twelve miles, often in heavy marching order. They issue forth from the barrack gates with an outstreaming, rhythmic undulation, curve steadily aside, and proceed with rustling tramp along the centre of the street, seeming to move more slowly than they do. Their bayoneted rifles gleam aslant in serried evenness, each helmet glistens alike, the brass spikes swaying aligned. Every hand and red-bound coat-cuff swings parallel, every knee crooks with one impulse, every empty scabbard wavers in similar arcs. There is an onward impetus, not swift, but so strong that it seems as if houses and stone walls must move aside to let them pass—the impetus of hundreds of men moving as one. The complete unison of physical and spiritual movement, in vast numbers of human beings, is awful to contemplate; or, if we let ourselves be swept with it, it hurries off our heads as a hurricane would our hats. But the unison is everything, and it is this which makes the

march of Saxon soldiers more impressive than that of troops less perfectly drilled. Their gait is as good as it can be—a long, elastic, measured shamble, as easy at the end of twenty miles as at the beginning; and the accuracy with which they keep to straight lines, whether in march or drill, is as satisfactory as a theorem in Euclid.

The division, which thus issues from the barracks several hundred strong, soon begins to separate into detachments that switch off on different roads, and in their turn split up, till the whole is parted into squads of ten or a dozen men each. Having got beyond the outskirts of the town and the chance of stray officers, the severity of the discipline is somewhat relaxed, the men are allowed to carry their rifles and to march as they please, and to chat with one another as they go. Of all these privileges they gladly avail themselves, and try to be disorderly; but the attempt only shows how intimately their training has entered into them. What is ease to other men has ceased to be so to them. The rigour of the march tires them less than irregularity. Behind their most careless laxity one sees the iron method and precision which makes the squad like a machine, out of gear for the time, but evidently needing only the turn of a crank to fall in order once more. On they tramp, dusty, muddy, heated, tired perhaps, but the pace never slackens; and when, two or three hours later, they pass again beneath the barrack gates, rifles and helmets, line and step, are as even and accurate as before.

After labour, play. At mid-day the crowd which has been collecting for the last half-hour in front of the Neustadt barracks beholds come forth a goodly detachment, clad in its newest uniform, and headed by a military band in full triumphant blast. Band, detachment, and crowd set out in gleeful array towards the bridge, every foot within range of the music keeping time to it. A halt is made opposite the old black guard-house, and here some of the music remains, disposes itself in a ring, and discourses away heartily for half an hour, the echoes coming finely back from the tall ungainly buildings that shut in the square. Now the market-women are enviable, sitting comfortably at their stalls; and our old friend Werthmann, if it be summer, plants tables and chairs under the oleanders outside his hospitable door, and finds plenty of customers. Every neighbouring window has its head or two, passers-by loiter or stop, the soldiers in the guard-house are gradually drawn forth to lounge and listen in the great dark portico, the perpendicular sun pours a jolly warmth over everything, and only Augustus, mounted aloft on his brazen steed, and carrying on his immemorial flirtation with the weatherworn water-nymph on the corner of Haupt Strasse, seems wholly indifferent to the melody ringing in his brazen ears.

Meanwhile another and larger assemblage is enjoying a similar concert in a corner of the Schloss-Platz on the other side of the river. The bands are the same which play in the afternoons at the Grosse Wirthschaft or other beer-gardens, and the music, excellent in itself, is enhanced by its quasi-incidental conditions. There is a rich spontaneity of flavour about it which is apt to escape the malice-prepense performances.

IV.

Of the barrack-life of the soldier not much is visible to the outsider. Passing along the sidewalk, we may glance in at the lower windows and exchange a stare with the inmates, but we gain little wisdom thereby. Often there are pots of flowers on the sill, and sometimes the *carte-de-visite* of a relative or sweetheart pinned to the wall. But the warriors themselves do not appear to advantage in undress. Neatness and sweetness in a Saxon private's barrack-room (or any other private's, for that matter) are hardly to be expected. They wear their dirty canvas jackets, and lie about half asleep, or drowsily gossiping together. There seems nothing but the lazy body of them left. It takes a sergeant or a sweetheart to enliven them.

When they obtain leave of absence after four o'clock, and come out in brave attire to drink a glass of beer, and take Gretchen's rough, affectionate paw in theirs, they are perhaps at their best. Some of the *Freiwilligers*, who belong to the better order of people, attend lectures at the Government schools and colleges during the intervals of their military duties; but the multitude are of the reasonable opinion that a day's drill is work enough, and that a taste of love and malt liquor is only fair compensation. Accordingly they form a good part of the guests at every saloon and concert-room, and at some of the dance-halls they have a monopoly. They are almost always the quietest and most decorous persons present; drunkenness is not for them, nor loud talking, nor insolence; they are a kind of children that do credit to their bringing up, and forget not the voice of the instructor even when out of his presence. But can these mild, smug fellows be successors of the shaggy, brutal, fierce, gigantic Suevi who roamed the Hyrcanian forests scarce two thousand years ago? and is it not funny that a chemical discovery or two and a smattering of mechanics should render these small, inoffensive-looking sons a hundred times as formidable in battle as their savage sires?

One of the most touching sights in connection with military matters which I have happened to notice is that of the newly enlisted men roaming the streets during the day or two of grace allowed them before donning the uniform and beginning the long,

weary servitude of powder and ball. They are permitted a license of behaviour quite extraordinary either to soldier or citizen; they are in the neutral ground between, and may have their fling, for once. Policemen are blind to their escapades; officers ignore them; people in general smile good-naturedly, and pick them up when they fall down. For it almost invariably happens that the first thing these unborn war-babes do is to get drunk: it is the traditional way of passing the solemn period of incubation, and appears to commend itself anew to each successive brood. They wear green ribbons in their button-holes, and stagger along arm in arm, crooning discordant lays, laughing or crying, and committing much harmless, foolish, and piteous uproar. Many of them bring smooth, inexperienced faces from unknown country villages; others are already coarse and stolid; a few bear traces of culture, but Gambrinus lays all alike in the gutter. Occasionally, indeed, from the midst of this beery bedlam, a sane and sober pair of eyes meets our own, making us marvel how they came there. Perhaps the drunkards are the wiser; the prospect is too sorry a one for sober contemplation; it requires all the enchantment that malt and hops can cast over it to make it tolerable. But what a rueful scene must to-morrow morning's drill be, with its *Katzenjammer*, its helpless ignorance, and its savage sergeant!

V.

Sentries represent, to my mind, the most interesting phase of army life. Something of poetic sentiment still attaches to them. A solitary figure, with gleaming weapon and watchful eye, moving to and fro with measured tread on the beleaguered ramparts, or along the snow-bound limits of the night encampment,—such is the sentry of the imagination. His suggestiveness is fascinating, and renders him impressive. How much is confided to him, and what power is his! He is the waking eye and thought and strength of the army, which slumbers defenceless but for him. A signal from him, and a thousand men spring to arms; or, if he choose to play the traitor, they are massacred without remedy. So great a responsibility so faithfully borne seems a remnant of the heroic age; and to see commonplace men of to-day, with small intelligence and infirm principles, so trusted and vindicated, is beyond all question encouraging. And in all ages of the world, sentries have maintained their good repute; the veriest scamp rises above himself when left alone on his beat, with the enemy at hand; so much depends upon his honour, that the sentiment he had fancied extinct is recreated in his breast. Generous thoughts renew a long-interrupted acquaintance with him, and when the relief-guard comes round

they perhaps find another and better man than was placed here three hours ago.

But we are venturing rash lengths, hardly borne out by our Dresden sentries in time of peace. With these our main quarrel is that they are too numerous—the poetic loneliness is wanting. Where one would suffice are two, and one where none is necessary. Moreover, they are used for mere display, and are set to watch over nothing more precious than their own sentry-boxes; it is hard to be enthusiastic about such a peril, such a responsibility as that. Again, the crowded streets belittle them; and finally, they are mere lay figures; if we brush past them, they do not challenge us, and if we ask them a question, they cannot answer it. To put so noble an instrument to such paltry uses is like cutting bread and cheese with Excalibur.

The chief business of city sentries—the only thing that gives a fillip to the lethargy of their plight—is saluting. This affords them a constant supply of mild excitement, varying in degree according as their man is a second lieutenant or the King. They are always on the look-out, like hunters for their game; and that were a soft-footed officer indeed who should catch one of them napping.

The whole idea of saluting is graceful; it is pleasant to see men paying one another mutual deference, even when it is based on so trifling a matter as the fashion of an epaulette, and the cut of a coat. It seems to declare a human sympathy and brotherhood outgrowing the bounds of mere private acquaintance. It is a pity that all men should not adopt so good a custom; we all wear the uniform of flesh and blood, and our common nature is respectable enough for us to touch our hats to it. Only, the respect we pay, to preserve its integrity, must be impersonal; I am Quaker enough to think that there exists no man who, in his private capacity, is entitled to the cap or knee of anybody. Into these subtleties, however, the simple soldier entereth not; it is enough for him that he sees his officer and knows his duty. The officer must salute in return, and, since he is greatly in the minority, he is sometimes kept at it pretty steadily. When, for instance, hundreds of soldiers are streaming across the bridge to their evening diversion, whatever pair of epaulettes is unlucky enough to be going the other way has to run the gauntlet of them all. The men glue their hands to their caps, straighten their shoulders, and will not be denied. No doubt they enjoy forcing his acknowledgment—the confession, as it were, that despite his grave dignity he is but their fellow-soldier, after all. Sometimes the soldier has both hands occupied, and then he only bends a respectful glance, while the officer must still touch his cap, with however arrogant a dab. The messenger, with his despatches in his breast, and his rifle on his shoulder, is likewise privileged to a

certain extent; his mission elevates him for the moment above ordinary regulations. But it is odd that so fraternal and catholic a practice should obtain only, and of all places, in the army; it is like the honey in the carcase of Samson's lion.

To return to our sentry, who has just discerned his quarry approaching up the street. In consideration of the spasmodic rigidity which always fastens upon sentinels when under the eye of their superiors in rank, the latter, one might suppose, must get queer notions of them: what is this fixed, convulsed object, gorgonized at my glance in so ungainly an attitude? Does it live? has it intelligence? As for the King, he probably thinks of his soldiers as of so many wooden toys, quaintly postured; and only by a determined effort realizes that they may have moved in a natural manner before he laid eyes on them, and will likely do so again hereafter. But kings are unfortunate in never being able to steal a march upon nature: in the attempt to express her sense of their divine rights, she becomes unnatural; and the more ineffable their majesty, the more fantastic her grimace.

Meanwhile, hither comes the officer, self-contained, leisurely, dignified: his gloved hand on his sword-hilt, his iron cross on his breast. If he be a colonel, the sentry begins to be spasmodic while the great man is yet half a block distant, and "presents arms" at a time when, unless the colonel's arm were sixty or seventy feet in length, he could not possibly avail himself of the offer. A lieutenant, on the other hand, succeeds in stiffening his man only within a range of six paces, and even then the rifle is but "ordered." But in any case, the inferior is anxious, tense, electrified; the superior serene, indifferent, haughty; he affects to be unsuspicious of the brewing of the salute, and acknowledges it at the last moment by a lazy uplifting of the forefinger. Gesture nor expression could better express aristocracy's contemptuous recognition of the plebeian's existence. But should the plebeian fail to discharge his whole debt of reverence, the aristocrat wakes up. I saw an overgrown captain, whose rank the sentry had mistaken, keep the fellow at the "present" for fifteen minutes; till the sweat ran down the poor devil's scared face, and the heavy rifle trembled in his tired grasp as though it shared his apprehensions. These are not insignificant details; they are the lifeblood of the army.

When the King or any member of the royal household comes by, the sentry is full of hysteric bustle and excitement. He runs to the bell-pull, jerks it, and back to his place, now craning his head forwards to see how near Majesty is, now twisting it back over his shoulder to see whether the guard has turned out, and the drummer is ready. Now passes the outrider, high jouncing on his hard-trotting blindered horse; now follows the smooth-

rolling carriage, Majesty within; the drum beats, the guard is transfixed, the sentry a motionless bundle of right angles. A few breathless moments, and all is over: the guard relaxes and stacks arms, the sentry comes to life and shoulders his rifle; the drummer puts up his drumsticks and disappears. Majesty has been saluted by man, and we may breathe again.

VI.

We continually encounter squads of men uniformed from head to foot in dirty canvas, marching hastily along the streets in military order, and in charge of a corporal. But though evidently connected with the army, they are always weaponless, and they pass their brethren of whatever rank unsaluted and unsaluting. Sometimes they carry spades, hatchets, brooms, or other agricultural and menial implements; and if we follow them up we shall find them sweeping the streets, digging gardens, chopping firewood, or otherwise making themselves sullenly useful: while the corporal looks on with folded arms; and, perhaps, when the weather is cold, wishes that military etiquette allowed him to bear a hand. These men are generally of a gloomy and dejected aspect, never laugh or sing over their labour, and converse, if at all, in a growling undertone. When their work is done, they are not allowed to go and play, but must shoulder their implements and march to barracks. They never have leave of absence, and must never stray beyond the corporal's reach. Their week seems to be full of Fridays.

These malancholy drudges are the *Bestrafene*—soldiers who have outraged discipline in one way or another, and have therefore incurred the penalty of deprivation of all soldierly privileges, and subjection to all refuse employments. All the more irksome burdens are put on their shoulders, and they get no thanks for bearing them. Nothing could be less exhilarating than their position: they are hopeless of bettering themselves, though any indiscretion will surely sink them yet deeper. They are prisoners bereft of the prisoner's right to fetters and stone walls; for certainly it were better to be dungeoned outright, and, by dint of never beholding human freedom and natural beauty, grow to forget that such things exist, than thus daily to be flouted by the sight and contact of blessings which they may not share. The lot of the soldier is not, under any circumstances, the kindest in the world; and the sting of his punishments is the fact that they are inflicted for offences intrinsically so trivial. The army is so portentously abnormal an institution, that its code of right and wrong must needs be exaggerated to match, and the strangest consequences ensue. Soldiers—and especially, it seems to me,

Saxon soldiers—are constantly subjected to burning provocations, none the easier to bear because they are part of inevitable discipline. Nevertheless, any symptom of restiveness is treated as a deadly sin—and properly so, if armies are to exist. But what intolerable wrongs may not be thus facilitated! Even Saxon soldiers, it appears, can lose their complaisance at last; and if an officer has a grudge against a private, it is evident that the private is doomed; either his life is made a bane to him by constant insult and oppression, or his forbearance yields for a moment, and he incurs perhaps twenty years' *Bestrafung*. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of *Bestrafene* in Dresden; and since they have all rebelled with a full knowledge of the consequences, we may partly estimate the severity of Saxon discipline.

Their terms of punishment vary from a few months to life, at the discretion of the officer. One cannot help being surprised that the crime for which they do penance is not always murder. And indeed, if the question is of moral accountability, were it not less sin to have slain him in one fiery instant, than impotently to curse him in cold blood every day for twenty years?

It must often happen, moreover, that the *Bestrafene* who are thus laid on the shelf so far as any manly use is concerned, had it in them to be the very flower of the army. It was the pith and force of the man that got him into trouble. Had he been a little more white-livered, he would have escaped. But he was convicted of a flickering of manly spirit, a spark of independence, a heat of temper; and for these unwarrior-like qualities he is extinguished. Is there no help for it? no allowance to be made for provocations and possibilities? By no means: discipline must be true to itself, or die. There is no flaw in the logic of the army. If mankind to-day really loved fighting as much as they seem to have done of yore, they would not stop to do it scientifically; the main expense of a campaign would be for grave-diggers; while peace could afford to be something more honest than a gatherer-together of expensive brickbats against the next contest. To shoot at a man is not to fight him; but get at him with your fists, or with a club, or dirk at most, and immediately you have satisfaction; you feel that you have measured yourself against that man; if you kill him, it is with the serene assurance that your superior personal prowess was the sole cause of victory; if he kill you, you are spared the annoyance of succumbing to some sleight-of-hand trick, or mechanical hocus-pocus. Rifles, cannon, and military manœuvres are among the Will-o'-the-wisps of the age. They seem to give us that which they rob us of. Since they came in vogue there have been no battles—no defeats nor victories. Unless we can slay our enemy as Cain slew Abel, and perhaps eat him up afterwards, we would better let him alone. "Civilized

warfare" is the very most dangerous device of the devil, worth all his other investments put together.

I scrutinized the faces of these canvas-backed fellows with morbid interest. There is not a cheerful one among them: many have acquired a sinister expression; some are sullen-brutal, some sullen-obstinate, some sullen-fierce. Only a few have the passive stolidity of despair, for hope is more obstinate than most misery. Some wear a hang-dog look; others stare us defiantly in the face. All this is what might be expected, but I was not prepared to find so many well-built heads and able countenances. I do not mean to say that there are any Liebig's or Goethes among them; but only that their intellectual promise outdoes that of their unpariah-ed comrades—no difficult feat, heaven knows. Brains, of a certain kind, are desirable in the leaders of the army, but not in the army itself. The analogy with man is strict. He must not allow his arms and legs, his liver and stomach, to be intellectual; the head is the place for cerebration, and any other member that presumes to do anything in that line ought to be licked into shape without delay.

The unlucky wretches sometimes try to escape, but only succeed when they accept the faithful co-operation of death. All plans for freedom to which that venerable friend of man is not made privy are sure to fail. The whole country rises and greedily hunts them down; and—such is human frailty—the fugitives generally suffer themselves to be caught alive. Occasionally they adopt other methods. Not very long ago a squad of *Bestrafene* were at work on some job in the Grosser Garten, when Albert (at that time Crown Prince) came riding by, unattended, except by the groom some distance behind him. Suddenly one of the men left his work and rushed up to the royal soldier—the head of the army, to whom all power was given to pardon, promote, or condemn.

Here I pricked up my ears, thinking I was going to hear something worth hearing. What! had this man's misery risen to so tragic a height as to nerve him to lift a revengeful hand against the Prince? I have done injustice to the strength and colour of the Saxon nature!

"Before he could be stopped," continued my informant, "he had thrown himself on his knees in the bridle path, and had seized the royal stirrup. He besought the Prince to remit some years of his sentence. He had been condemned to five-and-twenty years—ten had already elapsed. By this time assistance arrived; the groom rode the impudent fellow down, and his comrades dragged him off."

"But the Prince was gracious, of course?"

"Most gracious! he kept his eyes all the time averted; had he once looked at the man, it would have been a life-imprisonment!

but he affected to be not aware of him. Thereafter he called to him the corporal, and graciously commanded that the man's term should be not at all increased."

"Oh! I should think he might have pardoned him a year or two."

"Pardon! God forbid! where then would be discipline—the army?"

The gentleman who told me this was not a military person, but a simple Saxon citizen, a doctor of philology. On consideration, his view of the incident rather relieved than otherwise my injured sensibilities. If he, the most humane of Saxons, could thus utterly ignore the down-trodden petitioner's side of the question, might it not be justly inferred that the petitioner himself, being a Saxon as well as the doctor, and presumably of duller perceptions, was less affected by his misfortunes than I had rashly supposed? It has been recently established, I believe, that the beetle which we tread upon suffers very little corporal anguish after all. Why should not the analogy be applied to these *Bestrafene*? Our sympathy has been thrown away upon them; they do not half mind being put out of the sunshine of existence. Whoever attempts to apply to Saxons the moral, mental, or emotional standards of other peoples, may succeed in discovering himself, but not them.

VII.

The Saxon officers are a fine-looking body of men. They are taller, on the average, than the common soldiers, and possess symmetrical figures. Their uniforms are kept scrupulously neat, their bearing is not devoid of conventional grace, and, though not invariably remarkable for general culture, they are thoroughly competent to their duties in the field, and by no means ignorant of the arts of bowing, dancing, and uttering smiling compliments to pretty young foreigners, whose appreciation thereof is enhanced by the consideration that the complimenter, besides being an officer, is almost always either a Count or a Baron.

The army is, of course, the first profession in Saxony; all the young sprigs of nobility crowd to the cadet-schools, and are thence commissioned to the various branches of the service: there is little fun and less profit to be got by staying under the paternal roof-tree. The profession is no sinecure, however; these dapper captains and lieutenants must work like Irish labourers every day; from four in the morning till four in the afternoon they are sometimes kept in the field; while such pay as they get would hardly keep an American gentleman in cigars. In view of this fact, their immaculate coats and white kid gloves


and snug boots are doubly admirable. Such genius for economy, combined with such capacity for labour, would seem to argue just the men with whom love in a cottage could be made at once pleasant and profitable; and yet, for some unexplained reason, these Spartans always happen to fall in love with the wealthy young ladies. They will even marry them, upon occasion, thus proving the sincerity of their affection; not every young man, nowadays, is lover enough to sacrifice his best talents to his passion.

Well—but they are amusing and good-natured, and really the life of American and English parties. They have a child-like theatricality of manner which is highly entertaining; and their courteous extravagances are charming to women used to the cold attentions of English and American men. The French do it better, perhaps, but we cannot always be in Paris. It is something to have one's hand kissed without being obliged to consider it the first step towards a declaration. If only the Saxon officers would learn discretion at table, they would be the darlings of the foreign circle in Dresden; and I understand that they have considerably reformed in this respect. But the table is their weak point, and they might sin far more grievously in other directions without incurring half the reproach which this peccadillo brings upon them. I will not attempt to describe their manner of putting food into their mouths; it would lose colour in description; but in this connection a characteristic trait or two should not be omitted. The suppers given at the balls of our countrypeople soon began to acquire celebrity, being altogether more sumptuous than it is the German custom to provide on such occasions. Now the officers, as has been intimated, are not a wealthy class, and it may be supposed that their ordinary fare is neither rich nor varied. Accordingly, they looked forward to these repasts with no little eagerness; and, it is said, were in the habit of fasting on the day of a party, not only from motives of economy, but also by way of getting an appetite in every way befitting the good things provided.

Arriving thus sharpset at their host's rooms, we can readily imagine their thoughts and glances wandering towards the supper-room more frequently than their fair partners might consider flattering; and it is certain that at the very first opening of the doors, they stopped for neither partner nor precedent, but straightway and in a body crowded up to the tables, round which they formed a solid phalanx, and from which they budged not, neither for man nor woman, until every Saxon stomach had been filled to its very utmost. Then slowly, reluctantly, inertly did they retire, with flushed faces and glazed eyes; and in corners, on sofas, in cool entries, or by refreshing windows did they linger and lounge, and gradually recover their breath and energy: while

the other gentlemen of the company seized the opportunity to help the ladies to the remnants of the feast, and perhaps to nibble a little themselves afterwards. This thing occurred, let us suppose, once only in the course of history; yet, such as it was, it seemed not unworthy of being recorded.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.



THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

WHEN Cardinal Wolsey asked the House of Commons to grant his master £200,000 a-year for four years, in order to carry on his government, that assembly asked to see the accounts of their last subsidy. They received a very rough answer; and as they declined, in the absence of the accounts, to vote more than half the sum demanded, they were dismissed, and not allowed to meet again for seven years.

Fifty-three years afterwards, Queen Elizabeth, being very hard pressed for money, and finding in her Parliament a yet sturdier spirit than that which had opposed her father, directed Mildmay to produce to the House of Commons her accounts of expenditure, not of right, but "of the Queen's grace."

Stuart princes failed where Tudors had not succeeded, and the demands and answers between King and Parliament, from the time of James's accession to the time of the final flight of his grandson, were but provocatives to those actions which rendered the Stuart dynasty impossible in England. On the one side insistence on the duty of the subject to give unconditionally upon the demand of a king ruling by right divine; on the other a stubborn refusal to accept the royal word that the money would be properly spent.

No body of men liked to be ordered, as Wolsey ordered the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London, to contribute towards an unvoted tax, lest refusal "might fortune to cost some of them

their heads." No king, though depending for some two-thirds of his income upon a representative assembly, liked to be treated as if he had natural tendencies towards larceny, or, from his point of view, to be told that he should have no subsidy unless he remedied some grievance. "No song, no supper," was a maxim peculiarly distasteful to "absolute kings," whether of the Stuart or the Tudor school; but the advent of a constitutional king took away the personal element in the dispute, and gave practical meaning to the precept that the king can do no wrong.

Before proceeding to examine the nature of the control which is exercised now over the public expenditure, and before tracing the growth of that power, it may not be amiss to realize, if possible, the sort of relation in which Parliament stood to the King, in pre-constitutional times, in the matter of public funds. The right of the people to tax themselves was foreshadowed by Magna Charta, was conceded by Edward I. in the *Confirmatio Chartarum*, and was confirmed by many subsequent statutes. But this right, though often confounded with that of controlling the public expenditure, is separable from it, is correlative, but not identical, with it. To give or not to give, was an undoubted right of the national representatives. But to appropriate particular votes to particular branches of expenditure, and to require accounts of the manner in which specific votes had been expended, were no original rights of the people. They grew up gradually in face of the necessities of princes, who gave or withheld accounts according to circumstances. No statute of Plantagenet or Tudor conferred the right to require them, and the intervals between rendering and not rendering were sufficiently long to prevent any title by prescription. Yet we find instances quite early in English history in which the most absolute princes were content to allow inspection of their accounts, in return, it is true, for a valuable consideration, but still to allow it.

Strictly speaking, it was over only a small portion of the royal revenue that the representatives of the people in feudal times could claim any title to audit. The theory that for the ordinary expenses of the Government the crown lands, the feudal payments, and the personal revenue of the King sufficed, whilst for war purposes every tenant in capite was bound to bring his subfeudatories into the field, fully equipped, and to maintain them there for six weeks at his own cost, and without any charge to the King, left no more room for public inquiry into the royal expenditure than for inquiry into the expenditure of any of the great barons of the realm. Nor was this position theoretically altered when scutages and substitute money came to be paid instead of bodily service. It was not till experience showed that there were national expenses, properly so called, which could not

be met out of the scutages, nor out of the private funds of the King, expenses for which it was necessary to ask "subsidies," "aids," even "benevolences," from the people, that the people could be said to have had any right to call the King to account. This necessity manifested itself as early as 1258, and from that date it may be said that a right sprung up to control at least so much of the national expenditure as was met by money voted by the laity in Parliament, or by the clergy in their assembly. This right would seem to have been the stronger, as the purpose for which the subsidy was asked and voted was the more specific, so that there was nothing unreasonable in the demand of those people who, in Edward III.'s last Parliament, had voted a sum of money for the express purpose of "guarding the seas," that accounts should be rendered by the Duke of Lancaster, who had undertaken the double duty of guarding and spending, but who had succeeded only in the latter half of his duty. Still the title to accounts, if it existed at all, was strictly limited to the special sum voted, and did not include a general right to overhaul the books at the Exchequer, nor to make the King show what his income was, and how he spent it. Of course there could be no more potent argument for supply than the national necessity, and there could be no better demonstration of this necessity than the exhibition of the accounts. But then it might well be that the make-up of the accounts would show items undesirable, for King or ministers, to be disclosed. In such cases the absence of right in the Commons, and the natural absence of will in the Court, resulted in the refusal of accounts, sometimes in the refusal of supply. Sometimes, too, it resulted in acts yet more unpleasant to ministers. In 1376, the House of Commons, getting no accounts, but first putting themselves in the right by granting a subsidy, impeached the Sires de Latymer and de Neville, and four London merchants, for having wasted King Edward's money, and for having, in his extremity, lent him sums at exorbitant interest. They said, "that if their said liege lord had always possessed about him faithful counsellors and good officers, he would have been so rich that he would have had no need of charging his Commons with subsidy or tallage, considering the great ransoms of the French and Scotch kings, and of so many other prisoners; and that it appeared to be for the private advantage of some near the King, and of others by their collusion, that the King and kingdom are so impoverished, and the Commons so ruined." This undoubtedly was a case in which the accounts would not bear inspection, or the demanders of money would not have risked an impeachment, any more than the Earl of Suffolk would have done twelve years later, when it was charged upon him by the same home-thrusting assembly that "a

tax voted by the last Parliament had not been applied as demanded by the Commons, and assented to by the King and Lords."

When King or minister was strong enough, accounts were refused, and refusal, when the Parliament saw its opportunity, ended in impeachment. At least this was so till Richard II. ascended the throne. During the minority of Richard II., we find the first quasi-constitutional method of controlling the public expenditure. To Sir William Walworth and Sir John Philpot, merchants of London, and members of the House of Commons, was committed the charge of disbursing the subsidy voted by Parliament for the expenses of the governmental council which ruled in the name of the young King; and when in the following Parliament a further subsidy was asked for, over and above the usual royal revenues, the Commons murmured, and called for the accounts of their last supply. The High Treasurer, the Sire de Scrope, told them somewhat tartly, that Walworth and Philpot had had the money, "yet the King, to gratify them, *of his own accord, without doing it by way of right*, would have Walworth, with certain persons of the council, exhibit to them in writing a clear account of the receipt and expenditure, upon condition that this should never be used as a precedent, nor inferred to be done otherwise than by the King's spontaneous command." A few months afterwards the King informed this same Parliament, without waiting to be asked, that his treasurers were ready to exhibit their accounts before them.

By this time the feudal revenues of the Crown had become so inadequate to the necessities of government, so many alienations of originally fixed feudal payments had taken place, and so many abnormal permanent expenses had arisen, that the former position was reversed, and the Crown became dependent upon the people for the greater, and not the smaller portion of its income. This position, involving as it did increased right to control the public finances, was strengthened for the people under a dynasty with a bad title to the crown, and with small private means. Mr. Hallam points out that two Parliaments of Henry IV. granted money on condition that it should be spent in defence of the kingdom, and in no other way, whilst they appointed treasurers, responsible on oath, to see to the execution of this order. And though the brilliancy of Henry V.'s reign made the Commons more generous and less inquisitive, we find them breaking out again under his successor, haggling over supply without getting satisfactory accounts, and granting a subsidy only on the express condition "that it ne no part thereof be beset ne dispensed to no other use, but only in and for the defence of the said roialme."

The wars of the Roses confused this growing right of the

Commons as they obliterated many other constitutional rights. Tudor princes, ruling very much on the principle of the *droit du plus fort*, ignored the concessions of weaker ancestors, and the campaign of control had to be fought out again between king and people.

It is not the purpose of the present writer to trace the various forms of taxes by means of which English kings in times past carried on their government; but it may be interesting to give, before going further, some specimens, from Madox's "History of the Exchequer," of the entries which formerly appeared on the credit side of the King's account at the Exchequer. They are singularly indicative of the state of public administration at the time, whilst they clearly belong to a period in which no Auditor-General bore sway. They have at least the merit of plain speaking, and are no whit more questionable in themselves than many entries which might have been made under later kings who took, though they did not credit the Exchequer with, sums of money from foreign princes, for purposes baser than some of those set out by Madox.

Simon de Montford paid Henry III. ten thousand marks that he might have the wardship of Gilbert de Umfreville during minority. Solomon, the Jew, engaged to pay one mark out of every seven that he should recover against Hugh de la Hose. Henry, son of Arthur, gave ten dogs to have a recognition against the Countess of Copland, for one knight's fee. Geoffrey Fitz Pierre, the Chief Justiciary, gave two good Norway hawks, that Walter le Madine might have leave to export a hundredweight of cheese out of the king's dominions. Hugh, Archdeacon of Wells, gave a tun of wine for leave to carry six hundred sums of corn whither he would. Robert Grislet paid twenty marks of silver, that the King would help him against the Earl of Mortaigne, in a certain plea. Richard de Neville gave twenty palfreys to obtain the King's request to Isolda Bisset, that she would take him for a husband. Roger Fitz-Walter gave three good palfreys to have the King's letter to Roger Bertram's mother, that she should marry him. There are some entries of a yet more remarkable kind in Madox, where the curious in such matters will find them displayed at length.

Leaving these curious witnesses to the character of old English public revenue, it is advisable to come at once to the consideration of the matter with which this paper purports more especially to deal—the Public Accounts themselves. In doing this, one finds an invaluable guide in a Parliamentary Paper, No. 366, session 1869, which bears Mr. Gladstone's name, and which gives in fullest detail the particulars of the public income and expenditure from the year 1688 to 1869. This elaborate work, extending over more than twelve hundred pages, is a monument of ability

on the part of those who compiled it. It is also replete with information, derived from original sources, respecting every branch of the public income and expenditure, and contains a large quantity of historical matter of first-class importance.

Until the constitutional period gave the people a right not only to control the public expenditure, but also to dictate the form in which accounts should be presented, the management of the King's accounts was vested in "the King's Treasurer," "Lord High Treasurer," or "Treasurer of the King's Exchequer," who, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer (an officer first appointed in the 18th Henry III.) and the barons thereof, constituted the two courts of royal receipt, expenditure, and account. In the Lower Exchequer money was received from tax-payers, and was also paid out on order of the Upper Exchequer for the purposes of the public service. In the Upper Exchequer, accounts of sheriffs, tax-farmers, and other public accountants, were received and examined. There, too, sat the barons, who originated the civil jurisdiction of the present Court of Exchequer in causes between subject and subject, by entertaining suits from persons who claimed money from fellow-subjects, and averred that unless they had the help of the Court of Exchequer to get in their debts, they themselves would be unable to pay their dues to their lord the King.

The Treasurer acted in both divisions of the Court. Madox says it was his duty "to examine and control accountants, to direct the entries made in the Great Roll, to attest the writs issued for levying the King's revenue, to supervise the issuing and receiving of the King's treasure at the receipt of the Exchequer; and, in a word, to provide for and take care of the King's profit." It was perhaps in pursuance of this duty, or in acting up to his idea of what his duty required, that Cardinal Morton, Henry VII.'s Treasurer, twisted fines out of those who kept liveried retainers contrary to the statute, and forced gifts out of those who had evidently saved money by not doing so. Certain it is that the exigencies of the Treasury, in the face of inquisitorial or dictatorial Parliaments, impelled Lord Treasurers to have recourse to "Cardinal Morton's fork" in one shape or another; and finally to strain the power of the Star Chamber, both in respect of its own inordinate fines and of its enforcement of taxes by proclamation, to such a degree as to crack its sinews and to overthrow with dismal ruin the prince in whose name it proceeded. Till after the death of Charles II. Lord Treasurers bore sway, and as long as they did so there was no constitutional control by the popular representatives over the operations of public finance. Had there been, it is unlikely history would have had to record the closing of the Exchequer and

the suspension of Government payments between the beginning of January and the 24th May, 1673; or the proposal, made three years later, that in order to secure the due appropriation of money voted for ship-building, the amount should be paid into the Chamber of London; or the point-blank refusal of the House of Commons to take the King's word that money voted should be properly spent.

With the Revolution which placed William III. upon the throne came a different state of things. If the Bill of Rights reasserted that claim in the Petition of Right, which again was the echo of the claim allowed by Magna Charta, that subjects should be taxed by none but their representatives, the Parliament which presented the Bill of Rights was not slow to carry out their claim to its logical consequence. By 2 William and Mary, session 2, c. 11, were appointed Commissioners "to examine, take, and state the publick accounts of the kingdom." But their appointment was only temporary. They formed no part of the permanent service of the State.

The accounts prepared by these Commissioners were careful and elaborate documents exhibiting the items of public receipt and expenditure with sufficient distinctness. They were, moreover, laid before Parliament, and entered in the journals. Whatever pretext there may have been under former kings for excluding the eye of Parliament from any portion of the public accounts, there was none under the circumstances in which the Prince of Orange took the crown. Except such private property as he possessed—property which he more than once expressed a resolution to go and enjoy, free from the cares and mortifications which his new charge brought to him—the whole of the royal revenue belonged to the State, and was subject, therefore, to its control.

That this control was not a nominal one may be seen from the words of the 8 and 9 William III., c. 28—the first legislative enactment which took the receiving and paying office in hand. This Act, passed "for the better observation of the course anciently used in the receipt of the Exchequer, and the good, sure, and regular methods established, enacted, or appointed to be observed and kept by the respective officers and ministers of the said receipt, in all matters concerning receipts, payments, or other business to be there transacted or performed, whereupon the preserving and improving of the public credit do chiefly depend," lays down very precise rules for the guidance of all officers of the Treasury. The tellers were ordered, under penalties, to notify in every case to the accountants whenever money was paid in, and were forbidden to pay out "without an order or debenture for the same to be first made forth and directed by the auditor of the receipt for the time being, and recorded by the

Clerk of the Pells for the time being, and taking a receipt to discharge the King, according to the ancient course and practice of the said receipt." Oaths were prescribed for all the officers of the Treasury entrusted with the receipt or payment of money. The officers of the Tally Court were ordered "constantly to attend in their several places, at least from eight of the clock in the forenoon till one of the clock in the afternoon in every year from Lady Day to Michaelmas, and from nine of the clock in the forenoon till one of the clock in the afternoon in every year from Michaelmas to Lady Day, without absenting themselves from the same, unless they respectively be sick, or have leave of absence." The money in the receipt of the Exchequer was ordered to be in chests having three different locks, whereof the several keys were to be in the custody of three different persons, and every morning sufficient money, and no more, was ordered to be taken out of the chests to meet the known requirements of the day. Finally the auditor of the receipt was directed, once in twenty-eight days, from and after 20th April, 1697, to "call the proper officers of the said receipt together and visit every teller's cash, and by numbering the bags, opening them, or some of them, promiscuously, and (if he thinks it necessary) by weighing or telling the money, or any part thereof, to see that the respective tellers have, in real money, the remains wherewith he charges them; and that he do, as frequently as he thinks fit, but at least once in every three months, carefully examine the tellers' vouchers for the payments which he allows them in his weekly certificates."

Space is wanting to trace the interesting history of the Exchequer, its sinecure tellerships, worth £10,000 a year; its clerkships of the pells, paid at nearly the same amount, but worth to the public a fraction of that sum; the auditorships of imprest, paid with £16,000 a year; the issue of wooden tallies, continued till 1826, in lieu of receipts; the old-world practice of money-keeping, continued long after the Bank of England had become a power in the State; the singular oaths of fidelity imposed upon treasurer, remembrancer, chamberlains, and deputy chamberlains. All these things have passed away, though some of them remained till within living memory. They are strange historical monuments of a by-gone system, so different from that which obtains now as to excite wonder on comparison. They were cotemporaries with abuses which bit deep into the public service, and poisoned the very source of financial control; they commemorate the era when personal interest was made superior to the interest of the public, and when transactions took place daily between men of honourable standing, which to-day would bring an actor in them to the bar of the Old Bailey.

Nevertheless, in a rude way, some attempt was made at control-

ling and auditing the public expenditure so far as the mere receipt and issue of money at the Exchequer was concerned. The auditor of the receipt had veritable duties to perform in the national counting-house, though outside of it, in the national workshops, arsenals, dockyards, and spending departments he had no jurisdiction. Money once issued to minister or department was issued indeed, and, except during the brief intervals already noticed, when Public Accounts Commissioners bore sway, the manner of its expenditure was not subject to the scrutiny of Parliament. In 1816, it was stated, in answer to a precept of the House of Commons for certain information, that "owing to the confused state in which the public accounts were kept previous to 1800, no accurate view of the income and expenditure previous to that date could be made out."

The reports of the Commissioners of Public Accounts between 1780 and 1786—Commissioners having been re-appointed in the former of these years after an interval of half a century—testify in the most marked manner to the confusion and worse than mere confusion, which prevailed all through the period of administrative darkness under the first two Georges, and for twenty years after George III. had been on the throne. In 1780 these Commissioners began their work by recommending that money payable by the subject should pass direct to the Exchequer, and not be allowed to remain in collectors' hands; and they advised that all persons engaged in the collection of revenue should be paid by salary instead of by the unknown fees hitherto allowed.

In this country changes in the method of public business have ever been slow of accomplishment. Seventy years passed before the first recommendations of the Commissioners had fruition. They are not completely adopted even now.

In 1787, after the Public Accounts Commissioners had presented their last report, was published, for the first time, in pursuance of 27 Geo. III. c. 13, a complete statement of the gross and net produce of the public revenue, under its several heads. "But no systematic publication of the gross and net amounts, showing the several deductions from the revenue in its progress to the Exchequer, nor of the amounts of the public expenditure, was effected till 1802, when the Annual Finance Accounts were directed to be prepared, under the Act 42 Geo. III. c. 70." These accounts, in the form in which they were presented thenceforth annually, were the outcome of the deliberations of a Select Committee on Finance appointed by the House of Commons in 1797, and which, continuing to sit for several years, presented a long series of extremely valuable reports, not only dealing with the public finance, but also with much of the general administrative business of the country. It

was consequent upon their fourth report that a large number of sinecure offices in the Customs, Excise, and other revenue offices, were abolished. It was due to them that defaulting public accountants were punished in 1806; and it was upon materials elicited by them in the course of their investigations that the impeachment of Lord Melville in 1804 was founded. The facts disclosed before them gave ground for the appointment in 1810 of that Select Committee on Sinecure Offices which first laid axe to the root of that corrupt tree which was finally hewn down by Mr. Hume's Committee in the first session of the Reformed Parliament.

Since 1802 there have been annually presented to Parliament complete finance accounts of public income and expenditure, showing on the one side the gross amount levied under each head of taxation, and the cost of collection; on the other side the expenditure for each head of service. Comparison of these accounts with the budget statement allows of the closest criticism of the financial conduct of the Government, and a further comparison with estimates submitted and voted furnishes the completest possible check on the spending departments. But it is obvious that such a body of accounts, extending over transactions so vast and so varied, would be comparatively of little use unless subjected to much exacter criticism than could be applied in a popular assembly. Just as questions involving complicated matters of account are, by the judges in open court, referred for consideration *in camera*, so it was found expedient that the public accounts should be dealt with on their merits elsewhere than in the House, that arena being reserved for the presentation of any complaint, or of any recommendations which might flow from inquiry.

An attempt to do this, on the vicarious principle, was made in 1785, when Parliament, dissatisfied with the machinery in force at the Treasury for securing a due control over the public accounts, passed an Act embodying some of the suggestions of the Accounts Commissioners; and abolishing nearly all the Exchequer officers hitherto charged with control duty. The Barons of the Exchequer had long since ceased to act as verifiers of public transactions, and the officers acting in their behalf, the "Auditors of Imprest," the "Auditors of Land Revenue," the "Clerks of the Pipe," "Clerks of the Pells," and the "Tallyers," were for the most part sinecurist grantees of the offices, who took no sort of care that their slenderly-paid deputies did their doubly delegated duty. By the 25 Geo. III. c. 52, Auditors of the Imprest, *i.e.*, auditors of moneys issued from the Treasury on account of the public service, and to be accounted for again to the Treasury, were abolished, and five Commissioners of Audit,

including two Comptrollers of Army Accounts, were appointed in their stead. These Commissioners, who should have been *sui juris*, and no longer subordinate to the Exchequer, were intended to be in the position of public accountants, employed to look after the public accounts in the interests of the House of Commons, though they were ordered to report to the Lord High Treasurer, or to the Commissioners for executing that office. Amongst other things, the Commissioners appointed under this Act (25 Geo. III. c. 52) were directed not to allow any article in the accounts of persons entrusted with the expenditure of public money without a written voucher or other sufficient evidence of payment, "notwithstanding any allegation of papers being lost or destroyed." The Court of Exchequer alone, on sufficient proof, was to allow payments under any other circumstances. In 1799 the duties hitherto pertaining to the Auditors of Land Revenue were transferred to the Audit Board, vested interests being of course rigidly respected. Oaths were prescribed to be taken before the Barons of the Exchequer by public accountants delivering their accounts, to the effect that they were correct; and it was ordered that the accounts of the Paymaster-General of the Forces should be thus verified by the Accountant-General of the Pay Office instead of the Paymaster-General, without, however, abating the responsibility of the latter officer.

In 1805 it appeared that "the publick accounts of Great Britain have so much increased since the commencement of the late war, that the Commissioners appointed under an Act passed in the twenty-fifth year of his present Majesty's reign, for auditing the publick accounts, have not been able to enter upon the examination of a considerable part of such of the said accounts as have been already delivered into their office, and others have not yet been rendered by the parties accountable to the publick." An Act (45 Geo. III. c. 91) was accordingly passed for appointing three additional Commissioners to the Audit Board, with additional clerks, in order to get through the increased work, which grew even under their hands for at least ten years more. Indeed, in the very next year it became necessary "that some further provisions should be made for the more speedy and effectual examination and audit of the publick accounts." An Act passed in July, 1806, ordered the severance of the duties of Comptrollers of Army Accounts from those of the Audit Commissioners, handed over to the former the audit of all military expenditure, and, increasing the number of Audit Commissioners to ten, authorized the Government to split this number into Boards for the purpose of dealing with particular branches of expenditure. The Chairman of the Commissioners was awarded a salary of £1,500, and each of the Commissioners was to have £1,200. Provision was

at the same time made for the prospective reduction of their number, with the assumed future reduction of work, by a clause enacting that no vacancy should be filled up without the sanction of Parliament, till the body should be reduced to five members.

To the Commissioners were to be transmitted all the accounts of the spending and revenue departments, and the accounts of the Exchequer.

The Audit Commissioners organized and carried out their work to the best of their ability, not without criticism, however, from the Select Committee on Finance, which sat, with successive re-appointments, during many years. In 1819 this Committee seem to have gone rather closely into the working of the Audit Office, to have questioned the propriety of keeping so numerous a staff of clerks there; to have elicited from one of the Commissioners the statement that he did not think "there is, generally speaking, business enough to occupy the Board three complete days in any week;" and to have found fault with the scanty attendance of the secretary, who came about eleven o'clock, and stayed "three or four hours, as the business of the office demands." But they elicited matter of much greater importance, viz., the fact that the great departments of State were at that time jealous of auditors, and placed such serious obstacles in their way as to make it very difficult for the auditors to discharge the duties imposed on them by Act of Parliament.

Mr. Serjeant Praed, examined by the Committee, stated that—

"The high situation of some public accountants, and the connection of others with persons holding high offices, frequently impede the proceedings of the Audit Board. For example, the Paymaster-General and Treasurer of the Navy, both Privy Councillors and Members of Parliament, and much engaged in affairs of importance, are also accountants for public moneys to an immense amount. When their engagements and occupations as statesmen are considered, it can hardly be supposed that they should have leisure to attend personally to all the details of their money transactions as accountants. Hence, I apprehend, the making up of their accounts, and the intercourse respecting them with the Board of Audit, are in a great measure, if not wholly, committed to one or other of their subordinate officers. The questions and observations which arise on the accounts in the examination they undergo in the Audit Office necessarily give trouble to the persons thus deputed to act for the accountants, and frequently excite jealousy and dissatisfaction. Representations on the subject are made to the principals, and similar feelings are excited in them. Hence controversies arise between the principals and the Audit Department, which produce difficulties and delays in passing the accounts."

It appeared that "the express directions of the Lords of the Treasury," "the control of the Board of Ordnance," and even "the authority of a warrant under the royal sign manual," were urged by accountants as reasons for not complying with the requisitions

of the Board of Audit. "The Committee can have no conception of the extent of this evil," said one of the Audit Commissioners, "unless they could spare time to inspect our proceedings, and to read the correspondence on these subjects which we have had with the accountants, the Treasury, and the public departments to which I have alluded."

This difficulty, proceeding from jealousy, was somewhat diminished by the abolition in May, 1834, of the obsolete offices of Tellers and Auditor of the Exchequer, and Clerk of the Pells, with their suites, and the substitution of the office of Comptroller of the Exchequer. These arrangements were made in pursuance of the recommendations of Commissioners appointed in 1830 "to inquire into the charges of managing and collecting the public revenue, and into the manner in which the public moneys are received into, kept in, and issued from the receipt of his Majesty's Exchequer"—coupled with the advice of certain other Commissioners, appointed in 1831 to inquire into the practice and accounts of the Exchequer. Besides arranging for the simplification of business at the Exchequer, and for the payment of public moneys into the Bank of England instead of into the Exchequer, the Act of 1834 rendered the work of the Audit Department much more manageable, though not as complete as it should have been. The Audit Commissioners now knew with whom to deal, so far as the Treasury was concerned; but with other departments their difficulties remained in a more or less aggravated form till Parliament took the matter under its own cognizance. In 1832 Sir James Graham introduced at the Admiralty a system of audit of naval accounts, by which agents of the Audit Office, having accommodation at the Admiralty for the purpose, examined and audited, from day to day, the business of that department. In 1846 the plan was extended to Army accounts, under improved conditions, which were made applicable to both Army and Navy. Yet we find, with reference to the jealousy of which the Audit Office had complained in 1821, that in notifying the regulations under which the Act of 1846 was to be carried out, the Treasury felt it necessary to make a special bid for the co-operation of the Lords of the Admiralty, the Secretary-at-War, and the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, with the Commissioners of Audit, "in conducting the important duty entrusted to them by Parliament."

Parliament found, however, that it was obliged to do its own work; that no lieutenant, however capable, could effectually discharge the duties of supreme controller. The Select Committee on Public Moneys reported in 1857 in favour of the extension to all departments of State of the concurrent audit system in operation at the Admiralty and War Office, Woods and Forests,

and Public Works Departments, and also in favour of the audited accounts being "annually submitted to the revision of a Committee of the House of Commons, to be nominated by the Speaker." Further, they proposed "that the Audit Board should no longer transmit through the Treasury those accounts which they are bound to lay before Parliament, but should communicate them direct."

The appointment of the Standing Committee thus recommended is among the first business of each session. The Speaker's nomination is guarantee for strict impartiality, and the members appointed are always those who on either side in politics have identified themselves in some way or other with finance. To the Public Accounts Committee the Audit Board, and, since 1866, the Comptroller and Auditor-General, report upon the public accounts in perfect independence of Treasury or spending department. Before this Committee are called those accounting officers upon whose accounts the Auditor-General has passed sentence, and to the Committee these accountants must justify themselves in presence of their accusing angel. The knowledge that an independent scrutiny will be applied to accounts is in itself a great deterrent from wrongdoing; but the knowledge that any malappropriation, unauthorized expenditure, or other irregularity will be "set in a note-book, conn'd and learned by rote," and "cast into the teeth" before a supreme tribunal, cannot fail yet more effectually to heighten the general sense of responsibility. No better method, no more effectual guarantee could be devised. It is superior in principle and in practice to the *Cour des Comptes* of France, Italy, and Belgium, or to the *Ober Rechnung's Hof* at Potsdam, so far as cash is concerned; inferior to some of them so far as store audit goes.

Before noticing this question of store audit—an audit which is wholly wanting in England—it may be well to notice the existing machinery by which the public accounts are made up and submitted to the House of Commons, through the medium of the Public Accounts Committee.

The 29 and 30 Vict., c. 39, passed on 28th June, 1866, recited the expediency of consolidating "the powers and duties of the Comptroller of Her Majesty's Exchequer, and of the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts, and to unite in one department the business hitherto conducted by the separate establishments." The sovereign was empowered to appoint a Comptroller and Auditor-General, who should combine in his own person the functions of the two offices; and an Assistant Comptroller and Auditor. These officers were to hold during pleasure, but not to be removable except on petition from the two Houses

of Parliament. They were to be paid £2,000 and £1,500 respectively out of the Consolidated Fund. On their appointment, the offices of Comptroller-General of the Exchequer and of Commissioners of Audit ceased and determined, and the Comptroller and Auditor-General became the receiver and issuer of public moneys, and at the same moment auditor of the accounts.

Into accounts opened at the Bank of England and the Bank of Ireland, the Commissioners of Customs and of Inland Revenue, the Postmaster-General, and all payers to the Exchequer, were directed to pay the gross revenues of their departments, daily accounts of such payments being sent to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The fund thus constituted was made a general fund, out of which lump sums, to be spent in detail by principal accountants, for particular branches of the public service, were to be transferred, the principal accountants being held responsible for the due administration and account of the sums entrusted to them.

Quarterly accounts of the income and disbursements for the Consolidated Fund were ordered to be made out by the Treasury, and sent to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Comptroller, on examining the account, and finding it correct, was authorized to certify to the Banks of England and Ireland the amount of any deficiency on the quarter's income, and the banks were authorized, on such certificate, to advance the necessary funds at interest, such principal and interest being repaid "out of the growing produce of the Consolidated Fund in the succeeding quarter."

Daily accounts of all issues were to be sent by the banks to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and no issue or transfer of money to other departments of State was to be allowed except on written authority, signed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Treasury itself might get credits for the purposes of the charges on the Consolidated Fund, but only by written certificates from the Comptroller, who, as Auditor, would require a full account of the expenditure.

If it should appear by the Treasury accounts, made out within fifteen days after the expiration of the several quarter days, that there was a surplus of income, the Treasury, on certificate of the Auditor-General, was to notify the Commissioners for the National Debt, and these were to apply one-fourth of the surplus in reduction of the national liabilities, funded or unfunded.

The Treasury was to decide in what banks accounts might be kept by public accountants, and what accounts should be deemed public. On its part the Treasury was bound to transmit to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, by the 30th September in each year, a full account of the issues made from the Consolidated

Fund in the financial year ended on 31st March preceding. And "the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall certify and report upon the same with reference to the Acts of Parliament under the authority of which such issues may have been directed; and such accounts and reports shall be laid before the House of Commons by the Treasury on or before the 31st day of January in the following year, if Parliament be then sitting, or, if not sitting, then within one week after Parliament shall be next assembled." So careful was Parliament to secure that these reports should not only be made, but made in their full integrity, that a clause was inserted in the Act to the effect that if the Treasury omitted to place the reports of the Auditor-General before Parliament within the time specified, the Auditor-General was himself to transmit them.

The appropriation accounts required by this same Act from each department were ordered to include on the one side the total sums appropriated to the department by parliamentary grant for the financial year, and on the other side all sums coming in course of payment in the same period. A balance-sheet, and an explanatory statement of excesses and short spendings, were to accompany the appropriation account for the Auditor-General's information in making his reports. Vouchers for each item of expenditure, and certificates that the money spent has been spent for the purpose voted, or spent otherwise under due authority, are necessities preliminary to a *quietus* or discharge to the accounting department. The due authority under which alone a department can spend money otherwise than strictly as voted is the authority of the Treasury. That authority must be quoted as the justification of the department, and must itself be liable to such criticism as the Comptroller and Auditor-General may see fit to make for the information of the House of Commons.

Detailed accounts thus adjusted and audited come before the House of Commons annually, and are the tests on which the credit of the financial administration of the Government stands or falls. The House, by its Committee of Public Accounts, appointed at the beginning of each session, applies a minute criticism to the accounts, especially on the points brought to its notice by its watch-dog, the Auditor-General; and many are the administrative benefits which flow from its action. That irregularity almost deserves praise which can escape detection in the office of the Auditor-General or in Committee on Public Accounts. By their joint or several action, evils are nipped in the bud. Many are the proofs—some of them very recent—which might be adduced in support of this statement. But they are not necessary for the purpose, and special reference to them might be invidious. It is enough to say that deficiencies of £24,846 6s. 6½d. in the accounts of the

Navy Pay Office, such as presented themselves in 1806; of £264,507, as in the accounts of the Paymaster of Royal Marines in the same year; and irregularities not tainted with absolute fraud, such as those for which Lord Melville had to answer in 1804, are now virtually impossible. Even the small frauds which Samuel Pepys confessed so ingenuously to himself are no longer practicable; and the conjuring which used to be wrought with old store money and miscellaneous payments is feasible no more.


Whilst it may be true that the public accounts are kept so elaborately and expensively as to preclude the idea of their imitation by private firms, it is equally true that the accounts of no private firm or trading company are, or could be, subjected to so rigid an audit. It is practically impossible that there should be any undetected "cooking" of the public accounts.

It is true there is no audit of store expenditure, no independent valuation of stocks, no stock-taking and comparison with ledger statements on behalf of the State. Power was reserved, under the Act of 1866, for the Comptroller and Auditor-General, at request of the Treasury, to undertake such duties; but it has not been exercised, and it is very doubtful, in view of practical considerations, whether it would be wise to call it in aid. Apart from the enormous expense of applying such an audit—especially to services which are being constantly performed, but in different places and at uncertain times, all over the world—it is questionable if the game be worth the candle. Assured of the thorough audit of all cash transactions, from the credit of the gross sums voted by Parliament to the appropriation of it in detail to those services for which it was voted, it would seem that the duty of caring for the thrifty expenditure of materials might be left to those executive officers, whose responsibility might even be impaired by the intervention of an audit. The House of Commons has already, in Committee of Supply and by the agency of returns, many ways in which it can become cognizant of profligacy or niggardliness in expenditure; and if the recommendations of the Select Committee on State Purchases (No. 263 Parl. Paper, Session 1874) be carried out, they will have yet further means of judging for themselves as to the propriety of expenditure and of stocks. That Committee advised that "each department should take and re-value their stock annually, and submit an abstract, with the Estimates, to the House of Commons." They further said that "it is hardly possible to over-estimate the importance of this matter as bearing upon efficient and economical administration. No check that could be devised would be more likely to bring home to the purchasing officers of the State a full sense of their responsibility than an annual stock-taking and valuation. This would also tend to remove the question of stocks and stores

from the influence of party policy and politics." With such safeguards it would seem quite unnecessary to institute, in addition, an extrinsic store audit under the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

The recent extension, however, of the jurisdiction of that officer to the funds dealt with by the Court of Chancery must commend itself as most desirable; indeed, the principle of an external audit being admitted, no department which deals with public money in any shape should be excluded from the application of it. It is probably correct to say that at no time more than the present was the moral tone of the public service so high; at no period have the public had such good general guarantees as they have now in the personal character of the services. But audit is an instrument to guard against ignorance and carelessness, as well as against corruption; and, as these are recurring elements, not peculiar to any special epoch, it follows that audit should rule wherever public funds are dealt with.

FRANCIS W. ROWSELL.



CARLO CATTANEO.

WHILE the works of John Stuart Mill are in the hands of every student, translated into every language, the writings of Italy's greatest political economist and philosopher, who died in 1869, are familiar to a very limited circle of students in his own country, and abroad are utterly unknown.

In whatever other department Italy may have progressed since Independence and Unity became accomplished facts, in appreciation of literature she remains stationary. The announcement of seventeen millions of *analfabeti* startled her; but what strikes a stranger still more forcibly is the number of well-to-do people in whose houses you never see a book, of individuals with money and leisure who candidly confess that they never open one from year's end to year's end. No Italian, during this century, has earned a competence by his pen. No newspaper is self-supporting. Either they are directly supported by the Government; or the Prefect gives the editor, whom he chooses and keeps in order, the official advertisements; or they are kept alive by parties whose principles they represent. And as party spirit is very tame just now, most of them come to an untimely end. At the present moment the Liberals have scarcely an organ in the Peninsula; the Mazzinian papers are almost extinct; the *Provincia*, organ of the Federal Republicans, has suspended its publication; and the *Riforma*, the noted newspaper of the parliamentary opposition, after seven years of useful, brilliant life, has expired recently of

absolute starvation. Reviews and magazines barely cover their expenses. It is next to impossible to find a publisher for a new book; at best, he will offer the author a few copies in exchange for the copyright. Hence it is scarcely surprising that even as Carlo Cattaneo was unable, during his lifetime, to publish his numerous literary, political, economical, and philosophical writings in a complete edition, so, as he died in poverty, they still remain scattered in the newspapers and reviews in which they were printed, and that heaps of precious manuscripts are still sealed letters for the public. Dying, he left them sole legacy to his English wife, who, surviving him but a few months, left them in turn to her heirs. From these, Dr. Bertani, the celebrated surgeon, the volunteers' ambulance chief, the true organizer of Garibaldi's expeditions, and the life-long friend of Carlo, purchased them, hoping to find a publisher who, in return for the complete works, copied and classified, will pay a sufficient sum to erect a modest monument to the hero of the "Five Days" in his native city of Milan.

The task of compilation, for which our services for "our dead friend's sake" have been claimed, is extremely difficult, owing to the mass of papers accumulated, but it possesses an indescribable fascination, for Cattaneo's life extended over the entire period of Italian struggles for Unity and Independence, and it is interesting to note how he, Mazzini, and the minor artificers of *One Italy* marched unflinchingly towards the same goal by paths diametrically opposed. The failure of the Carbonari, the sense of their own strength with which the abortive revolutions of 1821 and 1832 inspired the Austrians, imbued Cattaneo with unconquerable distrust and aversion for plots, organized conspiracies, and partial risings fixed for a given moment. A Republican Italy governed by Italians was Cattaneo's ideal. He did not care for *unity* in its strict sense, as he was opposed to centralization, and desired the utmost liberty of commune and province compatible with the strength and *union* of the entire peninsula. Hence his efforts were bent to educate a generation in all the arts, sciences, and modes of life that have made other nations free; to extort from the existing authorities, now a college, now a literary or scientific institute, now railroads, roads, canals—now breathing space for a literary or industrial publication; and into these moderate and apparently insignificant periodicals, he managed to infuse just such a dose of free teaching as to arouse the patriotic ardour of the youth of Lombardy without incurring the wrath of the censor.

While Mazzini, in the clandestine sheets of *Young Italy*, was urging Italians to think of, act, live, and die for Italy, preaching immediate insurrection, and constant preparation for war against her oppressors; while Manzoni's pages, breathing resignation, yet

burned with patriotic aspirations; while Guerrazzi stung his contemporaries with taunting comparisons between their ignoble lethargy, and the death-defying valour of their forefathers—Cattaneo, in the pages of the *Annali di Statistica*, in the *Annali di Giurisprudenza Pratica*, in the *Politecnico*, in the *Memorie di Economia Publica*—periodicals which he edited personally—rendered his countrymen familiar with the progress of other nations. “The Custom-House Tariff of the United States,” “The Introduction of the Telegraph in Bengal,” “Free Trade,” “Railroads in Belgium,” “From Manchester to Bolton,” and “From Birmingham to Manchester,” and similar subjects, are the headings of articles interspersed with profound philosophical studies, treatises on political economy, reviews and criticisms of foreign contemporary literature. A list of more than four hundred printed articles lies before us, each of which in England, France, or Germany, would have been welcomed and *remunerated* by the editors of first-class Reviews.

In Cattaneo, Sir Robert Campbell, the British Consul in Lombardy, found a true friend, and most valuable aid. Among the numerous letters from Sir Robert, we find long lists of questions anent the population, exports, imports, public revenues, agricultural produce, manufactures, public charities, prices of labour, cost of principal articles of consumption, requests for exhaustive articles on education, on the Lombard system of irrigation. A Mr. Barlow Hogs is particularly “desirous of knowing the municipal charges, or *octroi*, the amount in cattle, corn, meat, butter, and wine,” and Sir Robert writes to Cattaneo “for such statistical information as will be most interesting or most useful.” The East Indian Company sends Captain Brian Smith to study the Lombard system of irrigation, and Sir Robert begs Cattaneo’s answers to a regular catechism. Later, letters of glowing thanks prove with what care and lucidity all these requests were complied with, and also the grateful esteem in which the large-hearted, intelligent consul held the Lombard patriot. Letters from Cobden attest his profound appreciation of Cattaneo as a political economist.

Despite his retiring habits, and his resolute abstinence from all plots or conspiracy, Cattaneo’s influence over the Lombard youth rendered him an object of suspicion to the police. When, in 1847, a banquet was offered to Richard Cobden, and Cattaneo was chosen president, the Governor of Milan requested him to write and consign beforehand the words he intended to speak, and when he indignantly refused, Lindenau dared not depose him. On the 3rd of January, 1848, the scientific institute of Lombardy met to discuss the questions of the press and education. Cattaneo, chosen to report, demanded reforms adapted to the times, in scientific institutions, in industrial pursuits, in the various branches of popular instruction, and, instead of the college opened at

Vienna for the sons of nobles, insisted that in Lombardy a military civil school should be open to all.

On the 16th of March, 1848, he was writing the manifesto of a new paper, when the youth whom he had taught to translate theory into practice came into his study and said—

“Master, the hour is come! Head us, and we will drive the Austrians from Milan!”

“You have no arms,” he answered, trembling at the responsibility they cast upon his shoulders.

“Arms or no arms, with you or without you, we shall risk all: your counsels may decide the victory, your obstinacy cannot prevent the struggle.”

He threw his proof-sheets into his desk, and in an instant his prudential hesitation was transformed into audacious resolution. Chosen with three other citizens to compose a council of war, he was from first to last recognized sole captain by the people and the *jeunesse dorée*, who, in kid gloves, and dressed in the last Parisian fashion just as they quitted the balls and salons, lived, fasted, and died on the barricades. How Radetzky despised those “dandies” on the 18th; how he cursed their “profound dissimulation” on the 22nd! Well might he stand amazed. The city totally unarmed—16,000 Austrians, armed with all that in those days rendered an army formidable, within the walls; the four fortresses garrisoned as for a siege; for the insurgents no communication from without, no certainty of support from Piedmont. Nothing daunted, Cattaneo set to work; he knew all the weak points of the enemy, all the chances for the insurgents, despatched short precise orders with lightning speed, organized the barricades, found work for women and children on the roofs of the houses, and time between whiles to calm the fears of the terror-stricken aristocracy, and of the trembling, bewildered municipal authorities.

Bolza, the head of the Austrian police, the most accursed of mortals in the eyes of Milanese, whose sons and fathers he had murdered, tortured, exiled, or imprisoned, who sent to the Spielberg Confaloniere Pallavicino, and other patriots, fell into the hands of the people, who came to Carlo to decide on his fate. “If you execute him you perform an act of justice; if you spare him you do a holy deed.” And Bolza was spared.

With such vigour were the Austrians assailed, that on the third day they were compelled to abandon their posts in the city, and Radetzky offered an armistice of fifteen days, which Casati, the mayor, whose son had wept to find him hidden in a garret, was clamorous to accept.

“Never!” said Cattaneo, brushing off the cobwebs from the mayor’s coat. “Even were we to sanction such cowardice, you could not tear our people from the barricades.”

"You could if you chose," retorted Casati.

"I do not choose. For three days our tocsin has echoed among the neighbouring villages and towns: if we accept an armistice we must remain inert spectators while the Austrians murder our friends hastening to the rescue."

To Radetzky's messengers Casati answered—

"Signori,—Will you represent to His Excellency, on one hand, the readiness of the municipal authorities to accept the armistice; on the other, the resolution of the combatants to die at their posts?"

To those who proposed to blindfold the messengers, Cattaneo answered—"There is nothing to hide;" and one of them, struck by the strange disparity between moral resolution and material force, turned at the gate of the city exclaiming, "Addio, brave and dauntless people!"

Again, on the 22nd, Radetzky proposed a second armistice, and the municipal authorities and the aristocracy pleaded for its acceptance, urging that it would be all in favour of the insurgents, afford them time to provision the city, which contained but food and ammunition for twenty-four hours, and time to their partizans without to come to their aid.

"The enemy," answered Cattaneo, "has furnished us with food and powder so far. Twenty-four hours' feed and twenty-four hours' fast will suffice. *Del resto*—better to starve than swing."

All the insurgents echoed the verdict.

On the 23rd, the last of the five days, the enemy fought for six hours at the bastions of Porta Tosa. In the evening the citizens forced the gates, and opened communication with their friends, while Radetzky commenced his precipitous flight *towards* the fortresses. Had Cattaneo's counsels still been followed, those fortresses would never have been reached.

Meanwhile a messenger arrived from Charles Albert, promising the assistance of Piedmont if the city should first be ceded to the King.

"Signor Conte Enrico Martini," wrote Cattaneo from the Office of War, "the city belongs to the combatants who have freed it. We cannot now summon them from the barricades to deliberate. If Piedmont come forward generously, she will be welcomed gratefully by men of all parties and opinions. Gratitude is the only word which to-day can silence that other word 'Republic.'"

But the aristocracy, who had quailed before Austria, crouched at the feet of Charles Albert, and the history of the following weeks is summed up by Colonel Forbes—"While Radetzky was collecting bayonets Charles Albert was collecting votes." Had the war been vigorously and instantaneously followed up—regular forces and

partizan warfare combined—the Austrians, beaten and demoralized, must have quitted Lombardy, and Lombardy would inevitably have annexed herself to Piedmont. But the golden quarter of an hour was lost, and Radetzky was as keen as Garibaldi in “profiting by a fair wind.” Among Cattaneo’s papers are a series of letters to Sir Robert Campbell from his own correspondents at the camp. He gave them to Cattaneo with the permission to publish them, without the names of the writers. They furnish the absolute proof of the above assertion, and will be invaluable to the dispassionate historian of the Revolution of 1848.

By his staunch opposition to all that savoured of parley or delay, Cattaneo added the hate of the fusionists to that of the Milanese aristocracy already condensed on his head, and though there was not a grain of vanity in his composition, though he had not sufficient personal ambition, his *amour propre* was intense; and, in common with many of his countrymen, his susceptibility rendered him thin-skinned to a degree that no Englishman could understand. He shrunk from misinterpretation, he quivered under calumny. When Mazzini’s books were burned by the populace in the public market-place, he joined Garibaldi, who refused to recognize the armistice of Milan, and bore aloft the banner of “God and the People,” then hastened to Rome, of whose struggle he was the soul and purifier, then returned to his exile to begin the strife anew. But Cattaneo retired, saddened and hopeless, to Lugano, where he wrote at once the narrative of the five days, and a most minute documentary history, entitled *Archivio Triennale*—the only work published at the time that can be regarded as authentic, veracious, and singularly dispassionate. Named Professor of Philosophy at the Lyceum of the Tessin, he never voluntarily quitted his hermitage at Castagnola, or mixed actively in public affairs, but never refused his counsels to the friends and disciples who flocked thither, and twice reluctantly yielded to their entreaties to leave his studies and his scholars, and throw himself into the noise and turmoil of revolution on the Volturno, into parliamentary strife at Florence. His courses of lectures on Philosophy, on Ideology, on Psychology, on Political Economy, on Logic, on Law, will, when published, occupy a couple of volumes. His manuscripts written, re-written, and re-copied, marked first, second, even fourth version, lie before us. It would be difficult to decide which version he considered final, but for the fact that he dictated his lectures, and that one of his scholars has almost a complete copy of “the master’s last lessons.”

Here is a chance note, which gives us an idea of the way he prepared his lessons—

“Name and Conception of Philosophy.

“First called knowledge (*sapienza*) (*sophia*), a title easily conceded then, because it was easy to embrace all then known. The seven wise men of Greece, the seven wise men of India, were there symbolized in the seven stars of Charles's Wain, in the seven good spirits of the Zend Avesta, the Magi, &c. Philosophy (*philos*) love of knowledge; constant research after truth. The first Greek philosophers, contemporaries of the Chinese Confucius about 600 B.C. Some give the preference to the study of nature (Thales, Heraclitus, &c.); others to the study of man (Chrysippus); Plato to ideal things, scorning transient appearances (*phenomena*). Aristotle embraces the entire circle of sciences (*en-ciclo-pedia*), and in the Middle Ages was called The Master. Free research was then abandoned—discoveries were thwarted—in geography, Columbus; in astronomy, Galileo; anatomy, geology, archaeology, linguistic studies abandoned.

“Philosophy should specially contemplate Man, but consult all the sciences—chemistry, physics, the laws of motion, &c. Each science will supply it with great truths.

“The sciences are vast operations of Thought; the history of sciences, is the history of thought. Every science has its method. Comparative study of all methods.

“Philosophy does not assume the place of any special science, but gathers their general truths, co-ordinates them in one still more general science. It accords all truths.

“Definition. Philosophy—Study of man in his general relations with other beings according to the concordant testimony of all the sciences. Still more ambitious but similar definitions:—Universal Science. The Science of Sciences. The reason of things. The Science of Reason. The Science of the Absolute.

“In our definition man cannot be isolated from nature or from God. The association of all sciences saves us from imaginary systems. Experimental philosophy is founded on the constant fact of the universe, and cannot fail if the universe does not change. It gathers, as to a lens, all scattered lights. It gives a common impress to all the sciences.

“Insoluble questions. Disputations gradually abandoned.

“Errors of men worthy of veneration, who, at their own peril, and with utter oblivion of self, have consecrated their lives to the research of truth.

“Errors arising out of pre-conceived opinions, *prejudices* (as that of the superiority of the circle over the ellipse, which form, in fact, predominates in the movement of celestial bodies).

“Errors arising from interest of those who hope to profit by error. Illusions. The universe is an integral and unique fact.

“Error is opposed to all the laws of creation. Truth is always concordant with truth.”

Having thus, as it were, established in his own mind the subject-matter of his lectures, he spared no pains to render it intelligible to the least intelligent of his scholars. We find sentences written and re-written a dozen times, the last diction ever the clearest, most incisive, and concise.

His lectures on logic, consisting of thirty short chapters, have taught us more, during the by no means easy task of copying, than we have been able to extract from volumes of universally accepted authors.

His articles on our Indian policy and its inevitable results,

on Ireland and her neglect of the elementary principles of agriculture, written and printed before the Indian mutiny and the Irish famine, are prophetic in their logical deductions from existing facts.

His Essay on Capital Punishments, written when the mania for unification bid fair to restore the scaffold to Tuscany, caused more than one statesman to pause before every Italian State had been stretched on the bed of Procrustes.

Though resolutely withdrawing himself from active share in politics, his heart and thoughts were with Italy in her struggles and efforts; all his influence was lent to keep the youth who loved him up to the mark to prepare themselves to take advantage of events. His correspondence gives us a clear insight into the soul of the man and of the patriot.

Here are extracts from a letter to Carlo Pisacane, written on the 29th December, 1851:—

“The kingdom of the *Burgraves** of every colour has fallen—*Laqueum quem posuerunt inciderunt in ipsum*. They are caught in the traps of their own police, of their own *gens d’arme*, of their own Prefects. Their own priests sing the *Te Deum*. Bravo, Signor Falloux! Bravo, Signor Oudinot! The Pope treats you in Popes’ fashion.

“Despairing of curbing the Revolution, they have evoked the enemy from the tombs; but an enemy is not a friend.

“The Empire is not the *status quo*—it is incompatible with the *status quo*. It is a general unstable *equilibrium*.

“Napoleonism is a system; it is the preponderance of France in Europe. It has its own essentials, even as the circle and the triangle, and with geometry there is no compromise.

“In the beginning of the year we shall have the Empire, in carnival the wedding, then the struggle for the Rhine and for the Po.

“The 2nd of December is somewhat Borgian in its style, minus dissimulation. The Man of Strasburg, of Boulogne, of Satary, is no deceiver. ‘Who is warned is half saved,’ says the proverb, ‘but who heeds not warning can be saved by none.’ The bee-hive of the socialists was better than the nest of the vulture. The French have wearied of good, they may weary of evil.

“Well! I am past fifty. I wrap myself up in my toga, and look on. You are young and a soldier. If there are eggs to be broken you should have a hand in frying them. In any case of war you should seek experience. a grade, a name: time and opportunity will not be wanting to use such gains for Italy and liberty.”

When the Crimean War commenced, he was eager for the Piedmontese army to gain her spurs. When the *Italo-Franco* alliance was proclaimed, he warmly encouraged the volunteers to enlist under Garibaldi. “Fight and hold your tongues”—“*Cosa fatta capo ha*,” was his pithy advice.

Requested by a friend to write six articles for *The Times*, whose editors “required good authentic writing, not of the Mazzinian school, setting forth the grievances of the Italians”

* The nickname then given to the men of order in France.

under Austrian and Papal rule, Cattaneo caught eagerly at the offer, and in very tolerable English wrote the six letters, giving his friend *carte blanche* to correct the style. The first three appeared in *The Times* on the 12th, 17th, and 24th January. The exposition of the relations between Italy, Austria, and the Pope was exhaustive and original, but his attempts to excite English jealousy of Russia, his openly avowed hopes in France, did not suit the English temper of the hour. Still they did not deserve the leading articles of scathing satire which accompanied the second and third. He simply urged England to use her moral influence in favour of liberty against despotism.

"These braves," writes the author of the second leader, "modestly ask us to fight for them, but they do not give us the slightest reason to suppose that they intend to fight for themselves. They may utter seditious cries, or even put up revolutionary placards on a dark night, but we have no reason to think that they have any stomach for more serious warfare. . . . When we are threatened with the resentment of a high-spirited nation with a population as large as our own, we may console ourselves with the reflection that a danger cannot be very pressing which will not come upon us till Italian unity is actually realized."

How such taunts take us back to the days of utter unbelief in Italy's destinies of all but a few "Utopians," "enthusiasts," "madmen!"

Cattaneo took his reprimand very philosophically:—

"*The Times*," he writes to a friend, "prefaces my third letter with a decidedly hostile confutation. This matters little so that they let us say our say, and the other English newspapers quote my letters without the *queue*. My friends have retouched this third letter—*un peu trop sur le vif*. They make me give *gates* to Venice, and reduce to three the four centuries of Venetian conquests. But the letters are anonymous, and before I am known as their author they will be forgotten. . . . Please read them, and give me your opinion as far as your diplomatic reserve permits. You will see that I defend our poor kingdom of Italy as I defended it in the pamphlet I published in Paris in 1848. The English must cease to boast that they have changed us into a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom which has never existed but in name."

This predilection for the old Italian kingdom Cattaneo shared with Foscolo. For him it was the beginning of the end. During its formation the Italians of the present century learnt to fight, and transmitted their education from generation to generation, till they fought and conquered. In the last three letters, which *The Times* rejected, and *The Daily News* published in February, 1859, he compares the short-lived Italian kingdom with Italy under Austrian rule; shows how, under the former, Italy, comprehending Milan, Venice, Modena, a part of Piedmont and Tyrol, and all the Roman provinces, had an army and a navy, both completely Italian—men, officers and banners, a senate, a ministry,

public courts of justice, separate finances, a very moderate debt, and very large national domains, &c. Then he shows how all this

"Rational order of things was wickedly broken down by Austria and the kindred governments who hated every trace of a national life, and everything that might become a future element of union between the several parts of Italy;" how she "destroyed the Italian army, carried off the *matériel* to the value of five millions of English money, pulled down the national colours, reduced a fine, complete army to some regiments of the line and one of cavalry, all of them disguised in white Austrian uniforms, and subject to the Austrian discipline of the cudgel."

And so on to the end of the chapter. He demonstrates that English ideas of redress from Austria are idle—because Italians choose to be Italians, not Germans. "Italy," he exclaims, "is not at the close of a successful career—she is at the opening of it. *Ca ira!*"

To the protest of Mazzini and his followers, who, rightly to our thinking, refused to ally themselves with the Man of the 2nd of December, with the murderer of the Roman and the French Republics, we find among Cattaneo's papers a fiery counter-protest, never published, perhaps because the peace of Villafranca rendered all such polemics useless. It re-echoes the burden of his eternal cry, "Fight when you can, how you can, where you can, with whom you can—no matter, so that you fight against Austria—and get used to fighting." He neither admired the Empire, nor believed in its stability: it was for him a transitory fact; but Italy, freed from Austria even by a "Bonaparte," would remain for Italians to organize as they chose in the future.

It was at the close of that war which did free Lombardy, though it left Venice enslaved, and French soldiers guardians of the Pope in Rome, that we first made Cattaneo's personal acquaintance, and to his hearty, genial kindness we owe the brightest hours of our compulsory exile. His life was as simple as Garibaldi's. One frugal meal a day, no cigars, scarcely any wine, six hours' sleep at the utmost; his entire day was devoted to his philosophical studies and to his articles for the new *Politecnico*—which monthly periodical he revived as soon as a Milanese editor could be found to print it. His one pastime was writing comedies, farces, songs, and poems, which he read to the priest and peasants of Castagnola. These playthings of his intellect are *chef-d'œuvres* in their way. Our delight was to waylay him in his evening walks to and fro the post, halt at the little inn at the foot of the hill, at our house midway to his own, then perhaps returning to and fro to finish his discourse. Now he would enumerate the botanical treasures of his beloved Lugano; now tell us where to find the Alpine rose, primroses which bloom in autumn;

now he bid us watch the vipers swimming across the lake; now would detail his articles for the *Politecnico*, chiefly military or agricultural; now enlarge on his favourite project for the St. Gothard line, which he originated and in great measure elaborated; now review the gains of Italy, her manifest duties, the traps set for her, the pitfalls that awaited her. The negotiations for annexing free and republican Tessin to monarchical Piedmont vexed him bitterly: "Why kill a nightingale to add an ounce of fat to a goose?" The cession of Nice and Savoy tortured him; he watched the negotiations with the anguish of one who watches by the death-bed of a friend beloved. His article on the proposed cession is pathetic in its passionate entreaty, persuasive, possible in its practical propositions.

"At least," he concluded, "let Savoy, for the common safety and defence of France and Italy, be added to the armed neutrality of Switzerland."

And to the members of Parliament gathered in Turin—

"Do your duty. If you have not the courage to refuse, have the courage to hesitate; even delay will do you credit. Suspend your vote. Order the ministry to re-open negotiations. Consult your electors. I pity all those who shall have the misfortune to allow themselves to be induced to inscribe their names for eternity on that fatal stone which shall mark the new frontier of a mutilated Italy."

When the Lombards were summoned to elect their deputies, requests poured in from all the principal cities to Cattaneo to present himself as candidate. Cavour and his partizans set every wheel in motion to prevent this dreaded fact, which would have given to the Opposition an intellectual head, a man of character, of spotless integrity—such as unfortunately it has never possessed; to the absence of which the Italian Liberals owe their failure in the parliamentary arena. Cattaneo was denied citizenship in Milan; even his election by a majority as member of a scientific institute was annulled. This put him on his mettle. His studious habits, the all-engrossing editorship of the *Politecnico*, the frail health of his wife, his poverty, above all, his repugnance to take an oath, militated against his acceptance. His natural desire to hold his own against the Cavourians led him to temporize. "Do your duty as electors," he wrote. "I shall do mine, guided by what may seem to me the best method to serve Italy." Elected triumphantly in Milan, Sarnico, and Cremona, as soon as his elections were consolidated, he chose his native city; and the testimony of the esteem in which his fellow-citizens held him more than outbalanced the calumnies and hostilities of the Government and municipality. In those days of vivid struggle, of preparation for the great campaign, we saw him daily, as we then lived above

the post at Lugano. He would come up and open his letters; read and comment on them; send off his pithy answers; consult, discuss, advise, leaving one always with the sensation of having bathed in the salt sea of the Cornish shores, of having taken a morning walk on the summit of some Alpine crest. Our skirmishes were frequent from the first to the last hour of our friendship. Mazzinian in heart and conviction—on that ground we could never agree; only when Garibaldi was the theme were we perfectly at peace. Garibaldi was his hero—his hope and pride. When the Sicilian expedition was mooted, all Cattaneo's efforts were devoted to ensure its success.

"Arm! arm! arm!" he wrote. "When we are *strong* we shall do all that we choose. But till then, your unanimity, your illuminations, your annexations, are so many castles in air, that a puff of breath from the powerful will overthrow as usual."

"When you ask me," he wrote to a Sicilian, "what is the line of conduct for Sicilians, I reply with Torquato-Tasso—'Italy and Rome.' It is evident that Sicily, choosing to *fare da se*, cannot aspire to a better fate than that of Malta or the Ionian Isles. *Veh soli*. You must aggregate yourselves to universal Italy in Rome if you would not remain isolated or succumb to Naples. Therefore, let your war-cry be *Italia e Roma!*"

His was the last hand that grasped ours, wishing us God speed as we quitted Lugano in disguise to join Garibaldi. As the order for our arrest was out at Genoa, telegraphed to Medici at Cagliari, delivered to Garibaldi in person by Persano, we kept quite quiet and wrote to no one, and we find among his letters to various friends the most urgent, anxious entreaties for tidings. Touching proofs these of his affection which could remember us at such a time! From Turin every post brought him enjoinders to take his seat in Parliament; from Genoa, prayers to come and help in the preparations for the successive expeditions. Garibaldi would have sent him as Special Envoy to London, but he would accept no office. At last the Dictator of Sicily and Naples wrote: "I want you here. Come!" And he came. On his arrival Garibaldi offered him the pro-dictatorship of Naples, and later requested him to form a ministry; but he declined, saying, "I do not know the country in the least. I should cut a sorry figure; and besides, you have not taken into account the jealousies that I, as a Lombard, should arouse." But he both spoke and wrote his mind fully to friends and foes. "Arm and fight; no discussions, no agitation of the populations by summoning them to vote, *pro o contro*, annexation until the southern provinces shall be free, and the last Bourbon put to flight!" In the Council Chamber, or on the summit of St. Angelo, where he sat in the midst of the bullets as placidly as on the crags of Castagnalo—his advice was unvaried. "Arm, fight, conquer, and be silent!" Looking on the red shirts,

whose wearers clustered round him, he would say, with his arm round the neck of one, and his smile beaming on the rest: "Bravo, my boys! arms, liberty, truth! So will you make Italy. Don't trouble your heads with anything else: the future is before you."

Ever on the watch for the underhanded plots of the annexion-ists, he discovered more than one ignoble scheme for depriving Garibaldi of the means of carrying on the war on the Volturno—and woe to the man, minister or general, friend or foe, caught in the act by Cattaneo. It was not that he cared a fig for the ultimate form of government that the people should choose: immediately after a war conducted to victory. For him, a federal republic was the natural, inevitable destiny of Italy; that she should pass through an intermediate phase,—so that she but expelled all enemies, shut her doors, and then proceeded to ordinate her house as she chose,—gave him no anxiety. But when he realized that a widely organized scheme for depriving Garibaldi of arms and ammunition was on foot, in order to give the Piedmontese troops time to come down and give the final battle to the Neapolitans on the Volturno, his wrath was as magnanimous as it was practical. He had a keen scent for powder, and hunted out more than one forgotten store. We seem to see him now seize Gasmaroli by both hands—Garibaldi's unfrocked priest—and thank him, as for a personal service, because he had found a treasure trove of ammunition in the Castello dell' Uovo, on the eve of the 1st of October.

With true patriots, whom he regarded as conscientious but decidedly in error, he held another language. To Marquis George Pallavicino, pro-Dictator of Naples, who had resigned because Garibaldi had refused to expel Mazzini and dismiss Crispi, he wrote as follows—(the grand question was immediate annexation on the convocation of a constituent Assembly in Sicily and Naples):—

" 12th October, 1860.

"The General arrives at Naples at noon to hold a Cabinet Council in the Angri Palace, and he has enjoined on me to ask you with friendly words to be present, since it is a question of our country.

"If you deem baneful in Naples that which you judged provident in Sicily, permit me to say that you do not follow a principle. You will remember that the minister, Conforti, expressed his opinion in one sense on Sunday, in your house, and on Monday voted in an opposite direction.

"Such are the men who leave our sons without cartridges in the face of the foe; who to-day refuse the Dictator 80,000 frs. for rifles ordered and consigned.

"There cannot exist duality, between a plebiscite and the guardian Assembly, which will justify it and raise it above the monstrous vote of Nice; between an assembly which legally consigns the country to the Parliament, and the Parliament which legally and loyally receives it; between the men whom the people send to a local Assembly, and the men (the same to a certainty) whom they send to the national Parliament!

"Such baneful dualities are never seen in the Swiss and American Assemblies, which are nevertheless invested with sovereign powers. It is a dream, and it is not yours.

"I believe in the necessity of a permanent assembly—in the twofold intent of concord and progress. The question is to fraternize the people of Italy and not to suppress them.

"But real and fatal duality does exist between the virtuous warrior and the men who have told you that they have the heart even for civil war.

"On which side do you write your name?

"A Garibaldian ministry is the only anchor of salvation.

"With all consideration, yours,

"CARLO CATTANEO."

Pallavicino refused to withdraw his resignation, adding, "Either Mazzini and Crispi quit Naples immediately, or I leave by the first steamer that starts for Genoa." Garibaldi was not the man to permit of dictation, neither would he have allowed an insult to Mazzini for any reason under the sun. He yielded not a jot. But when the words "civil war" were whispered in his ear, he who had handed over the Neapolitan fleet to the King the instant he set foot in Naples, who had lost his voice in crying *Viva il Re* to the people, who cried only *Viva Garibaldi*, settled all questions of duality by withdrawing suddenly and quietly to Caprera, with a curt "to meet again on the road to Rome" for all advice to his volunteers. Cattaneo withdrew also; publicly refused his hand to Pallavicino, and turned from him with scathing words of scorn, not on account of their political differences, but because he helped the underminers of Garibaldi; allowed a paid mob to cry "Death to Mazzini" with impunity; had treated Crispi with injustice, Bertani with ingratitude.

An eye-witness of the scene relates it as follows, having taken down the words from Cattaneo's lips:—On the morning of the 13th, while Garibaldi and the ex-ministers Pallavicino, Saliceti, De Luca, and a number of officers were gathered in council at the Angri Palace, Cattaneo was summoned by the Dictator, as usual when there was any special difficulty on hand. He maintained the necessity of convoking an Assembly with that eloquent logic of which he was master.

At the close of the sitting, Pallavicino held out his hand; Cattaneo turned and faced him, saying—

"I refuse your hand, because I have discovered that your tendencies are ungenerous. You persecute Mazzini, well knowing that his name strikes terror into the enemies of Italy, well knowing that, by thirty years of work and of sacrifice, he has paved the way for the triumph of the Italian cause. I have never been a follower of Mazzini, but it is the duty of all to honour the constancy and the virtue of the man who has conse-

crated his whole life to his country, and it is intolerable that he, an Italian citizen, should be driven out from this strip of free Italian soil.

"And you persecute Crispi, an honest man, a patriot most highly deserving of the Italian cause! You, a Lombard, come to Naples to drive Crispi out of Naples—out of his own house! Verily, there is cause to blush for you!"

The story of the last questions anent the Assembly he narrates in his very quaint but correct English to his wife. There is nothing private in the letter, so we venture to give it:—

"11th Oct., '60. Naples.

"My Dear,—Yesterday I was very busy. I was obliged to go to Caserta, before the dawn of day, to be able to see the General before his departure for the lines. I went and came back by the railroad; but he had telegraphed to Pallavicino to come to him in the evening, and begged me to be present at the interview, and so I was obliged to go again, and come back in the night. To-day, at three o'clock, I am to go there again.

"The Sicilians are decided to have an Assembly to look about everything that concerns the annexion to *all Italy* (not merely to Piedmont). The General wishes that the Neapolitans should do the same. Pallavicino does not like the idea of an Assembly; Mazzini is for it, and is beginning to be federal. The climate disagrees with me. I feel unwell, and as soon as the General gives me leave, I'll come back with the greatest satisfaction. My love to you, and your cats, and to everybody.

"12th Oct., '60.—General Garibaldi's mind is that the act of universal suffrage should be regularized and legalized by an Assembly. He does not approve of an irregular votation, such as took place at Nice. He wishes Naples and Sicily to adopt a uniform system."

Cattaneo was a man rare among Italians, in more than one respect; the asses' kick is here but too common, but Carlo stood up most warmly for men when others turned from them. When, after 1860, Bertani was well-nigh crushed into the grave by the calumnies of the triumphant faction—who could not forgive him his lion's share in sowing the rich harvest which they exclusively reaped—Cattaneo's letter to the electors of Milan, who wanted him to stand in his friend's place, taught the surprised but admiring public of what stuff the man's heart was made, whose intellect they prized aright.

Cattaneo, proposed for the V. College of Milan in January, 1860, sent a long letter to the editors of the *Politecnico* declining to stand on account of his age, his studious habits, his belief that he could better serve his country by his pen than seated on the opposition benches; and concludes—

"Alas! the politics of the party which ought to infuse new life into Italy may be summed up in two words—*corrupt or calumniate*. And of this policy we have a repulsive example in the way in which the servile press vituperates the honourable deputy Bertani. All know now that Garibaldi refused to accompany Pilo and Crispi to Sicily, and that without

Bertani's good offices he would not have gone thither, or would have been left to perish abandoned. Bertani has done; the Cavourians have undone, are undoing, will continue to undo. This is the truth.

"Now I say that the citizens of Milan have a duty to perform towards this deputy, Bertani; of honoured citizenship, of gratitude, of sacred justice. And this is one reason more why I decline to become a candidate. As the number of our deputies is reduced to five, I would not for anything in the world oppose, by my competition, his nomination. I should take shame to myself and for all.

"Hastily and cordially yours,

"DOTT CARLO CATTANEO."

Again, in 1865, when the publication of the *Politecnico*, and the fact of having become "bond for a friend," had swept away the last remnants of his wife's modest fortune, he resigned his Philosophical Chair,—his last resource, his greatest solace,—because in a public report to the Council of State, a friend, "formally recommended by himself, had been falsely and injuriously accused."

Vainly the municipality, "in the name of the students and populace, implored him to withdraw his resignation." He offered the use of his unused manuscripts to his successor, and at last allowed his name to remain on the College books as honorary professor. To the students, whose grief and consternation touched him to the quick, he wrote as follows:—

"Your affectionate words will always remain to me a beloved memory. In replying, I speak to all those who have preceded you in my cares and in mutual friendship.

"My duties are many, and now I cannot hope for much time to fulfil even those which I cannot leave undone without fault.

"The youthful friend of that citizen of yours who did so much to extend to all your people the principles of education, I found myself thirty years later led by the force of circumstances to this spot, where, first by advice, and later by work, I have succeeded in completing the edifice in its double aspect, scientific and industrial. Many who were not citizens lent their aid. You find gathered together a library and several works of art; a cabinet of physical and chemical sciences; a museum of natural history; a meteoric observatory; a botanical garden and plantation; and soon I hope to hear some voice reveal to your beautiful country the new discoveries in agriculture, in selviculture, in cattle breeding. Already, side by side with scientific instruction, a new branch of popular industry flourishes.

"By the side of the monuments of natural history I hope to see placed the monuments and documents of human history, which here date from the times of the Etruscans, and which might easily be extended to the Primitive Ages, and brought down to the most recent times, if these elements of a scientific endowment be enriched by the gifts and studies of your fellow-citizens. It is time that, with this end in view, a society be founded to encourage scientific discoveries, and enable enterprising geniuses to pursue them in the most remote regions.

"And I also nourish the hope that among the many students of decided talent who have followed my teaching, some will become interpreters and continuators of my thoughts, since our philosophy—the docile reflex of knowledge, and of the methods of knowledge—must proceed step by step, never halting, keeping time with all the other sciences. Thus it will

almost seem to me that I shall live and think among you still, even when my earthly career shall be for ever ended. I hope that free and sincere studies will, in the long run, win over even the minds now most adverse. Philosophy is the reason of man, who aspires to know the reason of the universe; who toils to discover in everything the thought, proves that he already believes in that thought. Even those whom a fatal discipline blindfolds will come at length to bear testimony to the free searchers after truth, since those who contemplate the work give glory to the workers.

"Dear lads, then, take my fraternal and paternal salutation in the same words that I have inscribed on your banner—*Liberty and truth*.

"C. CATTANEO,

"18th November, 1865."

"Honorary Citizen.

From 1860 to his last hours, his thoughts and works turned with increasing ardour to his country. He was less anxious for further conquests of territory than for the consolidation of that already won. He deplored the attempts of Sanrico and Aspromonte, and in this he and Mazzini were of one mind. They were both at Lugano when I arrived with the fatal tidings; both seemed stricken as though the royal bullet had entered their hearts. Persuaded against his will to allow himself again to be elected deputy, he was literally dragged to Florence by his friends.

"I cannot deny," he wrote to us, on the eve of his departure, "that the *dura prova* to which I am subjected by the judgment or prejudices (*giudizio or pregiudizio*) of my friends utterly disturbs my sentiments, my mature studies, my neglected interests."

Led by those friends to the very threshold of the Palazzo Vecchio, he could not be induced to cross it. He shuddered at the idea of taking the oath.

Twice in that year Garibaldi was our cherished guest at Bellosguardo, and Cattaneo came frequently. Garibaldi's presence transformed him; he used to sit and sun himself in that radiant smile. One evening, gathered round our dinner-table were T. A. Trollope, Bertani, Isa Blagdon, Ferrari, and other English and Italian friends. Various toasts to Garibaldi had been proposed: suddenly, Cattaneo, who sat opposite to him, exclaimed, "*Come si fa à non volervi bene con quella bella faccia?*"—"How can one help loving you with that beautiful face?"

His "Letters to his Electors" form a programme for the Liberals of the future; every subject of interest or utility to Italy is exhausted. We cannot regret that he did not take his seat; neither time nor opportunity would have been his to speak such courageous, practical, all-embracing words.

He disapproved of Mentana, and of the efforts made by the Liberals to avenge Mentana.

Summoned, at the close of 1867, to what was feared to be Mazzini's deathbed, we saw Carlo for the last time—spent our last

evening—Mazzini convalescent—in strolling to and fro Castagnola, and the house where “Pippo” was tended and watched over by his devoted friends, the Nathans. Of course we were at issue; Carlo defended his hostility, his public strictures; but we were not convinced. He was intensely anxious for Mazzini’s life; the transient clouds had sundered, they were one in hopes and fears for the Italy that both felt they must leave alone ere long.

“And now,” said Cattaneo, as we parted, “I am going to be selfish—to shut myself up with philosophy, condense the studies of a lifetime, and leave some footprints on the sands of time.” The quotation is his; he knew Longfellow by heart. For him the “Slave’s Dream,” was the “most graphic of modern poems.”

But, alas! the struggle for daily bread marred this, his last desire. His letters would make one weep but that he shared the common lot of *all* the heroic pioneers of Italy’s redemption—Mazzini, Manin, Tommaseo, Acerbi, Dal’ Ongaro, and the nameless myriads who gave all to their country—their own and their children’s all—nor took from her sufficient to pay for a span of earth in which to rest at last. And the survivors? Calumny—Italian calumny—cannot point to one single *Liberal* who has earned salt to his *polenta* by answering “present” to his country’s every roll call. And while we glory in the assertion which defies all contradiction, we cannot but lament the necessity which has deprived posterity of so many noble works which would have been completed and perfected but for the brain-scorching process of living from hand to mouth. Undoubtedly this constant harass hastened Cattaneo’s end.

“I see,” he wrote to Bertani, “that wherever there is a chance of turning an honest penny, you think of me. No one else does. Truly I thank you from my heart, because money is what I most need. It is but too true I am reduced to poverty, and I no longer feel my own master. D—— has taken from me my liberty’s last refuge. But for this, I could forgive him.”

From time to time we heard that he was ailing, but nothing prepared us for the catastrophe. He worked to the last. To a friend whom he was anxious to see, he wrote, at the end of November, 1868—“Advise me of your arrival; I will meet you at the diligence; we can talk as we walk, and save time.” On the 1st January, 1869, to another he wrote—“A happy new year to thee and thine; may it also prove less unhappy to me than the last.” Then he jests about a French paper—the *Gaulois*—“which consoles me by informing the public that I was born in 1815, and by no means in the first quarter of the first year of this century.” This is the last letter we find from his pen.

On the 6th February came the telegraphic announcement of the

fatal news. The following extracts from letters give all that is known of his last hours.

Mrs. Nathan in whose house Mazzini still dwelt wrote :—

“On the 31st January, we heard that Cattaneo had had a strange attack during the night, and Mazzini toiled up the hill to see him. He was very much pleased; I think he was the last person that he distinctly recognized. The local surgeon bled him copiously; after this he never rallied. Bertani (whose consummate skill had twice snatched back Mazzini from the very verge of death) was summoned too late to save.”

Perhaps not too late to soothe the final agony. Already in the previous year he had sounded the warning note :—

“Carlo mine! take care of thy chest. Be persuaded that the ascent to and fro Castagnola is not suited to one whose lungs or heart is affected, and thou shouldst live at least as long as Manzoni.”

This is his letter written when all was over, and a photograph and a plaster-cast taken from the sad dead face was all that remained to us of the mortal clay.

“My Friend,—I cannot yet collect my thoughts; can only tell you that our friend is dead. The philosopher, the economist, the man of letters, the daring combatant, the stainless patriot, the stern Republican, lives for us still. In his writings, in the acts of his life, there are teachings sufficient to regenerate Italy in belief, in intellect, in political power.

“But the friend’s heart beats no longer. Never more shall we see him stretch out his arms in his own jubilant fashion when surprised in his study at Castagnola; nor ever again will he descend, as he used to do even at night, from his house upon the hill to meet us at the arrival of the *diligence* in Lugano. What a festive welcome was his for the friends in whom he trusted! What a grief for him to see them go! ‘I take out a new lease of my life,’ he used to say, coaxing them to remain; ‘I re-live long days in you who are of the great world, and you are so stingy of yourselves.’ And in brief hours the themes of a hundred discourses to be spoken were sketched by that soul so ardently anxious for the welfare of his country, by that vast and lucid mind which propounded, illustrated, and aided every onward step, every vast undertaking of the age.

“When little more than two months since Cattaneo accompanied me to the bedside of Mazzini, then seriously ill, he too was ailing; and I, moved by that scene of affection, and by that meeting—a true episode of our history—contemplated sadly from the foot of the bed those two men so dear to Italy, and trembled for the life of both; and stifling the consciousness which professional intuition forced on me, sought to divine which of the two was most enfeebled, nearest to the end; and I forefelt the misery of the survivors, and then redoubled prayers and efforts to induce both to be more careful, more jealous of their lives. Cattaneo had but to trust to his robust temperament, to rest, to adopt a *régime* which should repair the ravages of the depressing blood-letting system incautiously practised, and by him with too much tolerance submitted to.

“That evening, which I will describe to you when we meet, was a sadly solemn one for me; but I did not then believe that Carlo’s ailments were so soon to destroy his life.

“Carlo’s death-agony was of the most painful; and from the precise movements of his hand, which moved slowly over his brow and lips, I incline to believe that he was conscious to the last, but powerless for any manifestation whatsoever.

"How intensely he must have suffered in that state! He roused himself at my voice calling 'Carlo, Carlo!' but the hand that I clasped could barely give me token of his last adieu. What grief to feel his forces wane so rapidly, when but a little while before his last expressions denoted all the ardour of the strife! Our latest national misfortunes were the themes of his dying phantasies. Custozza, Lissa, Mentana, the Macinato, he comprehended all our sorrows in the greatest grief of leaving Italy so desolate.

"To the last he remembered that he was a deputy, and with manifest agitation repeated the word 'Parliament.' And while he thus wandered, a friend, whom he did not recognize on taking leave, asked for his hand to press. He started, withdrew his hand, exclaiming, 'No! I do not give; I did not give my hand.* I am not pledged. I am free; I have promised nothing. I do not take the oath.' Then he dreamed of Spain re-arisen, and smiled. The comparison restored his serenity.

"He was pre-occupied with his political fame *vis-à-vis* his contemporaries and posterity. He was vexed when his political doctrines were confused with those of others, even with those of Mazzini. A recent number of the *Gaulois*, containing the biographies of the two eminent men, had made an impression on his mind during the last days, because it attributed to him ideas not his own, and, misunderstanding his genius and his work, settled that he would carry on the political propaganda of Mazzini, believed to be dying at the time.

"You remember his bedroom above the little sitting-room? He lay on the right. The 5th and 6th (Friday and Saturday) were splendidly bright. You know how beautiful is Castagnola; how Carlo's windows command a view along the Lake of Lombard soil? Our friend lay in death, with his eyes turned towards his native land, which he seemed to admonish with the expression that was at once gentle yet imposing in its seriousness.

"Through the open window a sea of light, a soft west wind, and spring-scented air poured in upon him as he lay dressed upon his bed; but he remained motionless, with his eyes turned upon his own country. I could not tear myself from that room, which contained death and immortality—the fame and example of a great citizen, of a soul so gentle and so generous.

"I contemplated him from a hundred different points. I called him with the voice of the soul that evokes friends from the tomb. I kissed and bathed him with my tears; turned his head from side to side, as though to arouse and force him to look at me once more. I deluded myself that he heard me; I looked down into his eyes inundated with sun-light, but they were immovable. He was cold, he was dead.

"If I could have believed in a miracle, I should have expected it in answer to my wild invocations.

"I cut off a lock of his hair, pressed every power of art into the service to save from oblivion the form of that so beautiful head. But at last I fain must leave him. I laid him myself in the coffin, surrounded him with flowers, and placed the cap so that the spacious brow remained uncovered; then I gave him a last kiss, and veiled the face that yet exhaled all the serenity of his soul. Finally, the fatal coffin lid closed over our friend.

"I can tell you no more, dear J——. My heart fails me as I retrace that solitary and desolating scene.

"Lugano is now for me a place of apprehension and of pain. Another great Italian lies there still in peril. The beautiful sky, the still more

* As the Speaker in the Chambers administers the oath to new members, they rise, extend their hands, and utter the word "Giuro," I swear it.

beautiful hills, only suggest to my mind the funeral pall that shrouds our friend from view!—Genoa, 17th February, 1869.

(Signed)

“AGOSTINO BERTANI.”

For a few months only was Castagnola allowed to guard the “sacred dust.” Ungrateful Milan claimed her own. Her citizens, who had forgotten “to crown the brow,” “garlanded the tombstone” in the monumental cemetery, for which he had worked and written. The municipality sent a funeral car to Lugano; the body was exhumed, and every man, woman, and child of Castagnola accompanied it down the hill to the town where students and fellow-professors and citizens awaited in speechless grief to give their last adieu. The inhabitants of Como and the Lombard cities through which the procession passed thronged to do honour to the hero of their glorious defence. And Milan official, and aristocratic Milan, mingled with the Milan of the people to welcome the dust that they no longer feared. The Syndic of Milan in tricolor scarf, received the bier from the hands of the Syndic of Lugano. Senators and deputies, and municipal authorities, lauded the “Modern Socrates,” the “Sage,” the “Genius,” the “Hero of the Five Days,” while Airoldi, of Lugano, in simple words, portrayed the life of work, of poverty, of dignity, of love, that Cattaneo had lived in his second fatherland, and bid him a last farewell in the name of his “republican country.” One of the grandest streets of Milan now bears the name of Carlo Cattaneo, and we can believe that he is well content to rest in the shadow of his beloved *Duomo*, in the city of his birth, the scene of his most glorious triumphs and of his bitterest sufferings. And we are sure that he is also grateful to the friend who placed in the coffin a bunch of flowers from Castagnola, gathered by his widow, that they might mingle with his dust.

The photograph taken after death retains the form of that noble face and head; this, and the plaster-cast, have enabled a talented sculptress, Signora Maraini, to make a bust of the great Lombard which wrung from his friend the exulting exclamation—*Questo è Carlo redivivo!*

The shawl in which that friend enfolded him Mazzini unwound and kept as a last memory. It never left him; he wore it during his last illness; it served as his funeral shroud, and is now kept a precious relic of the two great geniuses and patriots who “in death were not divided.”

The library purchased and presented to the Lyceum of Lugano, by the friend who was more than a brother, was the only thing of value that Cattaneo possessed.

The manuscripts lie before me ordained and catalogued, divided into five sections—philosophy, literature, economy, politics,

correspondence,—by the joint editors, Agostino Bertani and Alberto Mario, disciple of Cattaneo, and continuator of his Federalistic Republican doctrines.

The original manuscripts are destined as a gift by the owner to the Brera Library of Milan—when she shall be worthy of them.

JESSIE WHITE MARIO.



INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INMATES.

IT is as delightful as it is certain that for every evil under the sun there is in our fortunate country an easy remedy, and one which is applicable to nearly all cases of distress of mind, body, or estate; in fact it may be called universally beneficial. This palliative consists primarily in bricks and mortar.

Infant orphans and aged Christian pilgrims, soldiers' widows and aged governesses, idiots and homeless dogs, indigent blind, provident booksellers, and the offspring of licensed victuallers, can be alike relieved and consoled by that happy invention commonly called an institution.

Nor is the benefit of an institution at all confined to the class for whom it is nominally intended. There is the delight which canvassing evidently gives to many excellent people; there is the excitement of a collecting card, or of in some other way filling a purse with other people's money, to be presented to the charity on a gala day, *via* possibly a princess, certainly a duchess or countess. There may be also the pleasure of giving vent to such an irrepressible burst of religious feeling as may be evolved by listening to some eloquent bishop, or amusing Spurgeon, an emotion which may lead some members of congregations so far as to induce them to exchange the inevitable charity-plate shilling for a half-crown. While finally, for the small sum of one guinea yearly, we may become part proprietors in a splendid building, and have the excitement, besides, of being continually canvassed for votes. There are, there must be, always a large number of people

who have more money to bestow in charity than time to investigate for themselves how best to give it; and it is obvious that giving to established societies, whether they take the form of institutions or not, is a natural and inevitable way in which many rich folk can distribute alms.

Subscriptions to charitable institutions are also made by people of moderate means, who like to see something for their money, and who feel that they do get an equivalent by having votes to give away. The objections to the voting system seem to be the enormous expenditure of money which results in no gain either to the candidate or the charity, and the fact that those who have most influential friends are the most likely to succeed in a canvass. Still it appears that the majority of subscribers to charities prefer the voting system. It is somewhat like the reason that a fancy fair brings in money: people had rather pay a shilling for a hideous pincushion, which they could make at home for twopence, than give sixpence and see no return; and if they can make the pincushion at home, and then, as they think, help a charity by its sale, the temptation is greater still. It is true that in fancy bazaars for charitable objects a great deal of money is often wasted—I mean it brings in nothing to the charity—but it does give idle people occupation and interest, and a pleasing emotion of benevolent excitement. The fact that it is not the best way of helping the charity remains. For much the same reason the voting system continues, and will continue, as long as the majority of subscribers to charities prefer their own pleasure to the good of the candidates, and want to combine two ends. There is a sort of economical feeling about the arrangement: it kills two birds with one stone.

Another great feeling in the English mind is a love of method and order, and the necessary or unnecessary forms of an institution are popular. The feeling is even carried so far, that it is thought a neat arrangement to tie people up into ticketed bundles before we relieve them; and it is obviously a beautifully simple plan to choose the most outward and visible circumstance as a means of classification.

Soldiers' widows, for instance, must, of course, naturally prefer living near each other and apart from friends. They cannot (to obtain such a boon) object to a few little restrictions, such as not being able to knock in a nail on which to hang a picture without the permission of the authorities. It is impossible to suppose that they would, like the majority of Greenwich pensioners, prefer having a small pension, and living where they pleased.

One does not at first sight see the reason for placing together in an almshouse sixty tailors, who, if they knew each other in the days of health, were probably rivals.

This kind of classification is certainly carried out to a wonderful degree. A few years ago, if a man was only thoughtful enough to die of the right disease, his children were easily provided for in a cholera orphans' home. Now, I believe, this institution has a less distinctive title.

The chief advantage of an institution, at first sight, is that money is supposed to go farther; but I doubt this being always the case. Aged governesses, for instance, can hardly be said to study economy when living together. I copy the balance-sheet of the expenses of seven old ladies residing in an asylum at Kentish Town. It is difficult to regret the statement that it is intended they should move to a smaller house.

"ASYLUM AT KENTISH TOWN.

	£	s.	d.
Housekeeping expenses	929	18	1
Salary of Chaplain	50	0	0
" " Lady-Superintendent	75	0	0
Superannuation of former Lady-Superintendent	50	0	0
Rent, rates, and taxes	325	15	5
Total	<u>1,430</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>6"</u>

I once knew a dear old governess who, when rather in her dotage, used to entertain me, when I drank tea with her, with accounts of the grandeur of her past life. In one situation, she assured me, riding-horses had been kept for her use; and the luxury of the house was such that she had to "skip along the passages," or the floors, heated by an expensive warming apparatus, would have burned her feet. Warmed floors would indeed be a delightful arrangement; but I believe a member of the London School Board only suggested their use in Board Schools, and Board Schools seem to be among the most extravagant institutions of the day. Perhaps, though, all the old ladies in the asylum have been accustomed to the luxuries described by my friend, and have also been exclusively in noblemen's families, where private chaplains are kept. There is no doubt that many of us would gladly subscribe to make the declining years of old governesses happy; but I must own that this balance-sheet contrasts, to my mind, rather painfully with the accounts, in the same report, of the circumstances of most of the governesses who are receiving the very moderate pensions of £25 annually from other funds at the disposal of the society. I quote two cases, reminding my readers that fifty-seven instead of seven old ladies could be assisted, were the money spent in the asylum given in pensions.

"Miss H. B. B., aged seventy-two. Became a governess for the support of herself and family, maintaining her mother, an invalid, for upwards of

thirty years; and has consequently been unable to make any provision for herself. Held an engagement last year with a salary of £10, but is now without any means of support."

"Miss H. H., aged seventy. Her parents dying when she was an infant, she was brought up by an aunt, who, on being left a widow, was no longer able to support her, and she became a governess. Opened a day and boarding school, to give a home to this aunt, and bring up the children of a deceased sister. Kept it for twenty-eight years; but the infirmities of advancing age render her unable to continue the labours of nearly forty years. Entirely dependent upon friends."

The society has another asylum at Chislehurst, in which are eleven inmates. The balance-sheet is widely different to that of the Kentish Town asylum; and I would notice that at Chislehurst there seems to be a system of payment to the residents instead of an entry for housekeeping expenses, and that a doctor supersedes the chaplain. There is nothing down for rent; so to this table there ought to be added some allowance for the interest of the sum expended in either purchasing or building the house.

"ASYLUM AT CHISLEHURST.

	£.	s.	d.
Additional expenses on drainage and land ...	204	11	0
Fittings and furniture, &c.	32	16	1
Payments to the residents	448	0	0
Coals	70	3	9
Medical Officer	31	10	0
Lady-Superintendent	100	0	0
Parochial rates, water, and gas	39	12	1
Garden and Gardener	52	17	4
Total	979	10	3"

It will be noticed that the eleven inmates spend—even if we allow them £300 a year for rent, which is absurd—less than the seven.

Nor can any institution be maintained without a large sum going in what may be termed working expenses. I quote now from the balance-sheets of three orphan asylums.

"WORKING EXPENSE OF AN INSTITUTION CONTAINING 435 CHILDREN.

	£	s.	d.
Advertisements, and postage of polling papers and report	450	10	0
Charges on elections, anniversary dinner,* and other incidental items	286	10	2
Office expenses, including rent, taxes, and office repairs, and salaries to Secretary, Accountant, Collector, and Clerks ..	1,170	17	7
Total	1,907	17	9"

* The dinner possibly brings in money by obtaining new subscribers.

"WORKING EXPENSE OF AN INSTITUTION CONTAINING 173 CHILDREN.

			£	s.	d.
Salaries: Secretary and Clerks	596	7	2
Advertisements	199	14	7
Postage and stationery*	143	3	9
Election expenses	25	15	9
Printing reports, &c.	127	14	3
Collector's commission	122	7	0
Office rent and expenses	121	13	0
Total			1,336	15	6"

"WORKING EXPENSE OF AN INSTITUTION CONTAINING 253 CHILDREN.

				£	s.	d.
Salaries at the office	290	14	0
Clerk	15	6	0
Election and office expenses	54	6	7
Printing	83	18	0
Advertisements	116	1	3
Postage	40	18	11
Rent of office and cottage	99	15	0
Total			700	19	9"†	

It seems from these tables that very large sums are required for the external machinery of these institutions; and it must be noted that in no case do the sums mentioned include any part of the original cost of building—no small item.

But the question of the expenditure at institutions is a matter for the consideration of their subscribers only, and with which it is really almost impertinent for the non-subscribing part of the community to meddle. And as regards the expediency of putting people of one class together, that, again, is very much for the recipients of charitable gifts to decide, although I have a suspicion that many are found to accept the shelter of an almshouse because the same money value is not offered them in any other way; and as long as people are determined to see something like a fine building before they will go deep into their purses, almshouses and homes will exist. I remember, though, at this moment the sigh of a "decayed gentlewoman" as she said, "If only the institution would let me have the sum I cost in money, and let me live where I like!"

Still, governesses, and indigent blind, and aged pilgrims, and all grown-up people who have the use of their senses, are free to decide for themselves whether, supposing they have the chance, they will enter an institution or not. But there is one class for

* An additional charge of £148 2s. 1d. is made for school books.

† There is an additional item of £226 6s. for anniversary expenses, festival, and examination.

whom there are many asylums, a class that has no choice or power of choice: I speak now of orphans and destitute children. Now, undoubtedly, orphanages are the most interesting of our institutions. Their object is to prevent misery and poverty rather than to alleviate them when they come—to give our destitute children whose parents have been of a respectable class the chance of keeping their position. And undoubtedly there is very much to be said in favour of orphanages as homes for children. The classification is perfect of its kind, for, although old people are not happiest with their cotemporaries, the young undoubtedly are. Moreover, the expense of having children in an orphanage would, it would be reasonably supposed, be less than that of boarding them out. It would seem in many cases hard upon a mother to take her child from her in order to place it in another family, while she is thought ungrateful if she does not eagerly accept the proposal to place it in a school where it will be boarded, clothed, and receive an excellent education, free. Moreover, it is presumable that teachers would not offer themselves for such close work as that of an institution unless they felt special love of children, special aptitude for the work. In an institution the health and comfort of the children ought to be the first consideration. It is also more easy to have an institution under proper inspection than it would be to visit the same number of children (if assisted by charity), either in their mothers' homes, or boarded out. And one objection to leaving a young child with its mother and paying her is, that it is thought to have a tendency to pauperize the mother.

But all these reasons appear to me to be outweighed by the one consideration that orphanage life is an artificial life. Artificial life is inferior to natural life.

And here, before going farther, I would note that a large proportion of the inmates of our orphanages have mothers.* Now, let any reader of this paper cast his thoughts back to the days of infancy, and ask himself whether the remembrance of father or mother stands out the clearest? In most cases the answer will be that the earliest thoughts and associations are chiefly connected with the mother. Take a little child away from its mother, and put it into the happiest home-circle you can find. At bed-time, for two or three nights, the child will be homesick. This may be said to prove nothing but instinct; but it is a question whether instinct was given us for nothing. It is doubtless true that a young child taken away from its mother will soon forget her, and it is more than probable that the mother will gradually care less and less about the child. We see this in the cases of children sent over from India, who soon forget their parents, and

* About 90 per cent.

cling to the relations with whom they are placed; while usually the parents, when they return to England, care less for their children than if they had never been separated from them. But this is an artificial, not a natural or desirable state of things.

Again, it is a fact that a pauper spirit may prevail in any class. Help given by one friend to another, whatever the difference of rank, does not pauperize. Help given without individual knowledge or personal love and sympathy must. The mother who has canvassed hard to get her children into an orphanage feels no gratitude in the ordinary sense of the word, however much she may advertise it in the *Times*! How can she? She can no more be grateful to a committee, or to a body of subscribers, than a pauper can be grateful to the relieving officer who gives her an order for the "house," or to the ratepayer who maintains her in it. True, there is a slight distinction between compulsory payments and voluntary subscriptions, but as regards the effect on the recipient it is very slight indeed. After all, what does the institution do for the widow? At a time when she is, perhaps, almost overwhelmed by the death of a husband, the very palliative proposed does but remove the greatest stimulus towards returning to the work of life in a cheerful spirit, and marks very bitterly the fact that the poor cannot afford to have feelings! In the case of a rich widow, how eagerly do people say, "Oh, her children will comfort her!" The thought of the old nurse, described by Tennyson, is in every friend's mind if not on their tongues, and it is a reasonable and wholesome thought. But if a woman in a lower class of life has the deepest sorrow which woman can feel, the first cry is, "How many children are there? Let us canvass until they are in orphanages." I am not for a moment denying that in many cases boys could have a better education given them in an orphanage than they could receive at home; and, provided the home influence be carefully maintained by regular holidays, there is much to be said in favour of boarding-school education for fatherless boys; but I submit that what suits a strong, healthy boy of nine or ten is not the most suitable education for infants and girls. At one orphan asylum, for instance, no child is allowed to come out for a holiday until it is seven years old, and it may be admitted in infancy. It is true that the mother has leave to visit it occasionally, but how can this amount of intercourse keep up a child's knowledge of its home and mother? What is to make up for the mother's kiss every night? A visit once a month paid before the officials. The more affectionate the mother is, the greater trial will she find it to see a young child under such circumstances. What is the make-up to the mother for the loss of her child? The saving a very small sum annually. In some cases I notice that a little inmate of an orphanage is an only

child. Would it pauperize a woman hopelessly to receive for the maintenance of the child, say half the sum it costs in an institution?

What is the first need of every child—I had almost said even of every animal? Individual knowledge, individual love. In the case of children who have lost both parents, we have to do with those who have been deprived of what can never be made up to them in after-life. No amount of petting, of kindness, of love, through life can do away with the effect of this terrible loss: a loss of a natural education, of a home, of a love purer and deeper than any other earthly love—the missing the intense happiness of being an object of intense interest to one person.

“The love of all is but a small thing to the love of one.”

Have we never seen children whose interest in lessons, and even in play, flagged because no one grown-up person cared about the lesson or the play, because success or failure was a matter of no moment to any looker-on? I am sure there is real advantage in being looked at by at least one person, as if a halo were round our hair. We should all be much more ugly, and disagreeable, and stupid than we are, if no one had ever believed us to be beautiful, and pleasant, and clever. It may be said that a fond mother's admiration for her child is founded often on a fallacy. But it is not. She views through love's medium, that is all. Children are often such solitary little creatures, often even morbid. They seem gregarious, but yet are lonely; they are so constantly misunderstood. Is not stupidity often confused with obstinacy, and a nervous temperament with wilfulness? How many children suffer from terror of which they never speak? I do not for a moment doubt that in many cases childhood is a happy time, but I am sure that it is a perplexed and perplexing time, a period when, more than at any other in life, individual knowledge and love and infinite watchfulness are needed. And what does a charitable public do for children who, having lost their homes, specially need all the outside help that can possibly be given? It places them in as an unnatural a position as can possibly be found. It has been observed that where a child is to be naturally brought up, the patience of the adult in whose charge it is must be constantly tried. Therefore, as it is not desirable to worry the officials in our orphanages into untimely graves, the natural consequence of herding several hundred children together must be to bring them up unnaturally. It is of course true, that in many cases children, specially only children, suffer from having too much attention given by anxious mothers. But this evil prevails chiefly among a class who are ever likely to fill our orphanages. A mother in the middle class

is hardly likely to have had time to notice a child too much; and I would further add, that although what is called a spoilt (*i.e.*, an over-indulged) child is often unhappy, and always disagreeable, during the time of childhood, it by no means follows that it is ruined for life; while the child whose natural instincts are repressed during its early days is maimed, if not ruined.

But what of the training and education possible where children are put *en masse*? Doubtless habits of order, neatness, and all outside virtues, so to speak, can be readily acquired, more readily than in an ordinary home. But what of moral qualities—truth for instance? Is it not the very essence of truth that our notions of right and wrong should be true, our desires true? It is possible to be very inaccurate in the letter, and very true in spirit.

Now, the very fact of bringing up children in large numbers creates an artificial, *i.e.* a false, standard of truth.

The child who learns quickly is probably, in school language, a good child. So a retentive memory or quickness is confused, in that child's mind, with industry.

The child who is smooth-tempered is good. It does not matter whether the amiability is produced by good health or by a certain indifference and coldness of disposition. The happy owner of a naturally placid temper is distinctly a better child than either its more delicate or more sensitive companions.

But again, to speak of truth in a more ordinary sense, do not children frequently tell more lies at school than at home? And why? Possibly for two reasons proceeding from one root. They have more temptations at school to untruth, and also, though the untrue words may be discerned and punished at school, the cause which produced them is not known. A mother would avoid putting stumbling-blocks in her child's way; a school teacher, from want of knowledge of the child, cannot always avoid leading it into temptation. The untruthfulness of some young children is hardly a fault in itself; it is a circumstance arising from some fault or infirmity.

The majority of children are untruthful from timidity; a really radically untruthful child has probably been made so by some want of tact or sympathy in its elders. The treatment children require is so different, for one child may be a hero for whispering what another would delight in impudently proclaiming. Some children tell stories from vanity. These are imaginative children, who like to produce a sensation. We see the same inclination in those half-educated grown-up children who rush into our rooms open-mouthed, and eager to tell some horrible story, to make a sensation, if only for once.

Some children are naturally so proud that it gives them intense pain to own themselves in the wrong. They probably develop

into the tiresome people who, being infallible, never make a mistake. We envy them, but it is an envy unmixed with admiration.

Now, how is the most painstaking matron, the most careful teacher in the world, to discover what are the different causes which produce apparently the same result? The child is very naughty and untruthful, and is punished and scolded, and there is an end of it. But it is extremely improbable that the child is much the better for either the scolding or punishment. The symptom of the disease has been attacked, but not the disease itself, because there has been no doctor able to ascertain its nature. Again, nothing more upsets a child's notion of truth and falsehood than being treated unjustly; and it is distinctly unjust to treat all children alike. The child who is dull at his lessons, and is therefore scolded for idleness, is unjustly treated. The probability is that he may not understand the injustice, but he will puzzle his poor little brains with a weary sensation of perplexing naughtiness. Of course, among the numbers of children in an ordinary day school, there must be injustice and mistake often. But then the home influence tells the other way; the child knows that his mother, or big brother or sister, will like to hear how it all was, and is sure to comfort, or perhaps to give a little, not altogether unpleasant, scolding; but in any case sure to be interested and patient.

To take another point. How are children's tempers to be dealt with in masses? How is obstinacy to be turned to firmness, and weakness to self-reliance? In so-called ill-tempered children there seems usually a moment of hesitation when they are what is called "put out," a moment when a grown-up person who knows the child's disposition has a chance of turning the scale. But how impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule for this! One child may be cured by a joke, which would infuriate another. In a large school, bad-tempered children must be treated, to a great extent, alike. I cannot attribute the sullenness generally found among girls who have been educated in pauper schools entirely either to chance or pauper blood, and am inclined to believe the same condition likely to prevail in other cases where numbers of children are brought up together.

Children are often self-absorbed to an unwholesome extent. How are they to learn generosity and thoughtfulness for others in a school? The very saving up of pence for a brother or sister's birthday present is useful in bringing a child out of itself; but children brought up away from their relatives forget them, and frequently have nothing of their own to give.

And lastly, what of the religious training of young children? I would say it with all reverence, but does not a mother repre-

sent to a young child almost a Divine Being? And who so well as a mother can give the first idea of religion to a child? Listen to the ordinary nursery religious doctrine as administered by nurses or other servants. "God sees all you do, and is angry when you do wrong. He will make all wicked people miserable for ever." But the mother's teaching is of a Father's love and care. She tells the child how God loves all the people He created, but children most of all. The ideas which a young child has of the love of God all come from the mother.

But when children are motherless, we almost inevitably make the religious teaching hard and dry. It is not the teacher's fault. It cannot be helped or hindered. It is the fault of the institution, that mystic thing created, not for the children who fill it, but as a sort of Moloch to which they are to be sacrificed.

But if the want of individual care and attention be bad for young children, what must it be for those a few years older—specially for girls? There are a thousand questions which nearly any girl will ask her mother, or rather which the average mother will answer unasked. But the orphanage child adds to all the perplexities of ordinary life the fact that her preparation for that life has been entirely artificial. It might have fitted her for a convent, but not for the world into which she is plunged; for the seclusion of orphanage life has first created artificial difficulties and perplexities, and has further beautifully provided that there shall be no means of solving them, for the child who is virtually separated from her near relations at an early age (and here I would again repeat that a very large majority of the inmates of our orphan asylums have mothers) is hardly likely to confide in them when she leaves school. The affection on each side must be merged more or less in a sort of curiosity. It may be remarked that in many cases the children have holidays; but in all orphanages it will be found that a considerable number of children do not go home for the holidays (natural ties have been so broken by usage), and in some institutions they are not allowed. In one I know that the girls remain for five years, during which time they are not allowed to return home at all, unless their mothers are dying. This rule, which I hope is about to be altered, must surely have been invented by the class of people who, while they often neglect to visit their friends when alive, hasten, like so many superior undertakers, to their funerals.

The relations of the children may visit them, it is true, and in some institutions are allowed to see them alone; but this is not universal. I was myself present not long ago, on a visiting day, at one of our largest institutions. We were shown into a grand dining-hall, with countless tables covered with not spotless tablecloths, and the air heavy with a smell as of dinner and soft soap

mingled. Against the tables were benches, and there did friends and relations sit patiently for about twenty minutes. Then doors were opened, and sundry small faces peeped in. There are more than six hundred children in that asylum: there might have been fifteen or twenty who saw their friends on that visiting day. We had seen, as we walked through splendid grounds towards the grand entrance, many little faces flattened against the windows, on the look-out, I suppose, for visitors. Each parent or relative who was present was wisely provided with oranges or eatables in some form, and the visited children munched diligently, eating far more than they talked. My little friend, who looked well and happy, was spared much trouble as regards conversation by one of the servants who sat near, and who answered many of our questions (the child's sister was with me) in this style:—

"What class are you in, Janie?"

"Oh, Janie is a bright girl, are you not, Janie? She's in the second class."

"Yes," whispered the bright girl, who could not be induced to speak out; but she hardly knew her own sister, having been in the orphanage since she was two years old, during which time this sister had only twice visited her. (She is now nine, and has been home for holidays.)

Some other question elicited the answer that Janie had had a sore throat.

"Yes," interposed the indefatigable maid again, "Janie is a delicate girl. This time last year she was like a little fading lily; we had to nurse her up, and make quite an old woman of her, hadn't we, Janie?"

"Yes," hissed the fading lily again.

All this, and more of a like nature, was kindly said, and doubtless kindly meant; but I cannot say that if I had had any doubts as to Janie's talents or delicacy, this conversation would have tended to solve my difficulties. But besides being visited by relations, it may be suggested that the children are encouraged to write letters. To this I can only reply that children's letters do not convey much idea of their characters, thoughts, wishes, or feelings. It is difficult for any of us to do at once two things well; and a child has to contend with difficulties of writing and spelling, besides composition. It is about as easy for a child to write a real letter as it would be for a person whose knowledge of German was confined to the power of forming the characters to compose a poem in that language. But let us suppose the most favourable specimen possible—a girl advanced for her age, sent to school when not a mere child. Grant her a natural love of writing, and a special facility of expression, and what is the result? Are her letters very like her talks with her mother?

But the ordinary school-boy or school-girl, if natural, requests stamps or cakes, says when the holidays are coming, apologizes for a short letter because "there is no time," and that is about all.

It must further be noted that the half-educated adult, and the well-drilled school-boy or school-girl, consider a letter to be a means of expressing, not what is thought or felt, but what it is assumed ought to be thought or felt. An ex-inspector has kindly given those of us who study blue-books specimens of such letters from children brought up in district schools, and assures us, as proof of the excellence of the particular institutions dear to his heart, that hundreds of similar letters can be there perused—a statement which, though doubtless true, is certainly neither important nor surprising. It is a style of composition which has undergone various modifications, but of which Mr. Squeers has, perhaps, furnished the most perfect specimen.

An intelligent girl of my acquaintance, speaking of her brother and sister, remarked: "Herbert is a regular orphanage boy, surprised at everything he saw when he came for his first holidays, and in his letters (he is only ten) he says how he hopes his dear brothers are like himself, making the best use of their time for study; and Lucy writes that she has heard such a lovely sermon from dear Mr. Johnson!"

Now, would any reasonable person say that such letters as these afford any clue whatever to a child's character?

So I maintain that the orphanage child (unless she has gone home for holidays) comes out to her friends an unknown quantity, and likely to continue one, for what creature is so shy and so sensitive as a fifteen-year-old girl? Of course it may be urged that shyness does not exist in these days; it is a thing gone by. But surely people who say this confuse outside shyness—a shyness of manner, in fact—with something much deeper. Girls and boys, and grown-up people too, may have a freedom of manner bordering on insolence, and yet wear a thick shell of shyness and sensitiveness over the inner self.

Let me not be misunderstood here. I do not for one moment sympathize with those who would tear off coverings by force—who can enlarge from a platform upon experiences—whose eagerness to reveal themselves and their own opinions and feelings is so great that they are keen to probe their more sensitive neighbours as an excuse for their own egotism; neither do I for a moment deny that there are depths in each of us which could not be fathomed by man, and which cannot, without rashness, be stirred. But there are also in the minds of young boys and girls depths which had better be stirred and fathomed, ghosts to be scared away, doubts to be settled, mistakes to be set right, false views to be exchanged

for true ones; and I submit that these ends will not be attained by the most brilliant of collective lessons, for there are lessons to be taught only through home and family life, and there to be learnt as surely as unconsciously.

Again, it is an important question, What is to be the future of children brought up in orphanages? It is comparatively easy for boys to get places as clerks, or in shops; but all officials seem in a tale as to the comparative difficulty of placing the girls. And indeed it must be exceedingly difficult to know what to do with a girl of fifteen.* I talked over the point at one orphanage, where the matron told me a girl who had just left would be fitted for "a nice domestic character, but, of course, could have no domestic instruction given in an institution. The girls would so get into the servants' way. They learn drawing, and those whose friends desire it learn music." In another orphanage I heard that those who were likely to become governesses learnt music. This seemed a wiser rule; and in this asylum, too, a little housework was taught, and the girls encouraged by small money rewards. Now, a girl in her own home, or in a small middle-class family, certainly would have many opportunities of learning how to dust a room, wash up china, &c., which would never be possible in an orphanage. I went to one asylum where the published report spoke of the children not being *en masse*, but of a system of family life. I was most kindly shown over the range of splendid buildings—beautiful board-room, pretty sitting-rooms for the teachers, all exquisitely kept, a dining-hall like a banqueting room, with a gallery, from whence we saw the children dine. But the "family life?" Two hundred girls in one building, sleeping fifty in a dormitory. The boys are in sep rate houses, fifty in a house, twenty-five in a dormitory. Nearly every external thing that would naturally open the minds of children and develop their intelligence must be denied, because it cannot be managed in an institution. Here the girls had money to spend, but might not go to a shop. Their frocks are always the same colour, and the same material in winter and summer. The first point may seem unimportant, but we all know how children like a change of colour. With few exceptions, three meals a day are the rule. This may be enough for middle-class children, though I hardly know why it should be, if it is not enough for upper-class, and certainly it seems a long time for a child to wait from six o'clock supper time till the next morning's breakfast. Considering the large expenditure at these institutions, it seems curious that a little more should not be laid out on such extra luxuries as clean under-

* There are, of course, some large institutions where orphan girls are trained as servants. One old-established orphanage provides for the children being bound apprentices in respectable Protestant families.

clothing and slight suppers. And I should like the children to have more intercourse with the outside world than they have in most asylums ; in several they rarely go beyond the grounds.

Lastly, there must be, in all institutions where much of the care of the children is delegated from one official to another, considerable chance of injudicious treatment, specially if corporal punishment be given on the spur of the moment. Not long ago I chanced to be going through some dormitories, in one of which a master was beating a child. It is of course highly probable that the little fellow screamed more violently than was necessary ; but I did wish that the nurse, who was showing me round at the time, had expressed any opinion on the point beyond that " children must be punished, and they hallooed more than they were hurt ;" and I think most people will feel that the managers of orphanages would do wisely to make it a rule that beating should be a public punishment, not inflicted in a dormitory with no witnesses. This rule would be, I believe, as beneficial to the masters as to the pupils.

The fact that the chief promoters of institutions are people who have not time personally to superintend them increases the chance of the children's occasionally suffering from the hot temper or injustice of one official. Of course, all children at school, even children in the best-regulated nursery at home, may, and often I believe do, suffer from the tyranny of teachers and nurses ; but at least they have some one to whom they can complain ; and, at ordinary schools, there is this additional hold upon the master—that the pupils would certainly leave if their parents or guardians thought them ill-used, while orphanages are not wholly (as far as the children are concerned) unlike prisons.

The question now arises, is there any remedy for many of the evils I have described as attending the bringing up of children in masses, or must they all exist if numbers are to be congregated under one roof ?

It would seem that a good deal might be done to make the orphanages more of homes, less of schools, less still of prisons. It is certain that in many cases children do entertain a sincere regard for the officials under whose charge they were, and many inmates of orphanages become subscribers to them in after-life. But even if the utmost possible were done to make the institutions more home-like, their size would baffle the attempt at every turn, and therefore they cannot be, in my opinion, suitable for young children, or, indeed, for older ones, unless the regularity of holidays makes them, in fact, into free boarding-schools. And few mothers in the upper classes would care to send their children to a boarding-school containing 200 girls or more.

But another system is silently gaining ground in England—a

system which has worked well for years in Scotland and Ireland, though hitherto applied only to a lower class: I mean boarding-out. The Post Office Orphan Home, and the Railway Benevolent Institution, in England, are trying the plan. Both, at present, adopt the non-building and non-voting system. I append an extract from the third annual report of the former institute:—

“The Home is established for the purpose of boarding, clothing, and educating the orphans of sorters, letter-carriers, and other members of the minor establishment of the Post Office, either in London or the provinces, who have been subscribers to the institute. Applicants are admitted between the ages of five and twelve years, according to priority of application, and either placed at suburban and provincial schools, or as boarders with carefully-selected foster-parents, who are under the supervision of the committee; the great expense of maintaining an establishment is thus altogether avoided. Boys are maintained until fourteen, and girls till they are fifteen years of age. Girls are instructed in domestic duties, and on leaving the Home, suitable situations are obtained for them. Provision is also made for children under the prescribed age.”

I regret to see that the chairman of a meeting of the Board of Management of the Railway Benevolent Institution suggests establishing a school in which “the children could be gathered together,” on the grounds, first, “that the institution would gain more support if the good that is being done were visible to the public eye; and, secondly, that the institution would then more distinctly stand to the children *in loco parentis*.”

It is difficult to see how an institution can fill the place of parents to a child. Although I might venture to argue from theory that, when the family tie is broken, it is better to put a child into another family, where it will gradually fit in and find a new home, I prefer to go rather upon the effect of boarding-out as gathered from the experience of the Irish and Scotch. These facts, with much other interesting information, are contained in a book recently published by Messrs. Henry S. King & Co.:*—

“Boarding-out in Scotland has been in operation twenty-eight years (1874). Two hundred and ninety-four children were boarded out by Edinburgh parish in the year 1874, at an average cost of 4s. 1d. per week. . . . Ninety-one per cent. of boarded-out children from Glasgow parish were ascertained to be doing well in 1872—their several occupations being mentioned.”

IN ENGLAND.

The Local Government Board reports, in 1872, 169 children boarded out *under the management of twenty-eight committees*; and adds—

“The reports which we have received on the condition of the children generally are favourable as to their health, appearance, and management,

* “Boarding Out and Pauper Schools,” by Menella B. Smedley.

and exhibit a satisfactory result, in this respect, of the system of boarding-out our orphan and deserted pauper children, under the *immediate supervision of committees*, who voluntarily undertake the duty."

Special reports from Chorlton, Birmingham, Bath, and other places, entirely confirm this statement.

IN IRELAND.

The Protestant Orphan Society had in 1859 been at work thirty years; 2,132 children had been boarded out, and the deaths per annum had never exceeded 1 per cent. . . . Dr. M'Blair, Assistant Commissioner, comparing this system with that of large schools, observes—

"Children brought up in schools are not likely to acquire that self-reliance and experience of the world which are necessary to fit them for the struggle of after-life. . . . The same amount of funds will provide, in this way, for a larger number than if they were congregated together in one establishment."

The Presbyterian Orphan Society has been successfully at work for eight years, and has some peculiarities worthy of notice. There is in connection with it a "mutual benefit" scheme, by which the children of working men contributing above a certain sum (minimum 2s. 6d.) have a claim on the fund in case of orphanage or necessity. . . . Another feature is that orphans who have lost one parent only are boarded with the mother, and that a preference is given to relations in the case of those who have lost both parents.


In another part of the same volume Miss Smedley says of boarding-out—

"One of its greatest securities lies in the fact that if it is worked with any sort of success it must be worked by a number of earnest persons, co-operating, indeed, but yet acting with a certain healthy freedom and independence of each other. . . . It has the further advantage, that if a failure occurs, it affects only its own province. Like the water-tight compartments of a modern ship, one may be shattered and all the others remain intact. Separate life, space for individual development, power of adaptation to a great variety of needs, circumstances, and characters, convenience, cheapness, practicability as an experiment, without entailing any serious consequences if abandoned: on all these points—and they are points of high importance in dealing with pauper education—it does not seem possible to question its superiority to the other system" (*i.e.*, large schools).

Miss Smedley is speaking of pauper children; but surely the same arguments would apply, and it seems to me with increased force, to children of a higher class. Why should not orphan institutes be formed on the extraordinary system of considering, *first*, the benefit of the children? Surely while under seven or eight years of age that would be best secured by leaving them

with a mother or near relation. But of course proper care must be exercised to see that the money given is really expended on the child. Would not this be possible, and ought it not to be arranged at a less cost than nearly £2,000, divided among 435 children in working expenses? Societies might be formed after the fashion of the Protestant Orphanage Society in every county in England. Where it is necessary to board a child with strangers, care could be taken to select homes near good middle-class schools, and children might with advantage be placed in families as nearly as possible in their own rank of life. The gain would be to the better-class orphan all that Miss Smedley sees it would be to the pauper child, and more besides; for the children of the class who at present fill our orphanages would, if boarded out, have opportunities of making influential friends—friends more likely to stand to them *in loco parentis* than an institution possessing the most fascinating building that the most skilled architect ever planned.

HENRIETTA L. SYNNOT.



THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE ROMAN CATHOLICS.

WHEN Lord Melbourne was Prime Minister, in the first December of her Majesty's reign, there was a question before the House of Commons touching Irish Election Petitions. A young man addressed the House for some twenty minutes, amid "murmurs" and "interruption," until at last the "shouts" of members overwhelmed half a sentence. "The noble lord," said the maiden speaker, "might wave in one hand the Keys of St. Peter, and in the other——." Since that day Mr. Disraeli has sketched for us, with the fine satirical pencil of his tongue, a long gallery of Parliamentary portraits; they troop in the mind's eye, some with the supple step of his "red Indian of debate," others with the "Batavian grace" of his "hon. friend" the member for the University of Cambridge, but he was never permitted to finish this his first Parliamentary painting; and in place of Lord Melbourne's left hand he had to raise his own in deprecation and in prophecy that "the time will come when you will hear me." England had then effaced part of a great blot; a few years before she had conceded a tardy measure of justice to Roman Catholics, but even then there were few indeed of the Protestant majority who were sensible of the wrong, or in any way pained at the maintenance of religious disabilities of the most odious and insulting character.

The attention which we propose to invite to the relations of the Liberal party and the Catholics is suggested by the paper which

Mr. Pope Hennessy* contributed to the last number of this REVIEW; and in alluding to his own disqualifications as one "who has no longer the slightest pretensions to speak with the authority of a politician," Mr. Hennessy may be held to excuse the personality with which we must regard his work. He himself appears in the paper in two parts—conspicuously as a political Rip van Winkle, who, while the European world has been boiling in the caldron of controversy, has been slumbering among Labuans and West Africans, and as a Colonial Governor removed from the "struggles of party," who must not venture in the whirlwind of current politics. This, however, we must say, is a reserve to which Mr. Hennessy pretends; he is quite unable to maintain the rôle which he thinks most fitting for a Colonial Governor of savage tribes. In his swallow-flight through more than 200 years of history, he dips, like the bird in stormy weather, again and again to earth, pecking now at Mr. Gladstone, now at Cardinal Cullen, and chirping always when he meets with Mr. Disraeli, in whose brilliant and bejewelled utterances Mr. Hennessy delights to mirror himself. His paper is a eulogy of the policy of Mr. Disraeli, from the hour in which we have seen that distinguished man first rise in the House of Commons; and it is a censure of the Catholics for those wanderings from their "natural alliance" with the Tory party of which they have, especially under the leadership of Mr. Gladstone, been, as he alleges, so frequently and foolishly guilty.

We have followed his example in giving Mr. Disraeli a leading place in this reply because he is the hero of Mr. Hennessy's paper—"the highest living authority on political parties," "the most successful party organizer that the Conservatives of England have ever known," the *beau idéal* of a Tory Catholic in a State of which the vast majority is Protestant. And we shall understand Mr. Hennessy better if we recognize how gladly he would be Mr. Disraeli if he were not Mr. Hennessy. We had a special object in referring to Mr. Disraeli's maiden speech. His hat once covered a party in Parliament, and so did Mr. Pope Hennessy's. It is a matter of history—Mr. Hennessy says so—that "the Tory Catholic party that was formed in 1859" had a "solitary representative" in Parliament, one who has now returned from places far more outlandish than Lord Macaulay's New Zealand, to contemplate the stability of the Church of Rome from a seat upon the ruins of his party. And now in what his political master would denote as his "historical conscience," Mr. Hennessy thinks that minute and single-voiced body "attracted some attention, and may, perhaps, be said to mark a turning-point in the recent history of the Catholic party." To those who object, Mr. Hennessy

* "The Tory Party and the Catholics," CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, July 1875.

might well say, "Why smile, why envy me, why not let me enjoy that reflection?" as Mr. Disraeli pleaded when the House, on the evening to which we have referred, met with "loud laughter" his assurance that he stood "not formally, but in some degree virtually, as the representative of a great number of members of Parliament;" and for the present, until in due course we refer to the noble lord, the Tory Catholic and Home Ruler, upon whom Mr. Hennessy's mantle has, in these days, fallen, and who, with more sweetness and less light than his predecessor, does his best to preserve the solitary traditions of the party, we must leave Mr. Hennessy in sole possession of the Tory Catholic representation.

We do not propose to tarry long in the far-extending plains of historical record; but to touch Mr. Hennessy's ideas at their fount, we must pass up the stream of history to the time of Charles I., when that thing, so horrid alike to Mr. Disraeli and to Mr. Hennessy—when "Puritanism" had its origin. The Catholics then fought with the Church of England for the Crown. "The faith that is associated with loyalty to the Crown and an aversion to Puritanical tenets compelled them to do so." Mr. Hennessy, like Mr. Disraeli, is full of finesse of this sort. You may infer, if you please, that the Catholics of that period rather liked the Protestantism of the Church of England, and that the Puritanism of the coming Lord Protector was the only thing that their souls abhorred. We shall probably do no wrong to Mr. Hennessy if we trace his indebtedness to Mr. Disraeli for this stroke, so clever in a country where Protestantism is powerful, and Puritanism is but a dim idea and a vague recollection. In 1844, the present Prime Minister ascribed the then condition of Ireland—with, as he said, "a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, an alien Church, and the weakest Executive in the world"—"not to Protestantism but to Puritanism." That Puritanism, as a reaction from the unprincipled rule of Charles I., and afterwards as a protest against the licentious reign of Charles II., had its excesses, there can be no doubt; but Puritanism was the warden, the depositary, the very essence and power of Protestantism. The two things were, in fact, synonymous. Mr. Hennessy himself shows this in his complaint that "the Puritan Parliament was constantly quarrelling with the King (Charles II.) on account of his attempts to protect the Catholics." "Protect" is a mild word to employ in this connection. There would have been little Protestantism remaining in the Church of England, had it not been for the Puritanism of the period. Mr. Hennessy is all for the Merry Monarch and against Puritanism. He says:—"No period of English history has been so misrepresented as the reign of Charles II.; even Catholic writers have blindly copied the Whig calumnies against the King." We do not wonder at this; the

alliance is natural; the Stuarts always, as Macaulay says of Charles, "liked a Papist better than a Puritan;" but the Protestant Church of England would certainly have passed away, had it not been for the strength of Puritanism. Mr. Disraeli, in apology for the speech from which we have last quoted, has spoken of "the heedless rhetoric, which is the appanage of all who sit below the gangway," but his "historical conscience" recognizes the sentiment of that speech as "right." The same high court of appeal will, no doubt, reconcile his abuse of Puritanism in times when men like Laud, the greatest of Ritualists, ruled the Church of England, with his ardent support in 1874 of a Bill to "put down" that party in the Church of England. What was that period, and who was that monarch of Mr. Hennessy's eulogy—that Stuart period when the alliance of Tory and Catholic was cemented in blood? If wasted opportunity be the truest measure of failure, then Charles II. was the worst sovereign who ever occupied the English throne. And we believe that he fully deserves this title. His profligacy and prodigality have been painted in that famous death-bed scene where his sultanas muttered "Aves," and gamblers counted their gold, while the French Ambassador helped to smuggle the priest Huddleston to his bedside that he might die a Catholic; he violated the most sacred public law, in allowing more than three years to elapse between the dissolution and convocation of a Parliament; he encouraged fraud in the public service, and as Macaulay says of his time—

"From the nobleman who held the white staff and the great seal down to the humblest tide-waiter and gauger, what would now be called gross corruption was practised without disguise and without reproach. Titles, places, commissions, pardons, were daily sold in market overt by the great dignitaries of the realm, and every clerk in every department imitated to the best of his power the evil example."

We do not grudge the Tory party the fullest recollection of the period in which Mr. Hennessy dates the foundation of the Catholic alliance; an alliance, the true basis of which was confirmed by the late Lord Derby—"the Rupert of debate"—when that Cavalier politician said at Liverpool in 1859—

"I am happy to say that I have for some time past perceived a growing inclination [on the part of Roman Catholics] to alienate themselves from the advanced Liberal party, and to unite themselves with those who are *their natural allies*, the Conservatives of this country."

As Mr. Pope Hennessy is a distinguished servant of the Crown, we will not, though he has given us to understand that there was but one Tory Catholic in Parliament at the time, inquire too closely whether he is the gentleman who decorates himself upon the birthday of "King James III.;" but, in following the "natural alliance," it is instructive to notice that he and Mr. Disraeli are at

one in repudiating the settlement of the Crown in 1688. The present Prime Minister, in 1841, "had not the slightest doubt that those [the Liberals, who at that time had Lord Melbourne at their head] who have twice tampered with the succession would do so a third time, if occasion required it;" and Mr. Hennessy, who is all for King James, writes of the defeat by Sarsfield of "the Whig usurper at Limerick."

The "alliance" is by both assumed to have blossomed and borne fruit in the time of Mr. Pitt. From "the benignant policy of Charles I.," Mr. Disraeli passed, in 1844, to that of "Mr. Pitt, the last of Tory statesmen," who proposed "measures for the settlement of Ireland, which, had they been agreed to by Parliament, would have saved Ireland from her present condition;" and Mr. Hennessy is at pains to make out that Pitt's leaning towards the Roman Catholics of Ireland was the result of natural friendliness and affection for their religious system. He repudiates "the language of O'Connell" imputing fear as the moving power with the Tory statesman, and, to his own mind, satisfactorily rebuts this "language" by the demonstration, "that it was not fear that actuated Pitt in making the concessions which O'Connell says conciliated the Catholics and separated them from the Republicans, is evident from the fact, that at the very time he was maturing and carrying his plans of Emancipation he was refusing to repeal the Test Act, that pressed only on the Protestant Dissenters." Now, we have no intention of disputing the alliance between Pitt and the Catholics; we are quite of the late Lord Derby's opinion, that Tories and Catholics are "natural allies;" we are of Mr. Disraeli's opinion, that he and his friends are, in regard to the Roman Catholic religion, "the natural allies of the Irish people;"* but our "historical conscience" demands that the "heedless rhetoric" of Mr. Disraeli's Roman Catholic disciple should not pass uncorrected; and we must enforce our denial of Mr. Hennessy's assertion that "Pitt was really moved by his genuine friendship" for the Roman Catholic body.

Mr. Froude tells us that Burke's "advice to Pitt, his advice to the world, was to save his countrymen from the revolutionary tempter by restoring to them the privileges of citizenship;" that the prelates by whom "the Catholic Committee in Dublin had hitherto submitted to be guided," "terrified at the aspect of France, were inclined to the English connection;" and further, that, in 1790, "confident in Pitt's disposition towards them, the Catholic prelates published a letter condemning revolutionary principles." Now what was Mr. Pitt's disposition? Mr. Froude† says that,

* Speech on Ireland, Feb. 16, 1844.

† "English in Ireland," vol. iii. p. 59.

"in the well-disposed, loyal, and pious Catholics, he was hoping to find a Conservative element to cool the revolutionary fever." But we have the best evidence of Pitt's disposition in the letters from his colleague, Dundas, to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Dundas says that the Ministers wished only "that the Protestants should decide for themselves how far a slight concession might safely be made;" and he adds, in a "most private" communication,* which has eluded Mr. Hennessy's eye—

"I have nothing further to say, except that I and all his Majesty's Ministers have some reason to complain of the spirit and temper which have manifested themselves among our friends in Ireland in this business. If they had made no advances to us in the matter, we should have left it to their own judgment. But all through the summer and autumn they were expressing their fears to us of a union between the Catholics and the Dissenters. They asked for our opinion, and we gave it. What motive could we have, except an anxious concern for the security of the Irish Establishment? Whether we are right or wrong, time will show; but there is no imaginable reason why this opinion should have been received with jealousy.

"Mr. Pitt concurs in everything I have said. He and I have not a shade of difference in our opinion."

This at once ruins Mr. Hennessy's argument as to Pitt's friendship, while it exposes the true motive of Pitt's action. He must have been "moved by his genuine friendship," Mr. Hennessy contends, because, while he was promoting Catholic Emancipation, he was refusing to abolish the Test Act. But we have made it clear that the sense of justice did not enter into his calculations. He indulged in a "flirtation"—to use the word of the Viceroy of the time—with the Catholics, because, as that high functionary wrote, "it is good policy that the Catholics should be attached to the English Government," and because he wished to baffle the Dissenters, from whom he had no scruple in withholding justice, by maintaining the Test Act.

We have said that Mr. Hennessy appears as a Catholic Rip van Winkle; that, fortunately for his organization, to the heat of the tropics has not been superadded the torrid atmosphere of religious controversy, which has blown like a sirocco over Europe. Take, for example, his innocent reference, as "a student of history" following "the growth of Mr. Pitt's sentiments respecting the Catholics," to the application made by that Minister "to the Universities on the Continent for those authoritative expositions of Catholic principles with which he showed that his clients were the best friends of order and of a Conservative Monarchy." What were these "authoritative expositions?" Mr. Froude tells us, in the volume from which we have before quoted—

"Pitt sought the opinion of the Universities of France and Spain on the charges generally alleged against Catholics—that their allegiance to their

* "English in Ireland," vol. iii. p. 43.

Sovereign was subordinate to their allegiance to the Pope," &c. . . .
 "The Universities had unanimously disavowed doctrines which they declared at once inhuman and un-Christian; and, on the strength of the disavowal, the British Parliament repealed the Penal Acts of William for England and Scotland, and restored to the Catholics the free use of their chapels, and readmitted them to the magistracy."

Mr. Gladstone has reminded us, in his "Expostulation," that a similar proceeding was adopted in the current century, when Catholic Emancipation in England was the question of the day; and he has recorded the "declaration," in 1826, of the Vicars Apostolic—

"That the allegiance which Catholics hold to be due and are bound to pay to their Sovereign and to the civil authority of the State is perfect and undivided."

He has also quoted the Bishops' "Pastoral Address to the Clergy and Laity of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland," in Art. xi. of which—

"They declare, on oath, their belief that it is not an article of the Catholic faith, neither are they thereby required to believe, that the Pope is infallible."

Now, from Mr. Pope Hennessy asleep in the tropics, let us turn to the Tory Catholic in the present Parliament, and see how the opinions of the party bear upon these "expositions." Lord Robert Montagu, a recent convert, now occupies the place of Mr. Pope Hennessy, and this "callow, candid Catholic," as we have elsewhere described him, has, in reply to Mr. Gladstone, expounded the Tory Catholic creed, both political and religious.* "We," says the Tory Catholic party of the present, "owe the strictest allegiance to the Queen, and yield to no subject of her realms in loyalty; we also owe the same to the Pope; because the one power is subordinate to the other, just as the end of the State is subordinate to the end of the Church, and as the body is subordinate to the soul;"—"thus the civil society which has the care of one end is subordinate to the society which looks after the other end;"—"and so the State is subordinate to the Church." "Kings must be subordinate to the Sovereign Pontiff," says the Tory Catholic of our day, and "in all questions of disputed jurisdiction between Church and State, the head of the Church must overrule the government of the State;" and it is "not," as Mr. Gladstone thinks, "an 'exorbitant claim,' but most rational; nay, a necessity wherever there is not to be a chaos," that the principles of the Papal Church should recognize in the Pontiff "the right to determine the province of his own rights."

No doubt Mr. Hennessy thinks the thing was better done in his time, and perhaps it is a pity that he took to practising instead of

* "Expostulation in Extremis." By Lord Robert Montagu, M.P. 1874.

preaching the art of government. But much has happened since he quitted Parliament, and Lord Robert Montagu is, we can assure Mr. Hennessy, quite in the fashion of the day. Lord Robert would deride, if he were aware of it, the opinion of the Universities which reported to Mr. Pitt. He tells us that our "vaunt and glory in England is" that we have a "*limited monarchy*," and he implies that the Pope is the proper limiting power. He says a king "cannot be prevented from falling into the practice of tyranny, except he is regarded as subordinate to a superior authority. . . Such a Supreme Ruler has been provided by our Lord. He is the ruler of the Universal Commonwealth—of the Catholic Church." Yet something more has happened since the former Tory Catholic party in Parliament accepted a Colonial Governorship. This king of kings—this old man who has far less acquaintance with the world (of which he has seen only a few leagues) than the Seyyid or the Shah—this Pope has become infallible. Against this assumption of all Catholic authority, the illustrious statesman who was lately Prime Minister has issued an "Expostulation," and the line of our inquiry now leads us to consider how are the relations of the two great parties with the Catholics affected by the definition of this dogma.

The cardinal principle of Liberal policy is that the supreme government of a State shall be—the governed; and to this end Liberals are the natural allies of those who seek to be relieved from any questionable disability which prevents their participation in this power. The Liberal political creed teaches that civilization is concurrent, if not synonymous, with the extension and the proper exercise of civil rights; and instead of declaring with Mr. Disraeli,* "If government is not divine, it is nothing," we are disposed to say: "If government is not human, it is nothing." It is because Mr. Disraeli believes that† "an intelligent age will never discard the divine right of government," that he is a "natural ally" of Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholic power has been by the Vatican Decrees constituted an absolutism, a despotism, so changed in character that even Liberal Catholics cannot bend the knee to its yoke; how much, then, is it altered in the eyes of Liberal politicians who are not Catholics? Mr. Hennessy is not yet awake to all this, and we strongly recommend him to study the recent writings of the most acute of the princes of his Church—of that eminent prelate whose policy he has the presumption to condemn, though the name of Cardinal Manning is never mentioned in his paper. No one has laboured with more skill or with greater success than Cardinal Manning to prove that the Vatican Decrees have not altered the status of the

* Speech on Irish Church, April 8, 1868.

† Ibid.

Papacy. But he has failed because he cannot deny the existence of a vast body of opinion in his Church, which formerly recognized a different authority in the Pope from that which his Holiness now claims. Contesting the view of his "brother," Mgr. Maret, expressed in "*Du Conseil Général et la Paix Religieuse*," that "no judgments are certainly *ex cathedrâ* except when the Pontiff acts with the concurrence of the Bishops," Cardinal Manning wrote,* "The Ultramontane opinion is simply this, that the Pontiff's teaching *ex cathedrâ* in faith or morals is infallible. In this there are no shades or moderation. It is simply ay or no."

This is the Ultramontane faith, which except a man believe, he cannot partake in the most sacred offices of the Roman Catholic Church. But it was not always so, and we hold Cardinal Manning to admit this, indirectly in his laboured arguments against "the Gallican idea," and directly in the Pastoral Letter of the present year, in which he says:—"We are now told that the civil powers of the world can hold no relations with a Pope who is infallible. No account is, however, given of the fact that the civil powers have hitherto been in concord and amity for a thousand years with an infallible Church." There is just the difference; the justification of Mr. Gladstone's "Expostulation." The government of the Church has, by a revolution, been changed into the government of the Pope. Perhaps we may measure the difference most accurately by regarding the conduct of Pitt in 1791, and of the House of Lords Committee in 1825, and reflecting how absurd it would appear, were Mr. Disraeli to address inquiries to the Universities of France and Spain, or to interrogate Irish prelates for "authoritative expositions" of the Vatican policy! The response of the Universities, like that of Bishop Doyle, was in flat contradiction to the Ultramontane doctrine. The Pope of our day is infallible, and he dares to trample on the primary duty of the German or any other State—that of compelling obedience to its laws—in publicly declaring—

"To all whom it may concern, as also to the whole Catholic world, that those [Falck] laws are null and void, as being utterly opposed to the divine Constitution of the Church. For it is not the powerful of this world that the Lord has placed over the Bishops of the Church, in all that concerns His holy ministry, but St. Peter, to whom He entrusted not only His lambs, but also his sheep, to feed."†

No Liberal can be in "natural alliance" with a power making invasive claims of this sort. It is the reduction of infallibility to absurdity for the Pope to pretend that the German Govern-

* Postscript to Pastoral of 1869.

† Encyclical Letter to Archbishops and Bishops of Prussia, Feb., 1875.

ment, by imprisoning a bishop for contumacy against the law of the State, deprives him of the spiritual quality, whatever that may be, of episcopacy. The punishment, the severity of which we deplore, relates to the misuse, in regard to the law of the State, of functions and authority which he exercises from and in the buildings of the State. The supremacy of the civil power over any particular religious denomination in all that affects the law, the property, or any disposition of the income, of the State, is, as we have said in other words, the cardinal principle of Liberalism; and inasmuch as Vaticanism invades this principle in the most uncompromising manner, there can be no "natural alliance" of Catholics with the Liberal party. There can be fortuitous alliance, as there has been, but every step by which the Catholic, in a State like ours, advances to religious liberty and equality, diminishes for ever the duration of a common policy with the Liberal party. Mr. Hennessy's contention is that it has been a mistaken course for the Catholics ever to co-operate with the Liberal party. They might, he argues, have trusted for enfranchisement to the friendship or self-interest of the Tory party, which would have sought them as allies against Radicalism. With regard to religious equality, he indicates that in helping the Liberal party to convert the remainder of the Irish Church property to secular uses, they lost, for the time, at least, their chance of furthering the more profitable Tory policy of concurrent endowment, and Mr. Hennessy is evidently of opinion that, if the Catholics will only return and remain faithful to their "natural alliance," something of this sort may yet be theirs. He blames the Irish Catholic policy which helped to drive "the Prelates of the Anglican Church from the House of Lords;" he extols the Tory support of the measure which, in 1774, secured tithes to the Roman Catholic clergy of Canada; he lauds Charles II., but has no words of praise for George III., who "refused to allow Pitt to complete emancipation and to establish concurrent endowment" in Ireland.

The tactics of the Tories will be to strengthen the "natural alliance," and to sever the Catholics from the Liberal party by dangling before their eyes the possibility of a reversion to this policy. The present Premier in 1844 commended Pitt's policy, and affirmed that it would have "settled the Church Question;" in 1868 he vindicated the proposal to grant a charter to a Roman Catholic University, in affirming that "in Ireland the wise policy is to create and not to destroy, and to strengthen Protestant institutions by being just to the Roman Catholics."* In the same speech he suggested, as superior to Mr. Gladstone's policy,

* Speech on Irish Church, April 3, 1868.

the introduction of "measures which would have elevated the status of the unendowed clergy of Ireland, and so softened and terminated those feelings of inequality." He even argued that "the principle of property would be vindicated in a much higher degree by the principle of restitution [of Church property to Roman Catholics], and so it might be contended that there was no violation of property at all." This, however, we—and the Catholics—must remember was said in his place as Prime Minister *before* the crushing defeat of the Conservative party in the election which carried Mr. Gladstone to power in 1868. *After* that event we find the policy of Pitt, of Mr. Hennessy, and, we believe, of Mr. Disraeli also, placed quite in the background. The people of the United Kingdom, and especially the Conservative borough-voters had in many places fought to the cry of "No Popery!"

At this point, then, we shall do well to inquire what is the strength, and what the weakness, of the undoubted "natural alliance" between the Tory party and the Catholics? The strength is the innate Conservatism of the two bodies, a strength which brings them into close and continual alliance in all the Catholic States of the world; the weakness lies in the fact that two eminently Conservative classes—the shopkeepers and farmers of England and Scotland—are also the most obstinately Protestant. The alliance is therefore "natural" rather than "kindly." We have seen Lord North in 1774 trying to strengthen himself against the Liberal policy by endowing the Roman Catholic clergy of Canada; Pitt pursuing the same idea, and for the same motives, in 1791; and Disraeli in 1844 and 1868 labouring to detach the Catholics from the Liberal party by suggesting concurrent endowment as preferable to religious equality. The "natural alliance" always endures; the co-operation or the kindliness between English Conservatives and Catholics depends upon whether the Catholic demand menaces any institution dear to the superior strength of Protestant ascendancy in the Conservative party. Just now the two have found a wide common ground of action, and in several English boroughs the Roman Catholics in 1874 gave decisive aid to the Conservative candidates because of their concurrence upon the great question of education. Mr. Hennessy points with glee to the occasion when

"The powerful party of the Church of England, and the small, but compact, party of Catholics in England, made an open alliance on the 8th April, 1870, in St. James's Hall, when the Duke of Norfolk and the Marquis of Salisbury, the Duke of Northumberland and the Chairman of the Catholic School Committee, Lord Sandon, Mr. Beresford Hope, and a crowded meeting of the leaders of both Churches, assembled in support of religious education. They voted together at the Parliamentary elections in 1874, and they can now be seen every week assisting each other most cordially at the School Boards."

There they sit, and there they will continue in "natural alliance." In Ireland, the alliance will probably be strengthened by the suggestion of concurrent endowment rather than secularization, when the surplus property of the Irish Church comes to be dealt with. There is no rock ahead in the course of the alliance in Ireland, except the great stumbling-block of Home Rule. Mr. Hennessy, with the political agility of one who has long quitted the arena of politics for more healthy intercourse with barbarous people, jumps lightly over it, and writes of Mr. Butt as the leader of the "Irish Catholic party." It is only a Catholic party in so far as Home Rule would give ascendancy to the Catholics in an Irish Parliament, and it would be in alliance with the Liberal party if ever that party should promote a policy of decentralization in the direction of Home Rule.

It remains only to consider how the great question of disestablishment would affect the "natural alliance" of Tories and Catholics in this island. But for this question, the alliance would certainly endure and grow stronger every day: will it last when the superior status of the Church of England is seriously menaced—when the disendowment of Ritualist clergy is the demand of angry Churchmen, when religious equality is the cry of the Nonconformist, and loudest perhaps of those Dissenters who, for respectability's sake, and to be all things to all men, have feigned acquiescence in the existence of the Establishment? The Conservative party, prizing the Establishment infinitely above the Catholic alliance, would then repeat, with approval, the nonsense which Mr. Disraeli uttered in 1868, when he defined "religious equality" as "that state of things where a man has complete and perfect enjoyment of his religion, and can uphold and vindicate his religious privileges in the courts of law." Yet, perhaps, even more audacious was his statement on the same occasion that the Dissenter "considers himself to be on perfectly equal terms" with the members of the Establishment. But what would the Roman Catholic say? Mr. Hennessy would have him stand by the Church of England, opposing disestablishment and disendowment, both or either, as anti-Catholic policy. He censures the action of the Irish Catholics in 1868; he declares that the agitation which preceded the passing of the Irish Church Act "was not for a Catholic object;" and we all remember Mr. Gladstone's quotation from the *Osservatore Romano*, of which Mr. Hennessy speaks as "the authoritative Papal organ," showing that the Pope preferred concurrent endowment. It is for this that we believe Catholics, both in England and Ireland, will intrigue and contend, and the "natural alliance" will lead some at least of the Tory leaders to look with increasing kindness on the "levelling up" policy. Mr. Hennessy reproves Cardinal Manning, among "the leading Catholic prelates

in England," for urging Catholic voters to support Mr. Gladstone as a "great Liberal statesman" after "his public announcement that Rome disapproved of his Irish Church scheme;" and his Eminence has himself denounced "the desecration of the civil power by the rejection of the Church," and "the impossible theory of a free Church in a free State."* But then this applies to his own Church, and we cannot affirm that Cardinal Manning would object to disestablishment if he were assured that would give the Catholics a prospect of concurrent endowment. And while the Liberal party will shrink from concurrent endowment, they will hardly be encouraged by the example of Ireland to follow a similar policy to that of the Irish Church Act. In nothing has Mr. Disraeli shown the essential weakness of his statesmanship more thoroughly than in his unfortunate prophecies in regard to the Irish Church Bill. He said, "I want to impress on the House that no permanent endowment can accrue from this scheme." We will take the case of the bishopric of Derry as a refutation of Mr. Disraeli, as an exasperation to the Roman Catholic, and as a warning to the British Radical. The see of Derry is now, in spite of Mr. Disraeli's prophecy, permanently endowed with £50,000, or £2,000 a year, as much as Mr. Disraeli proposes to give his new English bishop; and, beyond this, the Bishop of Derry has received £62,000 by way of commutation for the surplus of his income. One cannot expect Mr. Disraeli's friends "the unendowed [Roman Catholic] clergy of Ireland" to admire the process by which this result has been achieved, nor does it well bear out Mr. Disraeli's denunciation of Mr. Gladstone's Bill as "sacrilegious spoliation," for we suppose that nothing which enters into a bishop's pocket defileth legislation. The Liberal party and the Catholics are now divorced; whether they will come together again is very doubtful; it depends upon the attitude of the Liberal party towards the question of Home Rule in Ireland, and upon the attitude of the Catholics with reference to the policy of disestablishment in this island.

ARTHUR ARNOLD.

* "Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam," 1873



NOTES OF AN INDIAN JOURNEY.

IV.

JAN. 3rd.—A much finer day, with occasional relapses into dust-gloom, and thunder.

We went in the morning to the church in the civil station. It was, like many of the buildings round Lahore, originally a tomb—the tomb, they say, of a dancing-girl. I know not whether that was so; but sure I am that it has been sufficiently consecrated since to satisfy all moderate requirements, though, naturally enough, many residents desire a more convenient and more ecclesiastical building.

The Lahore of to-day is a mere shadow of its former self. “If Lahore were not inhabited,” ran the old saying, “Ispahan would be half the world.”

Its fame had reached the ear of Milton, who speaks of

“Cambalu, seat of Cathaian Can,
And Samarchand by Oxus, Temir’s throne,
To Paquin of Sinsæan kings; and thence
To Agra and Lahore of Great Mogul.”

Paradise Lost, Bk. xi. v. 388—391.

You hardly drive a hundred yards in some directions without seeing that in its prime it was an immense city; but a long series of calamities had brought it very low before we took the country, and the capital began to rise from its ruins in a new and much altered shape.

Seen from above, the native town presents a far more varied

outline to the sky than any other I have yet seen in India, thanks to many houses being higher, to the close-set minarets and domes, as well as to the fact that the lofty fort rises in, and not, as at Agra and Allahabad, outside of it.

In the afternoon we went with our host and the General commanding the Lahore division to the church of Meeanmeer, a very good building, much the best of the kind I have seen since I landed. It is amusingly characteristic of India and its ways that the march to and taking of Magdala was one of the episodes in the life of the architect.

Jan. 4th.—We left Lahore at eight o'clock, and were forwarded along the partially completed State railway to Wuzeerabad, some sixty miles off. The line crosses the Ravee, the ancient Hydraotes, soon after leaving the station, and traverses the parched dreariness of the Retchna Doab, passing Goojranwalla, a populous trading town, but no other place of importance.

At Wuzeerabad, we were met by the post carriages, which were to take us on to the westward. Leaving our servants to make the necessary arrangements, and to go round by a bridge of boats, we started, with the engineer in charge of the Chenaub bridge, to see the works, travelling partly in a trolley and partly by boat. Nothing that I have seen in India has taken me so much by surprise as this river. To judge from the map, the Chenaub, the ancient Acesines, does not seem to be greater than his neighbours. Even now, however, his waters are much more ample. We saw people wading the Ravee, whereas the Chenaub was at this, the driest moment of a particularly dry season, rushing along thirty feet deep. In the rains it is a fearful torrent, some $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles in width, and terribly rapid. Communication between the banks is often impossible, no available boat having been yet able to live in those swirling waves.

The bridge is going to be a grand construction, and may, perhaps, be finished in 1876, before the end of the Indian financial year, on the 31st of March. It has been built to carry comparatively light trains, not the much heavier ones now contemplated, since the change in the policy about the use of the metre gauge on the line towards Peshawur.

After saying good-bye to our friendly and hospitable guide, we continued our journey from the western bank of the Chenaub, along the Grand Trunk Road, which is bordered here, as in other parts of it which I have seen, by long lines of Babool, under which a horseman can canter along as he might among the beech-bordered lanes of the Chilterns. The pace was good, and we got into the posting bungalow, the inn of this country, in time to have a stroll under magnificent starlight before we went to our rough but sufficiently comfortable beds.

Shortly before reaching our night quarters, we crossed the Jhelum, Hydaspes of classic memory, the river, too, of the Vale of Cashmere.

Jan. 5th.—We are close to the boundary of the Maharajah of Cashmere, and all day a grand snowy range in his territories is a joy to our eyes. It is more like the Pyrenees, as seen in early spring, from Pau, than any other which I remember; but much more serrated and higher. I thought about the finest of many fine views was the one from the post-house at 120 miles from Lahore.

Our way for some time lay over the spurs of the Salt range which stood up to the south of us. The sections that met my eye were soft sandstone, clay, conglomerate, and loose rolled pebbles.

We pushed on through a country cut to pieces by the rains—a perfect labyrinth of ravines and clay-banks; I never saw anything like it in surface or colouring except the district of Radicofani on the old Sienna road to Rome. Here and there clay-banks have taken the shape of the famous earth pillars, near Botzen, but I saw none nearly so high.

This Sind Sagar Doab, as the country between the Jhelum and the Indus is called, is a most desolate region except in a few favoured spots, and deserved to be coupled by Horace with the Caucasus.

As we neared our destination, we came to the camp of a European regiment on its march, over which hovered a number of vultures, who must surely have been reading some of the outpourings of our alarmists about Russia and her sinister designs. Soon we overtook a portion of the regiment, the men marching, the women in bullock-carts thatched with dried grass, the sick in litters, or doolies, the same beneficent contrivances which a great English orator mistook for a ferocious tribe which carried off the wounded! At length we reached Rawul Pindee, whose trim Dodonæa hedges and well painted railings were a strange contrast to the region through which we had been passing.

Here, under the roof of the General commanding the division, we passed a very pleasant evening, with much interesting talk about Indian military affairs.

Jan. 6th.—We continued our journey, starting about 6 a.m., and running straight to the westward. Most beautiful was the sunrise as we looked back, the unclouded horizon one blaze of red, on the upper edge of which was the moon, and high above this again, the morning star.

Day dawned on the same sort of dusty wilderness which we traversed yesterday. The hills were nearer, and we knew that the Sanitarium of Murree was only five hours to the north, but we

did not see the snowy range till we had got a good many miles on our way.

Traffic on the road much as yesterday and the day before—long strings of camels (R—counted one of 193 on the 4th), small laden donkeys, and bullock-carts. The population is of course very scanty, for there is nothing to eat. What people there are live in mud villages, very like those of Egypt.

Some seventeen miles from Rawul Pindee, a solid but extremely ugly monument commemorates the name of General Nicholson. We climbed to the platform at its base, through scrub composed chiefly of the *Justicea Adhatoda*, now covered with its white acanthoid flowers, and looked over the treeless and desolate landscape, which would be frightful if it were not for its clear atmosphere, and depressing if it were not for its crisp, almost frosty air. Somewhere near this is the site of Taxila.

Ere long, we came to a bright little river, of thoroughly European appearance, and passed into a country which might be in the Basque provinces. Long lines of fruit-trees, now without their leaves, are planted in the fields. I cannot see, as we gallop by, what they are, but they are wholly un-Indian, as we have hitherto seen India, in their general effect.

There was not much to claim our attention between this and the Indus at Attock, which we reached soon after mid-day, having left fifty-five miles behind us.

The view from the posting bungalow is fine. Right in front the horizon is bounded by a chain of mountains, some west, some east, of the great river. The mass which abuts on it to the north-west is the Mahabun, which certain geographers identify with the Aornos of Alexander, while others give that name to the hill which rises opposite Attock.

Between the mountains and the Indus is a great level, while between it and the spot where we stand, is furthest off a channel, about as broad as the Spey, at Fochabers, and very like it; then a gravel bank; then another swiftly running branch of the river about the same size as the first; then a considerable breadth of black rocks, covered in the rains, but dry and parched now; then the post road, and the broken ground of the hill on which the posting bungalow is built.

The executive engineer employed here accompanied us about the place, showed us the old Mahometan fort, the bridge of boats, and the site of the unfinished tunnel under the Indus. The river at Attock is comparatively narrow, and this is one of the things which have given the place its great historical importance. Above it the Indus is wild and unrestrained, but here it again enters a hilly region, and flows for many miles through a deep and, as I am told, very picturesque gorge.

The Indus left behind, we hurried on up the western bank, and reached ere long the mouth of the Cabul river.

We ran along its southern bank, over a dreary plain, where little grows, at least at this season; but, after passing Nowshera, where there is a pretty large body of troops, we came into a more cultivated country, with careful irrigation. At length, before it was dark, we got into Peshawur, having passed over one hundred miles in less than twelve hours, in spite of stoppages.

Jan. 7th.—A gloomy morning. We went out early under the guidance of the Commissioner, with whom we are staying, and climbed to the top of the old Residency, which, in still older days, was the house of Avitabile. The mountains were only half-seen through the mist which veiled them. It is a sad pity that rain has not fallen since September. A day of rain in the valley would have covered the mountains with snow almost to their base, while at the same time they would have become perfectly clear. As it was, however, we could make out a good deal, and learned, amongst other things, that the fold in the nearest range, which we had guessed to be the mouth of the Khyber, was really and indeed what we took it to be. We consoled ourselves by reflecting that if the weather had been clear it would also have been extremely cold. A fire has been known to be thought agreeable at Peshawur as late as the 24th of May.

In the afternoon, we drove through the city. All the roofs are flat in this country, but here they have round them a sort of walled palisade, to enable the women to go about unseen. From our vantage ground, at the top of the highest building in the place, we could, however, inspect the nurseries, which were not more interesting to strangers than others elsewhere.

In these regions, you are aware, one only sees women who cannot afford a servant going about in the streets, and here in Peshawur those one does see are closely veiled, not in the delightful semi-transparent pretences of Stamboul, but in a stout white garment cut into lattice work at the eyes.

As we looked over the housetops, I said to my guide: "Now, what town to the westward will this compare with? How is it by Meshed?" "Oh, Meshed," he replied, "is a much more considerable place, with some very good buildings indeed." "And how is it by Herat?" "If you remember," he replied, "we never saw Herat. We had to turn aside." "How, then, by Candahar?" "Well, very much the same, putting the great Mosque there out of the comparison."

As we drove through the streets, our questions were many. "Who is that?" "An Afreedee." "And that?" "Probably a hill Momund." "And that?" "A Hindoo of the town." "And that?" "A Mussulman of the town." "And that?" "A Cabulee." "And that?" "A headman of one of our outlying villages." "And that?"

"A Hindoo of the hills, who is to the wild Pathans what the Jews were to England in the middle ages." "And that?" "A Ghilzie, one of the fellows who killed so many of our soldiers in the retreat from Cabul;" and so on. The place is a "Sentina Gentium."

Among other characteristic sights, I note the saddle-bags of rough Persian carpet, the piles of chopped sugar-cane, the short strings of jasmine flowers, the strong matting and rope, made from the *Chamærops Ritchiana*, the scarves of thick dark blue cotton, with bright coloured ends, often worn as a plaid, the strong Cabul ponies, the Bazaar, built by Avitabile, and full of silk-workers.

One street I saw was narrow, and had a look of Cairo; but most were fairly broad, and sanitary considerations had had their due weight.

If Peshawur has less to show in the way of buildings than many places of 52,000 inhabitants, the cause is partly to be sought in its exposed situation, and partly in its great liability to earthquakes. Most of the walls are built in compartments, with a view to render these as little destructive as possible.

After our return home, our host came to my room, and we had a long talk, by no means the first in our lives, over certain aspects of what is commonly called the Central Asian Question, but which, if it is to be spoken of in the singular number at all, would be more accurately, if less conveniently, described as the Russo-Anglo-Turco-Egypto-Perso-Indo-Afghan-Uzbek question: a ridiculous word, no doubt, but not ridiculous if it impresses on the mind the truth that what we call the Central Asian Question is really, like the equally misnamed Eastern Question in Europe, made up of a great number of questions.

On some of these questions, and these the ones which touch ourselves most nearly, there is no better authority living than Sir Richard Pollock, and it is well that such an important political outpost as this is under the care of so well-informed and cool-headed a watcher of events.

Jan. 8th.—General Wilson, commanding the Peshawur brigade, was good enough to have the troops out for us to see. We started after an early breakfast, and riding past the uncompleted fortified enclosure, soon found ourselves in the open plain; on the other side of the so-called Circular road, to be beyond which, in ordinary circumstances, is to be "out of bounds."

Presently we joined the General, and reined in our horses at a point where we had the whole force between us and the mouth of the Khyber. It was very dusty, and we feared that as soon as the troops got into motion nothing could be discerned; but a light breeze, springing up from the north, carried the dust away. This is, I suppose, the grandest parade-ground in the whole of the Empire, as the Phoenix Park in Dublin is perhaps the

prettiest. The force, though not large, was worthy of its place of exercise. There was the Horse Artillery and the 17th, and the 72nd Highlanders, and a regiment of lancers, whose nucleus was Hodson's horse, and the corps which takes its name from the historical defence of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, with several others of not less efficiency and fame. Last, but not least, was the Elephant battery, with its gigantic Armstrongs, famous all through Central Asia. The wise beasts saluted as they passed General Wilson, I was going to say like any Christian, when it occurred to me that I could not by possibility use a more inappropriate expression, for never was there a force to which the lines in the "Siege of Corinth" could be more emphatically applied.

" They were of all tongues and creeds,
Some were those who counted beads,
Some of mosque and some of church,
And some, or I mis-say, of neither."

It was a striking sight, and none the less striking because one knew that the men before us, and those who were lying behind them, on the road along which we have come, could walk over anything and everything between this and the Syr Daria. I yield, I trust, to no British politician in pacific, and, indeed, in warmly friendly feelings towards Russia, but I am all the freer to indulge those feelings, because I well know that so far from having any cause to fear her aggression we could, if need were, which God forbid! make her position in Central Asia wholly intolerable. When will people learn that, as I have said before, our difficulty is not in *governing* India but in *governing it well*? We are strong enough now to try to govern it well, and are doing so. If we were weaker, we might be tempted to conciliate the violent and turbulent classes by a warlike policy. If we thought a warlike policy a right or wise one, we could occupy all Afghanistan, and hold it with the greatest ease. Let no one dream, misled by the fiasco of Lord Auckland, that there is any doubt about that. But what good would or could come to us from so doing—from annexing new expenses and responsibilities without any new advantage?

When the review was over, we returned to the Circular road, and then, striking off to the left, reached, before very long, Hurree Sing's Boorj or tower (observe our familiar Burg and Burgh in so unfamiliar a setting). This is the last outpost of British Government towards the Khyber, the old Fort of Jumrood being no longer occupied. We should have liked to go on, as is often done, to the actual opening of the Pass; but the Commissioner asked me not to ask him to take us there at this particular moment, and I need not say his word in such a matter was law. Leaning, however, over the parapet of the tower, I took him round the whole circle of hills and outposts, sparing him, I am afraid, nothing.

I had often studied all this on the map, and often forgot it. I shall not forget it now, but the very motives which made me unmerciful to him make me merciful to you, for you would remember as little the relative position of the places as I used to do.

When we arrived at the Boorj, we were met by the officer in charge, and here, for the first time, I heard Pushtoo, the language of the Afghans, which is as much harsher than German as German is harsher than Italian.

From the Khyber to where we stood, a distance of some five miles, stretches a stony plain, and there is nothing imposing in the actual opening.

ΧΘΟΝΟΣ, μὲν εἰς τηλουρὸν ἤκομεν πέδον
Σκύθην ἐς οἶμον, ἄβατον εἰς ἐρημίαν,

the first lines of the "Prometheus Vincitus," came into my head, as I gazed to the westward. If any Russian Chauvinist, with more zeal than sense, likes to take this as an omen, I wish him much joy of it; and I also offer it to all those Englishmen who think we should be, as matters stand at present, the better for having a great power as our immediate neighbour.

I have not seen the *Argemone Mexicana*, on one single occasion, since I mentioned it at Bhurtpore. It evidently does not like this comparatively northern climate; but I am amused to see that the *Asclepias Hamiltoni*, which I saw first at Ahmedabad, and which, after following us to Lahore, has had a representative every few yards along the Grand Trunk Road through the whole 270 miles—for all the world like the police in Warsaw, in January, 1864—has faithfully attended us to the "terminus imperii."

After inspecting the first *Clepsydra*, or water-clock, which I ever met with, and plucking some leaves from one of the last trees in the realms of law and order—*Zizyphus jujuba* it was—universal in the parts of the trans-Indian district we have crossed—we turned and rode back to Peshawur, passing many Khyberees coming in to the great metropolis with their wretched little merchandize—chiefly a large reed used for matting, on wretched little bullocks.

"Is that a man or a woman?" I said to my guide, pointing to a figure before us. "Oh, a woman," said he, "a man would have a better coat;" adding, as we passed, "What a hard face it is—never had a luxury in her life!"

And so I cantered back, by no means more inclined than I was when I considered the question at the India Office towards a "blood and iron" policy with these poor devils, though some persons, who ought to have had better information, talked the other day of another frontier raid, because a blockhead of a soldier, wandering helplessly after dinner, had been carried off

over the frontier—and this, though the Warden of the Marches sent him back, without our paying a penny, and the villagers came in and offered to raze the houses of the vagabonds who had been concerned in the outrage. The man was brought to Peshawur, and very deservedly put under arrest by his Colonel for being absent without leave; but the frontier is a long way off, while a sensational story is easily manufactured, and pays cent. per cent.

Passing through the approaches of the old Residency, and among the buildings used for judicial purposes, we noticed the picturesque group of suitors in this open-air "*Salle des pas perdus*." It was at Peshawur, you know, that Shere Ali, who lived to murder Lord Mayo, used to stand with a drawn sword to defend the presiding judicial officer against the—alas! far from chimerical—danger of a sword-cut from a disappointed suitor.

We tarried for some time amongst the trees, conspicuous amongst which was the superb *Bauhinia variegata*, now covered with its pinkish purple flowers, and for the hundredth time I regretted, as I saw the magnificent pods of the *Cassia fistula*, that I should not see in bloom that infinitely glorified cousin of the Laburnum.

In the afternoon we went, by invitation of the General, to see some of the warlike games of the country. A course of three or four hundred yards was covered with soft earth. Near one end of it a tent-peg, say one foot high by two or three inches wide, was fixed in the ground. Towards this a horseman dashed at full speed with his thirteen or fourteen feet lance. He came on sometimes silently—oftener with a long, low, anxious cry, and very generally succeeded in transfixing the tent-peg, and whirling it round his head in triumph as he galloped out of the lists.

It had been getting clearer all the afternoon, and towards sunset there was a very bright gleam. After I had looked for some time at the tent-pegging, as it is infelicitously called, Colonel G——, to whom I shall feel eternally grateful, said to me: "If you will come behind the tent, you will now have a good view. There," said he, "are the hills of Swat, and there," pointing far to the west, "is the Safed Koh, and there, right through that gap to the northward, is the end of the Hindoo Koosh." That last sight was one of the things I had not promised myself when I left England, for I did not know of the depression in the nearer chains which alone made it possible to see that range of mighty name. There, however, it was, perhaps 150 miles away; but as clear as sun and snow could make it, and I knew that the Oxus was flowing behind "from his high mountain cradle in Pamere," and that the "roof of the world" was not very far off.

By the time I had looked long enough at the mountains, the game was changed, and the object was now for the horseman, galloping from one end of the lists, to slice three oranges fixed on three poles, about four feet high, placed at intervals along them. This was done by several, while others sliced only one or two of the oranges, and some none at all. It was satisfactory to hear that many of our European soldiers succeed in these feats quite as well as the native troops. To-day, however, the latter had the best of it.

Conversation here turned of course largely on frontier matters. To neglect *Quid bellicosus Cantaber et Scythes cogitet* would not have been Horace's advice if there had been no Adrian sea. The Akhoond of Swat, who is a sort of Prester John at Whitehall, is decidedly no myth in the Peshawur valley.

Earthquakes are another topic of talk with strangers, and the Greco-Buddhist excavations in the neighbourhood are a third.

A beautiful and very tame little musk-deer, belonging to the Commissioner, was quite a novel sight to me.

Many stories are told of the ring of wild tribes between us and Cabul, their good and evil qualities. I should like to see an essay on the political influence of Scott and Byron on our appreciation of mountaineers. It is not so long ago since the Scotch Highlander was thought of by his lowland neighbours as nothing better than a polecat to be put to death where found. Now we think quite differently, and the tribes on the frontier reap the benefit of our change of view. They are not, I observe, praised for the virtues for which Mahometans are often praised. I remember, when I first came under the spell of the Crescent in 1851, when Omar Pasha was trampling down the old feudal nobility of Bosnia, being very much struck with the way in which people in Austrian Croatia talked of the truthfulness and reliableness of their Turkish neighbours. These Mahometans of the Afghan border are liars and thieves, but it does not seem to occur to them that lying and thieving are other than quite honourable and respectable pursuits. On the other hand, they are faithful in service, and as brave as lions.

They are good friends, these Pathans, and zealous; but their zeal requires now and then to be tempered by discretion. One of them had observed his master, a young Deputy-Commissioner, not a little fussed and worried, to get ready for the visit of his immediate superior. "That gentleman's coming, I observe, gives you much trouble," said the faithful creature one day; "you don't seem to find it pleasant. Would you like him *not to come again?*"

Another remarked to his employer, an officer who was poor and popular, "Have you no rich relations, Sahib, in England? If

you have, I think I could arrange that you should succeed to their property!"

Over the border their want of respect for human life is almost cynical. A traveller arrived in an Afreedee village one morning, and was detained by the people, who seemed inclined to plunder him. "You will do *me* no harm," he said, "I am a descendant of the Prophet." "Ah," replied the devout villagers, "you are exactly the man we have been looking for. We have long wanted a shrine." So they kept his property, cut his throat, and built his sepulchre.

And yet who shall say that these people are not capable of acquiring the finest flowers of civilization? I read in a missionary report, the other day, a story of one of them who, showing good dispositions, obtained one book after another. When there were no more to be had, he cut short controversy by declaring that he had had a revelation from God to the effect that the Koran was infallible. Surely the grandson of so promising a *bibliomane* might become the customer of a twentieth century Quaritch or Techener, and live to cry, with genuine enthusiasm, as he examined a doubtful edition, "Ah, c'est la bonne, voilà les fautes qui ne sont pas dans la mauvaise!" It is fair to add that the author of the report, a man, they tell me, of merit and ability, quite appreciated the humour of the situation.

What a distance we have already travelled over Indian soil, and how far away we are from the latitudes through which we passed to reach Bombay! Aden is in $12^{\circ}45'$, Peshawur is just short of 34° , and not much south of the shores of Crete.

One does, indeed, feel oneself at the end of the world. Our pomegranates come from Candahar; our stewed prunes from Bokhara. I have bought a rug from Kayn, in Khorassan, a great-coat in the nature of an Ulster, for railroad travelling, which was made in Cabul, to say nothing of a set of Russian tea-cups, which have come down the Khyber, and are the correct thing for every gentleman to have in Afghanistan. In gratitude to a dealer who described his lazuli as lajwurdi, and made me remember how near I was to its home in Badakshan, I bought his whole stock, which was, by the way, neither very good nor very extensive—a criticism which equally applies to the ferozes or turquoises from Nishapur, in Persia, which I added to my collection.

I sat late over the fire in this, the most English house I have seen in India. Frontier lines are, and always have been to me, in the highest degree solemnizing; and of all frontier lines I know none so solemnizing as that which I have seen to day, where the grandest political experiment that has ever been tried in the world comes to an end. I wished I had brought with me to read once again in this place, the thoughts which one of the few statesmen

of the old world who would have understood and sympathized with our work in India wrote down on another frontier line, very familiar to me too, "amongst the Quadi by the Granua." I had not done so, however, but in this mood I took up the Rhythm of St. Bernard, which, oddly enough, I had never seen in the Latin till a friendly hand lent it to me at Lahore.

How wonderfully fine some bits of it are! Take the opening:—

"Hæc novissima, tempora pessima sunt, vigilemus
Ecce minaciter imminet Arbiter Ille supremus:
Imminet, imminet, ut mala terminet, æqua coronet,
Recta remuneret, anxia liberet, æthera donet."

And again—

"Pax erit omnibus illa fidelibus, illa beata
Irresolubilis, invariabilis, intemerata:
Pax sine crimine, pax sine turbine, pax sine rixa;
Meta laboribus, atque tumultibus anchora fixa
Pax erit omnibus unica. Sed quibus? Immaculatis,
Pectore mitibus, ordine stantibus, ore sacratia."

SEALKOTE, Jan. 13th.—I turned my back on Peshawur, with many regrets, for I know that they spoke only too truly who said that we had seen its beautiful valley to the least possible advantage. In the flush of spring, when the horseshoe of mountains is still clad in snow, while its peach and quince gardens are in full flower, it must be enchanting.

The landscape of the Peshawur district, just now, is not wintry, but things look more wintry than we have seen them do elsewhere—that is to say, the pastures are brown, the young corn has not made the fields more than half green, and many trees have lost, or are rapidly losing, their leaves—the mulberry and the *Populus Euphratica* amongst them.

In order to reach this place, we had to return on our track as far as Wuzeerabad. We came along at a great pace, the service to and from Peshawur being most efficiently performed. Though the carriages are of a rough-and-ready kind, I have never seen better posting in any country. Those who wish to learn how bad Indian posting was, and still I fear is, in some places, should read Bayard Taylor.

Nowshera demanded a second glance as we passed. It is now a very different place from that which is described by Bishop Cotton in his letters, and still more from what it was when Runjeet Singh broke here the power of the Afghans and prepared the way for the British arms. We stopped a little time at Attock, and had some talk with several officers quartered there. Two of them were interested in the history and antiquities of the neighbourhood; but it was not until I had left it far behind that I learned that there was a dealer in engraved gems there whose stores I should like to have seen, having, as you know, carried into this nineteenth century that very eighteenth-century taste.

At Hassoon Abdool we turned aside to see the valley where Moore makes the disguised Prince of Bucharia sing the "Light of the Harem" to Lalla Rookh—not one of his happiest efforts—but containing one or two passages which every one knows, such as—

"There's a beauty for ever unchangingly bright,
Like the long sunny lapse of a summer-day's light."

And—

"Alas! how light a cause may move
Dissension between hearts that love."

I lingered for a time, seeing the fish fed by an old Sikh priest in the clear deep waters of a little basin, on the edge of which I gathered the maidenhair, which carried my thoughts to the fountain of Egeria. Further on was a deserted garden, in which there was a tomb overgrown with jasmine. Of course, the "Ineptia Ciceroniana" had christened it the grave of Lalla Rookh.

We spent a delightful evening at Rawul Pindee amongst people who had cultivated most successfully the amiable science of making strangers feel like old friends in about half-an-hour. Here, too, I saw with my bodily eye the native dealer who sent to the British Museum a coin of a Bactrian King unknown to history, for which he got, if I remember rightly, £100. We turned aside, on our way to Jhelum, to examine the Manikyala Tope, a curious Buddhist monument, absurdly named the tomb of Bucephalus.

Half the village crowded round, offering coins for sale. I bought thirty-five (none of which looked good for anything), on the chance of some one being interesting, but fear that the neighbourhood of the dealer above alluded to will make my speculation a very unprofitable one.

The day was pleasant, like one of the hot days we sometimes have in England towards the end of April, but the distance was obscured by dust and mist, so that the snowy range, which had been so great a pleasure as we went westward, was never once seen.

At the posting bungalow of Jhelum we made the native in charge talk Punjabi, while our Portuguese servant put what he said into Hindustani, so that we might see the kind of difference between them; and we did not forget to drink the waters that had come down from Cashmere, as we drank at Attock those which had flowed by Leh and Iskardo.

Perhaps I a little over-stated, the other day, the barrenness of the Sind Sagar Doab, not having made enough allowance for the crops being but little above ground, thanks to the extreme and almost alarming drought; but I was struck with the far more civilized look of the country between Jhelum and the Chenab.

At Wuzeerabad the carriages of the Maharajah of Cashmere, who had invited me to visit him, met us and took us up to Sealkote, through a country of great fertility, in which the sugar-cane is largely grown. Here we were welcomed most warmly by General B——, who commands the brigade, and was one of our companions in the Malwa.

We drove in the pleasant morning air through the pretty station of Sealkote, the prettiest I have yet seen in India, and were soon over the British boundary. The Pir Punjal, and other great Himalayan ranges, rose in front of us through the thin dust-mist like the ghosts of mountains. If we could have made the journey in a balloon we should have seen them splendidly, for we should have been above the semi-opaque stratum. As it was, however, they were extremely beautiful, with their strange spiritual look. At length we arrived at a tract of broken ground covered with jungle, and exchanged our carriages for elephants, advancing slowly through thickets in which *Butea frondosa*, and *Acacia modesta* were the prevailing trees, while *Justicia Adhatoda* had it all its own way, where trees were not. The *Euphorbia Royliana*, which might at a distance be taken for a plant of the Coal Measures, towered over our heads, even when we were mounted on our elephants, and was really a grand object. Armed men, in bright colours, ran before us, their uniforms shining through the woodland. At length we came to a rather broad river, which "the huge earth-shaking beast" forded with that deliberation which makes him so amusing, my companion describing to me how he had once crossed the Jumna with the water streaming into his howdah. At the foot of the slope on which Jummoo is built, the heir apparent of Cashmere met us on an elephant, accompanied by the father of the well-known minister, Kirpa Ram, who was, I regret to say, himself ill, and unable to appear. We proceeded slowly through part of the city to the house where the Maharajah receives his European guests, which stands on the edge of an enchanting valley, and is separated from the picturesque fortress of Bao by the river, which we forded as we approached the place. After various ceremonies had been gone through, we were left for some time, during which General B——, who is an enthusiastic and excellent artist, took us carefully to the best points of view.

In the afternoon, we again mounted our elephants and proceeded to the Palace, through winding streets of one-storeyed houses, so narrow that a skilful jumper could have sprung down from the howdah on to their roofs.

We were received at the door of the hall of audience by the Maharajah, who, after the usual civilities, led me to a room in another part of the building, which overlooked the river-valley,

and commanded a quite lovely prospect. Thence we returned to the hall of audience, where we assisted at another Nautch, a sort of pantomimic performance, showing some skill in the performers. This was followed by native music, which had a good deal of interest for me. Amongst other things, I saw the Vina. If you remember, Moore makes Feramorz take her Vina from the hands of Lalla Rookh's little Persian slave, before he begins to sing at Hassoon Abdool. He would have been a very confident suitor who made such an experiment, for the Vina is as unlike as possible to the typical lover's lute. It is about six feet in length, with two huge bottle-shaped gourds at either end. I wish him much joy of such an instrument.

I had a great deal of talk with his Highness, through various interpreters, about politics, books, coins, &c. We were speaking of my Indian tour and the objects of it. "Ah," said he, "between the eye and the ear there may be little more than two or three fingers' breadth, but still there is a mighty difference between hearing and seeing."

* * * * *

Jummoo is, as you know, the winter capital of the Maharajah, whose territory extends over some 25,000 square miles—is, therefore, about the size of Scotland, less the counties of Perth and Inverness. The famous shawls are chiefly made in the neighbourhood of his summer capital Srinuggur, the chief town of the vale of Cashmere, which is separated from Jummoo by about 125 miles of mountain—marching enchanting in summer, but out of the question at this season.

We dined, of course, by ourselves, but from time to time the Maharajah sent us native dishes, some of which were excellent.

Then we had fireworks. The night was perfectly still and very propitious to them. Seven fire balloons floated high in the air, and got exactly into the position of the Great Bear and the Pole-star. I called the attention of one of my companions to this, who, pointing it out to the Maharajah, said, "It is only your Highness who can add to the number of the constellations."

When the fireworks were over, we took our leave, and very picturesque was the ride home under the crescent moon through the dark silent streets, with our attendants clamouring in front to drive the sacred bulls and the camels out of the way.

This morning we started soon after sunrise, accompanied by the son of Kirpa Ram and others. Just as we came in sight, through the city gate, of the woodland which I described yesterday, the troops presented arms, and the band struck up "God save the Queen." Then we slowly descended the steep declivity on which Jummoo is built. As we were crossing the river, General B— called out to me, "It would take a fine reach of the Rhine to beat

this"—and so it would. Some half an hour passed, however, before we saw the full glories of Jummoo. We had crossed most of the woodland, and had descended from our elephants, when we reached a point where, in the clearer morning, the mountains stood out in all their beauty. On the left stretched the mighty snowy chain of the Pir Punjal—rising, I suppose, to about 17,000 or 18,000 feet. Then, in the middle of the background, came an outer range, not snowy, somewhat lower than Taygetus, and rather like it; lastly, far to the right, another snowy range on the borders of Thibet.

Between us and the mountains lay Jummoo, with its white pyramidal temples shining in the sun, and surrounded by a near landscape which wanted nothing to make it perfect. It was the most beautiful land view I ever beheld.

The Maharajah is a lucky man, with heaven for his winter and the seventh heaven for his summer capital.

We said farewell, with many regrets, to our friend, General B—, who reminded me not unfrequently of Leopold von Crlich. I need hardly say that the remembrance of that most excellent man has often been with me in this land which he loved so well, and which he tried so hard to make better known to his countrymen.

From Sealkote we returned by Wuzeerabad to Lahore. I was amused, the other day, by hearing the native explanation of the many changes that had taken place about the gauge of this railway. "You know," say the politicians of the Bazaar, "they are only governed by a woman, and women are apt not to know their own minds."

Jan. 14th.—On our way from Lahore to Delhi.—We have passed Umritsur, where I had a few moments of most interesting and memorable talk with General Rennell Taylor, who received us so kindly as we went north. Since that we have left behind Jullundur, Loodiana, and the fort of Phillour, whence the army that attacked Delhi drew its munitions. As we traversed the great Sutledge Bridge, there came back to my mind a wonderful epigram of events not universally known.

No sooner had the rear-guard of the avenging army returned from Afghanistan than the mighty river came down like a wall, and swept away the two bridges by which it had crossed.

I was amused to observe, on a bank in the middle of the channel, my friend the *Argemone Mexicana*. I know not whether the conjecture I made the other day is correct, or whether it too has been delayed by the Sutledge on its career of conquest.

Jan. 15th.—We reached Delhi at a very early hour this morning, after a journey of some nineteen hours, and have already seen much.

The Fort—the residence of the Moguls till their wicked folly swept them and all that they represented into annihilation amidst the whirlwind of 1857—is still noble and beautiful, though the hand of the Persian, the Afghan, and the Mahratta had fallen heavily upon it long before it passed into our keeping; for the eighteenth-century history of Delhi is the history of one frightful sack and massacre after another.

There is nothing in it which is, to my mind, as beautiful as the Jasmine Bower or the Pearl Mosque of Agra. The buildings, however, are for the most part on a larger scale; not so, by the way, what is here known as the Pearl Mosque, which is a mere Cappellina.

I had stupidly fancied the hall round which are inscribed the famous words, "If there is a Paradise upon earth it is here, it is here," to have been a hall in our sense of the term; but it is nothing of the kind. It is a series of open arcades of white marble; but it deserves all Fergusson says of it.

We went to see the Friday prayer at the Jumma Musjid, and here only in India have I heard the cry of the Muezzin. We were on one of the minarets at the time, while he was far below, only about forty feet above the great paved court—an innovation which cannot be considered an improvement. We descended immediately, and saw the service from two points, first enfiling the long lines of worshippers from the side of the arcades which here, as elsewhere in India, form the Mosque proper, and secondly looking straight across the great court to the Mecca Niche.

Nothing could be more striking than the way in which the people, two thousand perhaps in all, knelt and rose, stood up and prostrated themselves as one man. It brought to my memory the sad and famous lines of Alfred de Musset:—

"O Christ! je ne-sais pas de ceux que la prière
 Dans tes temples muets amène à pas tremblants;
 Je ne suis pas de ceux qui vont à ton Calvaire,
 En se frappant le cœur, baiser tes pieds sanglants;
 Et je reste debout, sous tes sacrés portiques,
 Quand ton peuple fidèle, autour des noirs arceaux,
 Se courbe en murmurant sous le vent de cantiques,
 Comme au souffle du Nord un peuple de roseaux.
 Je ne crois pas, ô Christ, à ta parole sainte,
 Je suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux,
 D'un siècle sans espoir naît un siècle sans crainte,
 Les comètes du nôtre ont dépeuplé les cieux."

As a *spectacle*, the prayer in the Jumma Musjid to-day was most impressive, and on the last Friday in Ramazan, when from thirty to forty thousand people assemble, and the whole mighty enclosure is filled, it must be one of the great spectacles of the world, but sound is wanting. There is no "vent de cantiques." Probably the voices of a vast multitude, repeating the responses, would give something of the same effect, but a few thousand are lost in the vast space.

A good deal of our time went this afternoon in looking over a great quantity of Delhi art manufactures, which a native gentleman had collected at his house for our inspection. These are better known at home than most Indian things of the kind, and consist chiefly of jewellery made in imitation of the Babool flower, of miniatures on ivory, sometimes excellent, of embroidered shawls, and other textile fabrics of which this place is a great emporium.

The Black Mosque, a characteristic specimen of the second or sterner phase of Pathan architecture, and a Jain temple, also claimed some notice, but far less than the famous ridge, along which we drove, recalling the details of that equally wonderful and glorious feat of arms which is known as the siege of Delhi in 1857, though the idea of our scanty force besieging the hosts who were collected in the city recalls the story of the Prussian soldier on the field of Leuthen, who, being asked how he had taken a flock of prisoners, replied—"If you please, sir, I surrounded them."

Jan. 16th.—I have never received a satisfactory reply to a question which frequently recurs to my mind. Why was this site chosen for a great city? It does not appear to have any peculiar natural advantage. And yet, if the archæologists are right, there have been thirteen great cities here at one time and another. This rather featureless plain would seem to have been important as far back as the days of Nineveh and Babylon, although there is nothing above ground now which has the slightest claim to any such antiquity.

Delhi has been called the Rome of Asia, but it will perhaps convey to your minds no very inaccurate idea of the real state of the case if I say that where in the European Rome you have a great ruin like the Colosseum or the Baths of Caracalla, you have in or near the Asiatic Rome the remains of a great city, and that the whole face of the country between the remains of these cities is dotted with tombs as thickly as the line of the Appian way.

It is a wonderful, but at the same time a rather melancholy, not to say irritating sight. Nowhere in the world is the disproportion between the monuments of men and their lives so great.

The Emperor Humayoun, whose name you probably do not know, or hardly know, sleeps in a tomb which might have been appropriate to Marcus Aurelius.

A wretched miscreant, of whom little can be said, except that he was probably the patentee of Thuggism—that is, of systematic murder by strangulation—is revered as a saint, and has a sepulchre which would have been almost too good for St. Francis. The most passionate admirer of Gustavus or Cromwell would

never have wished them a nobler resting-place than the tomb of Toghlucluck Shah, while all Europe would have been astonished if France had raised to Turgot, or Italy to Cavour, a memorial faintly comparable to that which covers the dust of the Sufter Jung, of whom the best that can be reported is that he was not the most infamous minister of the later Moguls,

The last tomb erected in the enclosure, sacred to the supposed inventor of Thuggism, is in honour of a scoundrel who was well known to Colonel Sleeman, and is by him described as having died of too much cherry brandy—the only liquor, as he expressed it, which the English had that was worth drinking. As I looked at his monument, an extremely graceful one, I thought of the last grave-stone I had seen in Europe, under its cluster of meagre firs amidst the bare landscape of the Brie.

“Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, at Cato nullo,
Pompeius parvo—Quis putet esse Deos?”

To the credit, however, of human nature, it ought to be stated that there is one monument, to a member of the house of Timur, which is to be regarded with very different feelings from those which are inspired by that of Mirza Jehangeer, above alluded to. It is the tomb of the sister of Dara and Aurungzebe, and its inscription runs as follows:—

“Let no rich canopy cover my grave :
This grass is a fit covering
For the tomb of the poor in spirit,
The humble, the transitory Jehanara,
The Disciple of the holy men of Christ,
The daughter of the Emperor Shah Jehan.”

Small wonder if Colonel Sleeman misread the second last line, and put Christ instead of Chist!

Rich marbles surround and partly cover the tomb, but the grass is still allowed to do so too, in part compliance with her wish.

Of course I admired the great Kootub Minar, but I think it has been overpraised. The three lowest storeys are admirable, no doubt—red sandstone grandly fluted and beautifully carved, but the two higher ones, in which much white marble has been injudiciously used, detract from its effect as a whole.

The remains of the great Mosque, hard by, the first ever built in the plains of India, are most noble, and have, at first sight, a strangely Gothic look. I was just thinking of Tintern, as I walked towards them, when R—— came up and said, “Dear me—how like Fountains!”

Most memorable, too, is the Alai Darwaza, or Gate, of which Fergusson says:—

“It was erected by Ala uddeen Khilji, and the date, 1310, is found among its inscriptions. It is, therefore, about a century more modern than

the other buildings of the place, and displays the Pathan style of its period of greatest perfection, when the Hindu masons had learned to fit their exquisite style of decoration to the forms of their foreign masters. Its walls are decorated internally with a diaper pattern of unrivalled excellence, and the mode in which the square is changed into an octagon is more simply elegant and appropriate than any other example I am acquainted with in India."

But why should I linger over ruins, the magnificence of which no one can realize without having seen them? If I could have had you with me by the Asoka pillar, in Ferozabad, one of the thirteen ruined cities of which I spoke—have showed you the wide field of desolation in which it lies, and the three vultures who sat a bowshot off, enjoying the congenial spectacle—if I could have wandered with you over the gigantic remains of Purana Killa, or of the still more gigantic Toghluclukabad (mightiest, perhaps, of all the astounding creations of imperial caprice in this land of marvels), description would have been superfluous. To those who have not done so I fear such description as I could give would be of no avail. I know, at least, how awfully indigestible I found Mr. Beglar's and even General Cunningham's pages, when I had occasion to look through them last autumn.

The guide-books I have used on the spot are Keene's, Cooper's, and Harcourt's—all useful, but none of them I should think easy or even endurable reading, at a distance from the scenes described. The best manual for the traveller to take to Delhi would, I think, be the "Travels of a Hindoo," by Mr. Bholonauth Chunder. His book was published in 1869, and its author made use of the most reliable writings that had preceded his own. I had had a copy on my shelves for some years, but had only read a little of it. It is, however, really extremely well worth reading, for more reasons than one, though even Mr. Bholonauth Chunder's best selected extracts from his predecessors, and his own often very judicious remarks, would hardly bear reading at a distance from Delhi.

Jan. 19th.—A second visit to the Kbootub—this time with a large party—an inspection of the great works at the head of the new Jumna Canal, with the engineer in charge, various conversations with Sir John Strachey and officers in his camp (which we left, if you remember, on the 24th Dec., and rejoined at this place on the 16th), were my other chief events at Delhi; but I did not forget to see (as I had been wisely enjoined to do) the Jumna Musjid at half-past eight o'clock in the morning, nor to look at it along the line of the Darweezah Street. A visit by moonlight, and a second ascent of one of its minarets, were not works of obligation, but withal very pleasant.

At Delhi, we returned to the Neem, planted everywhere here,

but which I have hardly seen in the northern districts. The *Millingtonia suberosa* is also very common; the *Baccain*, the other *Melia* which I confused at first with the *Neem*, is much less frequent. We have had more breeze here than in most other places, and I owe to that having heard a sound quite new to me—the rustle of the *Peepul*, which the gods love, and which is altogether different from that of any tree to which I happen to have listened.

In Delhi, I came for the first time on traces of the uneasiness which is said to be inspired in the minds of some of the well-to-do natives of India by the Russian advances in Asia—a gentleman of the mercantile class having questioned me under the shadow of the Kootub Mosque about the possible advent of strangers more formidable even than the Pathans who raised that noble pile.

Here, too, I succeeded, at last, in getting hold of Dr. Macleod's "Peeps at the Far East," and in reading his account of some of the places we have seen—interesting, of course, to me, as showing me how things struck one who made, like myself, a hurried journey through India during the cold season, and looked at the country from a somewhat different standpoint.

Jan. 19th.—We left Delhi early this morning in a special train along with Sir John Strachey. It was bitterly cold till the sun had got out of bed, and looked for some little time about him. Icicles hung on the water-pipes. All of us were in great-coats of one kind or another; and some even wore furs that would have done good service on the banks of the Neva.

There was little to interest in the first part of the journey. At length we reached Rewarree, the station to which comes down the trade of Bewanee, which is carried on by camels, and rises to a figure of something like a million sterling—the pastoral west sending hither enormous amounts of ghee, and receiving back chiefly piece goods and sugar.

My attention was drawn to the Sabee river, as an interesting illustration of the engineering difficulties of this country. The Sabee is a stream which, for, say, a generation, goes on quite respectably and peaceably; then it suddenly goes mad, and covers a whole district in a few hours. And small blame to it, if, as happened not very long ago, fourteen inches of rain fall in thirty-six hours. Of course, it would be impossible to provide by any bridges against such exceptional dangers as this. There is nothing for it but to let the river have its own way on the rare occasions when it loses its senses.

We had left some sixty miles behind before we began to get amongst the Aravullis, the mountain system (not range, for it is no real continuous range) of Rajpootana, whose southern slopes, as I mentioned when writing to you from Ahmedabad, are partly drained by the Sabarmuttee, the river of that place.

By twelve o'clock we were at Ulwur, where lunch was provided for a large party. I talked here with a very intelligent physician about the opium-eating and poppy-liquor drinking of the people. He told me that he could never see that either did much harm. Any bad results he had connected with the latter practice arose rather from the large amount of liquor consumed than from the fact that the liquor was an infusion of poppy-heads.

The Ulwur chief, who reigned while I was at the India Office, has, happily for his subjects, been gathered to his fathers. A boy of fourteen has succeeded, and the State is being managed during his minority by the Paramount Power.

A distinguished British official, who told me the story, shot some time ago an antelope, in the neighbourhood of an Ulwur village. He sent to ask for a couple of sticks and some string, with which to carry it, offering of course to pay for them. The people came and said, "We have no string and no sticks." "Oh, then," he replied, "let me have a blanket, that will do as well." "We have no blankets," was the rejoinder. "We have nothing but the clothes we stand up in here. Whatever we get we eat. No man dares to have money in this State. The chief's soldiery plunder us of everything."

This agreeable state of things has of course been terminated for the present, and peace will continue in Ulwur—at least until the blessings of independence are restored to it.

Many districts through which we have passed are quite uncultivated, chiefly from the want of water. The cattle are largely fed on the chopped twigs of *Zizyphus jujuba*, which, along with stunted Babool, the *Capparis aphylla*, and a tall grass, are the prevailing plants. I have seen a quantity of peacocks feeding just like pheasants in England, and at last a herd of antelopes.

A fellow-traveller gave me a curious piece of his experience, as to the oppressions exercised even in a model native State like Jeypore, against the will of course of the ruler: Some years ago my informant fell in with a party of Pathan traders who, with their camels, had come through the Khyber to traffic in India. "In the passes," they said, "we had no trouble. We knew exactly the blackmail we had to pay, and we paid it. In British territory we had no trouble, but here in Ulwur, we have been robbed of every single penny we possess, and what to do in Jeypore we know not." My informant, being a person of some influence, took the men under his protection, and when they arrived at the Jeypore frontier, asked the Customs officer what they would have to pay to frank them to the capital. "So much," the man replied. "Very well, make out a receipt for that sum, and I will see it paid—three of the camels to be handed over as security." The officer agreed; the receipt was given; but during the whole journey to Jeypore city, it was one

battle with local extortioners all along the road, every one claiming transit duty under one pretence or another.

Before it was dark we had reached the house of Colonel Beynon, the Resident of Jeypore, some two hundred miles from Delhi, having traversed part of the intervening space at a rate of over forty miles an hour.

The Maharajah came to the station to meet Sir John, but the visit was a strictly private one, and almost all ceremony was dispensed with.

I spent an hour, before dressing for dinner, in walking about by moonlight in the Residency Garden, the best-cared-for private garden I have yet seen in India, famous for cypresses of almost Florentine dimensions.

The Maharajah of Jeypore is, in point of rank, the second of the Princes of Rajpootana, yielding only to the Rana of Oodeypore, who represents one of the oldest families known to exist in the world—a family so old, if all tales are true, that its connection with Maurice, the Emperor of the West, is rather a modern incident in its history.

Jan. 20th.—We drove this morning into the city, famous for the regularity of its streets, then mounted and rode to Amber, the old capital of the dynasty, and a most striking place. It lies on the slope of a rocky hill, along the crest of which fortifications of the most picturesque kind were carried of old, and still remain to beautify what they can no longer defend. The approach to the outer gateway, up a long incline, might have been in the basin of the Mediterranean if the *Euphorbia Royliana* had not come in to scatter an illusion which the cactus, so common in Sicily, helped to foster.

The old palace, its mysterious Zenana passages, courts pleasant with jasmine and pomegranate, perforated marble and quaint stained glass, detained us long—the delicious view which it commands still longer.

The forenoon was largely spent amongst the manufactures of Jeypore—hideous marble gods, turban pieces, roughly cut carbuncles, and unequalled enamel. As usual, there was very little of the last in the market; but I succeeded in securing one or two characteristic bits. To my thinking there is no enamel, ancient or modern, at all to compare with it; but the secret of its manufacture is monopolized by one or two families.

The afternoon was given to the Maharajah's stud, to the seven-storied palace in the town, which is full of beauty, and commands admirable views, though not equal, perhaps, to those to be enjoyed from the old eyry of this great Rajpoot race.

Then came a visit to the large and, as I am assured, really excellent college, to the fine Jardin Anglais, and to certain for

the most part very unhappy and unusually savage tigers. One who allowed his head to be scratched and patted (not, I beg to state, by me) was a contrast to the rest.

The Maharajah objects to tigers being killed, unless they are really mischievous; saying playfully, as I have heard, that they are his best forest officers. Of course, when they begin to do serious harm, they are destroyed or captured.

Here, and only here, have I seen a hunting leopard being taken out for his walk like a big dog in London, only with his eyes bandaged. Hawking, too, is an amusement of this place, as it is also of Pattiala and Jummoo, in both of which we came upon falconers with their very attractive charges.

At night we dined at the palace, and had another quite exquisite display of fireworks—fountains of light playing alongside of, and being reflected in, the lines of water fountains in the stately garden.

Jan. 21st.—We left Jeypore betimes, and went slowly over forty miles of line, not yet ballasted, to Sámbar. The country was very waste; far-scattered rocky hills and plains tufted with the tall grass I have so often mentioned, being the sights on which the eye most frequently fell. Jeypore lies high, between fourteen and fifteen hundred feet above the sea, if I mistake not. The morning was searchingly cold, yet by a little after eleven o'clock the sun was as hot as it is in July at home. I was reminded of the climate at Madrid—

“El aire de Madrid es tan sutil
Que mata á un hombre, y no apaga á un candil,”—

Unjustly, however, I fancy; for save for the flies, which are a very Egyptian plague, Jeypore must be an exceptionally pleasant place. True, the thermometer sometimes stands at 115° Fahr. immediately after sunset; but it falls rapidly in this sandy region, and the nights are cool.

Arrived at Sámbar, I mounted an elephant and went with Sir John to look at the salt far out into the bed of the lake. The lake itself had for the present retired so much that I did not actually see the water at all; but far away over its basin stood the hills of Jodhpore, beckoning me into new lands which I have not time to penetrate. Looking in another direction, I saw the edge of the Great Indian desert, of which the country we have traversed to-day is “only the ante-chamber.”

Then we had a slow progress through the shabby little town, in the course of which my elephant, which knew, as they know most things, my interest in the *Salvadora Persica*, took me under one just coming into flower, and enabled me, by tasting the leaf, to see very clearly why it was called the mustard tree.

Next followed breakfast, and a speech from Sir John, in which he did ample justice to his three themes:—

1. The success thus far of the State lines.
2. The excellent prospects of the Rajpootana railway system.
3. The great importance of the treaties concluded a year or two ago, by which we obtained a lease of the Sámbar Lake.

The experiments of the creation of State lines, and the acquisition of our rights over Sámbar, having both been made under the auspices of the Duke of Argyll, all that the Lieutenant-Governor said was of course of peculiar interest to me. I told you, some weeks ago, how well the Agra section of the Rajpootana State lines is doing. The Delhi part of the system is not, and could not yet do as well, but the figures of the system, as a whole, are most satisfactory, and there is no doubt that with the completion of the unfinished line, over which we have to-day travelled, they will become better.

The acquisition of our present rights over Sámbar will, I hope, lead ere long to the abolition of many hundred miles of my enemy, the Salt line, and to the beginning of a new Customs policy, while it will largely increase the supply of salt in all our northern provinces, in some of which it has undoubtedly been too scanty. The salt tax in India is as far as possible from being a grievance, but the restriction of the sources of salt supply has been a great hardship.

All that will now be at an end, and the native States concerned in the transaction, Jeypore and Jodhpore, have already largely benefited by it.

Pleasant, too, it is to think that the Rajpootana railway system will make so terrible a scarcity as that of 1868-9 an impossibility; nor should the political importance of having one day a second line of communication between Bombay and the Punjab be overlooked or underrated.

From Sámbar we returned to Jeypore, where, however, we did not tarry long, but it was very late before we got to Ulwur, where we dined and slept.

Jan 22nd.—I had no intention of going to Ulwur when I landed in India, and am ashamed to say that I had no notion what sort of a place it was. A letter, however, from Mr. Lyall, urged me not to pass it by, and he had also written to Sir John to the same effect. Early in the morning, accordingly, we drove out to see what was to be seen. And verily we were not disappointed.

I drove with a well-informed denizen towards the city, passing the various English institutions which follow us in these lands. There was the High School, there was the Fives Court, there was the new Hospital, admirably planned after the last European lights.

Suddenly we came to the ditch, and all was changed. The great gate, flanked by a huge piece of ordnance, stood up before us, with its sharp spikes looking defiance. "I never drive through such a gate," said my companion, "without thinking of the story of the two Rajpoots who disputed as to which should be Commander-in-Chief. The Prince promised that he who first entered the besieged town should have that honour. One sought to enter by escalade, the other to force the gate on his elephant. The elephant refused to face the spikes, when its rider, throwing himself in front, told the driver to urge the animal against his body, thereby bursting in the gate just as he died. The followers of his rival, however, who was mortally wounded at the top of the wall, threw in his body first, so that he died Commander-in-Chief."

No sooner had we passed the gate than we saw, towering a thousand feet above our heads, the wonderfully picturesque fortress, with an outwork perhaps three or four hundred feet lower down. The street, in which we were, led us nearly straight to the Palace, full of exquisite jewels, armour, and books, one of which, a copy of the "*Gulistan*," and a product of this century, was certainly amongst the most perfect illuminated manuscripts I ever saw. Hardly less beautiful was a "*Koran*," and both had been so deliciously bound by a living artist that I have made interest to add to my book-cabinet a specimen of his work. Who would have thought that Ulwur and Northampton could compete on equal terms in this charming art with London and Paris?

The honours of the Palace were gracefully done by the young chief, who had been suddenly taken from a more than private station to fill his great place, and is still almost a child.

After we had seen as much of the interior as we wished, he led us to the outside of the building, where, right under the fortress of which I have spoken, was a tank, with temples on the further side of it, and at one end that tomb which is figured by Fergusson, and which seems to me a perfect gem.

In the garden near it was a large tree, covered with what seemed, at a distance, some strange black fruit. It was a mighty company of flying foxes, taking their natural rest.


From the Palace in the town we drove to another, known as the Pearl, and deserving its name, where we had breakfast.

Just before we sat down a gentleman stepped up to me and said, "Mr. Grant Duff, allow me to introduce myself to you as a constituent. You see you are looked after even here." And hardly had I sat down when the lady who sat by me said, "I recognized you at once this morning, for I heard you give your inaugural address, as Lord Rector, at Aberdeen."

The three north-eastern counties of Scotland certainly have their own share of the world.

We ran back the eighty odd miles from Ulwur at a very good pace, and by half-past three were in Delhi, where we had to say good-bye to Sir John Strachey and the pleasant society which surrounds him, of which we have seen so much in the last few weeks.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



THE RIGHT USE OF A SURPLUS;

OR, REMISSION OF TAXES AN ABUSE OF REVENUE.

IN a progressive country like Great Britain, each successive generation has its special danger to avert, its special reform to establish, its special duty to discharge. In the time of the fathers, one set of mischiefs are paramount and rampant; and practically it may be advantageous that the attention of reformers should be exclusively directed to these, and not disadvantageous even that the national zeal should exaggerate their importance and the perils which they menace. It is in this piecemeal fashion that progress with us has been in the habit of marching; and perhaps it is owing to this fashion that our work is often done so efficiently that it has not to be done over again. But one grave evil attends this system. The notions, the animosities, and the fears of the fathers are frequently transmitted to the sons who live under the reformed *régime*, and have an entirely different set of dangers to contend against; yet they go on repeating phrases and formulas that have lost their meaning; fighting against antagonists that are dead and buried, or at least have become shadowy and insignificant; and pursuing objects that perhaps have already been pursued too far. The prevalent habit of mind, the direction or *set* of principles and maxims, survive the circumstances which were their origin and justification; and, like all such survivals, become noxious as soon as they cease to be useful. Weapons and tools should be religiously buried when they have won their victory and finished their work. Unfortunately, how-

ever, this maxim is little in favour among us; like men who have grown rich by rigid parsimony, but continue the practices of saving and self-denial when ample wealth has converted wise economy into miserly unworthiness, we make an end of our means, an idol of our instrument, and permanent principles out of what were merely the fitting expedients of a pressing crisis or a passing hour.

Now, it appears to me that we are grievously in danger of making this mistake at present in many of our national transactions. We are forgetting that a virtue out of season easily degenerates into a vice, and that the wisest maxims of public life cease to be sound by ceasing to be timely. The stern and vigilant economy, which was worthy of all praise, and was perhaps the first requisite in a statesman in an age when the public revenue was noxiously collected and extravagantly squandered, becomes simply a timid weakness or a bad mental habit when objects immeasurably more valuable than money are sacrificed or postponed lest money should be spent—even though the money needed for effecting them is attainable at a moment's notice, without traversing one sound principle of taxation or laying one objectionable burden on the people—nay, when the money is actually in our Treasury, but is given away, almost as a matter of course, as an unrequired surplus.

Thirty or forty years ago the pension list was large, lavish, and not too well fitted to bear investigation; articles of food and first necessity coming from abroad were either entirely prohibited, or so heavily taxed as to be virtually almost inaccessible, and at all events to maintain high prices for home produce; customs duties were levied upon upwards of 500 principal articles of import—many upon raw materials, thus burdening our own industry—many upon foreign manufactures, designed to afford an artificial and mischievous protection to that very industry—many so complicated and perverse as materially to interfere with commerce; others so high as largely to check consumption, and limit the trade which should have paid for them. In short, at that time the whole spirit which presided over the collection of the revenue was so noxious and perverse that British statesmen might well be pardoned for regarding the liberation of trade, the reduction of expenditure, and thereby of taxation, and the cheapening of the main articles of food and general consumption, as about their most pressing functions; and Liberal politicians were almost excusable in considering retrenchment, economy, and repeal of customs and excise duties as constituting the first, if not comprising the whole, duty of man. They said so daily, and soon got into the habit of thinking so.

But in 1875 everything is changed; the old evils no longer exist;

the old language is no longer appropriate. The politicians who persist in wielding the old weapons, using the old maxims, running on the old lines, are like artillery-men who keep pointing their guns and firing away in the same direction as before when their foes have retreated, made a flank movement, and are now menacing their rear. The pension list has been reduced and purified, and jobbery has scarce a hole or corner wherein to hide itself. The principal articles liable to customs dues have been reduced to about *five*, and those are so levied as to be no longer practically a fetter upon commerce; articles of food, and raw materials, as well as foreign manufactures, can be imported absolutely free; the main proportion of our indirect taxes (nearly six-sevenths) are raised from articles of luxury, and probably we ought to say, of noxious luxury—certainly of luxuries that needy men can well dispense with—namely, spirits, tobacco, beer and wine, and licenses therewith connected. Specially objectionable duties, or those so regarded, such as “taxes on knowledge,” advertisement duties, fire insurance, &c., have been repealed; indeed, the entire amount repealed within the last fifteen years has exceeded £37,000,000. In fine, we doubt if a single tax remains which can be fairly represented as either a real fetter upon trade, or an unfair or heavy burden on the people. The incidence of our taxation is, we believe, as equitable as it can be made; the amount of it is far lighter than it used to be, and, we believe, lighter, too, than that of any other great country with which a fair comparison can be instituted. But this is not all: during the forty years that this astonishing relief from our burdens has been going on, the wealth of the country—*i.e.*, its power of bearing those burdens—has been increasing at an altogether unprecedented rate; the aggregate wealth subject to the income tax has nearly doubled, and the wages of labour, taking one branch of industry with another, have risen twenty-five per cent. With those few, and as we hold utterly unsound, fiscal authorities who condemn all indirect taxation as objectionable, we enter here into no controversy. No others, we apprehend, will demur to the above representation; but we append in a note a few confirmatory facts.*

* Absolute exactitude in the following figures we do not pretend to claim; nor can we enter into the lengthened explanations which would be necessary to lay before our readers all the sources from which our estimates are framed. But any one who is disposed to question, or desirous to verify, them, will I think be satisfied if they will consult not only the annual official returns, but the following works:—

Edinburgh Review, January, 1860	<i>British taxation.</i>
“Taxation of the United Kingdom”	By Dudley Baxter.
“National Debts”	” ” ”
“Wages, Earnings, and Taxation of the Working Classes of Great Britain”	” Leone Levi.
“Pressure of Taxation”	” George Norman.
“Political Problems for our age”	” W. R. Greg.
The Statesman’s Year Book, 1875	” Fred. R. Martin.

Our position, then, is this—and it seems desirable to place it broadly and plainly before the country, so plainly and broadly that, if contested at all, it must be contested not on details of figures, where errors may be easily fallen into and not easily detected, but on general grounds which no errors of detail can appreciably weaken or affect—our entire system of taxation has, in the course of the last generation, been so largely amended, and its amount in reference to our wealth and our population so greatly reduced,

I.—COMPARATIVE TAXATION OF THIS AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

I have endeavoured in vain to reach any near approximation to a correct result. The proportion which the *State* bears to the *Federal* expenditure in the United States, to say nothing of their large revenue derived from the sale of waste lands; the various items which are paid out of local funds in one country, and out of imperial taxation in another; and the moneys reckoned properly enough as sources of revenue, which are in no sense taxation (such as our post-office and telegraph net receipts), combine to baffle any but the most elaborate and lengthened calculations and explanations. Some notion of all this may be gained by reference to the above-named article in the *Edinburgh Review*. I will therefore content myself with giving side by side in round numbers the population and taxation in the three countries which most concern us:—

	Population.	Taxation.	Per head.
United Kingdom	32,000,000 ...	£93,000,000 ..	58s.
France	36,000,000 ...	113,000,000 ...	63s.
United States of America...	39,000,000 ...	180,000,000 ...	66s.

N.B.—(1). The real revenue from *taxation*, properly so called, for the United Kingdom (for, of course, the *profits* made by the post-office and telegraphs must be put out of consideration), would seem to be as follows:—

Customs	£20,840,000
Inland Revenue (various branches)	40,000,000
Income tax	5,690,000
	<hr/>
	£66,030,000
Local Taxation	26,440,000
	<hr/>
	£92,470,000

See *Statesman's Year Book* for 1875: pp. 213, 220.

(2). The sum given for France is taken from Goschen's work on local taxation, p. 122; and includes the *communal* taxation, but probably not a further sum for *departmental* expenditure, which should be included. See *Economist* for September 27th, 1875.

(3). The figures for the United States (with a trifling reduction, rendered necessary by considerations which I not need particularize) are taken from an official document—"Report of Commissioners appointed by the State of New York," dated 1871, and signed by David A. Wells and two colleagues—p. 9.

(4). Mr. Baxter classes the relative wealth of several nations thus:—

Income per head.

United Kingdom ...	£28	Germany	£19
United States of America	26	Austria ...	17
France	21	Russia ...	7

II.—INCREASING WEALTH OF THE NATION.

A very few figures will suffice to satisfy our minds on this score. *First*, we may refer to the remarkable calculation, signed "Surplus," which was published in the *Times* of April 12th, of this year, and appears to rest mainly on the authority of the first financial authority in the kingdom, from which it results that the average annual growth of the yield of our taxes (all due allowances for remissions and impositions made), had been as follows:—

1840—1852	£1,000,000
1852—1859	1,240,000
1859—1865	1,780,000
1865—1875	2,500,000

that economists and statesmen are bound to change their phraseology, and reconsider their popular maxims, in regard thereto. To continue to declaim against it as either unduly heavy, or unfair in its pressure, or a stimulant to fraud, or a fetter upon commerce,

Secondly.—The total amount of property and income assessed under the income tax has risen thus (Ireland being estimated for the first ten years):—

1843	£220,000,000
1859	266,000,000
1868	386,000,000
1871	420,000,000
1873	453,000,000

Thus, while in the course of a quarter of a century the assessable income of the nation had nearly doubled, the taxation levied had risen only about ten millions, or twenty per cent.

Thirdly.—While it is notorious that during the same period the wages of our population have increased in a corresponding ratio with the incomes of the propertied classes, we have no means of accurately measuring this augmentation. But the following table of the increasing consumption of imported and excisable articles per head will leave us little to be desired on this head:—

CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED AND EXCISABLE ARTICLES PER HEAD OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

	1853.	1863.	1873.
Bacon, lb....	0.81	6.09	9.07
Butter, lb.	1.61	3.65	4.89
Cheese, lb.	1.55	2.85	4.69
Eggs, number	4.48	9.08	20.56
Rice, lb. ...	2.25	5.58	11.37
Sugar, lb. ...	29.57	36.01	51.56
Tea, lb. ...	2.14	2.90	4.11
Tobacco, lb.	1.07	1.27	1.41
Wine, gallons	0.25	0.35	0.56
Malt, bushels	1.49	1.67	1.98
Spirits, home and foreign, gallons	1.10	0.85	1.23

INCIDENCE OF TAXATION.

This is a matter peculiarly difficult to ascertain with any precision. Perhaps the best plan is to place side by side the results of three careful calculations, the one my own, the two others by Mr. Baxter and Mr. L. Levi, both statisticians of eminence. (See "Political Problems," p. 309.)

1869.	Taxation per head.		Taxation in proportion to Income.	
	Propertied classes.	Proletariat.	Propertied classes.	Proletariat.
Greg	£ s. d. 8 3 0	£ s. d. 1 6 0	14 per cent.	9 per cent.
Baxter	7 0 0	1 8 3	10½ " "	7 " "
Levi	6 5 0	1 2 0	14 " "	5½ " "
Average ...	£ 7 2 8	1 5 5	13 " "	7.2 " "

That is, the classes who possess property, as compared with the working classes, pay six times as much per head, and nearly twice as much in proportion to income. The proportion will, of course, vary according to the severity of the income tax in each year. Since the above calculations were made, the tea duty has been reduced, and the sugar duty repealed. On the other hand, the income tax has been reduced; so that probably the comparison has not been much affected.

has become simply an abuse of language and a misdirection of the national mind. These statements may still have some insignificant fraction of reality about them, but it is a fraction as insignificant as can apply to any system of taxation. Watch expenditure as closely as you choose, for it may be injudicious, it may be clumsily levied. It may even be wasteful and misapplied; but cease to denounce it as oppressive or extreme. It is notoriously no more than a nation so extraordinarily—perhaps mischievously*—wealthy can bear with ease. If, for the sake of words, you insist upon calling our actual amount of revenue a burden on the people, add to your now pedantic phraseology that there are far heavier burdens pressing upon them from which the fitting use of that revenue would relieve them; that the money of the nation is entrusted to the Government not to be spent as sparingly, but as beneficially and as efficiently as possible; and that it is disreputable and scandalous to forego any great object, or to decline any manifest improvement, or to shirk any international obligation, on the plea that we cannot afford the outlay, because that plea is simply an untruth. We are the richest nation on the earth, and yet we submit to be told daily by our orators in Parliament that we are not rich enough to discharge our duties, or to mend our social evils, or avert our coming perils.† We find ourselves with millions of surplus revenue

* I consider that wealth may be mischievous to a nation, as history has shown ere now, when it comes upon it suddenly, inordinately, or as the result of conquest or mineral discoveries and not of industry; and when, therefore, its immediate and perhaps only consequence is a vast outburst of luxury—an increase in the consumption of perishable commodities which yields no added dignity to life, and no extended powers of usefulness, and whose main results are felt in a great inflation of prices and an enhanced system of expenditure, which, together, render life difficult to that portion (the large residue) of the community whose share in the increased riches of the nation has not been proportionate. When the influx of wealth is rapid, the production of needed articles, individual or family, rarely keeps pace with consumption, nor does the character of expenditure improve with the augmentation of its amount. Has not this been the case of late years in England?

† It is true the argument is not put forward in this naked form: shallow arguments seldom are, lest their fallacy should be too easily detected. But all who have had much opportunity of watching ministerial proceedings know too well the pressure that is put upon every department to cut down its estimates as low as possible; the earnest, and often peremptory remonstrances of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has to provide the funds, with his colleagues, who have to spend them; the rivalry between successive ministries as to which shall ask least money from the country rather than as to which shall lay out its money most profitably; and the perpetual recurrence of the resistless plea—"Oh! that is all very true, but we dare not dream of naming such a figure; it would be simple madness; the House of Commons would not listen to it for a moment. What! present heavier estimates than our predecessors!" Mr. Gladstone proposes to remit five millions of taxation. Sir Stafford Northcote never dreams of saying, "If you will trust me, I will spend that five millions so that it shall be worth ten to the nation." He simply wins popularity at the outset by promising to remit six.

We are all familiar with the perennial plea of the Cobden School of economists, "It is absolutely essential to reduce every vote of the larger departments as a rule, however plausible the grounds they may make out for its inflation. This is practically the only way of enforcing moderation in the public expenditure. We simply cannot trust the Government with the money; it is impossible to check the outlay in detail; ministers themselves cannot do it; if they have the millions, their subordinates will be certain to contrive to spend them. The only real way of saving is to say to ministers, 'You shall have no more than so much wherewith to carry on the State machine, whatever be your exigencies or your aims; and you must make that sum do.'" We appeal to the recollection

when our annual budget is unveiled to us—last year it was six millions—yet our constant question is not “What best can we do with it?” but “To what clamorous interest or class shall we give it away?” The budget-night is a scramble for alms, not an honourable competition for the means of supplying a grievous public need, or reaching a beneficial achievement. Even those among our legislators who still condescend to take lessons from the wisdom of Scripture, in place of bandying its anathemas, seem to forget that praise and reward were lavished on the administrators who used their five talents and their ten in active operations, while only scorn and penalty were bestowed upon the timid and idle minister who could give no better account of the funds entrusted to him than that he had wrapped them up in a napkin and held them ready for remission.

It will be asked, “What then are these items of public expenditure which ought to be enlarged before we think of any further remission of taxation? What are the obligations we are ever seeking to evade on the ground of poverty, in place of pressing to meet them with the liberality out of the abundance of our overflowing wealth? What the preparations for the future claims of less happy years that we ought to be eager to make in these years of fat and teeming prosperity? What those costly but profitable lines of liberal outlay which will repay us a thousand-fold? What, finally, especially those unsupplied wants, those urgent needs which lie as burdens on the nation far heavier than any impost we could name?” I have no intention of drawing out a complete programme, but will content myself with a few suggestions.

I.—THE STATE OF THE ARMY.

My readers need not be afraid lest I should drag them through the discussions on this topic, both in Parliament and in the press, which have wearied us from year to year, in which pictures the most irreconcilable were drawn by equally qualified members of the Government and the Opposition, and the most contradictory opinions confidently bandied about between very able civilians and very respectable military authorities. I will confine myself to facts, as to which little discrepancy appears to exist among those qualified to speak, most of which, indeed, might be inferred beforehand, and the conclusions pointed at by which are

of our readers whether this has not been the constant language of the Manchester School, whether in or out of power; and we appeal to their good sense whether any language could be more undignified or helpless. “These schoolboys who rule us—whom we select to rule us—must be kept on short allowance; cash slips through the fingers of all of them; empty purses are the only guarantees against waste; fifteen millions are probably wanted for the army or the navy, though the Cabinet dare only ask for twelve; let us vote them no more than ten, and they will contrive to spin it out, and leave us scarcely weaker or less defensible as the result.” And this passes for policy and saving!

too obvious to need elaborate argument. And for the sake at once of brevity and lucidity, instead of complicating my text with references and quotations, I will compress into a note a sufficient number of the authorities on which I rely for confirmation.*

* In the debate which took place in the course of May, in the two Houses of Parliament, we find the following admissions from quarters where such admissions mean much, and may be taken without discount. The recruits, the Duke of Cambridge allowed, are too young. "No doubt," the Duke said, "it would be better to have no recruits under twenty. I should be delighted to find that every recruit who entered the service was of that age. . . . But how are we to know a young man's age? We are obliged to take his word for it, and sometimes he may say he is twenty when he is only seventeen. I repeat that I should prefer men of twenty, but it is impossible to get them at that age. At twenty a young fellow has become a seasoned man, who has entered upon his career in life, and if he is at all a good workman or a good labourer, he will not come into the army, whereas a boy of eighteen or nineteen, who has not yet taken his position in life, you can enlist." In other words, the army can compete successfully with the labour market for what, in the Duke's view, are the less desirable class of recruits, but not for the more desirable. Indeed he said as much in plain words. The real difficulty, he avowed, "is the state of the labour-market." *"That is the difficulty, and, unless you can get over it, you cannot have an army such as we should wish to see, or a reserve worthy the name of a reserve; for the reserve at present, is much more on paper than in reality."* And again, in almost the very last words of his speech, the Commander-in-Chief said—"I repeat, if you wish to keep up the army, and to have short service, you must look to the labour-market, and pay your men accordingly."

Lord Cardwell, who rose next, expressed his "entire agreement" with the Duke's concluding observations. Conscription, as the Commander-in-Chief had said, was not to be thought of, and the question therefore resolved itself into a "matter of estimate." *"If you would rather see full battalions, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have a fuller estimate."* Lord Cardwell added that "in time of peace neither the present Government nor any other would venture to submit largely-increased estimates to the House of Commons."

The Secretary-at-War told the House plainly his view of the case:—"Twenty per cent. of our recruits," he said, "will never become efficient soldiers at all; other 20 per cent. are not at present efficient soldiers, but will or MAY in process of time become so."

Medical Inspectors of the Army—Dr. Adams, Dr. Cameron, and others—say:—"A deplorable deterioration has taken place in the quality of the rank and file in the last few years." "I must candidly assert that the physique of our infantry is not up to the standard of our race, and unless remedial measures be adopted at once, it will fall lower and lower." "We are enlisting the very scum of society."

The Commander-in-Chief, at the Lord Mayor's dinner, said:—"It is impossible to keep the army up unless you pay for it. And the question is, are you prepared to pay what is necessary? I am convinced you are, and that the reason you receive this toast so well is because you know perfectly that by contributing the sums essential to keep the services efficient, you are caring more effectually for your own interests than in any other way you could devise. This is really the view which we must take. It is my duty, and the duty of those who have to work with me, to manipulate the article when we have got it; and it is for you, the members of Parliament who surround me, and for the constituencies, to enable us to have the means of producing a good result. Unless you give us those means liberally, it is impossible we can attain efficiency. But all that requires money, and without money we cannot attain the object in view. Then, again, I am constantly hearing of economy and efficiency. Well, I think I am a most economical man in the right direction. I do not understand how it is that when we economize we are supposed to have become more efficient. I never have been able to see how efficiency was to be attained unless you spend money. I believe, if it were fairly and fully put by members to their constituents, they would enable you to be generous. But there ought to be no mistake about it; we ought to speak out freely, as I have endeavoured to do to the best of my ability, in placing this question in a common-sense way before my fellow-citizens in this great metropolis, wherever I have had the opportunity of speaking on the subject."

The rejections out of the recruits offering themselves have risen, in the last thirty years, from 30 to 44 per cent., according to one account. According to a more favourable one, they are now one in three. "Why," asks Captain Horne, "are the rejections so numerous? Because we are compelled now, and have always been compelled in emergencies, to enlist largely from town recruits of immature age." In 1872, 31 per cent. of the recruits were enlisted in London, and 52 per cent. in five other largest towns. In the same year, 27 in every 1,000 were under seventeen years of age, and 582 under twenty years of age. The ratio of deserters to recruits has never, since the earliest

It is admitted, then, on all hands, that the state of the army is far from satisfactory, and that, whether painted *en beau* by the Ins or *en noir* by the Outs, whether its condition be owing to a bad system or to the stinginess which has ruined a good system, it is such as, but for our navy and our "silver strip of sea," would not content the country for an hour. It is equally beyond question that our recruiting system is most disappointing in its results; that our enlistments are deplorably too few, and our desertions shamefully too many; that, in short, for some reason or other, the service, whatever changes we now make in it, is not attractive to the population; that we do not get the sort of men we want and that we used to get; and that, as the special point of all, we are forced to be content with the *scum* instead of the *élite* (physically) of the masses; with the weakened or diseased riff-raff of the towns instead of the hardy rustic of the country; with boys instead of men; with youths of 17 instead of 20; that is, with fellows who *may* become good soldiers in two or three years instead of fellows who will be ready for the field in six months,—and this at an era when wars are matters of weeks instead of years. I offer no opinion as to the wisdom of short service or long service, or any of the other alterations of system recently introduced; as a civilian, I do not feel qualified to form one; as a pleader, having one clear point in view, I am anxious to avoid all disputable matter. The two or three essential truths which concern my argument, and which no one, I apprehend, will deny or endeavour to extenuate, are—*first*, that whereas formerly we used to be able to recruit the sort of men we wished for in the numbers we wished, we can no longer do so; *secondly*, that we cannot do so, because we no longer offer them the same relatively equal or superior inducements—in pay, pension, treatment, &c.—compared with other claimants for their services, that we formerly did; in a word, that we are thus beaten in the competition for suitable men by the railway contractors, engineers, iron masters, emigration agents, and other employers of labour, because we do not bid so high as those rivals; in fine, because the State—the wealthiest of all employers of labour, since its wealth, being that of the nation, is simply inexhaustible—the one whose service would seem to have in some sort both a prior claim and a special dignity—will not offer its servants as good pay (*pay* including remuneration and attractions

years of this century, been so high as now: it was over 80 per cent. in 1872. According to Mr. Holms, from official estimates, the average number of recruits wanted annually is 82,449; the average number obtained has scarcely exceeded 20,000. Yet it is absurd to argue that sufficient numbers cannot be obtained by fitting inducements. There is no difficulty whatever in obtaining an adequate supply of men of the fitting age (twenty-one and upwards) for the Police force (43,000 men), nor by the lower branches of the Civil Service (the Customs, Excise, &c.), nor by the great Railway Companies, whose servants on weekly pay equal in numbers our home army. (See Holms's "British Army," pp. 73, 74.)

of all kinds)* as commercial companies, private individuals, colonies, or the back States of America; because, while it might be the best paymaster, it is the worst. For no one doubts that if *we choose to bid high enough*, we might command as many recruits of the right sort and the right age as we desire; that, in short, if, instead of giving back our surplus to the most clamorous and pertinacious of the tax-payers, we were to allot two millions, one million, or less (say even 6d. a day extra to every one of our soldiers),† to dealing with our army on signally generous terms, we could *command* the labour market instead of having to make shift with its refuse; unless, indeed, our military authorities were actual idiots in their way of laying out the extra money. But what reception would a Secretary-at-War who proposed thus to raise the pay of the soldiers to the market price receive from his Chancellor of the Exchequer? On the other hand, what reception ought a ministry which shrinks from such a proposal to meet with from a country which has confided its destinies, its safety, and its fair fame to such timid and short-sighted stewards?

It is to no purpose that some writers, like Mr. Holms,‡ maintain that we might make our army splendidly and adequately effective, at its present cost, by wiser management. The position may be sound, but it is irrelevant, for no man urges more strongly than Mr. Holms that we do not now get or keep the quality of recruits we so imperatively need. It is futile to argue, as I have heard others do, that we ought to take the scum of the population for the army; that soldiering is the best use we can put them to; and military discipline the best school for them. Granted to a great extent;—it may be the moral and social scum that we might and ought to utilize; but not the *physical* scum; and even those we don't want till they are full grown, otherwise cannot give them the adequate discipline they need—we cannot wait three years till they become ripe for service. The fact remains that we want a better and an older set than we get, and that we don't get them, simply because we won't pay for them. If any proofs, references, or confirmations were needed to clinch this fact, they are to be found in the two proposals that have been so vehemently urged from time to time during the four last

* Pray let it be observed that I by no means wish to give an opinion as to which *special inducement* is inadequate. It may be bounty, or daily pay, or pension, or comfortable quarters, or fitting provision for married soldiers, or decent, kindly treatment. It must somehow, however, be *something* which the army service lacks, and which the railway service, the police force, the navigators, and even the Customs, Excise, and Post-office, contrive to offer. I am inclined to believe (with Mr. Holms), that the army might be made as attractive to 80,000 young men every year, with little or no increase of actual outlay, if only our military authorities, parliamentary and others, knew how. That they *could* be got there can be no doubt.

† Even men who agree with me and with each other in little else, agree in recommending this advance. (See Holms, p. 72. Capt. Hime's Prize Essay, p. 29.)

‡ "The British Army in 1875." By John Holms, M.P., p. 7.

years; one class of orators and writers insisting that we shall never have a decent army till we adopt conscription and the ballot, as in France; the other maintaining that our only safety lies in universal military service, as in Prussia, in passing our whole male population through the ranks.* I confess both propositions fill me with infinite disgust, for what do they both mean at bottom? Simply, *the press-gang revived*. "Seize your men, because you are too stingy to pay them fair wages. Force them to serve you, because you think it too costly to induce them." And this, you fancy, would be the more economical measure of the two! and you disguise its monstrous injustice and oppression—some of you, under the wretched screen of the ballot, which is leaving the incidence of the iniquity to chance, or throwing it on Providence; others under the scarcely less transparent curtain of universal service,—which, if purchasable exemptions were forbidden, would be impossible and extravagant, and if they were allowed, would be simply a more wasteful and irregular system of recruiting. Would you dare—would you even propose—to fix an unremunerating rate of salary for your civil servants, and then collect them by conscription? And, if not, why should you recommend such a system for the military service of the State?

II.—THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

It will be admitted on all hands—and it would be a waste of time to argue the point—that the most important and imperative duty of the State, after providing for the safety and independence of the country, is to secure the prompt, efficient, and pure administration of justice to all its subjects. That justice should not be over-costly, is of signal consequence also; but is not half so essential as that it should be *accessible*, equally reliable for rich and poor, and, in fact, never impeded or denied, directly or

* The Royal United Service Institution has just awarded its annual prize to an Essay by Capt. Hime, R.A., entitled "Universal Conscription the only answer to the Recruiting Question." His Essay is full of such military learning as bears upon the subject, but we cannot praise its logic or adopt its conclusions. Its entire argument is this: that in order to obtain the number and class of suitable recruits the country needs, you must (for the home forces at least), render the whole population liable to serve, even if you do not pass the whole population through the ranks as they reach the age of twenty—(for his "Plan," Part III., is not very clear in its summary)—BECAUSE the army as at present recruited, is growing poorer in quality year by year, as well as more costly, and BECAUSE in no other manner can you obtain the men you need, in the numbers you need, without having to pay more than the country will ever consent to pay. He argues (virtually), that it is cheaper to take men than to offer them *adequate* inducements to come;—and, like all military reasoners, in Prussia as well as here, entirely leaves out of view the indirect and incalculable cost to the country of a system which would take every young man from his art, his profession, his craft, just as he was beginning to master it, and had found his niche, for a year or two at first, and at any time when he was wanted afterwards;—thus deranging the organization of every establishment in the country. Curiously enough, however, at p. 29, he writes:—"But, in the meantime, you must go into the labour market, and say, 'If you won't come for the pay and pension we offer, what will you come for?'—and give it them." Precisely my argument—not only for "the meantime," but for all times.

indirectly ; that every man who is wronged should have a remedy, easy and at hand ; that every crime should be promptly and adequately punished ; and that a legitimate litigant should be able to obtain a conclusive decision to his lawsuit ; that no man should have to endure a wrong, because it is so tedious and costly to get righted ; or, dread an appeal to the law, as a worse calamity than submission to a fraud or an oppression. A Government which does not secure this full and ready justice to its people, clearly fails in one of its most solemn and urgent obligations ; if it fails because the discharge of this obligation would cost money, the excuse would seem only to add to the guilt of the failure ; and if, having sufficient funds in hand, it prefers to use that money in purchasing popularity by remission of taxation, rather than in doing justice by strengthening the staff appointed to administer the law, it is difficult to characterize, in moderate language, the degree or the nature of its laches. Now, that the State in England is, and has long been, habitually guilty of this grave iniquity, is only too notorious ; and the expense, cruelty, and injustice thus inflicted on the community is known to be enormous and incalculable, but unluckily does not admit of being laid before the public in precise or provable figures.

The state of affairs referred to has been denounced as a scandal for more than a generation, yet it exists as a scandal still, and, probably, a scandal almost unmitigated in its essential points. Many attempts have been made to remedy it, but none have been effectual, and few have been actually carried into operation. No one denies the allegations, yet the facts adduced are of the most astounding order. I enter into no discussion as to the remedy : it would be pure impertinence in me even to pretend to an opinion on the subject. I only know that the present judges cannot, by any diligence, get through their ever-increasing business, far less overtake arrears. I know that, under the existing system, this inadequate judicial staff, instead of sitting continuously—and what institutions should be constantly open and in action, if not courts of justice ?—suspend operations for several months in the year in the metropolis, and hold assizes only twice or three times a year in the provinces. The appellate system, too, is a source of indescribable oppression. The impossibility of getting through the work has led to the use of the less occupied Queen's counsel to supplement the judges in trying causes at assizes ; and to a far worse evil—the practice of almost *forcing* parties (by the most urgent advice from the bench) to submit their disputes to arbitration—i.e., to a most costly and unsatisfactory method of decision.* The hardest source of cruelty of all upon

* See "Statistics of the Courts of Justice," &c., by F. H. Janson, Esq., read before the Statistical Society, Feb., 1874.

the suitors is the *remanets*—i.e., the cases which are postponed from session to session, simply because the judges have not time to hear them. They have therefore to be left over till another assize or another time; and what this means, in the way of added fees, renewed expenses for the journeys and maintenance of witnesses, and other items of outlay, may be imagined by many of us, but can be known only in its full bitterness by the unhappy victims. Yet, what was told us a few weeks ago by a late law officer of the Crown? Sir H. James's speech on the Judicature Bill of last Session says:—

“It seemed to him most inadvisable to bring the legal business of the country to a dead-lock by reducing the number of those judges. *The 15 judges could not perform the duties which now devolved upon them.* The trials of heavy commercial causes took place only at short sittings held three times a year, and the present state of things was in consequence a scandal to the country. The number of *remanets*, some of which had been standing for two years, was, in the Court of Queen's Bench, 186; in the Court of Exchequer, 92; and in the Court of Common Pleas, 37; and to these there had just been added 108, 111, and 112 new causes in those three courts respectively. The circuits required 14 judges, and there must be one judge sitting in chambers; consequently there was no provision made for the Central Criminal Court, or for cases of indisposition, and it would be impossible, under the Bill, to have continuous sittings in London during the circuits.”

Two other quotations from the Law Reports, given in the *Times*, will suffice for illustrations:—

“EXCHEQUER CHAMBER,
“Dec. 5, 1871.

“BUSINESS OF THE COURT.

“Mr. Justice Mellor said there were other judgments to be delivered, but on account of the engagements of the judges, several of them having to go the Winter Circuit, and his own Court being short-handed, the Court had been unable to prepare their judgments in the other cases, and they must therefore stand over until February.

“Mr. Justice Willes announced that, from a similar cause, this Court must suspend its sittings, and could not hear any of the cases of error from the Court of Exchequer, which, therefore, must stand over until February. Thus the Court was leaving the greater part of its business undisposed of, and most of the cases have been pending two or three years.

“From the same cause, only two out of the eight cases in error from the Common Pleas were heard at this sittings, and the other six stand over.”

Again—

“COURT OF ERROR IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER,
“Nov. 30, 1872.

“(Sittings in Error from the Court of Exchequer, before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Mr. Justice Keating, Mr. Justice Denman, and Mr. Justice Archibald.)

“The Court, as thus constituted, sat to take cases in error from the Court of Exchequer, of which there were 18—enough to occupy the Court for two or three weeks, especially as many of them are cases of great weight. Three days only, however, could be appointed, consistently with the other

probable demands upon the time of the judges as judges of ordinary or first instance jurisdiction; and the Lord Chief Justice, upon the judges taking their seats, had to announce that it was found it would be impossible to sit on Monday, owing to the Winter Circuits, so that the sittings will be curtailed to a single day, scarcely sufficient to dispose of one case. The consequence was that all the cases but the first one or two had to stand over until after next Term. Before taking any of the new cases, judgment was delivered in one which had stood over for consideration from the last sittings."

Now, I have not a word to say as to the variety of remedies which have been suggested during the discussions of the last two sessions. Legal doctors differ too much to make it decent for an unprofessional layman to offer an opinion. Nor is it necessary. All that is essential to my argument stands out above all controversy—viz., that all these ruinous *remanets* and enforced arbitrations, which are the disgrace and opprobrium of our system, and so grievous a cruelty to our suitors, might have been avoided had there been a timely addition to the number of our judges, and had those judges sat *de die in diem* both at assizes, in appeal courts, and in courts of first instance—as they would have done had they been numerous enough and adequately paid; and yet that, session after session and parliament after parliament, for a generation back or more, successive Governments have gone on remitting millions upon millions of surplus revenue in preference to rectifying, by a reasonable expenditure, this grievous, scandalous, and admitted wrong. I know few more flagrant examples of want of moral courage, or want of sense of the comparative importance of measures,—or of both combined.

III.—IRISH NATIONAL EDUCATION.

We shall not attempt to guide our readers through the utterly irreconcilable statistics on the subject of the condition and efficiency of the Primary Schools in Ireland which were laid before the House of Commons in the early August debates by official and opposition speakers; by the Chief Secretary on the one side, and Mr. Lyon Playfair and Mr. O'Reilly on the other; nor shall we quote in any detail from the voluminous report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. On this topic, as throughout this paper, we shall prefer to confine ourselves to data which are not, or scarcely, disputed, so that if any persons dissent from our general conclusions, their controversy with us shall concern only our logic and our inferences, and not at all our premisses. It will not, then, we apprehend, be disputed that among the most desirable objects which Government can aim at should be a thoroughly good education for the Irish people, conducted as far as practicable by well-qualified and well-disposed instructors;

that such a system, fairly, zealously, and liberally followed out for a generation ought to have gone far towards solving the eternal "Irish difficulty;" and that almost any number of millions successfully spent in bringing about such a result would be public money laid out to no ordinary profit. Theoretically, indeed, this proposition has been avowed and re-avowed for the last forty years, by every political party, whether in or out of office. It will be admitted, further, that the teachers appointed to train the youthful intellects of the Irish people, and sway their sentiments at the most impressible ages, ought to be as well qualified as can be found; so well treated as to make them almost inevitably contented, and the spreaders of content around them; and so comfortable as, by the nature of things, to be earnest friends of the system and the connection to which they owed their comfort. So far there can surely be no difference of opinion.

Yet it is admitted with almost equal unanimity—for controversy on the matter only deals with figures and details of degree—that the instruction given in the primary, and so-called "national" schools of Ireland, is defective in the extreme; inefficient, when compared, not by an ideal standard, but by the imperfect practical ones of England;—that only a portion of the teachers are even nominally trained for their occupation, and that the training they have had is, for the most part, ostentatiously inadequate;—that their salaries are wretchedly scanty, and residence for them rarely provided, and when provided sadly insufficient. No one disputes these things: scarcely any one denies either that, as a natural consequence, these teachers are (as a rule, and notoriously) disaffected, and propagators of disaffection—in fact, are too often to be ranked among the worst foes of England, in place of being her fastest friends.*

The comparison, according to Mr. O'Reilly, gives as the entire average income of the Irish national school teachers £43, against £103 in England, and £110 in Scotland; and *one* training school in Ireland, against *five* in Scotland, and *thirty* in England. The same authority says that last year, out of 9,960 teachers in

* The following is the summing up of the *Spectator*: "For several years the National School Teachers had been agitating for an increase of salary, and their case is simply irresistible. They are paid at a lower rate than London scavengers; with exceptions not deserving notice, they are without residences; and they receive no pension in old age. They have, therefore, neither the present means of saving, nor a future provision, and consequently they have only the workhouse to look forward to as the reward of a lifetime of faithful service. Leaving common justice and right feeling entirely out of the question, it is evident that ordinary prudence would hasten to redress the grievances of the teachers. The wretchedness of their condition closes the profession against competently qualified persons, and necessarily renders the schools inefficient. Nor are the political consequences less disastrous. Every one can see the folly of uniting great powers with physical wretchedness, and that is what is done in the case of those teachers. After the priests, they exercise the greatest influence over the minds of the Irish people, and they are so starved, that discontent and disaffection are inevitable results."

the Irish primary schools, only 3,842, or little more than one-third, had been trained. The Royal Commission gives (1870) fuller and rather different figures, but none at all invalidating the general conclusion: the result is, that taking all sects into account, about half the male teachers, and two-thirds of the female, are untrained.

The report gives the salaries of the *male* teachers as ranging for trained from £18 to £52, and for untrained from £18 to £44; *female* from £16 to £30 and £40—pay which the Commissioners declare insufficient for securing the needed character and talent. Out of 5,265 schools, only 1,430 have free residences; the Commissioners recommend that they should be attached to all. The inadequacy of the proposals of Sir M. Hicks Beach on moving the relative vote in August last to meet those recommendations on the requirements of the case, is obvious at a glance. I fully admit the force of collateral considerations, and the objections to an increase of grant in any form which would have the effect of fostering the inveterate tendency of the Irish to live on English liberality, and shut their own purses. I am merely concerned to point out that here we have a third instance in which a portion of the surplus funds that have been remitted to the tax-payers during the last forty years might have wrought a national good, now, perhaps, out of our reach for ever. An additional quarter of a million yearly, imperceptible to the English contributor to whom it was remitted, would have won the hearts of the Irish schoolmasters, to whom it was denied.

IV.—REDUCTION OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

This question has been so often, so recently, and sometimes so exhaustively treated, and the ablest statesmen and writers are so nearly in accord as to the principle involved, however they may differ as to the special measures by which that principle should be carried into operation, that a very few words of reminder are all that are necessary here. Our National Debt fluctuates about £800,000,000. It reached £900,000,000 at the peace of 1815. Thirty-nine years of peace reduced it to £800,000,000. The Crimean war, which lasted two years, added £30,000,000. Every war, every great and unexpected claim—negro emancipation, the Irish famine, the Crimean expedition, the fortifications voted in 1865, the purchase of the telegraphs in 1869—is met wholly or in part by loans, and, as we well know, will always be; and, as most of us admit, ought to be so; and for that very reason large reductions of the debt (thus inevitably and periodically augmented) ought to be held one of the first and most solemn obligations in every year of prosperity and peace.

Hitherto, in spite of a long cycle of such prosperity, and an enormous increase in the wealth of the nation, we have only nibbled at such reductions. We have no right to count on the continuance of such prosperity or such increase; we have many reasons to count on its diminution or cessation; intimations to this effect have been sounded in the people's ears of late, both by writers and statesmen with every claim to be listened to; and almost every one whose reputation entitles him to a hearing has in turn sounded the note of warning. We have no right to leave such an enormous burden on our posterity, who may most probably be far less able than ourselves to bear it. What is oppressive to us may be simply ruinous to them. It is scarcely honest—scarcely safe—to borrow for emergencies unless we repay *proportionally* in ordinary years. And, in fine, few will contest our conclusion that to remit taxation whenever there is a surplus—or even to consider that we have a surplus till a large sum has been set aside to pay off the debt—is a misappropriation approaching to iniquity.* The practical recognition of this truth by Sir Stafford Northcote, though inadequate, is worthy of all appreciation.

V.—SANITARY MEASURES.

This subject has been so fully discussed, has occupied public attention for so many years, and has given rise to so much local and general legislation, more or less abortive, more or less inadequate, that I need drag my readers through no details. *Sanitas sanitatum, omnia sanitas*, said Mr. Disraeli a year or two ago. It is admitted that nowhere in this country do our hygienic arrangements even approach perfection. It has been all but proved, and is, I believe, not denied, that in the United Kingdom 200,000 deaths out of 600,000 may be traced to preventible causes, and that these represent at least three times the number of cases of impaired health and spoiled life. It is felt, too, that as our population increases and towns extend, the mischief arising from neglected, misunderstood, or inadequate sanitation is growing serious and menacing to a hitherto unconceived degree. A good deal has been done, as we all know, not always wisely; but what remains to be done assumes year by year larger and wider dimensions. It is not very certain that we are altogether on the right tack; it is quite certain that the task before us presents appalling difficulties, and will involve enormous cost.† It has

* Perhaps I may venture to refer for particulars to "Rocks Ahead," chap. ii., "the Economic Rock." (See also Mr. Gladstone's Budget Speech, 1866; and J. S. Mill's speech in the House of Commons, April 17th, same year. Also Dudley Baxter's "National Debts.")

† The main drainage of the metropolis, from first to last, is estimated to cost about five millions; and if, as is probable, the proposal to supply London with pure water from Westmoreland, or the Bala district, in Wales, be renewed, we must prepare for an outlay of many millions more.

been determined that a sound and complete system of sewerage and drainage is essential, and must somehow be provided for every town and city; and towns and cities are growing up all round us, and swelling yearly as we watch them. The Pollution of Rivers Act, which was introduced last session, and will be re-introduced and probably carried next year, first began to open our eyes to the tremendous task before us—a task which can scarcely be *accomplished*, it is supposed, for less than one hundred millions—a sum which can scarcely be added to our already vast local taxation. That Act provides, in effect, that while our sewerage system shall be universalized and perfected, God Almighty's sewers, our streams and rivers, "for that end made and provided," shall no longer be used for that purpose; that our rubbish, manufacturing refuse, and household *excrements* shall no longer be turned into the natural watercourses, and so carried off into the sea, *but shall be disposed of and find depositories elsewhere*. In that last phrase lies the essence of the subject. "Elsewhere!" *Where?* Concentrate your attention for a moment on the valley of the Thames alone. Every one of the numberless towns, large and small, which make that valley one vast hive of life, must no longer use its grand river as an outlet—must do as London has done*—must find some issue, more or less distant, where, possibly miles off, it may convey its inevitable filth; and that issue must be unoccupied land—wastes, bogs, marshes, &c.—away from other habitations, where it shall be out of the reach of poisoning air or water for other human beings, present or future. In other words, the *excrements* of some ten or fifteen millions which has hitherto, for the most part, floated away to the ocean, shall be retained in the country, and concentrated into what *may* become centres of pestilence. It may be questioned whether this is wise, whether it is possible, whether it is based upon sound scientific or engineering doctrine.† What cannot be questioned, and what alone concerns my present purpose, is, that somehow or other the end must be attained if it be attainable; that scheme after scheme will be tried; that any scheme—be it hundreds of miles of piping, the purchase and consecration of thousands of acres, or the erection of elaborate machinery for pumping and deodorizing—will necessitate outlay on an enormous scale, which means rates by the million or borrowing by the million; and that, with such a prospect in view, giving back surpluses, neglecting to hoard surpluses, remitting one shilling of established taxation (now that our taxa-

* And every town has not, like London, Barking Marshes and the sea at its service.

† Even while I write, the town of Richmond has gone into court to prove that it is not possible for it to carry out the requirements of the law; and has adduced the declarations of very high engineering authorities in support of the plea—authorities which affirm that the whole scheme and theory of the actual system will have in a very few years to be reconsidered, and probably abandoned.

tion is so easy and so light, and, in the main, so equitable), would appear to be a grievous error and a curious want of foresight, —needing, but scarcely likely to obtain, justification.


VI.—RELIEF OF LOCAL TAXATION.

I have no intention of entering into the question of the degree or the mode in which local rates ought to be relieved at the expense of the imperial revenue; but that some such relief should be given has been, I think, a conclusion forced upon most minds by the discussions of the last few years. The Conservative party have long urged this principle upon Parliament, though without tracing out a plan which approved itself to the public mind. Mr. Goschen, when at the head of the Local Government Board, collected and published an enormous mass of information bearing on the subject; and in the name of the Liberal party conceded the principle, and as a sort of empiric and interim step, suggested that the house tax, which yields about a million, should be set aside to meet the immediate claims. But the proposal satisfied no one, and the matter was felt to demand bolder and more systematic handling. Very recently, Sir Baldwyn Leighton—than whom on such a topic no one deserves better to be listened to—in his published letter to Lord Lyttelton, has insisted upon the absolute necessity, in the interests of the poor themselves, of the cessation of all outdoor relief—and no competent observer, we believe, will differ with him. To insure this great end, he recommends (and Mr. Rathbone—also on authority of large experience—in the essentials, supports his proposal) that half the cost of *indoor* maintenance shall be borne by the Treasury.* This particular scheme may, or may not, be the best conceivable; but probably we can scarcely be wrong in assuming that in a very short period a sum not far off two millions per annum will have to be provided *ad hoc* by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who will then be less ready than at present to give back the surplus with which the natural increase of the revenue has provided him.

* "If—by charging half the *indoor*, or *necessary* poor on the Treasury, which justice as much as policy demands, and through persuasion and example inculcated by different inspectors in their districts, as has already been commenced—the outdoor pauperism could be reduced to the level of the best-managed unions, the saving in money would amount to £2,000,000 a year—indeed to nearly £3,000,000. f, in addition to this, Scotland were added to the grant from the Treasury for half the indoor maintenance, amounting to about £800,000 a year, the saving to the ratepayers would equal £4,000,000; but the saving to the poor themselves (in habits of self-reliance, &c.,) would be something like *ten times that amount*, and their improvement in moral and material welfare thereby would be quite incalculable. I look on this matter entirely from the point of view of the *amelioration of the poor*; and it is of course the consideration which would and should have the greatest weight in the House of Lords." ("Depauperisation," by Sir Baldwyn Leighton, Bart., p. 15. "Local Government and Taxation," by William Rathbone, M.P., pp. 23—36.)

I think that I have now shown that there are at least six classes of measures for the public good, of a character which the imperial revenue ought to take cognizance of and cannot without blame neglect, funds for which should be provided before the Government gives back to the nation any portion of the millions which it has confided to them to expend on its behalf, in its service, for its safety, and in discharge of its obligations formal or implied. There may be many more than six; the secular increase of the yield of existing taxation, so boldly counted upon, may any year receive a startling check; new indirect taxes cannot easily be imposed; direct taxes cannot be levied on the labouring masses; large and exclusive augmentations of the income tax, which falls upon the comparatively rich, will not, we may be certain, be endured, except for sudden and rare emergencies; and, to sum up the whole, any such marked improvement in the habits and character of the working classes as we all hope for, and many of us labour for, may, ere long, sweep away from the resources of the Chancellor of the Exchequer six or seven millions of the revenue now derived from the consumption of spirituous liquors. In short, our financial resources may very probably diminish, while the claims on those resources are very certain to increase. And in the face of these considerations—all I believe indisputable—the courage of the finance minister who ventures to remit his surplus, instead of hoarding it for future use, or spending it on present and pressing needs, should, I submit, be called by another name.

W. R. GREG.



OCEAN-CIRCULATION.

RESEARCHES IN THE "CHALLENGER" AND "TUSCARORA."

ONE of the principal objects of the *Challenger* Expedition was to bring to the test of more extended observation the doctrine of a General Oceanic Circulation, sustained by difference of Temperature alone, which had been suggested by the temperature-observations made in the previous *Porcupine* expeditions along the border of the Atlantic basin and in the Mediterranean. Of these observations, and of the conclusions I drew from them, I gave an account in the pages of this REVIEW four years ago (vol. xvi. p. 581); and I now propose to sum up the additions to our knowledge of the subject, which have since been made by the researches of the *Challenger* in the North and South Atlantic, in the Southern Indian and Antarctic Oceans, and among the islands of the Eastern Archipelago,—supplementing this by the information obtained by the United States ship *Tuscarora* in the North Pacific, as to which more complete information will doubtless be furnished by the *Challenger*, which has been at work there since leaving Japan in the spring of the present year.

It may be well for me to call to the recollection of my readers what was the state of scientific knowledge (or, as it now proves, of scientific ignorance) as regards the thermal condition of the deep sea, at the time when (in 1868) Professor Wyville Thomson and I explored the channel, of from 500 to 600 fathoms' depth, between the North of Scotland and the Faroe Islands.

The doctrine at that time current was, that whatever may be the

temperature of the *surface* of the sea—this being dependent on the temperature of the air above it, except when the transporting action of a current brings a body either of warmer or of cooler water from a hotter or a cooler area—the temperature at any considerable depth is everywhere 39° ; the thermometer progressively *falling* to that point from a surface-temperature of 75° or 80° as it sinks in the Equatorial sea, whilst it progressively *rises* to that point when sunk in either Polar ocean, after passing through the glacial surface-layer. And it was further believed that, between the Polar and the Equatorial seas, there is an isothermal band, in which the temperature of the ocean is 39° from the surface to the bottom. This doctrine appears to have originated with the French circumnavigator D'Urville; it was accepted by Sir James Ross, who supported it by the thermometric observations made during his Antarctic voyage; and, having received the stamp of Sir John Herschel's authority, it came to be generally adopted by physical geographers, not only in this country, but elsewhere—the lower temperatures occasionally recorded as having been obtained in deep soundings, being attributed to local "polar currents."

The promulgators and advocates of this doctrine appear to have supposed that the action of Polar cold upon sea-water would be the same as that of an ordinary winter's frost upon the water of a pond or lake; first cooling down the whole of it to 39° , which is the temperature of greatest density of *fresh* water, and then cooling down the surface-layer alone until it freezes, this layer continuing to float upon the warmer water beneath, in virtue of the reduction of its specific gravity produced by its expansion as it cools from 39° to 32° . But it was long ago shown by Marcet, and afterwards more exactly by Despretz, that *sea-water* continues to contract, and therefore to become heavier (bulk for bulk) as its temperature is reduced from 39° to its freezing-point at 27° or lower. And it necessarily follows from this fact, that the water of a *closed* Polar sea, when acted on by atmospheric cold, will have its temperature reduced below 30° Fahr., from its surface to its bottom; each surface-film becoming heavier as it is cooled, and descending until it meets with water as cold as itself. If, however, the Polar sea, instead of being closed, communicate with the general Oceanic basin, it may be predicated as a physical necessity, that as the weight or *downward* pressure of a column of Polar water exceeds that of a column of temperate or of Equatorial water of equal height, and as its *lateral* pressure has a corresponding excess in proportion to its depth, there must be a continual outflow of the deeper stratum of Polar water along the floor of any great ocean-basin accessible to it, towards the part where the elevation of temperature makes the column the lightest; whilst it might

so be predicated that the reduction of level which this outflow will be always tending to produce, will occasion a surface indraught into the Polar area, which can only be fed by a general movement of the upper stratum from the Equatorial portion of the basin. The warm water thus drawn into each Polar area, when subjected to the influence of atmospheric cold, will descend in its turn, and flow towards the Equator; and the two Polar flows, meeting at or near the Line, will there tend to rise to the surface, to replace the upper stratum which has been draughted off from the Equatorial zone towards either Pole, and will be thus brought under the heating influence of the tropical sun.

Thus, I argued, a continual *vertical circulation* must be maintained in any great Ocean-basin which ranges from the Equatorial line to either Polar area; the constant opposition of temperature maintaining an as constant disturbance of equilibrium, so as to keep in continual though very slow movement (a "creeping flow" being the term I have applied to it), both the upper and the under strata of oceanic water. The *primum mobile* of this circulation maintained to be the *surface-cold* of the Polar area, which occasions an increase of density in the whole column of water beneath, giving it a constant tendency to *descend*; its motor power being the exact parallel of that of the *bottom-heat* of the furnace which maintains a circulation of warm water through our large public buildings, conservatories, &c., by producing a reduction of density in the column of water above it, and thus giving it a continual tendency to *ascend*. The continuity of movement, in each case, is kept up by the subjection of the water which has been thus heated or cooled to the opposite influence elsewhere. Thus the water that rises from the top of the boiler through the pipes of a hot-water apparatus, gives up its excess of heat to the interior of the building through which it circulates; and, in virtue of the increase of density it acquires in cooling, flows down through the return pipes, which bring it back into the lower part of the boiler, there to be again heated and sent upwards. So, in the great Ocean-basins, the glacial water which descends in the Arctic and Antarctic basins under the influence of Polar cold, tends to rise towards the surface wherever the weight of the superincumbent column is diminished by the elevation of its temperature; and so soon as it comes under the influence of solar heat, it forms part of the upper flow whose poleward movement brings it again under the influence of surface-cold. Such a vertical circulation may be experimentally kept up, as I formerly described (vol. xvi. 1854), in a long trough, by the application of cold to the surface-water at one end, and of heat to the surface-water at the other; and the only objection that can be brought against the demonstrative value of this experiment, is based on the asserted

inadequacy of the force thus generated to put in motion the vast mass of water that intervenes between the Polar areas and the Equatorial zone.* This objection, however, assumes that a persistent disturbance of equilibrium can exist in the waters of an Oceanic basin, without any movement to restore it,—an assertion which can be no more justified than the assertion that a persistent difference of level can be maintained without any movement to equalize it. No Mathematical Physicist that I have met with (and I have placed the question before several of the very highest authorities, both in this country and on the Continent) would take upon himself to affirm that the “viscosity” of water is sufficient to prevent such movements; all that it can do being to retard them. And as the Astrónómer Royal, in his presidential address to the Royal Society in 1872, characterized the doctrine I had advocated as “certain in theory, and supported by observation,” while Sir John Herschel (in a letter he was good enough to write to me within a few weeks of his death) fully accepted it as “the common sense of the matter,” and as Sir William Thomson, at successive meetings of the British Association, has expressed his entire concurrence in my views, their authority has enabled me to present them with a confidence which my own comparative ignorance of Physical science would have otherwise made ridiculous.

Never having claimed for myself any merit as the original propounder of the doctrine of a General Oceanic Circulation sustained by difference of Temperature—what I considered myself to have done for the strengthening and completion of that doctrine being to show that Polar cold, rather than Equatorial heat, is the *primum mobile*—it was with nothing but satisfaction that I learned about a year ago from Professor Prestwich (who has made a special study of the literature of this subject) that nearly thirty years ago Professor Lenz, of St. Petersburg, one of the most eminent Physicists of his time, had advanced the very same doctrine, in terms almost identical with my own, as *an inevitable deduction* from the facts ascertained by the series of observations on the temperature and specific gravity of Oceanic water at various depths, which he had himself made in the second circumnavigatory voyage of Kotzebue during the years 1823-6. It is a remarkable proof of his sagacity, that when preparing for this voyage, he made (in conjunction with Professor Parrot) a series of experiments on the influence of pressure on self-registering thermometers, of the same kind as those which were carried on nearly fifty years later under the direction of the late Professor W. A. Miller and myself; and that, having been thus led to a complete distrust of their indica-

* This argument has been persistently urged by Mr. Croll, who attributes every movement of Ocean-water—whether deep or superficial—to the action of winds on its surface.

tions, he devised a method of obtaining deep-sea temperatures, which, though laborious and complicated, proved in his hands so satisfactory, that I find his results in singular conformity with those obtained by the use of "protected" thermometers in the *Challenger* expedition. Although Lenz published these observations (with corrective computations) in an elaborate memoir in the Transactions of the St. Petersburg Academy soon after his return, he did not then base on them any general doctrine; and the observations themselves appear to have excited but little interest. It was not until after the promulgation of D'Urville's doctrine of a uniform deep-sea temperature of 39° , that Lenz gave publicity to the conclusions to which he had himself been led by his previous observations, whose validity he justly maintained to be superior to that of the ordinary thermometric observations taken by D'Urville. These conclusions, contained in a short paper which appeared in the Bulletin of St. Petersburg Academy for 1847, are as follows:—

1. That the coldness of the bottom-water of the great Ocean-basins indicates the existence of a general under-flow of glacial water from the Polar areas towards the Equator.

2. That the existence, at and near the Equator, of a band of water beneath the surface, which is *colder* than the water at similar depths between the Tropics (as shown by the *rise* of the bathymetrical isotherms in passing from either tropic towards the Equator), can only be accounted for by a *continual ascent of Polar water from the bottom*; such an ascent being further indicated by the moderation of the surface-temperature of the Equatorial oceans, and by the low salinity of Equatorial surface-water as compared with that of tropical surface-water.

3. That a movement of the upper stratum of Oceanic water from the Equatorial region towards either Pole, is the necessary complement of the under-flow of Polar water.

4. That this double movement is maintained by the constantly renewed disturbance of equilibrium produced in the water of the great Oceanic basins by Polar cold and Equatorial heat.

That a doctrine so distinctly propounded by a physicist of Lenz's eminence should have attracted so little notice at the time, and should afterwards have been so completely forgotten, is not a little curious; more especially as it seems to have fallen under the notice of Arago, who has been shown by Professor Prestwich to have rightly apprehended the reason of the marked contrast between the thermal condition of the Mediterranean and that of the outside Atlantic, to which I drew attention in my former paper. The thermal phenomena of this great Inland Sea, indeed, afford such a valuable series of data for the interpretation of those of the great Oceanic basins, and of portions of them which are partially secluded from the general circulation, that it will be

advantageous to revert to them, before proceeding to discuss the additions which the *Challenger* has made to our knowledge of the latter.

The basin of the Mediterranean—except between Sicily and the coast of North Africa, where an elevation of from 1,000 to 1,500 feet would establish a continuity of land—may almost compare in depth with that of the Atlantic; ranging downwards to 1,600 fathoms (nearly 10,000 feet) between Sardinia and the Balearic islands, and to 2,000 fathoms (12,000 feet) between Malta and Crete. Although it communicates with the Atlantic by the Strait of Gibraltar, yet the shallowness of the ridge or marine water-shed (nowhere more than 200 fathoms beneath the surface) which divides the two basins at the western embouchure of that strait, between Capes Trafalgar and Spartel, cuts off communication between all but their superficial strata, the temperature of which, as we shall presently see, depends upon seasonal influences common to both. And thus, as the thermal condition of the vast body of water which occupies the basin of the Mediterranean beneath that plane, must depend upon influences affecting itself alone, we have a definite basis for estimating the influence of the General Oceanic Circulation in modifying the temperature of the corresponding strata of the Atlantic under the same parallels of latitude.

The careful observations of M. Aimé on the temperature of the Mediterranean, which (published in 1845*) seem to have attracted very little attention, showed that while *diurnal* variations of temperature are limited to a very thin stratum, *seasonal* variations have a deeper range; but that this likewise is limited to the upper plane, scarcely extending to more than 100 fathoms, beneath which depth the temperature is not only *uniform all the year round*, but is *uniform from above downwards to the very bottom of the basin*. My own inquiries, carried on during the months of August, September, and October, fully confirmed the latter fact; and, being made with “protected” thermometers, enabled me to obtain a more exact determination of the temperature at the greater depths than had been previously possible. I found that in the Western basin, between the surface and a depth of about 50 fathoms, the temperature fell rapidly from 77° to 57° or less; that there was then a slow reduction down to 55·5° at 100 fathoms; and that from that depth to the bottom at 1,600 fathoms there was not a difference of above half a degree, the bottom-temperature being about 55°. In the Eastern basin, to which the inquiries of M. Aimé had not been extended, I found the influence of solar radiation extending deeper; the reduction being from 79° at the

* “*Annales de Chimie*,” tom. xv.

ce to 59.5° at 100 fathoms, to 58.5° at 200 fathoms, and to 57° at 300 fathoms, below which the temperature was not reduced by half a degree to the bottom at nearly 2,000 fathoms. This difference between the Eastern and the Western basins seemed to be accounted for by the more powerful insolation which the former receives, in virtue of its nearer proximity to the Equator, the inclination of its axis being from 3° to 4° lower.

Thus, then, we are enabled by the thermal condition of the Mediterranean, to establish it as a fundamental fact, that depth has no influence in reducing Oceanic temperature; the influence of the solar rays* only extending to from 100 to 200 fathoms; while complete exclusion from that influence is compatible with the maintenance of a constant temperature of 55° to 56.5° . The condition which essentially determines temperature† may be inferred from the fact, that in winter there is a uniform standard which prevails from the surface to the bottom, which corresponds to the *isocheimal*, or mean winter isotherm, of the Mediterranean; and that a similar correspondence exists in the Red Sea, where the temperature in winter is as high as 70° or 71° from the surface to the bottom, and the temperature of the deeper waters remains at that standard through the whole year, though that of the surface rises in August and September to 96° , or even occasionally to above 100° . And thus we seem justified in concluding, that if a portion of any great Oceanic area could be in a manner so completely cut off from communication with the rest, that its temperature should entirely depend upon its own conditions, while the temperature of its superficial stratum should be subject to seasonal variation between the highest

we do not myself attribute the heating of the superficial stratum so much to the penetration of the solar rays, as to a *downward convection* arising from the increase of density which the surface-films undergo by evaporation, and their consequent descent. Their excess of salt has been diffused through the subjacent stratum. How far this convection may extend, will depend upon a good many conditions—most of which depend on the continuity of the action of heat upon the surface. Where, as in the Mediterranean, it is interrupted by seasonal change of temperature, which makes the influence of the surface-layer in winter undo all that the superheating in summer has accomplished, its downward range is probably far more limited than it is in the inter-tropical zone, in which the surface-temperature constantly approaches and often exceeds that of the interior. And with the example of the Red Sea before us, it can scarcely be doubted that the temperature of the partially enclosed seas of the Eastern Archipelago (p. 573) were to be completely shut in, its whole body of water would in time acquire by continuous downward convection the lowest mean of its surface.

Thus, in the first instance, inclined to regard the uniform temperature of the Mediterranean as determined by that of the subjacent crust of the earth, which there is no reason to regard as, in that locality, about 54° . But I am assured by Sir William Thomson that we may throw out the temperature of the earth's crust as a factor in determining the temperature of the water which overlies it; the exchange of heat or cold between the solid and the liquid being so excessively slow, as not to have any appreciable effect in countervailing other influences; such as either the horizontal flow of warmer or of colder water from a distance, or the vertical descent of water chilled by the action of cold on its surface. And it is obvious from the much higher elevation of the uniform temperature of the Red Sea, in accordance with its higher *isocheimal*, that the correspondence between the uniform temperature of the Mediterranean and the temperature of the subjacent crust of the earth is a mere coincidence.

summer mean and the lowest winter mean of the locality, that of the whole mass of water beneath this stratum would be uniform to the bottom, and would be that of the *isoeimal* of the latitude, —that is to say, of the coldest water that can find its way downwards from above.

It is important, on several grounds, to bear in mind the far greater potency of Atmospheric Cold than of Solar Heat, in their respective actions on the temperature of the great mass of salt water occupying a deep basin. Take, for instance, that of the southern portion of the Caspian, over which the winter temperature ranges from 40° to 35° , while the summer temperature ranges from 75° to 80° . For in winter the successive descent of films of water made heavier by surface-cold, exerts its full effect in bringing down the temperature, not only of the upper superheated stratum, but of the whole mass of water beneath, to the *isoeimal* standard; whilst in summer the heating effect of a very powerful insolation is mainly expended in producing surface-evaporation, scarcely raising the temperature of the sub-surface layer. And it is further to be remarked that the same effect would be produced if only a small portion of the basin were exposed to continuous intense cold; for while the diffusion of the successively descending cold films through the entire mass of deeper water, would tend to produce a constant reduction of its temperature, that tendency would not be antagonized by the play of solar heat on the remaining surface of the basin, the influence of that heat being limited to a very shallow stratum. We shall find a very striking exemplification of this principle, when we come to consider (p. 587) the thermal condition of the North Pacific; its enormously deep basin being nearly filled with water of almost glacial temperature, whilst even in the latitude of the Bay of Biscay we find but a mere film of water having a temperature above 35° .

It seems to me, therefore, that in the interpretation of the phenomena of Ocean-temperature, we may fairly assume that any water which is *colder* than the atmospheric *isoeimal* of the locality, must have come into it from a source nearer one of the Poles; whilst water which carries down to any considerable depth a temperature *warmer* than the *isoeimal*, must have brought that temperature from a source nearer the Equator. Thus when, in the neighbourhood of the Faroe islands, whose atmospheric *isoeimal* is 37° Fahr., we found the bottom of the "cold area" to be covered by water of from 32° to 29.5° , we seem justified in concluding that this water must have come from the Arctic basin; whilst, when we found in the "warm area" the stratum between 200 and 600 fathoms showing a temperature of from 47° to 43° , we seem equally justified in concluding that this excess of warmth

could not be derived from local insolation, but must have been brought from a Southern source by the movement of a stratum having at least this thickness.

This importation of a foreign temperature is made peculiarly obvious, by the occurrence of cases in which marine areas are separated from the general Oceanic basin, not (like the Mediterranean and the Red Sea) in such a manner as to produce a complete thermal isolation, but at such depths as to seclude the deeper strata alone; which then show a constant temperature from the surface of seclusion down to the bottom, instead of the continuous variation which presents itself outside. Of such cases the *Challenger* has now collected several in the Indian Archipelago, the bottom of whose area presents most extraordinary local depressions, often separated by intervening ridges; these irregularities having probably been caused by the volcanic disturbances of which this area has been one of the chief modern theatres. Thus, while the bottom-temperature of the Indian Ocean on one side, and that of the Pacific on the other, go down to 35° , or lower, the bottom-temperature of the Celebez sea, whose depth is 2,600 fathoms, does not sink below 38.5° . But as this temperature is encountered at a depth of 700 fathoms, and no further reduction shows itself through the whole subjacent range of 1,900 fathoms, it is obvious that the water below 38.5° which occupies the deeper parts of the two Oceanic basins just named, must be excluded from the Celebez sea by a ridge lying at about 700 fathoms' depth. So in the Banda sea there is a uniform temperature of 37.5° from a depth of 900 fathoms to the bottom at 2,800 fathoms; showing the existence of the ridge which excludes any inflow of colder water from the outside to be about 900 fathoms. In the Sulu sea (vol. xxii. p. 189), the seclusion is much more complete; for we here find a uniform temperature of 50.5° ranging from 400 fathoms down to the bottom at 2,550 fathoms; and as this temperature is met with in the adjoining China and Celebez seas, at a depth of 200 fathoms, and in the Pacific at about 230 fathoms, we may pretty confidently affirm that no deeper opening can exist in the reef ridges, which are known to connect the islands that enclose the remarkable "pot-hole," whereby colder water could find admission to it. Now let us suppose that an elevatory movement were to bring these reefs and ridges to the sea-level, so as completely to cut off the Sulu enclosure from communication with the adjacent basins; it may be pretty certainly affirmed that its lowest surface-temperature (which is probably not much below 80°) would, in time, descend itself uniformly downwards (p. 571, note), even to its greatest depths. But, on the other hand, a subsidence which should increase the depth of the barrier by 300 fathoms, would let in water of 40° from the China sea, and would thus reduce to that standard the

temperature of the whole 2,350 fathoms column from 500 fathoms to the bottom, which would then be deepened to 2,850.

When, by the consideration of cases of this kind, we have once familiarized ourselves with the notion that every deep-sea temperature which does not correspond with the isochermal of the locality (except, of course, in the Polar areas, where the isochermal is far below the freezing point of salt water), must be an imported one, we can at once apply the rule to the results of the *Challenger* or other temperature-soundings, so as to trace out the source from which the warmer or the colder water has been derived; and in this manner we can bring to the sure test of observation the general doctrine already set forth, which, if true, must be confirmed, and, if false, must be set aside by it.

The first part of the *Challenger's* survey was prosecuted in the Atlantic basin, which was traversed in various directions, between about 38° N. lat. and 38° S. lat., so as to obtain, by a sufficient number of "serial temperature-soundings,"* the materials for a set of "temperature-sections," which show the thermal stratification of the Oceanic water, in the same manner as geological sections show the disposition of the rock-beds of which the earth's solid crust is made up. The division of differently coloured bands, in temperature-sections, is made by "bathymetrical isotherms"—that is, by lines of uniform temperature drawn at the depths at which those temperatures are respectively met with; these lines are drawn at intervals of 5° Fahr., down to 40°, below which the slowness of the further reduction of temperature makes it desirable to mark each single degree by a line. The bathymetrical isotherm of 40°, in fact, seems generally to mark a very distinct plane of division between the upper stratum, whose temperature is directly or indirectly affected by heat from above, and that of the vast mass of water occupying the deeper part of the great ocean-basins, whose temperature is reduced by the afflux of Polar water. And we shall find the position of this isotherm in different localities, and the relative number and thickness of the 5° bands that lie above it, to afford a very significant clue to those great movements of ocean-water, on which its thermal stratification depends.

The Atlantic area, which has been thus surveyed by the *Challenger*, may be roughly estimated at fifteen millions of square miles, with an average depth of fifteen thousand feet; and it is not too much to affirm that the determination of the thermal stratification of this vast mass of Oceanic water is the grandest single contribution yet made to Terrestrial Physics. The plan of the voyage

* By a "serial temperature sounding" is meant the determination of the temperature, by thermometers sent down with the sounding apparatus, at successive increments of depth from the surface to the bottom; the intervals being usually of 100 fathoms from 100 to 1,500 fathoms, and of 250 fathoms below that depth.

not permit the continuous extension of the Atlantic survey southwards or northwards; but it was afterwards carried to the Southern Indian Ocean (whose thermal condition closely resembles that of the South Atlantic) into the Antarctic area; the *Valorous*, which has accompanied the *Alert* and the *Discovery* to Disco Island, is even now (if all has gone well) prosecuting similar inquiries, as complementary to those of the *Challenger*, on her return voyage down Baffin's Bay and across the northern extension of the Atlantic; while the return of the *Challenger* in the early part of next year, round Cape Horn, will enable her to make another line of section through the Atlantic, nearly north and south, during her homeward voyage.

The basin of the Atlantic is a vast area of depression, of an average depth of from 2,000 to 2,500 fathoms; showing few great inequalities, save where local volcanic outbursts have thrown up islands, and raised the bottom in their neighbourhood, as has been the case with the Azores, Madeiras, Canaries, and the Verde islands in the north, and with St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, and Fernando Noronha in the south. This basin is in direct communication with the Antarctic area; and it is a fact to be specially noticed, that there is a continual widening of the borders of the South Atlantic towards that area, by the action of the opposite coasts of the South African and South American continents. With the Arctic area, on the other hand, communication is far less free. The basin of the North Atlantic progressively narrows from the Equator to the Arctic; and of the channels which lie between its American and European borders, there is reason to believe that the passage between Greenland and Iceland is the only one which can bring any large body of glacial water from the Arctic basin.

These differences between the relations of the North and of the South Atlantic to their respective Polar areas, will be found, as I anticipated, to be in remarkable correspondence with differences in their thermal conditions. For I had ventured to conjecture that the Antarctic under-flow would be so much more copious than the Arctic, as to reduce the bottom-temperature of the South Atlantic below the 35° , which was the lowest that had been met with in the temperate portion of the North Atlantic; while I had further anticipated, on the same grounds, that the effect of the Antarctic under-flow would show itself to the south of the Equator. The meeting of the two under-flows in the equatorial region, beneath an upper stratum whose elevation of temperature would reduce its specific gravity, appeared to me (in accordance of what Lenz had long previously urged), to necessitate the rising of Polar water from the bottom towards the heating surface, just as in the trough experiment; so that, however

anomalous it may seem, I had been led by the principle I had adopted to conclude that water of 40° would be found in the Equatorial zone at a depth considerably less than that at which it lies in the Temperate portion of the North Atlantic. As it is universally admitted in science that nothing affords stronger evidence of the truth of any doctrine which cannot be directly demonstrated, than the fulfilment of predictions based upon it, the complete verification of the foregoing conclusions by the *Challenger* observations can scarcely be regarded in any other light than as a valid confirmation of the principle on which they were based.

The first line of temperature-section taken by the *Challenger*, extending obliquely across the North Atlantic, from Teneriffe (lat. $28^{\circ} 5' N.$) to St. Thomas's (lat. $18\frac{1}{2}^{\circ} N.$), shows a thermal stratification which is, on the whole, very uniform; the whole of the deeper part of the basin, from 1,000 fathoms to the bottom (which lies in some parts at a depth exceeding 3,000 fathoms), being occupied by water whose temperature ranges downwards from 40° to $35\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$; while, between the surface and 500 fathoms, the reduction of temperature is pretty uniform, becoming slower between 500 and 1,000 fathoms as the isotherm of 40° is approached. But a careful examination of the section reveals two remarkable phenomena—(1) that as the Equator was approached the bottom-temperature became *lower* by about a degree, the thermometer showing 34.4° in the deepest part of the western basin, against 35.5° in the deepest part of the eastern; and (2) that the isotherm of 40° , which lies at a depth of between 900 and 1,000 fathoms near Teneriffe, came *nearer the surface* by about 200 fathoms towards St. Thomas's, although the temperature of the superincumbent strata showed a considerable elevation. The reduction of bottom-temperature was afterwards clearly proved to be consequent upon the extension of the colder Antarctic under-flow to the north of the Equator; while the approach of the 40° isotherm towards the surface, as the elevation of the temperature of the upper stratum reduced its downward pressure, was interesting as an anticipation of what subsequently showed itself in a far more marked degree.

The *Challenger* then proceeded from St. Thomas's to Bermuda, thence in the course of the Gulf Stream towards New York, thence to Halifax, and thence back to Bermuda. The following were the points of greatest interest in this part of the survey. Soon after leaving St. Thomas's, a local depression was encountered of the (then) unprecedented depth of 3,875 fathoms, or 23,250 feet, or nearly $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The sounding was a very satisfactory one; and a proof of its exceeding depth was furnished by the crushing of the "protected" thermometers, which had previously resisted

pressure of nearly four tons on the square inch encountered
1,150 fathoms.

In contrast to this curious phenomenon, the *Challenger* soundings in the immediate proximity of the Bermuda group demonstrated a very small base from which the wonderful column arises, whose summit forms a platform of which the islands are the highest elevations. The shape of this column, which has a height more than 2,400 fathoms, may be compared to that of the Lighthouse lighthouse. Its upper part is entirely composed of coral; but there are curious magnetic indications of its being founded on a submarine mountain; and it seems to be the most remarkable case of which we have at present any knowledge, of progressive upward growth of coral, keeping pace with progressive subsidence of the bottom, which Mr. Darwin was the first to suggest as the explanation of the existence of dead coral at depths greater than those at which the reef-building corals can live.

As the *Challenger* proceeded northwards from St. Thomas's out of the reach of the Antarctic under-flow, the bottom temperature rose to 35° , and afterwards, in proceeding towards New York, to 35.3° ; as she neared Halifax, the bottom obviously came under the influence of the Arctic under-flow; for its temperature there was 34.3° .

This bottom-temperature was encountered beneath the Gulf Stream itself, which, notwithstanding the attributes which have been somewhat poetically ascribed to it, looks, as prosaically described in the *Challenger* temperature-sections, a mere rivulet in comparison with the Oceanic area over which it is reputed to exert heating and propulsive influence. It is perfectly clear from the sections, that the true Gulf Stream, or Florida Current, is a narrow river of superheated water, of which the breadth is about 100 miles near Sandy Hook, whilst near Halifax it has separated into divergent streams forming a sort of delta. Its depth (as determined by the use of the current-drag) was nowhere found to be greater than 100 fathoms; and it does not disturb the stratification of the subjacent layers, which show the ordinary progressive reduction, the isotherm of 40° here lying at the depth of about 640 fathoms. Clearly, therefore, it is utterly incapable of moving the enormous mass of water which can be shown, in the North Atlantic, to be slowly moving in a north-easterly direction towards the Polar area. The course of the surface isotherms laid down by Dr. Petermann, shows that this movement is in the whole breadth of the North Atlantic, from Newfoundland to the British Isles, a distance of 1,700 miles; on the other hand, the course of the bathymetrical isotherms laid down from the *Porcupine* temperature-soundings between Lisbon and the Azores islands shows that it extends to a depth of at least 500 or

600 fathoms. And thus we are required to believe that the Gulf Stream, which, according to the most trustworthy authorities, has lost every distinctive character as a current—warmth, movement, and colour—by the time it reaches the Mid-Atlantic in 40° N. lat. and 30° W. long., has still energy enough to drive polewards a mass of water 1,700 miles wide, and at least 3,000 feet deep. This, as it seems to me, is a sort of *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine which attributes the amelioration of our climate, and the keeping open of the harbours of the coast of Norway, almost as far as the North Cape, through the whole winter, to the heating influence of the Florida Current. For if the stream shown in the New York section subsequently spread itself out over the whole area that is shown by the northerly bend of the surface-isotherms to have a poleward movement, it must thin away to a degree that will leave it utterly incapable of resisting the cooling influence of the air above it. If, on the other hand, it is re-collected in a sort of *cul de sac*, and so pressed downwards as to acquire five or six times the depth it has off New York, it cannot propel a band of 1,700 miles' breadth.

When, on the other hand, we look upon the poleward movement of the entire upper stratum of the Atlantic as the necessary complement of the glacial underflow from the Arctic basin, the main difficulty vanishes; every fact is accounted for by an adequate *vera causa*; and we can estimate the share of the Gulf Stream in the amelioration of our climate by a judgment based on actual facts, instead of indulging in vague hypotheses or poetical exaggerations.

There can be no question that a large part of the heat which the Gulf Stream brings as far as the banks of Newfoundland, is there dissipated by its encounter with the Greenland and Labrador current, which, propelled by northerly winds, brings southwards a temperature as much below the normal as that of the Gulf Stream is above it. Further, in the spring and early summer, this current ordinarily brings down a vast quantity of icebergs, whilst occasionally (as in the season just passed) it is also loaded with field-ice. Partially dipping under the Gulf Stream, in virtue of its greater density, it drifts these icebergs into its course; and since the mass of each berg that is below the surface is eight or nine times as great as that which towers above it, the melting of a vast number of such masses will require an amount of heat, the abstraction of which must further seriously reduce the temperature of the Gulf Stream. What excess it still carries is communicated to the Mid-Atlantic water, with which it soon afterwards becomes indistinguishably mingled; and in so far as the temperature of the upper Oceanic stratum is raised by such admixture, does the Gulf Stream contribute, by the poleward movement of this stratum.

produce the effect with the whole of which it is popularly edited.

Only a portion of the Arctic current, however, dips under the Gulf Stream. Its main body keeps close to the shore of Newfoundland, turns the corner of Nova Scotia, passes across to Cape Cod, and "hugs the shore" of the Atlantic sea-board of the United States, remaining still perceptible as a current (at certain times, at least) as far south as New York. But this is not all. A continuation of this "cold band" is traceable southwards, intervening between the United States' coast and the Gulf Stream, as far south as the Florida Channel itself, of whose breadth it occupies nearly one-third; the plane of separation between this band and the Gulf Stream being so well defined, as to be termed by the United States' coast surveyors the "cold wall." Though they have traced its continuity with the cold stratum lying beneath the Gulf Stream, they have obviously been puzzled to account for its presence; since it shows little or no current-movement to the south of New York. The *Challenger* section taken off Halifax presents a yet more remarkable example of that continuity than that had been previously met with; for we there see not only bathymetrical isotherms of 55° , 50° , 45° , and 40° , sloping upwards towards the coast-line, so as to rise successively to the surface from depths of 400, 470, 550, and 620 fathoms respectively, the surface-water becoming colder and colder as the shore is approached; but even the isotherms of 39° , 38° , 37° , 36° , and 35° from the depths beneath, so that water of an almost glacial temperature is found outside the harbour of Halifax (lat. $44\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N.) at a depth of no more than 83 fathoms. The meaning of this singular fact I shall now endeavour to explain.

Much ink has been wasted in the discussion of a question, which common sense of any one who rightly apprehends the fundamental principles of physics should enable him to answer at once. To wit, the influence of the Earth's rotation upon the movement of the water which fills its Ocean-basins. This influence, supposing the water to be otherwise stationary, will be simply *nil*; for the water lying under each parallel will have the same rate of rotation from west to east, as the solid earth in that parallel. But suppose that a large body of water has a movement of its own, either from a lower to a higher, or from a higher to a lower latitude; it will then, according to a well-known principle of mechanics, carry with it the easterly momentum of the parallel it is quitted, into a parallel which has a different rate of eastward movement; and thus, if flowing from a lower to a higher latitude, it will carry with it an excess of easterly momentum which will cause it to tend constantly towards the east; and, if flowing from a higher to a lower latitude, it will

arrive at the latter with a deficiency of easterly momentum, causing it to be (as it were) left behind, so as to tend constantly towards the west. Now, the excess of easterly momentum possessed by the Gulf Stream, in virtue of its northerly flow, was rightly assigned by Captain Maury, and accepted by Sir John Herschel, as a principal cause of its eastward change of direction where the parallels of latitude are rapidly shortening; and I apply the same principle to explain the very strong eastward tendency of the poleward upper-flow, which carries it not only to the shores of Norway, but past the North Cape towards Nova Zembla. But if this be true, the converse also will be true in regard to any southward movement of Arctic water; and thus we see not only why the continuation of the Greenland and Labrador current should have a westerly tendency which keeps it close to the shore of the United States, but also why the glacial under-flow should approach the surface along the coast-line. For if this under-flow has a constant movement, however slow, towards the Equator, it must carry with it a deficiency of easterly momentum, which will cause it to creep up the slope that forms the western border of the Atlantic basin; and thus the upward slant of the deep, cold strata in this situation becomes an evidentiary fact of singular cogency, in favour of the actual existence of that southward movement which has been shown to be probable on *à priori* grounds—no other way of accounting for that slant being discernible.

It is a fact of no little interest, that, as I learn from Dr. Meyer of Kiel, who has made a special study of the temperature of the North Sea, a similar peculiarity presents itself near our own shores. The greater part of that sea is so shallow, that an elevation of no more than 300 feet would convert it into dry land, uniting the eastern coast of Great Britain to Continental Europe. But outside the coast of Norway there is a much deeper channel, along which there flows southwards a cold stream which can be traced as far as the Skager Rack; and this, under the influence of its deficiency of easterly momentum, flows up the western slope of that channel, and spreads itself over the floor of the North Sea as far as the Dogger Bank, on the eastern slope of which Dr. Meyer has found a sudden reduction of no less than fifteen degrees of temperature, in a vertical descent of no more than five fathoms. This extension of the Norwegian cold under-stratum affords the *rationale* of the remarkable fact previously ascertained by the dredgings of Mr. J. Gwyn Jeffreys—viz., the presence of Arctic mollusks on the Dogger Bank; and it further explains the low sea temperature of our eastern coasts, which had been previously attributed (like the "cold band" along the Atlantic seaboard of the Southern States) to a surface-current from the north, of which in neither case is there any evidence.

Returning now to the *Challenger*, we trace her course back from Halifax to Bermuda, and thence again across the Atlantic to the Azores and Madeira. The principal features of interest in this temperature-section are the great thickness of the upper stratum above the isotherm of 40° , which lies at a depth of about 900 fathoms between the Azores and Madeira; and the special thickness, in the western half of this section, of the stratum between 50° and 65° Fahr. We shall be better prepared to understand the meaning of these peculiarities, when we compare the thermal stratification of the North with that of the South Atlantic.

From Madeira, the course of the *Challenger* was turned southwards, in a direction of general parallelism to the western coast of Africa, until she approached the Equator; and we now encounter a remarkable change in the thermal stratification. For, whilst the surface-temperature progressively rose from 71° to 79° , this augmentation affected the superficial stratum alone; the isotherm of 60° remained parallel to the surface; but all the subjacent isotherms were found to *slant upwards*, that of 40° rising from 950 fathoms half-way between Madeira and St. Vincent to 650 fathoms off St. Vincent, and to 450 fathoms in 3° N. lat.,—thus confirming in a most remarkable manner the conclusion of Lenz, that the polar under-flow rises towards the surface in the Equatorial zone.

The *Challenger* then crossed the Atlantic for the third time between 3° N. lat. and 4° S. lat., passing St. Paul's Rock and Fernando Noronha, and thence proceeding to Pernambuco, lat. 8° S. The facts brought to light in this part of her survey may be considered as surpassing in interest all that had been previously ascertained; their confirmation of the doctrine she was directed to test being of crucial value. For in the temperature-section here obtained, these two features are specially noticeable—first, the further reduction of bottom-temperature, and, second, the yet nearer approach of the isotherm of 40° to the surface. Almost precisely under the Line, a bottom-temperature of 32.4° was obtained at a depth of 2,475 fathoms; and as the isotherm of 35° (the lowest temperature that the Arctic under-flow could here bear) lay at the depth of about 1,800 fathoms, it is obvious that the stratum of 675 fathoms (4,050 feet) in thickness beneath this, must entirely consist of water that has found its way thither from the Antarctic area. But this is overlaid by a stratum of 1,500 fathoms' thickness, whose temperature ranges between 35° and 40° ; thus actually carrying up the isotherm of 40° to within 300 fathoms of the surface. From 78° at the surface, the thermometer was found to fall to 55° within 100 fathoms, just as it does in the Mediterranean; but whilst in that inland sea the temperature remains constant from that point to the bottom, it goes on falling, beneath the Equatorial sun, to 45° at about 220 fathoms, to 40° at

less than 300, and thence progressively to the bottom-temperature of 32.4° through a stratum of more than 2,000 fathoms' thickness. Now, as the lowest surface-temperature of the whole year cannot be here less than 75° , it is clear that the influence of what may be called "imported cold" ranges from the bottom, where it is most intense, up to the superficial stratum, gradually dying out as the water comes under the influence of the downward convection (p. 571, note) of the heat imparted by solar radiation. And it seems impossible to account for this fact in any other way, than by attributing it to a continual uprising of colder water from below, to replace the warm upper layer which is constantly being draughted off towards either Pole. If that uprising were slower than it is, the downward convection of the heat derived from solar radiation would prevent the effect of Polar cold from showing itself so near the surface; and there would be no such extraordinary thinning-away of the upper strata, as shows itself in this Equatorial section.

Another evidence of this uprising is afforded by the moderation of the surface-temperature of the Equatorial Atlantic, which does not seem to rise (at least in the open ocean) to a higher average, even when the sun is vertical, than I have myself seen it to maintain in the Mediterranean during August and September. In the Red Sea, where there is no such ascent of an under-stratum of cold water, the mean temperature of the surface in August is $86\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, and in September 88° ; and the maximum not unfrequently rises to 100° , occasionally to 106° . Now, as it is not the heat of the air that thus raises the surface-temperature, but direct solar radiation, I can see no other reason why the temperature of the Equatorial Atlantic does not rise as high as that of the Red Sea, than that the former is kept down by the continual ascent of cooler water. Where such an ascent is prevented by the comparative shallowness of the bottom (as happens along the Guinea coast), the surface-temperature rises.

Another strong indication of this ascent is afforded by the Specific Gravity observations, very carefully and systematically made by the Physicist of the *Challenger*. It was long since observed by Humboldt, that whilst the salinity of Oceanic surface-water increases as either Tropic is approached from its Temperate zone, it diminishes again on passing from either Tropic towards the Equator; and this fact was confirmed by the observations of Lenz, on whom it obviously made a great impression. The progressive increase between the Poles and the Tropics is obviously referrible to increased evaporation; but what is the cause of the Equatorial reduction? To attribute it to the admixture of the fresh water which descends in Equatorial rains, seems absurd; because all this water, and more, has been pumped up by evaporation from

Equatorial area itself. And the quantity of fresh water discharged by the great rivers of Africa and South America is utterly inadequate to produce such a reduction, which is as distinct in the ocean as it is nearer either of these continents. The true explanation is afforded, as Lenz pointed out, and as, in ignorance of my work, I had myself suggested, by the ascent of the Polar undercurrent; which brings all the way to the Equator the low salinity water derived in the Polar areas from the melting of ice and snow. This reduction of salinity not being sufficient to neutralize the increase of Specific Gravity produced by reduction of temperature, the Polar water continues to underlie the more saline water above it; but rising to the surface as the latter is caught off, it continues to show its Polar source by its low specific gravity, even when its temperature has been raised to the Equatorial standard. A mean of eight observations between Thomas's and Bermuda gave 1.0272 as the specific gravity of (tropical) surface-water, and 1.0263 as that of (Polar) bottom-water.* But a mean of seventeen observations between Cape Verde and Bahia gave 1.0263 as the specific gravity of (Equatorial) surface-water, while a mean of eight observations gave 1.0261 as the specific gravity of (Polar) bottom-water,—an approximation so remarkable, that it can scarcely be considered as capable of any other explanation, than that the Equatorial surface-water is really older water which has risen up from beneath.

Proceeding southwards along the coast of South America as far as Abrolhos Island, lat. 20° S., the *Challenger* then crossed the South Atlantic to the Cape of Good Hope; first stretching obliquely from the island of Tristan d'Acunha in lat. 38°, and then keeping in nearly the same parallel to the Cape. Though the depth of this basin is less than that of the North Atlantic, the general temperature of its bottom was found to be about two degrees lower, averaging 33°, while the isotherm of 35° lay at about 600 fathoms above the bottom; thus showing the existence of a stratum of water of 1,800 feet in thickness, colder than any that is found (save under exceptional circumstances) in the North Atlantic. The isotherm of 40°, again, which, in the North Atlantic at a like distance from the equator, lay at 800 or 900 fathoms' depth, here lay between 300 and 500 fathoms; thus showing that the whole mass of water filling the South Atlantic basin beneath that depth has been subjected to the influence of Antarctic cold. Though the stratum above the isotherm of 40° is thicker than under the equator, it is only about half as thick as the corresponding stratum in the North Atlantic, and contains much less heat; the surface-

In all these observations, the temperatures of the samples compared were brought to common standard, so that their respective Specific Gravities truly indicated their relative salinity.

temperature in this section nowhere rising above 60°, and being generally much lower, though taken in the early summer of the Southern hemisphere.

The thermal condition of the South Atlantic, then, differs from that of the North Atlantic—(1) in the greater coldness of the vast mass of water occupying the deeper part of its basin; and (2) in the inferior warmth of its upper stratum. The former is clearly attributable to the complete freedom of communication between the South Atlantic and the Antarctic area; the latter is probably due to several influences in combination, as I shall now explain.

In the first place, as has long been known to Physicists and Geographers, the great predominance of land in the Northern hemisphere raises its general temperature; the solar radiation raising the temperature of the land, whilst it expends itself, when falling on the surface of the sea, in increased evaporation. Hence the *thermal* Equator lies to the north of the *geographical* Equator, and the isotherm which corresponds to the parallel of (say) 30° south, lies in the Northern hemisphere nearer the parallel of 40°.

But, secondly, the peculiar direction of the American coast-line gives a northerly slant to by far the larger proportion of the great Equatorial drift-current of the Atlantic. Too much attention, it seems to me, has been fixed on the part of it which is impelled into the Gulf of Mexico, and which issues forth from it as the Gulf Stream; and too little upon that very large part which strikes the chain of the Antilles and the peninsula of Florida, and which must be thus turned back without entering the gulf. Although this drift-current is quite superficial, its depth being estimated by Captain Nares at no more than 50 fathoms, yet it seems to me quite conceivable that the vast body of water it conveys should make its way downwards, when its onward motion is checked, as to raise the temperature of the sub-surface-layer, and that this is the explanation of the marked thickness of the stratum of between 60° and 65° Fahr., which has been already noticed as a peculiar feature of the sections taken in the western portion of the North Atlantic (p. 581).

In the third place, the progressive narrowing of the North Atlantic basin from the Equator to the Arctic circle, and the progressive widening of the basin of the South Atlantic from the Equator southwards, may be expected to exert precisely opposite influences upon the thickness of that upper stratum, which, as my *hypothesis*, is being drawn, in each hemisphere, from the Equator towards its Pole—tending, in the first case, to increase its thickness by lateral compression, and, in the second, to diminish its thickness by lateral expansion. In virtue of this excess of thickness, the north-moving stratum in the former will possess a far greater power of resisting the influence of atmospheric

d, than the south-moving stratum in the latter; and we thus find the isotherm of 40° lying at the depth of 800 fathoms even at the Faroe islands, in lat. $59\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N., whilst, near the island of St. d'Acunha, in lat 38° S., it lies at only about half that depth, the surface-temperature in both situations being about 52° Fahr. We are enabled, by this comparison, to estimate pretty nearly the relative effects of the Gulf Stream and of the General Oceanic circulation, in producing that amelioration of the climate of northern Europe, which is a fact that cannot be called in question, whatever may be our mode of accounting for it. The correspondence of the surface-temperature of the Mediterranean, which is regulated by local influences alone, with that of the outside Atlantic under the same parallels, seems to show that no excess of surface-heat is communicated to the latter by the transport into it of Equatorial water. But, on the other hand, the great excess of heat contained in its sub-surface stratum, over that contained in the upper stratum of the South Atlantic at a like distance from the thermal equator, seems partly attributable to the larger share of the Equatorial Current which the former receives in the two places just alluded to. This, however, would have no effect whatever upon our climate, if the entire upper stratum had not a continual northward movement; and for this movement, extending across the Atlantic to a depth of at least 600 fathoms, it is impossible to account by any residual *vis a tergo* of a limited current which has completely died out by superficial expansion. If we admit that, alike in the North and in the South Atlantic, the upper stratum is being drawn polewards by a *vis a fronte* generated by the continual descent of the water that comes under the influence of Polar cold, we see how the excess of thickness it possesses in the Northern hemisphere enables it to impart to the atmosphere above it a corresponding amount of warmth. For, as every surface-film that has given up its heat to the air above it, being until it meets with water as cold as itself, is replaced by the uprising of warmer water from beneath, so, the further down the excess of warmth extends, the longer will it be before the temperature of the surface is reduced to that of the air above—just as the surface of a deep lake remains uncongealed by a frost which forms a thick layer of ice on a shallow pond or mere. It was urged, several years ago, by the late Mr. Findlay, that supposing the Gulf Stream proper to have a continuous onward movement to the western shores of Great Britain, the thinness of its expansion, and the slowness of its rate, where it is last recognizable as a current, would subject it to the loss of all its surplus heat, long before it reaches our coast; and this argument is strongly confirmed by the fact, that the upper stratum of the Mediterranean, though heated by the summer sun to quite as high a temperature

as that of the Gulf Stream in the Mid-Atlantic, loses its excess of warmth with the seasonal reduction in the temperature of the atmosphere above it; whilst, as soon as its surface has been cooled down to the constant temperature of the deep subjacent bed, it resists any further reduction, whatever may be the temporary depression of the atmospheric temperature. And in this manner we find that the moderate, but permanent, elevation of the uniformly heated mass of Mediterranean water, has a far more potent influence in ameliorating the climate of its northern shores, than the transient superheating of its surface-layer.

But it does not hence follow that Mr. Findlay was right in attributing the amelioration of the climate of north-western Europe, as Dr. Hayes has since done, solely to the heat transported by the south-westerly winds; for the very careful and systematic observations which have now been carried on for some years under the able direction of Professor Mohn, of Christiania, upon the relative temperatures of the air and the sea along the coast of Norway, have shown that the latter has an average excess of warmth during the four winter months, amounting to $14\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ Fahr. This excess he very naturally attributed, in the first instance, to the influence of the Gulf Stream; but he has latterly expressed his concurrence in my own view, that the poleward transport of this vast amount of heat requires a far larger and deeper movement, for which the General Oceanic Circulation alone can adequately account.

This view derives further confirmation from the extension of the *Challenger* inquiries into the Antarctic Ocean, by a southward deflection from her course between the Cape of Good Hope and Sydney. For it becomes plain, from an examination of the temperature-sections taken in this part of her voyage, that the comparative coldness of the Southern oceans is essentially due, not so much to the want of a superheated surface-layer, as to the rapid reduction in the temperature of the whole comparatively thin upper warm stratum under the influence of atmospheric cold: the isotherm of 40° , which lies below 400 fathoms in lat. 37° S., rising to 150 fathoms in lat. 46° S., and actually coming to the surface near Kerguelen's Land (lat. 50° S.), while it lies below 800 fathoms in the corresponding northern parallel. Thus it comes to pass that the summer climate of Kerguelen's Land, as Captain Nares remarks, is comparable to the winter climate of the British Isles; and that glaciers there descend from the mountains almost to the water's edge, reminding us of the ice-sheet which covered the surface of North Britain during the glacial epoch.

The *Challenger* approached the great Antarctic ice-barrier in the height of the southern summer, when the influence of solar

ation was exerted in melting the icebergs and the edge of the ice, and thus in lowering rather than raising the temperature of the surface-water, which was found to be pretty constantly of melting ice as far down as the thickness of the ice extended. It was exactly what had been anticipated; for the water thus melted does not descend, but remains floating at the surface, in consequence of the lower proportion of salt which it contains; and it does not rise in temperature, because any further accession of heat it may receive from the sun is expended in melting more ice.

But underneath this stratum of half-salt glacial water, there was found a stratum of ordinary sea-water having a temperature between 32° and 37° ; and this was obviously continuous with the lower surface-stratum at such a distance from the ice-barrier as to be out of the reach of melting ice; whilst there was every reason to believe that the whole subjacent mass down to the bottom had a temperature of 31° or less.* Now, it is obvious that as this warmer stratum could not have derived its heat from local solar radiation, it must have brought it from elsewhere; and as there is no Gulf Stream in the Southern Ocean, there is no other agency to account for its presence, than the Polar current which has been so frequently referred to.

Thus the observations upon Ocean-Temperature hitherto collected by the *Challenger*, in the North, Equatorial, and South Atlantic, in the Antarctic, and in the Eastern Archipelago, not only prove conformable in every particular to the doctrine they were designed to test, but do not seem capable of any other explanation.

The Temperature-observations recently made in the North Pacific by the United States ship *Tuscarora*,—which was commissioned to carry a line of soundings for a telegraph cable across the vast ocean-basin from the coast of California to Japan, making the Sandwich Islands a half-way station,—enable us to test this doctrine by a case which presents a marked dissimilarity of conditions. For, although the North Pacific has a communication with the Arctic basin through Behring's Strait, yet this is too shallow, as well as narrow, to admit of any outflow of glacial water from the latter into the former. Now, as the average depth of the North Pacific is considerably greater than that of the North Atlantic, and as there is reason to believe that this excess extends to the South Pacific also, we should expect, on the prin-

As the thermometers supplied to the *Challenger* only registered *maxima* and *minima*, it is obvious that the reduction of the surface-temperature to 29° . prevented an exact determination of the temperature of any subjacent stratum having a higher minimum. The Arctic Expedition is provided with the improved thermometers devised by Negretti and Zambra, for recording the temperature of any stratum, whether higher or lower than that of the water through which they pass in their descent and ascent; and in this it is expected that the temperature stratification beneath the ice will be exactly determined.

ciple already stated (p. 572), that the influence of Antarctic cold will be strongly exerted throughout the whole of it; and this is fully borne out by the *Tuscarora* observations. For the bottom-temperature, at depths exceeding 2,000 fathoms, is nearly everywhere but a little above 32°; while the slight elevation which was shown as the *Tuscarora* returned by a more northerly course, along the Aleutian Islands, suffices to show that this low temperature cannot depend upon the surface-cold of the local winter, but must be imported the way from the Antarctic area. But, further, this glacial water was found to occupy the whole basin to at least as high a level as it does that of the South Atlantic; the upper stratum of about 40° Fahr. having nowhere a greater thickness than 400 fathoms, and thinning away so rapidly towards the north, that, except the line of the Kuro Siwo, or Japan current—which is the continuation of the Pacific Equatorial deflected to the N.E. by the continental and insular coast line of Eastern Asia—the glacial stratum comes to within a closer proximity to the surface than it is anywhere known to do under corresponding parallels; water of 32° being met with at no more than 15 fathoms' depth in the latitude of the Bay of Biscay.

Now, I do not hesitate to confess that the Thermal condition of the North Pacific revealed by these observations, was altogether contrary to my anticipations. I had supposed that the virtual seclusion of its basin from the influence of Arctic cold, and the vast distance of its northern part from the Antarctic area, would have combined to give to its sea-bed a temperature *above* that of the other great Ocean-bottoms. And no reason had occurred to me, why the surface-stratum should contain so small a measure of heat. And yet, on reasoning-out the problem, I came to see that, anomalous as it may seem, the want of communication between the North Pacific and the Arctic basins, in the presence of a perfectly free communication with the Antarctic, is a reason why the upper stratum of the former should be rather colder than the warmer. For we may consider the entire Pacific and Antarctic basin in the light of a long trough, at the south end of which Polar Cold is applied to the surface; while Equatorial Heat is applied to the surface at, say, one-third of the length of the trough from the north end. Now, in the Southern division of the trough the circulation will go on as in the former case (p. 567); the water chilled by Polar cold descending and flowing along the floor of the trough, and being replaced by the surface-inflow of warmer water from the Equatorial region. But as the Polar bottom-flow will not meet any similar flow from the opposite end of the trough, only a portion of it will rise to the surface under the Equator, the remainder continuing to flow to the northern end of the trough, thus keeping its temperature down nearly to the

Antarctic standard. On the other hand, the South Polar surface-indraught will not only extend to the Equator, but, in the absence of any corresponding indraught towards the North Pole, will act backwards (as it were) upon the upper stratum of the North Pacific, giving it a southward movement *towards* the Equator, instead of the northward movement *from* the Equator, which is so remarkable a feature of the North Atlantic. To replace this, the cold under-stratum of the North Pacific will be continually rising towards the surface; and thus the powerful action of the sun's summer heat between the parallels of 30° and 50°, will be constantly antagonized by that of the winter cold of the Antarctic area at a distance of 8,000 miles or more. But if a subsidence of the land bordering Behring's Strait were to take place to such an extent as to open a broad and deep channel between the North Pacific and the Arctic basin, the outflow of Polar water that would then go on from the latter into the former, would produce a movement of the upper stratum in the contrary direction; thus drawing a surface-flow of Equatorial water towards the Aleutian islands, and raising the temperature of the land-border on either side.

Thus we see the great importance of this General Oceanic Circulation in regulating the distribution of Temperature, alike at the surface, and over the bottom, of those vast marine areas, which, in the aggregate, cover little less than three-fourths of the whole superficies of our globe. And it is by this distribution of Temperature, that the distribution of Animal life is mainly dominated. But, as I showed on a former occasion (vol. xxii. p. 391), its influence in providing the inhabitants of the abyssal waters with both food and oxygen is not one whit less important; the condition of a deep Inland Sea (such as the Mediterranean), which is virtually cut off from its influence, being one of such stagnation, as to be incompatible with the existence of Animal life at any great distance beneath the surface. There is no reason to suppose that Animal life could exist on the Ocean-bottom at depths far exceeding that of the barren sea-bed of the Mediterranean, if it were not for the vertical movement produced by opposition of temperature; which, by bringing up every drop of ocean-water, in its turn, from the deepest abysses to the surface, purifies it from the carbonic acid and other products of animal decomposition with which it has come to be charged, imparts to it a vivifying dose of oxygen, and mingles with it those products of Vegetable life, which serve, when carried down to the ocean-depths, for the nutrition of the animals that swarm upon their bottom, and contribute, by the accumulation of their calcareous *exuviae*, to form the components of future Continents.

W. B. CARPENTER.



NOTES OF AN INDIAN JOURNEY.

V.

JAN. 23rd.—We slept in our carriage, the train not starting till 2.45 a.m., and by breakfast time were at Toondla, the junction for Agra. Thence we ran on, and are now past Cawnpore.

There is little new to note as we rush along. Did I mention the wells of the North-West Provinces, with their two patient grey bullocks walking up and down an inclined plane to draw the water? In the Punjab the villagers have the *Sakia* of the Upper Nile, the Persian wheel as Anglo-Indians call it. I don't think I did mention these, nor the frequent crops of oil-seeds, often I suppose mustard (*Sinapis ramosa*), and often rape or something very like it. I observe, too, to-day a little bajra (*Penicillaria spicata*) still left in the fields; and they bring for sale to the stations the acid, but not unpleasant, *Averrhoa Carambola*, and the cultivated jujube.

After we passed Cawnpore it became evident that a good deal of rain had fallen. There was much water in the pools along the line, on the margin of which several pretty water-birds were playing. The fields looked greener, and soon we came to barley in the ear. It was dark before we reached Berhampore, and, with the exception of a long delay at Allahabad, I was conscious of nothing except hearing the famous name of Mirzapore called in the night, till we reached the junction of Mogul Serai, and, soon after, Benares.

The Maharajah's carriage came to meet us, and took us in no

g time across the Ganges and past many noble specimens of the dy palm, which showed that we were once more in warmer ons, to the house of the head of the Government College.

an. 27th.—We left our kind host yesterday evening, and are well on our way to Calcutta.

have enjoyed no place more than Benares, although some rs have interested me more. Mr. Griffith lives in a lovely se, which, furnished with all Indian requirements within, looks ertheless, from the outside, like the ideal English parsonage, might well be the scene of one of Miss Sewell's novels.

ehind stretches a garden, far the loveliest I have seen in a, and one of the loveliest I have seen anywhere; a garden hich European care has combined with a semi-tropical climate roduce the most delightful results. Here, in the month of ary, I found, amongst other flowers of an English garden, white candytuft, the daisy, the mignonette, the violet, the oltzia, the common yellow marigold, the heartsease, the China , and roses of many sorts, known to florists but unknown to from Count Cavour and Souvenir de Malmaison upwards and nwards.

ese took one's thoughts to the north, but here, too, I found *Bigonia venusta* in all the glory of its flower, a perfect wall of ge-blossom. Here was the exquisite leaf of the *Uvaria longi-* and the lichi which Macaulay has made famous. Here was Colvillia, alas, not in flower, but growing into a great tree. Here the Kadumba and the Asoka of the poets, and here, above all, the most graceful bamboos, now trimmed into hedges, now ring as high as our highest elms. Nor did the sympathies of owner of this paradise confine himself to his plants. Even the rn dogs of the native town ventured to pay an occasional sure that they would not be roughly treated, the mungoses about almost tame, and the most fascinating tree-cats, divided two families of Montagues and Capulets, inhabited two neigh- ing bamboo clumps, staying their feuds from time to time, make a descent on the peaches or loquats of their kind enter- er.

yond the garden, and forming its boundary on one side, rose College, a Gothic building, which does not bear minute ection, for it was built a good many years ago, by an amateur itect, but the general effect of which, seen from a little nce, is very good.

his institution dates from the time of Warren Hastings, who t over the Sanskrit College of the Benares family, and now ists of two separate institutions, one of which gives an Eng- education, while the other is still governed in all its details by laws of Menu.

I was introduced to some of the Pundits, amongst them to one who was honourably mentioned by Professor Max Müller in his address to the Orientalists last year. Several are men of very great learning; and, indeed, there are, scattered through India, as I am assured, many native scholars who could hold their own in Sanskrit with the greatest luminaries of the West.

One of our first excursions was to the great Buddhist monument of Sarnath, once the centre of a group of religious houses. There seems no doubt that Boodha himself was here, and a little lake hard by is still pointed out as the place where he washed his clothes. It was with no small pleasure that I found myself, for the first time, on the track of that most wonderful person—one, I suppose, of the most wonderful persons whom the ages have ever seen.

On the 25th, the day sacred to Ganesa, the elephant-headed god of wisdom, we visited his temple, which was crowded with worshippers making their offerings. Then we went on to others, including the so-called Golden Temple, which is extremely sacred, but—like all the temples in Benares—somewhat mean in appearance. The whole place was sloppy with the sacred waters of the Ganges, and the holy well hard by was a mere pool of sulphuretted hydrogen.

At length we reached the observatory built by Jey Sing, who laid out the town of Jeypore, and is one of the few natives of the country figuring in the last-century history of India for whom one can feel any respect.

From the top of it the eye ranged over a wide prospect, the most interesting part of which was the great river, which here forms a curve not less beautiful than, and very like, “the stream-like windings of that glorious street” in the English Benares.

Thence we descended, and, embarking on the broad bosom of the Ganges, floated slowly down past the various ghauts or bathing-places.

These are bordered with houses, some of them of almost palatial dimensions, and connected with the most famous names in modern Indian history. There, for instance, is one which now belongs to Scindia, and once was the property of the last Peishwah, Bajee Rao. That other is owned by the Oodeypore family; a third was built by one of the Rajahs of Nagpore; while a fourth, far more interesting than all the rest, was the work of Abalia Bye, who, if she had only lived in Europe, might well have had her biography written by him who told the story of St. Elizabeth.

In front of them a motley crowd, of all ages and of both sexes, goes through the ceremony of bathing in the sacred Ganges, and at the same time of performing its toilet, with the utmost propriety,

in a steady, business-like way. There was nothing that I could see in the slightest degree solemn or beautiful in the human aspect of the scene. One woman of the better class, with a fine and gentle expression, who was dressing her little boy, was only a pleasing animate object on which my eye rested.

The ghauts themselves are, however, extremely picturesque, and there was a good deal more colour scattered along them than usual in an Indian crowd. They have, of course, their religious uses, but they are also a kind of club, the great marts of gossip, the birthplaces of *canards*. A stranger who knows this goes away from all of them, except the Burning Ghaut, which is sufficiently dismal, rather amused than impressed.

All classes bathe here, but women of the higher order come very early, and return home generally before daybreak. The men bathe too, but only when they wish for a bath, and connect with the act of bathing no religious ideas.

We spent much time in the Kinkhab shops, looking through and collecting some of the characteristic manufactures of the place, much, too, amongst the singularly handsome and effective work.

An afternoon was agreeably filled up by a visit to the Maharajah of Benares in his great castle of Ramnuggur, a noble edifice which rises straight out of the Ganges, not very far from the city, but on the opposite side of the river. He entertained us with native music of various kinds, and with dramatic recitations; but we were unable to stay to witness the performances of some actors whom he had in waiting, and who would, judging from the characters which they were to sustain, have performed a sort of mystery. One of them represented the Muse Saraswati, a second Krishna, a third the father of Rama, and a fourth, O shade of Heinrich Heine, no other than thy Wasischta.

One of the many indications of the change which is coming over this country may be found in the fact that even in Benares we did not see one of those disgusting ascetics whose self-tortures were once so common a sight in India. The number of holy men, too, must have been once far greater. We encountered few, and very friendly, good-natured brutes they were. At a temple dedicated to Durga, the wife of Siva, we came on a great company of monkeys—the brownish-red kind, not the grey creature which we saw at Ahmedabad; but they too must have been once much more numerous.

Amongst people we met was Mr. Sherring, a missionary, and the author of an excellent work on the city, which we used as our guide-book.

We had also, while in Benares, a number of most instructive conversations with a native of high position and very great

intelligence, a Jain by religion. I do not believe that anything would have induced this gentleman to dine with a European, to taste meat; yet how very unlike are the opinions contained in the following passage to those which are associated in our mind with a profession of adhesion to any form of Indian religion!

"Many orthodox Hindus will not concede so much. They will say that it is against religion to hold that imagination of the poets had anything to do with what is recorded in the Sástras. In the opinion of such men, a person is represented as having his head as large as the top of a mountain, his nostrils and ears must be as big as caves! They will not for a moment stop to question whence he got a horse or a wife befitting him. If one face was likened to the moon and his eye to the lotus, the former must be eclipsed and the latter must yield fruit. Jackals, foxes, bulls, and other animals, whose stories are related by Vishnu Sármá in the Hitopades, must be supposed to have been endowed with human speech and understanding. The people of Burmah still call their sovereign by the appellation of god, let then his hands and feet be melted, and put into the mould. Again, you ask: In spite of the immense increase of population, Hindustan at the present does not contain more than two hundred millions of inhabitants, whence could Ram or Yudhishtir raise an army of thousands of millions? they will never admit that this is only the hyperbole of their poets; when they are made to understand the economy of population, and that the whole world is not sufficient to contain so many beings, they will, though confused, at once remark that in former times the extent of Hindustan was vastly larger, but that the influence of the Kali-yug had contracted it. To men of such a temper of mind we have only to say that our purpose is neither to lay down nor to take away any religious system. We intend to give the history of our country, that is to say, those facts and events which would be admitted by men of all religions, and which can be established by evidence forthcoming. We have nothing to do with dogma, faith, tenets, or prejudices of any nation or sect. We shall give here an instance to illustrate what we mean by facts falling within the province of history, and religious belief and persuasions. That Banáras was visited by Aurangzeb, and the temple of Visvésva was demolished by him, is a historical event. Hindus, Musalmáns, Jains, and Christians, will all admit this; it is recorded in their historical works, and part of the building is still to be seen behind the Masjid. This, therefore, is a fact worth relating, but that Visvésva jumped into the Jnán Vápi (the well of wisdom) and having intimated this to his priest in a dream is a matter of faith to Hindus alone, and does not belong to history.

"In the same manner the birth of Jesus Christ in Judea in the year of Sambat era, or about it, his preaching amongst the people, and his crucifixion, are facts, but his being the Son of God and the Saviour of the world is simply a matter of faith to Christians only. Again, the birth of Muhammad at Makka (Mecca) in 569 A.D., and his waging war for the spread of Islám, his flight to Madína, and his death there, are events recognized by history, but his being the apostle of God, and the deliverer of his followers, will be believed by the Muhammadans alone. In showing our readers must learn what history means, and with this knowledge they will not take offence at what we write. But those who do not know what history is have generally so deep-rooted a prejudice that they think whatever they believe is right, and what another affirms can never be true, though it be supported with as strong arguments as possible. Such readers are not entitled to read this book. Fools of the common folly feel themselves wiser than those who can render a reason."*

* "History of Hindustan," by Rájá Siva Prasád. Benares, 1874.

our host, Mr. Griffith, had just finished a translation of the Ramayana, using the metre which Sir Walter Scott did so much popularize, and using it with very great success. I promise myself no little pleasure on my homeward journey from reading a series of translations published by him several years ago, some of the Ramayana, some from other Sanskrit writers. To read the Ramayana itself would be, as the French say, a work of long time. Mr. Griffith's translation fills five octavo volumes.

On the whole, Benares was far less mysterious and more modern than I expected to find it. The site of the city is of gigantic antiquity, but the existing city is not old. In that respect, and in that only, it resembles Ravenna.

A capital little account of the Massacre of Benares, resting chiefly on the authority of Mountstuart Elphinstone, but written by Sir John Davis, was forwarded to me while there, and I have been reading it to-day. The most curious part of the story is the defence of his family and himself by Mr. Davis, Sir John's father, who escaped to the top of his house, armed with nothing better than a spear, used by one of his native attendants rather for state than for war. With this he defended a steep staircase leading to the roof till the troops arrived, thus escaping the fate which overtook some of his countrymen and colleagues.

Mountstuart Elphinstone, then a very young man, was at the time assistant to Mr. Davis, who filled himself the office of judge. *Jan. 27th.*—By the time I had dressed this morning we were at Benares, having left behind Buxar, the scene of Munro's "king-making victory" in 1764; Arrah, so gallantly defended in the late war, as Trevelyan has admirably told in his *Competition with Allah*; and the great Soane bridge. One sees nothing of the city, now a place of secondary importance, but long, under the name of Palibothra, the spot in India best known to the Western world, for hither came Megasthenes, the envoy of Seleucus, and here he tarried long.

The country is a vast sheet of cultivation, as far as the eye can reach. The toddy palm and the mango are the prevailing trees. There is a great deal of the *Cajanus Indicus* on the ground, which yields castor oil, some tobacco, and endless fields of corn. Here, for the first time in India, I see the poppy, that great friend of the human race, which is so unjustly decried, because many do not use but abuse it.

We saw the Eastern sky black with clouds the other day as we looked from Benares, and there has evidently been a deluge here so that the crops are looking surprisingly happy. I wish I could hear that our friends have had the same in the land of the great Rivers.

I have never looked on a plain so blessed as this, in the German

sense of the word, no, not in Egypt, for in Egypt you never lose, even in the Delta, the sense of the neighbourhood of the desert. Here the vast sheet of green gives one the feeling of infinite extent.

At length we reach Luckieserai (look at the map), and leaving the arc proceed along its chord, through the northern parts of those highlands along whose south-western slopes we ran between Jubbulpore and Allahabad.

Then followed a good deal of pleasing hill scenery, and much land overgrown with jungle, in which I should like to have spent a day with Dr. Brandis. Then we passed into the Raneeunge coal-field, which, as the best authority in India on such matters lately assured me, is practically inexhaustible. The mineral wealth below the soil bids fair here, as elsewhere, to make the soil itself unspeakably hideous.

It was dark before we reached Burdwan, and half-past ten before we arrived at our destination in Calcutta.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, *Thursday, Feb. 4th.*—I have passed here a very interesting week, although, from the fact that the largest portion of my time has gone in conversation, there is less perhaps than usual to note for my friends.

On the morning of the 28th, exactly two months after my arrival in India, I saw for the first time that famous Council-room in which so much business that has at a later stage passed through my hands has been discussed by so many persons with whom I have in various ways been brought into contact. The picture of Hastings, which appropriately dominates it, gives, to my thinking, much more of the character of the man than that at the India Office—the face well reflecting the motto on the frame, “*Mens æqua in arduis.*”

On the 29th, I went to see the great bridge over the Hooghly, opened to allow ships to pass. My companion was Mr. Tisza, one of the two Hungarian statesmen of that name, who has broken down in health, and has come out here to recruit. It is a wonderful work, and everything that skill could do seems to have been done to make it permanent; but much danger is to be feared from the cyclones to which Calcutta is subject, and which might well dash two or three drifting ships against it.

The 30th was given in large measure to that terrible subject which is associated with the last days of each session, for under the guidance of the financial secretary I visited the Currency department, the Mint, the Assay Office, and the Bank of Bengal—a very instructive morning's work, though not perhaps one which would afford very attractive matter for description.

The same night I went with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to the great Mahommedan educational establishment, known as

the Madrisa, where I was introduced to the leading Mahommedan residents in Calcutta; saw a great number of the pupils, and inspected their rooms. There seems no doubt that within the last year or two the followers of the prophet have taken much more kindly to their books, at least in this place, than they have ever done before—a happy circumstance, which will, it is to be hoped, save us in another generation of a political inconvenience of some magnitude.

The 31st was spent at Barrackpore, where the Viceroy usually resides for the Sunday. There he can walk to church, as he might in England, instead of going in state, and there he escapes, to some extent, from the tremendous pressure of business which makes his splendid position so terribly trying even to the strongest man.

It is a charming, quiet spot, with an odd look of Kew Gardens. The house is built close to the river, and commands a most glorious view of it. Right opposite is Serampore, of missionary fame, a pretty place which jute-mills are beginning to invade.

The park contains many good trees—amongst others some lovely guarinas, which certain people abuse, but which, combining something of the growth of the tamarisk with something of the growth of the pine, are to my eye very pleasing, beautiful specimens of *Terminalia catappa*, whose leaves are now reddening to their fall, *Crescentia cujete* (the calabash tree), and much else.

A pleasant stroll through lanes bordered by the most graceful bamboos, and across patches of jungle amongst which the picturesque huts of the peasantry were thickly set, took us to the bathing beds, through which the waters of the Ganges pass to supply Calcutta. Of all the changes which we have recently produced, none has been more beneficent than this, and there is every reason to hope that, under the joint influence of good drainage and good water-supply, Calcutta will really become the healthy city which the late Mr. Gregson rather paradoxically maintained it to be in a discussion which he had in the House twelve years ago—while it was still in its old filthy and dangerous state.

We returned from Barrackpore on Monday, and I attended, after dinner, a most interesting Bengalee theatrical performance at the house of a native gentleman. The Viceroy was present, and everything was done by our host to make the evening agreeable to him and to his other guests.

On the 2nd, I went round the Port, with Mr. Schalch, Chairman of the Port Trust, partly by water, partly by land, seeing all the manifold improvements which have so immensely facilitated the operations of trade, and having their details explained by the persons responsible for them.

On the 30th, I spent the forenoon at the Botanical Gardens with the curator, Dr. King. They are the first which I have seen out of Europe, and, as you may suppose, the wealth of new objects was rather overpowering. The cyclones have done frightful mischief here, but many fine trees still remain. Amongst the best are some grand mahoganies, *Pterocarpus Indicus*, a giant from Burmah, a Banian tree, which was not alive when Plassey was fought, but which has now a girth of eighteen yards, and shades a space of eight hundred feet in circumference. On it grow many other plants well known in our hothouses at home, of the genus, *Hoya Pothos*, *Cereus*, &c. It was no small pleasure to see in the open ground the nutmeg, the cinnamon, the coffee, the cocoa, and the jacktree. Palms were numerous. I added to those I knew, the well-named *Oreodoxa regia*, from Cuba, the *Corypha elata*, the Talipot (*Corypha taliera*), from which fans and umbrellas are made, the *Arenga saccharifera*, one of the sources of sago, and very handsome, the *Wallichia oblongifolia*, which goes up in some parts of the Himalayas to 4,400 feet, growing with the birch and the alder. The creeping Calami, finding their way up the tall Casuarinas, were an altogether novel sight to me, and I noticed to-day, for the first time, the sound of the wind in these trees—like that of the pine, but still with a difference.

A very strange relative of the rhubarb having been pointed out, I was led to ask whether that long-standing puzzle of botanists, the real origin of the rhubarb of commerce, had been made out. I was told that it had at last, and that the species which gives it has been named *Rheum officinale*. It is, I think, a plant of Western China.

I took the opportunity, while in this land of science, of asking the names of various birds I had seen on my wanderings. One which I observed at Benares, and which has the odd habit of going about in flocks of seven, is the *Malacocercus terricolor*. The natives call these flocks the seven sisters.

The coppersmith, which I heard at Bombay and again here, is the *Xantholæma Indica*.

A bee-eater, green, with a bronze head, which I saw to-day, is *Merops viridis*, and another most lovely creature which was flying about in the gardens—a kind of kingfisher—is *Halcyon Smyrnenis*.

Few of the smaller herbaceous plants are in flower; but I came upon two *Limnanthemums*, one very like the Bogbean, a bladderwort, and the only ground orchid of the plains of Bengal, the sweet-scented *Zeuxina sulcata*. I saw, too, the tree orchid of the plains, a species of *Vanda*; but, unlike the *Zeuxina*, it was not in flower.

Both here and at Barrackpore, I have observed in great abundance a little composite which I have never seen elsewhere.

turns out to be a South American species *Tridax procumbens*, which has run wild. The *Ipomœa aurea*, a primrose convolvulus, well worthy of an English hothouse. I never saw it cultivated, but perhaps it may be.

I went at night to a large gathering at the house of Mr. Keshub Chunder Sen, so well known in England, where I was introduced to a great many native gentlemen, whose acquaintance I was glad to make.

All went on as at our evening parties in England, except that the music was national, and that our entertainer had thoughtfully provided various things which had the *couleur locale*. There was a native juggler, for example, and there was also a potter working at his wheel in a corner of the room after a most surprising fashion. I thought of Omar Kháyyám's lines:—

“ As under cover of departing day
Slunk hunger-stricken Ramazan away,
Once more within the potter's house alone,
I stood surrounded by the shapes of clay,
Shapes of all sorts and sizes, great and small,
That stood along the floor and by the wall;
And some loquacious vessels were, and some
Listened perhaps but never talked at all.”

Here, of course, one has heard a great deal about the Bengal famine. Amongst other things, a translation of a native poem has been put into my hands, from which I extract the following:—

The news reached London that no ryot of Mithila could live for want of grain. Now may your Majesty's pity be moved.

In the year 1281, God sent no rain. The Queen resolved that no ryot should be allowed to die for want of grain. At her Majesty's order the scarcity of grain in Mithila disappeared. All hail! all hail! Hail throughout the world, great Queen of London.

In what lacs and lacs of maunds was grain imported! What had never been heard with the ear, was now seen with the eye.

Those who work on tanks and embankments earn *substance* according to their strength. The children, the old, the weakly poor, are kept alive by alms; the better classes of cultivators take advances of grain without interest, to their hearts' content. The whole of Mithila is overjoyed, and sings the praises of Londoners.

The noble-hearted officers of Government travel from village to village to see that no ryot may die from want of grain. 'Let not a single ryot starve.' Such was the order from London. From Barrh Town to Durbangah railway is brought in an instant. Grain is imported by every one who can. Mithila is overjoyed at the flight of famine.

Wherever there is scarcity, thither is grain at once carried; wherever the ryot fails, there are tanks at once dug. Honest men are praised, skilled men are provided with work, good men are liked, but rogues are badly off. Thus the poet Chundra: 'Go, see Calcutta, and the cities of the world, the steamers, telegraphs, railways, and other useful inventions—see the great roads leading to the four holy places.' Peerless in glory is the great Queen.”

I see I have not chronicled my visit to the High Court, nor several Badminton parties, which are in Calcutta really an important part of life, the chief means indeed by which all sorts of people, grave and gay, take that exercise which is needed to preserve it. At one of these I met some Bengalee ladies, an almost unheard-of circumstance even in our days, so slowly does ancient prejudice lose its hold over the minds of the people of India.

It would be unpardonable, too, not to record some pleasant rides, for the Maidan of Calcutta is really the best riding-ground in any capital I know. Imagine Hyde Park bounded by a river, in which a line-of-battle ship can lie close to the shore. Imagine, further, that you may ride over that Hyde Park in almost any direction, and you will understand my highly favourable estimate of it.

Feb. 5th.—I left Government House yesterday, and went to Belvedere, the residence of Sir Richard Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

In the course of a long ride before breakfast this morning, he showed me the greater part of the European quarter. The native quarter I visited some days ago. The first seems to me the best, the second the worst, specimen of its class which I have seen in India.

Later in the day I went to St. Xavier's, the great Jesuit School of Calcutta. It is worked almost entirely by Belgians, and has for its head Father Lafont, a man of very considerable scientific attainments. That is probably one reason for its success in the examinations of the Calcutta University.

Before dinner we had a long ramble in the pleasant gardens of this most delightful house, and since dinner there has been a large gathering of Bengalee authors.

Feb. 6th.—Our ride this morning took us along the shipping and across the bridge to Howrah. The other chief event of the day, in the way of sight-seeing, has been a visit to a large native school, known as the Oriental Seminary, to be present at the distribution of prizes by Mr. Justice Phear.

Thursday, Feb. 11th.—Another charming, quiet Sunday at Barrackpore began our last week in Calcutta. The weather had been hot since we were there, and the flowering trees were coming out. Yet a few days, and the great Bombax will be one mass of crimson flowers. Already some had opened, and I almost saw the buds bursting. A grand white creeper too (the *Beaumontia*) had been added to those which were in blossom last week.

There are many drawbacks to Indian life, but assuredly there are many compensations. How strange it is to read of the dreadful winter you have been having, amidst the profusion of flowers, the soft air, and the unclouded loveliness of this climate!

It is amusing to see how anxious many of my friends are that should realize how very uncomfortable they are in the hot weather. Certainly Calcutta must be bad enough, and such a place as Agra terrible.

A visit to the Presidency College, to the Medical College, and the great hospital attached to it, as well as to the Free Church College, all admirable institutions of their kind, have been other incidents of the last few days.

I was present, too, at the reception of the Maharajah of Travancore by the Lieutenant-Governor, as I was last week at his reception by the Viceroy, and I have since had some conversation both with him and his prime minister, the successor of Sir Madhava Rao.

One of our rides took us along a road which runs towards Diamond Harbour, and impressed me much with the extraordinary wealth of Bengal. The country was one great tangle of cocoanuts, mango, the *Phoenix sylvestris*, the plantain, the moringa, the bamboo, and other trees, every one of them extremely useful for the purposes of life. It would have looked at a distance a dense jungle, but was densely inhabited; the road and the huts along it literally swarming with people.

Another took us past the property of the King of Oudh, who has contrived to call into existence around him a highly characteristic village, like one of the worst bits of Lucknow.

I visited the new market last Friday with Sir Richard Temple, and Dr. King sent me on Monday a complete set of all the fruits and vegetables now exposed for sale.

* * * * *

I must not omit a charming drive in the early morning from Barrackpore to the pretty park of Ishapore, where the mango was just coming into flower, nor several cruises in the Lieutenant-Governor's yacht, which is really a movable house, by means of which he can penetrate and carry on business in the wonderful network of water-courses which forms so large a part of his gigantic realm.

As I said before, however, conversations with all manner of people occupied the greater part of my time, as was but natural when I was at the centre of Indian affairs.

I note some of the principal subjects over which these ranged : The state of British Burmah; the Bhamo Route, Yarkand, and Kashgar; Pamere, lessons of the famine; passes and trade routes from the Punjab to the northward; primary and higher education in Bengal; inexpedient revival of the controversy about the permanent settlement by a recent pamphlet; the Zemindars and their good points; science and art in Bengal; our opium revenue; salt; excise; statistics of river traffic; difficulties

in the way of an English lawyer when he first joins the High Court; fixed or floating bridge on the Hooghly, *pros* and *cons.*; character of native officials in Bengal and the North-west; Central Asia; Persia; the Mahometans of Eastern India and their social state; the Sivaites and Vishnuvites, the root differences in their theology; preventive measures against famine; artistic deficiencies of the Indian coinage; the Bombay revenue system; the Madras army; the fort of Govindghur; Orissa; best modes of borrowing; loss by exchange; gold currency; the native army; Indian chaplains; the guaranteed railways; prospects of jute and tea; the gauge question; Afghanistan; results of the Looshai expedition; gradual breaking down, but only gradual breaking down, of caste prejudices against visiting England; the native press; real opinion of people about British rule; value of native States; the income tax; Assam; the Mahrattas; native manufactures; Thibet and Nepaul; drainage of Calcutta, and its bearing on disease; the supply of horses in Eastern and Western India; aptitude of natives for the judicial career; character of the people of Travancore; Chittagong.

So, you see, I am not able to say with Chamfort, "Tous les jours j'accrois la liste des choses dont je ne parle plus," however true it may be that "le plus philosophe est celui dont la liste est la plus longue."

Feb. 12th.—But time is inexorable, and Aranjuez is with the past.

The *Mongolia* threw off from Garden Reach about noon yesterday, glided past the Botanical Gardens, slipped over the terrible quicksands of the James and Mary without adventure or sensation, and was five miles below Diamond Harbour when the hour arrived—

"——che volge il disio
Ai naviganti e intenerisce il cuore
Lo di c'han detto ai dolci amici Addio."

Here for some mysterious reason we lay till nearly one o'clock this afternoon, grumbling over the precious hours which we were losing, for nothing, so far as I can see, would have been easier than to have run down from Calcutta and picked up the *Mongolia* this morning, if we had only known the delay which was in store for us.

Feb. 12th.—We are now getting near the Sandheads. I have observed nothing of that fever-stricken and tigerish look usually described by travellers who pass this way, probably because we have kept pretty far from either bank.

To me the mouth of the Hooghly has looked to-day, allowing for the very different sky, much like the mouth of the Elbe.

I have been finishing "Christianity in its relations to Hinduism,"

most instructive little book by Mr. Robson, a Scotch clergyman, lately a missionary at Ajmere. Nothing can be more manifest, or more admirable, than the way in which the writer tries to do full justice to a system with which he has been engaged in the most bitter strife.

The following passage is in accordance with much that I have heard of late from native gentlemen :—

It was hoped some time ago that railway travelling, and the facilities it now exist for visiting Europe, would soon put an end to caste ; but a system so deeply rooted does not die so quickly or so easily. There did not long ago to be a movement against it, but there is now a decided reaction, and caste seems again to be reasserting its superiority. One respectable Babu in Bengal, a pleader in the High Court, who had been long for some time to fight against caste, and to promote intermarriages, found the fight too hard, has undergone expiation, and re-entered caste. The expense of the ceremony was five thousand rupees (500), and he had to spend a similar amount in erecting a temple of Siva, feeding the Brahmans. In Bombay, a most respectable native judge, whose son had visited England, was asked by the Bombay Government to go to England at public expense, to give evidence before the Indian Finance Committee of the House of Commons. He, however, declined, pleading as a reason the persecution to which he was subjected by the Brahmans for having received his son into his house on his return from England, and his inability to obtain the sanction of his caste-fellows to visiting that country. He adds—

‘I therefore think that it would be a farce for me to appear as a witness, and at the expense of the public, when a considerable and intelligent portion of that public not only disapproves of my doing so, but is determined to persecute me by excommunication, against which no human remedy in India has yet devised a remedy, and no law of the land or earthly power can give any protection.’

* * * * *

One other effect of caste I would notice—the gap that it has kept up between the English and the Hindus. Englishmen in this country often reproach their countrymen in India with the antagonism, the enmity, the total want of sympathy, that seems to exist between them and the natives. It is a sad fact that such a feeling does exist, but it is the natives who are responsible for it. It is they who have made friendly social intercourse between the rulers and ruled impossible. Governed as they are by the English, owning their sway, and acknowledging that it is a just one, they look down on them as unclean. It is the Hindu who looks on himself as polluted by the touch of an Englishman, who will throw away his food, unfit for being eaten, if an Englishman comes within a few feet of it while it is being cooked—not the Englishman who looks upon himself as polluted by the touch of a Hindu. This has, no doubt, reacted on the English, and produced in their mind a feeling of dislike and antagonism to the Hindus, but the original blame lies with the latter.”

There are many pages in the book quite as interesting as the above ; as, for instance—

“I have mentioned that a tenth incarnation is looked for, called, in the Puranas, Kalkin. Who or what this is to be, is not very clearly decided. I would merely notice an idea that seems to have some adherents in India,

that the English are this tenth incarnation of Vishnu.* I once found this expressed in a part of India where, I believe, no missionary had gone before. When I was remonstrating with some Hindus on their worshipping a being who had been guilty of such acts as Krishna, one man replied very warmly, 'Why, these were but his sports. You English have your sports. You have the railway, and the steam-boat, and the telegraph; and no one blames you. Why should you blame Krishna for sporting in his way?'

"That this idea is held not merely amongst the illiterate, the following quotation from a work by a Hindu, a native of Bombay, will show:—

"There are traditions in this land which perhaps none has yet attended to with due concern—that the East will be completely changed by a nation from the West; and the tenth avatâr of Vishnu, a man on a white horse, so current among the prophecies of the sacred Brahmanical writings, must be looked on to typify the advent of the English in India. Statesmen vainly look upon the Anglo-Indian empire as an accident—something that will not last long; and, though events like the mutiny of 1857 frequently give to that expression a significance it can never otherwise bear, the prophecy of the West, "Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem," and the prophecy of the East relating to the tenth incarnation of Vishnu—a man on a white horse, coming from the West, and destroying everything Brahmanical—render it imperative on us to accept, however reluctantly, that European supremacy in Asia is one of the permanent conditions of the world."

Feb. 13th.—Once more in blue water, which I have not seen since the 27th of November, "mais malheureusement les jours se suivent et ne se ressemblent pas."

I have been reading two books on the Durga Puja, the chief national festival of the Hindus of Bengal.

Here is a portion—not an exceptional portion—of the liturgy used by many millions of our fellow-subjects upon that occasion:—

"Am to the forehead, Am to the mouth, Im to the right eye, Im to the left eye, Um to the right ear, Um to the left ear, Rm to the right nose, Rm to the left nose, Im to the right cheek, Im to the left cheek, Em to the upper lip, Aim to the lower lip, Om to the upper teeth, Aum to the lower teeth, Am to the cerebrum, Ah to the right shoulder-blade, Kam to the elbow, Kam to the wrist, Gam to the roots of the phalanges, Gham to the phalanges, Nam to the nails, Cham to the left shoulder-blade, Chham to the left elbow, Jam to the left wrist, Jham to the roots of the left phalanges, Nam to the left nails, Tam to the right heels, Tham to the right kneebone, Dam to the right ankle, Dham to the roots of the phalanges, Lam to the tarsals. Similarly Tam, Tham, Dam, Dham, and Nam to the several parts of the left leg."

The author of the two books, who has most learnedly annotated the liturgy from which the above extract is taken, and has written

* "But some consider, too, that the English are afraid of this tenth avatar. When vaccination was introduced into the Ajmere district, the report spread that it was a device of the English to discover a new incarnation of Vishnu, who was to have white blood, and who they feared was to extirpate them from India."

an admirable essay on the origin of the festival, is a reader of Professor Max Müller's books, and a B.A.

Nothing is stranger in this strange country, and in our relations to it, than the way in which the results of high education and the most abject ignorance lie side by side. I have been looking at the list of books published in Calcutta during the last quarter, as given in the *Gazette*. Here are a few specimens:—

A Brief History of British India. Bengali.—India from the advent of the English to the Government of Lord Canning: with a supplement on the financial and judicial administration of the country.

Bidyá-Bidyá-Biro dhini; or, Science opposed to Science. Bengali.—Advice to learn one's native language first. The English is considered a very unsettled tongue.

Niradá Upákhyan; or, A Tale of Niradá. Bengali.—A tale relating to Niradá the niece of a Rajah in Burrisál, who sought for her bridegroom a Kulin Brahmin. In the meanwhile this girl eloped with her lover for Dacca. This tale is intended to induce parents to continue the practice of early marriages.

Auguste Comte, the Positivist. Bengali.—Translation of a lecture delivered by the Rev. K. S. Macdonald at the Canning Institute on the life of Auguste Comte.

Artha Byabahar Prashnottar; or, Questions and Answers on the Use of Wealth. Bengali.—On the use of money and wealth; on exchange, value, capital, and labour; rich and poor, the extension of wealth; rent, wages, revenue; on labourers' co-operation and strikes.

Jánakt Prasanga; or, Address of Jánakt or Sitá. Bengali.—The reply of Sitá, after rescue from the giant Rawan, to the inquiries made of her by Urmilá, the wife of Lakshman, as to all the circumstances relative to Ceylon and the giant.

Christian Hymns. Urdu.

Madhupo Choutrisá; or, the Thirty-four Poems of the Black Bee. Uriyá.—Krishna is compared to the black bee; and his doings during the Madhu-Játrá are herein chronicled in verse.

The Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare. Vol. I. No. 6: Comedies. English.

Sarbbagyán Manjari; or, the Blossom of all Knowledge. Bengali and Sanskrit.—The Hanumán Charita, the Kak Charita, and the Spandan Charita; presaging events in life by figures drawn and touched, by the noise of crows, and by the moving and twitching of the facial and other nerves.

Feb. 15th.—It has been, except for the loss of time on the Hooghly, a quite perfect voyage: the sea calm, the weather cool, and the pace excellent. By noon yesterday we were in lat. 15°44', rather south of Masulipatam, but of course far out at sea.

When I came up from breakfast this morning, the land was quite close—a long line of wood continued by a long line of white houses, both seen over a sea which had lost its blue tint.

Some sixty or seventy ships lay in the offing, gently heaving in the swell. I thought of Faber's sonnet—

“ And marvel not, in these loose drifting times,
If anchored spirits, in their blytheest motion,
Dip to their anchors veiled within the ocean,
Catching too staid a measure for their rhymes.”

Soon the Massullah boats, of which you have read descriptions, were all around us, and the bronze-coloured natives came climbing up the ship's sides like cats, only to be driven down again by the watchful quartermasters. Now, too, appeared the quaint catamarans, worked through the water at a tremendous rate. I remember reading a whole book upon this part of India, which contained from beginning to end only one thing of the smallest interest—a quotation, namely, from some old writer who mentions having seen distinctly through a glass two black devils playing at single-stick off Madras. What he had really seen was one of these most remarkable of all vessels.

By ten we were on shore, where I am now writing. There was so little sea on, that we were able to land from the Master-Attendant's boat at the pier, and did not cross the surf at all, of which, for that matter, there was very little.

I got through a good deal of reading on board. Nothing interested me more than a pamphlet given me by General B—— which I have been keeping against a quiet hour. It is entitled, “From Sepoy to Subadar,” and is a translation by Colonel Norgate, whom we saw at Sealkote, of the autobiography of a Sepoy belonging to the Bengal army. If any of you had a special interest in India, I would most strongly advise you to read it, for it bristles with curious and instructive passages. As things are, I will only quote two, the one of a comic, and the other of a terribly tragic character.

The first is a description of the author's first visit to his future commanding officer when he came to camp as a lad from his village in Oudh with his uncle, an old Sepoy.

“ After bathing, and eating the morning meal, he dressed in his full regiments, and went to pay his respects to the Adjutant Sahab, and commanding officer. He took me with him. I rather dreaded this, as I had never yet seen a saheb, and imagined they were terrible to look on, and of great stature. I thought, at least, seven feet high. In those days there were but few sahebs in Oude; only one or two as saheb residents in Lucknow, where I had never been. In the villages in my country, most curious ideas existed about them; any one who had chanced to see a saheb told the most absurd stories of them. In fact, nothing then could be said that would not have been believed. It was reported that they were born from an egg which grew on a tree. This idea still exists in remote villages.

Had a mem saheb* come suddenly into some of our villages, if she was young, and handsome she would have been considered as a kind of fairy, and probably have been worshipped; but should the mem saheb have been old and ugly, the whole village would have run away, and have hid in the jungle, considering the apparition as a yaddo gurin (a witch). Therefore, my dread of seeing a saheb for the first time in my life is not to be wondered at. I remember, when I was at a mela (fair) at the Taj Mahal, at Agra, hearing the opinion of some country people, who had come from afar off to see the Taj, about the saheb log. An old woman said she had always been told they were born from eggs, which came on a tree, in a far-off island, but that morning she had seen a saheb with a *puri* by his side, who, she declared, was covered with feathers of the most beautiful colours; that her face was as white as milk, and that the saheb had to keep his hand on her shoulders to prevent her flying away! This she had seen with her own eyes, and it was all true. I am not so ignorant as all this now, but at the time I first came to Agra I should have believed it. I afterwards frequently saw this saheb driving his lady about, and she wore a tippet made of peacock's feathers, which the old woman thought were wings."

The other is an episode of the mutiny:—

"One day, in one of the enclosed buildings near Lucknow, a great number of prisoners were taken, nearly all Sepoys. After the fight, they were all brought in to the officer commanding my regiment, and in the morning the order came that they should all be shot. It chanced that it was my turn to command the firing-party. I asked the prisoners their names and regiment. After hearing some five or six, one Sepoy said he belonged to the — regiment, which was that my son had been in. I of course asked him if he had known my son, Anuntee Ram, of the Light Company. He answered that that was his own name; but this being a very common name, and having always imagined that my son, as I had never heard from him, must have died of the Scinde fever, it did not at first strike me; but when he informed me he came from Tillowee, my heart leapt in my mouth. Could he be my son? There was no doubt of it, for he gave my name as his father, and he fell down at my feet, imploring my pardon. He, with all the other men in the regiment, had mutinied, and had gone to Lucknow. Once the deed was done, what was he to do? Where was he to go, if he had ever been inclined to escape? At four o'clock in the day the prisoners were all to be shot, and I must be my son's executioner! Such is fate! I went to the Major Saheb, and requested I might be relieved from this duty as a very great favour; but he was very angry, and said he should bring me to a court-martial for trying to shirk my duty; he would not believe I was a faithful servant of the English Government—he was sure my heart was in reality with the mutineers—he would hear me no longer. At last my feelings as a father got the better of me, and I burst into a flood of tears. I told him I would shoot every one of the prisoners with my own hands if he ordered me, but I confessed that one of them was my son. The major declared what I urged was only an excuse to get off shooting my own brotherhood. But at last his heart seemed touched, and he ordered my unhappy son to be brought before him, and questioned him very strictly. I shall never forget this terrible scene; for one moment I never thought of asking his life to be spared—that he did not deserve. He became convinced of the truth of my statement, and ordered me to be relieved from this duty. I went to my tent, bowed down with grief, made worse by the gibes and taunts

* English lady.

poured on me by the Sikhs, who declared I was a renegade. In a short time I heard the deadly volley. My son had received the reward of mutiny! He showed no fear, but I would rather he had been killed in fight. Through the kindness of the major I was allowed to perform the funeral rite over my misguided son—the only one of the prisoners over whom it was performed, for the remaining bodies were all thrown to the jackals and vultures. I had not heard from my son since just after my return from slavery. I had not seen him since I went to Cabool, and thus I met him again, untrue to his salt, in open rebellion against the master who had fed his father and himself. But enough—more is unnecessary. He was not the only one who mutinied [literally he was not alone when he mutinied]. The major told me afterwards that he was much blamed by the other officers for allowing the funeral rite to be performed on a rebel. But if good deeds wipe away sins—which I have heard some Sahibs believe as well as we do—his sins will be very white. Bad fortune never attends on the merciful. May my major soon become a general!”

Our steamer was some hours before its time, but one of Lord Hobart's aides-de-camp soon appeared, and we drove off to Guindy, which is some nine miles from the landing-place.

Our way lay first along the shore, and made me think of the very sensible answer made to me by F——, when I was talking about going to India. “Go,” he said, “for God's sake. If you only spend twelve hours on the beach at Madras, it will be a great deal better than nothing.”

Thence we drove on, passing Fort St. George, the cathedral, and other buildings, observing the huge “Compounds” which make the distances of Madras more tremendous even than those of other Indian cities, admiring the brilliant yellow flowers of the *Thespesia populnea*, which is planted in avenues, and crossing two rivers—one of which, the Adiar, is rather pretty.

Arrived at Guindy, I found many familiar faces gathered in the bright airy rooms, and had many questions to answer about some of you.

Here, in India, for the first time since I left Parell, do I see the Punkah at work. It is the “cool season,” but the sun does not leave us in any doubt as to whether we are in the Tropics. Life, I can see at a glance, is arranged in every way much more for a hot climate than in Calcutta.

It was the Mohurru festival, and we drove into the town this evening to see some masquing at the quarters of the body-guard. There was dancing, and sword-play, and music intermingled with songs, in honour of Hassan and Hoossein, the heroes of the day.

Very striking was the scene, as we looked out from the brilliantly-lighted tent, past the long lines of gaily-dressed actors or spectators, into the purple darkness.

* * * * *

The drive back was charmingly cool, and the trees by the way-side were full of fireflies. I did not meet with these from the

ne I left Matheran till I saw them floating about like flakes of
ht in the pleasant garden of Belvedere, but they were to-night
be counted by thousands, and seemed to prefer the topmost
gs, round which they hovered in a dazzling cloud.

ate at night, after the guests had departed, I walked about on
terrace. The Southern Cross was just coming up above the
izon, and the far more beautiful False Cross was high in
even.

There was a very fair telescope on the steps which lead down to
garden, through which I saw, for the first time, Jupiter's
ellites.

Feb. 16th.—We drove in the morning to St. Thomas's Mount,
ere my grandfather lived long. I am glad, by the way, to
erve that the *Materia Indica* keeps its place, in spite of all
nges. Colonel Drury quotes it at almost every second page.

The Mount is a rising ground, said, I see in Murray's handbook,
e composed of greenstone and syenite. Its elevation is very
ll, but springing out of the dead level plain it looks more con-
rable than it is. A flight of steps—once, I suppose a Via
cis—leads to a little chapel at the top, which belongs, I am
, to that strange link between the East and West, the Catholic
enians. I observed the tomb of a lady born at Julfa, near
shan.

ere I took an opportunity of going over one of the much-
ed-of double-storeyed barracks, and of comparing it with the
le-storeyed barracks which some persons prefer.

walked, too, through the artillery lines and batteries, seeing all
r arrangements, under the guidance of a most intelligent
er.

n the afternoon, I went to visit the Agri-Horticultural Gardens,
ere I came to know the *Parkia*, a beautiful American tree of
acacia family; saw far the finest baobab I have yet seen; met
in with the curious *Crescentia cujete*, the calabash tree, which I
learned to distinguish at Barrackpore; came to know the
romica, and learned that odd habit of the sandalwood, which
xes it delight to grow up from a seedling in the midst of
ther tree.

The director of the museum, into which we had meant to look,
s not at home, so we drove on to the observatory, where I
de the acquaintance of Mr. Pogson, who, long known in the
ntific world, became famous far beyond its bounds by the
ident of an astronomer in Göttingen having telegraphed to
a year or two ago to look for a missing comet in a particular
tion of the heavens, which led to his discovering the wanderer.
Mr. Pogson presented me to his daughter, one of the few ladies, I
ppose, in the world who are employed in a high scientific capacity

by any government, and conducted me over a large part of his dominions, explaining requirements and other matters of business, besides showing me much that was scientifically interesting.

Then we went upstairs, and I saw, at length, the moon through a powerful telescope, learning thereby to appreciate the excellence of Mr. Nasmyth's photographs.

I saw, too, the Nebula in Orion and Sirius, called by the wise Alph Can Maj!

My friend of the Red Sea, Canopus, was in great beauty, and μ Argi was pointed out to me, which offers to the observer the strange spectacle of a world on fire.

Feb. 17th.—Hours are early in this climate, and by half-past six this morning I was with Z—— in the gardens, which are far the most extensive I have seen in India. A soft mist lay over the whole country, and every leaf was glistening with water-drops.

In the course of a long and pleasant wandering, I saw the bread-fruit tree, the *Dillenia speciosa*, the *Cerbera Odollam*, the *Petræa*, and several other plants.

The *Beaumontia* was in great splendour, and here I saw, for the first time, the beautiful little honey-bird, who was busily engaged in having his breakfast. These exquisite creatures are very easily tamed, and are kept as pets.

When I had seen enough of the gardens, Z—— drove me round the park, which is curiously like the Chace at Aldermaston—the banian, very numerous here, doing duty for the oak. The park is almost six miles round, and has many pretty retired nooks, with water lying amidst tangled thickets. The antelopes allowed the pony-carriage to come quite close, and then bounded off, rather to display their agility, I think, than from any feeling of fear.

After breakfast came a morning of visits and conversations with the Chief-Justice, the members of Council, and some native gentlemen, all agreeable and instructive.

In the afternoon we drove into Madras, walked over Government House, saw the fort, the site of the proposed harbour, the arsenal, with the keys of Pondicherry, and many other things. The same light airs continue, and there was no surfeit to speak of.

At night there was a large gathering of natives, with most of whom I had some talk.

Feb. 18th.—I spent the hours from half-past six to half-past nine in the Agri-Horticultural Gardens, where there was a flower-show. and to-day, at last, I saw the *Butea frondosa*, covered with its scarlet flowers.

The show would have been, taken as a whole, good in most English towns, and the foliage plants would have been thought excellent, as I conceive, anywhere. The first prize for these was

gained by a native of rank, who had gone to great expense, and taken an immense amount of personal trouble, in forming and superintending his collection.

I was naturally most interested by the ordinary produce of the country, by the various grains grown on the Government farm at Sydapet, by the tea from the Neilgherries, by the dyes and gums, fruits, and vegetables. I tasted the rose-apple, *Jambosa vulgaris*, which I liked extremely, and which seems peculiarly well adapted for being preserved, as they preserve fruits in the south of France. The Sapota I thought admirable, like a glorified medlar.

I should like to have seen a little more of Madras, but my days in India are numbered. As it was, however, I met all the people at the head of the Government except the Commander-in-Chief, who is away in Burmah, and the quiet of Guindy* afforded ample opportunity for long talks.

Feb. 19th.—I started yesterday evening, and found myself at Erode early this morning. The last place I observed was the station for Arcot, famous in the chequered history of Sepoy fidelity, and once or twice in the night a bright moon showed me that I was running through a picturesque and mountainous country. From Erode I went in about six hours to Tanjore, passing through a great plain in which rice is largely cultivated, and where the aloe and the prickly-pear—both, I presume, Portuguese introductions—give a quite peculiar character to the landscape. Most of the rice, unhappily, has been lately reaped, but there is a good deal of a second crop upon the ground, and this is enchantingly green. The temperature is very high, and it well may be, considering we are already far on in February, and within eleven degrees of the equator.

I reached Tanjore soon after twelve o'clock, and had a most friendly reception on the part as well of the princess and her family, as of our own officials.

The afternoon passed in conversing with our host, Mr. Thomas, the collector, well known not only as a man of business, but as a naturalist and sportsman, who told me a great deal that was novel and valuable.

* Six months have not passed away, and all the company of friends who made Guindy so pleasant to me are scattered to the winds. Lord Hobart has gone, leaving behind him the reputation of a Governor, who, at first unpopular, gradually won the esteem of all whose esteem was worth having, by steady devotion to the best interests of the millions over whom he was set to rule, as he understood those interests. I had known him for many years before his appointment, by the Duke of Argyll, to the Governorship of Madras, brought us into official relations, and no one could know him for many years without being struck by the solidity of his character, and by the fact that he brought to the management of public affairs a far more abiding sense of duty, and a mind far less easily satisfied with plausibilities, than many men who impress their acquaintance and the public much more deeply.

His brother, Frederick Hobart, whose worth I had learned to know at the India Office, and who was staying at Guindy in bad health when I was there, lived to come home, but is also now no more. "In pace requiescant."—Hampden, August 9, 1875.

We spent a good deal of time also in looking over some of the manufactures of Tanjore and Madura. I could see no good pottery, and no good carpets, though I have reason to believe that excellent specimens of both are produced in this neighbourhood. The Madura copper-work, inlaid with silver, is handsome, but to my eye not very attractive. The silk fabrics, on the other hand, pleased me extremely, and I bought several specimens.

When it began to get a little cool, we drove to the Great Temple, which is really a noble thing. You will find it figured and described in Fergusson; so it will probably be enough if I say that the general effect is not less imposing, though very different from that of Edfou or Denderah. The temples of Benares filled me with something nearly akin to disgust, but this is very different. The famous black bull is a grand beast, of Egyptian proportions and benignity. If only they did not think it necessary to propitiate him with oil! Still, after the horrors of the holy city on the Ganges, everything here looked comparatively clean and dignified.

We lingered long amongst the courts of this splendid temple, learning the uses of its different parts, and strolled a little in the till lately neglected garden, which is gradually being put into order by the local British providence. The lovely *Clitoria ternata* was growing wild, as mercury might be doing in such a place at home.

From the temple we drove through the town, which was full of richly carved idol cars, and went out to a picturesque bridge over the Cauvery. The country through which we passed was well wooded, but a little way off the wood ceases, and there is one unbroken rice-field down to the sea. It is this vast breadth of irrigated land which makes the Tanjore district one of the most fertile and valuable in India. I was pleased to hear that some of the natives here have lately applied to the Sydapet farm for the assistance of a trained agriculturist, which will, I hope, soon be given them.

Amongst others whom I met at dinner to-night was the distinguished scholar, Dr. Burnell, who is judge here, and who told me an infinity of interesting things.

After dinner the princess had arranged a nautch for us, and some very good fireworks, but they were not different from those I have described elsewhere.

Feb. 20th.—This morning we walked over the palace, visited the senior widow of the late prince, and then went to pay our respects to the princess, with whom we conversed through the silken purdah, or curtain, and whose very pleasant voice made us wish that that silly piece of etiquette might be abandoned.

The palace is large, with some fine features, and commands a

od view over the city, whose roofs, unlike those we had become familiar with in northern India, were not flat, but pointed.

There were an arsenal now empty of weapons, many rich houses, a most valuable Sanskrit library, and not a few creatures of the nature of pets, to be inspected. Amongst these last I observed particularly the Indian fox, a lovely little animal, so fleet that foxhounds have no chance with it.

TRICHINOPOLY, *Feb. 20th.*—We left Tanjore about eleven o'clock, and came to this famous spot, where we are staying with the English, Mr. Webster, who has just been showing us the Great Temple of Seringham, an enormous place, much larger than that of Tanjore, and affording within its huge precincts accommodation for a perfect host of Brahmans, and others more or less closely connected with the sanctuary—by no means to the advantage of the beauty or impressiveness. We wandered about it in all directions, accompanied by the managers, over roofs, through streets, and right up to the top of one of the gopuras or gateways (known to Fergusson), from which there was a quite admirable view, northward towards the mountains which bound the plain of Trichinopoly, eastward along the great irrigated level, and westward to the source of all its prosperity, the huge irrigation dam of the Cauvery. You should have seen us sitting in a bower wholly woven out of white oleander and jasmine, inspecting the treasures of the temple—pearl and ruby, diamond and emerald, worked into many hideous shapes, while a nauch of the usual variety kind droned its slow length along, and half the population gathered round in a noisy, more than half-naked crowd. I have rarely assisted at so strange a performance.

The great Hindu sect of the Vishnuvites is, in this part of India, divided into two parties “the men of the south” and “the men of the north.” The “men of the south” wear the symbolical crescent on their foreheads, but they produce the end of it to a point about half-way down the nose, while the “men of the north” cut it short between the eyebrows. The Great Temple of Seringham is in the hands of the “men of the south,” but the “northerners” have the right of worshipping there in a quiet way—though they must by no means carry about the objects of their worship in procession. The great majority of the crowd accordingly had the trident far down the nose, but here and there appeared some heterodox person who was so much left to himself as to omit the last inch. Those who have sailed, as you have, between Tentyra and Ombos,* will not be surprised to learn that a riot amongst these religionists is one of the agreeable possibilities which is always impending over Trichinopoly.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.

* Juv. Sat. xv.



PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S HYPOTHESIS THAT ANIMALS ARE AUTOMATA.*

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S reputation as a physiologist is so great, that those who do not follow his physiological reasonings will do well to suppose that the fault is their own. It is otherwise with his conclusions respecting mental philosophy. With regard to sensation, volition, thought, and contrivance, a person, who reflects on himself and on what he reads about others, acquires a stock of experience which will bear to be weighed against that of the expert, and entitles him to inquire, with less respect of persons, whether what seems to him wild and inconclusive is not really what it seems to be. All that modesty requires is that he should examine any paradoxical announcements of the great teacher, not with the off-hand trenchancy which their nature might seem to justify, but with that respectful elaboration which is due to the reputation of their sponsor. And if this excuses an unlearned person for applying to questions of this kind what may be called logical or metaphysical common sense, there is just now a special reason for taking that liberty. For, as the methods of material science are every year more freely applied to subjects hitherto considered immaterial, those who value the ideas of free-will and a Creator may be pardoned for examining, as occasion offers, how far this application is sound, and how far those who have so wonderfully succeeded in analyzing the

* *Fortnightly Review*, November 1, 1874.

mechanism of the material world have thereby increased their capacity for determining the laws of the world of sensation, with reference to which alone all mechanism is valuable.

A recent essay of Professor Huxley on the automatic character of animal movement raises, I think, this question.

It is, according to him, the doctrine of Descartes that beasts are mere machines or automata, devoid not only of reason but of any kind of consciousness"—by which he evidently means, not consciousness in the sense of reflection upon sensation, but consciousness in the sense of sensation itself. He thus paraphrases Descartes: "What proof is there that beasts are more than a superior kind of *marionettes*, which eat without pleasure, without pain, desire nothing, know nothing, and only simulate intelligence as a bee simulates a mathematician?"

In his position—that animals have no sensation—Mr. Huxley does not indeed believe, but he thinks that it is defensible, and deserves to be treated with a certain respect. In this, of course, ninety-nine men out of a hundred will differ from him, and, being one of the ninety-nine, I desire to justify my dissent from his position.

A wrong decision might be of terrible importance to the brute creation; but to this—the practical side of the question—I may quote Dr. Carpenter's remark, that "the common-sense decision of mankind . . . is practically worth more than all the arguments of the logicians who have discussed the basis of our belief." The subject of the matter, however, has an interest of its own in connection with what is called the argument from design. For if it is possible that a mere juxtaposition of insensible atoms can produce the movements of the animal world, there will be little difficulty in supposing that anything may produce anything.

I am sensible of my own audacity. I am aware that I and my ninety-eight may be struck by the anathema of the hierarchy of knowledge: "This people which knoweth not the law are cursed." I have an ominous consciousness that, if I dared, I should take into my mouth the language of those typical rebels whose tragic fate is incorporated in one of the earliest histories of our race: "Is it a small thing that thou hast brought us up out of a land that floweth with milk and honey, except thou make thyself together a prince over us? . . . Wilt thou put out the eyes of these men?"

Yet, Dathan and Abiram notwithstanding, the spirit of protest is too strong for me, and I venture forward on behalf of ninety-eight, in the power, or at least in the name, of that educated ignorance which men call common sense.

What proof is there that beasts are more than a superior kind of *marionettes*?" What I wish to do, in answer to this challenge,

is to place side by side the evidence for and against animal sensitiveness: the first, as it lies within the cognizance of every rational being; the second, as I collect it from Mr. Huxley's paper, supplemented by a perusal, less thorough perhaps than it ought to be, of Dr. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology."

Beginning at the beginning, the grounds of our belief in the sensitiveness of animals, when fully drawn out, I take to be as follows:—

All that a man is capable of knowing with absolute certainty is that he, individually, feels thus and thus. The sensations of which he is thus certain are conditions of his knowledge of what *may* be (abstract laws), and the foundations of his knowledge of what *is* (actual fact).

Among these sensations (which are to him certainties absolutely of the *first* order) are his pains, pleasures, hopes, fears, desires, purposes, and consequent volitions. Consequent, I say, because their connection with each other, by way of cause and effect, is as much a matter of certain and immediate experience as the desires and volitions themselves. I see (or seem to see) a wasp. I feel at once a desire to get rid of him, and a disinclination to the act of crushing him, but finally I determine to destroy him, and do, or appear to myself to do, so. That this desire, disinclination, and determination exist, and that the two first are antecedent to the last, is not more a matter of certain experience than that the determination is caused by the one and not by the other of the antecedents—by the desire, and not by the disinclination.

These internal facts I know. Facts external to myself I believe (as certainties of the *second* order), because and so far as they account for my sensations; and I believe them with more confidence, in proportion as the sensations which have to be accounted for are numerous and complex, the explanations adequate, and other explanations wanting.

On this account, and this alone,* I believe in the particulars which compose an external world, part of which world, that which appears to be most intimately connected with my sensation, I call my body—a substance which (assuming its existence) I find to be under the dominion of that sensational and volitional apparatus already described.

Next the same evidence, by way of sight, touch, or hearing, which I have of the existence of my own body, this—or something

* Dr. Carpenter, in a passage which I have half quoted, alleges the common sense of mankind as evidence of an external world. If he means that every individual man may, in that respect, rely on his own "common sense," I entirely agree with him. Only I attempt to develop the unconscious reasoning which underlies that common sense. If he means that a man may receive the *collective* evidence of his fellow-creatures on this subject, it is obvious to remark, that till he has satisfied himself of the existence of an external world, he is not entitled to assume that he has any fellow-creatures.

proaching this—I have of the existence of certain other bodies resembling my own. I see, or hear, or feel these bodies perform enormous variety of complex and minute movements, all which, up to a certain point, are sufficiently accounted for or systematized, by supposing them to be—as I know my own similar movements to be—under the dominion of sensation. I infer that they *are* under that dominion; and the experience of my whole life may be considered as a protracted confirmation of this inference. The tests continually supplied of sufficiency are so varied, so intricate, so continuous, so multitudinous, and so complete, that it is an injustice to their conclusiveness to compare them to the comparatively limited process of scientific inquiry. They form a kind of atmosphere of proof, in which a man is enveloped from birth to death. He habitually regulates all his conduct by the supposition that he has fellow-creatures, whose external movements are due to the same internal principles of sensation as his own; and amidst all the complication of circumstance to which this supposition is applied it never fails. There are plenty of difficulties in accounting for the varieties of human conduct, plenty of theories respecting the origin, nature, and limits of human faculties. But since the creation of the world I never heard that any person attempted to prove that what we call volition, as it was certainly the cause of my own conduct, did not, to the same extent, furnish an adequate account of that of his neighbours.

When we push our analysis beyond this point, no doubt we soon get into darkness. But up to this point it is a blaze of habitable light.

By way of illustration, I select from the accumulated evidence which must be afforded by every human life a single group of phenomena—a fencing bout, with all the rapid and various motions of the fencers, each born of the moment, and adjusted with the subtlest precision to those of the adversary. All this minute adjustment is simply explained if I assume in each fencer a nature like that which I know to exist in myself, capable of forming a desire to hit an adversary, and to avoid being hit by him, of devising means of effecting these objects, and of directing his bodily frame to take these means.

And what is the counter-supposition? I will first say what it is not. Mechanical science may be readily conceived capable of constructing a machine, actuated by a single moving power, and causing two automata to perform a certain series of pre-arranged motions, exactly similar to those of a particular, actual, or imagined fencing match, and having, of course, a definite relation to each other. But this is far from what is required.

What is wanted is this—such a disposition of (by hypothesis)

senseless particles of matter as will be sufficient without the intervention of consciousness or sensation, or purpose, or volition, to produce in one of these fencers, and equally in any number of other fencers, under any variety of circumstances under which they may meet an opponent, a series of complicated motions adjusting themselves *pro re nata*, and quicker than thought to the unknown and unforeseen and unperceived actions of the other;—unknown and unforeseen and unperceived, I say, because neither of the combatants is, by hypothesis, capable of knowledge, forethought, or perception.

It seems to me that to believe this possible would be the very fanaticism of credulity—faintly expressed by the fine old formula "*credo quia impossibile*," which, whatever its value in theology, has not yet established for itself a place in physical science. Why, then, do I take the trouble to draw out so laboriously what if nakedly assumed would be generally accepted as self-evident? I do it because the argument for *animal* sensation and volition is exactly the same as that for the sensation and volition of our fellow-men.

The motions of a dog, when I romp with him, are not so complicated as those of a fencer. But still they are sufficiently minute and various. His jumps and feints—the flashes of his eyes with all their bright varieties of expression, the pricking up of his ears, the quivering of his tail, have a relation to my acts and to each other perfectly intelligible, if I suppose him to be actuated by sensations of joy, hope, and desire bearing a certain analogy to my own. Refuse me that supposition and I am wholly unable to give any account whatever of that close correlation which exists between his acts and mine, and *pari ratione* of the general correlation between all the acts of the different members of the human and brute creation.

Look at the case in its physiological details.

By certain internal molecular movements, I set my limbs in motion, and effect a variety of gesticulations from which certain other molecular movements are transmitted through the intermediate space to the eye of the dog, and through his eye to his brain—immediately thereupon molecular movements are imparted to his limbs, eyes, legs, tail, and ears, issuing in further antics on his part, which are in like manner transmitted back through my eyes to my brain. Then, *da capo*, I set to work again with my responsive gesticulations, and he with his antics, and so on as long as we go on playing. The adjustment of my motions to those of the dog is in all its stages within my immediate experience. I can analyze it with ease and certainty. I find it to depend upon my perception of the dog's motions, my interpretation of his motions, my pleasure in his motions, my desire to produce similar motions, an instinctive apprehension that certain further movements on my

It will have this effect, and a consequent volition to make, and a consequent making, of those certain movements. So far so good. But if the dog is only a better kind of *marionette*, there is, on his side, a break in the chain of causation. He has no perception of his own motions, no interpretation of them, no pleasure in them, no reason to impress on his limbs any expression of his own pleasure or anything whatever to link the action of the sensory or afferent nerves with that of the motor or efferent nerves. The reason why the sensations received in his brain through his eye should cause other sensations affecting, with such variety and subtlety, eyes, ears, throat, mouth, legs, and tail, is absolutely wanting, and the motions themselves remain absolutely unexplained except on the astonishing and gratuitous hypothesis of which I have attempted feebly to illustrate the incredibility. If, instead of making myself party to the game, I imagine two dogs playing together, with an even more exuberant variety of capers to be accounted for, I have a precise parallel to my two fencers—the difference between the two cases being, on the whole, not unfairly represented by the evidently immaterial distinction that one pair of phenomena have two legs a-piece and the other four.

In all this I seem to myself to have shown that the evidence of the sensitiveness of human beings is as conclusive as anything could well be, and that, with unimportant difference of degree, the evidence for the sensitiveness of animals is the same as the evidence for the sensitiveness of men other than ourselves. I call the difference of degree unimportant, in the sense in which I could say that it was immaterial whether a fact was deposed to by 1,000 credible witnesses, or by 1,001. There is, no doubt, a real difference in the weight of evidence, appreciable by a logical thermometer; but not a difference of which any sensible person would be naturally desirous of arriving at truth would stop to take notice. This being the overwhelming evidence on one side, what is that on the other? And first, what ought it to be? It may be negative, or positive, or both. It may be shown negatively that the received explanation of the phenomena of animal motion is incredible in its nature, or that it is inadequate to account for these phenomena; or it may be shown positively that other causes known to exist, or at least capable of distinct imagination, are equally or more, or at least sufficiently, adequate to produce the phenomena for which we have to account.

I do not see that Mr. Huxley, or Descartes as exhibited by him, makes any attempt to clear the ground for the non-sensitive hypothesis, by discrediting that which is in possession. They do not deny that they are themselves sensitive, or that sensitiveness is an established part of the constitution of nature. In fact, I suppose that the whole course of their life has been regulated by

the supposition that other human beings are sensitive like themselves. They cannot affect to say that it is *à priori* incredible or even improbable that the principle of action thus admitted to exist in human beings should extend to brutes; they do not contend that the principle which is adequate (as far as it goes) to account for human actions is less adequate to account for those of brutes. They leave the sensitive theory in undisputed possession of the immense weight of positive proof which I have set forth, and bring themselves under the obligation of exhibiting some counter theory which will stand some comparison with it in point of completeness and intelligibility. To demand our attention for anything less than this is to trifle with the subject.

Now, what is done in fulfilment of this obligation?

Here is the salient point of Descartes' argument as quoted by Mr. Huxley:—

"When one who falls from a height throws his hands forwards to save his head, it is in virtue of no ratiocination that he performs this action; it does not depend upon his mind, but takes place merely because, his senses being affected by the present danger, some change arises in his brain, which determines the animal spirits to pass thence into the nerves in such a manner as is required to produce this motion in the same way as in a machine, and without the mind being able to hinder it. Now, since we observe this in ourselves, why should we be so much astonished if the light reflected from the body of a wolf into the eye of a sheep has the same force to execute in it the motion of flight?"

If in this passage "mind" had merely meant ratiocination, what Descartes says would be indisputable. But it would not be the paradox which Mr. Huxley imputes to him.

"Descartes' line of argument," says Mr. Huxley, "is perfectly clear. He starts from reflex action in man, from the unquestionable fact that, in ourselves, co-ordinate purposive actions may take place without the intervention of consciousness or volition, or even contrary to the latter. As actions of a certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere mechanism, why may not actions of still greater complexity be the result of a more refined mechanism? What proof is there that brutes are other than a superior race of marionettes, which eat without pleasure, cry without pain, desire nothing, know nothing, and only simulate intelligence as a bee simulates a mathematician?"

And he makes his own meaning indisputable by observing that the Port Royalists found in the Cartesian theory a defence for cruelty.

Taking, then, Descartes in the sense here imposed upon him, i.e., as denying animal sensation, I have, it seems to me, incidentally anticipated his arguments.

The reason why we should be "astonished" in the case supposed by him is this—that the sense of danger which he admits (or rather knows) to exist in man, and which forms the connecting link between the sensory nerves, which inform us that

are falling, and the motor nerves, which throw forward the hands; so that the one (the *sensory*) is brought to produce a certain effect on the other (the *motor*); is, on his hypothesis, wanting in the deep; in which, therefore, the rays of light can only, as far as we have means of judging, produce the primary effect proper to them as rays of light, and not those secondarily proper to them as giving information of a present danger.

Next I take Mr. Huxley—

(1.) "What proof," he asks, "is there that brutes are other than superior race of marionettes?"

Well, I have attempted to give that proof, which seems to me of the first order of practical certainty; as strong a proof as we could have unless we could get inside their minds and feel their feelings for ourselves. It is of so obvious a kind that it ought surely to have occurred to a philosopher, and, instead of asking for it, it was his business to have said something to weaken it.

(2.) "As actions of a certain complexity are brought about by mere mechanism, why may not actions of still greater complexity be the result of more refined mechanism?"

So I might ask, if the apparatus of analytical geometry can furnish the equation of a sphere, why cannot it furnish the equation of the whole surface of the material universe? or if granite sometimes simulates masonry, why may we not expect to find it producing a fac-simile of Salisbury Cathedral? or if a musical note will make grains of sand placed on a plate of glass jump into regular shapes, why should we doubt that Orpheus made trees dance? or if a man may, by accident, throw sixes three times running, why is it incredible that, by accident, he may have gone on doing so for a century? In the last-mentioned case the reason is that the number of chances against it is so immense that, in the present state of numeration, it could scarcely be pronounced in less than three or four months.

In the case in hand I have attempted to illustrate the stupendous difficulty of supposing that mere mechanism can supply the place of emotion, contrivance, and forethought, and insure the appropriateness of (*e.g.*) all those brisk and expressive movements of a dog by which we are enabled to conjecture his feelings on all the little daily occurrences of life, with a minuteness and practical precision which is always confirming, by increased experience, the theory on which it rests. But the truth is, it is the business of one who protects a theory not to ask for objections, but to advance evidence. To ask "why not," is not to argue. If Descartes or Mr. Huxley were serious, they would not only show that "purposive" actions have taken place in which they are not at present able to detect consciousness or volition; but should show, first, what was the nature of the agency which supplied the functions

of consciousness and volition when these faculties appeared to be absent, and, secondly, that this agency, thus ascertained was competent, not only to produce small occasional anomalies, but to adjust itself, with the elasticity of sense and desire, to the infinite and unforeseen varieties of animal motion. Till we have some idea what an agency is, we cannot tell how far its ability to produce a small effect removes the improbability of its producing a great one.

But it may be fairly said that this is a scanty mode of dealing with Descartes' exposition of his subject—that I have fastened on his illustration, rather than his argument, and that modern science has brought into view, not one or two isolated and exceptional anomalies, but a large range of facts, showing that man performs without consciousness a multitude of actions hitherto held to imply skill and purpose, and that these investigations give a force which I have not duly allowed for to Mr. Huxley's question, "If molecules can do all this, what limit is there to their powers?" And, indeed, it seems to be sometimes inferred that sense and contrivance would (but for our personal experience) be unnecessary assumptions, and that molecular movement—the mechanical effect of senseless atom upon senseless atom—cannot be pronounced incapable of producing by itself all that world of motion which we call voluntary.

I desire to examine how far this range of facts, represented by the phrase "unconscious* cerebation," affect the foregoing argument. And, first, I cannot help thinking that some persons take hold of the term "molecular movement" as representing some transcendental force of unknown nature, invested with an unlimited and quasi-magical power, and capable of effecting nobody knows what, nobody knows how. If this is meant, scientific men ought to indicate their incomprehensible force by some name suggestive of an unknown quantity—say, xy or yz —a symbol which might have covered anything that it might be convenient to imagine—even the spiritual operation of a creating Intelligence. But, instead of this, they have selected a pair of words expressing with precision two or three of the simplest ideas which the human mind is capable of conceiving.

"Molecular movement" is, I suppose, a change in the place or position of molecules; and molecules are very small particles of

* I hope Dr. Carpenter will not think me impertinent in expressing the exceeding pleasure and instruction—that of a person who is entering on a new and fascinating world of knowledge—which I derived from a perusal of his book on "Mental Physiology," which contains, I suppose, the fullest extant exposition of this subject, and the very sincere diffidence with which I venture to qualify some of his conclusions. I may perhaps add that what follows was in substance written before I had read his book, though not before I had been affected by echoes of it. I have now appropriated all that suits me. I scarcely know how much I have in one way or other taken from him—perhaps all that is worth reading.

matter; and matter—what is matter? What *the thing* matter really—that is to say, what is the nature of the substance (if any) which underlies the phenomena of sense—no doubt we are wholly ignorant. But most of us know perfectly well what we mean by *the word*. We mean, I conceive, that which occupies space. Or, to express the definition in the form of an axiom, we hold that two atoms of matter cannot be at the same point of space at the same moment of time. If they could, they would not be what we mean by matter. Mr. Huxley, *e.g.*, professes to believe in the independent existence of mind and matter. He means, I imagine, that mind does not (in this sense) occupy space, for if it does, why is it not matter?

Further, by intuition, experience, or otherwise, we are led to listen on this idea of matter certain other characteristics—that the same atom cannot be in two places at once; that an atom cannot move from point to point without passing through the intermediate space; that atoms attract atoms with a force varying inversely as the square of their distance; that, once in motion, they move until stopped, with a momentum proportioned to their velocity and attractive force; that, by impact, motion may be communicated; that action and reaction are equal; and so on. On assumptions of this order, arising out of our conception of material existence, or naturally attaching to it, we build up those dynamical laws—senseless and inexorable—which govern, if we could fully trace their operation, the most eccentric movements of every molecule of fluid in a wave or a whirlwind. It is, I presume, by laws of the same order—[—]by laws, that is, which determine the mode in which atom shall impart motion to atom, and which deal with such conditions as velocity, direction, juxtaposition, momentum, friction, cohesion, and so forth—that all those infinitely subtle vibrations are regulated which convey the sense of contact or constitute the physical form, as distinct from the living sensation, of light, heat, or sound; the tremor of each particle being a perfectly true dynamical result of the tremor of its fellows—true with a beauty of accuracy which it passes the power of words to explain, or of microscope upon microscope to gauge.

This being the case with the incoming molecular vibration which in sentient beings is the occasion of sensation, and this being also the case with the outgoing molecular vibration which is the instrument of volition, I first point out that the second bears to the first a relation utterly inexplicable on any dynamical principles. I call a man bad names. The tremor which we call sound travels in obedience to the laws of material motion through the intermediate atmosphere and nerve-substance till it reaches my neighbour's seat of sensation. This is to him the incoming molecular motion, direct, rotatory, spiral, serpentine, or whatever else

it may be. If the whole process is mechanical, it would seem to follow that, subject to intervening disturbances of a mechanical or mechanico-chemical kind, the outgoing and derivative movement, whether direct, rotatory, spiral, or otherwise, must be such as is required by its dynamical relations to its origin. But what is it likely to be in the supposed case? The sum of the outward molecular movement may be, according to circumstances, that my adversary blushes, or turns pale, or knocks me down, or runs away; or that, being a foreigner, he asks a bystander to tell him what I am saying. It is not merely that between the respective extremities of the incoming and outgoing molecular movements there is a connection to be established, a chasm to be bridged over. It is not a question of completing an electric circle, or transmitting a homogeneous motion. It is requisite that in the course of connecting these two nerve-movements a most surprising transformation should take place, and that the velocity or other characteristics of the incoming current should, in passing through the inter-nerval district, be so changed from fast to slow, from straight to curved, from spiral to oblique, that under different moral circumstances not easily described in terms of mixed mathematics, it may transmute itself into one or other of five strangely different outgoing currents, of which the velocity and direction is calculated to produce, as the case may be, a blush, a pallor, a blow, a retreat, or an inquiry.

Every one of us has an infallible internal experience of the process by which this kind of thing is effected in his own case. It is by the action of that sensitive and volitional machinery which some of us, philosophically or otherwise, call our spiritual nature, which, though partly at the mercy of our nerves, is in a measure their master—a machinery of perceptions, hopes, fears, desires, affections, and intelligence—things of which we cannot predicate length, or breadth, or weight, or velocity, or cohesion, and which are totally incommensurable with those things to which such terms can be applied, and appear to belong to a different order of existence. It is this difference of order which I wish to illustrate.

If a man tells me that he will make me a winter coat of atmospheric air, I am somewhat slow to believe him, but I do not deny that the idea which he presents to me is conceivable. For, after all, atmospheric air and a coat are *in eodem genere*. Air or some of its elements enter into the composition of grass, grass into that of a sheep, and a sheep into that of wool, and wool into that of a coat. Air and a coat have many things in common; they can be squeezed, they can be weighed, they can be packed up and sent by railway, they can be resolved into chemical elements more or less similar. But if he told me that he would

make me a coat out of a hope or a fear, or the battle of Waterloo, a cardinal virtue, he would seem to me to be saying not only what is very improbable, but what is absolute nonsense. So of motion and sensation. Motion, of course, can affect sensation, as silks and satins may impair self-abasement, and the battle of Waterloo wilt many a fine uniform; but I ask whether the assertion that motion or any modification of it can be or become thought or sensation, or can supply the absence of thought or sensation, assuming their functions and effecting what they effect, has not the same kind of incoherent self-condemnation as the supposition that humility can be or become sackcloth, or the Battle of Waterloo become a component element of a red coat?

I am of course aware that those who embark upon metaphysics often find themselves in a sea of alternate improbabilities. I find myself driven by inevitable reasoning to embrace the idea of a single cause or causes—yet unable to conceive anything which is not an effect of something else. Admitting the idea of a first cause, I find it equally—or rather as truly—impossible to imagine that it had a beginning, or that it had not. Reconciling myself to either the one or the other hypothesis, I am encountered by the difficulty of imagining either that the universe can have become what it is without a designer, or that any mind should be capable of the tremendous extent of moral and physical contrivance which such design implies. Facing the fact of the universe, it is a strain on my mind to suppose either that it is matter only, or that it is mind only, or that it is partly one and partly the other. I cannot conceive that the sensible world, with its history, science, poetry, and philosophy—with all that I see and seem to learn—is the mere development of my own mind. I cannot conceive that matter is a mere name to express the concurrence of the sensations of the animate world, without any underlying substance to support these sensations. I cannot conceive that desire, self-control, volition, and the sense of identity, are mere fleeting attributes of a shifting accumulation of atoms springing from no vital or permanent substance; nor, finally, am I able to understand how that of which the fundamental condition is that it occupies space can affect or come into contact with that which does not occupy space. Yet in each of these knots of alternative possibilities one—or some modification of one—must be true.

Under the pressure of these metaphysical conceptions, most men, I think, adopt the belief which seems most to satisfy their human nature; and these are curiously different. Dr. Carpenter takes it absurd to suppose that a sentient being can be divided into two sentient beings—Mr. Huxley that matter cannot exist unless it is perceptible to some mind. Neither of these suppositions presents to my own mind the slightest difficulty. On the other

hand, Dr. Carpenter treats the doctrine of gravitation as having become self-evident to scientific men. To me it is a standing wonder, inconceivable but for the evidence of it, that matter should be capable of affecting matter without touching it—or rather I should say that, to me, this apparent property of matter presents itself as a rude indication of something more than matter—of the unapproachable presence of a super-material force: a sparkle, as it were, of that supreme evidence of an immensely powerful mind, which imposes itself upon me, as soon as I attempt to interpret the complex mechanism which I believe to exist about me, by the sensation and contrivance which I know to exist within.

Again, thinkers of great power and authority conceive that existence is possible without succession—that time is destructible, and that when destroyed it will be replaced by eternity; which is something different from time (or succession) without end. All this is to me wholly unimaginable. Again, Mr. John Mill treats it as conceivable that to some other order of intelligence it may not be true that twice two is equal to three plus one—or in other words, that to these intelligences four may become substantially different from itself, accordingly as we view it as equally or unequally divided—that $(1 + 1 + 1) + 1$ does not equal $(1 + 1) + (1 + 1)$. Finally, I am told, with some considerable confidence, that what I call myself is only a succession of sensations—that is, that either sentiency is possible without a thing sentient (and I suppose, motion without a thing moveable) or else that a substantial thing may be composed of states of existence. Either of these propositions, to speak plainly, seems to me nonsense.

Of course in all this I must be taken as speaking “subjectively,” not “objectively”—not as enunciating dogmas, but as exhibiting a state of mind—“a poor thing, sir, but mine own”—though certainly with the expectation that I may find in the minds of others enough support to keep me in countenance.

With the same diffidence, but with the same hope of support from the common sense of mankind, I submit for the judgment of reflective persons the difficulty, to me insuperable, of supposing that motion can supply the place of sensation, with which it has no one attribute in common, except that of duration; that a change in the place of measurable and ponderable atoms—a change of which the attributes and characteristic forms are velocity, direction, momentum, obliqueness, or rotation, and the appropriate consequence further motion, can furnish a substitute for the feelings of an immeasurable and imponderable “Ego”—feelings of which the attributes and forms are such as intensity, pleasure, pain, hope, and fear, and the appropriate consequence, volition.

Among these conflicting impossibilities metaphysicians may perhaps hereafter establish some order of precedence, as mathematicians distinguish with the utmost ease and security between infinitely different depths of nothingness. But this being still undone, I do not affect to conclude from what I have now said more than this—that the *prima facie* improbability that motion can do the work of sensation is sufficiently great to authorize a close scrutiny of those facts which appear to involve it.

It is with the support of this *a priori* improbability, the amount of which every reader will measure for himself, that I endeavour to show that the facts of what I will call unconscious volition, when approached from the psychological side, bear a somewhat different aspect from that which they bear to Dr. Carpenter, who approaches them from the side of physiology.

For the purpose of eliminating what appears to me irrelevant, I begin by admitting unreservedly that numerous mental processes—how numerous we cannot tell—are, like those of the body, wholly imperceptible. The growth of our powers and habits we only know in their causes and results, not in themselves. I know that at one time I could not translate Latin into English, whereas now I can. This acquired power indicates (I suppose) some change in the substance, whether material or immaterial, which constitutes the sensitive being which I call myself. I remember the processes on which this change was consequent—the lessons, the exercises, it may be the whippings. But what the change itself really was—what is the difference between the being “I” as it is now, and the being “I” as it was then, or how the difference came about, my feelings do not tell me, and possibly my faculties would not enable me to understand. So a spontaneous thought arises in the mind. It is of course by some natural process that it does so. Nothing can possibly happen otherwise. But what that process is—or, indeed, whether it is a pure consequence of my own structure, or is imposed upon me by some unknown agency, which, by the law of its and my nature has access to my mind—is entirely hidden from me.

In all this, as there is nothing at all revolting to the imagination, so there is nothing to our present purpose. That matter or spirit may be capable of acting without the agency of sensation, need be doubted by none who believe that trees grow. But the present question is not whether matter can act, but whether it can produce systematically, extensively, and minutely, that particular class of phenomena which are usually produced by contrivance and volition.

The same observation applies to a variety of animal functions like digestion, pulsation, respiration, a cough, or a sneeze, which, though sometimes or always involuntary, are delicately calculated to

effect important purposes. Some of these are constant—some exceptional; some are in whole, or in part, consequent on a pain or *malaise*; some are, and some are not, perceptible; some are, and some are not, capable of being controlled or assisted by volition. But of all alike it may be said that except when so controlled or aided, they have not the versatile adaptiveness to unforeseen conjunctures which distinguishes volition, but either the pure irregularity of a natural convulsion, like the fall of a rock, or the modified uniformity of a natural influence, like the movements of stars, or the breaking of waves on the sea-shore, or an appearance of pre-arrangement to some specific purpose. And though I am forward to admit that they may be beautiful instances of the skill of the machinist, I cannot see that they enlarge that immense idea of the capacity of natural machinery which we derive, say, from the history of an acorn. It appears to me, therefore, that this class of unconscious operations may likewise be dismissed from our view.

Next I desire to bring into prominence the distinction between what we call sensation or perception, and what, departing from the terminology of Mr. Huxley and Dr. Carpenter, I will here call consciousness, by which I mean a certain act of recognition, realization, reflection, or registration, which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, accompany sensation.

It is a common observation that an immense proportion, possibly the larger part, of the sensations which regulate our actions and judgments are unrecognized at the moment. The phrases, "unconscious motive," "undefined apprehension," "intuitive judgment," "mechanical movement," "tact," indicate a class of phenomena of which every man's life is full. Who can tell at the moment, and off-hand, why he disbelieves a statement, why he supposes a friend out of humour, why he admires a work of art, why he makes a long-sighted move at chess? His reasons are present to his mind, but he cannot tell what they are; they have no shape or distinctiveness. He is not specifically "conscious" of them. I say they are present, or at least that they are often present, not on any *à priori* grounds, but because we can often see that they are so by an analysis of our recollections. This analysis is sometimes an obvious and immediate appreciation, following close on the heels of the volition which it explains; sometimes it is the fruit of a laborious self-scrutiny; sometimes it is flashed upon us by some significant accident which, to use a trite phrase, holds up the mirror to our mind, and exhibits us to ourselves. Sermons on "self-deceit" proceed upon this fact. Dr. Newman develops it in an analysis of consciousness. Mr. John Stuart Mill makes it the foundation of his theory that men argue from particulars to particulars. And it is not merely in cases of subtlety or

importance that we are thrown on these instinctive volitions. Most men would admit that the majority of their practical judgments are formed with more or less of conclusiveness before the intellect has had time to analyze and look in the face the perceptions which led to them.

"I do not know what it was in his face that put me on my guard against him." "I do not know what it was that made me admire that picture." "I am afraid I was affected more than I was aware by a feeling of jealousy." "I can scarcely say why, but I always distrust projects of that kind."

Such phrases are familiar. And they show—what is not more wonderful than anything else—that the practical connection between sensation and volition is more rapid than that of specific cognition of motives, and therefore may, and often does, precede and even dispense with it. Nor is the reason far to seek. A motive or reason is almost always entangled with other concurrent and adverse motives or reasons, each obstructing our view of the other, yet, in the aggregate, pressing us in this or that direction. And the power of estimating these conflicting aggregates, and striking a balance between them (which constitutes a sound practical, or artistic judgment), is more prompt than that of distinguishing the pressure, and ascertaining what it is composed of (which is analytical talent).* This, I think, every one who reflects will feel to be true.

Again, an operative sensation may be unrecognized from the vividity with which it is gone, or succeeded by another overpowering sensation. In a life-and-death struggle—the execution of a musical passage, or any game which requires a succession of instantaneous decisions—men act with the most finished skill, without time to say to themselves, "Let me do this," or "This is so." The action of the sensitive nature which, on information received from without, determines the movements of our limbs, is immensely swifter than intellectual recognition. And the information is superseded by a fresh call on the attention before it has time to be recognized. Sometimes it is gone for ever, as when a player comes home from a foot-ball match full of bruises, but without a conception how he got them. But at other times the recollection can be unwound, as it were, and details, not at the time recognized, assert themselves as the operative motives of this that instinctive act. What this recollection tells us is, that our action was not the result of any senseless machinery, but of a mental power acting under the influence of sensation with a vividity that defied instant analysis.

I say, then, that it is gratuitous, and therefore philosophically

I wish I could lay my finger on a passage in Dr. Newman's writings, in which this is brought more vividly brought out.

unjustifiable, to invest molecular movement with any transcendental power, not appropriate to small bits of matter in motion, in order to account for actions which may be referred to natural and familiar causes—namely, to motives which were at the time unrecognized, because they either were confused with other motives, or passed too rapidly for analysis, or, in the moment of analysis, were superseded by some more powerful emotion.

And now the ground is tolerably clear for the case of the absent man, who does all sorts of things without apparently knowing what he is about, yet with a method in his ignorance which produces all the results of purpose. The case of this man is supposed to give credibility to the idea that sensation is not a necessary condition of "purposive action."

And here I first observe that man is confessedly endowed with two powers, which may be as incomprehensible as you like, but are not considered as involving any such incoherency of structure as requires that they should be justified or accounted for in order to be believed in. These are (1) the power of concentrating and distributing our attention, and (2) the power of acquiring habits.

(1.) Having, it would appear, a certain amount of attention at our command, we can direct it, in the main, to a particular object, leaving available for other purposes sometimes just as much, sometimes not quite so much, as those purposes require. It is an accomplishment, of a recognizable value, to be able to do or watch small things (sometimes several at a time) with such slight attention that the whole strength of our mind is left available for the greater matter that requires it.

(2.) And this is facilitated by the power of habit, which enables body or mind to do with ease, and therefore with slight attention, what it is accustomed to do. Hence the sensation and volition which dictate any particular act are liable to pass unobserved in proportion as the act is habitual or as the attention is intently directed to other objects. While mainly occupied with my own thoughts I can copy papers, read aloud, walk in a garden, or perform any other easy and habitual act requiring only a faint and uniform kind of attention. Dr. Carpenter mentions a case singularly illustrative (as viewed from the psychological quarter) of the subtlety of unconscious attention. It is difficult to imagine a voluntary process more simple than that of carrying a weight. In this case, if in any, one might suppose that, the will having issued its command, and the muscles being placed in position, the attention might be withdrawn. But it is not so. A mother, it seems, lost all feeling in her arm, without losing the power of directing it by her will. The remarkable consequence was that she could

not carry her baby without looking at it. And the explanation of this fact, which I develop from Dr. Carpenter, seems to have been that she had hitherto regulated the muscular effort necessary for the support of the child by attention applied through the muscular sense, a process which, by long habit, had become of course so easy that the attention was no longer a subject of specific consciousness. But this easy method being lost with the sense through which it was applied, she was thrown upon the sense of sight, which, till properly trained, could not be exerted without conscious effort. Thus the attention which had always been indispensable was brought clearly into view. Possibly after some time her eye would have acquired a rapidity of motion and sensitiveness to oblique impressions which would have enabled her to attend to her child as unconsciously through the sight as she had formerly done by the muscular sense.

Inattention is not insensibility, any more than drowsiness is sleep. It is a matter of degree, a thing which in its fainter forms can be recognized and remembered, so that, from what we observe when we notice it, we can in some degree measure its effects when we are not able to do so. When it amounts to what we call absence of mind—when a man absorbed in an argument unconsciously edges himself to the best place before the fire, or goes on writing till he is frozen—when he helps himself to a whole dish of early peas, or drinks a glass of vinegar—or when he threads the strand without apparently recognizing the passers-by whom he avoids—he can summon up no such recollection of what he has been doing, and we are left to conjecture the impulses under which he has acted by putting two and two together.

One more observation before I draw my conclusions.

Our recollection of any event depends—among other things—on the intensity and duration of our attention to it. If that attention is faint and momentary, the image vanishes soon; if very faint, it is gone almost instantly, unless it is as it were clenched by specific effort of the mind. Everybody must remember awaking with a fairly distinct impression of a dream, which is lost in a few seconds, unless he makes haste to realize and impress it on himself. What done, it takes its place among the facts which we have in store. So in reading aloud, or hearing a sermon, if our attention wanders and is recalled, we find in our mind the impression of the last few words which have been spoken—the memory of what immediately preceded having already passed beyond our recall. So, walking along in a fit of absence, we do not recognize that a friend or a strange-looking man is passing, till he has passed, when not the impression, but the recollection of it, wakes us up. If it does not so wake us up, it is gone. Sometimes this awakening is immediate, sometimes after a lapse of time.

"I can remember now each circumstance
Which then I scarce was conscious of; like words
That leave upon the still susceptible sense
A message undelivered, till the mind
Awakes to apprehensiveness and takes it."

I do not exactly adopt Sir Henry Taylor's analysis of this recollection. But a deeply reflective poet is an unimpeachable authority on the workings of the human mind.

The phenomena taken together come to this—that sensations which are dismissed with very slight attention as they pass are apt to take but a momentary hold on the memory, and, if they do not attract special notice, disappear, never to return again to the mind except under conditions which, as they do not affect the present argument, it is not necessary, were it possible, to analyze.

And now I apply all these considerations to the case of Mr. John Stuart Mill, as quoted by Dr. Carpenter. He started from home full of a thought, he found himself at the India Office full of the same thought—having in the meantime put one foot before the other some thousand times, having kept his balance, having avoided the persons who met him in a crowded street, having used discretion in getting over the crossings—but not having the slightest recollection of having done any one of these things, or, in fact, of any one thing which had happened to him between the two ends of his journey.

This is all that he can possibly say for himself—that he does not recollect; and from this negative evidence it is argued backwards, that what he did not recollect ten minutes or an hour after it took place was not perceptible to him at the time. It is inferred that he must be in possession of a mechanical apparatus capable, without the aid of sensation or attention, of causing him, till he arrived at the predetermined object of his walk, to guide his footsteps, keep his balance, avoid foot passengers, choose his moment at the crossings, walk up-stairs, hang up his hat, and sit down at his desk. I inquire whether this reasoning is valid.

I think I have shown (if, indeed, it is necessary to show) that the human mind can and constantly does receive and act on sensations, without that distinct recognition which is sometimes called "consciousness." This happens under a variety of conditions, but particularly when the attention is strongly directed towards one object, and away from others. The attention which still remains available for those others is apt in such cases to be reduced to the smallest amount which is necessary for effecting any predetermined operation. When the operation is one which habit has made immeasurably easy, this amount is immeasurably small; and when the attention to any sensation is immeasurably small, the hold of that sensation on the memory is immeasur-

ly faint. There is therefore no difficulty in supposing—or rather, it is perfectly natural and consonant with our experience to suppose—that by the side of a rival train of thought, even though not very absorbing, the impression made on the memory by the performance of an habitual operation, such as those of walking, copying, or reading aloud, &c., would, unless it was accidentally arrested, vanish as it was made, “like as a dream when one awaketh,” leaving on the memory of the walker or reader no trace of what had occurred. And if so, what is the negative evidence of memory worth? She is the only witness, and I bring her into the witness-box for cross-examination.

Question: Do you recollect any sensation of these walking and other operations?

Answer: I remember nothing of the kind.

Question: If any sensation had been present, do you think you could have forgotten it?

Answer: Nothing more probable.

Question: Then why do you say that sensation was absent?

Answer: I never said anything of the kind.

And, if this is so, what solid ground does this unconscious, or unrecognized, action afford for imposing upon atoms a mass of capacity so totally foreign to their nature as that of supplying place of contrivance?

ought, however, to deal specifically with the auxiliary forces brought into the field with no inconsiderable parade by Mr. Huxley. They consist of a frog and a French sergeant, to whose conduct, as it bears on this question, he ascribes considerable importance. And I begin with the frog.

I assume that the particular example is, in each case, but a specimen of a multitude of others, which Mr. Huxley might have brought into line if he had thought it worth while. On the other hand, I assume that they are *fair* specimens, and that, if they are not absolutely the strongest that might have been searched for, they adequately represent the strength of his argument.

Now, it seems that so far as anatomical experiment has at present been carried, sensation is found in man to be connected with the anterior lobe of the brain. “Hence,” says Mr. Huxley, “it is a highly probable conclusion that consciousness in man depends on the anterior division of the brain,” and “it is further highly probable” that what is true of man is true of other vertebrated animals.

We may assume, then, that in a living vertebrated animal any part of the body, the nerves of which are severed from this anterior lobe, cannot feel.”

But it is found that if, after such a severance, we apply to a

sensitive part of a frog an irritating fluid, he will scratch himself with the most convenient foot in the place of irritation; and if that foot is held down, he will scratch himself with the other. It follows, then, that "purposive actions" (like scratching) do not require sensation (like irritation) to induce their performance.

Now, first observe the style of reasoning.

1st premiss. "It is highly probable."

2nd premiss. "It is also highly probable."

Now, we all know that according to the doctrine of chances a deduction from two probabilities, whether high or low, will be considerably less than of the most probable of them taken alone. It is necessary, however, for Mr. Huxley's frog argument, to assume that his conclusion should be treated as something nearly absolute; and this accordingly he does. He flings away the measured tone of the man of science, "It is highly probable," and jumps to the dogmatic assertion which belongs to a partisan, "We may assume."

I parallel his argument.

Remove from a piquet pack the diamonds, and draw a card.

1. It is highly probable (in fact 2 to 1) that it will be a black card.

2. It is also highly probable (in fact 5 to 3) that it will not be a picture card.

Mr. Huxley's conclusion would be "*We may assume*" that it will be a non-picture card of spades or clubs—the fact being that the odds are 15 to 9 against its being so.

It is quite impossible to suppose that Mr. Huxley imagines that a fraction would become larger by being multiplied into another fraction. Yet this is the arithmetical expression of his philosophical argument. And this is not a mere carelessness of diction, but a substantial flaw, for though, no doubt, he might have strengthened one of his premisses, yet, taking them together, he could not make them support his conclusion without making them false, nor lighten his conclusion without making it inadequate for his purpose.

I will examine the argument otherwise. The philosopher's reason for supposing that connection with the anterior lobe of the brain is necessary to consciousness is, I presume, that it has been found, in a certain number of cases, that when that connection is severed, the phenomena usually held to imply consciousness cease. But then he comes to a fact, or set of facts, where the connection is severed, and the phenomena do *not* cease. The obvious conclusion is that as the induction breaks down in regard to the phenomena, so it cannot be relied on as to the facts which are deduced from the phenomena—in short, that in the frog at any

ate, the removed part of the brain is probably *not* indispensable to some degree of sensation; and this conclusion is strengthened in proportion to the number of similar cases of which the frog is specimen. Mr. Huxley gives no reason for rejecting this simple explanation of the anomaly, and till he does there seems no reason why we should hunt for any other.

Next, and finally, comes the French sergeant. This person, according to a very curious narrative, seems to have performed a variety of actions involving a high degree of purpose or contrivance, while in a state bearing some relation to somnambulism; and his case is described at great length in order to show the extent to which unconscious action may be carried. Mr. Huxley, however, concludes his case as follows:—

“As I have pointed out, it is impossible to prove that F. is absolutely conscious in his abnormal state, but it is no less impossible to prove the contrary.”

That Mr. Huxley should have been unaware of the effect of this omission on his argument, is to me absolutely inexplicable.

I proceed, as before, by way of parallel.

“Bishops and priests (or physiologists—we can take it either way) are self-sufficient and dogmatical. Look, for example, at the articles in the — newspaper. To be sure, I have no proof that these articles were written by a bishop (or physiologist), but neither have you any reason to suppose the contrary.”

Mr. Huxley might, with entire consistency, press this form of argument against ecclesiastics, but would he really admit its validity against men of science? And yet it is better than that which he himself relies upon. For, *ex hypothesi*, the actions attributed to the French sergeant *did* furnish a very strong reason to suppose him conscious.

I must fairly confess that, as one of his readers, I feel some sentiment at being forced to suppose that he thinks arguments of this kind good enough for me.

To sum up, the question is, what is the link which in brutes connects the action of the *sensory* with that of the *motor* nerves, so as to account for the infinite variety of phenomena which we usually interpret to indicate hope, fear, pleasure, pain, anger, love, cunning, and so on? The one answer is, that it is a sensitive nature; the other, that it is something else. On the one side, you have an infinite mass of the most complicated and subtle phenomena which it is possible to accumulate referred for their explanation to a cause which every man knows to exist in his own person better than he knows anything else in the world, which he knows to cause in himself the effects which he has to account for in other animals, and which never fails to supply all

that can be expected of it in the explanation of those effects. On the other hand, it is proposed—as far as I can make out, quite gratuitously—to refer these phenomena to some cause of which the nature and appropriateness are absolutely unknown, and of which the existence is only conjectured from the fact that some reason may be adduced for thinking that some of the phenomena which would naturally be referred to sensation as their cause (I mean, of course, as one in the chain of causes) have been produced without it. If this contrast of *pro* and *con.* is not enough, I really cannot imagine what is.

And now a few words on the confession of faith which appears towards the close of Mr. Huxley's paper:—

“We are,” he writes, “conscious automata, endowed with free-will in the only intelligible sense of this much-abused term, inasmuch as we are able, in many respects, to do as we like; but, nevertheless” (inasmuch as our likings are not really, at bottom, of our own making), “parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be—the sum of existence.”

This is perfectly intelligible. We may admire or abhor the picture of ourselves which is thus presented to us. But it is impossible to treat it with disrespect. It has, as Mr. Huxley says, been held by great thinkers, religious and anti-religious, and that on grounds which it is very difficult to dispose of. But his subsequent professions, I confess, puzzle me. “So,” he says, “if the view I have taken did really and logically lead to fatalism, materialism, and atheism, I should profess myself a fatalist, materialist, and atheist.” But this he declines to do, and he proceeds to explain why:—

“As I have endeavoured to explain on other occasions, I really have no claim to rank myself among fatalistic, materialistic, or atheistic philosophers” (nothing evidently turns on the introduction of the word “philosopher”); “not among fatalists, for I take the conception of necessity to have a logical, and not a physical foundation; not among materialists, for I am utterly incapable of conceiving the existence of matter if there is no mind in which to picture that existence; not among atheists, for the problem of the ultimate cause of existence is one which seems to me to be hopelessly out of reach of my poor powers. Of all the senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of those philosophers who undertake to tell us all about the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by the still greater absurdities of the philosophers who try to prove there is no God.”

Now, in the first place, it is surely true that whether the conception of necessity has a logical or a physical foundation, Mr. Huxley, in the passage we have first quoted, applies that conception to the domain of human action. If we are all of us automatic parts of his great and eternal chain of causes and effects, what element is wanting to bring us completely under the rule of an

evitable necessity? What is necessity but the inability to escape from the operation of causes external to yourself?

Next, granting that the idea of necessity has a logical foundation, why should that preclude a physical philosopher from proclaiming himself a necessitarian, if, like Mr. Huxley, he is one? Are they precluded from the use of logic? On the contrary, he declares himself prepared to profess any belief which logic requires of him. It cannot of course be said, and therefore I presume Mr. Huxley does not mean, that fatalism is a question of logic, except as most other questions are so. It is, like them, a question which must be decided in conformity with the laws of reasoning; but it is not a question *respecting* those laws. It is not part of the science of logic.

Next, Mr. Huxley cannot conceive the existence of matter, unless there is a mind in which to picture it. Of course, in one sense, this is unquestionable. If mind were annihilated, his own mind would follow the fate of the rest, and he individually would no longer be able to conceive matter or anything else. That is true; but that, of course, is not what he means. He means that the existence of matter without the existence of a picturing mind is inconceivable—or, to utilize a current phraseology, that the objective is, in this case, impossible without the subjective. It appears to him, not—or at least not only—that being is a necessary condition of feeling or being felt, but that being felt is a necessary condition of being.

Now, in the first place, this argument seems either unnecessary or inadequate. If mind is necessary for "picturing," then every man's own conscious power of picturing is a proof of mind, and the argument is unnecessary. But if mind is not necessary for picturing, then matter may be pictured on matter—the necessity of picturing does not involve the necessity of mind, and his argument is inconclusive.

But I must add that, to my own mind, his assumption seems as gratuitous as his argument is as unconvincing. For what possible ground of intuition, or experience, or ratiocination, is there for conjecturing that unpictured existence is impossible? Cannot Mr. Huxley, as a non-theistic philosopher, admit the possibility of an absolutely undiscovered island in the Pacific—of an island "unpictured" in the sensorium of man, beast, bird, fish, insect, or any other being spiritual or material—of an undiscovered planet—of an undiscovered sidereal system, so immense in proportion to our own that it may be called an undiscovered universe: so immense that, in fact, the pictured part of the universe is but a grain of sand compared with the unpictured? Can he not then conceive some convulsion by which, in this pictured part of the universe, animal life was for a time destroyed? I am speaking of

abstract possibilities, for it is into that region that I am inevitably led. I ask him, if he does not answer all these questions in the affirmative, when does he begin to answer them in the negative? If he does answer them all in the affirmative, what becomes of the principle that matter cannot possibly exist without being pictured? If it is abstractedly impossible for matter to exist without being pictured, how is it possible for matter in the concrete so to exist? How, for example, can the inside of the earth exist—or, for that matter, the inside of anything?


Of course, Mr. Huxley cannot say that everything must surely be pictured in some all-pervading mind, for this would plainly be "senseless babble," respecting a matter which "seems to him hopelessly out of the reach of his poor powers." What reasonable meaning, then, is to be imposed upon his words?

Lastly, most Christians will follow him in saying that "the problem of the ultimate cause of existence," whether efficient or final, cannot be solved by the human intellect; adding, however, as a corollary, that if there is an intelligent author and governor of the world, and if He desires His creatures to know anything of His own nature and disposition, it is indispensable that He should make a special revelation of it; particularly if it happens to affect their prospects of happiness in this or any other state of existence.

Not doubting the immense advantages which Mr. Huxley's physical researches have conferred upon science, I cannot but submit that, if I have succeeded in my direct object of establishing that the doubt whether animals feel is an idle doubt, I have incidentally shown some cause for questioning whether the authority of a great physiologist is as conclusive beyond his proper province as within it, and, indeed, whether the habit of minutely investigating what is intricate and obscure may not in some degree weaken the capacity for grasping what is obvious and indisputable.

BLANCHFORD.

[NOTE.—The foregoing paper was sent to us before the appearance of the article "On Animal Instinct" in the July number.—*Ed. Con. Rev.*]



THE POOR LAW:

A PROPOSAL FOR ITS ABOLITION.

FOR many years past, there has been a growing tendency to believe that the highly-vaunted perfection of the English Poor Law is not so real as the language which is used in its praise would seem to imply. Competent persons have long formed an opinion which is opposed to the spirit of that boast, so often heard, that in England no man need starve. But, although men of great eminence, both as speakers and writers, have turned their thoughts to the subject, their criticisms have been directed rather to the working of the Poor Law than to the Poor Law itself. No one has ventured seriously to discuss the principle upon which the Poor Laws of this country are founded. It has always been assumed that, into whatever evils the maladministration, or even the defects, of the existing laws may have led us, the principle on which those laws are built up is an indisputable one. The present writer trusts that he will not be considered presumptuous if he indicates some of the false lines of thought, as they appear to him to be, which characterize our Poor Laws.

I.

The Englishman's boast is, that no man need starve in this country. What is the principle on which this boast is founded?

Englishmen have inherited, with the Puritanism which still goes to make up a large part of the national character, a certain impulsive activity of conscience which often leads them into an

illogical position. This was the case on the occasion of the abolition of the slave trade; for, during the controversy preceding that event, every consideration of expediency and justice was set on one side in favour of the principle which formed the cry of the hour, that "the man who steps on British soil is free." The evils, indeed, consequent on the abolition of slavery were very small in comparison with the great advantages gained; but in the case of the cry that "no man need starve in England," the harm is great and unceasing.

When society makes a law by which every one of its members is protected against the consequences of his idleness or want of thrift, to whatever extent these may be pushed, a course is adopted exactly opposite to that which is pursued by Nature. Society in England says to the lazy and unthrifty, "If you do not care to work, you shall be supported by the State; you shall not, indeed, be provided with luxuries, but you shall have sufficient food and shelter; you need not fear that any serious task of work will be demanded of you; if, during your youth and manhood, you choose to labour, well and good, but it is not necessary for you to lay up a provision for sickness or old age; you can spend all your spare cash on beer, gin, and luxuries, because you will be provided for at the public charge, in decency and tolerable comfort, when you are no longer able to work!" Nature, on the other hand, says to man, in unmistakable language, "If you do not work, you shall die like a dog in a ditch." Is the method of Society, or that of Nature, more merciful?

Man is so constituted that he can dispense with no safeguard against danger, no aid to exertion, supplied to him by his Maker. The fear of death, of pain, of disease or of suffering in any form is no small incentive to continuous labour; and a man will exert every faculty in order to avoid these evils. The habit of mind which is cultivated by the ever-present necessity of exertion is as important to a man's life as a limb of his body is. What would be said of a system which deprived him of an arm, a leg, or an eye, and but very imperfectly provided him with a substitute? Yet the English Poor Law renders useless the habit of mind from which activity springs, thus performing an operation which is akin to the amputation of a limb or the gouging out of an eye.

To look at the matter from another point of view, it may be not unjustly asserted that it is presumptuous in a high degree to interfere with the remedy against sloth and unthrift which a wise Creator has provided. That remedy is to be found in the law by which the penalty of suffering and even death is the natural result of those faults. This law is so clearly promulgated by nature that even the members of the lower creation are perfectly able to

comprehend the principle on which it is founded, and to shape their habits in accordance with it. Society in this country ventures to declare that this natural law is pernicious to man, and proceeds to render it inoperative.

It may be urged in reply to this argument that, in the present complex state of society in which many interests are involved and the whole fabric is only kept erect by the mutual interdependence of the parts, the working of this law of nature could not be safely allowed to continue without some human contrivance by which its results should be kept in partial abeyance. There is, however, no solid argument to be found in favour of this view. Society is delicate, and does not desire to be shocked; or society wishes to be liberal, and will pay anything sooner than let people die of starvation; or society is patriotic, and desires that England should not be as other countries, in which men may legally die of hunger; in any case, the matter is one of feeling rather than of reason.

No circumstance will ever warrant the infraction of a natural law. Were the arguments in favour of our Poor Laws ten times as strong as they are, we ought to expect the failure which in fact we find to be the result of a broken law of nature. Can it be fairly said that our system succeeds? The object of the present paper is to show the effect of breaking a natural law by tracing out some of the evil results of our Poor Law system.

There is no reasonable doubt that in no other civilized part of the world are there so many deaths traceable to starvation as in this country. During the year 1872, 238 persons died of hunger in England, being fifty-five fewer than in the previous year. These statistics are based on the verdicts of coroners' juries, but they do not include a probably vast number of deaths accelerated by want. To what end then is the boast so often repeated, that starvation is provided against by law, if it is found that in fact very considerable numbers actually do starve, and that probably very many more suffer the severest pangs of hunger, although they do not actually and immediately die from the want of food?

A ready reply to these figures will be made by the assertion that these deaths and other results are to be traced to the mal-administration of the existing Poor Laws, which, in themselves, it will be said, are calculated to fulfil all the ends for which they were designed. Yet it would be difficult to devise a more complete system than the present one. There are occasional abuses, no doubt; but it must be remembered that the public are on the look-out for these, and that it is impossible to hush up, or hide away, any serious evil or any real scandal. The working of the Poor Law is entrusted to the best administrators that can be found. It is, no doubt, disappointing to find that so costly and elaborate a machinery as ours is incompetent to prevent a very considerable number of

deaths every year, and a certainly large, although imponderable, amount of suffering which only stops short of death. It would be satisfactory to be able to lay the fault of the break-down on the machinery; but this may not be done, for the fault is in the system itself. To say that the mechanism with which it is worked is defective is to ascribe another fault to the Poor Law; for it has at its disposal all those resources with which the system of local government is able to acquit itself fairly well in other departments.

It is not surprising to find that our artificial method of treating poverty is incapable of dealing with that class of case which needs the gentlest handling. In spite of the legal declaration that no man shall want bread, the general feeling of the country is that a certain amount of disgrace or discredit attaches to the recipient of public relief. This sentiment arises from the disapproval with which society naturally greets failure; and to sensitive persons the expression of public blame is so serious a matter as to make even death preferable. We thus have the remarkable spectacle of our Poor Law rejected by a considerable number of persons for whom it may be said to have been especially designed, whilst on the other hand it is made use of, to their own injury, by vast numbers who would be in every sense better men and better citizens without it. It is impossible to devise a system which should have such qualities of delicacy and adaptability to all circumstances as would make it fit to deal with every case which could arise.

Having dealt with the chief sin of omission of the Poor Law, it is an easier task to point out some of its many sins of commission. Before the passing of the new Act in 1834, it was an acknowledged principle that wages should be habitually supplemented by rates. That principle is no longer openly acted upon, but it is by no means given up. What is, indeed, a Poor Rate of any kind, but a rate in aid of wages? Before 1834, farmers deliberately underpaid their labourers with the intention of making up the deficiency at the parish pay-table. The present system has a precisely similar result, as we may see by taking an example of its working. It may fairly be assumed that the labourer's share of the produce of the soil is just so much as will suffice to keep him in health and strength, and enable him to lay by sufficient for the exigencies of sickness and old age. If he does not receive this amount, it is clear either that labour is in excess in his neighbourhood, and should be relieved by emigration or by being partially turned to other branches of industry, or that the owner of the land receives more than his fair share. It is an obvious injustice to assign to the owner any portion of the legitimate wages which may be fairly claimed by those who, whether as farmers or labourers, are engaged in tilling the soil.

the tendency of legislation has long been in the direction of recognizing the labourers' claim, and to this tendency we owe the establishment and gradual development of the Poor Law system. A considerable proportion of the sum of nearly eight millions expended last year in the direct relief of the poor in England and Wales was received by the agricultural class. But if their wages were not sufficiently high in that year, they ought to have received the additional amount in the form of wage, and not through the cumbrous and demoralizing medium of the Poor Law. If the conditions of existence are to be made endurable in this country, every man ought to be able to support himself and his family, provided always that he exercises prudence in the conduct of life, in decency and comfort, and to feel that he is guarded against those ordinary ills of sickness and old age which he is bound to expect. In the case of the agricultural labourer it is now generally acknowledged that the wages hitherto earned have not been sufficient to enable him to provide himself with the necessaries of life. The parish payable and the workhouse have been the means devised to make up the deficiency. The wages of the tillers of the soil have been only supplemented by a rate mainly raised from land.

Nor is the case of other working men different in any essential point from that which has been considered. If, on the one hand, people have a great dread of seeing starvation and misery, they have also, on the other, a great dislike of seeing the trade profits unjustly due, as they suppose, to their capital, diminished by so high a rate of wages as would make a Poor Law unnecessary. They prefer, on the whole, to be on the safe, if the unjust, side. It is easier to pay low wages, and to supplement them from the Poor Rates. There are certain industries, mostly connected with the iron and coal trades, which are generally quoted by persons who are ignorant of the state of most other classes of labourers, as showing that labour is universally paid as well as in those more highly valued trades. No one who is acquainted with the working classes in London and other large towns will fall into this error. Though the condition of the wage-earning class has enormously improved of late years, there is still a considerable amount of arrears to be made up. Even yet the conditions of life are very severe for large bodies of working men, so that they are obliged to look for other ways of providing for their necessities than to their own resources. The Poor Law naturally presents itself to their view; it is difficult to see in what other way the assistance they receive from that source can be regarded than as supplementing their wages.

Employers of labour may be shocked at the notion that poor relief enters in any way into their calculations when they are settling the amount of wages which they pay. Nevertheless, the connection between Poor Rates and wages is an intimate one.

Although it would be difficult to adduce figures in proof of the assertion, it may be stated that the rate of wages is proportionately higher (that is, higher in purchasing power) in France and the north of Italy, where no Poor Law exists, than in England. There is little doubt that the condition of the labouring class (excluding the highest skilled labour) is, on the whole, superior in those countries to that of the corresponding classes here. The French or Piedmontese employer of labour has only to consider the actual value of the labour which he proposes to hire; the English employer finds the question influenced by the fact that one of the necessities of the labourer's existence—namely, provision against sickness and old age, and even want of work at times—is provided from another source, to which he is himself obliged to contribute. Again, the labourers themselves must be actually, although in most cases insensibly, influenced by the same fact, and be thus induced to offer their services at a lower rate than that to which they are justly entitled. Nor are the lowest strata of working men alone affected in this way. The descent from the higher to the lower grades of the working classes is an easy one, and the distance from the highest to that which is in immediate contact with the working of the Poor Law is not very great: moreover, its influences reach up from the lowest into far higher grades of society than is generally supposed.

The next step is to trace the direct result of the English Poor Law on the working classes themselves. Some brief and easily comprehensible statistics which have appeared in recent reports of the Local Government Board are full of instruction on this subject. The following table shows the comparison of the expenditure for 1874 with that of the eight years immediately preceding:—

Parochial Years.	Expenditure for Relief of the Poor.	Increase or Decrease* on immediately preceding Year.	Increase or Decrease* per Cent.	Rate per Head on Population.	Increase or Decrease* of Rate per Head.
	£	£		s. d.	s. d.
1865-66	6,439,515	—	—	6 1½	—
1866-67	6,959,841	520,326	8·1	6 6½	0 5
1867-68	7,498,061	538,220	7·7	6 11½	0 5½
1868-69	7,673,100	175,039	2·3	7 0½	0 1½
1869-70	7,644,307	28,793*	0·4*	6 11½	0 1½*
1870-71	7,886,724	242,417	3·2	6 11½	0 0½*
1871-72	8,007,403	120,679	1·5	6 11½	0 0½
1872-73	7,692,169	315,234*	3·9*	6 7½	0 4½*
1873-74	7,664,957	27,212*	0·4*	6 6	0 1½*

Decrease marked with asterisk (*).

From this table it will be seen that during a period of great and growing prosperity the amount of money expended on the relief of the poor in England and Wales has swollen from 6s. 1½d. to 10s. 6d. per head on population, although a satisfactory decrease in 1872-74 is observable. If we go back to 1853, the contrast is still more striking, the rate per head being then only 5s. 4½d. During the period tabulated above both rates and wages have increased considerably. If there is any meaning in a Poor Law at all, surely both ought not to be high at the same moment. Employers of labour, whether agriculturists or manufacturers, cannot pay high poor rates and high wages too. The working classes have a claim upon capitalists, in the form of a mortgage upon the real property of the country, of which the *interest* amounts to the annual sum of nearly eight millions sterling. Some persons are perhaps inclined to believe that the favourable conditions under which land is owned in this country justify even so heavy a burden as this. Assuming that the owner of real property is in an exceptionally favourable position, it is hard to conceive a more clumsy expedient for bringing about a more equitable condition of affairs than the imposition of a huge Poor tax. The obviously best course would be to impose only such burdens on land and houses as should be agreed to be fair, and to foster the movement now in progress which is gradually but surely readjusting the scale of wages in all branches of industry.

Any reflecting person informed that the English law provided for unemployed, sick, and aged persons with the necessaries of life, would conclude that the English working classes would not waste their means in providing against those contingencies. And such, in fact, is the case. One person in about twenty-six is a pauper in England and Wales. It cannot be denied that the majority of those for whom the Poor Law was designed and is maintained know themselves only too apt to learn the lesson of unthrift which it teaches them. When wages were low, an artificial system was needed to supplement them; but the time is rapidly approaching when labour will receive its full remuneration. In many cases this point has been already fully reached, yet it is found that the demand for poor relief is, at best, not seriously diminishing. What is the only logical conclusion which we can draw, but that the wage-earning class is not realizing that their true welfare is to be found in thrift and self-continence? Let us suppose that the artificial prop of the Poor Law were removed. What would be the result? Working men would have to devote from a twentieth to a fifteenth part of their income, at the outside, to the formation of a fund which should be available in case of sickness, or when old age comes upon them. This could be done by means of the existing benefit societies, or others founded upon securer principles.

As it is they spend this amount on luxuries, and fall back on the Poor Law in their time of trial.

Hitherto only those points have been considered which relate to the moral effect produced upon the minds of the wage-earning classes by the existence of a Poor Law ; we now approach two of those practical results which spring directly from the state of mind created by those laws.

In the first place, there is no saving among the working classes. The traditional picture of the British tar of a century ago, whose eccentric extravagance has been the source of inexhaustible laughter for several generations, would be no unfitting representation of the more prosperous section of the British workmen of the present day. Much has indeed been done in the direction of thrift by the great Benefit Societies, but their action has been greatly checked by the fact that even the best of them is based upon statistics which do not command the confidence of those qualified to form an opinion of their stability. It is little to the credit of past Governments that slight legislative assistance has been afforded to the only great effort which has been made by the working men of England to raise themselves permanently above the influence of pauperism. The life of a collier, of a London journeyman tailor in the season, or even of an agricultural labourer in the best districts, is one of more or less lavish expenditure ; and the idea of joining a benefit society, much less of laying by money, but rarely enters the mind of these men. They have no object in doing so in this country. A man who succeeds by his own thrift in providing himself with a little income in case of sickness or old age, is no better off than the man who has led the life of a jovial British workman, and who, in his hour of need, draws from the parish pay-table in all probability about the same income which the other has denied himself many a luxury and enjoyment to procure. The advantage to a country of a large number of small hoards is almost incalculable, as the recent history of France clearly shows. It is not too much to say that the folly and extravagance of Imperialism plunged that country into misfortunes from which the thrift of the working classes extricated her. There are no such hoards in England. If we had an indemnity to pay, we should have to make a hard bargain with those capitalists in whose hands the wealth of the country is accumulating with geometric speed. Is there a single working man in England who holds consols ?

Again, a natural result of an artificial system of relief in sickness and pensions in old age is that early and improvident marriages are usual in England. The life of the working man is bolstered up in every direction by external supports. Is it strange that from the beginning he learns to rely upon them ? The popu-

tion thus increases at an inconvenient and unnatural rate. There are those who think that Malthus was a great enemy of his kind, because he proposed that men should not be allowed to increase and multiply without reference to the means of support which might be available for coming generations. Wise men are able, on the other hand, to see that the real sin against nature consists in an utter disregard of the future. At the present moment a great wave of prosperity is passing over the wage-earning class. Even the personal want of thrift exhibited by that class is a less evil than the fatal facility with which marriage is entered upon by the working classes. In a generation the labour market will again be overstocked, and the old cry of destitution and misery will once more pervade the land. If men and women had no Poor Law to fall back upon, it is reasonable to suppose that they would not set at defiance, so completely as they now do, the economic laws which govern the supply of labour.

Unless there is some serious flaw in the argument, it is difficult to conceive a much stronger case than that which has been brought forward. It has been shown that a great natural law is broken, and that certain evil consequences are the result of the infraction. We now proceed to consider such means as are at our disposal by way of remedy.

II.

The present time is an appropriate one for the revision of our Poor Laws, because the universal rise in the rate of wages throughout England makes such a revision not only possible but just. As long as wages remained below their fair rate, it is clear that the Poor Law, by supplementing them, had a reason for existence. It would have been very unfair to withdraw a support to which the working classes had long been accustomed, one minute before the time when labour was receiving its full rights. That period, which is generally believed, has now, in most cases, arrived; there can, therefore, hardly be any injustice in expecting that labour, having received its rights, should perform its duties.

If, then, wages are now at, or approaching, their normal height, and if the previous arguments are just, there is no place for a Poor Law such as ours is, and its repeal should be contemplated.

The real difficulty lies in the impossibility of suddenly rooting out a plant of such vigour and long growth as that law. Nor is it denied that there would be real injustice in any hasty reverse of the present system. Those families whose names appear as paupers in some of our parish books, without a single break, from the days of Queen Elizabeth to those of Queen Victoria, have a prescriptive right to our consideration. As we have pauperized these and a large section of the nation, so we must depauperize them. It

does not appear that there would be any insuperable difficulty in a gradual demolition of the present Poor Law fabric. For instance, after due notice, out-door relief might be abolished; there is little doubt that this, as it would be the most righteous, would also be the most fatal blow which could be aimed against the whole system. By degrees even the workhouses might be closed, as the nation became more and more alive to the necessity of leaving to individuals the duty which nature has evidently devolved upon them of providing for their own necessities.

But it will be said that, in what is thus put forward, there is no provision made for that large class of suffering humanity which endures want by no fault of its own, and must always exist to the end of time. The reply to that observation is, that in voluntary effort is to be found the true remedy for unavoidable wretchedness. We do not hear of misery at all equal to that which prevails in this country, in our colonies, in the United States, in Italy, in France, in none of which countries a Poor Law like ours exists. What voluntary effort can effect is seen in the case of the London hospitals, which supply 1,200,000 persons, out of a population of less than four millions, with medical assistance. We might rather fear that aid would be carried to an extreme in general, as it undoubtedly is in medical relief, if the poor were left to voluntary charity. Fortunately the great work which is being done by the Society for the Organization of Charitable Relief gives us some guarantee that the matter would be approached in an intelligent spirit. By the abolition of the Poor Law, the great point would be gained that no man would be able to *calculate* on assistance. That pregnant evil would at least be done away with. And if, under the new system, a few deaths still annually occurred from starvation—it is impossible to believe there would be as many as there are now—at any rate, the right persons would pay the penalty. Those who die of starvation now are those persons of timid nature who shrink from revealing their misfortunes to the public gaze, and from encountering the rough machinery of a Poor Law. Under a system similar to that of the French *Société de Bienfaisance*, such cases would be treated with the greatest promptness and delicacy. The idle tramp, who now flaunts his laziness in the very face of society, would be the sufferer, as he ought to be, as long as he persisted in his idleness.

Moreover, if a system of voluntary effort were adopted, the grace of charity would become a reality. Under a Poor Law there ought to be no room for such charity as relieves temporal distress. That is the task which the Poor Law sets before itself, and with more or less efficiency performs. It is surely absurd to spend vast sums in the establishment of a public system of relief,

and then to supplement it by an irregular habit of giving without rule or discrimination. It is impossible that the two systems can work together; and, in fact, it is found that the main difficulty of the Charity Organization Society is to produce anything like harmony between them.

Charity is the highest religious act of which humanity is capable. Those who are afraid that voluntary effort would leave the work of the many to be done by the few, should be reminded that the work of relief is the privilege, as well as the duty, of the human kind. But experience seems to point in the opposite direction. If a good case is put before an average Englishman, there is no doubt that his purse-strings are easily loosened. Can the payment of a Poor Rate be called charity? Certainly not, if it is the means by which we are compelled to pauperize our fellow-men. It would be a very different thing if we were called upon voluntarily to provide means to be expended wisely and systematically upon proved cases of distress.

The reader may, perhaps, suppose that it is proposed to restore the work of charitable relief to the clergy. This is not so. The sacerdotal class of no religious body ought to be employed on such a task. The Christian Apostles set apart a body of laymen for that work, expressly that they might themselves be kept free for their own legitimate occupation. But they did not dissociate the idea of charity from that of religion. The true relation of the two seems to be happily caught up in the institution known as Hospital Sunday; it is hard to see why this principle should not be applied as a substitute for our present system. The difficulties in the way of altering our present compulsory method of meeting Pauperism into a voluntary system of charitable relief would be undoubtedly enormous. It might be even objected that the change would leave matters nearly as they are, on the ground that the Poor Laws virtually form a system of charitable relief. In some respects this might be true, but the main evil in our present method would be removed when no man could any longer be able to calculate on external help, and would thus learn to lean only on his own resources. The compulsory system has grown with the nation's growth, and the task of rooting it up, and substituting a better one for it, would undoubtedly be gigantic. But if it can be shown that it never has, and never can, bear satisfactory fruit, England ought not to shrink from the undertaking.

W. WALTER EDWARDS.



ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF MORALS.

A DISCUSSION.

I.

[The crude essay which here follows is allowed to see the light rather as a text for the remarks to which it has given rise than for its own sake. It was written as a means of seeking for more light, and in that respect has succeeded. Some remarks of Mr. Darwin's ("Descent of Man," part i. ch. 3) appeared to me to constitute a method of dealing with ethical problems, bearing a close analogy to the methods which have been successful in all other practical questions, but differing somewhat in principle from the theories which are at present in vogue, while in its results it coincides with the highest and healthiest practical instincts of this and of all times. All that is attempted here is to show roughly what account is given by this method of some of the fundamental conceptions—right and wrong, conscience, responsibility—and to indicate the nature of the standard which must guide their application. Exact definitions are not to be looked for; they come as the last product of a completed theory, and are sure to be wrong at an early stage of science. But though we may be unable to define fully what right is, we do, I think, arrive at principles which show us very clearly many things which it is *not*; and these conclusions are not only of great practical importance, but theoretically bear close analogy to the steps by which complete definition has been attained in the exact sciences.]

BY Morals or Ethic I mean the doctrine of a special kind of pleasure or displeasure which is felt by the human mind in contemplating certain courses of conduct, whereby they are felt to be *right* or *wrong*, and of a special desire to do the right things and avoid the wrong ones. The pleasure or displeasure is commonly called the moral sense; the corresponding desire might

are called the moral appetite. These are facts, existing in the consciousness of every man who need be considered in this discussion, and sufficiently marked out by these names; they need no further definition. In the same way the sense of taste is a feeling of pleasure or displeasure in things savoury or unsavoury, and is associated with a desire for the one and a repulsion from the other. We must assume that everybody knows what these words mean; the feelings they describe may be analyzed or accounted for, but they cannot be more exactly defined as feelings.

The maxims of ethic are recommendations or commands of the form, "Do this particular thing because it is right," or "Avoid this particular thing because it is wrong." They express the immediate desire to do the right thing for itself, not for the sake of anything else: on this account the mood of them is called the categorical imperative. The particular things commanded or forbidden by such maxims depend upon the character of the individual in whose mind they arise. There is a certain general agreement in the ethical code of persons belonging to the same race at a given time, but considerable variations in different races and times. To the question "What is right?" can therefore only be answered in the first instance, "That which pleases your moral sense." But may be further asked "What is generally thought right?" and the reply will specify the ethic of a particular race and period. But the ethical code of an individual, like the standard of taste, may be modified by habit and education; and accordingly the question may be asked, "How shall I order my moral desires so as to be able to satisfy them most completely and continuously? What *ought* I to feel to be right?" The answer to this question must be sought in the study of the conditions under which the moral sense was produced and is preserved; in other words, in the study of its functions as a property of the human organism. The maxims derived from this study may be called maxims of abstract or absolute right; they are not absolutely universal, eternal and immutable," but they are independent of the individual, and practically universal for the present condition of the human species.

I mean by Science the application of experience to new circumstances, by aid of an order of nature which has been observed in the past, on the assumption that such order will continue in the future. The simplest use of experience as a guide to action is probably not even conscious; it is the association, by continually repeated selection, of certain actions with certain circumstances, as in the unconsciously acquired craft of the maker of flint implements. I still call this science, although it is only a beginning; because the physiological process is a type of what takes place in all later stages. The next step may be expressed in the form of a

hypothetical maxim,—“If you want to make brass, melt your copper along with this bluestone.” To a maxim of this sort it may always be replied, “I do not want to make brass, and so I shall not do as you tell me.” This reply is anticipated in the final form of science, when it is expressed as a statement or proposition: brass is an alloy of copper and zinc, and calamine is zinc carbonate. Belief in a general statement is an artifice of our mental constitution, whereby infinitely various sensations and groups of sensations are brought into connection with infinitely various actions and groups of actions. On the phenomenal side there corresponds a certain cerebral structure, by which various combinations of disturbances in the sensor tract are made to lead to the appropriate combinations of disturbances in the motor tract. The important point is that science, though apparently transformed into pure knowledge, has yet never lost its character of being a *craft*; and that it is not the knowledge itself which can rightly be called science, but a special way of getting and of using knowledge. Namely, science is the getting of knowledge from experience on the assumption of uniformity in nature, and the use of such knowledge to guide the actions of men. And the most abstract statements or propositions in science are to be regarded as bundles of hypothetical maxims packed into a portable shape and size. Every scientific fact is a short-hand expression for a vast number of practical directions: if you want so-and-so, do so-and-so.

If with this meaning of the word “Science,” there is such a thing as a scientific basis of Morals, it must be true that,—

- 1, The maxims of Ethic are hypothetical maxims,
- 2, derived from experience,
- 3, on the assumption of uniformity in nature.

These propositions I shall now endeavour to prove; and, in conclusion, I shall indicate the direction in which we may look for those general statements of fact whose organization will complete the likeness of ethical and physical science.

THE TRIBAL SELF.*

In the metaphysical sense, the word “self” is taken to mean the conscious subject, *das Ich*, the whole stream of feelings which make up a consciousness regarded as bound together by association and memory. But, in the more common and more restricted ethical sense, what we call *self* is a selected aggregate of feelings and of objects related to them which hangs together as a conception by virtue

* This conception of an Extended Self I found many years ago that I had in common with my friend Mr. Macmillan. Since then I have heard and read in many places expressions of it more or less distinct.

long and repeated association. My self does not include all my feelings, because I habitually separate off some of them, say they do not properly belong to me, and treat them as my enemies. On the other hand, it does in general include my body regarded as an object, because of the feelings which occur simultaneously with events which affect it. My foot is certainly part of myself, because it gets hurt when anybody treads on it. When we desire anything for its somewhat remote consequences, it is not common for these to be represented to the mind in the form of the actual feelings of pleasure which are ultimately to flow from the satisfaction of the desire; instead of this, they are replaced by a symbolic conception which represents the thing desired as doing good to the complex abstraction *self*. This abstraction serves thus to support and hold together those complex and remote motives which make up by the greater part of the life of the intelligent races. When a thing is desired for no immediate pleasure that it can bring, it is generally desired on account of a certain symbolic substitute for pleasure, the feeling that this thing is suitable to the self. And, in many like cases, this feeling, which at first derived its pleasurable nature from the faintly represented simple pleasures of which it was a symbol, ceases after a time to recall them, and becomes a simple pleasure itself. In this way the self becomes a sort of centre, about which our remoter motives revolve, and to which they always have regard; in virtue of which, moreover, they become immediate and simple, from having been complex and remote.

If we consider now the simpler races of mankind, we shall find not only that immediate desires play a far larger part in their lives, and so that the conception of self is less used and less developed, but also that it is less definite and more wide. The savage is not only hurt when anybody treads on his foot, but when anybody treads on his tribe. He may lose his hut, and his life, and his opportunities of getting food. In this way the tribe becomes naturally included in that conception of self which renders remote desires possible by making them immediate. The actual pains or pleasures which come from the woe or weal of the tribe, and which were the source of this conception, drop out of consciousness and are remembered no more; the symbol which has replaced them becomes a centre and goal of immediate desires, powerful enough in many cases to override the strongest suggestions of individual pleasure or pain.

Here a helping cause comes in. The tribe, *quâ* tribe, has to exist, and it can only exist by aid of such an organic artifice as the conception of the tribal self in the minds of its members. Hence the natural selection of those races in which this conception is the most powerful and most habitually predominant as a motive

over immediate desires. To such an extent has this proceeded, that we may fairly doubt whether the selfhood of the tribe is not earlier in point of development than that of the individual. In the process of time it becomes a matter of hereditary transmission, and is thus fixed as a specific character in the constitution of social man. With the settlement of countries, and the aggregation of tribes into nations, it takes a wider and more abstract form; and, in the highest natures, the tribal self is incarnate in nothing less than humanity. Short of these heights, it places itself in the family and in the city. I shall call that quality or disposition of man which consists in the supremacy of the family or tribal self as a mark of reference for motives, by its old name *piety*. And I have now to consider certain feelings and conceptions to which the existence of piety must necessarily give rise.

Before going further, however, it will be advisable to fix as precisely as may be the sense of the words just used. Self, then, in the ethical sense, is a conception in the mind of the individual which serves as a peg on which remote desires are hung and by which they are rendered immediate. The individual self is such a peg for the hanging of remote desires which affect the individual only. The tribal self is a conception in the mind of the individual which serves as a peg on which those remote desires are hung which were implanted in him by the needs of the tribe as a tribe. We must carefully distinguish the tribal self from society, or the "common consciousness;" it is something in the mind of each individual man which binds together his gregarious instincts.

The word *tribe* is here used to mean a group of that size which in the circumstances considered is selected for survival or destruction as a group. Self-regarding excellences are brought out by the natural selection of individuals; the tribal self is developed by the natural selection of groups. The size of these groups must vary at different times; and the extent of the tribal self must vary accordingly.

APPROBATION AND CONSCIENCE.

The tribe has to exist. Such tribes as saw no necessity for it have ceased to live. To exist, it must encourage piety; and there is a method which lies ready to hand.

We do not like a man whose character is such that we may reasonably expect injuries from him. This dislike of a man on account of his character is a more complex feeling than the mere dislike of separate injuries. A cat likes your hand, and your lap, and the food you give her; but I do not think she has any conception of *you*.* A dog, however, may like *you* even when you

* Present company always excepted: I fully believe in the personal and disinterested affection of my cat.

thrash him, though he does not like the thrashing. Now, such likes and dislikes may be felt by the tribal self. If a man does anything generally regarded as good for the tribe, my tribal self may say, in the first place, "I like that thing that you have done." By such common approbation of individual acts the influence of piety as a motive becomes defined; and natural selection will, in the long-run, preserve those tribes which have approved the right things; namely, those things which at that time give the tribe an advantage in the struggle for existence. But, in the second place, a man may as a rule and constantly, being actuated by piety, do good things for the tribe; and in that case the tribal self will say I like *you*. The feeling expressed by this statement on the part of any individual, "In the name of the tribe, I like you," is what I call *approbation*. It is the feeling produced in pious individuals by that sort of character which seems to them beneficial to the community.

Now, suppose that a man has done something obviously harmful to the community. Either some immediate desire, or his individual self, has for once proved stronger than the tribal self. When the tribal self wakes up, the man says, "In the name of the tribe, I do not like this thing that I, as an individual, have done." This self-judgment in the name of the tribe is called Conscience. If the man goes further and draws from this act and others an inference about his own character, he may say, "In the name of the tribe, I do not like my individual self." This is remorse. Mr. Darwin has well pointed out that immediate desires are in general strong but of short duration, and cannot be adequately represented to the mind after they have passed; while the social forces, though less violent, have a steady and continuous action.

In a mind sufficiently developed to distinguish the individual from the tribal self, conscience is thus a necessary result of the existence of piety; it is ready to hand as a means for its increase. But to account for the existence of piety and conscience in the elementary form which we have hitherto considered, is by no means to account for the present moral nature of man. We shall be led many steps in that direction if we consider the way in which society has used these feelings of the individual as a means for its own preservation.

RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY.

A like or a dislike is one thing; the expression of it is another. It is attached to the feeling by links of association; and when this association has been selectively modified by experience, whether consciously or unconsciously, the expression serves a *purpose* of retaining or repeating the thing liked, and of removing the thing disliked. Such a purpose is served by the expression of

tribal approbation or disapprobation, however little it may be the conscious end of such expression to any individual. It is necessary to the tribe that the pious character should be encouraged and preserved, the impious character discouraged and removed. The process is of two kinds; direct and reflex. In the direct process the tribal dislike of the offender is precisely similar to the dislike of a noxious beast; and it expresses itself in his speedy removal. But in the reflex process we find the first trace of that singular and wonderful judgment by analogy which ascribes to other men a consciousness similar to our own. If the process were a conscious one, it perhaps might be described in this way: the tribal self says, "Put yourself in this man's place; he also is pious, but he has offended, and that proves that he is not pious enough. Still, he has some conscience, and the expression of your tribal dislike to his character, awakening his conscience, will tend to change him and make him more pious." But the process is not a conscious one; the social craft or art of living together is learned by the tribe and not by the individual, and the purpose of improving men's characters is provided for by complex social arrangements long before it has been conceived by any conscious mind. The tribal self learns to approve certain expressions of tribal liking or disliking; the actions whose open approval is liked by the tribal self are called right actions, and those whose open disapproval is liked are called wrong actions. The corresponding characters are called good or bad, virtuous or vicious.

This introduces a further complication into the conscience. Self-judgment in the name of the tribe becomes associated with very definite and material judgment by the tribe itself. On the one hand, this undoubtedly strengthens the motive-power of conscience in an enormous degree. On the other hand, it tends to guide the decisions of conscience; and since the expression of public approval or disapproval is made in general by means of some organized machinery of government, it becomes possible for conscience to be knowingly directed by the wise or misdirected by the wicked, instead of being driven along the right path by the slow selective process of experience. Now, right actions are not those which are publicly approved, but those whose public approbation a well-instructed tribal self would like. Still, it is impossible to avoid the guiding influence of expressed approbation on the great mass of the people; and in those cases where the machinery of government is approximately a means of expressing the true public conscience, that influence becomes a most powerful help to improvement.

Let us note now the very important difference between the direct and the reflex process. To clear a man away as a noxious beast, and to punish him for doing wrong, these are two very

different things. The purpose in the first case is merely to get rid of a nuisance; the purpose in the second case is to improve the character either of the man himself or of those who will observe this public expression of disapprobation. The offence of which the man has been guilty leads to an inference about his character, and it is supposed that the community may contain other persons whose characters are similar to his, or tend to become so. It has been found that the expression of public disapprobation tends to awake the conscience of such people and to improve their characters. If the improvement of the man himself is aimed at, it is assumed that he has a conscience which can be worked upon and made to deter him from similar offences in the future.

The word *purpose* has here been used in a sense to which it is perhaps worth while to call attention. Adaptation of means to an end may be produced in two ways that we at present know of; by the processes of natural selection, and by the agency of an intelligence in which an image or idea of the end preceded the use of the means. In both cases the existence of the adaptation is accounted for by the necessity or utility of the end. It seems to be convenient to use the word *purpose* as meaning generally the end to which certain means are adapted, both in these two cases, and in any other that may hereafter become known, provided only that the adaptation is accounted for by the necessity or utility of the end. And there seems no objection to the use of the phrase "final cause" in this wider sense, if it is to be kept at all. The word "design" might then be kept for the special case of adaptation by an intelligence. And we may then say that since the process of natural selection has been understood, *purpose* has ceased to suggest *design* to instructed people, except in cases where the agency of man is independently probable.

When a man can be punished for doing wrong with approval of the tribal self, he is said to be *responsible*. Responsibility implies two things:—(1) The act was a product of the man's character and of the circumstances, and his character may to a certain extent be inferred from the act; (2) The man had a conscience which might have been so worked upon as to prevent his doing the act. Unless the first condition be fulfilled, we cannot reasonably take any action at all in regard to the man, but only in regard to the offence. In the cases of crimes of violence, for example, we might carry a six-shooter to protect ourselves against similar possibilities, but unless the fact of a man's having once committed a murder made it probable that he would do the like again, it would clearly be absurd and unreasonable to lynch the man. That is to say, we assume a uniformity of connection between character and actions, infer a man's character from his

past actions, and endeavour to provide against his future actions either by destroying him or by changing his character. I think it will be found that in all those cases where we not only deal with the offence but treat it with moral reprobation, we imply the existence of a conscience which might have been worked upon to improve the character. Why, for example, do we not regard a lunatic as responsible? Because we are in possession of information about his character derived not only from his one offence but from other facts, whereby we know that even if he had a conscience left, his mind is so diseased that it is impossible by moral reprobation alone to change his character so that it may be subsequently relied upon. With his cure from disease and the restored validity of this condition, responsibility returns. There are, of course, cases in which an irresponsible person is punished as if he were responsible, *pour encourager les autres* who are responsible. The question of the right or wrong of this procedure is the question of its average effect on the character of men at any particular time.

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE.

May we now say that the maxims of Ethic are hypothetical maxims? I think we may, and that in showing why we shall explain the apparent difference between them and other maxims belonging to an early stage of science. In the first place, ethical maxims are learned by the tribe and not by the individual. Those tribes have on the whole survived, in which conscience approved such actions as tended to the improvement of men's characters as citizens and therefore to the survival of the tribe. Hence it is that the moral sense of the individual, though founded on the experience of the tribe, is purely intuitive; conscience gives no reasons. Notwithstanding this, the ethical maxims are presented to us as conditional: if you want to live together in this complicated way, your ways must be straight and not crooked, you must seek the truth and love no lie. Suppose we answer, "I don't want to live together with other men in this complicated way; and so I shall not do as you tell me." That is not the end of the matter, as it might be with other scientific precepts. For obvious reasons it is *right* in this case to reply, "Then in the name of my people I do not like you," and to express this dislike by appropriate methods. And the offender, being descended from a social race, is unable to escape his conscience, the voice of his tribal self, which says, "In the name of the tribe, I hate myself for this treason that I have done."

There are two reasons, then, why ethical maxims appear to be unconditional. First, they are acquired from experience not directly but by tribal selection, and therefore in the mind of the

individual they do not rest upon the true reasons for them. Secondly, although they are conditional, the absence of the condition in one born of a social race is rightly visited by moral reprobation.

ETHICS ARE BASED ON UNIFORMITY.

I have already observed that to deal with men as a means of influencing their actions implies that these actions are a product of character and circumstances; and that moral reprobation and responsibility cannot exist unless we assume the efficacy of certain special means of influencing character. It is not necessary to point out that such considerations necessarily involve that uniformity of nature which underlies the possibility of even unconscious adaptations to experience, of language, and of general conceptions and statements. It may be asked, "Are you quite sure that these observed uniformities between motive and action, between character and motive, between social influence and change of character, are absolutely exact in the form you state them, or indeed that there are exact laws of any form? May there not be very slight divergences from exact laws, which will allow of the action of an 'uncaused will,' or of the interference of some 'extramundane force?'" I am sure I do not know. But this I do know: that our sense of right and wrong is derived from such order as we can observe, and not from such a spruce of disorder as we may fancifully conjecture; and that to whatever extent a divergence from exactness became sensible, to that extent it would destroy the most wide-spread and worthy of the acquisitions of mankind.

THE FINAL STANDARD.

By these views we are led to conclusions partly negative, partly positive; of which, as might be expected, the negative are the most definite.

First, then, ethic is a matter of the tribe or community, and therefore there are no "self-regarding virtues." The qualities of courage, prudence, &c., can only be *rightly* encouraged in so far as they are shown to conduce to the efficiency of a citizen; that is, in so far as they cease to be self-regarding. The duty of private judgment, of searching after truth, the sacredness of belief which ought not to be misused on unproved statements, follow only on showing of the enormous importance to society of a true knowledge of things. And any diversion of conscience from its sole allegiance to the community is condemned *à priori* in the very nature of right and wrong.

Next, the end of ethic is not the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Your happiness is of no use to the community, except in so far as it tends to make you a more efficient citizen—that is to say, happiness is not to be desired for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. If any end is pointed to, it is the end of increased efficiency in each man's special work, as well as in the social functions which are common to all. A man must strive to be a better citizen, a better workman, a better son, husband, or father. *Farvi migliori; questo ha da essere lo scopo della vostra vita.**

Again, Piety is not Altruism. It is not the doing good to others as others, but the service of the community by a member of it, who loses in that service the consciousness that he is anything different from the community.

The social organism, like the individual, may be healthy or diseased. Health and disease are very difficult things to define accurately; but for practical purposes, there are certain states about which no mistake can be made. When we have even a very imperfect catalogue and description of states that are clearly and certainly diseases, we may form a rough preliminary definition of health by saying that it means the absence of all these states. Now, the health of society involves, among other things, that right is done by the individuals composing it. And certain social diseases consist in wrong direction of the conscience. Hence the determination of abstract right depends on the study of healthy and diseased states of society. How much light can be got for this end from the historical records we possess? A very great deal, if, as I believe, for ethical purposes the nature of man and of society may be taken as approximately constant during the few thousand years of which we have distinct records.

W. K. CLIFFORD.

* Mazzini, Doveri dell' Uomo.

II.

I PROPOSE in this paper to attempt the practical application in a single instance of certain theories of human life and morals recently set forth with much weight of authority. I shall, in the first place, state the conditions of the problem to be solved, in their simplest and most elementary form; and in the next place, the respective theories by the help of which I propose to attempt its solution.

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

Given an old woman afflicted with incurable cancer—certain to die, say, in twelve months from the present date—and meanwhile unable from poverty to obtain proper nursing, medical alleviation of her sufferings, or even the means of sustaining existence, without the aid of others, while I, on the other hand, am able to supply all her wants in these respects.

Given, further, the following conditions:—

A. That there is nothing *supernatural* in either of us,—i.e., nothing in which our nature essentially differs from that of any other known animal,—our differences from other animals being purely anatomical, as, for instance, that she and I are possessed of thumbs, of great toes of a peculiar shape, of hippocampus majors in our brains, and of certain useless intestinal appendages, by virtue of which we claim to be superior animals, but animals merely.

B. That there is nothing supernatural outside of us,—i.e., that there is no being distinct from us who has created us, and whose relation to each of us as creator might be for us the ground of certain relations and mutual obligations, or who could have given us either information or direction as to these relations and obligations, or as to any design of our being, by accordance with or

discordance from which the moral qualities of our dealings with each other might be tested.

The question arises,—What, under these conditions, is my duty towards that old woman, and what is the duty of the State towards us both as regards Hospitals for Incurables?

I have obviously before me the proverbial three courses. I may—

- (1) Provide her with medical and other comforts for the remainder of her days; or I may
- (2) Leave her alone; or I may
- (3) Terminate her existence.

I may comfort, neglect, or kill her. Which of these three courses ought I to take? If this question were to be decided on the ground of authority only, I should probably choose the second of these courses, which has in its favour the example of the great majority of mankind in all ages. But inasmuch as each of the other two courses has in its favour the example of considerable minorities of mankind, and as the third has not only the prestige of great antiquity, but the presumption in its favour of a power of survival which has preserved it to the present day, the argument from authority, powerful as it is in questions of morals, cannot here be regarded as conclusive. It cannot, I think, be pressed farther than to show that no one of these three courses can be regarded as inhuman or unnatural.

We must have recourse to other bases of morals in order to decide which of these courses is the right one to follow.

THREE BASES OF MORALS.

Of these bases of morals there are three, by the help of each of which I would propose to consider in this case the proper course of action.

These are—

1. The Mechanical. 2. The Utilitarian. 3. The Perfectionist.

Let us take each of these in their order.

According to the first of these, if I understand it rightly, all of us, both men and brutes, are conscious automata—machines, that is to say (though improperly so called, inasmuch as a machine implies a mechanist), machines all whose actions are *mechanically* necessary,—the inevitable and involuntary result of certain mechanical agitations in our brains, accompanied by, but in no way whatever caused by, certain sensations, one of which we call volition, but which volition has nothing to do with the genesis of our actions, and is itself as mechanically and as necessarily generated by circumstances wholly beyond our choice or control as they are.

On this theory I confess myself utterly unable to see anything save the absolute moral indifference of these three courses of action. I feel myself necessarily impelled by the molecular agitations which logic produces in my brain to say that there can be no moral responsibility attaching to the mechanically necessary movements of machines, the consciousness which accompanies these movements being as mechanical and as necessary as the movements themselves.

If I were to drive a knife into the heart of this supposed old woman, no one would dream of blaming the knife for its share in that transaction, it being not only an involuntary, but an unconscious agent. If a stronger being than myself were to fasten a knife in my hand and drive it, against my will, into her heart, no one would dream of blaming me for my share in that transaction, —I being, though not an unconscious, yet an involuntary agent.

If my consent or will happen to go with that act of the stronger being, or if I perform the act myself—the consent or the action being in this case as completely beyond my control and as purely mechanical and necessary as the motion of my hand in the former case—I cannot see how, in this case, I am one whit more morally responsible than my arm in the second, or than the knife in the first case.

Nay, there is even a secondary and improper sense in which we might blame the knife, and in which we cannot blame the man. We might say of the knife, if it did its work bluntly and ineffectually, that it was a bad knife; but we should say this because we regarded the knife as a machine, whose maker designed it for a particular end, viz., sharp cutting, and therefore in a metaphorical and analogical sense, we might say of the knife which failed to answer the design of its maker that it was a bad knife. But it is clear that we could not say this of any human being, unless we suppose him to have had a maker and to be made with a design. Any application, therefore, of moral epithets to human actions should be carefully eschewed by those who reject the idea of a designer of humanity, inasmuch as they certainly tend to foster this idea.

I know that I am warned against these conclusions by high authority as savouring of "logic," of which I am told I am to "beware,"—a warning which seems to me, however, as reasonable and as hopeful as that of the driver of a train who, having driven it to the edge of a precipice, should jump off as it was going over, with the warning to the passengers,—*"Beware of steam!"* Logic is as real a fact as steam. Once on the two grooves of the Major and Minor of a syllogism, we must go on whither they lead us, in spite of all the warnings of the man who has laid down the rails and got up the steam.

Admitting, however, for argument's sake, the moral quality of mechanically necessary actions, there is much to be said in favour of the third of these three courses. Undoubtedly, if we had in like case to deal with one of those animals which we are pleased to call inferior, we should not hesitate to shoot it, either in order to put it out of its misery, or to save ourselves the cost of keeping it, or the pain of witnessing its agonies. Now, assuming that this old woman is simply an animal, and no more, I fail to see how the fact that she is a superior animal should give her any exemption from the fate of an incurably diseased horse or dog. I can see no more sacredness, on this theory, in the one form of life than in the other. The assertion that there is seems to me fraught with dangerous and even (if I may use the word "moral" in this context) immoral consequences. For if the superior animal, simply because it is superior, may rightfully kill the inferior animal, I cannot see why a very superior man may not rightfully kill a very inferior man, supposing in both cases, of course, sufficient reason of convenience or comfort to the superior were to call for this killing,—as, for instance, why Babbage and Leech might not rightly have killed the organ-grinders who were killing them; or why a Sir Isaac Newton might not rightfully kill a Crétin between whom and Sir Isaac there would probably be less difference than between the Crétin and an intelligent dog.

And if it be alleged that human nature revolts against the idea of destroying diseased and repulsive human beings for our own convenience and comfort, or even to relieve them from misery, and that therefore such an action, if not immoral, is at any rate unnatural and odious; we must remember that human nature, or what we practically mean by that term—namely, our English human nature—has for many centuries been under the influence of certain beliefs as to the sacredness of human life—which, if they are ever dispelled by pure science, might leave a human nature by no means so averse to the killing of human beings as ours now in most cases happens to be.

There are, however, certain considerations of enlightened self-interest which tend, I admit, rather in the direction either of leaving this old woman alone, or even of placing her in a Hospital for Incurables. It may be urged that the knowledge of the best means of alleviating incurable disease acquired in such a Hospital might prove useful to ourselves; and also that the principle that one human animal may, for its own greater convenience or comfort, kill an inferior human animal, might, if generally acted on by inconsiderate or ignorant persons, have unpleasant consequences for ourselves. To the former of these pleas, however, it may be replied, that it might, after all, be better for ourselves, that if incurably diseased, we should be painlessly extinguished, than

that we should be alleviated. As regards the latter of these, it might be urged that, at any rate, it could not apply to the extinction of diseased lives, under proper precautions and with due solemnities, by the State.

On the whole, therefore—on this mechanical theory of human life—I incline to the opinion that if there be any morality in the case, the balance is rather in favour of the extinction than of the preservation of the incurably diseased life; if not by the individual, yet at least by the State. I do not think, however, that on this theory we should be justified in pronouncing either of the two other courses to be immoral.

THE UTILITARIAN THEORY.

Let us, in the next place, try this question on the Utilitarian or “greatest happiness of the greatest number” theory, and as this theory is confessedly too difficult of application to be a guide for the actions of individuals, I shall test by it my second question,—whether the State should allow of Hospitals for Incurables.

I confess, however, to a serious practical difficulty in the way of applying this theory to any actions whatsoever. It gives us no definition of what is this “greatest number” whose happiness is to be aimed at. Is this the greatest number of sentient beings, no matter of what kind or quality, or is it the greatest number of human beings? If the former, then undoubtedly the State ought to extinguish all cancerous old women, inasmuch as the number of sentient beings who would find happiness in devouring them after death would be incalculably greater than the number of persons so extinguished, even if we add to this the small number of persons who now find their happiness in ministering to their wants. On the same principle, we may observe that the resistance of a tribe of Africans to the locusts who find their “greatest happiness” in eating green crops would be decidedly immoral. If, on the other hand, we limit the right of “greatest happiness” to human beings, we can only do so on the principle that the right to happiness depends, not on the *number*, but on the *quality*, of the sentient beings concerned,—men, for instance, because they are men, *i.e.*, higher animals, being more entitled to be happy than locusts.

But this limitation is obviously fatal to the “greatest number” theory, inasmuch as it proceeds on the exactly opposite principle, that a lesser number of superior beings, and therefore of superior human beings, have a better right to be happy than a greater number of inferior ones, a theory which we know was long insisted on in defence of the enslaving of black men by white ones.

Assuming, however, that this greatest happiness is the right of

the superior members of the human race, and that the State should aim at this, it may be questioned whether this is not merely a roundabout way of saying that the State should aim at making good men happy; and if so, the answer to the question whether the State, on this principle, should allow of Hospitals for Incurables depends on ascertaining whether their existence gives happiness to good men. But inasmuch as, if these Hospitals are not good or right institutions, good men ought not to approve of them, we get here into the vicious circle of testing the goodness of an institution by the goodness of the persons who take pleasure in it, and then of testing the goodness of these persons by the goodness of the institution that makes them happy.

Assuming, however, this "greatest happiness of the greatest number" to mean that of the greatest number of human beings simply, it seems to me clear that Hospitals for Incurables should be suppressed by the State, as decidedly immoral institutions. For obviously, on this theory, the quantity of happiness for humanity is limited, and a good Government is therefore bound to sacrifice the happiness of the lesser to that of the greater number of its subjects. But if happiness be a limited quantity, so also must be many of its factors, *e.g.*, wealth, comfort, leisure, amusement, cheerfulness, gaiety, and the like. Clearly, therefore, all diseased, helpless, and repulsive forms of existence detract from the general stock of human happiness,—indirectly by contributing nothing to it, directly by withdrawing from it the wealth, leisure, cheerfulness, or gaiety which otherwise would go into the general stock of happiness. All such existences are injurious to the State, they are the *bouches inutiles* in the great siege which humanity sustains against misery, and should be dealt with accordingly. Indeed, they may even be reckoned among the *classes dangereuses*. An old woman with a cancerous diathesis is as truly, though not perhaps as seriously, inconvenient to the State as an old woman with a murderous diathesis. The molecular constitution of each is socially mischievous, and though it be true that the murderous constitution is more dangerous than the cancerous, yet, on the other hand, the former is presumably curable, and may be treated by appropriate remedies,—the latter, being incurable, can only be dealt with effectually by extinction. These arguments for the extinction of incurably diseased lives by the State are strengthened considerably by those which have lately been urged in favour of suicide.

It is argued, with much plausibility, that it is the duty of those whose lives are hopelessly burdensome to themselves and to others to relieve themselves and society of this burden by self-extinction. Clearly, therefore, to assist such persons in prolonging their lives, is immorally to aid and abet others in an immoral neglect of duty. It is only carrying this principle one step further, to say that the

State should at least forbid such aid, as being socially mischievous, even if it do not go the length of requiring such persons to do their duty to themselves and their families, or if they fail to do it, of doing it for them.

It may, however, be urged, on the other hand, that such a course of action on the part of the State might tend to produce a hard and uncompassionate temper of society, and that as compassion is undoubtedly an emotion of great social utility, such a proceeding would be contrary to sound Utilitarian principles. The answer, however, is obvious. The *emotion* of compassion is undoubtedly of high social utility. But the indiscriminate *gratification* of that emotion is undoubtedly most mischievous to society, while the restraint of its exercise to proper objects no more tends to weaken the emotion itself than the narrowing of a stream tends to make it shallow. Once let it be clearly understood that incurably diseased paupers are not proper objects for the exercise of compassion, and the prolongation of their lives will excite, in all properly regulated minds, the same indignation that is now excited by indiscriminate almsgiving,—an indignation which is felt, as we know, by persons of the most warm and active benevolence.

There is, I admit, one fatal objection to the whole of this argument, namely, that it assumes the moral right of the greatest number to be happy, and that this again assumes the moral right of any one individual to be happy, and that this again assumes, as its only possible basis, that argument from design which modern science so decidedly rejects. This objection, however, lies outside the scope of this paper, which only pretends to apply—and not to discuss—the theories with which it deals.

THE PERFECTIONIST THEORY.

Lastly, we may apply to this question the theory of a Scientific basis of morals set forth in Professor Clifford's paper. On this theory, the ultimate standard of morals is not utility, but perfection, society, we are told, tending naturally and inevitably towards this perfection by the development of an ideal tribal self, whose office it is to inform and guide the conscience of the individual self, whose "piety" consists in willingness to submit to these revelations of the tribal self, and who, if he "impiously" resist them, may be "dealt with by appropriate methods" on the part of the tribe. In attempting any practical application of this theory, we encounter, as it seems to me, two serious practical difficulties.

First, this theory supplies no definition of that "perfection" which is its ultimate standard of morals. Does this perfection, or does it not, include the idea of morality? If it does, then we are

at once involved—in deciding any practical question of morals—in the vicious circle of first making tribal perfection a test of morality, and then of making morality a test of tribal perfection. Clearly, if we must know what morality is in order to define perfection, the knowledge of perfection can be no great help to us in defining morality. To call that a basis of morals of which morality is a part is equivalent to saying that morality rests on morality, a basis which seems to me to lack the rigorous exactness which we expect from science. If, on the other hand, the definition of perfection exclude the idea of morality, then we are thrown back on that Utilitarian theory for which this has been proposed as a substitute.

Secondly, this standard of morals fails us exactly at the point where we most need it, namely, where there arises a conflict of moral judgment between the individual and the ideal tribal self; such, for instance, as might conceivably arise between a tribal self and the diseased pauper whom, in obedience to the supposed dictates of this ideal self, the tribe was about to immolate. In every such case it is clear that it is a fallacy to speak of the moral judgment of the majority as that of the tribal self. For it is clear that the opinion of the individual who dissents from that judgment is a part of that very ideal tribal self that is to judge, the tribal self being nothing but the sum of the individual selves of which it is composed. The judgment, therefore, of the majority of a tribe is not necessarily that of the tribal self, but only of a part of that self; and therefore, as the tribal self in this case cannot possibly be proved to have spoken, I fail to see the “impiety” on the part of the individual in resisting the judgment.

It is true that society may deal with the individual in that case “by appropriate methods,” *i.e.*, may hang or imprison him; but unless might make right, or unless majorities are infallible, and therefore individual reformers always impious, it does not follow that society is right in doing so. My difficulty (in one sentence) is, that whenever society and I differ, I cannot possibly be sure that I have got that judgment of the tribal self which should inform my conscience. Further, the individual may, I think, fairly allege that as society is, on this theory, not perfect, but only tending to perfection, he may, for aught he knows to the contrary, be advancing that perfection by indulging to the fullest extent his own propensities, whatever these may be—certain that in the end the strongest propensities, and therefore, on this theory, the best, will prevail, by a process of natural selection.

On this theory, therefore, I confess myself quite unable to say anything respecting the morality or immorality of Hospitals for Incurables, or, indeed, of anything else. All that I can say is, that if there be any “ought” in the case, it is that each person ought

to do as forcibly as he can whatever he feels the strongest impulse to do, satisfied that thus he is best contributing his share to the ultimate perfection of the ideal tribal self.

SUMMARY.

To sum up, therefore, the result of the attempt to apply to the case of Hospitals for Incurables the Mechanical, the Utilitarian, and the Perfectionist theories of life and morals: According to the first of these, such hospitals most probably ought not; according to the second, they certainly ought not, to be supported by individuals or tolerated by the State; according to the third, we ought each of us to please himself, and, when the State has come to an absolutely unanimous judgment on the matter, we or our posterity shall know who was right.

Hospitals for Incurables, and all other works of pure mercy and compassion to our fellow-men, can, I fear, be logically justified only on the assumption that the conditions I assumed for my problem are not correct; that there may be something supernatural in man, something essentially different from all qualities of all other animals—which cannot be ascertained by comparative anatomy, or brought under the rule of merely physical laws; and also that there may be, without and apart from man, a Supernatural Author of his existence, out of whose relations to him arise certain relations of all men to each other, which make the real and essential difference between nations of men and herds of brutes; and that from this Being man may have derived those rights to live and to be happy which it seems so difficult to establish on any scientific basis: nay, that He may even have given to man some information as to the existence of these facts and of these rights which might be more useful to him than the external revelations of the tribal self—that is to say, that there may be a supernatural revelation of a basis * of morals suited to a supernatural creature.

P. C. W.

* By "basis of morals" I do not mean any supernaturally revealed moral precepts. A moral precept can never be the basis of the morality which it inculcates. I mean by this expression, a supernatural revelation of *facts* in our own nature or in our relation to other beings, which may modify our conception of *duties* as regards these.

III.

THOUGH I do not presume to interpose in the principal combat waged by the learned Professor and P. C. W., I take the opportunity afforded me of saying a few words upon the paper of the latter, which propounds, I think, a new and dangerous claim. The argument of P. C. W., and it is his central position in the discussion, amounts to this: there can be no morality but one which is based on the design of the Creator of man. He insists that no one has any right to use the words "good" or "bad" of man, "unless we suppose him to have had a maker and to be made with a design." But this is to push the theory of final causes further than it has yet been carried, and to make morality the simple servant of theology.

Merely to *suppose* that the man has a maker, and was made with a design, would be to very little purpose, unless we knew *what the design was*, and how the design is to be carried out by the thing or being made. A savage, for instance (and moral problems must open, as do games of chess with a pawn, by advancing the convenient savage),—the savage finds a watch. How decide if it be a good watch? If the savage is a disciple of Dr. W. Paley, he will rightly argue that the watch had a maker, and this maker a design. But before he can say if it be a "good" or a "bad" watch, he must be instructed in its purpose and uses, or he will know no more about it than if he took it to be a curious stone.

In the same way, to apply P. C. W.'s argument, before we can pronounce the man to be "good" or "bad," we must know not only that the man had a creator, and the creator a design, but we must know precisely *what the design is*, and some one in the maker's confidence must instruct us how his work is to be used. Otherwise, simply to *suppose* that the maker of man had a design, is only to say that every man can form any opinion he pleases.

What precisely is the design on which man was created, and how he may rightly work out that design, is the very question about which all theologies and all religions, and certainly, not the least, all Christian theologians most vehemently contend. Thus, to tell us that there can be no morality but one based on the design of creation, is to adjourn any chance of agreement in morality, and even the commencement of moral truth, until Theology has settled all its controversies, and Revelation has disposed of every criticism. Our sense of right and wrong, conduct and precept, become corollaries of Divinity; they must wait the issue at stake between Professor Lightfoot and the author of "Supernatural Religion." If the Bible be an authentic and genuine revelation, we have indeed that precise and direct account of the design with which man was made. But until this distinct revelation of the Creator's design is established beyond dispute, and for all who do not accept it literally and completely, every man will conceive the design according to his temper and habits. To the cannibal, the final cause of man will be to eat his neighbour joyfully, until he be himself eaten peacefully. The red-skin will insist that man was created to take and furnish scalps, the Dahomian to celebrate and support "grand customs," and the Nubian to fill slave-markets. As of old, it will be always, *quot homines, tot Dei*; and the designs of these creators will be differently conceived by each tribe. A late ex-Chancellor was once heard to say, after a visit to the Zoological Gardens, that so great a multiplicity of created beings forcibly impressed him with the conviction of a similar multiplicity of creators. So, if we put aside a full and direct Revelation of the design, the past and present races of the world have given so many different answers to the question—what is the purpose of man? that it is plain mankind have attributed to the supposed creator an infinite diversity of designs, if they have not conceived an infinite variety of designers.

What is called Natural Theology, and even that which may be called the substratum of all theologies, are really of no use for the purpose of deciding if a man or an action be "good" or "bad." Vague assumptions that there is a Creator, that his purpose was benevolent, that man has relations to things, beings, or a being outside of himself—all these fall short of what is required. They will not enable us to build up any morality, much less to solve such questions of casuistry as the State support of incurable paupers. A basis of morals must determine the entire current of moral teaching; and it must be, like the axioms of geometry, universal, precise, and indisputable. If all morality is to depend on the question, how far does it conform to the design with which man was created? we must have that design ever before us, defined in all its breadth and its precision. This we can only get from

a specific revelation. Natural Theology and the light of Nature give the most opposite conclusions. If we do not mean, by the argument from the design of the Creator, the precise rules of life laid down in the Bible or by the Church, we really mean that every man is to call that "good" which is right in his own eyes; and accordingly the moral scheme of P. C. W. would not differ from that of any heathen moralist, for the "design," and the "Creator," would be used by each reasoner as a dialectic hypothesis, to be modified at will.

It is surely a dangerous ground to take up, thus to insist that there can be no "basis of morals" apart from theology, for this means, as we have seen, apart from some specific presentation by revelation; and if there can be no basis of morals, there can be no coherent morality, and if so, no settled sense of right and wrong, virtue and conduct, except such as comes hap-hazard, or by momentary impulse. Of all the systems affecting the practical problems of life, the moral code is perhaps the one on which there is the greatest agreement, and theology the one on which there is the least. And to insist that we cannot decide if any action be "good" or "bad," until we have a knowledge of the designs of the Creator—nay, that we may not use the very terms "good" and "bad," is to reverse the order in which man has proceeded, and to expose human conduct to prolonged uncertainty. It has always been seen that morality preceded theology, and was earlier fixed and accepted; the design of Providence was a deduction, in fact, from what men thought right, and God was an impersonation of their ideas of "good." It will be a perilous change to tell men that they must call nothing "good" or "bad," until the contending Churches have finally settled on some one way, in which "to justify the ways of God to man." When Churches tell the world that men may not apply moral epithets to human actions, save in language of some theological scheme, men are very likely to grow indifferent to moral judgment altogether, without advancing any nearer to the particular theological scheme.

My purpose is simply to draw attention to the new, as I think, and alarming doctrine, that no man may use the terms "good" or "bad," except in so far as he claims a knowledge of the design of a Creator; and I shall therefore abstain from comment on one or two matters in the same ingenious paper, in which I think metaphors may be found disguised in the uniform of arguments. But it is worthy of notice that the mode in which the condition A is stated virtually excludes the obvious answer. It is assumed "that there is nothing supernatural in either [if any] of us—i.e., nothing in which our nature essentially differs from that of any other known animal—our differences from other animals being purely anatomical," &c. &c. Here the sentence introduced by *i.e.*

is certainly not the equivalent of the former. Those who decline to assert any knowledge of anything supernatural in man are far from asserting that there is nothing in which our nature essentially differs from that of any other known animal. It is difficult to see how the one proposition can be assumed for the other; nay, it is difficult to see any connection between the two propositions. All orders of reasoners, however much they disclaim belief in the supernatural, would agree in acknowledging many things in which men essentially differ from brutes, and many differences not at all anatomical. The differences which separate men from brutes are infinite capacities of intellectual, moral, and practical life—powers of developing thought, religion, sentiment, art, and industry, which other animals have not. It may fairly be said that they who disclaim any supernatural superiority for man are they who best see, and who set most store by, man's natural superiority to the brutes, and who least think of these differences as anatomical rather than as social, moral, and spiritual. To tell those who disclaim any knowledge of the supernatural that they regard man as a mere brute, is an ancient reproach, but a novel argument. It has been used by the controversialists of many religions, but it does not often appear now in philosophical discussion. To the devotee of Brahminism, they who deny his doctrines degrade man to the level of the brute. And the Fuegian whom the missionary implored not to kill and eat his decrepit mother replied that, unless he did so, he should sink to the level of the dogs.

The truth is, that the attempt to limit the basis of morals to the design of creation is entirely needless. All the purposes it serves are easily fulfilled by a simpler condition. Very many schools of moralists will be ready to admit that the true basis of morals may be found in the end which most befits human nature. If we find man, as a fact, best adapted to live in a certain way, we can take that as a test of how man should live, without dogmatizing about the design of creation. For the purpose of supplying a basis of morals, it comes to precisely the same thing, whether we say that human nature is adapted to a certain life, or that it was designed by a particular maker to follow that life. The correspondence between man's capacities and a given moral life is just as complete in one case as in the other; and to encumber this fact with controversies as to its origin, is to raise needless difficulties. One class of reasoners believe that natural development has slowly adapted man to the particular life; another insist that man was created with this particular design; and a third are content to believe that he is so adapted as a fact, and they decline to set up any specific doctrine of creation, or any formal theory of evolution. All three schools will perfectly agree that, as a fact, it is better for man to live in the same way, and they have, in fact, the same

basis of morals. Nothing, therefore, can be more entirely gratuitous, or more certainly dangerous, than to convert a plain question of Moral Philosophy into a subordinate doctrine of Theology.


What, if we are to give names, we may call the functional basis of morals, will really satisfy all conditions, and it practically embraces almost all theories. Human nature, when investigated, proves to be of a certain kind, and capable of certain works. It has tried all kinds of lives, but the sort of life at which it is best to aim is that where its nature is most harmoniously developed, where there is the least waste of power by conflict, and the greatest sustained result. Ages, races, and individuals may differ, more or less, as to what life exactly fills these conditions, but all will agree (it is the basis, and almost all the result of ancient philosophy) that the object of man, *ought* to be to develop his nature most completely. That is to say, the basis of morals is to be found by determining the *function* of human nature. What in the foregoing discussion are called the Mechanical and the Perfectionist bases of morals, are only modes of explaining how this function of human nature came into existence, a question with which I am in no way concerned. The function, *i.e.*, the proper action of the human organism, is a thing to be determined by observation and reflection, and can be determined, and has been determined, by very various methods of reasoning in very much the same way. There is little more to be said, since Aristotle showed, at the outset of philosophy, that the *good* of man and the *happiness* of man may be used interchangeably, and both follow from observing and determining the proper *work* of man.

The ultimate consequences of finding the grounds of duty by observing the capabilities of human nature are, accordingly, almost exactly the same as those of finding them in the supposed designs of a Creator. Both say:—This is right, because man is adapted to this. The latter theory only adds the gratuitous and unprovable assertion that man has been adapted to it by a Being who created him with that design. And whilst nothing is gained to morality by this further explanation, everything is risked, by the mind being constantly invited to leave the ground of rational observation for that of arbitrary hypothesis. He who bases duty on observed capacities of mankind has every advantage possessed by him who bases it on the design of creation. He will, moreover, be kept in the sphere of reality; whilst the Duty of the other will be merely his own imaginations. The doctrine of *function* is intelligible science; that of *design* is mere theosophy. The designs of the Creator being limited only by the powers of fancy of the theorist, the theorist has to endow himself with a real power of omniscience, and to rehearse creation itself in his imagination, every time that he attempts to solve a moral problem. It is a

curious example of this, that in the case of the cancerous pauper discussed by P. C. W., it is impossible to solve the problem on the theory of design, without first deciding the somewhat formidable question, what is the design of cancer?

As I should approach the problem itself on a moral basis almost identical with that of P. C. W., theological substratum apart, it is not singular if I come to almost identical conclusions. I should look with equal horror both upon desertion and assassination as modes of treating incurable paupers, and I should look on relief and charity as equally a sacred duty. I should do so because I find the rule, To Love one another, written in man's nature; because every man, by the laws of social existence, is the neighbour of every other man, and because the succour of the helpless is the plainest of social duties. Society would be convulsed unless mercy, tenderness, compassion, and self-sacrifice were impressed upon it daily and hourly by system, unless every violation of the duty to practise these virtues were visited by the public horror of brutality. Every virtue and every grace which private or public life has ever displayed under the teaching of any religion can be really shown to be the following out of man's true nature; and, indeed, they have never had any other source or inspiration. The plain dictates of duty, and the ground of obligation for morality, may equally be found in watching human nature in all its varieties and the vast history of its development; and they stand on a footing far surer than our hesitating interpretation of what we call Revelation, or the vague hypotheses of Natural Theology. The Religion of Fictions may rest assured that a Religion of Science, in whatever form presented, will be lacking neither in the graces, consolations, nor sanctions of a religion. In its own way, it will have its Revelation, its Future, its External Power, and its common Brotherhood; and each of these will be all the more real and the more sustaining in that they will be natural, and not supernatural.

FREDERIC HARRISON.



REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS TO "LITERATURE AND DOGMA."

CONCLUSION.

WE might go through the Fourth Gospel chapter by chapter, and endeavour to assign to each and all of the *logia* in it their right character—to determine what in them is probably Jesus, and what is the combining, repeating, and expanding Greek editor. But this would be foreign to our object. We seek, not to produce a complete work of ingenious criticism on the Bible, or on any one document in it, but to help readers, sick of popular and conventional theology, and resolved to take the Bible for nothing but what it really is, to help them to see what the Bible really is, and how very much, seen as it really is, it concerns them. So we sought to show that the Old Testament is really a majestic homage to the grandeur of righteousness, or conduct, and a sublime witness to its necessity; while the New Testament is really an incomparable elucidation by Jesus Christ of what righteousness in fact and in truth is. And there can be no question that books of which this is the real character do concern men vitally. So, again, we seek to show that of Jesus Christ's incomparable elucidation of what righteousness is, many important elements are really to be found in the Fourth Gospel. In that case it urgently concerns people to study the Fourth Gospel, instead of throwing it aside as a Gnostic forgery, crammed with "the arid mysticism of the schools of Alexandria." But to lead men to study it, and to clear out of their way objections which might for ever prevent their studying it, is our aim; when we have accomplished this, we have accomplished as much as we intend.

But to restore perfectly the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is impossible. The data are insufficient, and the alteration, often important though perhaps verbally slight, which his sayings have undergone from the pressure of other minds upon them, is too considerable. Our restoration must frequently be conjectural, and we may be wrong in our conjectures. We do not pretend that we could establish as clear and certain our criticism of every passage in the Fourth Gospel, supposing we were to go through it with our reader. And even if we could save him from one or two mistakes by not merely giving him the guiding ideas with which to read the Gospel for himself, but by going through it with him, our object is not to make as faultless a critic of him as possible, but to keep him in contact with a book which will do him good, and to make him study it for himself. If he thinks it spurious, he is not likely to study it; but we try to show him that it is full of genuine things, and to give him the guiding ideas by which to account for the things which made the charge of spuriousness seem plausible, and to extricate the things which are genuine.

Nor let this be esteemed a slight assistance, or the abandoning him to uncertainty. What is uncertain, what a reader may frequently not determine right, and what we might not determine right if we came to help him, is the occasion on which each particular *logion* was spoken and the connection to which it belongs. The main doubt as to the Gospel's genuineness arose from the occasion assigned and the connection given by our Evangelist to his stock of *logia*. Now, we show that his circumstances and literary procedure were such that the occasion and connection imposed by him on his *logia* are not to be trusted. We may be tempted to try and restore the right occasion and connection, and in this work there must necessarily be some uncertainty. But if we stop short of this, then by setting aside our Evangelist's combinations as untrustworthy we simply leave to the *logia* of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel—those of them which are not manifestly theological developments and exercitations by our lecturer—the character of maxim-like, isolated sayings, complete in themselves. Now, the teaching of Jesus, as of the nation and race to which he belonged, had in general this character. His deliverances were "concise utterances touching the things of concernment to the truth." And for practical use among Christians it is in this way—as maxims, detached sayings—that they are in fact generally employed; and it is when they are employed in this way that their practical usefulness is greatest. As single sayings the mind ruminates them, turns them over and over, feeds upon them. For a critical curiosity we may not yet have done enough, when we have established that instead of taking the sayings of Jesus in that connection wherein the Fourth Gospel places them, it is fa

safer to take them as detached sayings. But for the practical use of the contents of the Fourth Gospel we have by this means done very much.

Jesus, no doubt, did not in his discourse deliver sentences articulated in the Greek fashion one to another. He delivered sentences juxtaposed in the Semitic fashion one to another. Because in the Fourth Gospel his sentences are articulated in the Greek fashion, those sentences have been confidently pronounced not to be sayings of Jesus. But the *logion* of Jesus is there; and often, in order to get at it, we have only to drop the Greek editor's conjunctions. For instance; we will take the sayings which form the speech of Jesus at the end of the twelfth chapter, from the forty-fourth verse to the fiftieth. As a connected speech, Jesus did not deliver those sayings; our Evangelist has made them into one speech for him. But drop the conjunctions and the connecting clauses, and there is not a *logion* there to offend, singly, even a jealous criticism; there is not one which does not show the characteristic and satisfying mark of Jesus.

Our great point, then, as to the Fourth Gospel is this: the Evangelist is a combiner, not an inventor. It is his forms of connecting and articulating which obscure the gnomic character of the sayings of the Lord in this Gospel; get rid of those forms, and the gnomic and genuine character reappears. He had a number of *logia* to plant. He did not, he could not, know their true connection; and the connection he imposes on them is not to be depended upon. Often we, studying quietly his work as it lies before us complete, can perceive a better connection for certain *logia* than that which he has devised for them. Almost certainly, the last half of the fourteenth verse, and the first half of the fifteenth, in the tenth chapter, have their right place, not where we now read them, but in the twenty-seventh verse of the same chapter. The twenty-seventh verse should run: "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they know me, as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father; and they follow me." The thirtieth verse of the same chapter ("I and the Father are one") has almost certainly its true place, not where it stands, but side by side with the *logion* in the fourteenth chapter, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father,"* and in a similar connection. Almost certainly the fourteenth verse of the twentieth chapter, "He that receiveth whomsoever I send receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me," is misplaced where it stands, and should go with the *logia* of the sixteenth verse of the fifteenth chapter, the eighteenth verse of the seven-

* John xiv. 9.

teenth, and the twenty-first of the twentieth,* and in a similar connection. Almost certainly the four verses from the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth, in the fifteenth chapter, belong to a connection such as that in the eighth chapter, were said to the Jews not to the apostles, and are a mere unseasonable repetition put by our Evangelist into the mouth of Jesus, speaking to his disciples, of things which he had previously said to the Jews. But we can never be quite sure of finding the real original connection for any *logion* of this kind; the safe thing is to distrust our Evangelist's connection, and to take the *logia* singly. Even where they have a dramatic propriety and beauty as joined together by our Evangelist, it is often very questionable whether Jesus thus joined them, whether we are not more on the trace of Jesus when we take them singly. Nothing can well be finer or more impressive than the speech formed by the series of *logia*† attributed to Jesus after Andrew tells him of the Greeks desiring to see him. But it is highly improbable that Jesus did actually thus deliver these *logia* as a series, and in one speech, and on one occasion; although we may grant every *logion* in the series to be in itself authentic, and of the very highest value.

It is wonderful how the likelihood of our having as the substance of the Fourth Gospel genuine sayings of Jesus will be found to gain, and the unlikelihood of it to dwindle, the moment we come to disregard our Evangelist's combinations, and to suppress his repetitions and lecturings. Let us take the series of chapters against which so much of objection has been brought, the series from the twelfth chapter to the end of the seventeenth. They form almost one continuous speech, and most certainly they were not spoken as such. They contain, also, repetitions which Jesus, to judge from everything that we know of his manner, cannot have made, and some things which he cannot have said at all. It is easy to see this, and to reject the whole series of chapters as unauthentic. But a little attention will show us a number of primitive themes, or *nuclei*, on which our Evangelist is operating; and that these themes—to judge, again, from everything that we know of the manner of Jesus—have all the marks of being authentic. And we may with profit try to get back to what Jesus can have actually said; only we must be careful in attempting this to distinguish between what is really probable, and what can only be called plausible.

For example. The governing word of our series of chapters is certainly the word *ἀρᾶν*—*I go away*. And the chapters have their reason for existence, certainly, in a development by Jesus of

* "I have appointed you that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." "As thou sentest me into the world, so send I them into the world." "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you." † John xii. 23—26.

this governing word. And that development is: *συμφέρει ἵνα ἀρῶ**—*It is expedient that I depart.* And the form of this development is certainly twofold at least: *συμφέρει ἐμοί, συμφέρει ὑμῖν*—*It is expedient for me; It is expedient for you.* It is expedient for me, because I go to the Father.† It is expedient for you, because the Paraclete's coming to you depends on my going from you.‡ This, we say, seems certain; and to us it seems probable that there is also a third development given by Jesus to his *I go away*; and that this development is: *συμφέρει τῷ κόσμῳ*—*It is expedient to the world.* We find this third development in the words of Jesus: "Ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice; ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy. A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come; but as soon as she is delivered of the child she remembereth no more her anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world."§ Combined as our Evangelist combines them, these words appear to mean, no doubt, that the world, the wicked world, shall exult in the sufferings and death of Jesus; and so the commentators take them. But we cannot help thinking that, as Jesus spoke them, they were words to be classed with the texts: "I am come a light into the world, that whoso believeth on me should not abide in darkness;" "A light to lighten the Gentiles;" "Go ye and teach all nations;" "One flock, one shepherd."|| We believe that they really mean, not *The world shall exult at my death*, but *My death is good for the world as well as for you and me*; and that they are a third and admirable development given to the ground motive of our chapters, *ἰπάρω*. This we believe; and perhaps if we were in a professor's chair at Tübingen, we should say that we could and did demonstrate it. But being what we are, we say that it is not demonstrable, indeed, nor yet with such overwhelming probability in its favour as to seem certain;—the evidence is not such as to admit of its being either the one or the other. But we say that it is probable; and that it has so much to recommend it that we ourselves believe it.

That Jesus, however, uttered a great deal of what is attributed to him in the series of chapters from the twelfth to the seventeenth, that he gave the primitive themes which are the basis of them, that the combination of the themes is the Evangelist's, and that by the Evangelist Jesus is made to repeat himself over and over again, to connect things as he never connected them, and to say things which he never said, we regard as so probable that it becomes certain. For the primitive themes are in the characteristic manner of Jesus, and we do not

* John xvi. 7.

† John xiv. 28.

‡ John xvi. 7.

§ John xvi. 20, 21.

|| John xii. 46; Luke ii. 32; M tt. xxviii. 17; John x. 16.

see from whom else they can have proceeded; the combination, repetition and development of the themes is in the characteristic manner of the Evangelist. The governing word of the chapters, and one or two of their primitive themes, we have formerly mentioned. Besides these, which we showed to be the nucleus of sayings giving the true doctrine of Jesus himself about his resurrection, there is the parable of the heavenly house with its many mansions, a parable which is the Evangelist's authentic nucleus for unauthentic combinations and developments favourable to the popular doctrine of the resurrection.* There is the parable of the vine and the branches, illustrating that primitive theme of Jesus: *Abide in me and I in you.*† There are the new commandment, the promise of the Paraclete, the promise that the disciples' requests should be heard, the exhortation not to fear the world's hatred, the prayer for the disciples, the sayings of Jesus about his glory, the sayings about his relation to the Father. All of these have their primitive theme or themes; all of them are connected, introduced and re-introduced, and more or less developed by our Evangelist. Now, if the reader simply takes all the sayings belonging to each theme, and puts them together, he will do what is very conducive both to a right enjoyment of the series of chapters, and to a right criticism of them. On the one hand, he will bring out the beauty and significance of the genuine sayings of Jesus; on the other, he will bring out how much is repetition, serving to introduce our Evangelist's developments. We should like our reader to distribute under the heads or themes indicated all the sayings for each, and then to judge them for himself. We will, however, taking one or two themes not hitherto touched by us, show him how true it is that by the process we recommend both objects are served: the right enjoyment of our Evangelist's materials, and the right criticism of them.

First, as to the enjoyment of what our Evangelist has, in these chapters, saved for us. We will simply put together the scattered *logia* about the new commandment, making the subject begin where it naturally does begin, with the sayings of Jesus after he has washed the disciples' feet at the last supper. "Know ye what I have done unto you? Ye call me Master and Lord, and ye say well, for so I am. If I then, your Master and Lord, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example that ye also should do as I have done to you. Verily I say unto you, the servant is not greater than his lord, neither is he that is sent greater than he that sent him. A new commandment give I

* John xiv. 2, 8; compared with xvi. 22, and xvii. 24.

† John xv. 4.

unto you, that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another. Hereby shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another. This is my commandment, that ye love one another as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends, if ye do that which I command you. Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends, for all things that I hear of my Father I make known unto you. These things I command you, that ye love one another."* All these we may take as genuine *logia*. Relieved from the separation which the Evangelist, for the purposes of his long discourse and its developments, inflicts on them, simply put together again as by their subject they belong together, how their effectiveness and impressiveness increases how heightened is our enjoyment of them!

And next as to the right criticism of our Evangelist's mode of procedure. Let us take, as the primitive theme for all which is said about the disciples' requests being granted, these words: "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, I will do it."† Let us put with them all the scattered repetitions of this same theme, some of them with a little variation, others in words almost identical with the *logion* we have quoted. When we see them all together, we see that by all the repetitions nothing is really added, either in the substance or in the form of expression, to the primitive theme: nothing is gained. The primitive theme, then, alone is from Jesus. The repetitions are our Evangelist's, to enable Jesus to make a long, connected speech, such as Jesus never dealt in, such as is quite alien to his manner. Now it is argued that the *logia* proper to the Fourth Gospel are all of them inventions, because they are unmeaningly and vainly repeated. But is the ineffective repetition several times of a *logion*, any reason why Jesus should not have given it with effect once?

The same with the sayings of Jesus about his glory. It is argued that the frequent and earnest insistence on his glory, particularly in the long prayer of the seventeenth chapter, is not the least in the style of Jesus, and cannot be his. As the Evangelist presents and develops it, we will own it cannot. But let us put together all the sayings of Jesus about his glory, going back for this purpose as far even as the eleventh chapter, where is the first apparition of them, and we shall be able to see both what Jesus may probably have said on the subject, and how the Evangelist has probably dealt with it. First of all, we find a primitive theme entirely in the style of Jesus, in his exclamation, when he heard

* Jchn xiii. 12—16, 34, 35; xv. 12—17.

† John xiv. 13.

from Andrew and Philip of the Gentiles, or as our Evangelist naturally calls them, the Greeks, present at the last Passover he kept, and desirous to see him: "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified!"* In all the Four Gospels there is not a saying of Jesus more safe to accept than this, more perfectly in character. For Jesus, these foreigners desiring to see him were the Gentiles, the nations. The Messiah, of whom the Jews had their minds full, he steadfastly identified, we know, with the mild and stricken Servant of prophecy, "his visage so marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men,"† and himself with this Messiah. He knew that the victory of this Messiah and of his cause could only come when he had "poured out his soul unto death."‡ What was that victory? It was the foundation, and henceforth unconquerable institution for the world at large, of the reign of righteousness. "The Eternal will cause righteousness and praise to spring forth before all nations; I will set my glory among the heathen; from the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same my name shall be great among the Gentiles."§ To bring in the reign of righteousness, was to bring in the Eternal's glory; and the Servant who brought in this, founded his own by doing so. We may conceive of many and various texts as contributing here. Texts originally proper to the despised servant, the Messias-ideal of Jesus: "So shall many nations exult in him; kings shall shut their mouth before him; he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied; he shall justify many."|| Texts originally proper to the renewed Israel: "The Gentiles shall see thy righteousness, and all kings thy glory." Texts originally proper to the righteous man in general: "Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory."¶ Texts originally proper to the conquering Root of David, the Messias-ideal of the Jews: "His rest shall be glory."** All these we may conceive as present and contributory in the mind of Jesus, when, seeing his death imminent, and hearing at the same time of the strangers desiring to see him, he said: "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified!"

But once this primitive theme given, how natural that our Evangelist should harp upon it, recur to it, develop it! The whole seventeenth chapter may be called a development of this theme and of one other: *That they may be one as we are one!* †† It is as much in character for a disciple to love to prolong the theme of Christ's glory and to dilate upon it, as it is little in character for Jesus himself to do so. And the mode of development followed is just

* John xii. 28.

† Isaiah lii. 14.

‡ Isaiah liii. 12.

§ Isaiah lxi. 11; Ezekiel xxxix. 21; Malachi i. 11.

|| Isaiah lii. 14; liii. 11.

¶ Ps. lxxiii. 24.

** Isaiah xi. 10.

†† *ἵνα ὅσιν ἐν καθὼς ἡμεῖς.* See John xvii. 11, 21—23.

the mode tempting to a disciple—Jew or Greek—of Jesus, but never adopted or encouraged by Jesus himself. Jesus checked questions of theosophy. He contented himself with taking the conception of God as the Jews had it, and as the Old Testament delivered it, as the eternal and righteous Father, and with saying of himself: "I came forth from God;" "God sent me."

But questions of theosophy had and have, as we see by the history of Gnosticism, and, indeed, by the whole history of Christianity, an irresistible attraction for the human mind. Men asked themselves, as Tertullian says, *unde Deus?*—and they loved to inquire, in like manner, how was Jesus precisely related to his Father who sent him? In a famous passage of the Book of Proverbs, Wisdom says of herself: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way before his works of old; I was set up from everlasting. I was by him as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight."* The Book of Wisdom, a late work, but for that very reason more likely to be popular, and of which in the Epistle to the Hebrews we can see the influence, added these striking traits: "Wisdom is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty. She is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness."† Eagerly did theosophy possess itself of these images, and spin its fancies by the help of two supposed personages, Wisdom and Word of God, *Sophia* and *Logos*. Jesus spoke of himself as uttering the word of God; but that he called himself the *logos*, there is neither indication nor probability. There is, however, some trace of his calling himself the *wisdom* of God. At least, a saying of the First Gospel, "Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets and wise men and scribes,"‡ is given in the Third Gospel in the following different and remarkable form: "Wherefore also *the wisdom of God* said, I will send unto them prophets and apostles."§ It is possible that we have here a trace of Jesus having really and naturally, on at least one occasion, called himself "the wisdom of God," and having to that extent seemed to give countenance to the personifying lucubrations upon these terms *Sophia* and *Logos*, the Wisdom, Reason, or Word of God, of both Jewish and Greek theosophy. It is possible; possible that our Evangelist, in developing what Jesus said of his glory, had this to go upon, as well as *logia* like "Before Abraham was, I am," and "I and the Father are one."|| At any rate, the glory of Jesus was made to accord with that of the *Sophia* or *Logos*

* Prov. viii. 22, 23, 30.

† Wisd. vii. 25, 26, Compare ἀπαργασμα φωτός διδίου . . . καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, in this passage, with Heb. i. 3: ἀπαργασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὁμοειότητος αὐτοῦ.

‡ Matt. xxiii. 34.

§ Luke xi. 49.

|| John viii. 58, and x. 30.

of theosophical speculation, and with the attributes assigned to them by Scripture. And so we have Jesus made to say: "And now, Father, glorify thou me beside thine own self with the glory which I had beside thee before the world was."* We have him saying: "Father, that which thou hast given me, I will that they also be with me where I am, that they may see my glory which thou gavest me, because thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world."† These things are not at all in the manner of Jesus. Jesus never theosophized. Not thus did he employ Scripture, not thus did he establish his divinity, not thus did he conceive his glory. But it is entirely in the manner of our Evangelist. And this is the good of putting together everything which relates to a primitive theme, because we then are enabled to perceive clearly both how simple and characteristic was the original nucleus given by Jesus, and also how naturally the additions to it which perplex us may have arisen from the manipulation by the Evangelist of the given nucleus, from his expansions and developments of it.

The seventeenth chapter is one where these expansions and developments appear to exceed considerably in amount the original nucleus. This is by no means always the case in our Evangelist's report of the sayings of Jesus. But in his report of miracles, and indeed in all reports of miracles, we may safely take it that the additions exceed the original nucleus of fact very largely. We said in the first of these papers that the suspension or diminution of hunger when the attention is absorbed and the interest excited was quite basis enough for the story of the miraculous feeding of the thousands. The answer has positively been hazarded that no absorption or excitement could enable five thousand people to satisfy themselves upon five loaves and two fishes, and to leave twelve baskets full of fragments. As if the details of a miraculous story had the sort of solidity which would warrant one in thus gravely arguing upon them! as if any one, who has come to distrust miracles, trusts all the circumstances related for them and only distrusts the final result! It is in the circumstances that the legend consists, that the creative power of the imagination shows itself active. Granted that a starting-point and hint of fact for the miracles related in our Gospels there has nearly always been, yet in nine cases out of ten we shall probably err if we imagine we can now seize this hint of fact; it was so slight in the first instance, and has been so buried under the additions. We have remarked how perhaps the sole nucleus of solid fact for the miraculous incidents at Christ's baptism was that weird light on Jordan mentioned in the Apocryphal Gospels. Sometimes the nucleus for a miracle was afforded, not improbably, by some saying of Jesus. The

* John xvii. 5.

† John xvii. 24.

miracle of the raising of Lazarus has been the theme of endless disquisition, every detail has been canvassed with elaborate minuteness. What part of the details is solid we shall never know. But it may safely be said that, the human mind being what it is, and stories of miracle arising as they do, the juxtaposition of one or two sayings of Jesus is sufficient, to an investigator willing to look at things simply, to account for the whole miracle. Let us attempt this juxtaposition.

The crowning moment in the career of Jesus, as Jesus construed and connected it, had arrived—the moment for “the Messiah to suffer and to enter into his glory.”* *The hour is come, that the Son of Man should be glorified.*† At this moment, Jesus is told of the death of a faithful disciple and friend. He says to his followers: *Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; I go to awake him.*‡ To the eye of Jesus, the introduction and triumph of everlasting righteousness—that triumph in which re-live all the saints who are dead, and the saints who are yet alive live for evermore—was at that moment beginning. The sisters of the departed are plunged in weeping and lamentation; Jesus says to Martha, *Thy brother shall rise again.*§ Not with the bodily resurrection which Martha and the popular religion of Palestine then expected, and which the popular religion of Christendom expects now; this materialism Jesus had to transform, as he had to transform the materialism of the Messiah-ideal. Martha imagines that Jesus is speaking of the resurrection in the sense of popular religion, but Jesus corrects her. He corrected her; but the correction was a gleam of light destined slowly to deepen, not of force at that time to pierce the darkness. His words were: *I am the resurrection and the life; he who believeth on me, though he die, shall live, and he who liveth and believeth on me shall never die.*|| Out of that very *logion* which points to a wholly new ideal of resurrection—out of that *logion*, passed from hearer to hearer, repeated, brooded over, misapprehended—grew up, probably, the story of the great miracle of resurrection according to the old ideal,—the raising of Lazarus. This *logion*, with the saying to Martha, *Thy brother shall rise again*; with the saying to the disciples, *Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; I go to awake him*; with some saying of Jesus about his glory, such as, *The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified*, were the materials out of which was built up a miraculous tale exactly effacing the truth which Jesus wished to convey. *Sed nondum est finis*, should always be our reflection in these cases. “The end is not yet;”¶ the space and scale required for working out the truths of the Bible are very large.

* Luke xxiv. 26.

† John xii. 23; comp. xi. 4.

‡ John xi. 11.

§ John xi. 23.

|| John xi. 25, 26.

¶ Matt. xxiv. 6.

The developing of miracle out of slight materials is, however, common to our Evangelist with the Synoptics. Baur opposes these to our Evangelist in such a fashion, that one is sometimes tempted to ask whether he supposes, then, that the Synoptics are historical. They have, indeed, over our Evangelist certain advantages already noticed; but historical they are no more than he is. A creative pressure on incidents they all alike exercise; a creative pressure, too, on the sayings of Jesus the Synoptics as well as our Evangelist exercise, though in a different manner from his. Sometimes he is more historical than the Synoptics. If we think of it seriously, for the words spoken by Jesus during his agony in the garden* the Synoptics could not possibly have had evidence, since the only companions of Jesus were asleep when the reported words were spoken. Their real source, probably, the Fourth Gospel discovers to us. This Gospel gives us two utterances of Jesus, made, one of them shortly before his arrest, the other at the moment of it: "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say: Father, save me from this hour? But for this cause came I unto this hour."† And again: "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?"‡ We have here, probably, the original of the words assigned by the Synoptics to the agony in the garden.

Where the Synoptics are more historical than our Evangelist is in cases where knowledge of Jewish localities and usages is required. When he varies from them in such matters, however, it is because this sort of knowledge he lacks, not because he is warping facts to suit a design. The Tübingen critics are confident that the truth of Baur's theory about the Fourth Gospel is quite established by our Evangelist's account of the Last Supper and of the Crucifixion. Baur found design in the whole of it: design to discountenance any heed of the Passover Supper by Christians, design to identify the Passover sacrifice with the death of Christ, design to prove the ending of all things Jewish, the coming-in of the reign of *Pneuma*, or spirit. But how slight are his grounds when we examine them! True, the Synoptics represent the Last Supper as eaten on the day when the Passover was eaten. This day was "the fourteenth day of the first month at even"§ —the 14th of the Jewish month of Nisan; and the crucifixion they represent as taking place on the day following, the 15th. True, the Fourth Gospel represents the crucifixion as happening on the very same day on which the Passover was eaten —on the 14th of Nisan therefore, not on the 15th. On the morning of the crucifixion, the Jews, says our Evangelist,

* Matt. xxvi. 39, 42.

† John xii. 27.
§ Exodus xii. 18.

‡ John xviii. 11.

would not enter the Prætorium, "in order that they might not be defiled, but might eat the Passover"*—the Passover which, according to the Synoptics, had been eaten the evening before! The Last Supper, then, must, according to our Evangelist, have been eaten on the 13th of Nisan, not on the 14th; not on the day appointed for eating the Jewish Passover.

There can be little doubt that the Synoptics, and not our Evangelist, are right, although the growing estrangement from things Jewish caused the Christian Church to explain their testimony away, and to assign the crucifixion to the 14th of Nisan. *Christ did not eat the Paschal Lamb, he suffered as the Paschal Lamb*,† was the view which prevailed. In the latter half of the second century, we find a keen controversy turning, in fact, upon this—whether the 14th of Nisan was the day on which Jesus ate the Last Supper, as the Passover Supper, with his disciples. The Asiatic Churches contended that he did; and Polycrates, the aged bishop of Ephesus, appealed‡ to the practice of the Apostle John, who, he said, had always observed the 14th as the day on which Jesus, keeping the Passover Supper, had eaten his last meal with the Twelve. But the Fourth Gospel puts this last meal on the 13th. It cannot, then, argues Baur, have been written by St. John. It was written by one of the anti-Jewish party, during the Paschal controversy, to put a stop to the identification of the Last Supper with the Jewish Passover; and Rome and the Christian Church at large adopted its view. There was, however, for the Church one cause of doubt and difficulty in the matter. How could it be that St. John, the author of the Fourth Gospel, kept the 14th as the day on which Jesus ate the Last Supper? This difficulty was got over by supposing that John, having to do with a number of Jewish Christians, had accepted, for the sake of peace, their identification of the Last Supper with the Passover, although he knew better all the time. In Bede's history we find our English St. Wilfrid offering to doubters this explanation.§

Nothing can be more improbable than that St. John, knowing the observance of the 14th of Nisan as the day of the Last Supper to be an error, should nevertheless have countenanced the error by complying with it in his practice. The tradition that he kept the 14th may well be believed; but then he must have kept it with the sincere conviction that it was the day of the Last Supper. And so, no doubt, it was. John, then, cannot have written the eighteenth chapter of the Fourth Gospel, cannot have

* John xviii. 28.

† See *Paschal Chronicle* (edit. of Bonn) i. 12. οὐκ ἔφαγεν τὸν ποικυλὸν ἄμων ἐν ἑσπέρῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὁ κύριος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν ὡς ἀληθὴς ἄμων.

‡ In his letter to Victor and the Church of Rome, quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 24.

§ Bede, *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 25.

put the crucifixion on the day when the Passover Supper was to be eaten. This we freely concede to Baur. But does the chapter aim at marking, and with a controversial and anti-Jewish intention, an error of the Synoptics about the days of the Last Supper and of the crucifixion? Is this the reason why John, who shared the error of the Synoptics if it was an error, cannot have written the chapter? By no means. He cannot have written it for the same reason that he cannot have talked of *Bethany beyond Jordan*, or made the high-priesthood of Caiaphas a yearly office. He cannot have written it because he was a Jew, and exactitude about Jewish days and ceremonies came natural to him. Now, it is for want, it seems to us, of this exactitude that the Fourth Gospel varies from the Synoptics in dating the Last Supper and the crucifixion, not from any controversial design.

John's Greek editor knew Jewish usages, and liked to import them into his narrative; but he knew them loosely, as a foreigner, and he sometimes placed them incoherently. He is like Michelet enlivening his account of things English with traits of detail, and meaning to say that at a financial crisis there was "consternation in Change Alley." That would have been all very well, but Michelet says, instead of Change Alley, *Alley Change*. Perhaps neither a Greek nor a Frenchman could ever bring himself to learn with minute accuracy the details of any civilization not his own. John's Greek editor knew the Jewish scrupulosity, and that a Jew in a state of defilement could not eat the Passover. He takes the occasion of Jesus being carried before Pilate to bring in this piece of knowledge, and says that the Jews could not enter the Prætorium with Jesus for fear they should be defiled, and hindered from eating the Passover. He does not observe that he is thus contradicting the Synoptics, who represent the Passover as being eaten, not on the evening of the day of Christ's crucifixion, but on the evening of the day before. Yet it may surely be seen, except by people bent on finding mountains in mole-hills, that he does not *mean* to contradict the Synoptics, for he calls the day of the crucifixion the Preparation Day,* as they do. The Preparation Day was the day intervening between the 14th of Nisan and the Sabbath. If Jesus was crucified on the 14th of Nisan, the day for eating the Passover, that day could not at the same time be the Preparation Day, the day subsequent to the day for eating the Passover, and coming between that day and the Sabbath.

The truth is, on these topics of Jewish doings and ceremonies, our Greek editor is rather in a haze. Thus he talks of putting *a sponge on hyssop*† where the Synoptics talk of putting *a sponge on a cane*.‡ Hyssop is the Hebrew name for a plant probably some-

* John xix. 31

† John xix. 29.

‡ Matt. xxvii. 48; Mark xv. 36.

thing like our marjoram, with a close, bunching head of flowers, which can serve for a mop or a sponge. To talk of putting a sponge on hyssop is therefore like talking of putting a sponge on sponge. But our Greek editor knew the connection of hyssop with "the blood of sprinkling," and did not clearly know what hyssop was; so he makes it do duty for the *cane* of the Synoptics. He has no profound dogmatic design to represent the death of Christ otherwise than as the Synoptics represented it, but his hold on Jewish details is less firm than theirs, and his use of Jewish details more capricious.

Again, the whole story of the soldier piercing the side of Jesus with his spear is said by Baur to be an invention of our Evangelist with the design of identifying Jesus with the Paschal Lamb (*a bone of him shall not be broken!*), and of mystically representing by the effusion of water and blood the apparition of the new powers of *Logos* and *Pneuma*. No other Evangelist mentions the incident, argues Baur; the quotation from Exodus* shows what was in the writer's mind; and Apollinaris of Hierapolis, taking part in the Paschal controversy soon after the year 170 of our era, marks the figurative character of the incident, identifies Christ with the Paschal Lamb slain on the 14th of Nisan, and the water and blood with *Logos* and *Pneuma*.† The argument that if an important thing in the Fourth Gospel is not found in the Synoptics also, it must be a mere invention of our Evangelist's, is always pressed by Baur against our Evangelist only. But why is it more incredible that the piercing of Christ's side, though given in the Fourth Gospel alone, should yet really have been matter of tradition, than that the last words of Jesus, *Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit*, which are in Luke only,‡ should proceed, not from Luke's own invention, but from a real tradition? Nor has the quotation, *A bone of him shall not be broken*,§ in all probability the reference alleged. Not Exodus or the Paschal Lamb is probably here in our Evangelist's mind, but one of the Psalms on the preservation of the righteous: *Thou keepest all his bones, so that not one of them is broken.*|| The form of the Greek verb corresponds with the form in this passage from the Psalms,¶ not in the passage from Exodus: "Ye shall not break a bone thereof." Besides, the Evangelist is heaping together instances of the fulfilment of predictions made by prophet and psalmist; and to suppose him suddenly turning to the Law and its precepts is not

* Exod. xii. 46.

† ἡ ἰδ' τὸ ἀληθινὸν τοῦ κυρίου πᾶσα, says Apollinaris; and presently afterwards: ὁ ἐκχέας ἐκ τῆς πλευρᾶς αὐτοῦ τὰ δύο πάλιν καθάρσια, ὕδωρ καὶ αἷμα, λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα.

‡ Luke xxiii. 46.

§ John xix. 36.

¶ Ps. xxxiv. 20.

¶ συντηρήσεται, and not συντηρήτε. Some later manuscripts of the New Testament show the pressure to connect John xix. 36 with Exod. xii. 46, rather than with Ps. xxxiv. 20. See in Sabatier, *Bibliorum Sacrorum Latine Versiones Antiquæ*, his note on the verse in John.

natural. It is most probable that the side-piercing, followed by the appearance of something thought to resemble blood and water, was really, like our Evangelist's incidents in general, given by tradition. As early as Justin's time, nay, as early as the date of the Apocalypse, the passage from Zechariah,* which in the Greek Bible was mis-translated to mean: *They shall turn their eyes towards me in exchange for their insulting*,† had been altered to its true meaning: *They shall look on whom they pierced*, as it stands in the Fourth Gospel.‡ This proves nothing as to the antiquity of the Fourth Gospel; passages of the Old Testament which had a Messianic sense were early, as we have said above, corrected to bring this sense out, if before they obscured it. But it proves the antiquity of some tradition of a piercing which the passage in Zechariah suited. If the piercing had been merely that of the hands and feet by the nails, the Greek verb of the Messianic Psalm would probably have been used for the prophecy of Zechariah also; a different verb is taken.§ We do not deny that the identification of Christ's sacrifice with the Paschal sacrifice was a conception entertained by our Evangelist; it was a conception familiar also to Paul,|| and a conception just and natural. What we deny is that it has become with him the nucleus of a theory for which he combines, arranges, invents. In the Paschal controversy in the latter part of the second century, the idea had become a nucleus of this kind. There is no doubt as to what Apollinaris makes our Evangelist's words mean, any more than there is doubt as to what Baur makes our Evangelist's words mean. But if our Evangelist had really meant what Apollinaris and Baur find in his words, he would have expressed himself somewhat as they do, he would have shown his intention as they do. Now, he expresses himself so very differently! Therefore we cannot credit him with the mystic meaning and design they suppose for him. "The 14th is the true Passover of the Lord," says Apollinaris; "the great sacrifice, the Son of God in the lamb's stead." Again: "His holy side was pierced, and he shed back out of his side the two cleansers, water and blood, *word and spirit*."¶ There is no uncertainty about the writer's intention here; and if our Evangelist had invented his Gospel to serve the same intention, the intention would have been as manifest. Probably, however, what the water and blood figured to our Evangelist's mind was not *logos* and *pneuma* at all, but—as the First Johannine Epistle indicates, and as Theophylact

* Zech. xii. 10.

† ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς με ἂνθ' ὃν κατωρχήσαντο

‡ John xix. 37. ὕψονται εἰς δὲ ἐξεκέντησαν.

§ ἐξεκέντησαν, instead of ἔρυσαν. See, in the Greek Bible, Ps. xxi. 16.

|| See 1 Cor. v. 7.

¶ See the fragment of Apollinaris in Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum Seculi Secundi*, vol. ix. p. 487; with the note.

interpreted*—the union of the human and divine natures in Christ. The water was a kind of celestial ichor, the blood was the blood of mortal man.

Tried fairly, then, and without a preconceived theory to warp our criticism, the Fourth Gospel comes out no fancy-piece, but a document full of incidents given by tradition, and of genuine "sayings of the Lord." Sayings are not to be rejected as inventions because they seem strong and harsh, and we do not like them; as, for example, the saying to the Jews about *their father the devil*: "He was a manslayer from the beginning."† The Peratæ quote it in substance, and that is an external testimony to its genuineness; the invectives against the Scribes and Pharisees in the Synoptics make it a not improbable saying in itself. Neither are sayings to be rejected because they are profound, and over their hearers' heads; as, for example, the saying: "Before Abraham was, I am."‡ Ever since man appeared upon earth, the clearing and saving influences which constitute the very being of Jesus have been present and at work amongst mankind; often they have been latent, but they have been always there. With some such thought as this, Jesus pursued his lofty treatment of the themes of life and immortality, while his hearers stuck fast in their materialistic notions of them, and failed to follow his real meaning. In this there is nothing strange or incredible. Nor, finally, are sayings to be rejected because they accommodate themselves to the materialism of the disciples. Only under these familiar figures of a bodily resurrection, a visible judgment-assize, of sitting on thrones to try the twelve tribes of Israel, of a heavenly Father's house with many mansions, could Jesus convey the ideas of happiness and reward to these materialistically trained children of the new birth, whom yet to raise out of their materialism he for ever strove. If he was to say to them nothing but either what they could perfectly follow, or what they could not possibly misunderstand, he could not, as we have already said, have spoken to them at all. The only sayings we are called upon to reject are those which contradict the known manner and scope of Jesus, as his manner and scope are established for us by the mass of the evidence existing.

Thus to the best of our ability have we made good our thesis, that the Fourth Gospel is no fancy-piece but an invaluable help towards a right understanding of Jesus and of the line taken by him. But we do not require our reader, even, to be so chary as we

* In his Commentary on the Fourth Gospel. His words are: τὸ μὲν αἷμα σύμβολον τοῦ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸν σταυρωθέντα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ὑπὲρ ἑν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ αἶμα θεόν.

† John viii. 44.

‡ John viii. 53.

have been about admitting sayings as genuine. If he finds himself disposed to receive as genuine some sayings of Jesus at which we hesitate, so be it. For we have sought merely to establish a minimum of what must be received, not a maximum; to show, that after the most free criticism has been fairly and strictly applied, and all deductions, to the very outside of what such a criticism can require, have been fully made, there is yet left an authentic residue comprising all the profoundest, most important, and most beautiful things in the Fourth Gospel.

We have found, however, in our study of this Gospel, nothing to shake our opinion about the Canonical Gospels in general and their history, but everything to confirm it. For at least fifty years after its production the Fourth Gospel appears not to have been in the settled state of Holy Scripture. There was a long period during which this Gospel yielded more easily to pressure, whether for altering its first contents or for interpolating additions to them, than it did afterwards. And so with our other three Gospels. As we accept the evidence of Basileides to show that the Fourth Gospel in some shape or other already existed in the early part of the second century, so we accept the evidence of Marcion to show the same thing for the Third Gospel, and that of Papias for the Second and First.* True, the description given by Papias does not accurately characterize our present Gospels either of Mark or Matthew,† but the hypothesis of other works of theirs being meant is extremely improbable, while it is not at all improbable that between the first appearance of a Gospel and its admission to canonicity it should have undergone alterations. The final admission of a Gospel to canonicity proves that it has long been in men's hands, and long been attributed to a venerable authority; that it has had time to gain their affections and to establish its superiority over competing accounts. To suppose as the originals of our First and Second Gospels such collections by Matthew and Mark as are described by Papias, to suppose as the original of our Third Gospel (which in its prologue tells us itself that in its present form it is not the work of an eye-witness but of a writer with two stages, even, between him and the eye-witnesses‡) a work by the same hand from whence proceed those records in the first person which crop out in the *Acts*, to suppose as the original of our Fourth Gospel data furnished by John at Ephesus, is at once agreeable to what traditions we have, and also the most natural way of accounting

* See Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 39.

† Papias says of Matthew, τὰ λόγια συνεγράψατο. Of Mark he says that he wrote, ἀκριβῶς, οὐ μέντοι τὰς εἰς, τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα. See the chapter of Eusebius just cited.

‡ The first stage is from the writer of our Third Gospel to the πολλοί, whose διηγήσεις he criticizes; the second from those πολλοί to the αὐτόπται, the original eye-witnesses.

for the facts that present themselves. But to suppose that in our present Four Gospels we have the original works as they at first stood, that they were at their first coming forth formed into a Canon and thereby protected from alteration, is contrary both to the direct evidence we have and to probability. The descriptions of Papias do not, as we have said, at all well describe our present Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark. And we see that our Gospels had gradually to establish themselves, because before the time of Irenæus they are hardly ever quoted as Scripture, but after his time constantly. And we know that there were many other accounts besides these, and that works not in our present Canon enjoyed such favour among Christians of the second century that even Irenæus quotes the Pastor of Hermas as "Scripture,"* and a so-called Gospel of Peter was publicly read in Church with episcopal sanction.† We know, above all, that there is no instance, not one, before the age of Irenæus and the last quarter of the second century, of even two or three consecutive verses being quoted as they are now given in our Gospels. So little were they documents sacred from the very first against all change and interpolation, that the habit of interpolation went on long after the Canon was formed, and the difference between the received text and that of the earliest manuscripts shows it. If the Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts of the Fourth Gospel contain neither the story of the woman taken in adultery nor the account of the angel troubling the water in the Pool of Bethesda; if, where the later manuscripts which our received text follows make Peter say: "Thou art the Christ the Son of the living God," the Vatican and Sinaitic make him say merely: "Thou art the holy one of God;"‡ and if this sort of change could befall a Gospel text between the fourth century and the tenth, while it was Holy Scripture beyond question; how strong must have been the original bent to additions and interpolations, and how much more must the text have been exposed to them in its earlier and less closely watched period, when the settled stamp of Holy Scripture it as yet had not!

To suppose therefore that we have in our Gospels documents which can stand as the very original, strictly drawn up, strictly authenticated, and strictly preserved depositions of eye-witnesses, is absurd. They arose not in the sort of world where depositions are taken, nor in the sort of world where manuscripts are guarded. They arose, and they passed many years, in the immense, under-

* And in remarkably emphatic language: *καλῶς οὖν εἶπεν ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα*, &c. &c. The words of Irenæus are quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* v. 8.

† The bishop was Serapio, bishop of Antioch from A.D. 191 to 218; the church was that of Rhossus in Cilicia. Serapio discovered afterwards that there was Docetism in the gospel of which he had inadvertently permitted the public reading. See Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 12.

‡ John vi. 69.

ground, obscure, fluctuating world of the common people. Probably even neighbours and contemporaries never knew or cared to know quite accurately the literary history of a document like one of our Gospels, and beyond question the knowledge, if it ever existed, was soon lost irrecoverably. The important inference to be drawn from this is that the internal evidence must, in sayings and doings of Jesus which are given us in our Gospels, be considered with great care. Jesus was far over the heads of his reporters, he is not to be held responsible for their actions or for all that they may make him do or say. And the way in which our Gospels arose and grew up was such that pressure upon the stock of data from the original eye-witnesses, and additions to this stock and insertions, were extremely natural and extremely easy.

In the chief Epistles of St. Paul we have, much more indubitably than in any other New Testament documents, the real original production of the assumed author. Letters like his, with the strong stamp of the author's individuality, and following in general a continuous argument, lend themselves to additions and interpolations far less readily than works like the Gospels. We know, however, that forged epistles, covering themselves with the authority of apostolic names, were early current; and here too, therefore, the internal evidence must have great weight. The exact literary history of our documents is irrecoverable; and in the absence of it we ought to resign ourselves to be ignorant of much, we ought to be sparing of vigorous and rigorous theories, to allow something to tradition, to dismiss the notion of sheer, designed forgery and imposture, to admit that for every Epistle, perhaps, in our Canon of the New Testament, there is something of a genuine basis. Striking phrases from apostolic letters or addresses were likely to survive and float in men's memories though their context had been lost; here was the hint and at the same time the defence for an imitator, speaking in an Apostle's name and, as he imagined, in that Apostle's sense. Everything is against the genuineness of the Second Petrine Epistle as a whole. But things like the phrase: "Give diligence to make your calling and election sure," in the first chapter,* and the passage beginning at the eighth verse of the third chapter and ending with the words: "Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness," may well have been Peter's, and their incorporation would have amply served to justify the Epistler both in his own eyes and in those of his public.

It is easy to be too sweepingly negative in these matters; easy,

also, to think we can know more about them, and more certainly, than we can. To us it appears very rash to pronounce confidently against the First Johannine Epistle being St. John's. Certainly there is the difficulty of a Galilean fisherman learning to write Greek after the age of fifty; but with this exception, almost all the difficulties are absent which make it so hard to think that St. John can have written the Fourth Gospel. The style is not flowing and articulated; the sentences come like minute-guns as they would drop from a natural Hebrew. The writer moves, indeed, amidst that order of religious ideas which meets us in the Fourth Gospel, and which was that of the Greek world wherein he found himself. He moves amongst these new ideas, however, not with the practised facility of the Evangelist, but with something of helplessness, although the depth and serene beauty of his spirit give to all he says an infinite impressiveness and charm. Save one ambiguous expression of Eusebius* there is nothing to indicate that John's authorship of the First Epistle was in the early Church ever questioned. Papias used it,† and it may fairly be inferred from what Epiphanius says‡ that even the Alogi received it, although they rejected both the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse. Of the authorship of the Apocalypse all we can safely assert is what we learn from the book itself, that the author was named John, and wrote in Asia. It was natural that this John, in Asia, the recipient of so weighty a revelation, should be identified with the Apostle John, and as early as the middle of the second century we find Justin Martyr so identifying him.§ But there was so little sureness about the matter that for Eusebius, in the fourth century, the Apocalypse was no more than a disputed and doubtful book of Scripture, which a Christian might receive or not as he thought good. And to us it seems impossible to make out more than that the Apocalypse was written by a John, but by what John there is nothing to show.||

The Canon of the New Testament, then, is not what popular religion supposes, although, on the other hand, its documents are, in some quarters, the object of far too aggressive and sweeping negations. The most fruitful result to be gained from a sane

* *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 14. *μηδὲ τὰς ἀντιλεγόμενας παρελθόν, τὴν Ἰουδα λέγω καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς καθολικὰς ἐπιστολάς.* The word *λοιπὰς* is not certain, and even if it were, we could not be sure from the sentence, Eusebius being the sort of writer he is, that the First Johannine Epistle was disputed, or that Eusebius meant to say that it was.

† *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 39.

‡ *Hær.* LI. xxxiv. Epiphanius conjectures that the Alogi must have rejected the Epistles because they rejected the Gospel and the Apocalypse. If they had rejected the First Epistle, he would almost certainly have heard of it.

§ *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, cap. 81.

|| M. Renan's confident conclusion that the author was the Apostle John is one of the few points in his admirable criticism of the Apocalypse where he fails to carry us with him. His only serious argument is, that no one but an Apostle would have ventured to speak so authoritatively. But surely the recipient of this grand revelation would, as such, have felt himself entitled to be authoritative to any extent in delivering it.

criticism of the Canon is, that by satisfying oneself how the Gospel records grew up, one is enabled the better to account for much that puzzles us in their representation of Jesus—of his words more especially. There were facilities for addition and interpolation, for adding touches to what the original accounts made Jesus do, for amplifying, above all, what they made Jesus say. Evidence such as apologists always imagine themselves to be using when they appeal to the Gospels—the pure, first-hand, well-authenticated evidence of eye-witnesses—our Gospels are not. Such evidence is remarkably wanting for the whole miraculous part in the commencements of Christianity. Sometimes we seem to be near getting it, but it vanishes. Jerome tells us that Quadratus, in the second century, declared that there were yet living in his time persons who had beheld with their eyes Jesus raise the dead to life, and that he himself had seen them and spoken with them. It happens that the declaration of Quadratus is preserved by Eusebius, in whose history Jerome probably read it. Quadratus undoubtedly says that in his time there were yet alive those who had witnessed the raising of the dead by Jesus; but the important addition which alone takes this statement out of the category of hearsay, and makes it personal evidence—the addition that these alleged witnesses he himself had seen and known—Quadratus does not make. The addition is merely a rhetorical flourish of Jerome's.*

No doubt this is so; yet the importance of it all is greatly diminished by one consideration. *If we had the original reports of the eye-witnesses, we should still have reports not essentially differing, probably, from those which we now use.* Certain additions that improved a miraculous story as it grew, certain interpolations which belong to the ideas and circumstances of a later age, would be absent. But we should most likely not have a miracle the less, and we should certainly find a similar misapprehension of Jesus and of what he intended. The people who saw Jesus were as certain to seek for miracles, and to find them, as the people who came a generation or two later, or the people who resort to Lourdes or La Salette now. And this preoccupation with miracles was sure to warp their understanding of Jesus and their report of his sayings and doings. The recurrence, so much talked of and recommended, to the Apostles, or to the first three centuries, for the pure rule of faith and the genuine doctrine of Jesus, is in truth, therefore, however natural an expedient, an utterly futile one. There were, indeed, as we have shown in "Literature and Dogma," certain points in the teaching of Jesus which his immediate followers had not yet lost, and which fell more out of

* See Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 8; and Routh, *Reliquiæ Sacre*, vol. i. pp. 71, 74. Routh quotes Jerome, and points out his exaggeration.

sight afterwards. But the pure and genuine doctrine of Jesus neither his immediate followers, nor those whom they instructed, could possess; so immured were they in the ideas of their time and in the belief of the miraculous, so immeasurably was Jesus above them.

But our opponents say: Everything turns upon the question whether miracles do or did really happen; and you abstain from all attempt to prove their impossibility, you simply assume that they never happen. It is true, and we have repeatedly admitted it; at the end of this investigation we admit it once more, and lay stress upon it. That miracles *cannot* happen we do not attempt to prove; the demonstration is too ambitious. That they *do not* happen, that what are called miracles are not what the believers in them fancy, but have a natural history of which we can follow the course, the slow action of experience, we say, more and more shows; and shows, too, that there is no exception to be made in favour of the Bible miracles. Epiphanius tells us that at each anniversary of the miracle of Cana the water of the springs of Cibra in Caria and Gerasa in Arabia was changed into wine; that he himself had drunk of the transformed water of Cibra, and his brothers of that of Gerasa.* Fifty years ago, a plain Englishman would have had no difficulty in thinking that the Cana miracle was true, and the other two miracles were fables. He is now irresistibly led to class all these occurrences in one category as unsubstantial tales of marvel. Scales seem to drop from his eyes in regard to miracles; and if he is to hold fast his Christianity, it must no longer depend upon them. It was not to discredit miracles that "Literature and Dogma" was written, but because miracles are so widely and deeply discredited already. And it is lost labour, we repeat, to be arguing for or against them. Mankind did not originally accept miracles because it had formal proof of them, but because its imperfect experience inclined it to them. Nor will mankind now drop miracles because it has formal proof against them, but because its more complete experience detaches it from them. The final result was sure, as soon as ever miracles began to embarrass people, began to be relegated—especially the greater miracles—to a certain limited period long ago over. Irenæus says that people in his time had arisen from the dead, "and abode with us a good number of years."† One of his commentators, embarrassed by such stupendous miracles occurring outside of the Bible, tries to explain away this remarkable allegation; but the most recent editor of Irenæus points out, with truth, that the attempt is vain.

* Epiphanius, *Hæc*. li. xxx.

† See Irenæus, *Adv. Hæc*. lib. II. cap. xxxii. 4; with the note on the passage in Stieren's edition.

Irenæus was as sure to want and to find miracles as the Bible-writers were. And sooner or later mankind was sure to see how universally and easily stories like this of Irenæus arose, and that they arose with the Bible-writers just as they arose with Irenæus, and are not a whit more solid coming from them than from him.

A Catholic imagines that he gets over the difficulty by believing, or professing to believe, the miracles of Irenæus and Epiphanius as well as those of the Bible-writers. But for him, too, even for him, the *Time Spirit* is gradually becoming too strong. As we may say in general, that, although an educated Protestant may manage to retain for his own lifetime the belief in miracles in which he has been brought up, yet his children will lose it; so to an educated Catholic we may say, putting the change only a little farther off, that (unless some unforeseen deluge should overwhelm European civilization, leaving everything to be begun anew) his grandchildren will lose it. They will lose it insensibly, as the last century has seen the extinction, among the educated classes, of that belief in witchcraft, which in the century previous a man like Sir Matthew Hale affirmed to have the authority of Scripture and of the wisdom of all nations—spoke of, in short, just as many religious people speak of miracles now. Witchcraft is but one department of the miraculous; and it was comparatively easy, no doubt, to abandon one department when men had the rest of the region to fall back upon. Nevertheless, the forces of experience which have prevailed against witchcraft will inevitably prevail also against miracles at large, and that by the mere progress of time. The charge of presumption, and of setting oneself up above all the great men of past days, above "the wisdom of all nations," which is often brought against those who pronounce the old view of our religion to be untenable, springs out of a failure to perceive how little the abandonment of certain long-current beliefs depends upon a man's own will, or even upon his sum of powers, natural or acquired. Sir Matthew Hale was not inferior in force of mind to a modern Chief Justice because he believed in witchcraft; nay, the more enlightened modern who drops errors of his forefathers by help of that mass of experience which his forefathers aided in accumulating, may often be, according to the well-known saying, "a dwarf on the giant's shoulders." His merits may be small compared with those of the giant. Perhaps his only merit is that he has had the good sense to get up on the giant's shoulders, instead of trotting contentedly along in his shadow. Yet this itself, surely, is something!

We have to renounce impossible attempts to take the legendary and miraculous matter of Scripture as grave historical and scientific fact. We have to accustom ourselves to regard henceforth all this part as poetry and legend. In the Old Testament, as an

immense poetry growing round and investing an immortal truth, the "secret of the Eternal:"* *Righteousness is salvation*. In the New, as an immense poetry growing round and investing the secret of Jesus: *He that will save his life shall lose it, he that will lose his life shall save it*.

The best friends of mankind are those who can make it feel animation and hope in presence of the religious prospect thus profoundly transformed. The way to effect this is by leading men to see that our religion, in this altered view of it, does but at last become again the religion which Jesus Christ really endeavoured to found, and of which the truth and grandeur are indestructible. We should do Christians generally a great injustice if we thought that the entire force of their Christianity lay in the fascination and subjugation of their spirits by the miracles which they suppose Jesus to have worked, or by the materialistic promises of heaven which they suppose him to have offered. Far more does the vital force of their Christianity lie in the boundless confidence, consolation, and attachment which the whole being and discourse of Jesus inspire. What Jesus, then, himself thought sufficient, Christians too may bring themselves to accept with good courage as enough for them. What Jesus himself dismissed as chimerical, Christians too may bring themselves to put aside without dismay. The central aim of Jesus was to transform for every religious soul the popular Messias-ideal, the ideal of happiness and salvation, of the old Israel; to disengage religion, one may say, from the materialism of the Book of Daniel. Fifty years had not gone by after his death, when the Apocalypse replunged religion in this materialism; where, indeed, it was from the first manifest that replunged by the followers of Jesus religion must be. It was replunged there, but with an addition of inestimable value and of incalculable working—the figure and influence of Jesus. Slowly this influence emerges, transforms the turbid elements amid which it was thrown, brings back the imperishable ideal of its author. For him himself, his own resurrection after a short sojourn in the grave was the victory of his cause after his death and at the price of his death. His disciples materialized his resurrection, and their version of the matter falls day by day to ruin. But no ruin or contradiction befalls the version of Jesus himself. He *has* risen, his cause has conquered; the course of events continually attests his resurrection and victory. The manifest unsoundness of popular Christianity inclines many persons to throw doubts on the truth and permanence of Christianity in general. Creeds are discredited, religion is proclaimed to be in danger, the pious quake, the world laughs; nevertheless, *the prince*

*of this world is judged,** the victory of Jesus is won and sure. Conscience and self-renouncement, the method and the secret of Jesus, are a leaven set up in the world, nevermore to cease working until the world is leavened. That this is so, that the resurrection and re-emergent life of Jesus are in this sense undeniable, and that in this sense Jesus himself predicted them, may in time, surely, encourage Christians to lay hold on this sense as he did.

So, too, with the hope of immortality. Our common materialistic notions of the resurrection of the body and the world to come are, no doubt, natural and attractive to ordinary human nature. But they are in direct conflict with the new and loftier conceptions of life and death which Jesus strove to establish. His secret, *He that will save his life shall lose it, he that will lose his life shall save it*, is of universal application, and judges not only the life to which men cling here, but just as much the life we love to promise ourselves in the New Jerusalem. The immortality propounded by Jesus must be looked for elsewhere than in the materialistic aspirations of our popular religion. *He lived in the eternal order, and the eternal order never dies*;—this, if we may try to formulate in one sentence the result of the sayings of Jesus about life and death, is the sense in which we can rightly conceive of the righteous man as immortal, and aspire to be immortal ourselves. This will stand us in stead when the popular materialistic version of our future life fails us. And here again, too, the version which, unfamiliar and novel as it may be to us, has the merit of standing fast and holding good while other versions break down, is at the same time the version of Jesus.

People talk scornfully of "a sublimated Christianity," as if the Christianity of Jesus Christ himself had been a materialistic fairy-tale like that of Messrs. Moody and Sankey. Insensibly to lift us out of all this sort of materialism was Jesus Christ's perpetual endeavour. The parable of the king who made a marriage for his son ends with the episode of the guest who had not on a wedding garment, and was cast out.† Here, as usual, the Tübingen critics perceive *tendence*. They see in the episode a deliberate invention of the Evangelist; a stroke of Jewish Particularism indemnifying itself for having had to relate that salvation was preached in the highways. We have disagreed often with the Tübingen critics, and we shall venture finally to disagree with them here. We receive the episode as genuine; but what did Jesus mean by it? Shall we not do well in thinking, that he, whose lucidity was so incomparable and who indicated so much that was to be seized not by the present but the future, here marked and meant to mark, though but incidentally and in

* John xvi. 11.

† Matt. xxii. 1—14.

passing, the profound, the utter insufficiency of popular religion! Through the turbid phase of popular religion his religion had to pass. Good and bad it was to bear along with it; the gross and ignorant were to be swept in, by wholesale, from the highways; *the wedding was to be furnished with guests.* On this wise must Christianity needs develop itself, and the necessary law of its development was to be accepted. Vain to be too nice about the unpreparedness of the guests in general, about their inevitable misuse of the favours which they were admitted to enjoy! What could have been the end of such fastidious scrutiny? To turn them all out into the highways again! But the king's design was *that the wedding should be furnished with guests.* So the guests are all to stay and fall to. Popular Christianity is founded. But presently, almost as it were by accident, a guest even more unprepared and gross than the common, a guest "not having on a wedding garment," falls under the king's eye, and is ejected. Only one is noted for decisive ejection; but, ah! how many of those guests are as really unapt to seize and follow God's designs for them as he! *Many are called, few chosen.* The delinquent is sentenced to be bound hand and foot, and taken away, and cast into outer darkness. In the severity of this sentence, Jesus marks how utterly those who are gathered to his feast may fail to know him. The misapprehending and materializing of his religion, the long and turbid stage of popular Christianity, was inevitable. But, to give light and impulsion to future times, Jesus stamps this Christianity, even from the very moment of its birth, as, though inevitable, not worthy of its name; as ignorant and transient, and requiring all who would be truly children of the kingdom to rise above it.

MATTHEW ARNOLD.



NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS.

DR. LITLEDALE'S ARTICLE ON "CHURCH PARTIES."

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR JULY, 1874—PAGE 817.)

IN this article I find myself reckoned among the most conspicuous members of "the Broad Church school."

I should be well content to accept this designation of myself, under protest; to do so absolutely, I must first know what it means.

When I consider that the Church of Jesus Christ was a broad Church in comparison with the Jewish Church: that the Sermon on the Mount was distinguished by the breadth of its teaching from all that the disciples had before heard: that it was the ministry of a Church too broad even for some Christians of that day, for which St. Paul exchanged "the most straitest sect" of the religion in which he had been brought up:—remembering all this, I cannot bring myself to treat "Broad Church" as a term of reproach.

Let others interpret it as they will, to me it does not appear an appropriate description of any existing "school," party, or body, held together by a common set of theological tenets. I understand it as signifying a certain stamp of individual character, which I would describe as a disposition to recognize and appreciate that which is true and good under all varieties of forms, and in persons separated from one another by the most conflicting opinions.

There is an opposition which all educated men more or less clearly understand between High Church and Low Church, but

there is none between Broad Church and either. The proper antithesis to Broad is not High or Low, but Narrow. It would be monstrous presumption, and utterly inconsistent with Broad Church principles according to my view, for any school or party to pretend to the monopoly of this title, as if there were no Broad Churchmen to be found out of its own little circle. I hope and believe that there are numbers who have a rightful claim to it, among those who only profess to belong to one or other of the two great sections of the Church.

I should be sorry to think that Dr. Littledale himself was so completely alien from the thing, as his polemical writings may seem to indicate, however he may detest the name. Viewing it in this light, he could hardly deem it matter of rejoicing that the party appears to be dwindling away, and the time approaching when it will cease to have any notable representative in the Church of England. It may be added that from this point of view his requirements of distinct proofs of productive energy in the Broad Church appear almost ludicrously irrelevant. There is no reason why it should not, or proof that it does not, according to its means, take its full share in every labour of love which commends itself to its judgment. The only reasonable question is, whether its influence, so far as it reaches, is wholesome or not: which seems as much as to ask, whether charity and toleration are good or bad things. Dr. Littledale's view of the subject must be very wide indeed of this: for he measures the value of an adherent of the Broad Church "camp" by his pugnacity, and the efficiency of the party by its "fighting strength." This to me is something new and strange, and quite at variance with my own conception of the state of the case. It may be unavoidable, especially at this day, that a Broad Church writer should be more or less forced into controversy, but it will be either in self-defence or for the purpose of amicable mediation. He has no standing quarrel with High Church or Low Church, though he could not consent to attach himself to either. He claims the right of taking up a position of his own, which he may be prepared to maintain without wishing to disturb the convictions of others.

I do not, however, mean to represent the note of Broad Churchmanship as consisting simply in a certain charitable and conciliatory disposition. No doubt it also implies an intellectual peculiarity, which parts it alike from the High and the Low School. What this is, I would rather illustrate by example, than attempt exactly to define. I would name, among those of past time, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and among those of my own generation, Archdeacon Hare, as furnishing a sufficient illustration of my meaning. To Dr. Littledale, and perhaps to all whose minds are differently constituted, this peculiarity will appear as a deplorable natural infirmity, or as the

result of a vicious education. But they are labouring under a gross delusion, if they believe that it admits of being remedied by any such process as Dr. Littledale suggests. He thinks that the deficiencies of the Broad Church teaching are the effects of ignorance, which might be corrected by a deeper study of theology. And he asserts that "theology grows clearer with advancing knowledge." If that means that, as knowledge advances, more becomes known, all I suppose would bow to the oracle. But if it means that as theology becomes more definite and systematic, it carries deeper conviction of its truth to minds which have ever been used to discriminate between that which is human, and that which is divine in it, it would hardly be possible to frame a proposition running more directly counter to all the results of my study of ecclesiastical history, and to those of my personal experience.

To hold a prominent place in such a brotherhood as answers to my conception of the Broad Church, would to me appear a most enviable distinction. I have only to lament that I can lay no claim whatever to such an honour. But on the other hand it is a satisfaction to me to know, that if there is a party in the Church which has been guilty of "sleight of hand" tricks, and has played "fast and loose with truth," I at least am not one of its "leaders" or its members, have never been admitted into its councils, and, but for Dr. Littledale, should not have known of its existence.

C. T.

Augs., 1874.

DR. LITTEDALE'S ARTICLE ON "ECCLESIASTICAL VESTMENTS."

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR MARCH, 1875—PAGES 586, 591, 592.)

DR. LITTEDALE appears to have overlooked the note by Valesius, quoted by Bingham, vol. i., p. 118, and also the obvious general consideration, that either St. John's example was followed by the other Apostles, in which case it would not have attracted any special notice, or, if peculiar to him, must be assigned to some other motive than that supposed by Dr. Littledale. I think it ought to be dropped from the controversy, as incapable of any satisfactory explanation (? as a legend).

Dr. Littledale appears to have overlooked that most important and decisive passage in the Epistle of St. James, from which it is evident that the *εὐθὺς λαμπρὰ* of the priest was no more splendid

vestment than that which was worn by every wealthy member of the congregation ; and was only distinguished from those of the other worshippers by its superior neatness and cleanliness. *Vide* St. James's Epistle, ii. 3 ; Zech. iii. 3, 4, Septuagint.

(PAGE 578.)

This proposition rests upon the assumption that an ornate and gaudy worship is that which is most congenial to the spirit of true piety and devotion, and that one destitute of such accessories must be in proportion careless and irreverent. The history of all Protestant Churches may be safely charged with the refutation of this astonishing assumption. It might also seem that, if it is the business of the Church to educate her children, it must be one of her most important duties to elevate their taste from the lower to the higher kinds of æsthetical enjoyment, to wean them from the natural craving for pomp and glitter, and to accustom them to find satisfaction in the higher arts of architecture, music, and religious oratory, which have, in fact, been always found sufficient to supply the wants of all classes of worshippers, and of the simplest, as well as the most cultivated minds.

C. T.

April, 1875.

ON A SERMON ON "HEAVEN," PREACHED BY THE RECTOR AT ST. MARY'S, BATHWICK, ON TRINITY SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1875.

It is hard to believe that those who claim the authority of the Book of Revelation for Ritualistic worship, can have duly considered the difficulties which this argument ["our service is a rehearsal of the endless service of saints and angels"—*Vide* Sermon] involves.

(1.) All the rest of the New Testament clearly favours the opinion, that every kind of Christian worship is alike acceptable to God, provided it be offered in the spirit of true devotion ("in spirit and in truth"). But, if the point is to be decided by the authority of the Apocalypse, this opinion is erroneous. For God will have declared a decided preference of a mode of worship as stately and gorgeous as the circumstances of the worshippers permit.

(2.) And from this flows another conclusion, which many will find it difficult to accept. A very great number of the most earnest and sincere Christians in the world find this Ritualistic worship repugnant to their religious feelings.

This might have been considered as a harmless prejudice ; but, if the authority of the Apocalypse is rightly invoked, such

Christians are not only in error, but in sin; for they stand convicted of rejecting or disregarding the declared Will of God; and Churches, which enjoin or sanction such modes of worship, must be guilty of an abuse of their authority, in the ordering of the forms of public worship, and of withholding from God that which is His due, and which He has declared Himself to desire.

(3.) The consideration of the heavenly worship cannot be severed from that of the heavenly blessedness; the Revelation is either history or parable. If it is to be taken as a simple record of matter of fact, within the writer's experience, Heaven is a place of circumscribed dimensions, within which certain proceedings are constantly going on; its enjoyments may be infinitely purer than those of the Mahomedan paradise, but they are essentially of the same nature, sensuous, though not sensual, consisting, mainly, of splendid scenery and delicious music.

This, to many minds, will probably present a still greater difficulty. It is an edifying and fruitful topic for a sermon, that the wicked, even if they were admitted into heaven, would find no pleasure there, as all its highest enjoyments would be repugnant to their habits and pursuits; but no discreet preacher would represent an intelligent taste for the fine arts as an indispensable condition of everlasting happiness. The lowest and narrowest conception of the heavenly blessedness, though it is to be feared it is the most popular, is that which makes it consist, not in any increase of knowledge, not in any enlargement of our sphere of action, not in any multiplication of the objects of our benevolent affections, but in an everlasting hymn-singing.

(4.) The whole argument is based upon the assumption, that the author of the Apocalypse could not have intended his vision to be a mere vehicle of truths, which he deemed needful for the comfort and direction of the Church in his day, without desiring or expecting that it should be regarded in any other light. How far Dr. Littledale may have committed himself to such a proposition, I do not know; but I believe that it is generally held by writers and preachers of his school. It is one which, being incapable of proof, is sufficiently refuted by a simple contradiction.

C. T.

May, 1875.

MR. ORBY SHIPLEY'S ARTICLE, "OUGHT WE TO OBEY THE NEW COURT?"

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR JUNE, 1875.)

THIS article ought not to be considered as a mere discussion of an ecclesiastical question; it is a great deal more than

that. It is a conclusion of the efforts, which the author has been making for so many years, to effect the disruption of the Church of England. It is not so much a Word as an Act. The author himself can hardly expect that it should produce any effect upon minds that have not already adopted his views, completely identified the Church with the priesthood, and refused to allow the laity any voice, even upon questions of mere outward ceremonial. It is apparently meant as the blast of a trumpet giving the signal for action. Time only can show, whether the author has or has not been too sanguine in his hopes of an approaching Disestablishment. But it is possible that he may not have greatly overrated the strength of his party; though it can hardly be considered as more than a section of one more numerous and powerful. But if his wishes should be fulfilled, the most probable effect would be that the Church would be broken up into two or three fragments, each claiming the name of the "National Church." But one of them at least, bearing a like proportion, as the Church of the Nonjurors to the present Established Church; and the clear gain which would result to Mr. Orby Shipley, beside Disestablishment, would be either the gradual extinction of the smallest and highest of the Churches, or its more speedy absorption in the Church of Rome.

C. T.

June, 1875.

THE EUCHARIST CONTROVERSY.

THE first part of Dr. Vogan's work, "The True Doctrine of the Eucharist," is mainly devoted to an examination of the sacred Words on which the Eucharistic controversy chiefly turns, the words of the Institution; and the result is to show that these words have been, unintentionally indeed, but through a very surprising oversight, mutilated, and, in consequence of that mutilation, misinterpreted by Dr. Pusey, and all the writers of his school, specially by Archdeacons Wilberforce and Denison, Bishops Forbes and Moberley, Mr. Carter and Mr. Orby Shipley, and that this gross mistake underlies all the speculations and practices of the Tractarian or Ritualistic party with regard to this sacrament. No unprejudiced person can read Dr. Vogan's work without feeling that it is a very careful and searching investigation of the subject, conducted in an excellent spirit, with an earnest desire to do the fullest justice to the opinions which he controverts, and to treat those who hold them with the greatest possible respect. The appearance of such a work is, indepen-

dently of the value of its conclusions, a very rare and refreshing phenomenon in our controversial theological literature.

Dr. Vogan points out that the advocates of the real objective (or objective real) Presence in the Eucharist, who most strenuously insist on a literal interpretation of our Lord's words, as that which is most favourable to their view, have totally neglected, and kept entirely out of sight, a most material part of them. They have reasoned as if our Lord had said nothing more than "Take, eat, **this is My body**"—"Drink ye all of this, for **this is My blood**." The important qualification contained in the words, "**which is given**" (or "**broken**") and "**which is shed for you**," they pass over as if they were of no meaning or of no moment. But that which was to be eaten was not simply the body; that which was to be drunk was not simply the blood. It was the body in so far as given or sacrificed; the blood in so far as shed. At the time when the words were spoken the body had not yet been so given, the blood had not yet been poured out on the cross. That which the disciples ate and drank, could not be that body or that blood which had not yet come into being, and as neither has been in existence in the same condition at any time since, no one who has partaken of the Eucharist from the time of its institution can have eaten or drunk that body or that blood, in any but a purely spiritual sense. In such a sense the words of institution are no doubt as true now as ever. But they afford not the slightest support to the doctrine of the Real Presence, whether in the Roman, Lutheran, or Tractarian form. So interpreted, they are wholly inconsistent with the idea of a local presence on a material altar, which is common, and alike essential, to all those forms: and the scenic decorations of the Sacrament, lights, vestments, and ornaments of the altar, so far as they are significant of doctrine, become manifestly unmeaning, inappropriate, and misplaced, the question as to the "position of the celebrant" a mere waste of breath. Such being the character of Dr. Vogan's work, the manner in which it was received by the persons whose theological position it most deeply concerned, is very remarkable. One might think that a word had gone round through the Tractarian party, of general agreement to neglect and ignore it. The person who might most naturally have been expected to notice it in some way or other is Dr. Pusey. If Dr. Vogan's view of the subject is correct, a very large part of the labours of Dr. Pusey's life have been worse than worthless and useless. He has then—though with the best intentions—been in fact a blind guide, and has misled all who relied upon his authority, into mischievous error. He is responsible for the evils which distract the Church, beyond any other man. If his other occupations did not afford him leisure for answering Dr. Vogan—though one can hardly conceive any occupation surpassing or even

approaching the importance of this—he might have committed the task to one of his disciples. That none of them should have undertaken it spontaneously, is only a little less surprising than the Master's silence. Lookers-on will consider that silence as expressive of one of two things: either that he deems Dr. Vogan's work beneath his notice, or that he feels it to be unanswerable. No one who has read it will believe the possibility of the first alternative.

According to Dr. Vogan's view, the Eucharistic terms "Body and Blood" signify something which differs as widely as possible from the common familiar sense of the words. They are "food:" but spiritual food: food of the soul, such as cannot be placed on any material table or altar, which can be done only with the material symbols of bread and wine.

But then in what sense is it to be understood that the Eucharistic Body and Blood are food of the soul? By a simple and common figure the mind is said to be nourished by knowledge or the object of knowledge—truth. But such purely intellectual nourishment is not sufficient for the soul. None can supply its wants, but that which kindles the affections, animates the will, satisfies the deepest longings of the heart. Such a kind of truth must be supposed to be veiled under the figurative terms Body and Blood. The soul which receives and embraces this truth not with simple assent, but with emotions corresponding to its nature, may very fitly be said to feed upon it. According to this view, there is no presence of Christ in the Eucharist, differing in kind from that which is promised whenever two or three are gathered together in His name. There is no room for any adoration, though directed to Christ Himself, through any visible object. He is no more present on or at the Altar, than in the Pulpit. The wicked and unbelieving, who do not share the benefit of Christ's death, cannot partake of the Body and Blood. It may however be asked, If the words of institution are nothing more than a compendious expression and lively presentation of the truth that Christ gave Himself for us, must not the reception of this view tend to abate the fervour and veneration with which devout Christians have ever approached the Eucharist? And it must be owned that it may sometimes be difficult to translate the mystical rhetoric, in which the Fathers loved to indulge on the Eucharist, into language better adapted to the state of the case.

C. T.

July 25, 1874.

THE DIVISION IN THE CHURCH :

A DIALOGUE.*

R. How do you reconcile our Lord's promise, as to the indwelling Presence of the Holy Spirit, with the present divisions in the Church?

L. That is a question which seems to be meant to stand for an argument. As such we are very familiar with it in our controversy with Rome; and it appears to have great weight with many minds, among others with Mr. Newman. But you must be aware that many—indeed, the great majority of Christians—deny the existence of those divisions which you speak of as an indisputable fact, and consider their absence as one of the most conspicuous characteristics of their own communion. But, if you ask how, while rejecting this opinion, and taking an entirely different view of ecclesiastical history, I explain the fulfilment of our Lord's promise, I should feel obliged to decline offering what would be no more than a fanciful and unverifiable conjecture, at the risk of being supposed to attach some value to it myself, as if I had a clearer insight into the Divine counsels than others. But I might have answered your question with another, How do you reconcile the general corruption of manners which at various times has overspread the Christian world, and, in general, the existence of sin in the Church, with that promise?

R. I think I could give a satisfactory answer to that question. The promise of exemption from error did not include immunity from sin, because that would have required a supernatural interference inconsistent with the freedom of the human will.

L. That the Holy Spirit should have been tender of the freedom of the will, while foreseeing the abuse that would be made of it, is a supposition which presents no difficulty to my mind. But it would remain to be explained how it is that, on the same principle, He did not refrain from violating that great law of human nature, according to which an evil life not only burdens the conscience, but darkens the understanding, and is a fruitful cause as well of error as of sin.

R. Would not the preservation of the deposit of the faith be an adequate motive for such an interposition?

L. Possibly; but you do not seem to have considered the nature of the difficulty I suggest. Do you find it easy to conceive a succession of causes severed from their effects?

R. That would be a sheer absurdity.

L. I am not concerned to deny the fact; but I leave it to you

* This was the last production of the lamented Bishop, a portion of it having been dictated the day before his death.—[Ed. C. R.]

to describe it by its proper name. For me, it is enough to say that, to my mind, it is absolutely unthinkable.

R. You intimated that you could not admit the force of the argument, drawn by Roman divines from our Lord's promise, in favour of their Church; but you did not explain the grounds on which you rejected it. I should be glad to hear what they are.

L. Briefly and in substance this: I cannot consider an artificial, factitious unity, obtained by brute force and terror, as a work of the Holy Spirit, to whose nature it belongs that all His operations are wrought, not by violence, but by a sweet and gentle constraint, and a process of conviction and persuasion, acting on the understanding and the will. When the Church had been transformed from a suffering to a persecuting body, it appears to me that it could no longer be rightly considered, as in all respects the same, as that to which the promise related; and it would be contradictory to the order of the Divine dealings, so far as they are known to us, that this or any other promise, whether to Churches or to individuals, should have been made unconditionally, and without regard to the character and condition of those to whom it was given. Perhaps the most pernicious and shocking of all heresies was that by which knowledge was elevated above goodness: error on the most abstruse subjects which could occupy the human mind, regarded as the most atrocious of crimes, deserving the severest punishment. Surely the fires of the Inquisition did not come down from heaven, but were lighted from the pit; and the Popes, who are considered by their adherents as the personification and embodiment of unity, lent the whole weight of their authority to this false doctrine, and were the most active promoters of the extirpation of heresy by fire and sword; and this was not a mere passing cloud, which obscured for a moment the firmament of the Church, but an opinion with which she is possessed as firmly as ever to this day.

R. You know the arguments which are used to justify the employment of physical force for the repression of heresy, and by which humane and charitable persons have reconciled themselves to it?

L. Yes; they are grounded, partly on the enormity of the guilt attributed to the crime, and partly on the peculiar danger with which it is supposed to threaten the Church. What offence, it is argued, can be comparable in heinousness, to one which destroys the souls of men? and, again, who would accuse a physician of cruelty or hard-heartedness because he does not hesitate to prescribe a cautery, or the amputation of an unsound member, which would otherwise spread a fatal disease through the whole body, though it must cause the patient very severe pain? But these analogies, though specious, are fallacious. They

rest on the assumption, that lack of knowledge, or weakness of judgment, which in other matters are thought to call only for pity and help, in religious subjects, in which, in proportion to the greater difficulty of ascertaining the exact truth, any aberration would be the more pardonable, are accounted criminal in the highest degree.

R. Perhaps you would not deny that religious zeal has not rarely been sullied by impure motives, and that the founders and propagators of sects have been impelled by ambition, vanity, personal animosities and prejudices, and other motives quite foreign to the simple search after truth.

L. Such a denial would betray gross ignorance, both of human nature and of history, and is quite needless for any purpose of mine; but the facts admitted could only serve to prove weakness, not wickedness, and this last is what is required to sustain the arguments of the advocates of persecution. But a simple refusal to conform to the expression of orthodox doctrine, has always been held sufficient to establish the charge of *hæretica pravitas*. *What Inquisitor was ever known to allow the plea of honesty, earnestness, love of truth, and the like, as a ground of acquittal or a mitigation of punishment?* The persecutors can only justify their maxims and conduct by claiming for themselves the prerogative of the Searcher of hearts, and by practically blaspheming the Holy Ghost, by imputing their own uncharitableness to His inspiration.

R. That is awful language, and I should shrink from using it when applied to a period of at least comparative purity and fervour, to which we are used to look back as to a golden age.

L. Such reluctance is both natural and right, especially when it is a guarantee that the point in question has been carefully weighed, but it would be unwise to reject the evidence of history, because we cannot find a place for it in our system. No doubt the actual development of Christianity was widely different from that which would have been expected by Christians, who lived at the time of our Lord's departure from the earth, both with regard to the prolongation of the period which was to precede His second coming, and with regard to the events which were to take place, and the nature of the changes which were to pass on the character of the Church. One who heard the last words of comfort addressed by Christ to His disciples, might well be led to believe that the borders of the Church were to be enlarged by a series of pacific conquests, and herself to be constantly growing in faith, hope, and charity. Such expectations, however, were, as we know, doomed to disappointment.

R. You have warned me against intruding into the secrets of

the Divine government, by unauthorized and arbitrary conjectures, but I hope it is not inconsistent with reverent submission to the Supreme will, to consider what conclusions may be allowably drawn from that which is spread before us in the records of the past.

L. Such an inquiry may be both safe and profitable, so long as we take care to bear in mind, that what we see not only includes no part of the illimitable future, but is no more than the shell and surface of the things that are unseen and eternal.

R. I must own that I find myself bewildered by the vast multiplicity and variety of the phenomena, and unable to reduce them under any kind of general law or theory. You have bestowed much thought on the subject, and I should be glad to hear if you have been more successful.

L. The conclusions to which I have been led are partly negative, partly positive. I postulate two points as essential conditions of every Christian view of the subject. On the one hand, I utterly reject the claim set up by the Church of Rome to be the one and only Church of Christ; the terms on which those pretensions were denounced by the Reformers, were, in my opinion, not at all exaggerated, however they may have been tinged by a glow of righteous indignation. The history of the Papacy is, from first to last, a simply human history, and that, not only in the sense that every step of it was due to merely natural motives, without any indication of a supernatural interference, but also in the farther sense, that these motives were only those of ordinary selfishness, without anything truly noble and heroic, even when measured by any human standard, much less heavenly, but, on the contrary, of the earth, earthy, and such as could not be ascribed, without blasphemous folly, to the workings of the Holy Spirit. This, however, does not preclude the admission which I am perfectly willing to make, that many, if not the greater part of the Popes, who contributed most to the aggrandizement of the Papacy, themselves believed in its Divine origin. The general lack of critical intelligence in those ages, and the influence of personal interest, not the less powerful because it was unperceived, are amply sufficient to account for the fact, and I can easily understand how Gregory VII. might die with a cry of afflicted virtue on his lips. The sincerity of this conviction imparted a certain dignity and grandeur to their really iniquitous enterprises, and was one of the main causes of their success, and will probably long continue to exercise a powerful influence on minds of a certain class. The strength of the Papal Church lies in the weakness of human nature: (1) in its childish fondness for a pompous and glittering ceremonial; (2) in its slavish readiness to accept without inquiry any pretensions, however unfounded, if they are only put forward with a

sufficient degree of confident assurance; (3) in the cowardice with which it shrinks from the burden of personal responsibility, and is anxious to shift it upon another; (4) in the intellectual sluggishness which makes it impatient (as Thucydides observed) of the labour required for the investigation of Truth; (5) in the proneness to substitute outward devotional exercises for the realities of a religious life, and to take credit to itself for the performance of such exercises as meritorious works, in proportion to the trouble and annoyance they may have cost; (6) and the intolerance with which, especially in matters connected with religion, it resents dissent from its own opinions as a personal injury, for which it is ever ready to revenge itself by persecution.

July 26, 1875.

CONNOP THIRLWALL.



THE ETRUSCANS.

IT will be seen from a map of ancient Italy how the Tiber prescribes a natural barrier between the peoples of Etruria and Rome. Both, it would seem, had long submitted to this separation as if waiting, like the rustic, till the stream should pass ; and if the Etruscans were the first to cross, it must be said for them that they did so as emissaries of peace, conveying to the rising town of Rome models of the social, political, and religious institutions which they had found to answer best ; so that, in fact, it was with some show of reason that Rome was at times called a town of Etruscan foundation. In other directions, with the Apennines forming a substantial eastern frontier, and with the Tyrrhene sea washing the western coast, Etruria presents a picture of natural isolation at once strongly suggestive of the peace and prosperity which, in an early age at least, must have reigned absolutely there, and yet singularly at variance with the annals of a later period. That is to say, that with the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome began in that quarter a series of conflicts, the various operations of which, on one side or the other, are justly characterized as acts of treachery, massacres, and prolonged sieges, rather than open battles. At first the Etruscans, organized under Lars Porsena, of Clusium, compel Rome to yield up her footing on the farther bank of the Tiber, and to submit to humiliation in other forms (B.C. 507). The Romans, in turn, rapidly increasing their forces, become the aggressors ; and then follow fast events

in which the tragic and romantic element play strongly-cast parts, till, with the termination of the siege of Veii through the legendary stratagem of Camillus (B.C. 474), Etruria ceased her resistance to Rome. But Rome, though the most bitter and the least satiable, was not the only enemy of the Etruscans then. At sea they were defeated by Hiero of Syracuse and the Cumæans (B.C. 474), and, lastly, from the lofty Apennines stormed down upon them the destroying Celtic hosts. Nor was this all. These dates will bring to mind certain events of infinitely more moment which, though transpiring elsewhere, were yet of vast importance to them also. The Etruscans were allies of the Carthaginians, who again, there is no doubt, were leagued with the Persians to crush the free States of Greece. But on one and the same day, as it is said, the Persian fleet was shattered to the waves at Salamis, and the Carthaginian army laid prostrate at Himera in Sicily (B.C. 480). It must be seldom that history has had to record anything in which the modern mind, inspired as it is with love of freedom and hatred of Oriental oppression, has had greater sympathy than with the result of these battles. But while we are ready to adopt the most sweeping condemnation of the Persian empire, and to go far in joy at the defeat of Carthaginian ambition, how does it happen that for their avowed friends—the Etruscans—we cherish still a special fondness? It may be owing to the peculiar glamour which has been shed on their history by the Roman annals, and perhaps more to the fascination which has been exercised by their artistic remains. Whichever it be, or if it be neither, there the fact is still that a desire for more knowledge of the Etruscans, based more or less on a sympathetic feeling, continues to supply a powerful impetus to inquiry.

It is true that the labour of research has been most frequently directed to the explanation of the Etruscan language, or to the still less satisfactory question of the origin of the race. In both cases so scarce are the records and the facts, that there seems to be no theory which may not be advanced without fear of decisive contradiction. It was lately shown that the closest affinity existed between the language of the Etruscans and old German. Since then it has been demonstrated—but without the sacred office of the writer as a guarantee against the whole thing being a joke, it would hardly have been accepted seriously—that the language so constantly associated in most minds with classic civilization was of the Tartar stock. No doubt this habit of associating the Etruscans with the Greeks and Romans, founded as it is for the most part on the local contiguity of these races, and on a comparison of their artistic remains, has also led to some singular combinations, when its advocates have ventured into the field of philology. In at least one case it is hardly exaggeration to say

that the results obtained were little different from what would follow if it were attempted to identify the Russian language with Greek, on the strength of a few Russian inscriptions, consisting mostly of proper names. At first the identity would appear self-evident. Nothing short of second sight, in the familiar sense, could carry the inquiry a step farther. It may have been some such gift which guided Campanari in regard to Etruscan. But since to multiply instances of absurd results gained by hap-hazard inquiry does not affect the ultimate truth of a theory, and since this ultimate truth has not yet been positively ascertained by a universally acknowledged method of research, we must not in fairness advance beyond this position, that the Etruscans were simply the Etruscans, till they are proved to be something else, whether Greek or Tartar. Meanwhile the great bone of contention lies between those who declare the Etruscans to be a native Italian race, comparing them with the Latins, Umbrians, and Oscans, or more distantly with the Greeks as kinsmen of them all, and those who content themselves with insisting upon it that no such connection exists. On both sides the weapons are powerful, but with this difference, that in one case they are adapted to construction, and in the other to destruction. Possibly the victor will be he who, like Jason with the monster which guarded the golden fleece, flings aside his armour, and leaps down his enemy's throat. The fable of Jason was not, so far as we know, a parable about talking loud, nor is it here quoted to convey this meaning, though it might, perhaps, seem that we referred to Professor Corssen, whose first volume on the Etruscan language, recently published, is certainly remarkable for bulk. We mean rather that till one side can be persuaded to swallow the other, and perish in consequence, there will apparently be no peace. Yet this is not said under the influence of Niebuhr, and from disrespect to this branch of philology. At the same time there can be no obstacle to our indulging in favour of the Etruscans a classic prejudice so far as it is supported by their works of art. Nor need it compromise the issue if we give space to the views of the Etruscans themselves concerning their origin, or if we consider certain statements on this point made by ancient authors.

On the authority of Tacitus (*Ann.* i. iv. 55) it is stated that the Etruscans had declared in a public decree their consanguinity with the people of Lydia in Asia Minor, whence their ancestors had originally come as colonists. Against the substance of this statement, which had apparently been long accepted as correct, Dionysius had protested, denying the existence of any community of language or manners between them and the Lydians. He could, however, only speak of the Lydians of his own day, it is supposed, and not of their language and manners in the remote

age when the colony was assumed to have set out. By his time the native language of the Lydians had disappeared (Strabo xiii. p. 539). He must also have overlooked the following facts—that in the fashion of their dress, in their effeminate habits, their musical instruments, and, above all, in their partiality for the innocent game of dice at which Lars Tolumnius was playing when the Roman ambassadors were introduced to him at Veii, the Etruscans resembled the Lydians; that the name of *Ludiones* in the Roman circus had come from Etruria, and was significant of the Lydian origin of their occupation; and that, finally, certain weight attached to the story of the Lydian emigration as told by Herodotus (i. 94). Xanthus, a native historian, it seems, knew nothing of this emigration, but even dismissing his negative authority, it would remain a curious problem—unless, indeed, it be resolved by a simple appeal to human nature—as to how this offshoot of Lydia should have carried away with it the trifling invention of dice, and on the other hand should have neglected what, after all, was the greatest invention of the Lydians—coined money—so much that it is perhaps the scarcest commodity among the remains of Etruscan antiquity. If it be said that the dice may have been invented before coined money, so as to account for the colony setting out without the latter, we must not deny the possibility, but we may be allowed to make it a matter of congratulation that there was once an age when this game could not be played for a stake of money. As it happens, one of the most vital questions apparently in Etruscan philology at the present day turns upon a pair of dice, the sides of which are marked, not as usual with pips, but with inscribed words, each of one syllable. Nothing was more natural than to take these syllables as representing the Etruscan numerals from one to six. The difficulty was to find out where to begin, and in what order to proceed. Such being the circumstances, it did not seem amiss to put this half-dozen words through a vigorous comparison with the lists of numerals of all nations, and according as the comparison fell out to discover their order on the dice. Doubtless it would have been better to have first looked well at home, and seen whether the Etruscan numerals had not in fact been accurately ascertained, and whether, in that event, the new syllables agreed with them. Finding that they in no way agreed, Professor Corssen looked round for some other explanation, and by the bold stroke of combining the six separate syllables into four words, has produced an intelligible sentence out of them, to the effect that a certain *magus* had made the ivory dice as a present. As to the Lydian theory generally, it would be a pity to delay it longer in its passage to the limbo of unsubstantial fabrics, even by the conjecture that in early commerce there may

well have existed very intimate relations between Etruria and Lydia.

There still remains to be considered the statement of an ancient author who is not to be approached with levity. Thucydides (iv. 109), speaking of a native population in Thrace, affirms that they were of the Pelasgic race, which once had been settled in Athens and Lemnos. In the next breath he identifies the Pelasgi with the Turseni, but whether he had in his mind for the Turseni the people who in his own time bore that name, i.e. the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans, must be open to question. Yet it is worthy of careful consideration that those very peoples in Thrace of whom he speaks, together with the Bisaltæ, Crestonians, and Edones, with whom he couples them, have left us a series of silver coins which very strongly suggest a comparison with the engraved scarabs of the Etruscans.

While carrying out this comparison, it is not to be forgotten that the chief occupation of this Thracian population was to work the rich silver mines of the district; that the Etruscans excelled in metal-working perhaps more than in any other form of art or industry; and that, whether in die-sinking or in gem-engraving, a skilful use of tools is to be looked for, rather than originality in artistic designs. The gem-engraver and the die-sinker went to work in precisely the same way, and it is more than probable that one class of men did indifferently both kinds of work. As regards date, the earlier examples of this coinage—and it is they which best recall the scarabs—cannot well be placed after B.C. 500, since they are free from the manifest signs of deterioration from the original type observed in the coins of this neighbourhood struck by Alexander I. of Macedon, the contemporary of Xerxes. We arrive thus at a period in which what Livy says of the empire of the Etruscans by land and sea was still true, though destined soon to cease being so (*Tuscorum ante Romanum imperium late terra marique res patuere*). It is usual to quote this passage whenever a discovery is made north of the Alps of some bronze vessel, or other object in a different metal resembling in its decoration articles of the same form or class found in the oldest cemeteries of Etruria. But without endorsing this proceeding on all occasions, it is certainly not unreasonable to extract from the words of Livy this much of probability, that the Turseni of Etruria, in their communications by land, reached as far as the Turseni or Pelasgi in Thrace. One result, had these two peoples been originally of one race, as seems to be meant by Thucydides, would have been to maintain in its native character the artistic spirit common to both, such community, in fact, as may be seen existing between the coins of the Thracian Turseni and the engraved scarabs of the Etruscans. Encouragement to uphold

the probability of such intercourse is to be found, among other sources, in the favour pretty generally shown to the theory, which, from the likeness of Etruscan names, and particularly the national name of *Rasena*, to proper names surviving among the people of the *Raetian Alps*, seeks to prove that the Etruscans had entered Italy from that quarter. Livy (v. 33) had identified the *Raetian language* with that of the Etruscans, finding the difference to be only one of pronunciation, while Corssen (*Die Sprache der Etrusker*, p. 950) fully confirms the statement of Livy from existing inscriptions. The movement of the Etruscans in historical times is known to have been from north to south, while their scarcity of seaports is against their having entered by sea. But this argument, based on artistic grounds, is less powerful in reality than it seems, by reason of a reservation which must be made, that in both cases the designs are undoubtedly derived in their general scope from the Greek. So that it is only in the details where they vary from the Greek model that a community of artistic spirit is to be observed between the coins and the scarabs. Yet, with this limitation, the argument will have considerable weight, if we recollect, from the abortive attempt of *Cassivelaunus* to imitate the gold coins of Philip of Macedon, how even in the matter of imitation there is a style which is not to be mistaken. Indeed, were it not for this provision in the nature of things, many specimens of forged antiquities which can now be traced to their authors would remain unclaimed. Curiously enough, too, some of the earliest of these Thracian coins resemble the Greek style more than the later; as if, in the first instance, the design had been carried out under the eyes of a Greek artist. But now, while it is easy to see how the necessities of trade may have driven these Thracian *Pelasgi* either to reproduce, with as much accuracy as possible, the types of the coins then current among the Greeks, with whom they had principally to deal—for example, the coins of the neighbouring island of *Thasos*—or to adopt from the Greeks only as much of general style as would entitle the two coinages to compete fairly, what could it have been, short of pure artistic impulse, which led the Etruscans to follow up precisely this same proceeding, not in the production of coins for the exigencies of trade, but in the production of engraved gems to meet the mere demands of luxury and taste? No doubt there must have been in the period preceding the Persian wars a very strong temptation to copy or imitate works of Greek art among the various peoples whose trade and intercourse had made them acquainted with it, and perhaps also aware of the extraordinary activity with which, at that time, the small nation of the Hellenes was preparing to assert its still undivided supremacy in art. This much is certain, that the Greeks

had then, by their conspicuous advance in civilization, drawn upon themselves from the various powers which claimed to lead in this direction a hatred which implies intimate knowledge. Yet, among these powers neither the Phœnicians or Carthaginians, nor the Persians, have left any positive trace of an artistic impulse derived from the Greeks at that period. It may be said that national antipathy then ran too high for this; but that would hold equally good of the Etruscans who took part in the hostilities against Greece; and yet they undoubtedly imitated with artistic spirit the Greek models.

The evidence of a few coins may, in ordinary cases, go for little; but when it tends to confirm the statement of a historian, it is entitled to very considerable weight. Yet the coins do not here stand absolutely alone. Besides them, the modest bequest which posterity inherited from the Pelasgi of Thrace includes a few names of places with the peculiar termination of *scus*, as Drabescus, Doriscus, Nyrgiscus. It is a fact, that the same termination occurs frequently among names in Italy, for instance, Opsci, Volsci, Falisci, Gravisca, and particularly in the name *Etruscus*, in regard to which an authority of eminence * says, "the termination *σχοι* seems, in fact, to have been peculiar to the Pelasgi;" so that without experiencing the pleasure either of a numismatist in the importance of coins, or of a philologist in the value of verbal endings, we can, nevertheless, recognize this, that the coins and the endings together confirm the statement of Thucydides; and this is the more important, since no other source of evidence now exists bearing directly on the question. But Mommsen treats this statement as a mistake. Mr. Dennis ("Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria," i., p. xxxi.) is confident that the Etruscans and Pelasgi were of entirely different races, saying, "All history concurs in representing the earliest inhabitants of Etruria to have been Siculi or Umbri, two of the most ancient races in Italy—little removed, it is probable, from barbarism, though not nomad, but living in towns. Then a people of Greek race (the Pelasgi) entered Italy at the head of the Adriatic, and, crossing the Apennines, and uniting themselves with the aborigines or mountaineers, took possession of Etruria, driving out the earlier inhabitants; raised towns, and fortified them with mighty walls; and long ruled supreme, till they were in turn conquered by a third race called by the Greeks Tyrrheni or Tyrseni, by the Romans Etrusci, Tusci, or Thusci, and by themselves Rasena, who are supposed to have established their power in the land about 290 years before the foundation of Rome, or 1044 B.C." It is a simple expedient—unavailable on some occasions in early Greek history—to account

* Millingen : Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, ii. p. 86.

for new phases of civilization by the advent of new races. But before having recourse to it as a means of reading the Etruscan enigma, something positive should be made out in regard to the former seat of that people, and the route by which they entered Italy. Apparently, the only excuse for here inventing a new race is to be found in the persistently low estimate of the Pelasgi, between whom and the Etruscans the difference is thought to have been too great to admit of a theory of development. Our information concerning the Pelasgi is of that kind which is expected to be known by everybody, but which sadly vexes the historical student. Grote deemed it beyond his faculties. They inhabited towns surrounded by walls, the stupendous masonry of which seemed fitly to have been the work of the mythical Cyclopes. At Dodona, they recognized the voice of their god in the rustling branches of an oak. Their settlements were traced as far south as Athens; but, on the whole, they appear to have been more at home in the northern districts of Greece. For the rest, a tolerably free field is left to the imagination, with the result, however, of a singular uniformity in confining them to their massive walls, and in regarding them as little better than highland clans, skilled only in the construction of fortresses, or as a sort of pirates. They are pictured as dying out, or as avoiding that calamity for a time by retiring to their fastnesses before a new race and a new phase of civilization. Their survival in Thrace to a comparatively late period is an anomaly. No doubt exists as to their having once inhabited Etruria, and at least its adjoining districts of Italy. Many specimens of massive masonry attest this. Yet it is curious that the Pelasgi should not be readily believed to have developed into the Etruscans. Our business, as has been said, is not with the ultimate decision on matters of this importance. We desire only to assume—if it can be done under a decent pretext—that certain artistic tendencies preserved by the Pelasgi, Etruscans, and Greeks in common had come to them by a common birthright. To define this tendency, it will be necessary to make a more extended examination of the artistic remains of the Etruscans with reference to the well-ascertained stages of early Greek art.

Perhaps the first impression gained from a general review of Etruscan art is that, as regards style, it had passed through only two distinct periods, with no intermediate stage of ripeness, no single work of mere ideal beauty, such as Greek art displays. The later stage, represented chiefly by the numerous sculptured urns and engraved bronze mirrors, but including also the bronze *ciste* and a portion of the statuettes, does not call for many remarks. In the first place, when the subject is of a mythic or legendary character, the treatment, like the probably contemporaneous treatment of similar subjects among the Romans, is wholly in the

manner of late Greek art, from which, indeed, it would not be readily distinguishable but for the frequent presence of native demons on the outskirts of the composition or, more seldom, involved in it. But while in all subjects of this kind, in the manner of composition, and, what is more important, as will presently be seen, in the rendering of the human figure, they were dependent, having no native source of inspiration, on Greek models, it must yet be said that this dependence was one of affection rather than servile in its nature. It is impossible, for instance, that the immense numbers of essentially Greek designs on their engraved mirrors could have been taken directly from Greek mirrors, because the latter, with engraved designs, do not appear to have existed, and if they had, we may be perfectly assured, that the subjects on them would have been very differently adapted to the circular form of the mirror, as may be seen from the few—not above half-a-dozen—existing mirror cases, with incised designs, and the numerous painted cups of circular form. It was apparently a necessity among the Etruscans that the composition should cover the whole field available for it; and accordingly to work in on a mirror a design suited by its very nature for a triangular space, like the pediment of a temple, or for an oblong frieze, required artistic ingenuity which would hardly have been forthcoming, except in obedience to a strong affection for Greek models. As it is, the result is often painfully forced. But side by side with this imitation of the Greek in mythological, or ideal subjects, and in marked contrast with it, is the strong realism which prevails in the portrait sculpture, and always, so to speak, crops out in this later period whenever an object is to be sculptured in the round. In modelling in the round, the rivalry between art and nature is not to be settled by expedients as in drawing, not, at least, until an impulsive effort has been made to produce a figure substantially identical in external appearance with the living being. This impulse entirely swayed Etruscan sculptors in the execution of portraits. It followed them closely also when they reproduced those ideal figures in the round, the type, and form of which had been invented by the Greeks, as may be pointed out more or less clearly in perhaps every one of the existing statuettes from this period. In their portraits, there is a certain grossness which is wanting even in the worst Roman times, but is yet rather a sign of technical incapacity than of artistic feebleness in grasping the image of a person. They did not sin, as many now do, by mistaking exaggeration of conspicuous features or details for realism, a process which would never have helped them in what they sought and attained, viz., the expression of life. It is certainly to be regretted that this tendency to realism was practically crushed by respect for Greek models and tradi-

tions, since otherwise an accurate study of nature might at least have led to a new and locally peculiar treatment of the human figure in designs or composition in other respects copied from the Greek. As it was, the Greek proportions of the figure, Greek composition in groups, and Greek dress everywhere prevail, though nature in reality must have produced a different race of men there, and the climate required a different dress.

Turning now to the earlier stage of Etruscan art, we find it represented chiefly by the engraved scarabs, and a series of wall-paintings on tombs at Tarquinii, Vulci, Cervetri, and Chiusi. It includes comparatively very few objects of the kind already identified with the later phase of art, that is, mirrors and urns, so that there is a coincidence, with which it is impossible not to be struck, between the classification based on style and that based on the form, material, or destination of the objects. An urn or a mirror of really early date is as much an exception as is an engraved scarab or a tomb painting of a late period. But, after all, this may mean nothing more than that mirrors, being articles of luxury and fashion, would naturally be scarce till the later age of wealth, at which time also the modest scarabs would give way to the flaunting golden *bullæ*, which hang in chains round the necks of the *pingues et obesi* Etruscans, as they are figured on the lids of their sarcophagi. Even urns may have been seldom required in the early days, not that we would suggest patriarchal longevity as the cause, but for the reason that cremation, though freely practised among the primitive inhabitants, and again revived in Roman times, undoubtedly found little favour in the period of refinement with which we are now dealing. It will be observed that we have excluded from consideration the painted vases which have been found in vast numbers in the tombs of Etruria, and now constitute the bulk of most European collections. But these vases, though entitled perhaps to the name of "Etruscan," from the locality where they were discovered, are by no means to be regarded as the productions of Etruscan painters and potters. The inscriptions which frequently occur on them are as invariably Greek as the inscriptions on the bronze mirrors are invariably Etruscan. Many bear the names of Greek painters and potters, and finally they are, taken all together, obviously made by the same hands as the vases found in Greece itself, from which they must have been imported by the Etruscans. As illustrations of Greek art, however, they will serve the present inquiry by showing at least one source from which the Etruscan artist may have derived his subjects and compositions. And, again, it is worthy of remark that these vases, while abundantly representing the fictile art of Greece from about 550 B.C., or perhaps even 600 B.C., onwards, do not appear to include anything like a fair representation

of that art in the previous stage, usually described as Corinthian. Possibly the Etruscans imported vases not for use, but only as household ornaments, for which purpose the Corinthian class may not have been sufficiently enticing.

As yet the scarabs and tomb paintings have been spoken of as "early," on a tacit understanding that, though experts might be unanimous on the point, a more general and more obvious proof of the same was to follow. The intention was to point out certain indubitable features of "early" Greek art, and to conclude that if essentially the same features were presented by the Etruscan work, the term would be effectually justified, while at the same time each instance of identity between them would bear upon the main argument of a community of artistic spirit between the Etruscans and Greeks. The period of early Greek art may be set down as from about 700 B.C. to 500 B.C. Now, it is a matter of fact, and in no way dependent on individual opinion, that the remains of Greek art from this period represent with a remarkable preference the legendary exploits of heroes, the labours and adventures of Herakles and Theseus, the contest of Achilles and Memnon, the quarrel of Agamemnon and Achilles, and the incidents of the epic cycle generally. Not unfrequently there is a banquet scene, such, it may be, as those at which the deeds of the heroes were recounted. For some reason the myths of the gods are mostly avoided; and when they occur, it is noticeable that the types of the deities are different from the types familiar to us after 500 B.C. As regards the painted vases which here come in question, we may quote from the "Guide" to the collection in the British Museum: "The subjects represented in this period are generally myths taken from Homer and the epic cycle, hunting scenes, and games, and exercises of athletes." What is true of the vases is equally so of sculpture, as may be seen in the archaic relief from Samothrace in the Louvre, with Agamemnon, his herald Talthybios, and Epeios, the sculptor of the wooden horse, it is supposed; in two of the metopes from the oldest of the temples at Selinus in Sicily, now in Palermo, with Herakles carrying off the Cercopes, and Perseus cutting off Medusa's head; in the sculptured architrave, from a temple at Assos in the Troad, now in the Louvre, representing (1) Herakles overpowering Nereus, to the horror of a string of Nereids, whose dread is finely expressed by the rigid positions of their arms, and (2) a banquet scene, which admirably compares with what will be found in Etruscan art. But the result thus obtained from the remains of Greek art, instead of being open to the objection of being based on too small a proportion of ancient works, is strikingly confirmed by the descriptions which fortunately exist of some of the most important of the early sculptures. Pausanias (v. 17) describes the reliefs on the cele-

brated chest of Kypselos, the tyrant of Corinth, about 650 B.C., as consisting of forty-five distinct groups or scenes, the personages of which he gives by name. Of these, thirty-four are taken from the heroic legends, while of the remainder, only four can be strictly referred to the myths of the gods. These are Apollo with the Muses; Ares and Aphrodite; Dionysos, of whom Pausanias remarks that he was figured as a bearded man with ample drapery, which, it is known, was his appearance in early art; and lastly, Artemis, winged, and holding with one hand a panther, with the other a lion, as in the archaic gold ornaments from Camirus in Rhodes, now in the British Museum. In the other seven groups the deities occupy subordinate positions; Athene stands by Herakles when he attacks the Hydra; Zeus assumes the form of Amphitryon to visit Alcmene; Aphrodite assists Medea when Jason arrives at Colchis; Hermes leads the three goddesses to be adjudged of their beauty by the shepherd Paris; Eris, a personification of strife, appears between Ajax and Hector as they fight; Night carries the twin infants, Sleep and Death, in her arms; Justice punishes Injustice. The last two groups, it is true, are not of a heroic nature, but still less are they divine, being mere allegories. Then, again, if we take the description of the reliefs on the throne of Apollo at Amyclæ (Pausanias iii. 18), a precisely similar result will be obtained; while, to come down to a somewhat later date, it is only necessary to read the account (Pausanias x. 25—31) of the paintings by Polygnotos in the Lesche at Delphi, to see how completely the art of the time was under the dominion of the heroic legends. Nor had it, even under Pheidias, escaped from these traditions entirely, as the reliefs on the throne of Zeus, at Olympia (Pausanias v. 11), testify.

But this delight in the exploits of heroes, while occupying artists and epic poets, acted also on the more serious affairs of life. It led, for instance, the Athenians to search for, find, and bring back to Athens the bones of Theseus, and, above all, it led to a special reverence for the dead, which was perhaps nowhere equalled except in Etruria. Solon, indeed, thought the costly tombs and monuments of his day extravagant, and imposed a limit to them.

If, then, it has been clearly established that in the subjects of Greek art from 700 B.C. to 500 B.C., heroic legends prevailed to the almost complete exclusion of divine myths, we obtain a very simple test by which to try the remains of Etruscan art claiming to belong to this period, and apparently allied in spirit to the Greek. Of these remains, the engraved scarabs form by far the most considerable portion, and of them there is a fairly representative collection in the British Museum. Without reckoning many which from their rudeness are beside the present purpose,

there are to be seen 197 specimens, of which only ten bear direct representations of deities, and they again are not the deities with whom we are familiar in Greek art after the time of Pheidias. In one of the two figures of Athene here included, she has not a helmet, though she swings her lance, and strides as if to battle. In both figures it is to be noticed that the snakes which, in the usual type of the goddess, encircle the ægis on her breast, form instead a sort of fringe down the skirt of her drapery, darting forward their heads against her enemies. Three of the ten specimens give the head of Athene, one of them with this peculiarity, that the helmet is worn reversed, which, though at first sight ludicrous, is yet conceivably a simple archaic expedient to represent her in the character of a goddess of peaceful occupations, and, if need be, of war. The other two heads are unmistakably ancient copies from a coin of Corinth. From the remaining 187 scarabs, two more must be deducted as being personifications of Fate, and therefore belonging to the inferior order of deities. They appear as winged female figures moving with great speed. To make the speed more obvious, one of them is furnished with six wings, two springing from the shoulders, two from the waist, and two from the heels. The same phenomenon frequently occurs on the Assyrian reliefs. The goddess Artemis had wings on the chest of Kypselos, and on this point generally attention may be drawn to the circumstance that on the early vases are to be found many representations of animals, which, though in the main part quadrupeds, are yet furnished with wings. Curiously enough, too, birds which are fairly entitled to wings are comparatively rare. Next we have seven satyrs, for whom it is more difficult to find a place, because though in figure they were assuredly more human than divine, they were neither heroes nor associated with heroes, being, in fact, the amusing attendants of the wine-god Dionysos. On the other hand, Dionysos himself was, in one important phase of his character, a hero rather than a god, as appears among other incidents conspicuously in his expedition to India, so that the satyrs may perhaps best be ranged with the centaurs and Gorgons on the side of the heroes. Of the three Gorgons here reckoned two are represented only by heads, and the head of the Gorgon. it will be remembered, was viewed literally as cut off from her body, and as an object complete in itself. For some reason—whether to avoid a suggestion of decapitation as in this instance—the Etruscans seem only on the rarest occasions to have figured heads alone. The two heads of Athene already mentioned are copied, as was said, directly from a coin of Corinth, and in the vast collection of engraved mirrors published by Gerhard (*Etruskische Metall-Spiegel*), with its 430 plates, many of which contain from four to six specimens, there will be found, besides four heads

of the Gorgon, only five other heads, of which four are beyond identification, being apparently, so to speak, mere models, like the heads sometimes seen on late Apulian vases. The fifth is a head of Herakles. Yet heads are common on early Greek coins, and if the story of Butades, the Corinthian potter, is to be trusted, it will follow that the very first effort of Greek sculpture, was to render a head!

To sum up our arithmetical operation. Out of 197 scarabs, ten represent Greek divinities, two native personifications, and eighteen such fabulous creatures as centaurs, Gorgons, satyrs, syrens, and harpies, all more or less intimately connected with the heroic legends of Greece. On the remaining 167 scarabs, the subjects are exclusively drawn from these legends. It will thus be seen that there is a complete agreement between this result and that previously obtained from an examination of the remains of early Greek art, combined with the existing descriptions of Greek sculptures and paintings executed between 700 B.C. and 500 B.C. Again, it was a distinguishing feature of the Greek artists in this period, as compared, for example, with Assyrian sculptors, that they were fond of inscribing beside each figure its proper name, or even at times adding a descriptive couplet, while the Assyrians, not loath to inscribe their work, confined themselves to the glorification of a king. Of the two—and there seems to have been no other competitor then—it must have been from the Greeks that the Etruscans imbibed their habit of inscribing the names of the persons in their compositions. On the other hand, it is not to be denied that they may have acquired this habit from the Greeks after B.C. 500, since by the vase painters, at least, it was perpetuated, though with diminishing frequency, to a considerably later period, and possibly there were few Etruscan households without specimens of these vases. It will also be admitted, as has already been practically done, that these vases may have supplied designs for many of the later mirrors. But then between them and the scarabs of which we are speaking there is a wide difference, not only in the general class of subject and in the style, but also in the technical details of each. The vase painter attained his greatest success by skilful outlines and composition, the gem engraver by an elaborate and mostly overdone system of anatomical details. On this matter of style, however, and on the rendering of anatomical details, we propose to found a third argument, with the purpose of showing that the Etruscan artists, in following the example of the Greeks, could not have been limited, as regards models, to objects of art imported by them, but must either have been acquainted personally with sculptures of an immovable kind in Greece, such as those on temples, or must have developed contemporaneously, by a singular coincidence,

precisely the same feeling for and appreciation of the human figure.

Among the remains of Greek sculpture previous to B.C. 500, beyond all comparison in value are the figures from the temple of Athene in Ægina now in Munich. Primarily, they were simply architectural decorations, and the sculptor necessarily obeyed the conditions of the space available for him; so that, so far as the composition of his group was concerned, he was subject to the same laws as an artist working in relief. But in his individual figures—excepting of course that of the goddess Athene, when he was bound to a traditional type—he was as free as the sculptor of a statue. We have the same phenomena in the Etruscan scarabs—not a figure which, in its attitude, can be compared with a statue properly so called, and yet each figure has the details strictly proper only to a statue. As a rule, the action of the figures is such that, had they been sculptured in the round, they could not have supported their own weight. There is no such thing among them as that repose which Pheidias, to his fame, discovered, and his successors wisely maintained, even when rendering battle scenes, as in the friezes of the Mausoleum and the temple at Phigaleia in the British Museum. For it was as natural to the successors of Pheidias to produce repose of individual figures in the most agitated compositions as it was to his predecessors to exhibit a constant muscular straining, even in solitary statues, when the occasion demanded absolute repose. The archaic statue, for example, of Apollo from Tenea at Munich, and the Strangford Apollo in the British Museum, are strained from head to heel, though professing to be of a calm attitude. But such a condition of art is no other than what would be expected from the nature of the subjects with which it had principally to deal—exploits of heroes, and latterly, also statues of athletes who had won great victories at the national games. It seems to have been, indeed, the study of the figures of athletes, more than anything else, that brought about the intensely anxious reproduction of anatomical details in this period. But, before drawing a conclusion from this resemblance between Etruscan scarabs and Greek sculptures of the kind described as immovable, it is necessary to meet an objection which may arise from a combination of two facts—first, that celebrated sculptures were occasionally copied by the Greeks on their coins; and, secondly, that Greek coins were sometimes copied with accuracy by the engravers of the Etruscan scarabs. The objection would be, that in the latter, the designs may conceivably have been obtained through the medium of coins as a rule, though, on the other hand, among existing remains, direct imitations from the coins can only be found in comparatively few instances. And further it may be

added, to account for the presence of inscribed names on the scarabs, as compared with their absence on the coins, that the painted vases could have supplied them. These are mere possibilities, and may, if necessary, be simply set aside as such. Yet they are not here advanced from the not-uncommon desire of parading an imaginary foe for the sake of showing how complete the discomfiture would be. On the contrary, it would be a gain to admit them as realities, since then it would appear the more clearly that the Etruscans, instead of slavishly copying a coin for a coin, or a vase for a vase, possessed the artistic faculty of combining and adapting Greek designs for their own purposes. But, meantime, the records are not to be overlooked which speak of celebrated early Etruscan sculptures in the round executed mostly in terra-cotta. There is, too, the legend, now generally regarded as founded on historical fact, that certain artists, driven by the tyranny of Kypselos from Corinth (about B.C. 650), then the seat and centre of modelling in clay, had settled in Etruria, the likelihood being that the exiles had selected this country as a free and favourable field for artistic activity where art had already made some progress, and where the instincts or tastes of the people were in advance of what was supplied by their own native artists. But as a condition of admitting this to have been the motive of their choice, it would then necessarily also be accepted as extremely probable that the impetus from this new movement would have enabled Etruscan art to leap, so to speak, over at least one stage of its natural development. Its remains should decide this. They should represent, first, the so-called "Indo-European," or, perhaps better, "Pelagic" stage, the vestiges of which are to be traced in Greece, Italy, and the greater part of Europe, but nowhere more abundantly than in the North of Etruria and in Scandinavia, where, apparently, it was never superseded by a second phase growing out from or in any way connected with itself. Secondly, there should be, from the analogy of Greek art, a style in which figures of animals and plants formed the chief decorations; and, thirdly, a style in which the human figure takes the place of the animals and plants. From this point the development is steady, and not marked by violent changes. Now, the first and third of these stages are very amply represented among the remains of Etruscan art; but the second, though traceable on some few of the tomb paintings, and perhaps elsewhere, is yet, curiously enough, as conspicuous by its absence in two classes of Etruscan works of art, as by its presence in the same works of Greece. We refer to the numerous painted vases with figures of animals and plants found in Greece and the Greek islands, and to the engraved gems, mostly with grotesquely-disposed figures of animals, which of late have been frequently found in the Greek islands. Less stress may

be laid on the absence of the vases of this class, since it appears that the Etruscans at no time applied themselves successfully to vase-painting. But surely it is of much significance, as bearing on the question of the date of Greek influence, that the Etruscan scarabs begin at the third period of art—that is, at the period when Greek art for the first time separated itself finally from the hereditary manner of the Indo-European race, and assumed a distinct individuality. In its effort to reach this point, it had passed through the second stage of attempting a new manner under Oriental influence, of which, as has been said, the Etruscan scarabs retain no corresponding vestiges; and, indeed, taking Etruscan remains altogether, it may be confidently affirmed that such of them as relate to this second period are not adaptations like the Greek remains, but direct copies, which may equally well have been produced in the East and imported. While, then, there is no proof that the advent of Corinthian artists in Etruria had been preceded by the importation of Corinthian wares or works of art—that, in fact, they had followed in the wake of their trade—it must seem reasonable to suppose that these exiles, if not invited by admirers among the Etruscans, had founded their prospects of appreciation on favourable reports of the artistic tendencies of their adopted country. That they were well received there can be little doubt; and if they were not followed by others of the brotherhood in Greece, it was nevertheless now shown to Etruscan artists where models were to be found, if they cared to seek for them. The sculptures in Greek temples were free for their inspection.


The penalty of following impulsively some new and great example, whether in art, literature, or active life, is the annihilation of originality or creative force in the followers, a result which, in regard to art, is familiarly expressed by the word “school.” To be sure, there is also another penalty, consisting of a certain specious eminence attained by many who otherwise would be entirely incapable of any artistic combination whatsoever. But that falls on the outside public. Both consequences, doubtless, attended the spread of the great Greek example in Etruria, between 700 B.C. and 500 B.C. An impulse of this kind, while it carries along with it artists of ambition, leaves often behind persons employed in inferior branches of art, as may be seen, for instance, from this, that the sublime impetus of Pheidias passed over the heads of at least the gem-engravers and die-sinkers of Athens. As regards the latter, we are told that the traditional types of the coins were retained in the interests of commerce, and it is then apparently argued that, gem-engraving and die-sinking being in the hands of the same persons, a limitation set on the one class of objects would extend naturally to the other. But one would rather have

expected a contrary result, that these artists would have made an effort, had they felt the impulse, to assert their freedom when it was not denied them. Now, if there is one class of objects among the remains of Etruscan antiquity which more than another may correctly be assigned to a residuum of native artists left behind by the more ambitious imitators of the Greeks, it is the large class of gold ornaments and jewellery. So strikingly peculiar, indeed, are they that the essential difference between "Greek" and "Etruscan" in art could not be better illustrated than by a comparison of them with Greek productions of the same nature. In the latter, grace and beauty of design are supreme; in the former, taste certainly, but above everything a laborious minuteness, to which all energies were strained. Where a Greek would have made a pattern by means of a thin gold wire, an Etruscan preferred to carry out the same pattern with almost invisibly distinct globules, separately made, and soldered in the necessary order. Till lately the marvellous fineness of this granulated work was considered inimitable by goldsmiths. To the Greeks, at least in the active times after B.C. 500, the result, it is possible, did not appear to compensate for the trouble, though, on occasion, they did not spare prolonged labour, as may be seen in the celebrated Milo necklace in the British Museum. Examples of Greek goldsmiths' work, previous to this date, are extremely scarce, but when they do occur, as in the tombs of Camirus, in Rhodes, the likeness between some of them and the Etruscan productions, both in design and in the matter of granulation, is so striking that at first sight they might be regarded as importations from Etruria. It is noticeable among them that in the later specimens the actual and laborious granulation is superseded by an easily produced imitation which has the same effect as the dotted lines employed on the early Greek coins, and in a measure also in sculpture, to indicate hair and some other details, the modelling of which is an impossibility to all early artists.

If it were quite certain, as seems most natural, that in this matter the goldsmith has preceded the die-sinker, it could then be argued, to explain, first, the persistency with which the Etruscans clung to this form of work, and, secondly, the fact of these globules being, so to speak, rampant on the coins of the Pelasgi in Thrace, that both their nationalities had parted from the original race at a time when this branch of art had arrived at this particular stage; and that, in short, both were Pelasgi, and both kindred of the Greeks. This much is certain, that the dotted lines so conspicuous by their presence in early Greek coins and sculpture, by their absence after 500 B.C., pervade, like a second nature, Etruscan goldwork, apparently from first to last. To this day even, it is said, village goldsmiths in the Apennines retain the art.

It remains now to repeat as, in general terms, the result of our inquiry—first, that Greek art from the time when it assumed a distinct national character, somewhere between B.C. 700 and B.C. 600 onwards, had exercised a sovereign influence over the higher art of Etruria; secondly, that the lower form of Etruscan art, represented by the goldsmiths' work which never yielded to the influence of kindred work in the advanced times of Greece, but retained its primitive manner and style, is characterized by the same features as the primitive art of Greece; and, thirdly, that these primitive artistic features were common also to the Pelasgi of Thrace. That Etruria and parts of Greece had once been inhabited by the Pelasgi is an historical fact, and possibly no one will care to dispute that the primitive artistic element in question had been inherited from them, unless, indeed, objection be taken to the word inheritance as implying descent. For we still cling to the traditions of antiquity that the Etruscans and the Greeks were both distinct in race from the Pelasgi who had preceded them in the occupation of the soil. But if, instead of in this way having recourse to a new race, we were to assume, what cannot be called unreasonable, that both the Greeks and the Etruscans were descendants of the remote Pelasgi, we should be furnished with a very satisfactory explanation of the source of that artistic sympathy between the two peoples which it has been our pleasure to illustrate in the foregoing pages.

ALEXANDER S. MURRAY.



ON CERTAIN PROPOSED CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

IT is not long since England learnt from the rough teaching of experience that it is wise from time to time to reconsider her views of International Law with reference to foreign opinion, and to bring them into harmony with new and importunate facts. Still more lately, the attitude of the great military powers at the Conference at Brussels brought home to her that the strength of Continental Europe is in the hands of nations whose ways of thought and material interests are not those of a peace-loving and unarmed people. And the fears which accompanied the meeting of the conference proved that a dim consciousness lurks in the English mind that this strength may be used to mould the laws of maritime no less than of continental war. The nervous anxiety which displayed itself lest the usages of war at sea should be debated agreed badly with the outward complacency with which Englishmen regard their maritime position. If the nation had felt certain of ability to uphold its usages in the teeth of foreign desires, it would have been careless of a discussion the issue of which it intended to disregard. But its instinct was true; its disquiet is more justified than its content. Sooner or later, and possibly at no very distant time, Englishmen will find themselves in presence of a resolute attack on existing maritime law. And when that moment comes, it is to be hoped that their policy will have been settled upon a firmer ground than mere habit, and that, if existing rules are to be followed, the cost of their main-

tenance will have been counted. It would not be pleasant to be wakened out of a sleep of illusions to discover that the wishes of Continental nations are a force which must not be ignored. For it is beyond doubt that outside England a keen desire to alter maritime usages is well-nigh universal, and that, if no alteration comes, it will be because England is, in such matters, still strong enough to impose her law upon the world. That a craving for change should exist is only natural. It springs from traditional prejudice no less than from actual interests; and it has therefore every element of permanence and force. The States which have possessed, or hoped for, supremacy on the ocean, have laboured in turns to extend the privilege of belligerents; but when the Napoleonic wars gave the empire of the seas to England alone, the theories of maritime doctrine, which every naval people have contributed to form, became identified with the nation which profited by them most lately and most amply. It was solitary in its power, and it was solitary in its interests also. Its isolation is now the more marked that the nations which are most stirring, and which have risen into predominant influence during the last few years, are those which, from their unwillingness or incapacity to become great naval powers, had least inclination to tolerate practices to the advantages of which they were unlikely to succeed. Ninety-five years ago, Germany and Russia committed themselves to theories contradictory of English usage, and the United States have always been ready to accept views which might lessen or destroy the burden of a navy. Each has seen the triumph of some of the principles for which they have struggled; and partial success rarely puts an end to the wish for innovation. At the same time, their interests, and those of the minor powers, are more deeply engaged than formerly; their commerce and their mercantile marine have grown, and promise to grow still more; while their national fleets, though no longer insignificant, have little proximate chance of being able to cope singly with the navy of England.

It is certain that proposals for a change in maritime law will be made and pressed; and, in the present state of feeling, it is as certain that we shall look upon them with alarm, and reject them with impatience. Yet it is possible that a scrutiny of English interests in the present day may reveal that they are no longer what they were, and that England may be able to welcome changes which, though urged for the advantage of nations differently circumstanced, may be for her benefit as well. It is possible also that it may be found wise to go on standing in the ancient ways; but if so it is imperative to measure accurately the forces which will be put into action against existing international rule. In any case, it is necessary that the matter shall be thought

out, and the public mind be made to face it ; so that national action may not be paralyzed at a critical moment by doubt as to the right policy to adopt, and that the country may neither drift into a position of danger by inconsiderate adherence to traditional principles, nor lay up a store of future difficulty by equally inconsiderate entanglement in new engagements.

So soon as England is engaged in hostilities with a European or American State, the question will arise whether enemies' goods are to be freed from capture at sea ; and on the next outbreak of Continental war in which she is not mixed up, the claim that neutral States are bound to prevent the export of contraband will certainly be revived, and most likely be obstinately pressed. Ought, then, Great Britain to accept innovation in these matters, or ought she to stick to the old and recognized doctrines of International Law?

So far as the immunity of hostile private property at sea is concerned, the answer to this question obviously depends in the main upon whether England will do more harm to her enemies by capturing their property than she will suffer by losing her own. But there are two points, one preliminary, the other subordinate, which cannot be left altogether unnoticed. In the actual state of international morality and belligerent usage, is a nation justified in seizing the goods of hostile subjects ? and whatever the merits of the case, is it necessary to take into account the general dislike which is felt to the practice ? Fundamentally International Law has a very loose connection with morality. Part of it is a collection of arbitrary rules prescribing conduct in matters with which morality has nothing to do ; much of it is based on an assumption that right springs from the possession of brute force. No positive moral standard can therefore exist, and a nation is merely bound to conform to the spirit of the rules which it has been to the common advantage to adopt. It must not hold to special practices which fall below the general level of the customs by which humanity or enlightened selfishness have softened the reign of force ; but it is no way obliged to cultivate the solitary virtue of acting up to a moral ideal for the profit of its enemy and its own hurt. If we are to believe our good friends the Germans, and even others from whom perhaps moderation and temper might be more naturally expected, England does not conform to the spirit of the general rules of war, and existing maritime usage is a blot upon modern civilization which her criminal selfishness alone perpetuates ; the seizure of enemies' goods is an act of piracy, the legal principle which allows it a survival from the systematic robbery of the middle ages. On the other hand, we are invited to contemplate the benign rules by which the miseries of continental warfare are lessened, the firm recognition of the sanctity of private property which they embody, their incessant growth

towards more perfect humaneness. In their extreme form these assertions are simply grotesque. It is impossible to read them in the columns of newspapers with gravity, or in the pages of responsible writers without deep indignation. But the motives which underlie them are more or less consciously at the bottom of a great mass of perfectly honest desire for a change of rule, which, in virtue of its honesty, deserves to be treated with respect. It is worth while, therefore, to consider for a moment whether there is any plausible ground for saying that maritime customs are of low morality compared with the usages which prevail on land.

The essential principles upon which the rights of belligerents rest cannot be better put than in the words of M. Bluntschli, the most eminent German writer on International Law, and a warm opponent of existing maritime rule. "A belligerent," he says, "may do whatever his military operations require, that is to say, whatever is necessary to obtain the object of the war, so long as the general rights of humanity, and the received usages of civilized nations are not violated;" and what, in the opinion of the great military powers, these usages are, may be deduced from the rules which their representatives proposed or supported at Brussels, and from the action of the German army in France. What the view is of the American Government has been expressed in their instructions for United States armies in the field. From these excellent authorities it must be concluded that if the immunity of private property by land receives the homage of a theoretical recognition, its value in practice is limited by enormous and arbitrary exceptions. An invading army has a right in case of necessity—and when armies are numbered by hundreds of thousands the necessity will always arise—to exact such supplies as it may need of provisions, of clothing, and of means of transport; it may levy contributions in money; it may employ the population in the indirect service of war. In other words, it may eat the food out of the mouths of the people, it may deprive them of the means of moving what is left to where it may be wanted, it may take the bread-winners to work, and leave their children to starve. It would be hard to cite a maritime war in which private property has been seized in the course of six months to the value of the £16,000,000 to which the contributions and requisitions amounted which were levied by the Germans in the occupied districts of France. True, an invading army with bitter mockery gives receipts for the goods and the money which it exacts. It seizes without compensation, but, in its infinite care for the rights of property, it presents the owners of its spoil with vouchers of a loss for which their own government may indemnify them if it chooses. And what is to prevent the government of the State to which a captured vessel belongs from indemnifying its owners in like

manner? In what would the seizure of property at sea differ from its seizure on land by requisition if an act were performed which the capturing belligerent can neither compel nor forbid? In both cases property is taken against the will of its owners because the belligerent considers that its possession will bring nearer the submission of his enemy. If there is any difference between the two, it is that maritime capture has a more immediate tendency to bring about its end. Its pressure is direct: the seizure of property on land merely facilitates the performance of military acts which could be otherwise provided for. I have no wish to pretend that maritime war presents an agreeable spectacle. But it is not for the spokesmen of military governments to demand that it shall be waged by sprinkling one's enemy with rose-water. Morally England is justified in practices, if she thinks them necessary to her success at sea, which are indulged in on land in the mere wantonness of strength; and she may shut her ears without compunction to the cheap virtue of nations who damn sins they cannot see their way to commit. The loose assertion and looser rhetoric which is common abroad is only important in so far as it indicates a certain force of opinion; and the next business is to determine how great this force is. For it must not be supposed, because the treatment of private property at sea is primarily a question between belligerents themselves, that therefore the weight and bulk of opinion is of little importance. Neutrals will not throw their sword into the scale for the sake of an abstract principle; but their interests will be directly affected to the extent that their trade with the belligerent whose ships are captured is carried on in his vessels and by his merchants. They may suffer by the privation of commodities which are necessary to their comfort, or to the existence of their industries; and their traders may see their profits disappear in the forced sales which they are practically reduced to make when vessels laden with their goods are captured and taken into the ports of a country which is not their intended market. If the injury which they receive is not enough to move them to active interference, their neutrality will become malevolent, and an inclination to embarrass the power which hurts them will grow, the more that they look upon the mischief which is done to them as unnecessary, and the motive which causes its infliction as unjustifiable. It is needless to preach to Englishmen of the evils of a malevolent neutrality. Their measure in English estimation has been given by the eagerness with which an agreement with America was clutched at, which the keenest apprehensions could alone render intelligible, and necessity alone could justify. When people are disposed to quarrel, occasions of quarrel never fail to present themselves; but, given malevolent feeling,

there is at least one source of collisions which can be indicated beforehand with certainty. So long as the law of contraband continues to exist, a neutral government may wish to guarantee the legitimacy, or hide the noxiousness, of the trade of its subjects by the use of convoys; and as convoys were formerly often used to cover traffic in forbidden goods, so now they might be used by a malevolent neutral with equal ease to protect belligerent shipping. In the heat generated on the one side by the interruption to which commerce would be subjected, and on the other by the suspicion with which convoys would be regarded, disagreements would occur, the consequences of which it might not be possible to limit. The maintenance of the right of search has already once led us to disaster and to shame; it has not yet exhausted its capacities of ill-doing.

The first occasion on which the principle of the immunity of private property at sea was brought seriously within the range of practical politics was when the United States refused to accede to the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering was abolished. In an elaborate note, Mr. Marcy defined the view of his government with much frankness. It was a cardinal principle of national policy that the country should not be burdened with the weight of permanent armaments. If, therefore, the United States engaged in hostilities, it would be necessary, under existing usages, to supplement their inadequate navy with the resources of private enterprise; but the inferiority of their naval power would compel them to limit themselves to defensive tactics, and their main object must be to provide for the safety of their commercial shipping. If this could be otherwise assured, they would readily abandon the right of employing privateers; and he suggested that the "private property of the subjects of one or other of two belligerent powers should not be subject to capture by the vessels of the other party, except in case of contraband of war." The attitude thus taken up by the United States was that most in accordance with their permanent interests. Secured from continental war by their remoteness and the extent of their territory, it is through their commercial marine that foreign powers, with the doubtful exception of England, can alone attack them. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, in 1870, Mr. Fish expressed his hope to Baron Gerolt that "the Government and people of the United States may soon be gratified by seeing the principle" of the immunity of private property at sea "universally recognized as another restraining and humanizing influence imposed by modern civilization on the art of war;" nor that a treaty should have been concluded, in 1871, between the United States and Italy, by which it is stipulated that private property, with the exception of contraband, shall be exempt from capture. The feeling of

Russia has not been indicated with equal precision, but it shared the views of the United States in 1854; and it is not likely that a State which has always been a prominent advocate of change in maritime law, and which has seen the tonnage entering and clearing from its ports increase 134 per cent. in ten years, while in naval force it still occupies the fourth or perhaps the fifth place among the great powers, will have been converted of late into an adherent of the existing usage. In 1866 an Austrian imperial *ordonnance* declared that "ships and their cargoes belonging to a country with which Austria is in a state of hostility cannot be captured at sea by vessels of the Austrian navy, nor be condemned by the Austrian prize courts, so long as the State to which the ships belong observes a strict reciprocity." The condition was observed by both Prussia and Italy. The latter had, in fact, already passed a marine code, in 1865, by which the capture of mercantile vessels of a hostile nation by its vessels of war is forbidden in all cases in which reciprocity is observed. The Parliament of the North German Confederation, in 1868, unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the government to secure the recognition of the principle in question, either by negotiating for separate treaties, or by obtaining a general declaration from the European Powers. No attempt seems to have been made to give effect to the resolution, but, on the outbreak of war in 1870, Prussia declared that the merchant vessels of its enemy should not be subject to capture, whether the French Government recognized or ignored the magnanimity of abandoning a right which the German navy was powerless to enforce. In the fervency of his zeal for humaner law, Count Bismarck took measures to impress upon France the merits of the new doctrine. He responded to the confiscation of German vessels by imposing a fine of 100,000 francs on each of the occupied departments, and by sending as prisoners to Bremen forty notables of Dijon, Gray, and Vesoul. A zeal so warmly manifested will find other occasions for its exercise; and it is not uninteresting to note that the Austrian Government suggested, during the negotiations for peace, that Germany had then an opportunity of getting France to surrender the right of seizing an enemy's property at sea, and that "in this way the means of bringing about an agreement at the next European Congress would be facilitated. The Government of the German Emperor would undoubtedly be certain of the support both of Russia and Italy."

England therefore stands alone with powerless and discredited France in affirming the ancient doctrine. The persistent American Government, the not less persistent statesmen of Germany, have declared for a change of rule; they are known to be supported by the more powerful European countries, and it is not

likely that the minor States will refuse to accept a principle by the adoption of which they have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Under ordinary conditions, the right of capturing private property at sea enures to the advantage of the State possessed of the strongest navy, provided that it is sufficiently able to defend itself by land. But the minor States are no longer in the position of Holland and Denmark in the last century; they are no longer superior at sea to their larger neighbours, and they are all, with the exception of Spain, so open by land to their probable enemies that maritime escapades, if they were able to indulge in them, would be likely to prove a costly luxury.

If we turn from the action of governments to the expressed opinion of the people whom they govern, dislike to the capture of private property at sea is seen to be as widely spread, and its expression, freed from the restraints of diplomatic reserve, becomes more energetic. It is not only in the wild talk of German newspapers that France is accused of having violated the principles of existing law in having captured German merchant vessels during the war. Unaltered as the traditional doctrine is as yet by prescription or by general international consent, there are publicists who can permit themselves to teach that its authority is nullified by what they are pleased to consider its immorality. M. Bluntschli, whose intimate relations with the Prussian Government lend exceptional importance to his views, says that—

“Although maritime war is directed against the State and not against individuals, and although according to natural law private property ought to be respected at sea as well as upon land, several maritime powers still recognize the right of seizing and bringing in vessels which are the property of the enemy's subjects, and of confiscating the so-called hostile merchandise found on board;”

and adds that the “true modern principle” is enshrined in the resolution drawn up in 1859 at Bremen by a congress of merchants, who pardonably considered that the seizure of their property would be iniquitous. Few other writers commit themselves to statements of equal daring, but Calvo, Rolin Jaquemyns, Pierantoni, Ahrens, Lawrence, Woolsey, and a crowd of less known authors unite in advocating or approving of a change of doctrine with an influence which extends far beyond the limits of their respective countries. Ortolan, Hautefeuille, and Heffter in a qualified sense, are perhaps the only modern foreigners of acknowledged position who adhere to the hitherto received doctrine.

If the drift and force of English opinion were under consideration, it would be unnecessary to dwell upon the views of text writers. Even in municipal law we are little accustomed to accept

the theories of systematic students; and in matters in which we honestly admit that policy has a large share in our decision, the national will would be little moved by the efforts of self-constituted teachers of an ideal doctrine. Jurists themselves, hardly tempted to wander from the firm ground of existing rule, are with us generally willing to abandon the future to the care of statesmen. But on the European Continent the commentaries and dicta of legal writers enjoy a far different authority. In the minds of people accustomed to Roman law, they have something of the quality of *responsa prudentum*; and if in municipal law a check upon their influence is exercised by the existence of codes and of the court which interprets them, in the ill-defined and unsanctioned international custom which is embellished with the name of International Law, it may be used to impose every vagary which theory or interest may suggest. In treating of International Law, writers, impatient of the shifting and uncertain nature of its principles, and craving to introduce a precision of which it is incapable, have always been too apt to find its rules, not in usages by the method of historical inquiry, but by an abstract method in the dictates of natural law, the precepts of which, born in the imagination of its interpreters, react upon the mind with all the strength of the divine origin with which they are credited. They form the basis of a faith, perfectly genuine, but attended with the rare convenience that it lends its authority with equal facility to either of two inconsistent doctrines. It can declare that private property is sacred, and that "aggression is a natural right, the extent of which is measured by the power which God has bestowed on the aggressor." Principles so elastic are sure to be insensibly moulded at the demand of convenience, and no examples can probably be found in which the lofty doctrines of foreign publicists are at variance with the real or supposed interests of their country. But the solid practical value of a faith is no obstacle to its acceptance as true by the masses, and they are not less likely to believe in the iniquity of English policy that they expect to gain by its discomfiture.

But, after all, the policy of granting immunity to the private property of an enemy must be judged by its direct effects in war. Is England likely to put such stress upon her enemies by the capture of their ships and the blockade of their ports as to make her own losses of small account? or is she likely to gain so much by the safety of her own commercial marine as to render it wise to forego the right of destroying the commerce of her enemy? The answer would not be uncertain if the conditions under which a maritime war were to be now carried on resembled those under which England kept the seas in the great days of old. But in

some ways they are startlingly altered for the worse, and in none is it clear that they are bettered. Her probable enemies are not more vulnerable than before; perhaps they are less so; while she is herself far more open to attacks upon her trade, and the consequences of attack may be graver. In picturing the incidents of a future maritime struggle, the mind naturally recurs to the time when the navies of France had been swept from the seas, and their few remaining ships lurked behind the guns of Rochefort and Brest. Now and then a frigate ventured timidly out, and spread momentary alarm through the Channel; a few privateers worried the more defenceless traders; but, as a rule, British commerce was undisturbed, and Europe was supplied with its necessities by written permission of the Government of England. But to produce effects like these, a naval force requires not less to be omnipresent than strong. When war was declared in 1803, Pitt pronounced the number of available ships to be alarmingly insufficient. Yet 270 frigates and smaller vessels were ready to harass the commerce of the enemy, to blockade his coasts, and to protect our own trade. When war ceased in 1814, 157 frigates and 437 cruisers of other classes were in commission. It may be true that in 1875 the British navy is superior in combative strength to any forces that could be united against it. It is not the place here to affirm or deny the pretension. But after deducting from the list of its vessels those which its line of battle would demand, and those which are unsuited for the destruction or protection of commerce, it is hard to enumerate a hundred and forty sail, from the *Agincourt* to a gun vessel, which could be used for all the varied duties entailed by the enforcement of our present policy. While, therefore, in 1803 trade was protected by one cruiser to every sixty-six vessels of the mercantile marine of the United Kingdom, each vessel employed in like manner would now be charged with the care of a hundred and eighty-two traders; or, to make the same comparison in another form, in 1803 every cruiser guarded 7,650 tons of British shipping entering or clearing outwards on foreign trade during the year, and in 1875 the amount so protected would be 32,000 tons, or more than four times as much. Of course the number of cruisers would be soon increased. Mail steamers would be armed, and every building slip of sufficient size would contribute its quota to the fleets of the nation. But vessels of the weight required in modern warfare cannot be improvised by the score. They are costly, and they take long to build. The resources of England, great as they are, would be strained in the production and maintenance of the 600 and odd giants which would be now needed to do the work of the 594 puny cruisers of 1814. What matter? it may be asked. We have more ships now

than our adversaries would have, and we can add more rapidly to their number. But it does matter. It is not merely a question of destroying the commerce of our enemies, it is one of protecting our own. Paucity or relative weakness of vessels is of far less importance for attack than for defence. The aggressor has choice of time, place, and object of attack; and the power of making this choice has become more valuable in proportion to the means which steam has given of striking rapid and unexpected blows. But convoying or covering ships must be ready at every moment, present at every point, and able to fight the best of the vessels employed by the enemy in raiding upon commerce. Trade cannot be safe now, as it was seventy years ago, unless our cruisers swarm, as they swarmed then, in every water where our merchant flag is seen. And after all it may be questioned, whatever their number, whether their task could be effectually performed. Steam and electricity have enormously increased the difficulties of blockading a coast, and it was proved in the American war that it is impossible to prevent a considerable proportion of fast vessels attempting ingress or egress from succeeding in their object. Cruisers are not less able than merchantmen to elude a blockading force, and if its vigilance forbids them to bring in their prizes, they have only to burn them and sink them. It cannot therefore be assumed that English commerce would be carried on under no greater risks than those to which we have been accustomed in the past, if a war were now to break out with the United States or France, or even a while hence with Germany or Russia. It is true that the precautions which neutral States are compelled by modern opinion to take against a violation of their neutrality limit the area within which the vessels of a nation destitute of colonies can commit depredations. It is no longer the custom to permit belligerents to bring prizes into neutral ports, except in cases of necessity. It is likely that, under a growing usage, cruisers would be forbidden to receive supplies of coal greater than those necessary to carry them to their own country, and would be refused permission to remain more than twenty-four hours at a time in a neutral port, unless ill-will towards England, or expectation of her defeat, suggested disobedience to a rule which has not yet hardened into strict law. But the Atlantic can be scoured from Europe or America without the use of foreign harbours, and in some maritime wars hostile vessels would find ports of supply within reach of the China or West Indian seas. In order that a severe stress should be put upon England, that the sources of its wealth should be deeply touched, more deeply perhaps than those of nations whose vessels it might at the very moment be driving from the seas, the number of ships captured need not be large.

Commerce is sensitive. English commerce is more sensitive, because more essential to the life of the people, than that of any other country; and uncertainty may injure it as fatally as actual loss. We are not without warnings to guide us in forecasting its effects. During the whole course of the American civil war, the Confederate cruisers seized no more than 169 vessels, of an average size of 510 tons. Nevertheless the ordinary sea rate of insurance of thirty shillings per ton on vessels trading to England was gradually swelled by the addition of a war rate to seventy shillings; and in 1861, and the two following years, 388,830 tons of United States shipping were transferred into English hands, against 47,620 tons in the three preceding years. The degree in which the existence of a state of war further affected the American marine by arresting ship-building is rendered doubtful by the general substitution of iron for wooden ships which took place coincidentally. But after making all reasonable allowance for the results of this change, it is startling to find that, while the tonnage of vessels belonging to the United States entering their ports in 1861 exceeded that of foreign vessels by 2,806,363 tons, in 1866 the excess of foreign over American tonnage so entering was more than 1,000,000 tons out of a total of 8,000,000, and in 1871 was more than 2,500,000, out of a total of 10,000,000. But the American civil war was in no serious sense a maritime war; and the amount of risk and consequent terror caused by the few weak vessels of the Confederate States is no sufficient measure of the harm which would be done to the mercantile fleets of England by the efforts of a people who began war in possession of a navy,—who could build vessels for itself, and who, if unable to contest possession of the seas, would devote its whole force to throwing British trade into confusion. To what height such confusion might rise may perhaps be indicated by the history of the insurance rates paid on cotton from the Confederate ports. The extra war rate, which in 1862, was 35*s.* a ton, grew with the stringency of the blockade till it reached 60*s.* at the commencement of 1864. During that year it sprung sharply up to 100*s.*; then to 120*s.*; and at last quotations became nominal, and insurances almost ceased to be effected. As in a monetary crisis, so in maritime commerce, distrust up to a certain point of intensity produces only strain and inconvenience. That point passed, action becomes suddenly paralyzed, and results follow wholly out of proportion to the extent to which the cause of distrust has increased. It is not probable that the Thames or the Mersey will ever be affronted by blockading squadrons, but it would be rash to say that a stress far short of that produced by blockade would not be enough to give birth to panic among the multiform industries of England. If, in such a state of things, British shipping

were to pass to neutral owners, there is no certainty how much of it would ever return. It is hard to guide commerce away from a path which it has learnt even for a short time to tread. It might be long before England recovered that mastery over the carrying trade of the world, which it now possesses, or even before she could rescue the supply of her own markets from the grasp of foreigners. Meanwhile the shipping of her enemy would be ruined. Granted. But the prosperity of neither France nor the United States is so closely identified with their navigation as is that of England with hers; and the transfer of every Russian boat into German or Swedish hands would not throw out of cultivation an acre of the ground from which the riches of the empire spring. If two men set fire to each other's houses, he is apt to lose most who has most to lose.

The custom of seizing private property at sea appears, in fact, to be of more and more doubtful advantage to England, as we turn from its possible effect upon shipping to that which it is likely to have in other ways in the well-being of the nation. With the exception of England, the great powers, taken as a whole, are countries which import commodities the use of which they can forego for a time, which raise for themselves the necessaries of life, and which, at a pinch, can obtain what they require by land transport. England alone draws from abroad raw material, on which most of its wealth and part of its subsistence depend; it alone, destitute of a land frontier, is a slave to the freedom of the seas. The statistics of the imports and exports of Russia, of the United States, and of France are eloquent of the contrast between their position and that of England. Germany, from the form in which its returns are made up, cannot well be brought into comparison, but it differs in no essential respect from the other powers. The only raw materials important from their value which reach Russia by sea are raw cotton, cotton yarn, and unmanufactured metals; the only manufactured articles, deprivation of which would cause serious embarrassment, are metal wares and machines. In 1870 the value of the former amounted to £7,730,259, and of the latter to £5,093,252. The United States import no raw material in considerable quantities except iron and tin, of which the value in 1872-3 was £8,002,528; no important manufactures, except that of machinery, depend upon foreign products for their existence; and cotton, linen, and woollen stuffs, which may possibly be looked upon as necessities, were introduced to the value of £11,256,425. France approaches more nearly to England. Excluding articles of food, the six commodities of which the largest quantities enter the country are raw materials destined in the main to be manufactured, or to be used in manufacture. The value of the silk, raw cotton, wool,

timber, flax, and coal imported in 1871 was £50,032,000. But the six corresponding commodities imported into Great Britain in 1873—viz., cotton, wool, timber, flax, &c., silk and hides—reached a gross value of £117,790,327. Again, take the value of the sea-borne exports. Those from Russia amounted in 1870 to £41,483,308, and from France in 1872 to £131,401,686. The United States in 1872-3 reported seawards domestic commodities to the value of £133,614,060. From Great Britain the value of the merchandise exported in 1873 was £310,994,765. But it is in matters touching life rather than mere prosperity that the comparison is most unfavourable to England. Russia imports no necessary food except salt and fish. Of these, a large proportion enter by land, and the value of the remainder amounts only to £811,000. The United States suffice to themselves. France may be taken to retain for her own consumption, out of the grain and flour which she imports, a quantity to the average value of little less than £4,000,000 yearly; and in 1872 the imports of animals, meat, and salt fish, by sea, exceeded the total exports of the same articles by about £500,000. But England, in 1873, drew upon the world outside her for £71,103,778 worth of the barest necessities for her own consumption—for grain, rice, and potatoes, for animals, bacon, meat, and cheese. In that year 207 lbs. of foreign wheat, wheat-flour, rice, and foreign potatoes were consumed per head of the total population of the United Kingdom; while in 1803 an importation of less than 1½ lb. per head of wheat and flour were enough to supplement the produce of the country. Large also as the importation of food already is, it increases every year disproportionately to the growth of population. In the three years beginning with 1859, 6·98 lbs. of foreign bacon, cheese, rice, and potatoes were consumed per head of the population; in the three years beginning with 1866, the quantity of the same articles used was 16·88 lbs.; and in the corresponding period beginning with 1870, the quantity was 37·42 lbs. In the event of a maritime war, it would be impossible at once to hand over to neutrals the care of importing the vast mass of necessary commodities. Ultimately the task might fall too wholly to them, but for some time the bulk of the food imports, no less than of the materials which are needed to supply the looms of Manchester and Bradford, would continue to be borne in our ships. Merchandise would be liable to capture, markets to panic, and the distress which restricted production, consequent upon high prices, would impose upon the working classes, would be intensified by the dearness, and perhaps by a scarcity of provisions. In face of these facts, it may be permitted to doubt whether the belief that England has any interest in maintaining belligerent privilege at sea is not a mere superstition, and whether Mr. Cobden was not

right in saying that "Englishmen have, above all other people in the world, an interest in extending the Declaration of Paris so as to include the exemption of private property from capture by government vessels." Shall we bring our wars to triumphant issues by depriving ourselves of bread, and our enemies of wine?

The common and most plausible argument for maintaining the actual law of the seas is that Great Britain, not being a military power, cannot relinquish any means of bringing her enemies to terms; that if the immunity of private property at sea were recognized, a defeated navy need only retire within the protection of its harbours to render its country no less than itself inaccessible; and that before long commercial blockades, the last weapon of maritime States, would slip from their hands, because, the freedom of private property being admitted in principle, its confiscation would no longer be justified, except when the character of merchandise makes its supply to an enemy a direct aid to his hostilities. To take the latter point first; there can be no doubt that a campaign would be opened against commercial blockade by the advocates of the immunity of private property at sea so soon as the recognition of the latter principle had been secured. But the surrender of one usage does not theoretically follow from the abandonment of the other. The capture of enemies' property at sea has no aim beyond the immediate injury caused by the act itself; a commercial blockade, on the other hand, is a military act in so far as it involves an occupation of the territorial waters of the enemy, and sometimes it is an indispensable part of an offensive plan. An army does not permit hostile trade to be carried on through its lines or across the territory which it occupies; and detached forces are often engaged less in strategic occupation than in denying to the enemy the fiscal and commercial advantages which he would reap from the possession of his own provinces and his own roads. A blockading squadron holds a strictly analogous position. It occupies a part of the hostile territory, and in virtue of its military superiority within that territory it forbids the access of commodities, and dries up the sources of customs revenue. In exceptional cases, a commercial blockade materially affects the issue of hostilities. That which closed the ports of the Confederate States was an essential element in a system of compression on every side which was intended to stifle into inanition a country inadequately furnished with the necessaries of war. Seizure of private property therefore for attempted breach of blockade is not the end in itself; it is the exaction of a penalty for interference with an act which, in the exercise of his military discretion, a belligerent declares to be necessary for the attainment of his objects. It is wholly independent of the general immunity from capture of private property at sea.

For the present, however, the right of blockade is unthreatened. The first objection is the immediate and practical one. Is it true that England, in giving up the right of seizing private property at sea, would surrender the best or the only means of reducing her enemies? It is not a complete answer to say that it has been proved, if it has in fact been proved, that she has more to gain than lose commercially by an abolition of the practice. A gun may be more likely than not to burst in one's hands, and yet it may be better to use it than to be wholly unarmed. But if the gun will not carry to where one's enemy is standing, and there is no way of getting near him, it is best to go home and draw the charge. And the latter is very much the state of things nowadays with respect to the capture of private property at sea. The value of the privilege has been destroyed partly by the magnitude of our own victories, partly by the concessions which were made to neutrals in the Declaration of Paris. When the policy of maritime States centered in the possession of colonies and of a monopoly of colonial trade, and when enemies' goods could be torn from the custody of a neutral, disasters to mercantile shipping and the capture of private property swept commerce from the ocean, and seemed to pierce to the heart of national prosperity. But no other State than England is now a great colonial power. Great Britain is surfeited with colonies. She has no wish for those that are left to her former adversaries; colonial monopoly is an abomination to her, and her enemies may buy in her own or in any other markets, sure that the goods which they have bought will be delivered by a neutral carrier. It is conceivable that a great State might go to war to rob England of her colonies or her commerce; but it is not conceivable that Germany, or Russia, or the United States would end a war undertaken for serious objects in order to save their mercantile marine from loss or even from extinction.

The fact is, whether we like to face it or not, that in a purely maritime war England can reap little profit, and might find ruin. On the one hand, the vast extension of her trade has made her indefinitely more vulnerable. On the other, she cannot put decisive or even severe stress upon any probable foe by merely capturing his merchant navy. Even the right of blockade may be of doubtful use to her. On the greater part of the Continent of Europe its efficacy has been annihilated by railways. Except in the improbable case of the whole land frontier of an enemy being occupied, he could import every foreign commodity generally with little addition to its cost, never with such additions as to be an insuperable obstacle to its purchase. A war with France would merely divert the trade of Havre and Marseilles to Antwerp and Genoa; a blockade of the Elbe and the Weser would merely

crowd the quays of Rotterdam. It is assuredly a matter for grave consideration whether, under these altered circumstances, it is worth while to maintain a traditional policy in defiance of nearly universal opinion, or whether it would not be better to accept a change which may be to our advantage, which cannot hurt us much, and which leaves untouched in the smallest particular that fighting strength of our navies which, far otherwise than the plunder of merchantmen, gave into our hands the empire of the seas.

If, however, the interests of England seem not only to permit but to demand that concession shall be made on one of the two great branches of International Law which are threatened with revolution, in respect of the other it is at least open to argument whether the interests of England do not equally demand that existing law shall, at all costs, be upheld. What that law is can be open to no doubt. It rests upon the broad principle that the commercial acts of an individual cannot compromise the neutrality of the State to which he belongs. The subjects of every State have a general right to carry on trade with governments or individuals with whom their nation is in amity; and as it is only through being members of a State that they have rights or duties in reference to other persons, in dealing with any one not a member of the same State they have only to note in what relation he stands to their own government. If that relation is friendly, they must not commit unfriendly acts, and therefore when he is at war they must not aid in the hostilities of his enemy, but, except to this extent, his quarrels are immaterial to them, and in performing colourless acts, dictated neither by benevolent nor by hostile feelings, they are not bound to consider in what way he may be accidentally affected. Commercial acts, done in the way of business, are of this colourless nature. They are innocent on the part of the individual, and they afford no presumption of unfriendliness on the part of the State to which he belongs. But, however legitimate neutral traffic may be in its motive, it is often highly noxious to a belligerent, and he is therefore permitted to take such measures, within places where he has a right to act, as are necessary to protect him from injury. In the case of merchandise contraband of war, he can seize goods on the high seas, and can confiscate them. On the one hand, in doing so he is not held to commit an act of war against the neutral State; on the other hand, the latter, by abandoning the trader to him, is freed from all responsibility. The convenience of this usage is obvious, and at no time since International Law assumed definite form has its authority been uncertain. The practice of nations has been invariable, and at the rare moment when pretensions at variance

with the admitted principle have been put forward, State papers have vindicated it with equal clearness and decision. Of late, however, some writers on International Law, more especially in Germany, have asserted a contrary doctrine, which was unfortunately echoed in English newspapers during the war of 1870, and which has been raised into practical importance through its adoption by the German Government. M. Bluntschli, for instance, while admitting the general rule that a neutral individual is permitted to trade at his own risk in contraband merchandise, pretends that although "the neutral State cannot be asked to prevent the issue in small quantities of arms and munitions of war, it is altogether different with wholesale export." The latter gives a sensible advantage to one of the two parties, and in the larger number of cases is, in fact, a subsidy." The principle that State responsibility exists at all being once admitted, it would be impossible to measure its application; and in the complaints addressed to Lord Granville by Count Bernstorff it is nakedly paraded without shame or affectation. England was distinctly accused of acting in violation of her duties as a neutral in suffering the export to France of coal and horses, and in permitting contracts to be entered into by the French Government with English houses for the supply of arms and ammunition; she was held "morally responsible for the blood which was being shed" through "the permission of such abuses;" and she was told, as Belgium has since been told, that it is "the duty of every government to bring its own law into harmony with International Law," as understood by the statesmen of Germany. It might be supposed that this language was no more than the petulant expression of that ill-temper which characterized the ordinary German view of English conduct at the time, especially as, with strange inconsistency, the clearly non-neutral sale to French agents of surplus munitions of war, direct from the public arsenals of the United States, excited none of the bitterness which was poured out on legitimate trade in England. But the supposition is forbidden by the language of Prince Bismarck at a subsequent time. In 1872, Count von Beust informed his government of a conversation with Lord Granville, in which the latter had mentioned a declaration on the part of Prince Bismarck that acceptance of the rules of the Treaty of Washington by Germany must depend upon the extension of State responsibility to the sale of arms and munitions of war; and a modification of International Law to that effect would be so clearly in the interests of the power entering on war in the highest state of preparation, that it is not difficult to believe that the German Government will urge the new doctrine on every convenient opportunity. That no remonstrance was addressed to the United States, and that the controversy with England was

dropped, may be accounted for by the discovery, made while the correspondence with Lord Granville was going on, that, under a Treaty of 1828, contraband of war on its way from the United States to an enemy of Prussia was not liable to confiscation. As yet, it is true, Germany stands alone in a distinct attempt to reverse the established law, though some of the complaints made of the conduct of France by the Government of Marshal Serrano came perilously near to an assertion of a like principle. But the happy accident of peace is the only reason for the momentary quiet in which the subject lies. Every great military power, or, in other words, every State which is looking forward to wars in which it hopes to win by the excellence of its organization or the mass of its forces, has an interest in denying to its adversaries the means of filling their arsenals after the outbreak of hostilities. The more that military success depends rather upon long and painful preparation than upon the qualities of an individual, the less will the possessors of great armies tolerate interference with the rewards which they consider their foresight to have earned. Supplies obtained in neutral markets may adjourn, but can hardly change, the issue of a war. But the ease with which warlike stores can be bought wholesale, the readiness with which they can be transported by steamer and rail, the quantities which the vastness of modern armies demand, may strike the imagination of a belligerent in fact, and certainly afford him a pretence for declaring that his enemy owes his power of resistance to neutral aid. An arsenal falls, and the enemy makes a contract in England or America for half a million of rifles; an army surrenders, and Sweden is stripped of horses to furnish the new levies with transport. Every day that an overgrown army remains in the field adds new weight to the burdens of the nation; every day that a citizen army is away from home, the strain upon the feelings of the whole population becomes more tense. It is not altogether to be wondered at that in the heat of war a German lost his temper with whatever helped to prolong the agony of France and his own inconvenience. We may be sure that a like cause will always produce a like result. The next successful belligerent will be equally irritated, and will have equal occasion to vent his irritation on England. This would signify little but for two reasons. First, that Lord Granville infelicitously said to Count Bernstorff that "Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to enter into consultation with other nations as to the possibility of adopting in common a stricter rule;" and secondly, that the principle of a stricter rule has been so far admitted as to render it somewhat difficult to escape from a further application of it. So long as the duties of a neutral State stopped short at the obligation to prevent an act of war from being committed or prepared

in its essentials by the belligerent within the neutral territory, a broad and wholesome distinction existed between non-neutral and commercial acts. But so soon as England conceded that she ought to prevent the fitting out, even as a strictly commercial act, of a vessel which, when delivered into belligerent hands, is intended to be used for warlike purposes, she granted that, in some cases at least, traffic in merchandise ought to be restrained because of its inconvenience to a belligerent. An armed ship, apart from her fighting crew, differs in nothing from guns or military accoutrements, except that it approaches more nearly to a completed means of attacking an enemy. This, however, is a mere matter of degree, an accident of the nature of the merchandise; and unless it was intended to assume State responsibility for all contraband trade, the duty of hindering the export of armed ships ought not to have been acknowledged, without a distinct understanding that a concession was being made of a wholly exceptional character and for wholly exceptional reasons. No such precaution was taken. In obedience to a fatal habit which seems to be ingrained in the minds of English statesmen, the particular case was dealt with as it arose; the particular cases of the future were left to take care of themselves; and the history of the controversy with the United States, together with the language used by Lord Granville to Count Bernstorff, suggests a fear that British governments may drift into the acceptance of a principle, the immediate consequences of which would be sufficiently intolerable, but of which the full scope would only gradually betray itself.

On the threshold of the matter lie practical difficulties. Before a State engages to prevent the export of contraband it ought to know, and before it can prevent such export it must know, in what contraband consists; but at present no such knowledge is possible. According to the view which is identified with the practice of France, and which was adopted by the members of the armed neutrality, contraband may be defined as consisting of guns, small arms, swords, projectiles of all sorts, sulphur, saltpetre, accoutrements, and harness. England, refusing to be bound by a rigid catalogue of objects, looks upon merchandise as contraband which is essential in the particular case to the operations of war. Thus coal, which in the English theory is in general free, becomes contraband when immediately destined for the fleets or naval ports of a belligerent. Germany, in complaining that coal was allowed to leave England for any French destination, seems to have included whatever commodities are susceptible of remote warlike use. As things are, therefore, a neutral country would be unable to satisfy any one. Each party to a war would think that it received a mortal injury by the adoption of its enemy's list; and if the neutral administered his own law, England, or Germany, or

the United States would be saddled with the invidious or impossible task of deciding whether under the actual circumstances a particular article was essential to the prosecution of the war. It is clear that a definition common to all States is the condition precedent of State action; but it is equally clear that a common definition is impossible. England cannot agree to exclude marine engines; and France, after losing her eastern provinces, can less than ever be asked to stretch her list to the inclusion of coal. In the long run, therefore, each nation must be allowed to give effect to the definition of contraband which best suits itself. So long as the State remains free from responsibility, differing usages are compatible with the absence of serious friction. The belligerent settles matters with the trader in his own way. Import State responsibility, and international disputes become inevitable. It is not to be expected, no doubt, that the maintenance of existing law will save England from annoyance or from danger. It would be vain to hope that a great war will come and go without manufacturing nations being exposed to ill-feeling, which, however little they may deserve it, attends necessarily on their position as sellers of useful goods. But it is not well to change a law under which quarrels are likely, for one under which they are certain.

Another practical difficulty was well pointed out by Lord Granville in his answer to Count Bernstorff. "Exportation," he argued, "if prohibited, would be certainly clandestine; the nature of a cargo, and the destination of a vessel would be entirely concealed." It would therefore be necessary "to establish an expensive, intricate, and inquisitorial customs system, under which all suspicious packages, no matter what the assumed destination, would be opened and examined." This "would cause infinite delay and obstruction to innocent trade." According to Count Bernstorff, trade with neutral countries is not to be interfered with, "but how would it be possible to avoid this? A ship carrying prohibited articles would invariably have a colourable destination. How is this to be detected without interfering with the trade of neutrals, if even then?" Count Bernstorff suggested the exaction of a bond from shippers, "but such a measure would be most onerous to the mercantile community, would be easily evaded, and at the best would be no security against ultimate destination." In other words, the neutral State, after harassing its own innocent commerce in a vain attempt to satisfy the unreasonable exigencies of belligerents, would find itself as much as before the object of their complaints and suspicions. Its precautions would be evaded, and the fact of evasion would never be admitted as an excuse. It would be told to render its laws more stringent, to alter them till they were sufficient for their purpose; the ingenuity of its own or the


belligerent trader would be imputed to it as a crime, and at the end of each war a bill for damages would, as a matter of course, be sent by the victor to every neutral whom he thought himself able to intimidate or cajole.

But behind the practical difficulties, in themselves sufficient, there lies a still more fatal objection of principle. The only ground on which a demand can be placed that a neutral State shall forbid its subjects to trade with a belligerent in articles of contraband is that it is a duty to prevent them from doing anything, from whatever motive, which may indirectly assist him. There is nothing special in the nature of traffic in contraband separating it from other mercantile acts, which can at present be done at the private risk of the trader, or without any risk at all. To consent to prevent the issue of contraband from neutral territory is, in principle, to consent to exercise a general supervision over trade in the interests of a belligerent. The introduction of goods into a blockaded port may indirectly assist a belligerent in the highest degree. If contraband trade is to be prohibited, there is no reason why a belligerent should not next ask that the neutral government should stop all vessels sailing with possible intent to break a blockade; and if it could be shown that the military resources of a country were increased by the importation of confessedly innocent commodities, it is hard to see by what reasoning a neutral could justify a refusal to bar his subjects from supplying a belligerent with them. The sale of railroad iron, or of iron ore to a country destitute of mines, would remotely enable it to supply itself with guns. It is, of course, extremely unlikely that any attempt would be made to push the application of the principle to so absurd an extreme, but a gross case best shows its inherent monstrosity. There is a certain superficial plausibility in the demand that a neutral shall not supply the enemy of his friend with the arms which are to be used a few weeks afterwards for the friend's destruction; but when it is seen that the demand simply amounts to a claim that such neutral trade as a belligerent from time to time finds inconvenient shall be stopped for him, without exertion of his own, sympathy vanishes, and one asks irresistibly what there is of divine in the state of war which gives it the right to call upon all the interests of peace to humble themselves before it. Hitherto it has been content with a compromise. Belligerents have been allowed to put such restraint as their own strength and vigilance enabled them to exercise. Neutral trade was a normal fact, like the armed force of an enemy, to which they had to calculate, and with which they had to cope. Now they must be relieved of the trouble, and the rights of peaceful folk must be lost in the noise of arms. England, as the greatest producing nation, and as the nation to which efficient prevention

would be the most difficult, is called upon, above all others, to resist. Already it is a question whether she has not bought immediate ease at the cost of an undue probability of future embarrassment. It is to be hoped that neither cowardice nor a false humanitarianism will lead her further along a path in which it is very simple to go forward, and very hard to go back.

To conclude: Two established customs of International Law are menaced with extinction, or with radical change; neither can be touched without the interests of England being deeply affected; and the question is whether English interests are better served by resistance or consent. At present a vague sentimental impression that it is not fair to help one friend to slaughter another, and a certain horror of war in itself, make Englishmen ready to clutch at anything which professes to lessen its evils. Hence they are not on the whole indisposed to submit to a stringent interpretation of their neutral duties. On the other hand, full of the memories of naval successes gained in days when success and the seizure of hostile goods were inextricably mixed up with each other—unwilling to admit the truth that in the present condition of the world, though an island State may be safe behind the protection of its fleets, it must impose its will abroad, not by its ships, but by its armies—Englishmen still cling to the belief that victory is bound up with the capture of private property at sea, and they repel the bare suggestion of yielding a right which they regard as a condition of their greatness. In both cases sentiment and prejudice are the true foundation of their views; and neither sentiment nor prejudice are safe advisers of national policy. It is time now for Englishmen to clear their eyes from the mists of lazy thought, and to look facts steadily in the face. Let them beware lest they are being obstinate when they ought to concede, and yielding when they ought to be firm.

W. E. HALL.



WEST INDIAN SUPERSTITIONS.

IN bringing such a subject before the English public, one has the advantage of entering upon comparatively unbroken ground. The number of these superstitions is so great, that some, at least, will almost certainly be new to every reader of this REVIEW. Even to West Indians themselves, familiar with many of these extraordinary beliefs from their childhood, some mentioned in this article will be new, from the fact that they vary greatly in different islands of the Caribbean group, so greatly that sometimes the superstitions connected with the same thing are almost directly opposite in islands geographically very near each other.

The character, too, of many of the superstitions is such that there is an interest attaching to them not dependent upon the way in which the subject may be treated.

The study of them is, and has always been, to the writer a very fascinating one. It would naturally be so from his profession. But it has other attractions besides its bearing upon professional duties. There is in these things a wide-enough field for guessing as to their origin and meaning. It is but guess-work, as of course we possess but few data to give us any clue to the meaning of many opinions that have always had a firm hold on the minds of the ignorant in these islands, or to the purpose of many practices that obtain among them, whether these be of directly African origin or otherwise.

They are amusing enough from their very absurdity. But he

who would root them out of negro minds will find he has a harder task than he bargained for. Many generations must pass; education must be much more widely diffused; and religion must become much more of a reality, before the hold of these notions can be even loosened, whether they be only West Indian forms of European or American superstitions, or whether they be direct African importations.

The writer has found great difficulty in inducing people who believed in these superstitions to tell them to him. They have a sort of feeling that these things are in themselves wrong, and therefore they shrink from telling them to "the parson." And they have an instinctive perception that you will laugh at them.

Some superstitions, common in these parts, are not peculiarly West Indian. They have been transplanted bodily, and the only thing to be remarked about them is that they find a congenial soil in the Caribbean Archipelago, and flourish as vigorously as in their native homes.

Such, for example, is the belief about a parson's giving a vessel a bad passage—a superstition that has evidently sprung from the bad results of Jonah's presence in a certain vessel. An old West Indian skipper once told me that he had remarked that if you carried more than one parson at once you were all right. The old fellow thought that one acted as an antidote to the other. "The trouble is when you have *only* one, sir," he said to me; "no matter how favourable the wind has been, it is sure either to go dead ahead or to fall off entirely."

Such another superstition, prevalent in almost every Christian land, is that thirteen is an unlucky number at dinner—unlucky, at least, for the one who leaves the table first. This belief is by no means confined to the lower orders. There is no wonder it should be so wide-spread and so deeply rooted when its origin is remembered. Most know that it sprang from the fatal result which attended Judas, the first who left the table at that most wonderful supper ever known on earth—the supper at which the Great Master and his chosen Apostles made the thirteen.

As might be expected, the most abundant of all West Indian superstitions are those connected with dead bodies and funerals.

When one of our people has a sore or bruise of any description, he will on no account have anything to do with a dead body. The sore is made incurable thereby, or almost so. This notion is very prevalent both in St. Croix and Grenada, two islands widely different in every respect, as unlike in their physical conformation, in the habits and manners of their people, indeed in their character altogether, as two West Indian islands can be. But in neither of them will any person who has a sore, follow a funeral. Even if the sore be on the leg or foot, and thus be covered, it matters not.

Go to that funeral you must not, if you wish the sore to get well. Even if the deceased be so near of kin to you that you must needs be one of the funeral procession, beware how you have anything to do with getting the body ready for the grave. You must not be about the corpse in any way.

Instances of the firm grasp this notion has on the negro mind can be readily furnished by any clergyman in these islands. And it is far from being relaxed even in minds that have received some cultivation. I recollect a black man in the island of Grenada, who was very intelligent, and had read a good deal, and was also a member of the Grenada House of Assembly, who assigned a bruise on his foot as the reason of his absence from a funeral where I had expected to see him. He alluded to it as a matter of course, and was apparently astonished at my being unable to feel that his excuse was a good one. This was a man, who, though entirely self-taught, could quote Shakespeare, of whom he was very fond, with great accuracy, and at much length. Doubtless, even on that occasion, he consoled himself with his favourite author; and, although he did not say so, he thought that there were "more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in my philosophy."

In St. Croix, a very slight bruise indeed is sufficient to make it highly dangerous for you to have any dealings with a dead body. At one of the first funerals I attended here, I was putting on my gown and bands at the house where the corpse lay, and I happened, in fastening the bands, to give my finger a prick with a pin, sufficient to draw a drop of blood. One of the people present earnestly entreated me not to go into the room where the dead body lay in the yet uncovered coffin. "You must not look upon the dead now, sir," said the woman—a good woman too.

Possibly this belief in the harmful powers of dead bodies may be connected with the Jewish notion of the uncleanness that came from touching the dead. Not that there is any repugnance in these countries to touching, or being with a dead body as such. Our people are only too ready to crowd in to see a dead body, to sit up with it at night, to wash it, or aught else, provided only there be no sore in the case. Then they give the corpse a wide berth.

Even sore eyes are made much worse by looking on the dead.

But yet, strange to say, the superstition in Barbados is that, if any rum be used in washing the corpse, the person who will use it afterwards for washing the eyes, may then and there dismiss all fear of bad eyes for the future. You are thus safe from cataract, or any other eye ailment—such is the magic power of this disgusting remedy. And, verily, any one who could be found willing to go through such an ordeal ought to have his reward in eyes

made strong enough to last him his lifetime. Some of the authorities in Barbados, however, hold that it is not necessary for the living to use the very rum which has been used for the dead, so the washing of the sore or weak eyes be performed in the presence of the dead body.

In another respect, too, the Barbadian superstition about contact with a dead body differs from the St. Croisian. The touch of a dead hand has a wonderful effect upon all swellings and chronic pains. I believe that, even in Barbados, there ought to be no abrasion of the skin; but of this I am not quite sure. Anyhow, as regards the pain or swelling, any old Barbadian negro woman will tell you how to cure it—ay, even when the “great doctors” have given it up. You have only to get into the room at night with the corpse, take its hand, and pass it carefully over the swollen or painful place. You can then go away quite sure that the swelling will go down, or the pain diminish, contemporaneously with the decay of that dead body in the grave.

But now comes the important point. You must go into the room *alone*, and remain in it *alone* all the time, or else there is no more virtue in your friend's dead hand than there was in his living one. Yes, alone you must encounter him. And what, then, will you do with the “duppies,” as they call ghosts in Barbados, or “jumbies,” as they say in St. Croix?

It is true you can take a light when you go in to do the rubbing, and we all know that jumbies, or duppies, or whatever they are, can't bear light, except it be pale, dim moonlight. That will be a little help. But still there is a risk. Woe betide him who dares in Barbados pass a light, whether lamp or candle, across a dead person's face, or even hold it over it! Such an outrageously venturesome person would soon have the lamp of his own life extinguished as the price of his temerity!

Alluding, as I did just now, to the practice of washing the dead, reminds me of a custom prevailing in St. Croix among those who perform that unpleasant office, or who otherwise assist in preparing the body for the coffin. They are almost sure to take home with them, and keep in their own homes, something immediately connected with that body. It may be a lock of hair, or it may be some garment, or even a fragment of a garment. But be it what it may, something must be taken, if the spirit of the dead is to be prevented from molesting those daring ones who ventured to tamper with the place of its late habitation.

Of course it is difficult to give the rationale of any particular superstition. This last may, however, be perhaps explained. At first thought, it seems most natural to believe that the surest way to prevent any visit from a dead man is to take nothing of his with you. But not so. A liberty has been taken with his body

by one who is probably a total stranger, hired perhaps for the express purpose of preparing him for his coffin. Now, if you take something of his, something that is either a part of him, or has been on his person, you in a sense identify yourself with him; you establish, as it were, a kind of relationship, and thus the liberty you take with him must seem much less to him.

Kinglake relates, in "Eöthen," a similar custom prevailing among the people of Constantinople. When an Osmanlee dies, one of his dresses is cut in pieces, and every one of his friends receives a small piece as a memorial of the deceased. If it be true that the infection of the plague is in clothes, then, as Kinglake observes, this is certainly a fatal present, for it not only forces the living to remember the dead, but often to follow and bear him company.

The disgusting and heathenish practice of having dancing during the night, while a corpse is in the house, prevails among the negroes in many West Indian islands. Revolting superstitions are probably connected with this custom, which seems at once to transplant us to lands where the light of the Gospel has not yet penetrated. All old negroes, when asked about it, say that this custom came from Africa.

We pass now to superstitions connected with funerals, where also we have a wide field—too wide, indeed, to be occupied within the limits of a single article. These are perhaps more plentiful in Grenada, St. Lucia, and Dominica, than in other West Indian islands.

In all the islands rain at a funeral, or on the day of a man's burial, is thought a good sign about him. The old superstition, expressed in the saying, "Blessed is the dead that the rain rains on," prevails here as in Europe.

There is a curious practice, not uncommon among the very ignorant in Grenada. When a corpse is passing through the door on the way to interment, the bearers will let down the head of the coffin gently three times, tapping the threshold with it every time. I have been told that this was to let the dead bid farewell to his house in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. We say to let *the dead* bid farewell, for that the body is merely the tenement in which the man lived, the machine through which he acted, is an idea which the negroes have in no wise realized yet. They are far, generally speaking, from believing that the living, sentient man is gone, and is living for the present in a separate existence. The body to them is still the man.

Sometimes a gourd, or a small cup, will be thrown into the grave just before the coffin is lowered. It is brought from the house of the deceased and contains earth, or perhaps, if the people are Roman Catholics, it has holy water, brought from church on Good Friday, and kept hitherto as a great charm.

I have, in Grenada, seen the bearers of a corpse running at a tolerably quick pace, and, on remonstrating about the impropriety, I was told that the bearers could not help it, as the dead was running. Both the bearers and my informant firmly believed this; and he was a shrewd black man, who could read and write, who was thriving as a cocoa-planter on a small scale, and was even a communicant of my own church. He proceeded on that occasion, in proof of his statement, to relate to me many cases he had known of this wonderful desire on the part of a corpse to have a run, as also some in which the corpse had almost refused to go, from an objection to some one of the bearers. It had, of course, been always found that, on the substitution of some one else for the obnoxious bearer, the dead man had gone to his grave cheerfully enough.

This is another proof how far from the negro mind is any notion of the person, the individual "I," being anything else than the body itself.

It must be remarked, however, that corpses do not play these funny tricks in every island. I have never known them in St. Croix, for example, to have any decided propensity either to run or to stand still, so the bearers have an easier time of it.

In measuring a dead body for the coffin, the thing generally used in Grenada is one of those reeds called "wild canes." These grow in swampy places, and are very common in Grenada. A clump of them looks from a distance exceedingly like sugar-canes. But whether it be the wild cane or any other stick, the measuring-rod is taken to the grave, and thrown in on the coffin as soon as this is lowered. It is worth while knowing, too, that to take the rod that has measured a dead body and measure yourself against it, is certain death at no long interval.

The custom common in St. Croix, and all but universal in Grenada and some other islands, for every person present at a funeral to cast in at least one handful of earth on the coffin, after the funeral service is over, has been variously explained to me, as an asking for the dead person's prayers, as an act of praying for him, as a formal taking leave of him, or as a helping to do the last act for him—viz., make his grave. I think the second is the prominent idea in most negro minds, for I have often heard a "God bless you," or a "God rest you," accompanying the act. I have also myself heard, along with the throwing in of the earth, the request made for the dead man's prayers. Among the more educated of our lower orders, the last is perhaps the reason—the taking a share in making up your friend's last resting-place. Whether this throwing in earth is an imitation of any ceremony in use among the illustrious body of Freemasons, who certainly cast things into graves, the writer, in his utter ignorance of their tenets, cannot determine.

Next in our course, we naturally enough come to the superstitions connected with illness. And it is wonderful to think of the risks we run through ignorance, or through our obstinate unbelief of the queer stories we hear.

The only thing more wonderful is the beautiful simplicity of some remedies—remedies not to be met with in any Pharmacopœia, or any doctor's book whatever. Only think that a few hard red seeds of one of the leguminous plants common here, worn round the neck, will prevent a "rush of blood to the head," whatever that terrible expression means! Only think, too, that a little bit of scarlet cloth round the neck, no matter how narrow a strip it may be, will keep off the whooping-cough. Perhaps the sanguineous colour of the seeds is a sort of homœopathic remedy—like curing like; but why the cloth cures the whooping-cough, and why it must be scarlet, who can say?

Simplest of all cures, however, is a small bit of paper, carefully made in the form of a cross, then wet, and stuck on a baby's forehead, to take away the hiccough. This is a true homœopathic remedy in another way. It can't hurt you, even if it do you no good.

In the island of Nevis there is an unfailing cure for warts. They must be rubbed with a bit of stolen meat. The peculiarity about this remedy is, that it does not matter what the meat is, whether pork or mutton, beef, veal, or venison, or anything else. It is true it must not be fowl or fish, but meat. But the virtue is in the theft. The meat must be stolen, or you may rub with it until you rub it all away, and no result will follow.

All West Indians are familiar with the virtue of a wedding-ring for rubbing a "stye," as those disagreeable little boils on the eyelid are called. One can understand the use of the friction or of the heat that is produced thereby. But the thing is that the ring must be a *wedding-ring*. Not every plain gold ring will do. The reason probably is, that a wedding-ring is something which, once given, can never be taken back. It is therefore regarded as a suitable antidote to these styes or "cat-boils," as the Barbadian negro calls them, for, in my small-boy days, it was firmly believed by my old black nurse, and so taught to me, that if you gave anything away, and then took it back, you were sure of a "cat-boil."

In these cases, one can be one's own doctor, even though you "have a fool for your patient." But there are some horrible troubles, in which you need the aid of an adept. Such, for example, is the presence in the body of bits of broken glass, old nails, and such like, which can be drawn out, rubbed out, squeezed out, or got out somehow through the sufferer's skin by the man or woman supposed to possess some mysterious power. Hard as it may be of belief, it is nevertheless true, that not more than two years ago

an instance occurred in the chief town of St. Croix, of two old negroes, natives of the island, one of whom was foolish enough to fetch in from the country an Antiguan negro man, to rub nails out of his wife's leg. The Antiguan man was well paid for the job, and after a great deal of soaping, he got an immense number of nails through the old woman's skin. They dropped from her leg freely through his hands into a basin, an indefinite number having been, of course, provided for the occasion by him. If he had not been interrupted by the entrance of an unbeliever, in the person of the old woman's son, who caused him to make a hasty exit through the window, there is no telling what he might have drawn out of her, as nothing was too hard for him to do, or for his victims to believe.

In a multitude of instances the illness comes from the presence of some evil spirit. Rarely, if ever, do we find among negroes any such idea as that the spirits of the departed dead revisit earth with a good intent. Joined with the gross materialism of these people there is yet a strong conviction of the agency of spirits, but almost always as doing actual hurt—as being an influence decidedly hostile to living people. The “jumbies” in some islands—notably St. Croix—are evil-disposed. The only innocent propensity they have in that island is to wear “jumby-beads.” These are little red seeds, very bright, and with a black spot on every one. One would presume they are called “jumby-beads” because they are the “particular wanity” that the jumbies indulge in by way of ornamentation. The same seeds are called “crab's eyes” in Barbados, from their resemblance to the eyes of a very active little red crab well known there. The Barbadian ghosts are not so elaborately got up, it seems, as their St. Croisian brethren.

The power of seeing jumbies is hardly one to be coveted; but it is possessed, whether they like it or not, by those individuals in these islands who are fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to be born with that little membrane called a “caul,” which sometimes encompasses a child when born. This membrane is generally kept by the family with the utmost care as long as it will last.

Such is the power of jumbies to hurt little children, that I have been told by a mother whose child was ill that it *could* not recover, as “*de spirits dem bin and walk over de child.*” But there is a wonderful charm in the mere *outside* of a Bible or a Prayer Book. Put one of these under the pillow on which the baby's head lies, and you can keep off the most mischievous jumby. This will do for the daytime; and at night a bright light must be kept in the room. Otherwise, the jumbies will take advantage of the dark to do their evil deeds, to take their eccentric perambulations over the child, or to blow in its face. This last is quite a common jumby trick.

But they are poor, cowardly fellows, these West Indian ghosts, after all. They will never come near a door that has the "hag-bush" hung up over the threshold. Or should any ghost, more courageous than the ordinary run, boldly pass under the magic bush, you can still laugh at his arts if you have much of it hanging about in the room. The "hag-bush," with which I am familiar, is the lilac. I have had, before now, to refuse to baptize a sick child on an estate in St. Croix until all the branches of lilac hanging around the room were thrown out, as I naturally felt a repugnance to admit a child into the Christian faith with emblems of heathenism hanging around it.

I have never found out whether it is the scent or the sight of the lilac which is so disagreeable to jumbies, or whether the anti-jumby virtue is in something more intangible than sight or scent. Nor do I yet know if there is more than one "hag-bush." Probably so, for the lilac is not abundant enough to furnish supply for the possible demand.

Would that this were the worst use to which plants are put by some negroes in the West Indies! There is no doubt whatever that the medicinal properties of many common West Indian herbs are known to them—herbs of whose deleterious or beneficial powers science as yet knows nothing. And it is sad to record my firm conviction that in many West Indian islands murders are still committed sometimes by the administration of subtle and powerful vegetable poisons, given in such a way as to preclude the possibility of detection.

In Nevis, the poisoner is safe from being haunted by the ghost of his victim if he will go to his grave, dig down to his body, and drive a stake through it. An instance has been known in that island where the family of a man supposed to be poisoned have secretly watched his grave every night for ten nights, with the expectation of detecting his supposed murderer when he came to stake him. No one coming, the idea of foul play connected with the death was given up.

With certain plants and with certain animals there always goes bad luck. The *Stephanotus*, rich in leaves and flowers though it is, is an unlucky plant in some mysterious way. But, considering of how slow growth it is, you have, at least, a very long time during which the storm is brewing before it actually bursts upon you.

There is another plant, however, that brings much more serious trouble upon any house near to which it grows. And this is of quick growth. It is the plant which a Barbadian may be pardoned for thinking the most beautiful of all flowers. I mean the *Poinciana pulcherrima*, or "Pride of Barbados," or "Flowering Fence," as it is also called. In St. Croix, where it goes by the

unpoetical name "Doodledoo," it is never used as a hedge. Exceeding beautiful as it is, it only springs up here and there, without cultivation or care. People are unwilling to run the risk of the unknown troubles—and all the more alarming because unknown—which will follow the planting of it.

That other splendid and most showy tree, the *Poinciana regia*—the "Flamboyant," or "Flame tree," sometimes called in St. Croix, "Giant Doodledoo," is not hurtful in itself, but it is remarkable as a tree under which jumbies like to sit. An old man, who transplanted a large one to my rectory, actually charged more for his work on account of the danger that he said attended the meddling with "such a jumby tree."

As regards animals, guinea-pigs may be mentioned as specially unlucky, at least in St. Croix. There are families there, among those from whom one would not expect such things, whose children would on no account be allowed to keep these pretty little pets. What precisely is the harm they do is not stated. All you can get out of any one is, "Oh, they always bring trouble to a house; they're very unlucky." And yet, if the writer of this was a "dab" at one thing more than another in his small-boy days—which were spent in Barbados—it was at keeping guinea-pigs. They were kept by him on a scale so large that he could set up some of his school-fellows as guinea-pig-keepers. He even ran the risk of keeping them sometimes in his desk at school, boring holes and cutting slits in the lid, to give the little bright-eyed creatures air. And it was a great risk to run, for those were the good old "licking times"—now, happily, almost over for schoolboys. The master of the school was one of those men who are now, it is to be hoped, nearly as extinct as the dodo—men who believed that you could teach a boy through his back, or through the palms of his hands, or the seat of his pantaloons. But yet the guinea-pigs never brought a thrashing upon their owner or his friends.

Some of the boys at this very school were possessed of a sovereign plan for making you perfect in your lessons, which may have kept off the trouble the guinea-pigs would otherwise have brought on the school. Although not a negro superstition, it may be mentioned here, being, as far as I know, only West Indian. When you had learned any lesson *thoroughly* (and some fellows kept the talisman in their hands all the time of learning the lesson), rub the page up and down, or across, with a large seed, called a good-luck seed. Then return it to the pocket, where it ought to be kept. This done, you need not fear. Be the subject of study what it may, the power was as great in that seed to conquer every lesson, and just about as real, as in "Holloway's Pills" to cure every ill that flesh is heir to. The only thing in which the good-

luck seed could not help was in arithmetic. There memory was of very little use, and so this wonderful substitute for, or rather whetstone to memory, was powerless. But alas! that venerable custom of the good-luck seed has entirely gone out of date. The present generation of Barbadian boys, high and low, I fear know it not. It has gone out with the almost equally absurd practice of making children say lessons entirely by rote. In these days children are happily taught to use their brains more; and in every school worth the name, whether in or out of the West Indies, reasoning and comparison, and other mental faculties higher than memory, are cultivated more.

Birds have apparently more ill-luck attending them than animals. For any bird whatever to fly into your house and over your head, is at least indicative of some ill tidings you are to hear before long. Birds have always had, ever since Solomon's days, a propensity to carry news. He warns us not to curse the king or the rich, lest "a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which hath wings shall tell the matter." And most of us can remember some "little bird" being jokingly given to us by our grandmothers or some old friend of our childhood as the authority for some piece of news.

But the only news that birds in the West Indies carry is ill news, it would seem. It is reserved for the "black bee," or "carpenter bee," so-called because he bores holes in wood, to come buzzing with any kind of news he can catch, good or bad. He is a true gossip. Only give him a piece of news, and away he flies, buzzing in the ear of this one and the other one, telling it to every one he meets, whether they wish to hear it or not. Your efforts to get rid of him are as vain as those of Horace, when victimized by his friend's loquacity. "Nil agis, usque tenebo, persequar," is the spirit in which the fellow acts. The negro belief about him is that when he comes buzzing up to you, you are sure to hear some news before long. He can scarcely, however, be considered abundant in any West Indian island. There is, to say the truth, such a plentiful supply of human gossips, male and female, in these islands, that there is hardly room for an insect with that propensity.

But to return to our birds. The "black and yellow creeper" of St. Croix, *Certhiola flaveola*, sometimes called "yellow-breast," is apt to betoken sickness or trouble if he frequent a house. But he only does this in St. Croix, not having a bad name in other places, except among planters. He certainly has the reputation of stealing sugar, whence another name of his, the "sugar bird." Even this is, however, questionable. Perhaps he much rather goes after the flies that attack the sugar than after the sugar itself.

The gentle little "ground dove," or "turtle dove," as they call

him in Barbados, *Chamaepetia trochila*, is, on the other hand, an innocent bird in St. Croix, whereas his going on the top of a house is a sure sign of death to one of the inmates in Barbados.

The bird who is the great "prophet of evils" is the "black witch," or "old witch," *Crotophaga ani*. And certainly if it is allowable at all to believe evil of any bird, this must be the one. The singularly knowing look the creature has, with its hooked beak to give emphasis to the queer and malevolent expression of its eyes, the shabby-genteel appearance of its rusty black coat, the unearthly screech it utters, and its entire freedom from fear of man, allowing any one, as it does, to come very close to it—all these things combine to make it a most disagreeable bird. The very name—"black witch"—tells a tale of the unsavoury reputation the bird has. Some among our lower orders not only give these birds credit for supernatural powers as witches, but consider them the spirits of the departed returned to earth in this form. I have myself been told that when they were screaming round a house, they were really the jumbies calling on some one inside to come out and be one of themselves. There are people who will assure you that these old witches are so particular at times as to provide the usual number of bearers for the corpse. When a crowd of them is near a house, and some are apparently set apart from the rest, or are more vehement in their screaming, these are the ghostly bearers waiting to convey the spirit to its abode, just the same in number as those that shall take the body to its long home. This is the most distinct trace I have met with among negroes of the doctrine of metempsychosis.

These black witches are abundant in many West Indian islands: in others they do not exist. It is said in Grenada that they came there by being blown over in numbers from Trinidad or Tobago. If so, one can imagine what consternation there was among the superstitious, when one morning they awoke and found these new colonists and fellow-citizens. How they came to St. Croix is not sure. It is almost the only one of those West Indian islands whose ornithology has been looked into, that has no bird peculiar to itself. All the virgin forests of the island were set on fire by some early French settlers, who adopted this plan to cure it of real or supposed unhealthiness. They took to their ships, and did not return till the fire had burnt itself out. All the fauna of the island probably perished, and of the few varieties of birds in it (and they are very few) the originals must have been imported. Have the St. Croisians then to thank some kind friend for the first wizard and witch? Or did the birds come over *en masse*, a whole flock of jumbies?

Everywhere in the West Indies a superstition prevails among servants in reference to spiders. Not that the insect is unlucky,

but quite the contrary. The mischief is in killing him. The housemaid may sweep down any cobwebs, destroy ruthlessly any web, however old it be, but the spinner of the web she will allow to escape. Woe betide her if with broom or other instrument, and whether wittingly or unwittingly, she kill a spider! She is then certain to break some piece of crockery or glass in the house. The connection is undoubted. But what the connecting link is who can tell? The tradition is a very old one.

A long procession of black ants in a room is a bad sign, especially if among them there be those large ones with white wings, which are called "parson ants," from the resemblance to a clergyman in his surplice. They always, of course, signify a funeral from the house before long.

West Indian houses are subject to the attacks of two or three kinds of ants, in great numbers at times, but superstitious housewives, at least in St. Croix, have two very efficacious remedies for them. First, they try the simple plan of preparing some fowl soup, but not for the family. They must have none of it. It is to be given over entirely to the ants. It must be put on the top of a press, or in some other private place, so that there may be a grand ant banquet, undisturbed by the fear or presence of man. Appeased by this particular mark of respect, the ants will generally emigrate in a body. But should this be impracticable, a plan may be adopted, involving more trouble, but less outlay. Let one ant be caught, some one whose daring or appearance betoken him a leader, let him be wrapped up carefully in a small piece of meat, and then take him with you, either on foot or in some vehicle, as far as possible from your house. Cast him out with his meat, make all speed home, and sleep peacefully with the assurance that the ants will have left you before next day.

Among insects, crickets too play an important part for good or evil, according as they are "sick" or "money" crickets, the very names of which indicate the superstitions respecting them. The latter makes a steady, hissing sound, loud enough to penetrate a large room in every part. It is held strongly by our negroes that the presence of this insect in a house is an indication of the approach of money. The melancholy, fitful chirping of the sick cricket, betokens, with equal certainty, the nearness of illness.

But the causes of trouble are not in any wise confined, in the opinion of our credulous people, to plants, or insects, or animals. Inanimate objects have as much, or still more, to do with trouble. And of them there are things which actually bring it, and those which only foretell it. It may be as well to give illustrations of both classes.

The feeling is by no means uncommon that to talk much of the health of a family, is a way to bring sickness on them. In the

course of pastoral visitation, the clergyman will perhaps say, in a house where there is a large family, that he never has occasion to go to that house for visitation of the sick, so healthy is the household. He will be respectfully, but very decidedly asked not to speak too much about it, as it has been noticed that if this be done, sickness comes upon the family soon after. And sure enough perhaps it does come, as it must needs come sometimes to every large family. And thus the superstition gets firmer hold. All the many instances in which no result followed are forgotten, and this one case, in which the sickness did happen to follow soon after your congratulatory remarks, is given as a proof how well founded the belief is. On such coincidences rests the public faith in "*Zadkiel's Astrological Almanack*," a mass of absurdities. The old man who publishes it owes his present large income partly to the fact that his predictions are generally, like the Delphic Oracles, couched in such ambiguous language, that they can be fulfilled in many ways. But still more is the rapid sale of the book due to the fact that the astrologer has been fortunate enough to make some successful guesses. And who, that guesses upon so large a scale, and about so many things, but must be right sometimes?

This objection to speak too much about health may be an exaggeration of a proper dislike to anything like boasting, the same feeling that led Joab, while praying that the Israelites might be an hundredfold as many as they were, to recommend King David not to see how many they actually were, and thus indulge his own pride in them.

There is another superstition, deeply rooted in St. Croix, that to add any building to your house—a wing, or any smaller shed—is sure to be followed by the death of some member of the family. Is it possible that the origin of this, too, was the feeling that it was a vain show, this adding to houses, and therefore deserved punishment? Strange notion, surely, of the merciful Lord, who is "not extreme to mark what we have done amiss," but knoweth our weakness, and pitieth "as a father pitieth his children."

To something of the same feeling may also be referred the dislike that exists in certain West Indian islands to repairing an enclosure within which the remains of the family lie. If you do so, it is likely that soon it must be taken down again for the entrance of another member of the family. It is not improbable that the original feeling here was that one had no right to take it for granted that his family burying-place could not be wanted again directly.

But if the last-mentioned superstitions are the development in a wrong direction of certain right feelings, the same cannot be said of the absurdities which I have now to mention.

The mere turning upside down of the calabash that is used to

bale the passage-boats in St. Vincent, is a fearful thing, betokening sure destruction to the boat, and imperilling the lives of the passengers.

And in St. Croix it is terrible only to open an umbrella over your head in a house, a sure way to bring trouble, either on yourself or on some one in that house. Any reason for this I must leave to some more fertile imagination than my own to suggest.

Now, one can easily see why the present of a pair of scissors should be an unsuitable one, as dividing love. This belief is not at all purely West Indian, but it is greatly prevalent in these islands. It is certainly held that the gift of a crooked pin, along with the knife or scissors, will do away with their ill effects. But authorities seem divided on this point, so it is better to be on the safe side.

"Circumstances over which you have no control" there are which will cause your troubles to come, or, rather, which will show that they are coming, "not single spies, but in battalions." Let a glass break in your house, as glasses sometimes will, without any reason that appears, and you are in trouble. The writer well remembers the consternation among the servants in his father's house at the sudden bursting of one of those large barrel-shades that have now almost gone out of use.

Another pretty sure sign of coming grief is when a horse neighs at your door. This is as deeply-rooted a superstition in negro minds as any I have mentioned, notwithstanding the hundreds of instances in which the sign must prove false. But yet a horse, accustomed to be driven double, and neighing frequently when deprived by any chance of its companion, can carry trouble up one street and down another, and can certainly fill many a heart with dismay.

As might be expected, there are West Indian superstitions enough connected with particular days, notably with Good Friday. It may be known in England that eggs laid on Good Friday will never spoil, but the virtue of Good Friday bitters is hardly known there. Any bitters made on that day have not only the ordinary properties of such a compound, but are invaluable cures for disease. So firm is this belief, that there is among the negroes quite a general making of bitters on Good Friday, which are put up and specially kept to be used in cases of dire illness. Well would it be for the West Indies, to say the truth, if the upper classes believed a little less in "bitters" as an article of diet, and confined themselves more strictly to the merely medicinal use of them.

It would extend this article far beyond its proposed limits if I were to enter at all upon the superstitions connected with dreams.

Suffice it to say, that of them also we have our full share. We dream in these warm climes as often as, perhaps oftener than, those living in temperate latitudes. And there is the usual amount of nonsense believed about dreams, such as that they go by contraries, and the like. Far be it, however, from the writer to say that warnings are *never* given in dreams. He would not so impugn the veracity of some unexceptionable witnesses. He would not so question the truth of that saying of Elihu in the Book of Books, that the Almighty "openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instruction" sometimes "in a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed."

In concluding this sketch of West Indian superstitions, I cannot forbear mentioning one which I have met with among the negroes in St. Croix, and which is at least a beautiful one. It is the belief that the baptism of children ought always to be performed with rain-water. In going to a house for the private baptism of a sick child, and finding only well-water, I have been requested to wait until some rain-water could be got from a neighbouring house. The explanation was given me simply enough by a man: "'Tis de rain-water does come down from heaven." These people have a notion that the spring-water, being "of the earth, earthy," is hardly the fitting vehicle for enrolling children as members of Christ's Church, and subjects of the kingdom of heaven. One would like to deal tenderly with such a poetical superstition, and almost wish to retain it rather than otherwise.

But how shall the hold be shaken of such gross superstitions as form the subject of this article? And all have not been mentioned. Would that they were only so many as could be embraced in the compass of one article! The story of them, though in every point of view interesting, though in some respects amusing, is a sad story after all. While such things are believed by any people, their notion of a personal loving Lord, "without whom not a sparrow can fall to the ground," and by whom "the very hairs of our head are all numbered," must be very imperfect. Practically, He is looked upon as too great a Being to concern Himself with the affairs of this world—a notion held by some who pretend to be much wiser than poor West Indian negroes, but a foolish and devilish notion surely—or else too weak to be able to control all things. It is well to labour for the enlightenment of those who have such feelings about Him. It is well to use all our influence against every one of these absurd superstitions. It is well to use reasoning, and ridicule, and every available weapon, against them, so that we may compel them to abide in holes and corners for sheer shame, until we can drive them out altogether. But it is best ourselves to live such a life of daily,

childlike dependence on our God and Saviour, the Almighty Lord, "to whom all things in heaven and earth do bow and obey," as shall lead others likewise to feel that under His care they are safe, that nothing can really harm those that are His, but that all things are ever converging together for the good of them that love Him.

CHARLES J. BRANCH.



THE HISTORICAL VIEW OF MIRACLES.

A GOOD deal has been said of late years upon the subject of miracles, but a great deal more than what is said is by many tacitly assumed. The direct question of the credibility of miracles is not very frequently raised, and we may thank the author of "Supernatural Religion" for having brought it prominently forward. Before him the late Mr. Baden Powell was one of the few who argued openly in behalf of absolute incredulity. But hosts of writers accept the same view as a thing which it is altogether unnecessary to prove. The literary and scientific world is full of unbelief, and orthodox views, for the most part, are now so generally discredited that it is deemed unnecessary to make any serious effort to disprove them.

It is with no direct reference to theology that I propose to treat the subject here. I merely take cognizance of one fact at the outset which, I think, will scarcely be contradicted,—the fact, namely, that the belief in miracles has not yet died out. Whether it is or is not to be ultimately extinguished, no one will deny that the belief in miracles is still held by many, and not entirely by the ignorant and vulgar, but by some of the most thoughtful and honest minds that adorn the present age. At the same time, it must be frankly owned that the number of minds both honest and thoughtful who repudiate the possibility of miracles has largely increased in our day ; and it is clear that the philosophy of the one school or the other must have in it something radically erroneous.

To ascertain the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis, the only philosophical method of proceeding is to hold it up to view in different aspects. Truth will infallibly be consistent with itself, from whatever side we look at it; whereas error will inevitably clash at some point with facts that are already ascertained. If the impossibility of miracles be a sound hypothesis, it is not enough that it may appear to harmonize pretty well with the physical phenomena around us; it must also agree with all we know of history, of geology, of the moral and intellectual nature of man, and of his relations to the Supreme Being—at least, if we consider, as some of us do, that this last can possibly be a subject of knowledge at all. But even if we exclude this region of investigation, there are still a considerable number of fields on which to test our theory.

I purpose, therefore, to inquire how far this hypothesis of the absolute incredibility of miracles may be safely assumed as a basis of historical criticism, and whether such an assumption is likely to make history more lucid to us or the reverse. Its bearing on theology, and on the origin of species, I must leave to other inquirers. Whether it be more credible that the immense variety of forms in which life exists upon the earth are no more than natural variations of one original type, or were the result of separate acts of creation—whether even the first appearance on the earth of life in any form may be conceived to have been due somehow to the operation of existing laws—is a matter on which I shall be content to follow the opinion of naturalists when they are agreed upon the subject themselves. I purpose to carry the non-miraculous theory into a region where it can be more easily tested by ordinary men; for, though all men are not historians, it is quite within the power of all men to form a judgment of the principles on which history should be studied.

Now, we are told by men of science that the laws of nature are invariable, and that miracles are consequently impossible. That such should be the teaching of many men of science is not altogether wonderful. Science itself is founded upon an instinctive belief in the uniformity of nature's operations. It first presumes that there are laws by which those operations are guided, and then endeavours to discover what those laws are. Moreover, the success which has crowned its efforts fully justifies this original belief in law. The more fully philosophers have entered into the study of nature, the more have they seen of the regularity which pervades creation; and they make it an axiom in the study of phenomena, that however various and unaccountable they may appear, there must inevitably be some law at the bottom of them from which no departure is possible.

This, however, may be conceded in the abstract. It is a

hypothesis which undoubtedly has rendered the greatest service to science, and there is no reason to suppose it is not absolutely true. On the other hand, it is very material to observe that, although perfect law may govern all phenomena, our knowledge of the law is, and always must be, very far from perfect. Great as has been the advance of science, I imagine that even now the philosopher is frequently obliged to acknowledge and take note of phenomena which he cannot absolutely reconcile with any law yet discovered. Probably there are some which seem even to contradict laws otherwise well ascertained; and it is precisely cases of this nature which, on being examined more closely, enable the inquirer to correct something that was erroneous in his view of the law before. Science would cease to make any further advance if it neglected such apparent contradictions, and contented itself with a general belief in the invariability of law; for it is an essential condition of its progress that every step in speculation be brought to the test of facts, and that theory alone can be accepted as true which appears to account for all known phenomena.

Now, the phenomena of history ought to be treated with no less deference than those of science. I do not say the *facts* of history, for they are not so certain or so easily verified. The book of nature is open, more or less, to every one, and the facts of science can be verified by experience. But the facts of history, all but the most recent, lie outside the experience of all living men, and the only way of getting at them is by the study of testimony. The phenomena of history, therefore, are the phenomena of testimony, which you have got to weigh and explain, and reduce to laws (if you can), by processes similar to those applied to the phenomena of science.

If this be accepted as the true foundation on which historical study ought to rest, it follows as a matter of course that we are not justified in setting aside *any testimony whatever* as absolutely worthless, any more than we are justified in rejecting physical phenomena when they do not happen to accord with our theories of the operations of nature. I do not mean to say that we are to accept all testimony as true. That, of course, would be in the highest degree absurd; and some may possibly think that by this concession I altogether destroy the basis of that analogy which I am seeking to establish between the phenomena of nature, which form the groundwork of science, and the phenomena of testimony, which form the groundwork of history. Facts in chemistry, I shall be told, or in optics, or electricity, or in astronomy, may be verified by any observer. Only in very special cases do they depend on isolated observations. The foundation on which science builds is secure from all attack. But history, as it depends

on human testimony, is liable to be perverted by the medium through which it comes. You have no such security to begin with as to the basis on which you stand. A large proportion of the human race are liars, and many more are easily deceived. Sound judgment, clear perception, and scrupulous honesty, combined, are necessary to make testimony really unimpeachable; and if you dismiss at once the witnesses who are not possessed of all these qualifications, how much history shall we have left to us?

It is not difficult to perceive that thoughts like these, though seldom fully expressed, have really a very considerable influence in preventing the systematic study of history. But, in truth, the objection is superficial. The phenomena which form the basis of historical inquiry are, *when considered as phenomena*, every whit as stable in themselves as those which form the basis of science. They may, perhaps, be more delusive. If so, it is from want of power on our part to interpret them aright. But physical phenomena are delusive too, until we have gained the true interpretation. The rising and setting of the sun are not in reality what they are to our bodily senses; but the phenomena are clear and quite indisputable. And so it is with the phenomena of history. Such and such testimonies may be false; it is free to the historian to maintain that they are so; but there is no doubt that those testimonies exist, and he must not overlook them. The real problem of the historian is to supply a philosophic explanation of the testimony that exists, showing how, in conformity with what is known of human nature, such and such a course of events must inevitably have taken place, and how such a view only can explain all the facts and the fictions, the satires and exaggerations, the libels and misrepresentations, which have been handed down to us. The historian's function, in short, is like that of a jurymen, bound to take cognizance of all that is said about the facts by competent witnesses, and to form his own conclusion from their sayings as to what the facts really were.

From this point of view, then, we are clearly debarred from rejecting *primâ facie* any kind of testimony whatever—even testimony to the miraculous. The only real question when we meet with such is, what could have been the purpose of its introduction? In some narratives, for instance, miracles have been introduced clearly for an artistic purpose, and it is no more necessary to accept the facts in anything like a literal sense than to regard the long speech, in which an ancient general is said to have addressed his soldiers, as if it had been taken down in shorthand by reporters. In such cases the critical historian will of course dismiss the miracle, but will interpret for his readers its historical significance, as he might do that of a poem. In other narratives, again, it cannot be doubted that the author reports what he

believes himself, or wishes his readers to believe. Here questions arise as to his judgment, probity, and opportunities of information; and such questions the historian has always to grapple with, whether the authors from whom he derives information report miraculous events or not. Does the witness relate what he professes to have seen, or only what he has heard from others? Was he likely to have been deceived, or to have had an object in deceiving? Was he imaginative and given to illusions? These are important matters of inquiry, not merely in the case of miracles, but in regard to all testimony whatever. To account for the existence of *any* testimony, we may either assume that it was true, or we may indicate certain causes which might naturally have influenced the imagination, or biassed the judgment, or perverted the honesty of the reporter. But we must beware of being biassed ourselves by any *à priori* argument. To lay it down as a settled thing beforehand that a miraculous statement *cannot* be true, and must therefore be somehow explained away, is simply to disqualify ourselves from investigating the matter as a historical question at all. The impossibility of miracles is at best only a *scientific* presumption; for of course it is quite right that the student of nature's laws should assume at the outset that those laws are uniform in their operation. But to import this presumption into the region of history is virtually to say, "Here is so much testimony to be got rid of—testimony which is not to be weighed or criticized, but simply turned out of doors. Assume, first, that lying or delusion was at the bottom of it, and then account in whatever way you please (if you think it worth while attempting to account at all) for the characters and motives of those who have left such statements upon record."

If such a canon of criticism be admissible, it seems to me that it must go a considerable way to destroy the value of all testimony whatsoever. For it evidently presupposes that all faith in human character—however well grounded otherwise—ought invariably to give way to a certain *à priori* belief in the regularity of nature's operations, and in our own perfect knowledge of the extent and limits of her powers. It may be safely said that such a principle, if it were not practically rejected in some things, even by scientific men themselves, would do more to hinder the progress of science than the grossest superstition that ever clouded the human intellect. For its operation would necessarily be that all new observations tending to disturb old-established theories would at once be rejected without inquiry by every one but the observer. It would be a clear and settled point that all such observations must be erroneous and not worth the trouble of investigating; so that the most essential function of science—to test the value of preconceived opinions—would be at an end.

Moreover, if the canon of historical criticism we are considering be a sound one, can we limit its operation, even in history, to the elimination of a miraculous element? I do not for my part believe that any miracle has taken place in the world during the last eighteen hundred years, but I cannot see how I could honestly investigate any period of history with a fixed resolve not to believe in such an event beforehand. That would mean, as I have already indicated, a fixed resolve beforehand either to discredit the judgment, or to throw a stigma on the honesty, of any writer in whom I might meet with a miraculous story; and if I were justified in adopting such a rule, why should I limit its operation to cases of mere miracle? If the internal improbability of a story containing miracle is such that it must be considered as amounting to impossibility, are there not many stories containing nothing quite miraculous whose internal improbability is also very great? Why should I not be justified, then, in rejecting a story that is antecedently very improbable without reference to the character of the witness? If it be reasonable to do so without weighing the testimony in a case of miracle, it should be reasonable to do so also in a case of great improbability.

For example, let it be supposed that I have left home in the morning as usual, and gone to business. An unknown messenger comes to me in the middle of the day to inform me that my house is on fire. I am seriously alarmed, and rush homewards in all possible haste. Ought I to have reflected that the thing, though not impossible, was antecedently very improbable,—that not one house out of so many thousands catches fire on any particular day, and that I knew nothing whatever of the character of the witness? With reflections such as these, ought I to have schooled my mind into a state of tolerable equanimity until authentic intelligence came through a medium I had better reason to trust? I think it is needless asking whether such a course would be philosophical. Where is the philosopher alive that would be found practically to pursue it?

It is evident, therefore, that according to the laws of the human mind, internal probability or improbability is not the principal element by which we judge of the truth of a report. And it is well for us that our judgments are so constituted, for there is no line of investigation, scientific or historical, in which views that are *à priori* probable are not continually discredited, and those which seem at first altogether improbable do not meet with remarkable confirmation. A sound judgment therefore is not naturally prone to disbelieve on the score of mere improbability. It is the believing, not the sceptical mind, that is essentially the sound one. Better to believe too much at first, and eliminate error afterwards, than by believing too little to shut out from view

altogether facts which may have an important bearing on our own interests or on our own peace of mind. Infinitely preferable, indeed, as regards human happiness, and infinitely more philosophical as a means of arriving at truth, is the childlike credulity of inexperience to the bitter cynicism of disbelief which an over-familiarity with the depths of the world's evil is apt occasionally to engender.

I do not mean that we should cultivate credulity, or endeavour to lull to sleep suspicions which experience suggests to us as reasonable. To attempt to stifle doubts of any kind without convincing one's own understanding is neither wise nor praiseworthy. Doubt, if it be not answered rationally, will assert itself in a form all the more malignant from any effort to suppress it. But, on the other hand, there is no true wisdom in making deliberate search for a doubt, as if doubts enough did not suggest themselves unasked whenever we make it an object simply to seek for truth. In matters of practical consequence, as I have shown by one example, doubt readily gives way to belief as a motive for action, even where the evidence is by no means strong. The testimony even of an unknown witness commands belief to this extent that we act upon it in many cases as if it were undoubtedly true. And I say, for my part, that such confidence is wise and reasonable, though it may undoubtedly lead to a false result. For it is grounded upon a just belief that men in general love truth better than falsehood in the abstract, and that they will speak truth in preference to falsehood where no selfish or malicious motive intervenes.

But let us see how far reasonable doubt may be generated by the extraordinary character of the thing reported. I have already suggested the case of an unknown messenger informing me that my house is on fire. But they who maintain the incredibility of miracles will, of course, reply that there is nothing in this case that is even extraordinary; for although the antecedent improbability is great that one particular house should take fire on one particular day, yet, in point of fact, a day seldom passes when some house does not take fire in one part of London or another, and it is quite as likely to happen to my house as to any other. Let us suppose, however, a case in which the antecedent improbability is so extreme as to be nearly, if not quite, as great as that of a strictly supernatural event.

Say, I belong to a club of twelve persons or more, who meet together monthly in a certain room, and while we are all sitting together, intelligence comes to each of the party in succession that his particular house is on fire. Here, it will be seen, there is nothing against the laws of nature, even though the event were true in every case. And yet the occurrence of twelve separate fires without wilful and preconcerted fire-raising, all at the same

time, and each fire attacking the house of a member of my club, would be a thing as violently opposed to probability as anything could possibly be. What, then, would be the natural effect of the intelligence on the minds of twelve rational men? I think no one will deny that the first man who received it would be justifiably alarmed, and would hurry away homewards with all possible despatch. When the second received a like summons, suspicion might possibly be awakened of some trick, but he, too, would doubtless feel uneasy without going and satisfying himself. But unless the club were composed of the veriest simpletons, this process surely would not be allowed to go on till the very last man was called away. A little cross-questioning of the messengers would infallibly lay bare the plot; and if the club did not altogether resume its equanimity, it would only be from the desire of the members to track and punish the conspirators.

Here, then, is a case of rational incredulity induced entirely by the extraordinary character of the things reported. But we have presumed nothing to be known of the character of the witnesses, and that cross-questioning reveals a plot. Let us suppose, however, the contrary of these suppositions. What, if the news was conveyed to each of the club separately by a servant living in the house that had caught fire? Or what if, the messengers being unknown, each offered to go home in a cab with the man whose house he professed to have seen burning, and submit to severe punishment if the intelligence were untrue? Notwithstanding the extreme improbability of the testimony in itself, would not evidence like this go far to conquer our incredulity?

It is evident, therefore, that whatever be the laws of the physical universe, or whatever may be the laws of chance, there is nothing in the laws of the human mind to forbid the reception of testimony as to facts in themselves exceedingly improbable. However antecedently incredible a thing may be, when only a suggestion of the imagination, no sooner do we hear it reported to us as a fact, than the attitude of our minds, with regard to it, is at once and altogether changed. We no longer judge of its truth from mere *à priori* reasoning. The argument *à posteriori* comes immediately to the front, sometimes with such force as completely to overpower the former view, but in any case with sufficient force to make us think over the testimony, and endeavour to weigh it fairly against the antecedent probabilities. And, even to do this at all, we must give the testimony what we may call a hypothetical or provisional belief. We must say to our own minds, "What if this extraordinary testimony were strictly and literally true? How would that supposition agree with my past experience of physical nature and of human nature? How does it agree with such facts as I am able to collect at present?"

Indeed, it is not merely the science of human testimony that calls upon us for provisional belief in the improbable. All sciences, even the most strictly logical, make similar demands upon us. Euclid himself would not have owned as his disciple a man who could not hypothetically accept, free from all sorts of prejudices, the supposition that a straight line might cut a circle in more than two points. And the true scientific mind is shown in the frank and full acceptance of such a proposition until it is worked out by the *reductio ad absurdum*. The student is taught to dwell even on a false hypothesis, to rest his whole weight upon it, so to speak, and try if it will bear him—to put himself, in short, into a state of mind which, if the proposition were true, would be nothing but incipient belief. It is not so, of course, in the case supposed, because to give real credence, even for a moment, to such a violent absurdity, is scarcely possible; but the nearer we can approach for a moment to such a state of mind, the more truly scientific will be our reasoning. The realization, indeed, of a provisional belief to start with, is simply the first requisite in science. And we know that if the belief be a wrong one, it will be impossible to work on with it for ever.

It is the function of history, then, to determine the truth of miracles, as of other things, not from *à priori* considerations of any kind, but by a genuine philosophical inquiry, in every case, into the value of the testimony. If David Hume really treated the history of England, even under the Tudors or the Stuarts, in harmony with the principle which he endeavoured to establish in his famous "Essay," I maintain that on that very account the work would be altogether valueless; for the principle must have inevitably led him to prefer testimony which was probable in itself to other testimony which was not so probable, without inquiry into the characters and motives of the witnesses. The true historian's function, on the contrary, is to find an adequate explanation of the testimony that has been handed down to us, whether that explanation involve belief or disbelief in the things stated. If, by disbelieving the recorded facts, he can account philosophically for the existence of the testimony, he is not only at liberty to do so, but it is his special duty to point out by what influences the truth was so perverted. But if he cannot do this philosophically—if he cannot get rid of the miraculous element in the story without assuming something morally incredible, and at variance with human nature—then he is no way justified in disbelieving what is simply beyond his comprehension.

The mere occurrence, then, of a miraculous element in any narrative—whatever we may mean by calling it miraculous—in no way alters the duty of a historian to give all testimony whatever a fair and candid hearing. However extraordinary may be

the facts recorded, the principles on which they should be investigated must in all cases be the same. Even if there were nothing more in the record than a set of physical wonders, apparently well vouched for, and quite inexplicable to the physical philosopher, the historian would have nothing to do but to state what he found recorded, and leave it as a puzzle. But the miracles believed in by the Christian world are something more than this. Their evidence does not depend entirely upon the written testimony; but that testimony is felt to be the only adequate explanation of an influence which has ruled the world for eighteen hundred years, and which is quite as much alive at the present day as it has been during all that period.

JAMES GAIRDNER.



NOTES OF AN INDIAN JOURNEY.

VI.

FEB. 22nd.—I continue my diary, which I left off in burning Trichinopoly, by a good fire some 7,500 feet above the sea-level, in Ootacamund, which we reached an hour or two ago.

Before leaving Trichinopoly we climbed its historic rock, and looked down on those fields where the question of French or English supremacy in the "Grandes Indes" was so fiercely debated. Clive's house still stands much as it did in his day, but the walls of the town, and most of the fort, are entirely destroyed. On the way down there were pagodas to visit, and a chapel under the management of a Sudra, or low-caste priest, of great sanctity, prodigiously long hair, and unusual cleanliness. We turned aside to see some relatives of the Sankara Acharya designate, the representative of the great philosopher and religious teacher of that name, and a personage so holy that, as I have been told, some of the greatest of Indian princes would not think of sitting down in his presence—a sort of small pope in fact, who has been lording it in this planet for a great many hundred years, although few persons in England have ever heard his name.

It was in this circle, and only here, that I heard Teloogoo spoken; a pleasant-sounding language, much more agreeable to the ear than Tamil, which is the speech of this neighbourhood, as Teloogoo is in the north-east of the Presidency. Both of them belong to the Dravidian group of tongues.

I must not leave the Rock of Trichinopoly without chronicling

my having half-way up it made the acquaintance of the *Guettarda speciosa*, one of the most delicious of perfume plants. Near the top of it, too, I met with another natural product which filled me with astonishment—a deep chasm, exactly like those which one sees by the dozen along the Banffshire coast. I can hardly doubt that, at a geological period comparatively recent, a furious sea beat from the westward upon this hoary rock, which has had time since that to become the Acro-Corinth of this corner of the universe.

Some hideous jewellery was brought us to inspect, as unlike as possible to the lovely Trichinopoly work of two generations back, but not a single specimen of the inlaid copper, nor of the silks, both said to be good, could be discovered. It was the old story—they could be made to order, but were not kept in stock.

There was little to interest between Trichinopoly and Pothanoor, from which place to Coimbatore I had the society of Mr. and Mrs. G——, who had kindly come over to meet me. Thence we pushed on to Metapolliam, whence we crossed the dangerous but beautiful jungle which extends to the foot of the Neilgherries or Blue Mountains. It was one great thicket of cocoa palms, plantain, bamboo, and *Butea frondosa*, attended by numbers of low-growing plants, and matted together in many places by creepers, yellow and red, blue and purple. After six miles we came to the foot of the pass, where we mounted our ponies, and by nine miles of riding reached Coonoor. The views looking back over the plains were delightful, the noise of running water in the fierce heat was most soothing, and the whole road was one long botanical debauch.

Arrived at Coonoor, about 6,000 feet above the sea, we were met by the acting Commissioner, and an officer of Engineers who has lately been making a plan for a railway up these hills, both of whom told us much as we rambled about along hedges of heliotrope growing six feet high.

At Coonoor we exchanged our ponies for carriages, and came on twelve miles to this place, along a road of which three Australian trees, *Acacia robusta*, *Acacia dealbata*, and *Eucalyptus globulus*, have taken complete possession. Near Coonoor, European forms began to meet the eye, a *Rubus* either the same as or close to *Fruticosus*, *Berberis Asiatica*, very near that of the Alps, and the common bracken (*Pteris aquilina*).

To-day too, in addition to the coffee, which I never before saw, except at Kew, and a tree-fern, I gathered *Acacia cinerea*, *Acacia speciosa*, *Strobilanthus Neilgiriensis*, *Indigofera cœrulea*, *Hypericum Hooperianum*, *Sida Indica*, *Lobelia excelsa*, *Clematis Wightiana*, *Osbeckia Wightiana*, *Indigofera pulcherrima*, *Senecio Wightiana*, *Strobilanthus Wightianus*, *Lantana grandiflora*, &c., &c.

Some people have imagined that the blue flowers of the *Strobilanthes* gave to the hills on which they grow so abundantly the name which distinguishes them; but this is a mere latter day refinement.

Feb. 23rd.—This morning, under the influence of our evil star, we determined to go to Marcoorti peak, which lies about seventeen miles off, and is 8,400 feet high. We ordered our horses for half-past six; but, alas, fate was against us. One thing after another went wrong, and we did not get off till nearly nine.

At length we did start, and rode across a country which was as bare as the Wiltshire Downs near Glory Ann and Marlborough. Here and there in the hollows were little jungles, *Sholas* as they are called, which look at a distance exactly like Velvet Lawn seen from above, only instead of the twenty foot boxes you have here the Tree Rhododendron, the Rhodomyrtus, an arborescent *Vaccinium*, a most lovely *Mahonia*, a *Hedyotis*, and other outlandish plants.

After some hours the path got too rugged. We tied our horses to trees till their grooms should arrive, and struggled up to the Horn as it would be called in Switzerland.

Here is, according to Murray, what we *ought* to have seen:—

"The west side of the mountain is a terrific and perfectly perpendicular precipice of at least* 7,000 feet. The mountain seems to have been cut sheer through the centre, leaving not the slightest shelf or ledge between the pinnacle on which the traveller stands and the level of the plains below. To add to the terror of this sublime view, the spot on which the gazer places his feet is a mouldering precipice, the ground being so unstable that, with a touch, large masses are hurled down the prodigious height into the barrier forest at the foot of the hills, which looks at a distance like moss."

What we *did* see was a mass of clouds which blew over the lip of the mountains in a fine mist. Now and then it lifted just enough to let us look a few hundred feet down, but that was all. I need not say that the fall is not perpendicular. Perpendicular precipices of the height mentioned in the above quotation are very rare things, if indeed they exist. In the whole range of the Alps, Mrs. Somerville says, there is not one above 1,600 feet. I should fancy that this precipice might be about as steep as the fall of Croghan on the outside of Achill towards the Atlantic, and should like much to have had it as a companion picture to that very memorable view. I found the tree rhododendron growing quite close to the top. A bright yellow *Anaphalis* waved in the wind just over the brink, and might well have tempted an incautious botanist to break his neck.

* Qy. 4,000?—"Make it less, gossip, and you shall have the greyhound," as the Spaniard says.

We waited to give the weather time to reconsider itself, but in vain, and then slowly descended, mourning, as we went, over the loss of some very precious hours, and crossing great tracts of hill-side over which a fire had just passed—the wasteful custom of burning the surface with a view to obtain a good bite of grass being in full force here.

At the half-way house a number of Todas, men, women, and children, were drawn up for our inspection, and we met many more in the course of the day. I quite understand what people mean when they fancy they see traces of Roman or Jewish origin in these people. A fine Roman, rather Antoninic type is not uncommon among them. One decidedly handsome girl was unlike any one I ever saw, with long black straight hair, grave regular features, and splendidly white teeth. I suppose there are such faces in Italy, but I do not remember any.

From the half-way house I rode home with a forest officer, a cheery, pleasant companion, and the sun had hardly set when we were once more among the Scotch whins and French immortelles which, having run wild, form such conspicuous features in the scenery of Ootacamund at this season.

Feb. 24th.—Marcoorti must be visible from the sea; and as it is very peculiar in shape, Vasco de Gama is almost sure to have seen it as he came into Calicut. There was a certain amount of comfort in that thought; but if I had been well advised, I should have gone yesterday to Neduwuttum to see the plantations of *Cinchona succirubra*, a far more interesting and less fatiguing expedition. However, there is no good crying over spilt milk, and I started at break of day to see the Botanical Gardens, where I found myself in the excellent hands of Mr. Jamieson, an old *élève* of Kew. Here I saw *Eucalyptus pendula* (a gum-tree with the smell of pepper-mint), *Eugenia Wallichii* (the favourite tree of the agricultural population here, taking, indeed, the same place amongst the Badagas that the *Micocoulier** does in Provence), the *Aralia papyrifera*, some splendid camellias in the open air, and an Australian *Erigeron* which makes a good substitute for the English daisy.

When I had walked over the Botanical Gardens, I passed into the charge of Mr. Macivor, and rode off with him to the plantations of crown bark cinchonas on the slopes of Dodabetta.

Mr. Macivor first showed me the *Cinchona officinalis*, and explained his process of mossing, whereby he obtains bark singularly full of alkaloids without immediate and fatal injury to the tree. He then showed me the rival or coppicing system, under which the tree is cut down, and a new supply of bark obtained from the

* *Celtis Australia*.

shoots which rise, or sometimes rise, out of the stock that remains in the ground.

I will show you specimens of the original bark, of the bark after eighteen months' growth, and of the bark after six months' growth under the mossaing process. You will see that the bark of eighteen months' growth is admirably developed, and that of six months' very fairly so; but you will not thank me for expressing any opinion on a controversy of which I have only heard one side stated by a competent advocate.

We rode on along paths which were curiously like those you have so often in the grounds of a gentleman's place in Scotland, winding about amongst the cinchona plantations. Here and there one came on the native vegetation: a most lovely box, a croton, a tall yellow sempervivum, and some of the things I have already noticed specially caught my eye.

Then, after seeing the packing process, we went down to look at the *Cinchona calisaya*, some excellent hybrids, and some of the so-called petayo barks from Bolivia. The *Cinchona succirubra*, which is more of a tree than the crown bark, I had seen at Coonoor.

A lovely little scentless violet, and a herbaceous Euphorbia, recalled our own woods; and when I came out of the plantation, covered with the seeds of the Spanish needle, I rejoiced that that most unpleasant herb, *Galinsoga parviflora*, has not spread as much in England as it might have done. I have only come upon it once—in the neighbourhood of Kew. It was then in flower, and I had no idea how detestable it could make itself later in life.

From one part of the plantation I had a delightful view of Mysore and the country between it and the Neilgherry hills, including the so-called Mysore ditch, and felt sadly grieved that I was obliged to decline Colonel Malleson's invitation to visit him at the capital of that interesting country.

A long drive through Ootacamund, to pay a visit to a distant part of the station, put me in rather better humour with the place. The lake is pretty, and Australia has lent some tolerable woods; but originally it must have been a hideous spot. Much of it, indeed, is sufficiently hideous now. To compare the poorer part of the town with New Pitsligo, would be to libel the architecture of that classic city, but there is just enough peat visible to remind me of the Moss of Blyth, and other equally charming tracts in my native land.

After visiting a little Toda mund, or village, seeing the houses, with their low doors about two feet high—the little temple, if so it can be called, and the kraal for their cattle, all placed in the most picturesque situation possible—we drove down to Coonoor, through the military sanitarium of Wellington. On the way I

saw a village of Badagas, the agricultural population of these hills, and gathered a most beautiful Australian leguminous shrub, a *Westringia*, which has run wild in these parts.

Arrived at Coonoor, we mounted and rode, with the Engineer officer I mentioned the other day, to Lady Canning's seat, passing through the most lovely woods, and gathered more treasures, such as *Crotolaria Malabarica*, *Impatiens Lachenaulti*, *Salonum ferox*, a beautiful yellow *Momordica*, *Lastræa sparsa*, &c.

From Lady Canning's seat there is a grand view of the plains, through which we passed to Metapolliam, and across which the railway runs from sea to sea. We then made a circuit, coming round the hills of Coonoor, through the tea and coffee plantations, saw at a distance the station of Kotagherry, and had a quite noble sunset view of the Kunda peaks—the only view in the Neilgherries for which I cared at all. The sun went down behind the purple hills, shooting streamers far above a line of dark clouds between him and them. L—— will remember seeing something of the kind near Helston.

Feb. 25th.—We left Coonoor about seven, and drove down by the new carriage-road to the plains—a much longer route than that by which we ascended, which is only fit for riding. I was fortunate in being *tête-à-tête* with Mr. Jamieson, a delightful companion on such a journey. My greatest prize was almost my first—*Passiflora Lachenaulti*—the only passion-flower I have ever seen wild, and a very beautiful species. Then followed *Rosa multiflora*, a most lovely meyenia, a thunbergia, a clematis, a jasmine, &c., &c.

I interrupted this bird's-flight botanizing (for we rattled down at a great pace), to visit a coffee estate. The gentleman in charge met us at the point of our road nearest to the upper limit of his dominions, and conducted us through them, telling me almost as much that was new to me about coffee as Mr. N—— did, in the Deyrah Doon, about tea. He pointed out the peculiar flattened shape which is given to the bush with a view to the convenient collection of the berries, explained the method of pruning and manuring, the chief enemies against which it is necessary to guard, and the results which might be obtained by careful cultivation.

The fruit of the coffee is a fleshy berry, with a sweet and rather sickly taste. When it has been gathered, the first process is to get rid of the fleshy matter, which is done by the help of a running stream, in what is known as the pulping-house. The stone, or bean as we call it, is then left to ferment, and afterwards dried.

I tasted some of the coffee grown on this plantation, which seemed to me admirable—better than any which one can buy in London, without great trouble.

I have been reading some very clear and excellent reports on the agricultural capabilities of the Neilgherries. From these I gather, that a well-managed coffee estate in full bearing requires a capital of from £40 to £45 per acre—that coffee planting is exposed to far greater risks than ordinary British agriculture, and that the average profit derived from the capital expended can hardly be put at more than 15 per cent.

With regard to tea, of which some is grown upon this estate, the China plant, the Assam plant, and hybrids being all used, I gather that nearly the same amount of capital will be required as in growing coffee, but that the return, in the opinion of the very competent judge whose opinions I have been studying, will probably be considerably greater; nor should it be forgotten that a man who devotes himself exclusively to tea, will spend his life in a better climate than a man who resides on a coffee plantation in this district.

I observed, by the way, that the reports of the Calcutta brokers about the Neilgherry teas which were shown me at the Agri-horticultural Show in Madras were decidedly good.

We returned to our carriages, and hurried down the hill to the Government experimental gardens at Berliar, which are likewise under the charge of Mr. Jamieson.

Here I saw the Mangosteen, which fruits excellently at Berliar, but, alas! alas! it was just over. The Durian has never fruited here, but I beheld the plant, which was some consolation. Here, too, in addition to other trees which I have mentioned elsewhere, was the clove, covered with the buds, which are the nails (*clous*) of commerce, and at least as pleasant in their fresh as in their dry state. Here, too, was the allspice and the ipecacuanha, the most important recent introduction to India. In addition to various interesting plants, we also saw at Berliar some interesting organisms rather higher in the scale. These were the Karumbars, a small tribe of wild people who live in the jungle, and support themselves chiefly by collecting honey. They are very poor in physique, and with none of the agreeable characteristics of the Todas.

After we had seen them, Mr. Jamieson took leave of us, and we rushed down to the plains, passing some splendid specimens of (I suppose) *Cochlospermum gossypium*, now covered with its great yellow flowers.

I do not think that, in describing the region at the foot of the ghaut the other day, I mentioned the groves of slender Areca palm, nor the bright scarlet blossom of the great *Erythrina Indica*, one of the most gorgeous of flowering trees.

Feb. 26th.—At Metapolliam we reached the railway, and in six hours were at Salem, under the Shevaroy hills. From that point

I was conscious of nothing till I reached Arconum early this morning.

Here, amongst other letters, I received one from E. B., in which, alluding to a conversation we had had in Calcutta about the small amount of prose or poetry having a value independent of the information it conveyed, that India had added to our literature, he enclosed a vigorous ballad, of which I quote the first three verses to pique your curiosity—

"Now is the 'devil-horse'* come to Sind,
Wah! wah! gooroo, that is true!
His belly is stuffed with fire and wind,
But as good a horse had Runjeet Dehu.

"It's forty kos from Lahore to the ford,
Forty and more to far Jummo,
Fast may go the Feringhee lord,
But never so fast as Runjeet Dehu.

"Runjeet Dehu was king of the hill,
Eagle of every crag and nest;
Now the spears and the swords are still,
God will have it, and God knows best."

The lines have a great deal of merit, but still the old Pindaree remains, so far as I know, the best ballad on any Indian subject.

There are surely few better verses in any ballad than the one I quoted from it in the House of Commons, and those that immediately follow.

"My father was an Affghan, and came from Kandahar,
He rode with Nawáb Amir Khan in the old Marátta war;
From the Deccan to the Himalay, five hundred of one clan,
They asked no leave of king or chief, as they swept through Hindustân.

"My mother was a Bráhmání, but my father loved her well,
She was saved from the sack of Jaleysur, when a thousand Hindus fell;
Her kinsmen died in the sally, so she followed where he went,
And lived like a bold Pathani, in the shade of a rider's tent."

"'Tis sixty years gone by, but still I often dream
Of a long dark march in the winter, of crossing the Jumna stream;
The waning moon on the water, and the spears in the dim starlight,
As I rode in front of my mother, and wondered at all the sight;

"And the chill of the pearly dawn! Then the crash of a sentinel gun,
The gallop and glint of horsemen who wheeled in the level sun,
The shots in the clear still morning, and the white smoke's lingering wreath!
Is this the same land which I live in, the dull dank air that I breathe?"

"Theology in Extremis," attributed to the same author, which appeared in the *Cornhill* for September, 1868, is far the best Indian poem I have ever read, and would do honour to any one who ever wrote in our language.

A long, hot day has taken us through a rather pretty country, to the north bank of the Northern Penna, and into the so-called Ceded Districts. The chief characteristic of the scenery has been

* The locomotive engine.

the Ghauts which hold up the Mysore plateau on the left, and an outlying range, parallel to them in its general direction, on the right. Through the interval between these, the line runs, passing an immense number of artificial lakes or tanks. We have left behind the sacred Tripety, and are now in the district of Cuddapah, proverbial for its unhealthiness.

Feb. 27th.—We pushed on, having much conversation throughout the afternoon with the Commissioner of the Neilgherries, who happened to be in the train, across a wide black-soil district, covered with cotton, indigo, and a poorish variety of the *Holcus sorghum*, which we saw so much in Egypt, locally called cholom. The Coromandel coast, by-the-bye, simply means the land where cholom is grown.

We wasted nearly twelve hours in a halt at Gooty, rendered necessary, it is said, by the breaking of some of the bridges in the great floods of last autumn. I could not sleep, and walked up and down for hours, watching the sky. It was a glorious night—much more beautiful even than that in which we ran through the Channel of Serpho—only, alas, I had not S—to lecture to me on the stars. . . . At dawn, I got up and cast a glance round the dismal landscape of Gooty, where my father's old friend Sir Thomas Munro died, and whence, say some, the so-called Golcondah diamonds chiefly came.

Feb. 28th.—From Gooty to Poonah the country is hideous. The line runs for a long way through the Nizam's territories, and a branch goes off at Goolburga to his capital, Hyderabad.

There was nothing to note on the line which we travelled except the parched and dusty look of everything, the rocky bed of the sacred, but at this season very woe-begone Kistna, and the fact that I found the Sholapore station at 8 p.m. hotter than any place I have yet tried in India.

The nights, however, are still cool, and it was almost more than cool when early this morning we reached the capital of Maharashtra.

Feb. 28th.—Baron Larpent's carriage met us at the station, and took us to his house at the Sungum, the Confluentia (Coblentz) of these parts, where the Moota and Moola join.

This spot is naturally very interesting to me, for it was here that my father, then attached to Mr. Elphinstone's mission to the Court of Poona, was living when Bajee Rao made the sudden and treacherous attack which began the last Mahratta war. He was the only person who was with his chief during the long and fateful watch, which he has thus described:—

“For several nights the Peishwa and his advisers had deliberated on the advantage of surprising the troops before the arrival of the European regiment; and for this purpose, on the 28th of October, their guns were

yoked, their horses saddled, and their infantry in readiness. This intelligence was brought to Mr. Elphinstone a little before midnight on the 28th, and for a moment it became a question whether self-defence, under all circumstances, did not require that the attack should be anticipated. It was an hour of anxiety. The British cantonment and the residency were perfectly still, and the inhabitants slept in the complete repose inspired by confidence in that profound peace to which they had been long accustomed; but in the Peishwa's camp, south of the town, all was noise and uproar. Mr. Elphinstone had as yet betrayed no suspicion of the Peishwa's treachery, and, as he now stood listening on the terrace, he probably thought that, in thus exposing the troops to be cut off without even the satisfaction of dying with their arms in their hands, he had followed the system of confidence, so strongly recommended, to a culpable extremity; but other motives influenced his conduct at this important moment. He was aware how little faith the other Mahratta princes placed in Bajee Rao, and that Sindia, who knew him well, would hesitate to engage in hostilities until the Peishwa had fairly committed himself. Apprised of the Governor-General's secret plans, and his intended movements on Gwalior, which many circumstances might have concurred to postpone, Mr. Elphinstone had studiously avoided every appearance which might affect the negotiations in Hindoostan, or, by any preparations and apparent alarm on his part, give Sindia's secret emissaries at Poona reason to believe that war was inevitable. To have sent to the cantonment at that hour would have occasioned considerable stir; and, in the meantime, by the reports of the spies, the Peishwa was evidently deliberating; the din in the city was dying away; the night was passing; and the motives which had hitherto prevented preparation determined Mr. Elphinstone to defer it some hours longer."

Here, too, it was, that on the night of the 29th, with that remarkably acute hearing which distinguished him, he caught, miles and miles away, the tap of the drums of the European regiment, on whose arrival from Bombay our power of successful resistance to the vast forces arrayed against us entirely depended.

One of my first visits was, of course, to the battle-field of Khirkee, to see the frame of what I have always thought a very good Wouvermans:—

"Those only who have witnessed the bore in the Gulf of Cambay, and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at sight of the Peishwa's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day; there was a dead calm, and no sound was heard except the rushing, the trampling, and neighing of the horses, and the rumbling of the gun-wheels. The effect was heightened by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes, startled from their sleep, bounding off, and then turning for a moment to gaze on the tremendous inundation which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn, and completely overwhelmed every ordinary barrier as it moved."

Then I visited the modern Khirkee, an important military station, and walked over the excellent college with some of the native students, seeing their rooms, library, &c., and talking with them.

The too famous Gunnesb Kind could not be passed over, seeing I had been dragged into the controversy about it. I cannot say that I saw anything to change the opinion which I expressed last year in Parliament.

The other sights of Poona, which are not numerous or important, were duly seen, and I walked over the inchoate Botanical Gardens of Dapoorie, with their curator, Mr. Wodrow, who gave me a good deal of information about various subjects. In the part of the ground devoted to economical purposes, I saw *Carthamus tinctorius*, which I had not identified when I saw it grown as an oilseed crop in the Nizam's country.

We made an expedition to the shrine of Parbuttee, which rises like a Provençal pilgrimage church over the city of Poona, and which figures a good deal in the eventful history of the last Peishwa.

It was from a window or opening here that he saw his great army thrown into hopeless confusion by our scanty force. We had 2,800 in all, out of which only about 800 were Europeans, while he had 18,000 horse, 8,000 foot, and 14 guns. That is the history of nearly all our Indian battles, and yet there are people who are frightened out of their senses "because we cannot put 30,000 men in line!" The answer to that allegation is, first, *We can*; and, secondly, Against whom, in the name of panic, are we to put 30,000 men in line? How often did we put 30,000 men in line when India was one vast camp—when every second man was a warrior?

From the battlements of Parbuttee we saw Torna, the first hill fort of which Sivajee obtained possession, and Rajgurr, the first he built, while, on our way to and fro, we observed various interesting things, such as a beautiful tank at the foot of the hill, the streets of the fine old Brahminical town, the Secretariat where the Peishwa's government was carried on, and where I dare say Nana Furnuwees, subtlest of Mahratta Brahmins (and there is on earth nothing subtler than a Mahratta Brahmin), often passed, revolving many thoughts.

We passed a small temple, where preaching was going on. "I have no doubt," said my companion, who knew the country, "that it is a very good moral sort of discourse." Presently we met a lady walking to service, unveiled and with a servant behind her, just as if she had been going to Wells Street. The Mahratta Brahmins never adopted, to any great extent, the absurd Mahometan custom of shutting up their women.

Another interesting and far longer expedition was to Singurr, taking on the way the artificial lake which governs the Moota irrigation, of which I used to hear a good deal, and whose success has still to be tested by events.

The great Lion Fortress towers over the plain some eleven miles from Poona. We drove to the foot, and were then carried up the very steep ascent, an operation which took about an hour. Do you know the general character of these hill forts? They are thus described in the "*Mahratta History*:"—

"When ascending and on gaining the summit of any of these passes, especially to the southward of Poona, the scenery which everywhere presents itself is of the grandest kind. Some idea of it may be formed by imagining mountains succeeding mountains, three or four thousand feet high, covered with trees, except in places where the huge, black, barren rocks are so solid as to prevent the hardiest shrub from finding root in their clefts. The verdure about the ghauts to the southward of Poona is perpetual; but during the rainy season, especially towards the latter part of it, when the torrents are pouring from the sides of the mountains, the effect is greatly heightened by the extreme luxuriance of vegetation; whilst gleams of sunshine, reflected from the breaking masses of clouds, give a thousand evanescent tints to every hill they light upon. Tempests and thunderstorms, both at the commencement and close of the south-west monsoon, are very frequent; and in that region these awful phenomena of nature are, in a tenfold degree, tremendous and sublime.

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"In the ghauts and along the hills alluded to, both above and below the great range, the summits are frequently crowned, or girded towards the top, by large, massy basaltic rocks. These, with little aid from art, are capable of being formed into fortresses, which, independent of the extreme difficulty of approach, often seem in themselves impregnable. In many of them there are springs of the finest water, and in all a supply can be secured in tanks or reservoirs during the periodical rains from May to October. Throughout that period of the year it is scarcely possible for troops to act in the Ghaut-Mahta; as, superadded to the steep, rugged, rocky hills, and the deep, winding dells, covered like the mountains by high trees, or tangled with low, impervious brushwood, there is almost perpetual rain; most of the rivulets are then frequently swollen into impassable torrents, and there is a chilling damp in the forests, exceedingly insalubrious to persons not inured to its influence; in short, in a military point of view, there is probably no stronger country in the world."

I have told some of you of my father's nocturnal ride in pursuit of Trimbukjee Dainglia along with the late Colonel —, who did not fear the face of clay, as he often proved, but who was frightened half out of his senses by the Will-o'-the-wisps which danced about them as they crossed a swamp, and which the worthy man took, if not for the devil, at least for something nearly akin to him.

Well, I never expected to be thankful to Trimbukjee Dainglia, who was one of the most unmitigated scoundrels of his nation, which is saying a good deal, as the readers of "*Pandurang Hari*" will readily admit.

Thankful, however, I was as we drove to Singurh, and on this wise. Trimbukjee Dainglia instigated his master to murder the Baroda envoy. In expiation of that murder, his master planted

on the road over which we passed many thousand mangoes, from whose shade and blossom I to-day derived much comfort.

There were numbers of these hill forts, and the only wonder is that there were not more, for one can hardly look along any of the lines of flat-topped trap hill which are ever in sight without seeing some point probably of harder rock which has resisted the general denuding process, and could easily have been made defensible.

The mystery is how a warlike people like these "mountain rats," as Aurungzebe called the Mahrattas, gave them up to us one after another with so little difficulty.

If you will turn to vol. i. of the "Mahratta History," you will find a picturesque description of the taking of Singurh by Sivajee too long to quote here. It was on this occasion that, having lost in the assault his favourite officer, he said, what we all have too often occasion to say—"The den is taken, but the lion is slain!"

Singurh is now a sufficiently peaceful spot, used by families from the plains of the Deccan as a kind of sanitarium. The vegetation of the ascent is, I dare say, striking in the rains; but all is now very dry. I remarked none of the balsams which I have seen mentioned as growing there, but plenty of my Jummoo friends, the *Justicea Adhatoda* and *Euphorbia Royliana*, while within the walls I think I caught sight of a vitex, which must be very near the *Agnus castus* we knew so well on the Simois' banks.

From Poona we drove through the night between sixty and seventy miles to Satara, where the Collector kindly took charge of our interests.

This, you know, was the place to which my father was sent in April, 1818.

The kind of work which this youth of eight-and-twenty had to do when he was sent up with only one European to take charge of a country bigger than the whole of Sicily, full of a warlike population, and dotted with strong places, is amusingly characteristic of our proceedings in India.

Here is pretty responsible work for eight-and-twenty:—

"To get possession of the country, to prevent the revenue of the current year or the treasures of the Peishwa from being made applicable to purposes of hostility; to protect and conciliate the inhabitants; to attempt no innovations, and to endeavour to show the people that they were to expect no change but the better administration of their own laws, were the primary objects to which the Commissioner directed the attention of his agents. As the country was drained of British troops, the greater part of which had proceeded in pursuit of the flying Peishwa, the means of those agents were at first limited; but by raising irregulars, taking such places as they could reduce, destroying or executing straggling plunderers, especially when they were found torturing or murdering the villagers, opening negotiations with the Killidars of the stronger forts, and represent-

ing the hopelessness of resistance, the country, with the assistance of such regulars as could be spared, fell almost as fast as men could be collected to keep possession. It not unfrequently happened that irregulars that had left Bajee Rao's service a few days or hours before entered that of the British Government; and instances are adducible where, having quitted the Peishwa, they were enlisted, subsisted, supplied with ammunition, and fighting for the new Government within little more than twenty-four hours—so readily do the irregular troops of India transfer their allegiance to the prevailing power. To these men the new conquests were frequently of necessity entrusted, and they proved in no instance treacherous or disobedient."

And again—

"There were few attempts at insurrection. One conspiracy was detected, which had for its object the release of the pretended Chittoor Sing, the murder of all the Europeans at Poona and Satara, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the person of the Raja of Satara. The persons connected with it were men of desperate fortunes among the unemployed soldiery: many of them were apprehended and tried; and the ringleaders (some of whom were Brahmins) were blown from guns, an example which, though severe, had a great effect in restraining that intriguing race, and preventing similar attempts in the country."

But you may say, and perhaps truly, Well, all that must have come naturally enough to one who had been campaigning and diplomatizing almost from his childhood. True, perhaps, but how as to administration? Here is a note from the "*Mahratta History*" upon that subject:—

"The plan followed in the Raja's country was simply to amend the native system, and to place the routine of business in that train which it was possible might be preserved after the interference of the British Government was withdrawn. The Raja himself was taught to expect power according to his ability to exercise it, and in a short time laboured as assiduously as any carcoon under his government. The entire powers of the State were formally delivered over to him on the 5th of April, 1822, at which period the boon thus conferred by the British nation on the descendant of Sivajee was certainly appreciated by the country generally, as well as by his relations and himself; *but time must prove whether this liberal experiment on the part of the authorities of the East India Company will be attended with any lasting good effect to the governor or to the governed.*"

I shall supplement this by some extracts from a very remarkable article called "*Satara and British Connection therewith,*" which appeared in the *Calcutta Review* just thirty years ago:—

"When Grant Duff assumed the government of the districts which were to form the future kingdom of Satara, everything was in disorder, and many important branches of the administration had not so much to be remodelled as created. Where former precedents might be safely followed, he seems to have set before himself the practice of the best rulers in the best times, and steadily to have worked on this model, regardless alike of more faultless theories or the vicious customs of later years. Where the

altered state of affairs rendered it necessary to lay down new rules, he legislated with the enlightened views of a statesman, who with his eyes fixed on some lofty object of distant attainment, never forgot the nature and characteristic defects of the instruments with which it was to be acquired.

"He had to organize the Durbar of a prince nursed in ideas of his own importance as extravagant as those of an emperor at Peking, and used to means and powers as narrow as those of a king of strolling players. The great nobles were used to none but nominal and theoretical fealty: those of inferior rank were some of them rustic mountain chiefs, and others broken down denizens of the dissipated courts at Poona or Gwalior; while the few who had been faithful adherents of the royal family in its debasement were ill fitted by early training to fill their old places about their prince when trusted with real powers and responsibilities.

"To introduce due subordination among such discordant elements—to assign to each his appropriate place, and to enforce the performance of duties under an entirely new *régime*—would of themselves have demanded a rare union of personal weight of character with the power of appreciating and attending to petty and apparently unimportant details. Many men would have considered the subject as either beneath their notice, or as likely to be best arranged if left entirely to the Raja and his courtiers; but Grant Duff judged otherwise; and to this day the organization of the court, the laws of precedence, the duties of the various officers, the amount and mode of disbursing and checking every branch of the expenses of the Raja's household, down to the minutest item, are regulated on the rules he laid down; and the judgment with which this was done is shown by the result. The Durbar has always been reckoned, by competent judges, one of the most orderly native courts in India, and one of the very few which, for thirty years, have never been involved in any pecuniary difficulties, either as regarded the public or private treasury of the sovereign, and we have been assured that the order and regularity of all disbursements of the household more resembled that of an English nobleman than of a Mahratta Raja.

"There is probably no other portion of the territory conquered from the Peishwa, except Satara, in which the revenue settlement made at the first conquest is still unchanged, or free from glaring defects which call loudly for reform. In all this portion of Grant Duff's arrangements, we trace the same proof of practical shrewdness and sagacity, and of power to adapt his measures to the circumstances with which he had to deal, which distinguished his proceedings in other branches of administration.

"His antiquarian researches might well have tempted him, as they have so often tempted others, to recall land tenures to what he might imagine them to have been in the time of Manu. Or economical theories, true enough on the banks of the Thames or the Forth, might have led him astray with a still larger section of our Indian administrators into hasty perpetual settlements, attempts to create a race of landlords, or other fiscal experiments, captivating in theory, but as little adapted to the tenures and customs of the country as an English farmer's top-boots and great-coat are to the person of the Dekhan Ryot. And there was yet a third and still more dangerous error, of which many instances might be cited elsewhere, that of continuing, as sanctioned by the custom of the country, the system of universal farming to the highest bidder, and consequently of equally universal rack-renting oppression and misery, which had long prevailed everywhere under the Peishwa's government.

"Into none of these errors did Grant Duff fall. He appears to have diligently inquired into the characteristics of the land revenue settlements, in the best times within the memory of man; to have discovered where, and when, and why the Ryots were most prosperous, and the

revenue most flourishing; and wherever he discovered the traces of a tenure sanctioned by both the usage of the country and the practice of the best native rulers, he did his best to restore, define, and render it as permanent as detailed records could make it.

"Here, as in almost every other portion of the Peishwa's dominions, the necessity of a systematic survey was early apparent; and survey operations were commenced almost as soon as the permanent tranquillity of the country was secured, and a regular scheme of government organized. In almost every other district of our acquisitions from the Mahrattas, these early surveys have proved useless, or worse than useless. In Satara alone, the survey conducted by Captain Adams, of the Bombay army, under the instructions of Grant Duff, is still the standard authority on all points to which it was originally intended that it should apply.

"In Satara alone, the practical good sense of Grant Duff saved the survey from such a lamentable failure. He saw that no practical good was likely to result from the attempt to enforce uniformity of system where custom had sanctioned differences of tenure, or where local peculiarities were observable in the character of the country or its population. He knew that it was vain to attempt regulating the demand of a landlord (which was the position in which Government stood throughout the Mahratta territory) by any invariable standard, applicable alike to the fertile or the barren district—to a population of cultivators, wealthy, industrious, and intelligent, and to one poor, apathetic, and ignorant. He saw that almost the only pressing practical want which a survey could at that period supply was the deficiency or incompleteness of records of measurement, and other tangible elements of forming a settlement; and he consequently directed the chief attention of his survey officers to these objects. Boundaries of villages and fields were ascertained and marked: the superficial extent of lands, especially those which claimed to be rent-free, was measured; and of all these particulars careful and intelligible records were preserved.

"In forming his assessments, instead of nice estimates of gross and net produce, grounded on elements so varying and uncertain as almost to defy calculation, Grant Duff proceeded much as any practical and humane man would on succeeding to an estate of whose resources he had little certain knowledge and few trustworthy records. He ascertained, as nearly as he could, what his tenants had actually paid in former years; he judged for himself, from the appearance of the people, their villages and lands, facility and uniformity of collections, and other obvious marks of prosperity or poverty, whether the demand had borne hard on them or otherwise—whether he should listen to the clamour of the cultivators for abatement, or to the invariable advice of his native subordinates to enhance his assessments; and having thus settled, on plain common-sense data, what he thought the cultivators could afford to pay, and yet thrive on the remainder, he troubled himself little with inquiring whether the Institutes of Manu sanctioned a tax of the fifth or the tenth of the produce, or with calculations as to whether his demand were one-third of the gross, or half of the net produce of the soil. If he found that the assessments thus settled were paid in an ordinary season without difficulty, he fixed them permanently as the extreme limit of the Government demand. If otherwise, he reduced them, acting invariably on the golden rule, that where perfect accuracy is unattainable, it is best to err on the side of moderation.

"The surveys conducted by Grant Duff in Satara have no pretensions to the completeness of these later operations in any one particular, but they still preserve their original character of perfect practical adaptation to the

purpose to which they were designed; and an appeal to 'Adams Sahib's survey,' or 'Grant Sahib's settlements,' is, to this day, 'an end of all strife,' on any point to which they relate.

"Similar principles seem to have guided, and equal success attended, the arrangements made by Grant Duff for the police of this tract of country. In the report on the territories conquered from the Peishwa, by the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, will be found a graphic sketch of the Mahratta system of police, as he found it on the conquest of the country. He points out its excellences and defects, and indicates, in almost prophetic terms, the points in which any system we might introduce would be likely to fail. Our limits forbid our making any extract; but we would recommend to any devoted admirer of the superior excellence of our own police,* and to any one who is puzzled to account for the continued prevalence of violent crime in our oldest settled districts, a perusal of Mr. Elphinstone's pregnant remarks on the subject, which, like all he wrote, had an application far more extended than the particular case under discussion.

"It is sufficient to say of the system of police established by Grant Duff, and maintained to the present day, that, whilst most of the faults of the old Mahratta administration were lessened, if not entirely removed, its characteristic excellences were preserved. This is not the place for entering into lengthened details; but to those who have seen the native system in operation in a well-governed native State, much will be conveyed in the remark, that Satara is probably the only part of the Dekhan where the ancient village police, with its powers and responsibilities, has been kept up unimpaired.

"The result justifies the opinion of Mr. Elphinstone, and the measures of his assistant. Notwithstanding the local difficulties arising from the strength of the country and the existence of large communities of Ramusis and other semi-barbarous and predatory tribes—difficulties greater, probably, than in any part of the Peishwa's dominions, Candeish excepted—there is no portion of those dominions which has enjoyed such complete immunity from anything approaching systematic resistance to government, or where person and property are so secure from violent crime. Rebellion has been raging on the very border, in Kolapur, Sawunt Warri, and the Southern Mahratta country to the south; and something closely approaching rebellion has been repeatedly experienced in the presence of organized bands of plunderers under Vomaji, Ragoji Bangria, and other robber-chiefs of local fame in the Puna and Nuggur districts to the north, where, sometimes for months together, they have levied black mail unresisted by the inhabitants, and successfully eluded a large police force and considerable bodies of troops of the line. But the Satara districts have for thirty years enjoyed the most perfect immunity from disturbance of any kind; and in no case has any rebel or freebooter been fairly proved to have taken refuge in the Satara territory without the certainty of his being speedily seized and surrendered to his own Government for punishment.

"Our remarks on the system of revenue and police administration adopted by Grant Duff have detained us so long that we have no time to describe the courts of civil and criminal justice which he organized, or the simple and comprehensive regulations which he drew up to guide judicial officers in the administration of justice. Neither have we space to enumerate the internal improvements—the roads and bridges, the aqueducts, and other public works which he either executed, or planned and left to be completed by the Raja under the advice of his active and public-spirited successor. Still less can we detail his judicious measures to rescue the finest of the ancient buildings at Bijapur from inevitable destruction, or his antiquarian

* As it was in 1845.

and historical researches of which he has left an ample and enduring monument in his admirable 'History of the Mahrattas.' But the immediate object of the present article requires that we should not altogether pass over in silence the constant attention he paid to the training of his royal pupil. It was his constant practice while he held the reins of government to associate the Raja and his brothers with him in the transaction of all public business, pointing out to them the reason of all that was done, and explaining to them and interesting them in all his plans of public improvement, in this, as in all other matters, sparing no pains, and omitting no personal sacrifice by which he might ensure the future good government of the country when he himself should be far from the scene of his labours.

"Such, in brief outline, was the admirable system of government planned and matured by Grant Duff. Having entrusted his royal pupil with the direct management of the country in 1822, he returned to his native land in the early part of the following year. A quarter of a century has since passed away; but the name of Grant Sahib is still familiar as a household word in every hut and hamlet of the country."

This is a long extract, but it will be interesting to you for obvious reasons, and I dare say it might interest many people who never heard my father's name or mine, because he was only one of many, and much the same story might be told of others.

During his five years at Satara he not only did what I have related, but likewise collected the materials for, and wrote much of, his "History of the Mahrattas;" but that kind of high pressure defeats itself; and in the beginning of January, 1823, he left India with his health utterly shattered; nor, though he lived to be an old man, was he ever afterwards other than an invalid.

I should like to have seen what traditions, if any, about him linger in the country now that the quarter of a century of which the reviewer speaks has turned into fifty-five years, and since the Satara Raj has been swept into the same nothingness as that of the Peishwa. Our friendly host, however, held an acting appointment, and had only been at Satara itself for about a fortnight, his experience, which is very large, having been gathered in other parts of the Presidency.

I slept little, but there was no time to be lost, and a hot climb soon took us to the top of the Fort of Satara. I had with me a sketch map made the day after it surrendered to the British arms in February, 1818, which enabled me to see the changes of recent times, and likewise to identify the spot where Aurungzebe's great assault was made. He lost 2,000 men by the faulty construction of a single mine.

Below the ascent lies the town, chiefly of grey one-storeyed houses. Huge masses of black rock hang on the declivity, some of them perhaps the very blocks which were hurled down on the advancing legions of the Mogul. It is the hot season here (March and April being about the warmest months in this part of the

Deccan), and almost everything was burnt up, but they tell me that in the rains, and just after them, the ferns are particularly beautiful. One of the few flowering plants which caught my eye, as I ascended, was an orange-coloured *Lantana*. From the summit one has the usual Mahratta view—long lines of flat-topped hills, with here and there a higher bit, the suggestion of a hill fort. Close to Satara is another of these eyries called Yuteshwur, an ugly place to tackle, but whose fame has been eclipsed by its mighty neighbour.

In the course of the day Bhowanee (Sivajee's sword) came to visit me. *She* is a fine Genoa blade of great length and fine temper. I say *she*, for to this day she is treated in all respects, not as a thing but as a goddess, and receives adoration. With her came other interesting objects, among them the two Wagnucks which her illustrious owner used on a critical occasion. My father makes him use only one, *plus* a crooked dagger, but Bhowanee's guardians say he used two, which is improbable. Of these two, one is a fac-simile of that in my possession; but the other is smaller and more manageable, with only three claws—a very sweet thing of its kind.

When it grew cool, we drove out to look at the town and neighbourhood, but without seeing much to interest, except the cavalcade which accompanied the representative of a once famous personage, the Prithee Needee.

I may be generalizing hastily, but I confess I did not much like the look of things either at Satara or Poona, especially at the first of these places. The people seem to cherish the recollections of old times quite as much as is desirable, and while they are peculiarly attentive to the representative of the Satara family, they rather fail in the respect usually paid throughout the empire to the local British authority. Such symptoms should be well watched. Satara was within an ace of giving trouble in 1857, and although nothing of real importance could ever happen there, enough might happen to involve all the odious necessities of retribution.

The more emphatically therefore it is affirmed that what was done twenty years ago is irrevocable and final, the better it will be for all concerned.

March 3rd.—We were well away from Satara before the morning broke, and drove for miles and miles through a valley bordered by hills, formed, of course, of trap, but in height and uniformity of contour very much like the limestone arms which embrace Upper Egypt.

Various species of *Ficus*, among which the Peepul and the Banian were far the commonest, and the omnipresent mango, lined the whole road till we got to the bottom of the pass which leads up from the Deccan to the Mahabuleshwur Plateau, the Deccan

itself being, as it were, the first landing on the flight of stairs leading from the sea.

The little ponies of the country are not fit for such work, and so our carriage was pulled up by five-and-twenty men.

Arrived at the top, we found ourselves once more amidst the vegetation of Matheran, which I described to you in the beginning of December, and recognized again the red dust of the crumbling laterite. Soon we reached the hospitable house of Mr. Daniell, where we spent some twenty most agreeable hours seeing the temple whence flows the hallowed Kistna (more properly Krishna) and other sacred streams less known to fame, seeing too the fortress of Pertabgurh, which Sivajee loved so well, and the grand view from Arthur's Seat.

The little summer house or shelter for travellers, so called, stands in the midst of a thick jungle, to which the tiger is by no means a stranger, on the edge of one of the most tremendous precipices I ever beheld. My father speaks of the western side of Pertabgurh as going down 4,000 feet, but we, as it happened, saw all its sides but that.

Looking westward from Arthur's Seat, I counted eight ranges of hills in sight at once, exactly the number I once counted from the Frogner Soeter, near Christiania, to which this place has a certain resemblance.

Far off, I caught the "tremolar della marina," and saw a ship at a great distance, like a black speck on a stream of gold.

I should much like to have gone to the point which my old friend General Lodwick reached, when, as resident of Satara, he first explored Mahabuleshwur. It has been hitherto called Sidney Point, but is henceforward to bear the name of the man who, by discovering this great sanitarium, conferred such a benefit on the Bombay Presidency.

From Mahabuleshwur we descended on Waee, a very sacred spot, which travellers who pass it at the season of verdure find lovely. At this time of the year it is dusty and dry.

Soon after nightfall, on the 4th of March, I was back in Poona, inspecting a most interesting collection of Brahminical sacred vessels which Professor Kielhorn, the great Sanscritist, whose acquaintance I made as I passed through, had procured for me during our absence.

I don't think I mentioned that when I was at Poona, the other day, I received a visit from a very aged Parsee gentleman who had been wounded at Korygaom on New Year's Day, 1818, had afterwards commanded with much credit a troop of horse under my father, and had still later been a most efficient judge in our service. "Wounded at Korygaom." I doubt whether all even of you, and still more whether many to whom you are likely to

show these notes, ever heard of Korygaom. And yet it was one of the most desperate struggles which ever took place, even in this country. I wish some one would write a book of golden deeds for India, keeping severely to facts, and avoiding sermonizing.

March 5th.—We left Poona long before daylight, and reached Karli soon after sunrise. The country in the neighbourhood of Tullygaom, itself the scene of a battle, made me think of the hills which bound the Deveron on its left bank above the bridge of Alvah, and I recognized the justice of a remark which my father made to me one day, when, pointing across the river, he said, "That's just like a bit of the Deccan; I can quite imagine a body of Mahratta horse coming down on us through that hollow." When Orlich, who had written much on the wars of the Great Frederick, saw the same bit of Scotland, he said to me, "What a country to fight over!"

Karli was the place where Captain Stewart was killed, who was long known amongst the Mahrattas as Stewart Phakray, or "the hero."

It is now peaceful enough, and very pleasant was our stroll, partly on foot, partly on horseback, across the little bit of plain and the steep slope which separated us from the famous cave, which we soon reached. A very remarkable spot it is.

Fergusson thus describes it:—

"The great cave of Kárlí is, without exception, the largest and finest chaitya cave in India, and is, fortunately, the best preserved. Its interior dimensions are 102 feet 3 inches in total length, 81 feet 3 inches length of nave. Its breadth, from wall to wall, is 45 feet 7 inches, while the width of the nave is 25 feet 7 inches. The nave is separated from the side aisles by fifteen columns on each side, of good design and workmanship. On the abacus which crowns the capital of each of these are two kneeling elephants, and on each elephant are two seated figures, generally a male and female, with their arms over each other's shoulders, but sometimes two female figures in the same attitude. The sculpture of these is very good, and the effect particularly rich and pleasing. Behind the chaitya are seven plain octagonal piers without sculpture, making thus thirty-seven pillars altogether. The chaitya is plain and very similar to that in the large cave at Ajayanti (Ajunta); but here, fortunately, a part of the wooden umbrella which surmounted it remains. The wooden ribs of the roof, too, remain nearly entire; and the framed screen, filling up a portion of the great arch of a bridge (which it much resembles), still retains the place in which it was originally placed. At some distance in advance of the arched front of this cave is placed a second screen which exists only here and at the great cave at Salsette, though it might have existed in front of the oldest chaitya caves at Ajayanti (Ajunta). It consists of two plain octagonal columns with pilasters. Over these is a deep plain mass of wall occupying the place of an entablature, and over this again a superstructure of four dwarf pillars.

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"It would be of great importance if the age of this cave could be positively fixed; but though that cannot quite be done, it is probably

antecedent to the Christian era; and, at the same time, it cannot possibly have been excavated more than two hundred years before that era."

The great cave of Karli is now in far better order than when Mr. Fergusson wrote. The vendors of sweetmeats have been got rid of, and all is kept in a clean and respectable state—all, including the monastic cells of the old Buddhists in the adjoining rock.

The place, and the approach to it, made me often think of Beni Hassan, on the Nile, but, compared to that, Karli is a creation of yesterday.

We descended the hill in the pleasant morning air, and I plucked, for the last time in India, a sprig of white jasmine, that fortunate genus which, after having occupied so prominent a place in Eastern poetry, was to become not less famous far away under the Western Star. The variety of the white jasmine, which grows in French and English gardens, is, however, not often met with in India. I think I only gathered it once—at Hassoon Abdool.

We stopped in the village of Karli to see the village officers, to inspect the maps, and examine the village books. The progress of society has swept away many of the officers who existed in the original village, as described in the introductory chapter of the "History of the Mahrattas;" but the Patel and the Koolkurnee still remain, as does the village watchman, and one or two more. An official, not thought of in old days, has been added, to the sorrow of Mahratta youth, in the shape of the inevitable school-master, into whose domains we penetrated before we turned away.

It was on this excursion that I first identified a tree, which I had frequently seen during the last few days, as no other than the *Michelia champaca*, of Shelleyan* renown, and I must admit, to my shame, that it was likewise only to-day that, in crossing a field sown with the plant, I learned from the officer who accompanied me the odd resemblance in its seed to a ram's head, which gives the *Cicer arietinum* its specific name.

After a short interval (which I employed largely in looking at the ballasting of the line, for I never before saw a line ballasted with agate rock-crystal and cornelian, as the Great Indian Peninsula hereabouts most certainly is), the train from Poona came in sight, and, picking us up, by the courteous arrangement of the authorities, carried us down through the magnificent pass known as the Bhore Ghaut, to the lowlands near Bombay. The line is a noble piece of engineering, and the scenery is even more striking than that along the Nervion, between Miranda and Bilbao, which it frequently recalls.

* "The wandering airs they faint
On the dark, the silent stream,
The Champak odours fail
Like sweet thoughts in a dream."

The breeze blew fresh from the sea as we crossed Salsette, and ere long we were once more at the starting-place of our three months' wanderings, under the hospitable roof of Sir Philip Wodehouse.

PARELL, *March 7th.*—It is very hot—the thermometer about 90° in the shade, but there is a delicious breeze. The only really bad time here is the month of May, when the breeze fails.

The garden is looking lovely—two huge white triumphal arches of the imperial Beaumontia being its chief feature.

The Parell mangoes, the best in India, are in full flower.

In the evening I went to the cathedral, and saw the admirable recumbent statue of J——'s excellent friend, Bishop Carr, which I had missed last December, though I sat close to it. On the way back I observed, for the first time, the zodiacal light, which I have looked for in vain so often.

March 8th.—I rose early, and wandered down to the sea across the Mahim palm groves. The cocoa-nut is the prevailing tree, though I saw some of the Borassus, and a few of the Areca. The coast of Ceylon, they tell me, is bordered by just such woods as these for hundreds of miles. The whole scene was thoroughly tropical, a single leaf sometimes stretching over a road where two carriages could pass each other, and the little huts looking like vignettes to *Paul et Virginie*. At length I reached the shore. The tide was far out, but there were few shells, and none at all attractive—a great contrast this to the last beaches we explored together near Suez, and at Ramleh. To the left stretched a salt marsh, covered with shrubs, none of which I knew. One, with a prickly leaf, might easily have been mistaken for a holly. I crossed the marsh by a causeway, and, climbing up a slight eminence, skirted by the *Erythrina Indica*, all blazing with its scarlet flowers, came on the open sea, which we shall soon be traversing. The horizon was dotted with fishing boats, as I have often seen the Bay of Banff on a summer evening; only here the sails were dazzlingly white.

As I walked back to Government House, I lost myself in the mazes of vegetation, and came suddenly upon a building surmounted by a cross. It was the Roman Catholic Cathedral, as it is called, in reality a very humble little chapel. Some twenty native women, in white veils, were kneeling near the altar. Hardly any one else was there. All the epitaphs I chanced to see were in Portuguese.

Later in the day I was present at the reception of the Chief of Palitana by the Governor. He is lord of the sacred hill of the Jains, which I would fain have gone to see when I was near the Kattiawar border in December, but that, like a visit to Bindrabun, the corresponding centre of Vishnuvite devotion, had to remain, as the Germans say, "a pious wish."

They brought us the unripe mango to examine and to taste. The turpentine flavour, of which some complain even in the ripe fruit, was very marked indeed.

In the afternoon I strolled into the garden, and sat long on the terrace, gay with the brilliant *Bougainvillea*, which will always remain to me associated with pleasant Indian memories.

I observed, as I passed, the very plant of *Vitis quadrangularis* which so puzzled me when I first saw it three months ago hanging from the branches of a tree. I took it, small blame to me, for some strange kind of cactus.

This set me thinking how far I had carried into effect my intentions as far as plants are concerned, and I don't think I have much with which to reproach myself.


True it is that I have merely scratched the surface of Indian botany. True it is that my eye still continually falls on altogether new objects; but, nevertheless, I can put the people and the scenes I care about in India in their appropriate setting of trees and flowers. I have come to know many of the plants which have poetical or religious associations, and I have seen a very large number of those which are economically and commercially important. This in a run of little more than a quarter of a year, a very large part of which has been spent in rapid locomotion by rail, by road, or by sea, and the main objects of which have been political, does not appear to me altogether bad.

I have had various conversations of interest while here, though fewer than when I was last in Bombay. The Baroda affair is, of course, uppermost in the thoughts of most of the people I have seen.

At length the last of many notes, letters, and small bits of business was got through, the parting words were said to our kind entertainer at Government House, and we drove to the Apollo Bunder, whither Dr. Wilson and some others had come to say good-bye. A steam launch carried us rapidly over the dancing ripples of the harbour to the *Venetia*, which was getting ready for sea. The sunset-red faded out; the lamps were lit in the town, and grew gradually fainter as we steamed away. At length there was no more to be seen but the far-off flashing of the same light which had told me early on the 28th November that I was at last in Indian waters.

Four most memorable and delightful months lived only in recollection—*encore un rêve de la vie fini*.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



THE ITALIAN ANSWER TO THE EUROPEAN CHURCH QUESTION.

THE European church question, at present, means the German question; and the relation of Germany to Catholicism, according even to the latest accounts, may be best described as *dead-lock*. For a dead-lock is not a state of quiescence and repose; it is a state of strain and pressure, in which two opposing powers are so equally balanced as to result in nothing. The pressure is painfully there, but it is, in the meantime, equal on both sides. Assume that the Church of Rome is despotic and aggressive. But look at the position of Germany on the other side. In one month alone—March last—there were eighty or ninety convictions under the Ecclesiastical Laws—five of them of bishops sentenced to fine and imprisonment. In the diocese of Posen alone, there were in that month thirty-nine priests sent to prison for refusing to divulge the name of the superior supposed to have been selected from among them from Rome, whose acceptance of office without permission from the civil power would, of course, have been visited with still more severe punishment. And this policy, which the most complete success would not justify, is not even successful. The Churchmen outside, Lutherans and Old Catholics alike, seem to disapprove of it. The Catholic laity have not taken part with the State against their own clergy and the foreign supremacy; and all this pressure tends directly to prevent their doing so in future. The key grates hard in the lock, even in the iron hand of the great Chancellor. And who else is there to

solve the problem? Not France, nor England. France, indeed, so far as I am aware, has contributed very little recently to the solution of the question. The reaction which had for years been progressing in that country against its tradition of administrative interference with religion—a reaction which is best represented by the distinguished name of M. de Pressensé—has latterly been obscured by being mixed up with a very natural anti-German feeling. Prince Bismarck has not deserved well of France, and his laws are oppressive; but French writers do not sufficiently observe that the principle of these laws is too much that of their own most famous publicists and lawyers, and that the new uprising of Ultramontanism, which is destroying the French Church from within, may plausibly be represented as attacking the German empire from without. And as to England, it is surely needless to say, that our thinkers and writers have produced no solution of a question which, to do them justice, they are earnestly studying. Our press feels that the German and Catholic question is the only one of supreme interest in the politics of the world; but who will venture to say on which side England as a whole has pronounced? And, above all, who can suggest any principle by which our views on the Continental conflict are at present regulated? There is just one advantage in the present state of matters. Other nations may not have solved the problem; *we* have at least gained this—that we know we have no solution to offer.

Now, in these circumstances, a voice comes from Italy, reminding us that the nation on which is laid the burden of maintaining within it the personal head and ruler of Catholicism, has deliberately adopted and is working out a *third* theory, equally distinct from that of Germany and that of Rome. In the spring of this year, Vigliani, the present Minister of Grace and Justice of the Italian Kingdom, addressed to the Procureur-General of the Court of Appeal at Rome a communication, intended for the Italian magistrates generally. In it he reminds the judicial and executive authorities that, in 1871, on the "entry of the Italian Government into this great metropolis of the Catholic world," laws on the relation of Church and State were adopted which proceed upon a general principle. That principle is the "Free Church in the Free State," not in any popular or declamatory sense of Cavour's aphorism, but as carried out into exact judicial application. So carried out, it leaves the Church free in the Church region, even when its proceedings are condemned and held invalid by the State; but maintains also the freedom of the State in *its* region, to deny all civil effects and results to such ecclesiastical proceedings, as well as to enforce, in that civil region, all its own laws, however these may be con-

demned by the Church or its head. There are other countries, and there have been other times, in which the same equipoise in principle has been maintained and asserted, and the past of Europe is a history of oscillation and variation around some such centre. But the view has, probably, never been enshrined in legislation with the same emphasis and solemnity, and certainly never at such an important national crisis, as when Victor Emmanuel went to the Capitol. The theory was new at least in the States of the Church. And Vigliani is certainly justified in pointing out that the new manner of procedure under such a law demands careful attention on the part of the magistracy. The practice of jurisprudence, he reminds them, may occasionally require new forms or special care; for it, at all times and in all its details, "ought to be in conformity with the principles of reason and with the true idea of the legislator." And, with a view to regulate that practice, he recalls the executive and judicial authorities of his country to the principles and idea laid down in the laws of May, 1871.

Now, however interesting this study may be for Italy, as regulating details of its administrative jurisprudence, it is of immensely more importance in its bearing on the European question generally. It does not at all appear whether this was in the recollection of the Italian minister in penning his circular. But the fact that he makes no direct application of his principle to foreign matters, and deals only with its supremacy for the last four years in the kingdom of Italy, makes it by no means of less interest *for us*. What is this legislative adjustment of the most irrepressible and most difficult of all questions, which the nation so peculiarly exposed to its violence, claims, after such a trial, to have found sufficient and successful? What is the principle of the Church and State laws of Italy, as embodied in the legislation itself, and as illustrated in this circular of 1875?

The present law on the "Relations of the State with the Church," the text of which I give below,* is the second part of the

* RELAZIONI DELLA STATO COLLA CHIESA.

ART. 14.—E abolita ogni restrizione speciale all' esercizio del diritto di riunione dei membri del clero cattolico.

ART. 15.—E fatta rinuncia dal Governo al diritto di legazia apostolica in Sicilia, ed in tutto il Regno al diritto di nomina proposta nella collazione de benefici maggiori. I Vescovi non saranno richiesti di prestare giuramento al Re. I benefici maggiori e minori non possono essere conferiti se non a cittadini del Regno, eccettochè nella città di Roma e nelle Sedi suburbicarie. Nella collazione dei benefici di patronato Regio nulla è innovato.

ART. 16.—Sono aboliti l'*exequatur* e *placet* regio ed ogni altra forma di assenso governativo per la pubblicazione ed esecuzione degli atti delle Autorità ecclesiastiche. Però, fino a quando non sia altrimenti provveduto nella Legge speciale di cui all' articolo 18, rimangono soggetti all' *exequatur* e *placet* regio gli atti di esse Autorità che riguardano la destinazione dei beni ecclesiastici e la provvista dei benefici maggiori e minori, eccetto quelli della città di Roma e delle Sedi suburbicarie. Restano ferme le disposizioni delle Leggi civili rispetto alla creazione e ai modi di esistenza degli Istituti ecclesiastici ed alienazione dei loro beni.

statute of 17th May, 1871. The first part, to which I shall afterwards have occasion to refer, deals with the special position accorded to the "Supreme Pontiff." But the general Church law commences with the principle of Article 14, that—

"Every special restriction on the exercise of the right of assembly (*riunione*) by members of the Catholic clergy is abolished."

This is a guarded and negative form of allowing a right of "association." Accordingly, in Article 15, the Government "renounces the right of nomination or presentation (*proposta*) in the conferring of the greater benefices," a right which in some form or other has been claimed in almost all Catholic countries. The effect of this seemingly is to make the appointments of bishops by the Church independent of all State sanction and approval. It is provided even that they shall no longer be "required to take oath to the king." There is, however, the special restriction (the counterpart of which finds its place also in the German laws), that both greater and lesser benefices "can only be conferred on subjects of the Italian kingdom;" and it seems all subject to the general principle that the royal sanction is required, not to the ecclesiastical appointment or function, but to the enjoyment of the benefice attached to that appointment by law. This comes out in the next law, which now passes from the *personnel* of the Church to the validity accorded to Church acts and functions. These, in the first place, require no civil sanction.

"The royal *exequatur* and *placet*; and every other form of government assent to the publication and execution (*esecuzione*) of the acts of the ecclesiastical authority, are abolished."

But ecclesiastical acts which refer to the "destination of ecclesiastical goods," or the "provision for the benefices," still require the old form of royal sanction, with certain specified exceptions. This is a distinction which at once raises important questions, on which we may presently look for some light to the Minister of Justice. But let us, in the first place, quote the important text of the law on ecclesiastical actings and their effects, towards which his commentary is specially directed.

"LAW XVII.

"In matters spiritual and disciplinary no complaint or appeal is admitted

ART. 17.—In materia spirituale e disciplinare non è ammesso richiamo od appello contro gli atti delle Autorità ecclesiastiche, nè è loro riconosciuta od accordata alcuna esecuzione coatta. La cognizione degli effetti giuridici, così di questi come d'ogni altro atto di esse Autorità, appartiene alla giurisdizione civile. Però tali atti sono privi di effetto se contrari alle Leggi dello Stato od all'ordine pubblico, o lesivi dei diritti dei privati, e vanno soggetti alle Leggi penali se costituiscono reato.

ART. 18.—Con Legge ulteriore sarà provveduto al riordinamento, alla conservazione ed alla amministrazione della proprietà ecclesiastiche nel Regno.

ART. 19.—In tutte le materie che formano oggetto della presente Legge, cosa di avere effetto qualunque disposizione ora vigente in quanto sia contraria alla Legge medesima.

against the acts of the ecclesiastical authority, but neither is any coercive execution of the acts recognized or granted.

"The cognition (*cognizione*) of the legal (*juridical*) effects of these, as of every other act of the said authority, belongs to the civil jurisdiction.

"Therefore, such acts are deprived of their effects, if contrary to the laws of the State, or to public order, or if injurious to the rights of private persons, and they become subject to the penal laws if ascertained to be criminal."

The principle which seems laid down here, of meeting the excesses and aggressions of ecclesiastical authority, by simply *denying civil effect to its acts*, is one of startling simplicity. But the question is at once raised, is it possible to carry out such a maxim in practical application? Or have we rightly apprehended what it means? One-half of the first general rule, that no complaint or appeal against Church acts is allowed, is in the same article qualified in certain cases as regards "effects." And the other half, that the civil power does not recognize execution of Church sentences, is qualified by adding that it is "coercive" execution which it denies to them. This, then, seems to be an attempted severance of two spheres, or an abstention on the part of the civil power from meddling with the Church except by refusing to allow the Church to meddle with it. Is it so?

Let us turn to the ministerial commentary. The press of Rome had this spring directed public attention to what it considered the excesses of the Church, and the sluggishness of the law. In particular, says M. Vigliani,

"It has been supposed that if the higher ecclesiastics on the one hand abuse their authority by unjust persecutions of the curés or other ecclesiastics of inferior rank (and that from political motives), the government, on the other hand, has not availed itself of the means which it possesses to correct such abuses—at least within the circle of civil effects—in that region, namely, which touches the possession and enjoyment of the temporalities with which ecclesiastics, struck by the unjust measures of their superiors, have been invested."

The question raised here is strikingly like that crucial one in Germany, and the last words in which it is stated above recall us to the general principle on which the Italian law answers it. Vigliani, who is himself a Catholic, and favourable to the Church in his administration, feels it necessary, in the first place, to vindicate his own loyalty to the new law.

"I have no reason to believe that any ecclesiastic, whoever he may be, having had to bear unjust censures on the part of his superiors, has invoked fruitlessly, or can invoke in vain, that assistance which, as to civil effects (*quant aux effets civils*) may and ought to be extended to him by legal means, and that according to the 17th Article of the law of 13th May, 1871, upon the Guarantees. If it is not given to the secular power, in Italy, to meddle with that which regards the exercise of spiritual functions, it always retains means sufficiently effectual to prevent the unjust privation or suspension from a spiritual office from drawing along with it deprivation of the temporalities assigned to that office."

This very striking illustration of what may fairly be called an independence of both Church and State, is followed up by an energetic declaration that "if the government observes and faithfully respects the liberties which it has conceded to the Church, it is in its turn firmly determined not to tolerate the abuse of these liberties, or the smallest transgression of the laws of the State;" and the rule of our conduct, it is added, ought to be "respect for the liberties" and "repression of their abuse." The paragraph last quoted, however, refers to cases where the man, attacked by a Church sentence, appeals to the State. If he does it as to "civil effects," and not as to "spiritual functions," the law will listen to his appeal; and that not out of mere comity or unreasoning benevolence. It is its *duty* to do so; in hearing what he has to say, as to the validity, it is strictly in the exercise "*de cette attribution tutelaire des droits de l'Etat*," for the remedy which he seeks is one which the State alone can give. But the same question may, and often will, be raised, on the other side. What is to be done when it is the Church which intimates that it has in ordinary course passed a sentence? We shall find in the answer to this question an instructive enumeration of the vices which in Italian civil jurisprudence render an ecclesiastical act null, accompanied with the consistent confession that the nullity declared by the court is only *quoad civilia*, and does not extend to such possible validity as the Church on its side may choose to attribute to it in purely Church relations. If in *materia spirituale e disciplinare* there is "no complaint or appeal," while yet the State takes cognizance of the juridical *effects* of all Church acts, how is the thing to be worked out? Let the Minister's circular again answer:—

"So often as the courts are asked to apply disciplinary steps taken by the ecclesiastical authority to civil results and consequences, the officers of administration called upon to give their opinion must adhere to the provisions of the above-quoted 17th article, which denies all civil efficacy to acts of the ecclesiastical authority contrary to the laws of the State, or to public order, or injurious to the interests of individuals. Acts which would appear destitute of all canonical motive, contrary to the laws and to national institutions, or pronounced without spiritual competency, or without the observance of the forms which the canon law requires for their validity, would be in this position. Those radical vices which render such an act null, can and ought to be, without attacking its spiritual competency (*sans porter atteinte à la compétence spirituelle*), remedied by the civil authority called upon to decide questions arising between parties interested, so far as regards the civil effects of acts emanating from the ecclesiastical power."

Vigliani concludes with pointing out that this principle has brought in "a new method of procedure, replacing Appeals *comme d'Abus*." Both attempted remedies, the positive and the negative, sprang from "that duty of protection which the State cannot abdicate." But the new or negative scheme, which simply

denies civil effect to the act condemned, has the twofold advantage of being decidedly simpler in principle (as any one who has dipped into the huge literature of the *Appel comme d'Abus* must confess), and of producing less, and less harassing, litigation. It is natural, indeed, that any litigation which now takes place should not take the form of "appeals." The priest unjustly condemned will, in the ordinary case, simply hold to his temporalities; and the Church, whose sentence has no "coercive" or temporal power in itself, will think twice before presenting to the State, which alone can attach to it the proper civil consequences, a sentence which the Courts must declare invalid. So far the legal problem is simplified. Yet it is a great question, worthy of being worked out by a nation whose aptitude for administration is equalled by its philosophical and legal genius; and I do not think the minister assumes too high a tone as he concludes, "*J'ai la confiance que la magistrature Italienne saura dignement remplir cette haute mission.*"

For let us now inquire how this Italian principle would bear upon the German struggle. The Prussian constitution of 1850 recognized "*la liberté des cultes*" and "*le droit de former des associations religieuses;*" and while it denied the "*droits de corporation*" except to those favoured by special statute, it provided that "*the Evangelical Church and the Roman Catholic Church, like every other religious society, govern and arrange their affairs independently.*" When the Falck laws were introduced in January, 1873, a significant addition was made to this clause of the constitution, which now reads as follows :*—

"The Evangelical Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, like every other religious society, govern and arrange their affairs independently, *but remain subject to the laws of the State, and to the oversight of the State, as regulated by the law.*"

"Independence" in the first clause, and "subjection" in the second, of the same sentence, create an obvious, if superficial, difficulty. There is a certain contradiction in the terms at least, which repeats itself in many pages of modern history. In Italy, and under the Italian principle as we have seen it expounded, the verbal balance might cover a real equipoise—the independence being complete in the internal or Church region, and the subjection being equally absolute in the civil sphere, including therein even the civil results of Church actings. But on both sides of the Prussian Parliament it was admitted that no such equipoise was

* "*Les Eglises évangélique et catholique-romaine, comme toute autre communauté religieuse, règlent et gèrent leurs affaires d'une manière indépendante, mais elles restent soumises aux lois de l'Etat et à la surveillance de l'Etat réglée par la loi.*"—*Nouvelle Législation Prussienne réglant les Rapports entre l'Etat et l'Eglise*. Berlin. P. 87. I am unable while writing to lay hands on the original German, and shall not guess at the word translated into "*d'une manière indépendante.*"

intended in its new constitutional law. The acting of the Churches in their own affairs is there independent only in the sense that the State does not choose to interfere with it ordinarily or administratively; for the clause of subjection overrides it, to the effect of making both the Church and its administration subject to the positive legislation of the State, as well as to its oversight and restriction. The parliamentary question in 1873 was, whether this had not been the case even under the constitution of 1850, on the general principles of German law, and Dr. Gneist's report was intended to prove this. (That document reveals that the Minister of Worship in 1850 contemplated a merely negative right, and it signally fails when it claims the support of the Catholic jurist Zöpff to something more than a negative.) But whether an innovation or not, the Prussian Parliament thought the general declaration of Church subjection to be now necessary or appropriate; and they also interposed between it and the new legislation the ominous subsidiary clause, "Further, the law regulates the powers of the State with respect to the preparatory education, the nomination, and the *deposition* of ecclesiastics and religious officers, and fixes the limits of the Church's power of discipline." Some of the words are, again, in themselves ambiguous; but in one view they leave it open to the State to interfere to the uttermost (legislatively, at least) with a most sensitive and delicate part of proper Church life. And here, as before, it is the absence of the question put by the Italian jurists, "*To what effects does the State claim a right of legislation? sacred or merely civil? internal or external?*" which opens a door in theory for any extent of interference.

What the actually resulting interference has been, all Europe painfully knows. It is said to have been necessary in the meantime; and to have been called for as a defence against ecclesiastical aggression. Without pronouncing prematurely on that question, two things are at least plain: (1) I have hitherto been part of the German scheme to regulate not only the pecuniary and other civil results and effects of Church acts, but to compel and prevent or reverse these Church acts themselves in the internal or Church region; and (2) it is this specialty which has produced the chief irritation on the side of the members of the Church, and which has also caused a divided or imperfect sympathy with Germany in our own country. Many things in the Falck laws, as has been well pointed out to the English public,†

* "Du reste, la loi règle les droits de l'Etat par rapport à l'éducation première, à la nomination et à la révocation des ecclésiastiques et des serviteurs religieux, et fixe les limites du pouvoir disciplinaire de l'Eglise."—*Nouvelle Législation*, p. 88.

† By far the best exposition and the ablest defence of these enactments in English will be found in two articles by the Rev. J. B. Paton, in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1874, and February, 1875. I take the liberty of occasionally using his accurate translation.

are unexceptionable. The whole of the last of these enactments, giving individuals the right to separate from any existing Church, with corresponding freedom from the legal dues, is obvious justice; while the restrictions on the power of the Catholic authorities to impose corporal or pecuniary punishments rather fall short of the powers of the State than exceed it. But take the first law—that on the training and nomination of the clergy (which means the clergy of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic, the two privileged or established Churches of Prussia). It enacts that

“To enter upon a clerical office, it is requisite to have passed the final examination at a German gymnasium, to have completed a three years’ theological curriculum at a German university, and to have passed a literary examination appointed by the State.”

Besides this negative restriction, it is forbidden to institute any new priestly seminaries for boys, and “during the prescribed university course, students must not belong to a Church seminary.” The existing “seminaries” are put under the oversight of the State, and if the regulations made for them are not observed, the Government may *either* withdraw their allowance, or close them until the regulations be observed. Now, these regulations as to the education of the clergy—a matter which surely properly belongs to a Church itself—are enforced in the second part of the same law, by the provision that nominations made in contravention of them, and protested against by the Ober-President, are null, and may be followed by penalties, (not merely that, as is also provided, the Government may “reserve, until the law is obeyed, the State endowment”). And so completely is this carried even into the Church sphere, that when a priest not having “the legal requirements” has been protested against, and appointed, the mere *delay* after a certain specified time to fill up the place with another is punished by fines upon the ecclesiastical superior, steadily increasing. Then if we go from the appointment of clergymen to their disciplinary removal, we find that

“An appeal to State Courts is open: generally for protection under this [second Falck] law; and further, when deposition from Church office has been decreed as a disciplinary punishment, or otherwise, against the will of the person sentenced, and the judgment plainly opposes the clear facts of the case, or when it violates the laws of the State, or common civil rights.”

This quashing of a Church sentence (to all effects) is to be upon appeal to a new royal tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs, consisting of State judges and others appointed by the king; and the same tribunal is, by the following clause, entitled (if the ordinary ecclesiastical courts refuse to do it) themselves to try and to depose clergymen.

"Church officers who violate the prescriptions of the law, or the regulations of the authorities, in respect to their office and their clerical duties, so injuriously that their continuance in office appears incompatible with public order, can, at the instance of State authorities, be tried and deposed from their office by a judicial sentence. Such deposition from an office involves legal disqualification for the discharge of its functions, the forfeiture of its income, and its being declared vacant."

These provisions relate only to the two quasi-established Churches—the Evangelical and Roman Catholic. But that they are intended to authorize the State to regulate these bodies *internally*, and to ecclesiastical as well as civil effects (in so far as they touch them at all), is plain from the fundamental paragraph of the third law, which applies to them and to all religious societies. That declares, as to all of them:—

"No Church or religious society is authorized to threaten, *execute*, or officially publish any other punishment or discipline than that which belongs strictly to the domain of religion, or which involves either the withdrawal of some right that is esteemed and is influential within the Church or religious society, or exclusion from the Church or religious society. No punishment or discipline which affects the person or property or freedom, or which is defamatory, is allowed."

By this excellent general law all Church discipline in *all* ecclesiastical communities in Germany* is formally restricted to the "domain of religion." And yet it is this very discipline, so restricted, which by the other clauses of the same law which we have read, is, if not interfered with, at least defined or regulated, *in that which is now its only domain*—its acts in certain cases quashed, in certain others usurped, by the State functionaries, but in both cases to all effects, sacred as well as civil. The State, in short, takes upon itself the *internal* management and working of the Church, to the effect of carrying out in Church action these laws and regulations. That this was the general idea and effect of the four Falck laws of 1873, was not doubted at any time; but it received the greatest prominence from the "Law of the Empire," which followed them in May, 1874. By this it is provided that "if any ecclesiastic or other Church officer, after having been deprived of his office by a judicial sentence (*révoqué de son emploi par un arrêt judiciaire*), does acts from which it appears that he pretends to continue to exercise the functions which have been withdrawn from him," he may be removed from the place, or interned in another, by authority of the police. And if these acts consist of either "a formal claim to his former office (*emploi*), or an effective exercise of it, or if he resists the said police regulation," he may be deprived of his nationality, and expelled from the federal territory. Nothing could lay the emphasis more clearly upon Church func-

* Only the "Evangelisch" and Roman Catholic communions are described as "Churches" in German law: other bodies are religious societies.

tion ; and the emphasis has been followed up by pressure, under the form of deportation, as well as fine and imprisonment, to an extent which has startled and revolted onlookers, at least, in this country.

The only apology which has had much influence in England for this State interference with Church function and clerical organization is one—very well put by Mr. Paton—founded on the historical and present relations with the Roman Catholic Church in Prussia to the State. It is in some sense, it is argued, an established Church, and it certainly is privileged. Its officers have many civil functions in their parishes, with small civil emoluments attached ; in many cases the incomes are paid to, and in all the taxes are collected for, the clergy by the State ; and the bishoprics and ecclesiastical seminaries enjoy direct grants and subventions from the central civil power. It is, in short, a Church endowed by the State ; and as M. Laveleye puts it, “so long as the State pays the ministers of religion, it is impossible to refuse a certain right of control.”* The argument may be a very fair one, provided the State gives the Church in question the option between endowment and independence. But it is scarcely asserted that this option was given. And the last step in the conflict taken by the Prussian Government—the Bill for the withdrawal of State grants to the Roman Catholic episcopate and clergy—brings this matter to a point at which the Italian principle assumes great practical importance. In this enactment (the fifteen skilfully framed clauses of which are given in full below†).

* “On Ultramontanism,” *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1874. So Mr. Paton : “If the Roman Catholic Church were composed of voluntary associations of worshippers, which accepted and supported their own religious officers, the claim of the State would be despotic.”—*Fortnightly Review*, February, 1874, p. 180.

† The text of the Bill, as laid before the Diet, for the withdrawal of State grants to the episcopate and clergy, is as follows, (I am not aware that any change has been made in its provisions as it passed through the Legislature) :—

“1. All State grants to the episcopate, the institutions connected with the bishoprics, and the clergy, of the archbishoprics of Cologne, Gnesen, and Posen ; of the bishoprics of Kulm, Ermeland, Breslau, Hildesheim, Osnabrück, Paderborn, Münster, Treves, Fulda ; of the delegate districts of those dioceses, as well as of the Prussian parts of the archbishoprics of Prague, Olmütz, Freiburg ; and of the diocese of Mayence, will cease from the day of publication of this law. The subventions destined for clergymen attached to public institutions are excepted. The special funds under the permanent administration of the State are included in the State funds.

“2. The suspended grants shall be again accorded for the extent of the diocese as soon as the officiating bishop (archbishop, prince-bishop) or administrator of a bishopric binds himself to the Government by a written declaration to obey the laws of the State.

“3. In the archbishoprics of Gnesen and Posen, as well as in the diocese of Paderborn, the suspended grants will be accorded again for the extent of the diocese as soon as the appointment of an administrator or the installation of a new bishop has taken place according to law.

“4. Should a vacancy occur in an episcopal see filled at present, or should the present administrator of the diocese of Fulda resign his office, before a resumption of the grants in accordance with clause 2 has taken place, the cessation of the same for the extent of the diocese continues until the appointment of an administrator or the installation of a new bishop takes place according to law.

“5. If the State grants have been resumed again for the extent of a diocese, individual clergymen, however, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken by the

the Roman Catholic dioceses in Prussia, adhering to the Vatican Council, are disendowed. It is not a threat of disendowment in the future. It is not a provision of legal machinery, by which such a measure may, if necessary, be carried out. It is a declaration that the State grants shall cease at once "from the day of publication of this law," and shall only be resumed in each diocese so soon as the bishop "binds himself to the government by a written declaration to obey the laws of the State." Failing the bishop's doing so, if an individual ecclesiastic under the bishop chooses to give such a declaration, the administration may continue a grant to him. Now, it can scarcely be said that an obligation to obey its laws is an unreasonable condition for a State to attach to its endowments. And it must further be observed, in defence of Prussia, that the prompt withdrawal of the endowments *until* such a promise should be given, was its rejoinder to a very strong statement by the bishops, intimating

bishop or administrator of the bishopric, still refusing to obey the State laws, the Government is empowered to withdraw the aid destined for such recipients.

"6. The resumption of the suspended payments to individuals entitled to State aid, besides in the cases mentioned in clauses 2 to 4, takes place also if the individual entitled to the grants binds himself in the manner provided in clause 2 to obey the laws of the State. The Government is empowered likewise to continue temporarily suspended grants to individual clergymen if they prove by their behaviour that it is their intention to obey the laws of the State. Should they a second time refuse obedience to the latter, the payments are to be withdrawn again.

"7. The resumption of the suspended grants commences in all cases with the first day of the quarter in which compliance with the laws takes place.

"8. The question as to the disposal of the funds accumulated during suspension of grants, in so far as they are not, in accordance with their legal nature, considered as saved in favour of the exchequer, or to be otherwise employed, is reserved for future legislation. The Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, in case of episcopal property being administered by a commission, in accordance with the law of May 20, 1874, is empowered to order the continuance of the State grants, in so far as they are required for the purposes of such administration, or the expenses attending the same.

"9. The collection by the State of the taxes and imposts due to the bishoprics, the institutions in connection with them, and the clergy, is discontinued as long as the suspension of State grants lasts.

"10. If the State grants are once more resumed to an individual entitled to them, by virtue of clause 6, the dues and imposts will again be collected by the State. The same holds good with regard to the dues and taxes to those clergymen who do not receive State grants, if they bind themselves, either expressly or tacitly (clause 6), to obey the laws of the State, as long as they comply with this obligation.

"11. Any one withdrawing his written promise (clauses 2 and 6), or acting contrary to his obligation, by violating the laws of the State, or the regulations issued by the Government in accordance with them, will be dismissed from his holding by judicial proceeding.

"12. The dismissal from office involves legal incapacity for performing his official duties, loss of income, and vacancy of the office. Besides this, the suspension of the State grants, as well as cessation of State aid in collecting the revenues, take place to the former extent. The Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs is empowered to order the cessation of grants as soon as judicial proceedings are instituted. If the latter result in an acquittal, all arrears accruing while the case is pending are to be paid in full.

"13. All cases under this law will be tried by the Ecclesiastical Court. Its procedure is determined by the regulations of Section III. of the law of May 12, 1878, for the disciplinary powers over the Church, and the creation of the Ecclesiastical Court.

"14. Any one officiating after being suspended from office by virtue of clause 11 of this law renders himself liable to a fine of not less than 300 marks (£15), nor more than 8,000 marks (£400).

"15. The Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs is ordered to carry this law into execution."

that they could not obey the new Falck laws of 1873, with the constitutional modification on which these were founded, and their application in the laws of 1874. Such a rejoinder was quite legitimate. It was fair fighting on both sides;* and so far as this is concerned there is nothing of the nature of persecution. There is, indeed, in this new law nothing which can be called oppressive, or in the strict sense outside of the acknowledged powers of the State. At first sight, the provisions in clauses 11 and 12 may seem to go too far. They, like the previous laws, provide for dismissal of an ecclesiastic from his office by judicial (*i.e.*, civil) proceeding, and this dismissal is to "involve incapacity for performing his official duties" and "vacancy of the office," as well as loss of income. Here, as before, the law seems to intrude into the domain of Church function. But the former section shows that this refers only to the case of "any one withdrawing his written promise, or acting contrary to his obligation"—the obligation, as I read it, being undertaken in the written promise invited in clauses 2 and 6. *This* law, therefore, binds no one except those who have voluntarily submitted to it. It refers back, no doubt, to the "laws of the State," which are chiefly those of 1873. But it contemplates a community deliberately submitting itself to those laws; and so protected and endowed and regulated by the State, which has the right (and perhaps the duty) of affixing its own conditions to its own establishment. Of this new scheme, therefore, the Church cannot complain: *volenti non fit injuria*. But on the policy of the German government it raises a question of immense importance. This new law (as I write it is being put in force by withholding the quarterly endowments usually paid on the 1st of July) does not repeal or even modify the Falck laws. But it contemplates another way of working out the thing, and opens another road on which the central Protestant country of Europe may march in the great coming conflict. Another road, and is it not a safer?

For that the German State (like every other State) is called to deal in *some* way with a gigantic aggression on the part of the Roman Catholic Church I cannot doubt. The defences which have been put forward in the recent controversy in this country by the champions of that body, really amount to this—that the claims of authority over individuals and nations made for the Church and its head by the present Vatican Council are not, after all, new. They ought, it is said, to have been anticipated by any intelligent student of its doctrine, and they are at the most the

* I abstain from inquiring minutely whether, on the one hand, some of the endowments were not private rather than State endowments, and whether, on the other hand, the churchmen ever really offered to throw up to the disposal of the civil power what pertained to it.

explicit assertion and development of what was unasserted but implied before. Let it be so. It is plain that aggression, if it exists, becomes all the more alarming when it is presented as the essential and inevitable result of a system claiming to be ancient and divine. The express "enthronement of will" in the Latin Church in 1870 is not less, but more serious, as the fateful consummation of a growing past of centuries. What, upon either view, is Germany, the ancient adversary and counterpoise in Europe of the Papacy, now confronted with? A priesthood and hierarchy, which having long since deprived the Christian people of all their representative and Church rights, has gradually become a despotism, and now at last an autocracy, and that of a foreigner. Nor is this foreign despotism exercised merely through Germans and in Church matters alone. It is claimed as controlling and overruling the private judgment of all Catholic Germans, if not of all baptized Germans. It extends absolutely over all the greater regions of human life; and in the lower province, which alone it relegates to the State, it *authoritatively* prescribes to the State the limits of its acting, and declares null to all effects, civil as well as sacred, whatever State action is struck at by this most real supremacy. And yet this Church (or at least this priesthood and hierarchy), now depending on a foreign power, has hitherto in Germany been established by the State, and till this year has been fostered by it. Who can wonder, who can blame, if Prussia, hampered by many Erastian traditions, and desirous to protect German Catholicism against the foreign influence, should at first have made itself responsible for Church actings as well as civil results, and so transferred the question from the legitimate sphere of the State to one in which success is impossible? Success did not appear impossible at first. Had the mass of Catholic laymen gone against the hierarchy, it might have appeared that Dr. Falck and Dr. Gneist were only fighting their battle, and that in deposing Ultramontane clergymen the law was getting rid of those whom the (German) Church had never called to preside over it. But the Catholics of Germany have not responded to the call of the Legislature. They have not repudiated the Council, or rejected its authority, or broken off from the foreign majority, or from their own acquiescent bishops. And in these circumstances the exceptional legislation, in losing the aspect of being legislation for the Church, has necessarily assumed that of legislation against it, of aggression or persecution. What course is still open for the State to take? It has failed in its attempt to make itself responsible for the Church (in internal or Church actings). May it not remain that each body now assume its *separate responsibility*?

That does not necessarily mean separation of Church and State.

It may exist without disestablishment, and without disendowment: just as, on the other hand, the State may both disestablish and disendow a Church, and yet make itself responsible for its administration. In Italy, for example, the Church of Rome is still the Established Church, but the State is not responsible for it or its actings. In Germany, the same Church is under the most recent law disendowed, but Prussia retains a responsibility on the part of the State for its internal administration. No doubt the way to cut the German knot which has occurred to most thinkers throughout Europe is simple disjunction of Church and State. Let Prussia take the same relation to the Church of Rome as is held to it by England or by the American Republic, and what further difficulties can there be? I have had many occasions to point out that this mere severance is not an end of all strife; and that so long as Church and State exist in the world, however separately, questions will arise which will force the recognition of the one upon the other, a recognition which may be occasional merely, but which may also be systematic. But the excellence of the Italian theory, which we have seen above expounded by the Minister Vigliani, seems to me to be that it is universal—equally applicable whether the Church is established or not established, endowed or not endowed. In either case, the position that the State meddles with the Church *only to civil effects* promises important results. And for Germany in particular, its present importance depends not merely upon what, in obedience to this theory, the State would give up, but on what it would retain. Even if Germany is to disestablish as well as disendow the Roman Catholic Church, as I have little doubt in some form it will soon do, it will certainly refuse to let it go beyond that “surveillance” claimed for the State by its constitutional law. But under the form of “cognitio,” the Italian law claims this also, and to well-defined results. Thus I read that on the 16th June last “the Bishop of Matera in Sicily, who, not having obtained the royal *exequatur*, illegally occupied the episcopal palace, has been requested by the police to quit the edifice.” But the Bishop of Matera, though turned out of his palace, is allowed freely to exercise all his functions in the Church as a Church bishop. The Government does not supersede him, or deport him, or prevent him from governing his diocese as Dr. Ullathorne governs his. I have no doubt the Italian State will recognize clergymen ordained by him even before he has got his *exequatur*. But even if it does not, the utmost it would do in consequence would be to withhold civil emoluments and advantages of all kinds from these unrecognized functionaries, leaving them to act in the Church as the Church may choose. So in America, and even England, the State does not ordinarily concern itself with the internal adminis-

tration of the Latin or other non-established Churches: but it retains its full right to take "cognisance" of all they do, with a view to carry out civil justice in worldly results between the parties.*

* Since the above paragraph was written, the questions dealt with in it have received illustration from a judgment of the Civil Court of Mantua, as to one, and perhaps two parishes there. (See letter from *Times* correspondent, of date 14th July.) These cases are very interesting from another point of view than that in which I cite them. They sprang out of the question of the patronage or election of pastors, so often the occasion of the other question of Church independence; and the judgment adopts views as to the elective rights of the Christian people in the Catholic Church, and the usurpation of their functions by the bishops, which (if confirmed) will show a great advance in the Italian mind. No doubt this is a purely internal, or Church question; but it cannot be too often repeated that civil courts frequently have to solve for themselves what are purely theological or ecclesiastical questions, in order to arrive at the civil results, for which they are always competent, and with which alone they directly concern themselves. And whatever view the Italian Courts of Appeal may take on this question of the constitution of the Church, they may be expected to adhere, as those of Mantua have instructively done, to the general idea of not meddling with the Church, except as to the temporalities.

In the Commune of San Giovanni del Dosso, a certain priest, Don Lonardi, has been acting, since 1871, as *locum tenens* until a regular incumbent should be appointed. As such he received the royal *placet*. The present archbishop is strongly Ultramontane (and has himself no *exequatur*), and not being satisfied with Don Lonardi, who was a candidate for the place, he passed him by, and appointed another (for whom he has procured no *placet*). The parishioners, disappointed and indignant, held a meeting, which was called with much formality, and whose proceedings were recorded by a notary public; and at it, by a vote of 207 to 47, they elected Don Lonardi to be their priest. The archbishop protested, and issued letters pastoral forbidding his being recognized or acting as such; but Don Lonardi was formally, and, indeed, festally inducted into possession of the church, a few of his clerical brethren countenancing him and acting on the occasion. The minority of the electors, with the concurrence of the archbishop, then brought a suit in the civil court, which seems to have embraced two demands—(1) to interdict Don Lonardi from exercising his functions as the parish priest; and (2) to eject him from the parish church and priest's house. The Civil Court of Mantua, after very elaborate argument, pronounced judgment on the 1st July, 1875, refusing to grant either branch of this twofold application; and the grounds on which the Court proceeds (especially in distinguishing between the two proposals) are very instructive. It first quotes the general law of 1871, that there is no civil appeal against ecclesiastical acts; it is only their effects that are subject to the civil tribunal. On this principle of "religious toleration," therefore, the plaintiffs have clearly no ground to ask the interference of the Court with Don Lonardi's spiritual functions (whatever may be afterwards said as to the church or edifice). The Court, indeed, went farther, and held that the law of 1871 in recognizing the liberty of the Church, allowed freedom to each parish, and that therefore the election was valid. But even were it, as the plaintiffs alleged, invalid, "no rights of theirs were violated by the election," all being free to have for priest whichever person they preferred. "If Don Lonardi had not the mandate of the archbishop, he had that of the electors," and although the minority might lament that this was contrary to Tridentine rule, their liberty of conscience or of worship was not prejudiced, and they had no right to interdict him from mere Church functions in the parish generally. This seems clear enough on the general principle. But the judgment then goes on to deal with the use of the church buildings. On this, as unquestionably a civil "effect" of the ecclesiastical act, there was no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Court. Unlike the former demand, the plaintiffs are here entitled to succeed if they can prove the necessary facts. But the Court, in a very elaborate judgment, held that they had failed to do so, and refused to interfere with the present possession of the church by Don Lonardi. The ownership of the parish churches, it lays down, belongs not to the Catholic Church as a whole, nor to the bishops, but to the civil communities, and its administration falls to the syndic and other local civil authorities, until the vacant incumbency has been filled up. The Court seem to have considered that the municipal authorities should therefore have been made defendants in the present suit. It also seems to have regarded the archbishop's want of *exequatur* as depriving him of legal authority to transfer, or to insist on transferring, the Church temporalities from one holder to another. But apart from this, the judgment declines to consider Don Lonardi's election as invalid. "We must recognise and admit the right of the parishioners of San Giovanni del Dosso to assemble together and elect their parish priest, or spiritual minister;" and the laws of 1871 are referred

The result, therefore, of the application of the Italian principle to the German question would be—1. Abstinence by the State from any interference with the internal government or proper ecclesiastical action of the Roman Catholic communion in Germany. 2. "Surveillance" retained over the whole communion, even in its details, with a view to settling any pecuniary or other civil questions which may arise out of Church action. Under this head, as well as the next, it would be competent for the State even to transfer the endowments, in whole or in part, to the Old Catholics, or any others whom it regarded as more entitled to them in consequence of recent changes. 3. There might, and probably would, follow disestablishment and disendowment of any communion which adheres to a system already disapproved and condemned by the State. 4. In so far as that system is disapproved as aggressive in its relations to the civil power, positive acts of aggression or intrusion (upon German soil) would fall to be punished and repressed by the public law from time to time.—That such a system would be absolutely simple, or without difficulty, no wise man will assert. The working out of questions of conscience and religion will be a difficult and delicate problem to the end of time, on any system. But it would be just. And it would be practicable: the State, being clearly on its own ground and within its right, could no longer be frustrated by that passive resistance on the ground of conscience which, in the meantime, is successfully opposed to it. Not that the new course, any more than the old, would free Germany from Romish hostility.

to as intended to "amplify the primitive idea of liberty of conscience, of religion, and of Church, taken in its etymological meaning of assemblage of persons." The result, therefore, as to San Giovanni del Dosso, is, that the Court leaves the two priests elected, each to minister to his own people; but leaves Don Lonardi undisturbed in the possession of the church.

But from the neighbouring commune of Frassinò, a claim of a different kind was about the same time thrown out, and the two invite comparison. On the same day on which Don Lonardi was elected, the people of Frassinò (then vacant) met, and without the archbishop's concurrence, elected their priest. According to the decision already mentioned, the Court would hold this election at least not illegal. But the commune having since demanded that the patrimony of their church be surrendered to him, the Minister of Grace and Justice (and seemingly the Court also) has declined to give it, on the ground that he "has not been canonically appointed." The communal council of the parish may, it is said, give him the parish church if they choose; but the Government cannot give the benefice, unless to one properly appointed.

Here is evidently something to solve. Which gives validity? popular election, or episcopal appointment? or are both necessary? The Italian Court declines to decide this for the Church, or for the parishioners looked at as churchmen. It leaves them to make double elections, and each party to carry out its arrangements freely. But for its own purposes, and especially for the disposition of the property, the Court of Appeal or of Cassation must make up its mind on this. What they do will be looked for with interest by ecclesiastical Europe; for if they adjudge the local patrimony of the Church to the local Catholics themselves, instead of to the superior clergy, such a view of the constitution of the Church, though taken outside of the Church, might initiate a great reform within it. But this question, however interesting, is not the thing with which we have to do. What we have to observe with satisfaction is that, hitherto at least, these Courts seem to have kept true to their principle of not entering into the internal or Church department, and have settled their own questions of property or "civil effects" by throwing the burden of proof on those who wish to change the present possession.

The Italian principle, scrupulously fair and symmetrically just as it is, is still the object of ceaseless attack and invective by Ultramontanism; and if transferred to the German Empire (as it will, no doubt, soon be, at least in practice) it will not find more favour with an Ultramontanism, against which it would probably unite the nation. But from what a burden of censure and misconception from every part of Europe would this change deliver Germany! And how would its being set free from its self-imposed ecclesiastical duties enable the empire, with fourfold power, to assume that championship of the whole European conflict to which it is clearly called!

That conflict may in the future have relations, not only to the Western Church, but to its head. The question whether civil governments are to accept the Pope, or even the Bishops, as absolutely representing the Church, is one which may come up most legitimately in the future, in working out merely civil questions such as endowments. The Mantua proceedings, detailed in the note on a previous page, show that even Italy is beginning to raise this question. But there is no danger that Italy will go too fast or too far in this direction. In recent years that country has been unquestionably much too favourable to its own great hierarchy: it has given freedom not so much to the Church as to the Church rulers, and it has surrounded the Pope with prerogatives which make him more than a spiritual sovereign. The Italian law of 13th May, 1871, which we have been considering, is "upon the relations of the State with the Church." But the first half of the same enactment (from which the whole statute derives its popular name of the Guarantees Law) is "upon the prerogative of the Chief Pontiff, and of the Holy Seat." This provides that "the person of the Supreme Pontiff is sacred and inviolable;" that attacks and conspiracies against his person shall be punished as if against that of the king; and that in the kingdom of Italy he is to receive sovereign honours, and the precedence accorded him by Catholic sovereigns. No police, or agents of public authority or justice, are to enter the place where the Pope is residing either permanently or for the time; and the same inviolability is extended to a conclave and Ecumenical Council, and to the persons of the cardinals during a vacancy in the Popedom. His papers and documents relating to matters spiritual are to be neither seized nor examined by the civil power; envoys to him from foreign States have the same immunities as envoys to the King of Italy; and his correspondence with all parts of the Catholic world is to be forwarded by the Italian Government, free of charge, and sacred from examination. Just about the time of Vigliani's letter this year, the question whether the Pope could plead these guarantees against other nations of

Europe, as well as against Italy, became the subject of a very interesting discussion between the journals of that country and Prussia. The result seems to be that they are mere domestic or Italian laws. As such, they, at all events, make it plain that Italy treats the Church's now autocratic head with immensely more observance than our laws would permit, were he resident in England or America. It is not wonderful that it should do so, nor is it in the meantime undesirable. Even if Catholic sentiment, flowing at last back towards its source, should in coming years deprive the Bishop of Rome of his pretended absolute power within that community, the legislation of 1871 would secure that this should not go too far. He might forfeit thereby his dominion over the temporal goods of the Church, but his official and personal freedom would be permanently secured by the laws of the very country whose laws he denounces.

And whatever shall happen when the Conclave sits, or when the next Pope assumes an irresponsible tiara, the law of Italy on Church and State in general suggests a ground on which the nations of Europe may practically unite. The legislation of Austria in 1874 seems to me to take up a position nearer to that of Italy than to that of any other country. Now, were Germany content to abandon its present unwise enforcement of the laws of 1873, and to proceed rather on the path indicated by the State Grant Laws of 1874, I see no reason why these three powers should not arrive at a common understanding as to the defensive principles on which they are to deal with the Roman Catholic Church. And if the principles were those already worked out by Italy as to "general Church relations," they would certainly be *substantially* approved of by the United States and by our own country, and they would not be opposed by France. And with such a peaceful and steadfast consent from the civilized world, we might not have to wait long, and we could at least wait in peace, for that tremendous reaction against Churchism within the Catholic Church itself, which pressure from civil power without tends to delay, but which, if it comes, will be the salvation of Europe.

ALEX. TAYLOR INNES.



“SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.”

VI.—PAPIAS OF HIERAPOLIS.

(Continued from p. 408.)

IT has been seen that in the meagre fragments of his work which alone survive, Papias mentions by name the Evangelical records of St. Matthew and St. Mark. With the Third and Fourth Gospels the case is different. Eusebius has not recorded any reference to them by Papias, and our author therefore concludes that they were unknown to this early writer. I have shown in a previous paper on the “Silence of Eusebius,”* that this inference is altogether unwarrantable. I have pointed out that the assumption on which it rests is not justified by the principles which Eusebius lays down for himself as his rule of procedure, while it is directly refuted by almost every instance in which he quotes a writing now extant, and in which therefore it is possible to apply a test. I have proved that, as regards the four Gospels, Eusebius only pledges himself to give, and (as a matter of fact) only does give, traditions of interest respecting them. I have proved also that it is not consistent either with his principles or with his practice to refer to mere quotations, however numerous, even though they are given by name. Papias therefore might have quoted the Third Gospel any number of times as written by Luke the companion of Paul, and the Fourth Gospel not less frequently as written by John the Apostle; and Eusebius would not have cared to record the fact.

All this I have proved, and the author of “Supernatural

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January, 1875, p. 169 seq.

Religion" is unable to disprove it. In the preface to his last edition he does indeed devote several pages to my argument; but I confess that I am quite at a loss to understand how any writer can treat the subject as it is there treated by him. Does he or does he not realize the distinction which underlies the whole of my argument—the distinction between *traditions about* the Gospels on the one hand, and *quotations from* the Gospels on the other?

At times it appears as if this distinction were clearly before him. He quotes a passage from my article, in which it is directly stated, and even argues upon it. I gave a large number of instances where ancient authors whose writings are extant do quote our Canonical Scriptures, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, sometimes anonymously, sometimes by name, and where nevertheless Eusebius does not mention the circumstance. This is his mode of dealing with such facts—

That he omitted to mention a reference to the Epistle to the Corinthians in the Epistle of Clement of Rome, or the reference by Theophilus to the Gospel of John, and other supposed quotations, might be set down as much to oversight as intention.*

Does it not occur to him that he is here cutting the throat of his own argument? The reference to the First Epistle to the Corinthians is the single direct reference by name to the Canonical Scriptures of the New Testament in Clement; the reference to the Gospel of St. John again is the single direct reference by name in the extant work of Theophilus. What would be said of a traveller who paid a visit to the Gorner-Grat for the express purpose of observing and recording the appearance of the Alps from this commanding position, and returned from his survey without having noticed either the Matterhorn or Monte Rosa? If Eusebius could have overlooked these most obvious notices, he could have overlooked anything. His gross and habitual carelessness would then cover any omission. Nor again, I venture to think, will our author deceive any fairly intelligent person, who has read my article with moderate care, by his convenient because cloudy expression, "other supposed quotations." I need only remind my readers that among these "other supposed quotations" are included (to take only one instance) numerous and direct references by name to the Acts of the Apostles and to eleven Epistles of St. Paul in Irenæus, of which Eusebius says not a word, and they will judge for themselves by this example what dependence can be placed on the author's use of language.

But our author speaks of the "ability" of my article, as a reason for discrediting its results. I am much obliged to him for the compliment, but I must altogether decline it. It is the

* Preface, p. xv

ability of *facts* which he finds so inconvenient. I brought to the task nothing more than ordinary sense. I found our author declaring, as others had declared before him, that under certain circumstances Eusebius would be sure to act in a particular way. I turned to Eusebius himself, and I found that, whenever we are able to test his action under the supposed circumstances, he acts in precisely the opposite way. I discovered that he not only sometimes, but *systematically*, ignores mere quotations from the four Gospels and the Acts and the thirteen Epistles of St. Paul, however numerous and however precise. I cannot indeed recollect a single instance where he adduces a quotation for the mere purpose of authenticating any one of these books.

But our author asks,*

Is it either possible or permissible to suppose that, had Papias known anything of the other two Gospels (the third and fourth), he would not have inquired about them from the presbyters and recorded their information? And is it either possible or permissible to suppose that if Papias had recorded any similar information regarding the composition of the third and fourth Gospels, Eusebius would have omitted to quote it?

To the first question I answer that it is both possible and permissible to make this supposition. I go beyond this, and say that it is not only possible and permissible, but quite as probable as the opposite alternative. In the absence of all definite knowledge respecting the motive of Papias, I do not see that we are justified in giving any preference to either hypothesis over the other. There is no reason for supposing that Papias made these statements respecting St. Mark and St. Matthew in his preface rather than in the body of his work, or that they were connected and continuous, or that he had any intention of giving an exhaustive account of all the documents with which he was acquainted. On the contrary, these notices bear every mark of being incidental. If we take the passage relating to St. Mark for instance, the natural inference is that Papias in the course of his expositions stumbled on a passage where this Evangelist omitted something which was recorded by another authority, or gave some incident in an order different from that which he found elsewhere, and that in consequence he inserted the notice of the presbyter respecting the composition of this Gospel, to explain the divergence. He might, or might not, have had opportunities of inquiring from the presbyters respecting the Gospel of St. Luke. They might, or might not, have been able to communicate information respecting it, beyond the fact which every one knew, and which therefore no one cared to repeat, that it was written by a companion of St. Paul. He might, or might not, have found himself

* P. xxi.

confronted with a difficulty which led him to repeat his information, assuming he had received any from them.

As regards the second question, I agree with our author. I am indeed surprised that after ascribing such incredible carelessness to Eusebius as he has done a few pages before, he should consider it impossible and impermissible to suppose him guilty of any laches here. But I myself have a much higher opinion of the care manifested by Eusebius in this matter. So far as I can see, it would depend very much on the nature of the information, whether he would care to repeat it. If Papias had reported any "similar" information respecting the two last Gospels, I should certainly expect Eusebius to record it. But if (to give an illustration) Papias had merely said of the fourth Evangelist that "John the disciple of the Lord wished by the publication of the Gospel to root out that error which had been disseminated among men by Cerinthus, and long before by those who are called Nicolaitans," or language to that effect, it would be no surprise to me if Eusebius did not reproduce it; because Irenæus uses these very words of the Fourth Gospel,* and Eusebius does not allude to the fact.

But our author argues that, "if there was a Fourth Gospel in his knowledge, he [Papias] must have had something to tell about it."† Perhaps so, but it does not follow either that he should have cared to tell this something gratuitously, or that any occasion should have arisen which led him to tell it. Indeed, this mode of arguing altogether ignores the relations in which the immediate circle addressed by Papias stood to St. John. It would have been idle for Papias to have said, as Irenæus says, "John the disciple of the Lord, who also lay upon His breast, published his Gospel, while living in Ephesus of Asia."‡ It would have been as idle as if a writer in this REVIEW were to vouchsafe the information that "Napoleon I. was a great ruler of the French who made war against England." On the hypothesis of the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, such information would have been altogether superfluous. Papias might incidentally, when quoting the Gospel, have introduced his quotation in words from which a later generation could gather these facts; but he is not at all likely to have communicated them in the form of a direct statement. And, if he did not, there is no reason to think that Eusebius would have quoted the passage.

So far however, our author seems to recognize the distinction which I drew between stories about, and quotations from, the Gospels. But elsewhere, when the practical consequences become

* *Hæc.* iii. 11. 1.

† P. xxi. So again he says (II. p. 328): "It is scarcely probable that when Papias collected from the presbyter the facts concerning Matthew and Mark, he would not also have inquired about the Gospel of John, if he had known it, and recorded what he had heard," &c

‡ *Hæc.* iii. 1. 1.

inconvenient, he boldly ignores it. Take, for instance, the following passage:—

The only inference which I care to draw from the silence of Eusebius is precisely that which Dr. Lightfoot admits that, both from his promise and his practice, I am entitled to deduce. When any ancient writer "has something to tell about" the Gospels, "any anecdote of interest respecting them," Eusebius will record it. This is the only information of the slightest value to this work which could be looked for in these writers.*

What? does our author seriously maintain that, supposing Papias to have quoted the Fourth Gospel several times by name as the work of John the Apostle, this fact would not be of "the slightest value" in its bearing on the question at issue between us—the antiquity and genuineness of that Gospel—because, forsooth, he did not give any anecdote respecting its composition?

So again a few pages later, he writes—

Eusebius fulfils his pledge, and states what disputed works were used by Hegesippus and what he said about them, and one of these was the Gospel according to the Hebrews. He does not, however, record a remark of any kind regarding our Gospels; and the legitimate inference, and it is the only one I care to draw, is that Hegesippus did not say anything about them.†

Yes; "did not say anything about them," in the sense of not recording any traditions respecting them, though he may have quoted them scores of times and by name. If this is the only inference which our author cares to draw, I cannot object. But it is not the inference which his words would suggest to the incautious reader; and it is not the inference which will assist his argument at all. Moreover this passage ignores another distinction, which I showed to be required by the profession and practice alike of Eusebius. Eusebius relates of Hegesippus that he "sets down some things from the Gospel according to the Hebrews;"‡ but, as our author correctly says, he does not directly mention his using our four Canonical Gospels. This is entirely in accordance with his procedure elsewhere. I showed that he makes it his business to note every single quotation from an apocryphal source, whereas he deliberately ignores any number of quotations from the Canonical Gospels, the Acts, and the Pauline Epistles. How else (to take a single instance) can we explain the fact that, in dealing with Ireneus, he singles out the one anonymous quotation from the Shepherd of Hermas, and is silent about the two hundred quotations (a very considerable number of them by name) from the Pauline Epistles?

But the passage which I have just given is not the only one in which the unwary reader will be entirely misled by this juggle between two meanings of the preposition "about." Thus our

* P. xvi.

† P. xix.

‡ H. E. iv. 22.

author has in several instances tacitly altered the form of expression in his last edition; but the alteration is made in such a way as, while satisfying the letter of my distinction, to conceal its true significance. Thus he writes of Dionysius*—

EARLIER EDITIONS.

It is certain that, had Dionysius mentioned books of the New Testament, Eusebius would, as usual, have stated the fact.

LAST EDITION.

It is certain that had Dionysius said anything about books of the New Testament, Eusebius would, as usual, have stated the fact.

And again of Papias†—

EARLIER EDITIONS.

Eusebius, who never fails to enumerate the works of the New Testament to which the Fathers refer, does not pretend that Papias knew either the third or fourth Gospels.

LAST EDITION.

Eusebius, who never fails to state what the Fathers say about the works of the New Testament, does not mention that Papias knew either the third or fourth Gospels.

These alterations tell their own tale. One meaning of the expression, "say about," is suggested to the reader by the context and required by the author's argument, while another is alone consistent with the facts.

Elsewhere however the distinction is not juggled away, but boldly ignored. Thus he still writes—

The presumption therefore naturally is that, as Eusebius did not mention the fact, he did not find any reference to the Fourth Gospel in the work of Papias.‡

I have shown that there is not any presumption—even the slightest—on this side.

Elsewhere he affirms still more boldly of Hegesippus—

It is certain that had he mentioned our Gospels, and we may say particularly the fourth, the fact would have been recorded by Eusebius.§

I have proved that, so far from this being certain, the probability is all the other way.

I confess that I cannot understand this treatment of the subject. It may indeed serve an immediate purpose. It may take in an unwary reader, or even a stray reviewer. I must suppose that it has even deceived the writer himself. But *magna est veritas*. My paper on the Silence of Eusebius was founded on an induction of facts; and therefore I feel confident that, unwelcome as these results are to the author of "Supernatural Religion," and unexpected as they may be to many others, they must be ultimately accepted in the main.

The absence therefore of any direct mention by Eusebius respecting the use of the Third and Fourth Gospels by Papias

* II. p. 166.

† I. p. 483.

‡ II. p. 323.

§ II. p. 320.

affords no presumption one way or the other; and we must look elsewhere for light on the subject.

Unfortunately the fragments and notices of the work of Papias which have been preserved are very scanty. They might easily be compressed into less than two ordinary octavo pages, though the work itself extended to five books. It must therefore be regarded as a mere accident, whether we find in these meagre reliques the indications which we seek.

As regards St. Luke, these indications are precarious and inadequate. They may afford a presumption that Papias used this Gospel, but they will not do more. Independent writers indeed, like Credner and Hilgenfeld, are satisfied, from certain coincidences of expression in the preface of Papias, that he was acquainted with this Evangelist's record, though he did not attach any value to it; but I agree with the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" in thinking that the inference is not warranted by the expressions themselves. It seems to me much more to the purpose that an extant fragment of Papias, in which he speaks of the overthrow of Satan and his angels, and their fall to the earth, appears to have been taken from an exposition of Luke x. 18.* At least there is no other passage in the Gospels to which it can so conveniently be referred. But obviously no great stress can be laid on this fact. It must indeed seem highly improbable that Papias should have been unacquainted with a Gospel which Marcion, a contemporary and a native of Asia Minor, thought fit to adapt to his heretical teaching, and which at this time is shown by the state of the text to have been no recent document.† But this is a consideration external to the evidence derivable from Papias himself.

The case with the Fourth Gospel however is quite different. Here we have a combination of circumstantial evidence, which is greater than we had any right to expect beforehand, and which amounts in the aggregate to a very high degree of probability.

1. In the first place, Eusebius informs us that Papias "has employed testimonies from the first (former) Epistle of John, and likewise from that of Peter." The knowledge of the First Epistle almost necessarily carries with it the knowledge of the Gospel. The identity of authorship in the two books, though not undisputed, is accepted with such a degree of unanimity that it may be placed in the category of acknowledged facts.

But, if I mistake not, their relation is much closer than this.

* The passage is given below, p. 845.

† In justification of this statement, I must content myself for the present with referring to an able and (as it seems to me) unanswerable article on Marcion's Gospel by Mr. Sanday, in the June number of the *Fortnightly Review*, in reply to the author of "*Supernatural Religion*."

There is not only an identity of authorship, but also an organic connection between the two. The First Epistle has sometimes been regarded as a *preface* to the Gospel. It should rather be described, I think, as a commendatory *postscript*. This connection will make itself felt, if the two books are read continuously. The Gospel seems to have been written or (more properly speaking) dictated for an immediate circle of disciples. This fact appears from special notices of time and circumstance, inserted here and there, evidently for the purpose of correcting the misapprehensions and solving the difficulties of the Evangelist's hearers. It is made still more clear by the sudden transition to the second person, when the narrator breaks off, and looking up (as it were), addresses his hearers—"He that saw it hath borne record . . . that *ye* might believe," "These things are written that *ye* might believe."* There were gathered about the Apostle, we may suppose, certain older members of the Church, like Aristion and the Presbyter John, who, as eye-witnesses of Christ's earthly life, could guarantee the correctness of the narrative. The twenty-fourth verse of the last chapter is, as it were, the endorsement of these elders—"This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things, and *we know* that his testimony is true." After the narrative is thus ended, comes the hortatory postscript which we call the First Epistle, and which was intended (we may suppose) to be circulated with the narrative. It has no opening salutation, like the two Epistles proper—the second and third—which bear the same Apostle's name. It begins at once with a reference to the Gospel narrative which (on this hypothesis) has preceded—"That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we beheld and our hands handled, of the Word of life . . . that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you." The use of the plural here links on the opening of the Epistle with the close of the Gospel. The Apostle begins by associating with himself the elders, who have certified to the authorship and authenticity of the narrative. Having done this, he changes to the singular, and speaks in his own name—"I write." The opening phrase of the Epistle, "That which was from the beginning," is explained by the opening phrase of the Gospel, "In the beginning was the Word." The whole Epistle is a devotional and moral application of the main ideas which are evolved historically in the sayings and doings of Christ recorded in the Gospel. The most perplexing saying in the Epistle, "He that came by water and by blood," illustrates and itself is illustrated by the most perplexing incident in the Gospel, "There came forth water and blood." We under-

* John xix. 35; xx. 31.

stand at length, why in the Gospel so much stress is laid on the veracity of the eye-witness just at this point, when we see from the Epistle what significance the writer would attach to the incident, as symbolizing Christ's healing power.

This view of the composition of the Gospel and its connection with the Epistle has been suggested by internal considerations; but it is strongly confirmed by the earliest tradition which has been preserved. The Muratorian fragment* on the Canon must have been written about A.D. 170. As I shall have occasion to refer to this document more than once before I have done, I will here give an account of the passage relating to the Gospels, that it may serve for reference afterwards.

The fragment is mutilated at the beginning, so that the passage describing the First Gospel is altogether wanting. The text begins with the closing sentence in the description of the Second Gospel—obviously St. Mark—which runs thus: "At which however he was present, and so he set them down."

"The Third Book of the Gospel" is designated "according to Luke." The writer relates that this Luke was a physician, who after the Ascension of Christ became a follower of St. Paul, and that he compiled the Gospel in his own name. "Yet," he adds, "neither did *he* (nec ipse) see the Lord in the flesh, and he too set down incidents as he was able to ascertain them.† So he began his narrative from the birth of John." Then he continues—

"The Fourth Gospel is (the work) of John, one of the (personal) disciples ‡ (of Christ). Being exhorted by his fellow-disciples and bishops, he said, 'Fast with me to-day for three days, and let us relate to one another what shall have been revealed to each.' The same night it was revealed to Andrew, one of the Apostles, that John should write down everything in his own name, and all should certify (ut recognoscentibus cunctis Johannes suo nomine cuncta describeret). And therefore, although various elements (principia) are taught in the several books of the Gospels, yet it makes no difference to the faith of the believer, since all things in all of them are declared by one Supreme Spirit, concerning the nativity, the passion, the resurrection, His intercourse with His disciples, and His two advents, the first in despised lowliness, which is already past, the second with the magnificence of kingly power, which is yet to come. What wonder then, if John so boldly puts forward each statement in his Epistle (ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς)§

* This fragment may be conveniently consulted in the edition of Tregelles (Oxford, 1867), or in Westcott's *History of the Canon*, p. 514 seq. (ed. 4). It must be remembered, first, that this document is an unskilful Latin translation from a lost Greek original; and, secondly, that the extant copy of this translation has been written by an extremely careless scribe, and is full of clerical errors. These facts however do not affect the question with which I am concerned, since on all the points at issue the bearing of the document is clear.

† I venture to offer a conjectural emendation of the text, which is obviously corrupt or defective. It runs—"et idē prout assequi potuit ita et ad nativitate Johannis incipit dicere." I propose to insert "posuit ita" after "potuit ita," supposing that the words have dropped out owing to the homœoteleuton. The text will then stand, "et idē, prout assequi potuit, ita posuit. Ita et ab nativitate," &c. (καὶ αὐτὸς, καθὼς ἴδεναι παρακολούθει, οὕτως ἔθηκε, κ. τ. λ.), "And he too [like Mark] set down events according as he had opportunity of following them" (see Luke i. 8). But the general meaning of the passage is quite independent of any textual conjectures.

‡ "Johannis ex discipulis" i.e., τοῦ ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν, where μαθητῆς, "a disciple," is applied, as in Papias and Irenæus, in conformity with the language of the Gospels, to those who had been taught directly by Christ.

§ The plural appears to be used here, as not uncommonly, of a single letter. See the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 845 seq. The sentence runs in the Latin (when

also saying of himself, 'What we have seen with our eyes and heard with our ears, and our hands have handled, these things we have written unto you?' For so he avows himself to be not only an eye-witness and a hearer, but also a recorder, of all the wonderful things of the Lord in order."

After speaking of the Acts and Epistles of St. Paul, this anonymous writer arrives at the Catholic Epistles; and here he mentions *two* Epistles of St. John as received in the Church.

I shall have something to say presently about the coincidences with Papias in this passage. For the moment I wish to call attention to the account which the writer gives of the origin of St. John's Gospel.* There may be some legendary matter mixed up with this account; the interposition of Andrew and the dream of John may or may not have been historical facts; but its general tenor agrees remarkably with the results yielded by an examination of the Gospel itself. Yet it must be regarded as altogether independent. To suppose otherwise would be to ascribe to the writer in the second century an amount of critical insight and investigation which would do no dishonour to the nineteenth. But there is also another point of importance to my immediate subject. The writer detaches the First Epistle of St. John from the Second and Third, and connects it with the Gospel. Either he himself, or some earlier authority whom he copied, would appear to have used a manuscript in which it occupied this position.

But our author attempts to invalidate the testimony of Eusebius respecting the use of the First Epistle by Papias. He wrote in his earlier editions:—

As Eusebius however does not quote the passages from Papias, we must remain in doubt whether he did not, as elsewhere, assume from some similarity of wording that the passages were quotations from these Epistles, whilst in reality they might not be. Eusebius made a similar statement with regard to a supposed quotation in the so-called Epistle of Polycarp² upon very insufficient grounds.†

In my article on the Silence of Eusebius,‡ I challenged him to produce any justification of his assertion "as elsewhere." I stated, and I emphasized the statement, that "*Eusebius in no instance which we can test gives a doubtful testimony.*" I warned him that, if I were

some obvious errors of transcription are corrected):—"Quid ergo mirum si Johannes singula etiam in Epistulis suis proferat dicens in semet ipsum, *Quæ vidimus*," &c.; and so I have translated it. But I cannot help suspecting that the order in the original was, *ἕκαστα προφέρει, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς αὐτοῦ λέγων εἰς ἑαυτὸν*, κ. τ. λ., "puts forward each statement (i.e. in the Gospel), as he says in his epistle also respecting himself," &c.; and that translator has wrongly attached the words *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς* κ. τ. λ. to the former part of the sentence.

* I am glad to find that Mr. Matthew Arnold recognizes the great importance of this tradition in the Muratorian Fragment (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 977). Though I take a somewhat different view of its bearing, it has always seemed to me to contain in itself a substantially accurate account of the circumstances under which this Gospel was composed.

† I. p. 488. He uses similar language in another passage also, II. p. 323.

‡ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January, 1875, p. 181 seq.

not proved to be wrong in this statement, I should use the fact hereafter. In the preface to his new edition he has devoted twelve pages to my article on Eusebius; and he is silent on this point.

Of his silence I have no right to complain. If he had nothing to say, he has acted wisely. But there is another point in the paragraph quoted above, which demands more serious consideration. In my article I offered the conjecture that our author had been guilty of a confusion here. I called attention to his note ⁽⁵⁾ which runs, "Ad Phil., vii.; Euseb. *H. E.*, iv. 14," and I wrote:—

The passage of Eusebius to which our author refers in this note relates how Polycarp "has employed certain testimonies from the First (former) Epistle of Peter." The chapter of Polycarp to which he refers contains a reference to the First Epistle of *St. John*, which has been alleged by modern writers, but *is not alleged by Eusebius*. This same chapter, it is true, contains the words, "Watch unto prayer," which presents a coincidence with 1 Peter iv. 7. But no one would lay any stress on this one expression; the strong and unquestionable coincidences are elsewhere. Moreover our author speaks of a single "supposed quotation," whereas the quotations from 1 Peter in Polycarp are numerous.

I then pointed out *ten other coincidences* with the First Epistle of St. Peter, scattered through Polycarp's Epistle. Some of these are verbal; almost all of them are much more striking and cogent than the resemblance in c. vii. Our author will not allow the error, but replies in his preface:—

I very much regret that some ambiguity in my language should have misled and given Dr. Lightfoot much trouble. I used the word "quotation" in the sense of a use of the Epistle of Peter, and not in reference to any one sentence in Polycarp. I trust that in this edition I have made my meaning clear.*

Accordingly, in the text, he substitutes for the latter sentence the words:—

Eusebius made a similar statement with regard to the use of the Epistle of Peter in the so-called Epistle of Polycarp, upon no more definite grounds than an apparent resemblance of expressions.

But the former part of the sentence is unaltered; the assertion "as elsewhere" still remains unsubstantiated; and what is more important, he *leaves the note exactly as it stood before*, with the single reference to c. vii. Thus he has entirely misled his readers. He has deliberately ignored more than nine-tenths of the evidence in point of amount, and very far more than this proportion in point of cogency. The note was quite appropriate, supposing that the First Epistle of St. John were meant, as I assumed; it is a *flagrant suppressio veri*, if it refers to the First Epistle of St. Peter, as our author asserts that it does. The charge which I brought against

* P. xv.

him was only one of carelessness, which no one need have been ashamed to confess. The charge which his own explanation raises against him is of a far graver kind. Though he regrets the trouble he has given me, I do not regret it. It has enabled me to bring out the important fact that *Eusebius may always be trusted* in these notices relating to the use made of the Canonical Scriptures by early writers.

2. But this is not the only reason which the fragments in Eusebius supply for believing that Papias was acquainted with the Fourth Gospel. The extract from the preface suggests points of coincidence, which are all the more important because they are incidental. In the words, "What was said by Andrew, or by Peter, or by Philip, or by Thomas or James, or by John or Matthew," the first four names appear in the same order in which they are introduced on the scene by this Evangelist. As this order, which places Andrew before Peter, is anything but the natural order, the coincidence has a real significance. Moreover, three of these four hold a prominent place in the Fourth Gospel, which they do not hold in the others—Philip and Thomas being never once named by the Synoptic Evangelists, except in their lists of the Twelve. It has been said indeed that the position assigned to the name of John by Papias in his enumeration is inconsistent with the supposition that this Apostle wrote a Gospel, or even that he resided and taught in Asia Minor, because so important a personage must necessarily have been named earlier. But this argument proves nothing, because it proves too much. No rational account can be given of the sequence, supposing that the names are arranged "in order of merit." Peter, as the chief Apostle, must have stood first; and John, as a pillar Apostle, would have been named next, or (if the James here mentioned is the Lord's brother) at all events next but one. This would have been the obvious order in any case; but, if Papias had any Judaic sympathies, as he is supposed to have had, no other is imaginable. This objection therefore is untenable. On the other hand, it is a remarkable fact that the two names, which are kept to the last and associated together, are just those two members of the Twelve to whom alone the Church attributes written Gospels. As *Evangelists*, the names of John and Matthew would naturally be connected. On any other hypothesis, it is difficult to account for this juxtaposition.

Again, it should be noticed that when Papias speaks of incidents in our Lord's life which are related by an eye-witness without any intermediation between Christ and the reporter, he describes them as "coming from the Truth's self" (*ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας*). This personification of Christ as "the Truth" is confined to the Fourth Gospel.

3. When we turn from Eusebius to Irenæus, we meet with other evidence pointing to the same result. I refer to a passage with which the readers of these articles will be familiar, for I have had occasion to refer to it more than once; but I have not yet investigated its connection with Papias. Irenæus writes :*—

As the elders say, then also shall they which have been deemed worthy of the abode in heaven go thither, while others shall enjoy the delight of paradise, and others again shall possess the brightness of the city; for in every place the Saviour shall be seen, according as they shall be worthy who see Him. [They say] moreover that this is the distinction between the habitation of them that bring forth a hundred-fold, and them that bring forth sixty-fold, and them that bring forth thirty-fold; of whom the first shall be taken up into the heavens, and the second shall dwell in paradise, and the third shall inhabit the city; and that therefore our Lord has said, "In my Father's abode are many mansions" (*ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου μὲν εἶναι πολλάς*); for all things are of God, who giveth to all their appropriate dwelling, according as His Word saith that allotment is made unto all by the Father, according as each man is, or shall be, worthy. And this is the banqueting-table at which those shall recline who are called to the marriage and take part in the feast. The presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, say that this is the arrangement and disposal of them that are saved, and that they advance by such steps, and ascend through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, the Son at length yielding His work to the Father, as it said also by the Apostle, "for He must reign until He putteth all enemies under his feet," &c.†

I am glad to be saved all further trouble about the grammar of this passage. Our author now allows that the sentence with which we are mainly concerned is oblique, and that the words containing a reference to our Lord's saying in St. John's Gospel are attributed to the elders who are mentioned before and after.‡ He still maintains however, that "it is unreasonable to claim" the

* *Har.* v. 36. 1, 2.

† After two successive alterations, our author has at length, in his last edition, translated the oblique infinitives correctly, though from his reluctance to insert the words, "They say," or "they teach," which the English requires, his meaning is somewhat obscure. But he has still left two strange errors, within four lines of each other, in his translation of this passage, p. 328. (1.) He renders *ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου*, "In the (heavens) of my Father," thus making *τοῖς* masculine, and understanding *οὐρανός* from *οὐρανός* which occurs a few lines before. He seems not to be aware that *τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου* means "my Father's house" (see Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 100; Wetstein on Luke ii. 49). Thus he has made the elders contradict themselves; for of the "many mansions" which are mentioned, only the first is "in the heavens," the second being in paradise, and the third on earth. (2.) He has translated "Omnia enim Dei sunt, qui omnibus aptam habitationem præstat, quemadmodum verbum ejus ait, omnibus divisum esse a Patre," &c., "For all things are of God, who prepares for all the fitting habitation as His Word says, to be allotted to all by the Father," &c. He can hardly plead that this is "a paraphrase," for indeed it is too literal.

A few pages before (pp. 325, 326), I find "*Mag sie aber daher stammen*," translated "Whether they are derived from thence." A few pages after (p. 332), I find the work of Irenæus, *de Ogdoad*, cited instead of the *Epistle to Florinus*, for the relations between Irenæus and Polycarp. It might have been supposed that any one who had looked into the subject at all must have been aware that this *locus classicus* was in the *Epistle to Florinus*. But Eusebius happens to quote the treatise *de Ogdoad* in the same chapter; and hence the mistake. Such errors survive, though these pages have undergone at least two special revisions, and though this "sixth" edition is declared on the title page to be "carefully revised."

‡ See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, December, 1874, p. 4; January, 1875, p. 184 seq.; May, 1875, p. 855 seq.

reference "as an allusion to the work of Papias." He urges in one place that there is "a wide choice of presbyters, including even evangelists, to whom the reference of Irenæus may with equal right be ascribed;"* in another, that "the source of the quotation is quite indefinite, and may simply be the exegesis of his own day."† To the one hypothesis it is sufficient to reply that no such explanation is found in the only four Evangelists whom Irenæus recognized; to the other, that when Irenæus wrote there were no "disciples of the Apostles" living, so that he could have used the present tense in speaking of them.

This reference to the tense leads to a distinction of real importance. Critics have remarked that these reports of the opinions of the presbyters in Irenæus must be accepted with reserve; that the reporter may unconsciously have infused his own thoughts and illustrations into the account; and that therefore we cannot adduce with entire confidence the quotations from the canonical writings which they contain. This caution is not superfluous, but it must not be accepted without limitation. The reports in Irenæus are of two kinds. In some cases he repeats the *conversations* of his predecessors; in others he derives his information from *published records*. The hesitation, which is prudent in the one case, would be quite misplaced in the other. We shall generally find no difficulty in drawing the line between the two. Though there may be one or two doubtful instances, the language of Irenæus is most commonly decisive on this point. Thus, when he quotes the opinions of the elder on the Two Testaments, he is obviously repeating oral teaching; for he writes, "The presbyter used to say," "The presbyter would entertain us with his discourse," "The old man, the disciple of the Apostles, used to dispute."‡ On the other hand, when in the passage before us he employs the present tense, "As the elders say," "The presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, say," he is clearly referring to some *document*. No one would write, "Coleridge maintains," or "Pitt declares," unless he had in view some work or speech or biographical notice of the person thus quoted.

We may therefore safely conclude that in the passage before us Irenæus is citing from some *book*. So far as regards the main question at issue, the antiquity of the Fourth Gospel, it matters little whether this book was the exegetical work of Papias or not. Indeed the

* II. p. 338 (384).

† II. p. 329 (380).

‡ *Har.* iv. 27. 1 seq.; iv. 30. 1; iv. 31. 1; iv. 32. 1. Even in this case there remains the possibility that we have a report of lectures taken down at the time. The early work of Hippolytus on Heresies was drawn up from a synopsis which he had made of the lectures of Irenæus (Photius, *Bibl.* 121). Galen again speaks of his pupils taking down his lectures as he delivered them (*Op.* xix. p. 11, ed. Kühn). The discourses which Irenæus reports from the lips of this anonymous elder (perhaps Melito or Pothinus) are so long and elaborate, that the hypothesis of lecture notes seems almost to be required to account for them.

supposition that it was a different work is slightly more favourable to my position, because it yields additional and independent testimony of the same date and character as that of Papias. But the following reasons combined make out a very strong case for assigning the passage to Papias. (1.) It entirely accords with the *method* of Papias, as he himself describes it in his preface.* Scriptural passages are interpreted, and the sayings of the elders are interwoven with the interpretations. It accords equally well with the *subject* of his Expositions; for we know that he had a great fondness for eschatological topics, and that he viewed them in this light. (2.) The possibilities are limited by the language, which confines our search to written documents. So far as we know there was, prior to the time of Irenæus, no Christian work which would treat the same subject in the same way, and would at the same time satisfy the conditions implied in the words, "The elders, the disciples of the Apostles, say." (3.) The connection with a previous passage is highly important in its bearing on this question. In the thirty-third chapter of his fifth and last book Irenæus gives the direct reference to Papias which has been considered already;† in the thirty-sixth and final chapter occurs the passage with which we are now concerned. Is there reason to believe that the authority in these two passages is the same or different? Several considerations aid us in answering this question, and they all tend in the same direction. (i.) The subject of the two passages is the same. They both treat of the future kingdom of Christ, and both regard it from the same point of view as a visible and external kingdom. (ii.) In the next place the authorities in the two passages are described in similar terms. In the first passage they are designated at the outset "the elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord," while at the close we are told that "Papias records these things in writing in his fourth book." It is not clear whether these elders are the authorities whom Papias quotes, or the class to whom Papias himself belongs, and whom therefore he represents. Since Irenæus regards Papias as a direct hearer of St. John, this latter alternative is quite tenable, though perhaps not as probable as the other. But this twofold possibility does not affect the question at issue. In the second passage the authorities are described in the opening as "the elders" simply, and at the close as "the elders, the disciples of the Apostles." Thus the two accord. Moreover, in the second passage "the elders" are introduced without any further description, as if they were already known, and we therefore naturally refer back to the persons who have been mentioned and described shortly before. (iii.) The subject is continuous from the one

* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1875, p. 378.

† *Ibid.* p. 389 seq.

passage to the other, though it extends over four somewhat long chapters (c. 33—36). The discussion starts, as we have seen, from Christ's saying about drinking the fruit of the vine in His kingdom.* The authority of the elders, recorded in the work of Papias, is quoted to support a literal interpretation of these words, as implying a material recompense of the believers. Irenæus then cites those prophecies of Isaiah which foretell the reign of peace on God's Holy Mountain (xi. 6 seq., lxxv. 25 seq.). This leads him to the predictions which announce the future triumphs of Israel and the glories of the New Jerusalem, all of which are interpreted literally as referring to a reign of Christ on earth. Creation thus renovated, he argues, will last for ever, as may be inferred from the promise of the new heavens and the new earth (Isaiah lxxvi. 22). Then follows the passage in question, which contains the interpretation, given by the elders, of Christ's saying concerning the many mansions in His Father's house. A few lines lower down Irenæus refers again to the words respecting the fruit of the vine from which he had started; and after two or three sentences more the book ends.

These seem to be very substantial reasons for assigning the words to Papias. And probably the two passages which I have been considering do not stand alone. In an earlier part of this same fifth book Irenæus writes:†—

Where then was the first man placed? In paradise plainly, as it is written, "And God planted a paradise . . . ;" and he was cast out thence into this world, owing to his disobedience. Wherefore also the elders, disciples of the Apostles, say that those who were translated were translated thither (for paradise was prepared for righteous and inspired men, whither also the Apostle Paul was carried . . .) and that they who are translated remain there till the end of all things (*ὡς συντελείας*), precluding immortality.

On this passage our author remarks:—

It seems highly probable that these presbyters who are quoted on paradise are the same "presbyters the disciples of the Apostles" referred to on the same subject (v. 36. §§ 1, 2), whom we are discussing.‡

With this opinion I entirely agree. "But," he adds, "there is nothing whatever to connect them with Papias." Here I am obliged to join issue. It seems to me that there are several things. In the first place, there is the description of the authorities, "the elders, the disciples of the Apostles," which exactly accords with the statement in Papias' own preface.§ Next there is the subject and its treatment. This latter point, if I mistake not, presents some considerations which strongly confirm my view of the source of these references in Irenæus. The elders here

* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1875, p. 389 seq.

† *Har.* v. 5. 1.

‡ See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1875, p. 378.

§ II. p. 333.

quoted maintain that the paradise of Genesis is not a terrestrial paradise; it is some region beyond the limits of this world, to which Enoch and Elijah were translated; it is the abode, as Irenæus says, of the righteous and the spiritual (*πνευματικοί*), of whom these two respectively are types; their translation precludes the immortality of the faithful in Christ. In the second passage where paradise is mentioned by these elders, it is declared to be one of the "many mansions" in the Father's house. But it is clear from this latter passage that the work from which these sayings of the elders are quoted must have contained much more about paradise. The intermediate position there assigned to it between the celestial and the terrestrial kingdom does not explain itself, and must have required some previous discussion. Is there any reason to think that Papias did directly occupy himself with this subject?

The work of Papias was in the hands of Anastasius of Sinai, who (as we have seen) set a very high value on it. He tells us in his "Hexaemeron,"* that "the more ancient interpreters . . . contemplated the sayings about paradise *spiritually*, and referred them to the Church of Christ." They "said that there was a certain *spiritual* paradise."† Among these "more ancient interpreters," of whom he gives a list, he names "the great Papias of Hierapolis, the scholar of John the Evangelist, and Irenæus of Lyons." Here the two are associated together as dealing with this same subject in the same way. How much of the exegesis which Anastasius gives in the context, and attributes to these ancient interpreters, may be due to Papias in particular, it is impossible to say. But it may be observed that the expression "the delight of the paradise," in the saying of the elders reported by Irenæus, is taken from the Septuagint of Ezekiel xxviii. 13, where the Prince of Tyre is addressed, "Thou wast in the delight of the paradise of God;" and that Anastasius represents "the interpreters" (among whom he had previously mentioned Papias) as "especially confirming their views of a spiritual paradise" by appealing to this very passage, "where God seems to reveal to us enigmatically the fall of the devil from heaven," the Prince of Tyre being interpreted as Satan, and the "stones of fire" the hosts of intelligent beings; and he immediately afterwards quotes in illustration our Lord's words in Luke x. 18, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven."‡ "See," he concludes, "we have heard plainly that he was cast down to the earth from some paradise of delight high above, and from the cherubic coals of fire. (Ezek. xxviii. 16.)"

* *Patrol. Græc.* lxxxix. p. 962 (ed. Migne).

† Under this "spiritual" interpretation, Anastasius includes views as wide apart as those of Philo, who interprets paradise as a philosophical allegory, and Irenæus, who regards it as a supramundane abode; for both are named. But they have this in common, that they are both opposed to a terrestrial region; and this is obviously the main point which he has in view.

‡ *Patrol. Græc.* lxxxix. p. 954 seq.

From the Hexameron of Anastasius I turn to the Catena on the Apocalypse, bearing the names of Ecumenius and Arethas, which was published by Cramer,* and here I find fresh confirmation. On Rev. xii. 9, the compiler of this commentary quotes the same passage of St. Luke to which Anastasius refers. He then goes on to explain that there was a twofold fall of Satan—the one at the time of the creation of man, the other at the Incarnation; and he proceeds—

Seeing then that Michael, the chief captain [of the heavenly hosts], could not tolerate the pride of the devil, and had long ago cast him out from his own abode by warlike might, according as Ezekiel says, that “he was cast out by the cherubim from the midst of the stones of fire,” that is to say, the angelic ranks, because “iniquities were found in him” (xxviii. 15, 16); again at the coming of Christ, as has been said . . . he hath fallen more completely. This is confirmed by the tradition of the fathers, especially of Papias (καὶ πατέρα παράδοσις καὶ Πατίου), a successor of the Evangelist John who wrote this very Apocalypse with which we are concerned. Indeed Papias speaks thus concerning the war in these express words: “It so befell that their array,” that is, their warlike enterprise, “came to nought; for the great dragon, the old serpent, who is also called Satan and the devil, was cast down, yea, and was cast down to the earth, he and his angels.”†

I turn again to Anastasius; and I read in him that “the above-mentioned interpreters” gave these explanations of paradise to counteract the teaching of divers heretics, among whom he especially mentions the Ophites who “offered the greatest thanksgivings to the serpent, on the ground that by his counsels, and by the transgression committed by the woman, the whole race of mankind had been born.”‡ This notice again confirms the view which I adopted, that it was the design of Papias to supply an antidote to the false exegesis of the Gnostics. Thus everything hangs together, and we seem to have restored a lost piece of ancient exegesis. If this restoration is uncertain in its details, it has at least materially strengthened my position, that the two sayings of the elders respecting paradise, quoted by Irenæus, must be attributed to the same authority, Papias, whom Irenæus cites by name in the intermediate passage relating to the millennial kingdom. I must add my belief also that very considerable parts of the fifth book of Irenæus, which consists mainly of exegesis, are borrowed from the exegetical work of Papias. It is the unpardonable sin of Papias in the eyes of Eusebius, that he has misled subsequent writers, more especially Irenæus, on these eschatological subjects.

* P. 358 seq.

† Routh (*Rel. Sacr.* l. p. 41) would end the quotation from Papias at “their array came to nought;” but the concluding sentence seems to be required as part of the quotation, which otherwise would be very meaningless. Papias, adopting the words of the Apocalypse, emphasizes the fact that Satan was cast down to the earth, because this shows that paradise was a supramundane region. As I have said before (p. 834), the only saying of our Lord to which we can conveniently assign this exposition is Luke x. 18. St. Luke is also the only Evangelist who mentions paradise (xxiii. 43).

‡ P. 963.

This is speaking testimony to the debt of Irenæus. Literary property was not an idea recognized by early Christian writers. They were too much absorbed in their subject to concern themselves with their obligations to others, or with the obligations of others to them. Plagiarism was not a crime, where they had all literary things in common. Hippolytus, in his chief work, tacitly borrows whole paragraphs, and even chapters, almost word for word, from Irenæus. He mentions his name only twice, and does not acknowledge his obligations more than once.* The liberties which Hippolytus takes with his master Irenæus, might well have been taken by Irenæus himself with his predecessor Papias.

I have adduced three distinct reasons for believing that Papias was acquainted with the Gospel of St. John; and their combined force is all the greater, because each is independent of the other. I will now add some other considerations pointing in the same direction.

4. Eusebius tells us that Papias "relates also another story concerning a woman accused of many sins before the Lord," and he adds that it is "contained in the Gospel according to the Hebrews."

The story in question is allowed to be the narrative of the woman taken in adultery, which appears in the common texts of the Fourth Gospel, vii. 53—viii. 11. In the oldest Greek MS which contains this pericope, the *Codex Bezae*, the words "taken in adultery" are read "taken in sin." In the *Apostolic Constitutions*,† where this incident is briefly related, the woman is described as "having sinned." And again Ruffinus, who would possibly be acquainted with Jerome's translation of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, boldly substitutes "a woman, an adulteress," for "a woman accused of many sins," in his version of Eusebius.

But it is equally certain that this pericope is an interpolation where it stands. All considerations of external evidence are against it. It is wanting in all the Greek MSS. before the sixth century; it was originally absent in all the oldest versions—Latin, Syriac, Egyptian, Gothic; it is not referred to, as part of St. John's Gospel, before the latter half of the fourth century. Nor is the internal evidence less fatal. It is expressed in language quite foreign to St. John's style, and it interrupts the tenor of his narrative. The Evangelist is here relating Christ's discourses on "the last day, that great day, of the feast" of Tabernacles. Our Lord seizes on the two most prominent features in the ceremonial—the pouring out of the water from Siloam upon the altar, and the illumination of the city by flaming torches, lighted in the Temple area. Each in succession furnishes Him with imagery illustrating His own person and work. In the uninterrupted narrative, the one topic

* *Ref. Har.* vi. 42, 55.

† ii. 24.

follows directly upon the other. He states first, that the streams of *living water* flow from Him (vii. 37 seq.). He speaks "again" (πάλιν), and declares that He is the *light of the whole world* (viii. 12 seq.). But the intervention of this story dislocates the whole narrative, introducing a change of time, of scene, of subject.

On the other hand, it will be felt that the incident, though misplaced here, must be authentic in itself. Its ethical pitch is far above anything which could have been invented for Him by His disciples and followers, "whose character and idiosyncrasies," as Mr. Mill says, "were of a totally different sort."* They had neither the capacity to imagine nor the will to invent an incident, which, while embodying the loftiest of all moral teaching, would seem to them dangerously lax in its moral tendencies.

But, if so, how came it to find a place in the copies of St. John's Gospel? Ewald incidentally throws out a suggestion† that it was originally written on the margin of some ancient manuscript, to illustrate the words of Christ in John viii. 15, "Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man." This hint he has not followed up, but it seems to me to be highly valuable. The pericope in question occurs, in most authorities which contain it, after vii. 52; in one MS. however it stands after vii. 36; and in several it is placed at the end of the Gospel. This is just what might have been expected if it was written, in the first instance, on the margin of a MS. containing two or three columns on a page. When transferred from the margin to the text, it would find a place somewhere in the neighbourhood, where it least interfered with the narrative, or, if no suitable place appeared, it would be relegated to the end of the book. It should be added, that some good cursives give it at the end of the twenty-first chapter of St. Luke—the most appropriate position, historically, that could be found for it. Whether this was an independent insertion in St. Luke, or a transference from St. John made on critical grounds, it is not easy to say.

But if this was the motive of the insertion, what was its source? Have we not here one of those illustrative anecdotes which Papias derived from the report of the elders, and to which he "did not scruple to give a place along with his interpretations" of our Lord's sayings? Its introduction as an illustration of the words in John viii. 15 would thus be an exact parallel to the treatment of the saying in Matthew xxvi. 29, as described in the first part of this paper.‡ A reader or transcriber of St. John, familiar with Papias, would copy it down in his margin, either from Papias himself or from the Gospel of the Hebrews; and hence it would gain currency. The *Codex Bezae*, the oldest Greek manuscript by two

* *Three Essays*, p. 254.

† *Die Johanneischen Schriften*, p. 271.

‡ *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, August, 1875, p. 389 seq.

or three centuries which contains this narrative, is remarkable for its additions. May we not suspect that others besides this pericope (I would name especially our Lord's saying to the man whom He found working on the sabbath) were derived from this exegetical work of Papias? At all events Eusebius speaks of it as containing "some strange parables and teachings of the Saviour, and some other matters more or less fabulous (*μυθικώτερα*)," which Papias derived from oral tradition.

5. I have already suggested that the notice relating to St. Mark in Papias might have been given to explain some peculiarities in the Second Gospel, *as compared with St. John*. This conjecture, standing alone, appears to have a very slight value, but it assumes a higher importance when we find that a writer who was a younger contemporary of Papias speaks of St. Mark's Gospel in this same way and with this same motive.

The extract from the Muratorian fragment relating to the Gospels has been given above.* The writer is obviously desirous of accounting for the differences in the four Evangelists. As the fragment is mutilated at the beginning, we cannot say what he wrote about the First Gospel. But the half sentence which alone survives of his account of the Second Gospel tells its own tale; "Quibus interfuit et ita tamen posuit." It is evident that he, like Papias, describes St. Mark as dependent on the oral preaching of St. Peter for his information respecting Christ's life. He "set down" such facts as he knew from having been "present" when the Apostle related them to his hearers. If the words themselves had left any room for doubt, it would be cleared up by his account of the Third Gospel, which follows immediately. St. Luke, he tells us, was a follower of St. Paul, and so wrote his Gospel; "but *neither* did he (*ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτός*) see the Lord in the flesh," and so he gave such information as came within his reach. On the other hand, he declares that the Fourth Gospel was written by John, a personal *disciple* of Christ, at the instance and with the sanction of other personal disciples like himself. Hence, he argues, though there must necessarily be differences in detail, yet this does not affect the faith of believers, since there is perfect accordance on the main points, and all the Gospels alike are inspired by the same Spirit. At the same time, the authority of the Fourth Gospel is paramount, as the record of an immediate eye-witness; and this claim John asserts for himself in the opening of his Epistle, when he declares that he has written what he himself had seen and heard.

Probably, if the notice of St. Mark had not been mutilated, the coincidence would have been found to be still greater. Even as

* P. 836.

it stands, this account throws great light on the notice of Papias. The Muratorian writer lays stress on the secondary character of St. Mark's account; so does Papias. The Muratorian writer quotes from the First Epistle of St. John in evidence; so did Papias. We are not told with what object Papias adduced this testimony from the Epistle; but it is at least a plausible hypothesis that he had the same end in view as the Muratorian writer. It should be observed also that Eusebius mentions Papias as quoting not only the First Epistle of St. John, but also the First Epistle of St. Peter. May not the two have been connected together in the context of Papias, as they are in the notice of Eusebius? It is quite clear that Papias had already said something of the relations existing between St. Peter and St. Mark previously to the extract which gives an account of the Second Gospel; for he there refers back to a preceding notice, "But afterwards, as I said, he followed Peter." Would he not naturally have quoted, as illustrating these relations, the reference to the Evangelist in the Apostle's own letter, "Marcus my son saluteth you" (1 Pet. v. 13)? If the whole of the Muratorian writer's notice of the Second Gospel had been preserved, we should not improbably have found a parallelism here also. But, however this may be, the resemblance is enough to suggest that the Muratorian writer was acquainted with the work of Papias, and that he borrowed his contrast between the secondary evidence of St. Mark and the primary evidence of St. John from this earlier writer.

And such a contrast offers a highly natural explanation of Papias' motive. The testimony of the elder respecting the composition of St. Mark's Gospel was introduced by him, as we saw, to explain its phenomena. Though strictly accurate in its relation of facts, as far as it went, this Gospel had, he tells us, two drawbacks, which it owed to its secondary character. The account could not be taken as *complete*, and the order could not be assumed to be strictly *chronological*. In other words, compared with the other evangelical narratives which Papias had in view, it showed *omissions* and *transpositions*. A comparison with St. John's narrative would yield many instances of both. We have ample evidence that within a very few years after Papias wrote, the differences between St. John and the Synoptic Gospels had already begun to attract attention. The Muratorian writer is a competent witness to this, nor does he stand alone. Claudius Apollinaris, who succeeded Papias in the see of Hierapolis, perhaps immediately, certainly within a very few years, mentions that on the showing of some persons "the Gospels seem to be at variance with one another."* He is referring especially to the

* Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* I. p. 160.

account of the Crucifixion in St. Matthew and St. John respectively.

It is much to be regretted that the Muratorian writer's account of St. Matthew also has not been preserved; for here again we should expect much light to be thrown on the corresponding account in Papias. Why did Papias introduce this notice of the Hebrew original of St. Matthew? We may suspect that the same motive which induced him to dwell on the secondary character of St. Mark's knowledge led him also to call attention to the fact that St. Matthew's Gospel was not an original, but a translation. I turn to an exegetical work of Eusebius, and I find this father dealing with the different accounts of two Evangelists in this very way. He undertakes to solve the question, why St. Matthew (xxviii. 1) says that the resurrection was revealed to Mary Magdalene on the evening of (or "late on") the sabbath (ὁψὲ σαββάτων), whereas St. John (xx. 1) places this same incident on the first day of the week (τῇ μὲν τῶν σαββάτων); and among other explanations which he offers is the following:—

The expression "on the evening of the sabbath" is due to the translator of the Scripture; for the Evangelist Matthew published (παρέδωκε) his Gospel in the Hebrew tongue; but the person who rendered it into the Greek language changed it, and called the hour dawning on the Lord's day ὁψὲ σαββάτων.*

He adds, that each Evangelist corrects any misapprehension which might arise—St. Matthew by adding "as it began to dawn towards the first day of the week," St. John by a similar qualifying expression "when it was yet dark." Being acquainted with the work of Papias, Eusebius might have borrowed this mode of explanation, if not this very explanation, from him.

But it may be urged that on this hypothesis the motive of Papias must have appeared in the context, and that, if it had so appeared, Eusebius must have quoted it. The reply is simple. Papias must in any case have had some object or other in citing this testimony of the presbyter, and none is given. But I would answer further, that under the supposed circumstances Eusebius was not likely to quote the context. As a matter of fact, he has not done so in a very similar case, where he tears out a fragment from a passage in Irenæus which intimately affects the relations of the Evangelists to one another.† He commences in the middle of a sentence, and extracts just as much as serves his immediate purpose, leaving out everything else. On this point, I am glad that I

* *Quest. ad Marin.* 2, iv. p. 941 (ed. Migne). Jerome, who seems to have had Eusebius before him, says more plainly (*Epist.* 120, *ad Hedib.* l. p. 826):—"Mihi videtur evangelista Matthæus qui evangelium Hebræo sermone conscripsit, non tam respere dixisse quam sero, et eum qui interpretatus est, verbi ambiguitate deceptum, non sero interpretatum esse sed vespere."

† *Iren.* ii. 22. 5; *Euseb. H. E.* iii. 23.

can reckon beforehand on the assent of the author of "Supernatural Religion" himself. Speaking of this extract from Irenæus, he says, "Nothing could be further from the desire or intention of Eusebius than to represent any discordance between the Gospels."* I do not indeed join in the vulgar outcry against the dishonesty of Eusebius. Wherever I have been able to investigate the charge, I have found it baseless. We have ample evidence that Eusebius was prepared to face the difficulties in harmonizing the Gospels, when the subject came properly before him. But here he might fairly excuse himself from entering upon a topic which had no bearing on his immediate purpose, and which once started would require a lengthy discussion to do justice to it. Moreover it is obvious that he is very impatient with Papias. He tells us twice over that he has confined his extracts to the very narrowest limits which bare justice to his subject would allow;† he warns his readers that there are a great many traditions in Papias which he has passed over; and he refers them to the book itself for further information. Though exceptionally long in itself compared with his notices of other early Christian writers, his account of Papias is, we may infer, exceptionally brief in proportion to the amount of material which this father afforded for such extracts.

6. I have said nothing yet about the direct testimony of a late anonymous writer, which (if it could be accepted as trustworthy) would be decisive on the point at issue.

In an argument prefixed to this Gospel in a Vatican MS, which is assigned to the ninth century, we read as follows:—

The Gospel of John was made known (manifestatum), and given to the Churches by John while he yet remained in the body (adhuc in corpore constituto); as (one) Papias by name, of Hierapolis, a beloved disciple of John, has related in his exoteric, that is, in his last five books (in exotericis, id est, in extremis quinque libris); but he wrote down the Gospel at the dictation of John, correctly (descripsit vero evangelium dictante Johanne recte). But Marcion the heretic, when he had been censured (improbatus) by him, because he held heretical opinions (eo quod contraria sentiebat), was cast off by John. Now he had brought writings or letters to him from the brethren that were in Pontus.‡

No stress can be laid on testimony derived from a passage which contains such obvious anachronisms and other inaccuracies; but the mention of Papias here courts inquiry, and time will not be ill spent in the endeavour to account for it. It will be worth while, at all events, to dispose of an erroneous explanation which has found some favour. When attention was first called to this

* Preface, p. xvii.

† ἵψ' ἂς τοὺς φιλομαθεῖς ἀναπέψαντες ἀναγκαίως νῦν προσθήσομεν, κ. τ. λ., and again, ταῦτα δ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκαίως πρὸς τοῖς ἐκτεθεῖσιν ἐπιτετηρήσθω.

‡ This argument to St. John's Gospel was published long ago by Cardinal Thomasius (Op. I. p. 344); but it lay neglected until attention was called to it by Aberle, *Theolog. Quartalschr.* xlv. p. 7 seq. (1864), and by Tischendorf, *Wann wurden*, &c.

passage by Aberle and Tischendorf, Overbeck met them with the hypothesis that the notice was taken from a spurious work ascribed to Papias. He supposed that some one had forged five additional books in the name of this father, in which he had gathered together a mass of fabulous matter, and had entitled them "Exoterica," attaching them to the genuine five books. To this work he assigned also the notice respecting the four Mariæ which bears the name of Papias.* This explanation might have been left to itself if it had remained as a mere hypothesis of Overbeck's, but it has been recently accepted by Hilgenfeld. He speaks of these five "exoteric" books, as attached to "the five esoteric or genuine books;" and to this source he attributes not only the account of the four Mariæ, but also a notice relating to the death of St. John which is given by Georgius Hamartolos on the authority of Papias.†

This however seems to be altogether a mistake. We find no notice or trace elsewhere of any such spurious work attributed to Papias. Moreover these titles are quite unintelligible. There is no reason why the five genuine books should be called "esoteric," or the five spurious books "exoteric." About the notice of the four Mariæ again Hilgenfeld is in error. It is not taken from any forged book fathered upon the bishop of Hierapolis, but from a genuine work of another Papias, a Latin lexicographer of the eleventh century. This is not a mere hypothesis, as Hilgenfeld assumes, but an indisputable fact, as any one can test who will refer to the work itself, of which MSS exist in some libraries, and which was printed four times in the fifteenth century.‡ Nor again does the passage in Georgius Hamartolos give any countenance to this theory. This writer, after saying that St. John survived the rest of the twelve and then suffered as a martyr (*μαρτυρίον κατηξίωται*), continues:—

For Papias, the bishop of Hierapolis, having been an eye-witness of him, says in the second book (*λόγῳ*) of the "Oracles of the Lord" (*τῶν κυριακῶν λόγῳ*) that he was slain by the Jews, having, as is clear, with his brother James, fulfilled the prediction of Christ. . . . "Ye shall drink my cup," &c.§

Here we have an obvious error. The fate which really befell James is attributed to John. Georgius Hamartolos therefore

* Overbeck's article is in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. f. Wissensch. Theol.* x. p. 68 seq. (1867). The notice relating to the four Mariæ will be found in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* i. p. 16.

† *Einleitung*, p. 63 (1875); comp. *Zeitschr. f. Wissensch. Theol.* xviii. p. 269 (1875).

‡ I verified this for myself ten years ago, and published the result in the first edition of my *Galatians*, p. 259 seq. (1865). About the same time Dr. Westcott ascertained the same fact from a friend, and announced it in the second edition of his *History of the Canon*.

§ This fragment was first published by Nolte, *Theolog. Quartalschr.* xlv. p. 466 (1863). It will be found in the collection of fragments of Papias given by Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschr. f. Wissensch. Theol.* (1875), p. 258.

cannot be quoting directly from Papias, for Papias cannot have reported the *martyrdom* of John. But, on the other hand, Papias seems plainly to have been the ultimate source of his information. The work is precisely and correctly quoted. The general tenor accords with the main object of Papias' book—the exposition of a saying of Christ, and the illustration of it by a story derived from tradition. This being so, the error is most easily explained by a lacuna. In the intermediate authority from whom Georgius got the reference, some words must have dropped out; a line or two may have been omitted in his copy; and the sentence may have run in the original somewhat in this way; Παπίας . . . φάσκει ὅτι Ἰωάννης [μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων βασιλέως κατεδικάσθη μαρτυρίαν εἰς Πάτμον. Ἰάκωβος δὲ] ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων ἀνῆρέθη, “Papias says that John [was condemned by the Roman emperor (and sent) to Patmos for bearing witness (to the truth) while James] was slain by the Jews.”*

The hypothesis of a spurious Papias therefore is wholly unsupported; and we must seek some other explanation of the statement in the Vatican MS. This passage seems to be made up of notices gathered from different sources. The account of Marcion, with which it closes, involves an anachronism (to say nothing else), and seems to have arisen from a confusion of the interview between St. John and Cerinthus and that between Polycarp and Marcion, which are related by Irenæus in the same context.† The earlier part, referring to Papias, is best explained in another way—by clerical errors and mistranslation rather than by historical confusion. The word “*exotericiis*” ought plainly to be read “*exegeticis*.”‡ In some handwritings of the seventh or eighth century, where the letters have a round form, the substitution of OT for EG would be far from difficult.§ In this case *extremis*, which should perhaps be read *externis*, is the Latin interpretation of the false reading *exotericiis*. Thus purged of errors, the

* This solution of the difficulty by means of a lacuna was suggested to me by a friend. In following up the suggestion, I have inserted the missing words from the parallel passage in Origen, to which Georgius Hamartolos refers in this very context: in *Matth.* tom. xvi. 6 (III. p. 719 seq., Delarue), πεπώσας δὲ ποτήριον καὶ τὸ βάπτισμα ἐβαπτίσθησαν οἱ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου υἱοί, ἐπέπερ Ἡρώδης μὲν ἀπέκτεινεν Ἰάκωβον τὸν Ἰωάννου μαχαίρῃ, ὃ δὲ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς, ὡς ἡ παράδοσις διδάσκει, κατέδικασεν τὸν Ἰωάννην μαρτυροῦντα διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον εἰς Πάτμον τὴν νῆσον. It must be noticed that Georgius refers to this passage of Origen as testimony that St. John suffered martyrdom, thus mistaking the sense of μαρτυροῦντα. This is exactly the error which I suggested as an explanation of the blundering notice of John Malalas respecting the death of Ignatius (*CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, February, 1875, p. 858).

† See Lipsius, *Die Quellen der Aeltesten Ketzergeschichte*, p. 237 (1875). Though the notice in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vii. 17 (p. 898) makes Marcion a contemporary of the Apostles, there is obviously some error in the text. All other evidence, which is trustworthy, assigns him to a later date. The subject is fully discussed by Lipsius in the context of the passage to which I have given a reference. See also Zahn in *Zeitschr. f. Hist. Theol.* 1875, p. 62.

‡ Aberle suggested “*exegeseos*,” for which Hilgenfeld rightly substituted “*exegeticis*.” This was before he adopted Overbeck's suggestion of the spurious Papias.

§ The photographs, Nos. 3, 7, 10, 20, in the series published by the Palaeographical Society, will show fairly what I mean.

reference to Papias presents no difficulties. We may suppose that Papias, having reported some saying of St. John on the authority of the elders, went on somewhat as follows: "And this accords with what we find in his own Gospel, which he gave to the Churches when he was still in the body" (ἐν τῷ σώματι καθεστῶτος). In this contrast between the story repeated after his death and the Gospel taken down from his lips during his lifetime, we should have an explanation of the words *adhuc in corpore constituto*, which otherwise seem altogether out of place. The word *constituto* shows clearly, I think, that the passage must have been translated from the Greek. If St. John's authorship of the Gospel had been mentioned in this incidental way, Eusebius would not have repeated it, unless he departed from his usual practice. On the other hand, the statement that Papias was the amanuensis of the Evangelist can hardly be correct, though it occurs elsewhere.* Whether it was derived from a misunderstanding of Papias, or of some one else, it would be impossible to say. But I venture to suggest a solution. Papias may have quoted the Gospel "delivered by John to the Churches, which *they* wrote down from his lips" (ὁ ἀπέγραφον ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ); and some later writer, mistaking the ambiguous ἀπέγραφον, interpreted it, "*I* wrote down," thus making Papias himself the amanuensis.† The *dictation* of St. John's Gospel is suggested, as I have said already, by internal evidence also. Here again, so far as we can judge from his practice elsewhere, Eusebius would be more likely than not to omit such a statement, if it was made thus casually. This seems to me the most probable explanation of the whole passage. But obviously no weight can be attached to such evidence. Like the statement of John Malalas respecting Ignatius, which I considered in a former paper, it is discredited by its companionship with an anachronism, though the anachronism is not so flagrant as those of John Malalas, and the statement itself does not, like his, contradict the unanimous testimony of all the preceding centuries.

But the author of "Supernatural Religion" closes with an argument, which he seems to think a formidable obstacle to the belief that Papias recognized the Fourth Gospel as the work of St. John:—

Andrew of Cæsarea, in the preface to his commentary on the Apocalypse, mentions that Papias maintained "the credibility" (τὸ ἀξιόπιστον) of that book, or in other words, its apostolic origin. . . . Now, he must, therefore, have recognized the book as the work of the Apostle John, and we shall hereafter show that it is impossible that the author of the Apocalypse is the author of the Gospel; therefore, in this way also, Papias is a witness against the Apostolic origin of the Fourth Gospel.‡

* In the *Catena Patr. Græc. in S. Joann.* Proœm. (ed. Corder), ἀρρίστων ἀναφαισῶν δεινῶν υπαγόρευσε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῷ αὐτοῦ μαθητῇ Πάπῃ εὐβιάτῃ (sic) τῷ ἱεροπολίτῃ. κ. τ. λ.

† Or, the confusion may have been between ἀπέγραφῃ (ἀπέγραψαν), and ἀπέγραψα.

‡ The passage of Andreas of Cæsarea will be found in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* I. p. 15. It is

This argument however is an anachronism. Many very considerable critics of the nineteenth century, it is true, maintain that the two works cannot have come from the same author. I do not stop now to ask whether they are right or wrong; but the nineteenth century is not the second. In the second century there is not the slightest evidence that a single writer felt any difficulty on this score, or attempted to separate the authorship of the two books. It is true that Eusebius mentions one or two authors, whose works unfortunately are lost; as using the Apocalypse, while he does not mention their using the Gospel; and this negative fact has obviously misled many. But here again the inference arises from a fundamental misconception of his purpose. I have shown that his principles required him to notice quotations from and references to the Apocalypse in every early writer, because the authorship and canonicity of the work had been questioned by Church writers before his time; whereas it would lead him to ignore all such in the case of the Fourth Gospel, because no question had ever been entertained within the Church respecting it. This indeed is precisely what he does with Theophilus; he refers to this father's use of the Apocalypse, and he ignores his direct quotations from the Gospel. The inference therefore must be set aside as a fallacy. Beyond this, all the direct evidence points the other way. There was indeed a small sect or section of men outside the pale of the Church, before the close of the second century, who rejected the Gospel, but they rejected the Apocalypse also. Moreover they ascribed both to a single author, and (what is more important still) this author was Cerinthus, a contemporary of St. John.* Thus the very opponents of the Gospel in the second century are witnesses not only to the very early date of the two writings, but also to the identity of authorship. On the other hand, every Church writer without exception during this century (so far as our knowledge goes) who accepted the one accepted the other also. The most doubtful case is Justin Martyr, who refers by name to the Apocalypse; but even Hilgenfeld says that it is difficult to deny the use of the Gospel of St. John in his

not there said that Papias ascribed the Apocalypse to St. John the Apostle, or even that he quoted it by name. Our author's argument therefore breaks down from lack of evidence. It seems probable however, that he would ascribe it to St. John, even though he may not have said so distinctly. Suspicion is thrown on the testimony of Andreas by the fact that Eusebius does not directly mention its use by Papias, as his practice elsewhere would demand. But I suppose that Eusebius omitted any express mention of this use, because he had meant his words to be understood of the Apocalypse, when, speaking of the Chiliastic doctrine of Papias higher up, he said that this father "had mistaken the Apostolic statements," and "had not comprehended what was said by them mystically and in figurative language" (*ἐν ὑποδείγματι*).


* These persons are discussed at great length by Epiphanius (*Hæc. li.*), who calls them *Allogi*. They are mentioned also, with special reference to the Gospel, by Irenæus (*iii. 11. 9*). Hippolytus wrote a work "In defence of the Gospel and Apocalypse of John," which was apparently directed against them. It may be suspected that Epiphanius is largely indebted to this work for his refutation of them.

case.* Melito again commented on the Apocalypse; and there is ample evidence (as I trust to show hereafter) that he recognized the Fourth Gospel also. Both books alike are used in the Letter of the Gallican Churches (A.D. 177). Both alike are accepted by Theophilus of Antioch, by the Muratorian writer, by Irenæus, and by Clement. It is the same during the first half of the third century. Tertullian and Cyprian, Hippolytus and Origen, place them on an equal footing, and attribute them to the same Apostle. The first distinct trace of an attempt to separate the authorship of the two books appears in Dionysius of Alexandria,† who wrote about the middle or early in the second half of the third century. Even he argues entirely upon considerations of internal criticism, and does not pretend to any traditional evidence. He accepts both works as canonical; and he questions the Apostolic authorship, not of the Gospel, but of the Apocalypse.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

* *Einleitung* p. 67; comp. p. 733 seq.

† Euseb. *H. E.* vii. 25. Gaius the Roman Presbyter, who wrote about A.D. 220, is often cited as an earlier instance. I gave reasons some years ago for suspecting that the Dialogue bearing this name was really written by Hippolytus (*Journal of Philology*, I. p. 98, 1868); and I have not seen any cause since to change this opinion. But whether this be so or not, the words of Gaius reported by Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 28) seem to be wrongly interpreted as referring to the Apocalypse.



INDIA : POLITICAL AND SOCIAL.

WHEN you asked me to supplement, by a political paper, the studiously unpolitical Notes, which you have allowed me to publish in the CONTEMPORARY, I felt myself in a difficult position. I have been too much, for the last six years, behind the scenes, to make it proper for me to write much about *current* Indian politics; and besides, to sit down in cold blood to write a political essay upon India would result, if one could bring oneself to do it, in the production, not of an article, but of a volume.

I replied accordingly to your suggestion, that I could not attempt to write a political paper unless you would give me a list of those questions as to which you and your readers were good enough to wish to have my opinion.* That list is now before

* The author of the following article has adhered so closely to the letter from the Editor to which he refers, that it may conduce to clearness to print it, although it was not written for publication:—

“First and foremost—I should like to know generally in what sort of ways India most strikes you as a benefit to England rather than a burden and a risk—I mean of course, quite apart from the fact that it is ours now, and has to be made the best of. Is it a strength or a weakness to England, and why? Would it have been worth our while to take it, supposing we could have sat down beforehand to consider the matter by the light of the future? or would it have been better, so far as we can now forecast Imperial interests, to have left it alone? What, moreover, would be the economical disadvantages of dropping it now—apart from moral and sentimental considerations (to which I, for one, attach immense weight)?

“Becoming less vague, I should much like to know to what extent a personal view of India affects faith in the stability of our position and rule there, and in what way it does so, and why. Then I should greatly like to know your own opinion as to the sort of *leaven* which we English are in India. Are we a *leaven* which shows as yet any signs of

me, and I am happy to say, that there is not a question in it on which I shall find any difficulty in giving you my opinion, for what it is worth, with perfect unreserve. I have been accused sometimes of expressing very positive opinions about Indian matters, but any one who takes the trouble to examine into the truth of this accusation will see that I have never expressed positive opinions upon Indian matters except when I was speaking not in my own name, but as the mouthpiece of the Secretary of State in Council, and when it was my obvious duty to give no uncertain sound. If any opinions which I am *now* going to express seem to be positive, pray understand that I merely state them positively in order to be brief. I have the most unfeigned distrust of my own individual opinion about Indian matters, although I have also the most unfeigned want of respect for the very confident criticisms upon those opinions which I often see or hear delivered by persons who have not taken anything like the same pains to form opinions worth having upon things and people in India.

You begin by asking me in what sort of ways, India most strikes me as a benefit to England rather than a burden and a risk.

To that question I reply, I think that India is chiefly useful to England in that it enlarges our national view of things; in that it affords a market for the products of our industry; in that it sends to us many valuable commodities; and in that it obtains for us increased consideration from other nations.

Let us take each of these four heads in order.

leavening the whole enormous and overwhelming mass? and if so, in what special directions? In other words, if we were swept out of India to-morrow, how much of us would remain and be recollected, and for how long? Is there any sort of hope or prospect that if we stay there 500 years, what the Romans did for England may in any kind of similar way be done by us for India? Are we beginning to impress ourselves on the mind and life of India as Rome impressed herself on these islands?—or, considering the utter difference of a complex civilization instead of a total barbarism being already in possession, are we nothing but outsiders and foreigners and temporary visitors? (If the latter only, why would not India do just as well as a mere market for our traders, even if Russia had it?)

"I should much like to know whether the social attitude of the European to the native is as harsh as it is stated to be—and as I fancy it too much is; and, if so, what is the best way of discouraging it? Then I should like to know how *competition* is working—well or ill—especially in far-off stations? Also, what your own view is as to the *famines* and their best preventatives—whether irrigation, or railroads, or what? Also to what extent public works not directly remunerative can be defended as conducing in the long run to economical advantage? Also, to what real extent the missionaries of any Christian sects have done any good? Also, what chances there are (if any at all) for any sort of *education* being set on foot amongst the great awful masses of the common people, who loom upon us here like countless swarms of flies—as black, as feeble, and as multitudinous—and yet all of our 'flesh and blood'? Also, whether the popular fancy that they are ineradicably *lying*, is true of 'natives'? Also, how far and in what ways social and other native influences seem to affect Anglo-Indians?

"Finally, to become more immediately practical, I should much like to know your views of the frontier questions, as matters of right policy, on the sides towards both Russia and Burmah."—EDITOR, CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

It is no slight advantage to any nation to have a large body of its middle class sent every year to the other end of the world to carry on great affairs, and to bring back, at a later period of life, its experience and knowledge to the country of its birth. No doubt, it will be replied, that the returned Indian has, hitherto, not been a progressive element in our society. That is true enough, but he has brought back a great deal of knowledge and a great deal of experience which *might*, under certain circumstances, have been very useful in this country. I myself have known numbers of men who began their Indian life in the first years of this century, and who never played an important part in Great Britain, who I am very sure could have done so, and would have been most useful citizens, if circumstances had arisen to call them out. There they were, a latent force, living quietly, not influencing very much the march of affairs, but still a distinct addition to the *reserve strength* of the nation. The present generation of Indians, so far as I have been able to judge, are superior even to these men, whom I am, you perceive, very far from disposed to undervalue. I think that, when they return home, they will exert a more progressive influence than their predecessors did; not necessarily in public affairs, but in the general life of the country. I speak under correction, but I should say, that the intellectual life of an ordinary Indian station in the year 1875 is very decidedly above the intellectual life of an ordinary English neighbourhood.

I know that many will say that India is an extremely bad school for English politics; that the Indian, according to his temperament, is likely to come back with either too despotic notions, or with ideas about economical matters, private property in land for example, in a very chaotic state—nay, that you will sometimes get a man of great ability, who swings about between Toryism and Radicalism like a gun on shipboard which has broken loose in a gale. I do not at all deny this, and am quite willing to give to it as much importance as it deserves; but the number of such Indians who will have direct influence will be not great. The majority of men and women who go to India, especially in these days, when frequent visits to Europe will enable them to keep up their home interests, will be improved by their temporary exile.

People must be preternaturally stupid who do not gain a great many new ideas by being exported to Asia; and depend upon it, in one way or other, these ideas circulate at home, and raise the whole level of national thought, not very much, perhaps, but still to an appreciable extent.

Then the imperial temper, if kept within bounds by reason and justice, by thinking more of the duties to others which vast possessions impose, than of the rights which they confer *over*

others, is distinctly good, adds to the individual power of the Englishman, and to the power of the nation to which he belongs. You see something of the same good effect when you travel in Holland, and talk to people there, from the possession by Holland of the second colonial empire in the world. You see something of the disadvantages of the absence of it, when you travel in France. Who shall say that the passion of France for military glory in Europe has not been largely stimulated by the want of such a field for imagination and enterprise as India has afforded to us?

Now we come to the importance of India as a market for the products of our industry. I know that it is quite a common thing to overrate its importance in this respect. If you look at the population of India, and the amount of our trade with her, it is indeed surprisingly small. Doubtless, it will increase, though by no means so fast as many sanguine persons believe. Still, such as it is, it is eminently worth having; and most assuredly, if India had been left to tear her own vitals, or if she had become a French possession, *our* trade with her would not have been nearly so great.

On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Indian trade has absorbed capital and ability which, if we had not had India, might have been sunk, more to the advantage of its possessors, in developing the colonies; and very likely, too, if there had been no India, our merchants would have pressed more continuously upon successive Governments the doing all they could to open far nearer and *more profitable* markets in Europe. "Far-off fowls have feathers fair," is a true saying in commerce, as in many other things.

Then again, India sends us many valuable commodities, which she would not have sent to any one if she had gone on tearing her own vitals; while, if she had become a French possession, French, and not English, merchants and shipowners would have netted great gains by the carriage and distribution of these valuable commodities.

Lastly, if consideration from other nations is of importance, there can be no doubt that our Indian Empire gives us greatly increased consideration throughout the world. True, that consideration is usually given from mistaken reasons. India is supposed to add to our strength, from which it certainly at this moment detracts, and is supposed to add to our wealth very much more than it really does. Only very well-informed persons on the continent of Europe are exempt from the delusion that England receives a direct money tribute from India, as Holland does from Java; and again, thanks to our national habit of self-depreciation, a habit only less disgusting than the converse one of self-laudation, you find an idea widely spread, and existing in very high quarters

indeed, that the English rule in India is a cruel, or at least a harsh one. Still, everywhere, it conveys an idea of vast power and limitless resources, and that is good, because in a certain sense it is perfectly true. It might be said that a greater colonial empire would have done the same. I do not think it would. It is quite curious how little our existing colonial empire, to which India is in point of size a very small affair indeed, strikes the European, or even for that matter the English imagination. How many people know that the territory of poor Western Australia, the Cinderella of the Southern Seas, is about as large as *British* India? Besides, if our colonial empire had increased too rapidly on us, other colonies would have perhaps grown *strong* before we grew *wise*, as the United States did; and we should have lost, first, energy and treasure in trying to keep them; and next, them into the bargain. India, too, has been for ages the land of romance. No colony could have affected the imagination as it has done.

I am very anxious not to overstate these advantages, but they must be allowed, *even in the past and present*, to be considerable; while in dealing with India we must never forget that the play is not played out, that she may yet do (*I think she will do*) much more for us than she has done. If a great many of the benefits which she is hereafter likely to confer upon us are benefits in which the whole world will share as much as we—the kind of benefits, I mean, which are so admirably set forth in Sir Henry Maine's "Rede Lecture,"—I can only say, "Eh! bien, le grand malheur?"

But while some persons will say that I *overstate* the advantages which come to us from India, others will say that I *understate* them. "He forgets," such people will murmur, "the vast benefits which England derives from the number of careers which India has opened to Englishmen, and he forgets that it has been an admirable training-ground for our armies." He forgets neither the one nor the other, but he thinks that too much may easily be said about both.

India does, indeed, provide an early competency for a large number of persons, and the aggregate amount of wealth brought home by individuals must, even in this day, when the pagoda tree has been cut down, be very considerable. Supposing, however, there were no India, the surplus part of that section of our population which now goes to India would go to the colonies and to various parts of the Continent, and make a career there. Take the case of Scotland. Before the Scotch went to India they became famous all over Central Europe in three different ways. Large numbers of the men of rank went into Continental armies, large numbers of the trading class went as traders into Poland and Prussia, while the learned class went everywhere, from Paris

to Bologna and Rome. Nowadays all these careers would be closed to our Scotch youth, but they would soon invent other careers for themselves. Still it is probable that many of them would remain in the lands of their adoption, and would not bring back their wealth to Britain. Yet, on the other hand, a good many *would* return; there would be less money expended in everlasting journeys to and fro for health, there would be far less misery in families, and something would be gained by keeping in the country a per-centage of ability and energy which we now export, to consume its best ability and energy in the tropics.

Then again, as to India being a training-ground for our armies; no doubt it was so at one time and to some extent, but it can never be so again. The whole conditions are altered. "*Debellavimus superbos*" with a vengeance, and no fighting that could now take place in India would be of any avail for the instruction of our armies, with reference to any field in which they are likely to be engaged on a large scale. For European warfare, indeed, any training that troops are likely to get in India now, *by actual warfare*, would probably be distinctly bad—bad in the way in which the Algerian training was bad for the French.

Now I come to your second question—Is India a strength or a weakness to England?

Certainly a weakness—a glorious weakness, but a weakness. A weakness, that is, in material strength. Of course, it is impossible to say how much importance is to be attached to that enlarging the national view and quickening the national pulse to which I have already alluded. People will attach less or more importance to it according to their temperament; but I cannot conceive there being any doubt as to the possession of India making us very much weaker in Europe and in America. In Asia, of course, it is otherwise; but the additional strength given in dealing, for non-Indian purposes, with such States as Persia or China, or certain parts of the Turkish Empire, including Egypt, by the possession of India, is not worth considering, when compared with the clog it is upon our power nearer home. As against France, for instance, or Russia or Germany, we should be much stronger for wanting India. If we had no India, we should be at once able to put our army on a totally different and, for European purposes, a very much more efficient footing. I, personally, do not much regret this, because I think the occasions on which we shall be called upon to take part in European wars are likely to be very few and far between; but the fire-eating portion of the community, and those who think that it is a part of England's business to be a sort of knight-errant—now fighting against France to help Germany, and now against Germany to help

France—ought, if it were consistent, to wish India at the bottom of its own ocean.

You ask me, thirdly, whether I think it would have been worth while to take India, supposing we could have sat down beforehand to consider the matter by the light of the future.

That is a very difficult question. I think, however, that if I were to understand you to mean, would it have been for the advantage of England to have had an Indian Empire, if our Indian business, so to speak, was now, *in this year 1875*, to go into liquidation? I would answer it in the negative. I think we might have made a better use of our national energy, and genius, and capital; but if I am to understand the question to apply to the future, I should find it hard to give any answer at all. On the one hand, there is every reason to hope that by our rule in India we shall succeed in making that vast country enormously more useful to the world than it is now, or could ever have been under other circumstances. On the other hand, it is impossible to say what results might not have been produced in fields of enterprise more congenial to English habits—in fields of enterprise where our race could have maintained and multiplied itself. And if it be replied that the prosperity of the colonies is of a much more homely and less glorious kind, I would reply that the colonies are still, even the most forward of them, very undeveloped communities, and that we hardly know how much they might be contributing to the higher work of the world—to its science, its literature, its social and legislative improvement—if a large portion of the ability that has gone to conquer and rule India had gone to them. And then in India you have always—what you have not, to anything like the same extent, in the colonies—the element of the Unknown to reckon with. You are making an absolutely novel experiment. Even the history of Rome, in her dealings with the provinces—the only one which presents the slightest analogy—offers you no help. Things are continually turning up in India which show that you are surrounded by unknown dangers—dangers which may well make even those anxious who, like myself, attach no importance to some of the recognized and stock dangers which are periodically trotted out by alarmists.

I never read a description of a great ship steaming through a fog on the banks of Newfoundland when icebergs are known to be about, without thinking of our government of India. We can do nothing except what the captain does in that case—get the keenest-eyed men in the ship to watch, and go right ahead. It is impossible not to see that things which we are promoting every day in India draw with them very great dangers; but still it is right to promote them, in the spirit of that noble passage of Lord

Metcalf, which I once quoted before in speaking of India, but which is worth repeating:—

“The world is governed by an irresistible Power, which giveth and taketh away dominion; and vain would be the impotent prudence of men against the operations of its almighty influence. All that rulers can do is to merit dominion by promoting the happiness of those under them. If we perform our duty in this respect, the gratitude of India and the admiration of the world will accompany our name through all ages, whatever may be the revolutions of futurity; but if we withhold blessings from our subjects from a selfish apprehension of possible danger at a remote period, we shall not deserve to keep our dominion; we shall merit that reverse which time has possibly in store for us, and shall fall with the mingled hatred and contempt, the hisses and execrations, of mankind.”

. You ask, fourthly, what I think would be the economical disadvantages of dropping India now, apart from moral and sentimental considerations, to which you naturally and properly attach “immense weight.”

To that I reply, the thing would be absolutely impossible, however much you might desire it. Think first what conceivable arrangement could be made about the Indian debt, any interference with which would carry discomfort, not to say ruin, into so many British households. What arrangement could be made about the railways, as to which the same remark would apply? What about all the numerous creations of English capital in various parts of the country? How would you compensate all your servants, whose careers would be destroyed by your abandonment of India? How would you pay the pensions of all of those who have served that country under your régime, and whose means of livelihood is largely derived from her revenues? How would you compensate the innumerable traders who would be so grievously prejudiced by your change of policy, as to have a good right to ask for compensation? No, putting moral and sentimental considerations entirely on one side, we are in for it, and must stick to it. I cannot conceive any one coming to an opposite conclusion, even if he took the gloomiest view possible, and had persuaded himself that Clive and Hastings had simply got their country into the most magnificent scrape recorded in history.

When we add the moral and sentimental considerations to these economical ones, we may be very sure that England will hold on to *India and to the perfect freedom of the Isthmus transit*, even if she had to go through such a strain in doing so as she did in the Napoleonic War.

I know that a certain kind of politicians believe that when the wage-receiving class knows its own strength, it will deliberately come to the conclusion that it is against its interests that we should stay in India, and instruct its representatives accordingly; but I believe that to be a complete delusion.

You inquire, fifthly, whether a personal view of India has affected my faith in the stability of our rule there, and in what way it has done so, and why.

To that I reply, it certainly *has* affected my opinion, and affected it favourably. Before I went to India I was more occupied with the obvious difficulties that beset our rule, difficulties which are brought home every day to any one before whose eyes the whole course of our Indian government passes from week to week, as it did for more than five years before mine. When I was travelling in the country, I was in the position of a spectator. I knew the difficulties of course, but I did not *think* so much of them; when I did I was inclined to contrast them with the much greater difficulties which we had successfully encountered. At Madras, for example, where everything has for so long been peaceable, to a proverb, I remembered that I had known, and known intimately, a man who recollected the time when all we held in that part of India was just the amount of land that could be covered by the fire of the fort guns, and when the Mysore horsemen were swarming all over the quiet compounds which spread on every side of me. At Satara I thought of my father, sent with one single European to reduce to subjection, to reorganize, and to administer a country about as large as a third of Scotland, covered with armed men and filled with hill forts. In the Punjaub I thought of the desperate struggles by which we won it. At Surat I thought of our humble mercantile beginnings. Every place, in fact, to which I went had some history attached to it, which made me say, "Well, things are difficult enough, God knows, and new problems of all kinds are rising, but is there any reason to suppose that our sons will not be as equal to the solution of the new problems as our fathers were to that of the old?"

Then, when one actually sees our Indian officials in the middle of their work, they impress one very much more than they do when you see them in this country. The way in which men, even of moderate ability, are called out and ripened by early responsibility, and by the habit of command, is very wonderful, and must be seen to be understood. And these men, so individually efficient, for the most part, are linked together by the closest ties. They form one vast club, as has been very truly said, holding every military position of strength, and every civil position of importance, throughout a land which is covered by races which have no bond whatever to each other, and which, if the white faces were withdrawn to-morrow, would be instantly and most actively engaged in cutting each other's throats, till the whole peninsula was one scene of desolation and blood.

Again, till one actually sees the natives in masses, one does not realize how great the gap between them and ourselves, considered as a whole, in fact is. We see in this country remarkable individuals—clever boys, who come over to push their fortunes; men of rank, who have had the strength of mind to set at naught the prejudices which oppose themselves to their coming to this country. Sensible people do not, of course, imitate those public speakers who talk of “the Indians” as if India was anything, or ever had been anything, but a geographical expression; nor do they quote the memorials of this or that association in the Presidency towns, as if they, in the most distant manner, represented anything but themselves. But still they often do not realize how utterly *unpolitical* is the vast mass of the population which lives in India; how little they are touched by the kind of Indian questions which are talked about in this country, and which are supposed to be deeply interesting to them.

The observation of the Russian peasant to the enthusiastic Englishman—“Yes, God is great, and Nicholas is great; and then Nicholas is *so young*!”—has a very up-country Indian ring about it—very much represents the sort of way in which many a ryot who is imagined to be deeply interested about the income-tax (which some one else pays!) looks forth into the Cosmos.

You ask, in the sixth place, whether there is yet any sign that the English leaven is leavening the whole enormous and overwhelming mass of Indian life, and if so, in what special directions.

Yes, I think there are such signs. Considering that we cannot be said to have been in possession of India for more than a generation at the most, or half a generation if we date from the conclusion of the war of the Mutiny, which, perhaps, may hereafter be considered as the real conquest of India, I think that the signs are sufficiently numerous and satisfactory; but the area over which our influence has to work is so enormous, that as yet it is only the day of very small things.

To condescend, as we say in Scotland, upon particulars, I think the codes are producing a very considerable effect, and that in a generation or two *their* morality will become the morality of India.

Secondly, There seems reason to believe that, at least in Bengal, the infection of incorruptibility is really beginning to extend from the English to the native magistrate.

Thirdly, In the same province, the zemindar is learning to have a glimpse of the truth that property has its duties as well as its rights; and the same phenomenon is more and more witnessed in other parts of India.

Fourthly, A great number of educated natives are getting to

think about many philosophical subjects very much as persons in Europe think of them, who have broken with all definite forms of creed. There would be a difference in their way of stating their opinions; their statements would be coloured by the associations of childhood and national history; but, when you came minutely to examine them, the root differences would not be great.

Fifthly, The whole of the Indian mode of regarding the world is being put in the way of being altered. The boy, whose answers to questions about Europe I noted in my paper in the *CONTEMPORARY* for July last, could never make the same sort of mistakes about the power of England which lay at the root of the outbreak of 1857.

Sixthly, It seems now quite clear that English is going to become the *lingua franca* of the peninsula. It is surprising to what an extent this already is so. A very intelligent English servant, who travelled with me, told me that he found it much easier to get on in India than he ever did in any of the numerous countries to which he had accompanied me, from the number of people who spoke just enough English to enable him to make himself understood.

Seventhly, The changes which we have introduced, and are introducing, are making and will make the native utterly impatient of the old methods of communication. Already our railways are largely used for the purpose even of religious pilgrimages, and the theocratic caste system has accommodated itself to the purely plutocratic arrangements of railway directors.

Eighthly, The demands made by the ruled on the ruler are becoming entirely different. The very people who *think* they prefer native to English rule would be wild with horror if they were to be exposed for a single year to native rule, as native rule would be, if English rule did not subsist side by side with it.

Ninthly, We are creating numerous quite new industries and modes of life. We have steam jute-factories and cotton-factories manned by natives. We have introduced tea-planting, coffee-planting, cinchona-planting. Our experimental farms have hitherto been no very great success, because we have only been feeling after the right methods; but I heard enough at Madras and Tanjore to make me hope that at last, in Southern India, we were getting on the right track—the track, that is, of attempting not to revolutionize, but to improve native practices.

Tenthly, Our schools and universities are extending the idea of scientific method. Read carefully that extract from Raja Siva Prasad's book which I quoted in the *CONTEMPORARY* for

September. That man, at least, has obviously got hold of the scientific view of history.

I might multiply somewhat these heads, but the ten that I have given will show you that I think we are as far as possible from being mere "outsiders and foreigners," and that the leaven is working very fast and very wide; but, remember, you have to leaven two hundred and fifty millions, and what portion of your own millions at home, so few by comparison, have you already leavened, although you have within Great Britain such an infinitely larger amount of leaven to dispose of?

If we abandoned India to-morrow, we should leave great material traces of our rule in roads, railways, and other public works, although nearly all of them would very soon fall into ruin. We should leave considerable moral traces for a time, but only for a time, on the lives of a mere fraction of the most enlightened portion of the inhabitants, but on the great mass of the population we should leave no trace that we would wish to leave whatever. We have put the millions on the very first step of the ladder which will lead them to a more prosperous life, but India must have a further hundred years of education before they will have climbed many steps up that ladder. If we disappeared now, the relics of English influence would be just one perturbing element more in the vast and complicated world of India. In what direction the relics of that influence would work it is vain even to speculate. You might have, amongst other things, some such movement as the Taiping rebellion in China growing out of a crazy and horrible mixture of Christian and non-Christian ideas. Some years ago in the Punjaub, a peasant told an Englishman that he and his village had been reading a book about a country to which light did not come from the sun, but, strange to say, from a lamb, and that he had arrived at the station for the purpose of getting some more information about this wonderful lamb. The man had been reading a translation of the Apocalypse, and had taken it for a geographical work. That is merely one instance to show you the sort of unexpected result that has been produced thus far by our very best efforts to influence the masses. It will all, I dare say, be very different some day, but we must have time, and long time, to let our influence filter down. The pert talkers in the Presidency towns who dream dreams of the time when the English will disappear, would be the very first to be devoured, if the English did disappear; but through them and the like of them, our influence will gradually filter down, through two or three generations, becoming, it is to be hoped, somewhat better in the third than it shows itself in the first generation of educated Indian youth, which, however, with all its faults, is quite as good as we have any right to expect it to be. We are all too apt to forget in

what a fearful plight we found India, and out of what a gulf of ruin we are slowly raising her.

You ask, seventhly, whether the social attitude of the European to the native is as harsh as it is usually said to be.

Well, I suspect that a vast deal of what is commonly said on that subject *was* much truer than it *is*. The private soldier from Kent or Aberdeenshire, who had driven native armies before him like chaff before the wind, was not likely to have the same sort of feeling about the individual native which is natural to educated people, who know that many of those natives belong to races which have done great things, and that many of them have all kinds of good qualities. Again, the European private soldier, and the lower class of Europeans generally, came across only the lower kind of native. When they found that native trying in every way to cheat, circumvent, and impede them, as was often the case, they felt an amount of indignation which cannot be approved, but is readily understood, and they behaved accordingly. The younger and more thoughtless members of a higher social class, I fear, occasionally still behave in the same way, but I do not think contempt for the natives was ever the tone of the better portions of Anglo-Indian society. Every one will form his judgment upon such a subject from his own individual experience; and all I can say is, that, having been brought up very much amongst Anglo-Indians, especially those of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, from my very earliest childhood, I have never heard any other tone taken about the natives than that which I found prevailing amongst the best people whom I saw in India, which is just the same as that which prevails amongst well-informed persons at home.

It is idle cant not to admit that the natives of India are far inferior to ourselves. If that were not so, we should not be there. That being so, our attitude must be usually an attitude of command; and an attitude of command, if prompt obedience is not rendered, is very apt to become an attitude of harshness and menace. If you are not prepared for a good deal of the attitude of command, you had better leave the country; for the problem which you propose to yourselves is an insoluble one; but the very men who will be most prompt in crushing down opposition to lawful commands will be the first to adopt as little of the attitude of command as possible. Under their rule, the thing they wish will be done, with no appearance of effort on their part. That is the ideal which all your best men set before themselves, ruling as if they merely guided; and that ideal will more and more spread amongst classes which would not have adopted it of their own mere motion. Mr. Bright's expectation, that the courtesy of the Prince of Wales towards the natives would react favourably upon

our own uncourteous officials, does not seem to me to be founded on any wide knowledge of those officials, who are certainly not generally uncourteous; but I think the per-centage of uncourteous officials, already much diminished, will become less and less, from the operation of other causes. The bitter feeling roused by the mutiny very naturally did cause a change in the attitude of the European to the native, but the mutiny is now becoming an event of ancient history, and the feelings it engendered are gradually giving place to other and better ones. The private soldier has indeed been lectured about good behaviour to the natives, to such an extent that it is a great question whether his comparative meekness has not impaired his most important function—his *preventive* military efficiency. When he was supposed to be a sort of demon, who would eat up a native who crossed him in any way, the native was much less likely to provoke a conflict with him than he is now, when he knows that the English private soldier is merely a somewhat stronger man, accustomed to act with other strong men by the bonds of military discipline, and so far, but not further formidable.

The better behaviour of your lower European population is thus not all pure gain, any more than the rough manners of some of your railway people, and such like, have been all pure evil. The guard who, when the train was just starting, tumbled the almost naked but very dignified Brahmin into a railway carriage, out of which he was insisting that a whole flock of his humbler countrymen should be turned lest *his* sacredness should be defiled, with the exclamation, "To 'ell with your caste!" was, I humbly venture to think, in his way, a great, though somewhat iconoclastic, reformer.

Besides, we, who sit quietly at home and discuss these questions, should not forget that *the* great difficulty in the way of putting the natives on anything like the same social platform as the Europeans, comes from the native, not the European side. What are you to do with the orthodox Mahomedan, whose creed, as far as you are concerned, is tersely summed up by the poet in the lines:

"Praise to the name Almighty; there is no God but one;
 Mahomet is his prophet, and his will shall ever be done.
 Ye shall take no use for your money, nor your soul for interest sell;
 Ye shall make no pact with the Infidel, but smite his soul to hell!"

What are you to do with the high-caste Hindoo, who washes his hands the moment your back is turned, if he has had the misfortune to touch you? As long as these fierce religions and caste distinctions remain, there is a gulf between the races which cannot be crossed, and which will prevent the growing up of

many of those charities of life which are the chief bond of a homogeneous society.

Let us, then, on this side, do all we can to echo the views on such matters expressed by the best Indians of the present day, and the long line of eminent men who have taken the same view, each in his own generation; but let us most carefully avoid general and unjust accusations such as are too commonly brought by persons who try to make capital at home by philanthropic commonplaces, or by the far more numerous class which innocently and honestly repeats their utterances.

You proceed, cighthly, to ask me how competition is working.

I say, with the utmost confidence, that it is working extremely well. I think that you are getting into your Civil Service a decidedly better set of men than you got in the old Haileybury days—and in the old Haileybury days you got a great many very good men. It is not true, but the exact opposite of true, that the men you are now getting are physically inferior; on the contrary, they are very healthy and powerful. If any one is disposed to deny this, let him move next Session for the figures in the possession of the India Office. It is, further, not true that they are men from a low social stratum. The clergy of the Church of England, which is, I hope, a sufficiently respectable class to satisfy cavillers, has contributed much more largely than any other; and the wonder at first sight is, not that there are so many, but so few from the humbler ranks of society. I have never examined how far the men who do spring from the humbler classes have succeeded. The only case that happens to occur to my mind, as I write, is that of one of the most distinguished men in all India. The cry against competition for the Civil Service of India arose, I fancy, chiefly from two classes—first, from the Indian families who, under the old system, commanded such an immense amount of Indian influence that they could push into the service as many sons or nephews as they wished, if, at least, the sons and nephews were decently intelligent and well-behaved; secondly, from the schoolmasters who find that their antiquated and clumsy methods of teaching, or no teaching, are of none avail against the thoroughly real and good teaching of the best of the much-abused crammers.

With the vexation of the Indian families I can thoroughly sympathize, but they have the remedy in their own hands, and they are applying that remedy, so that more and more the old names will, as I hope and believe, reappear in the various branches of the Indian service. This is a matter to which, I hope from no undue prejudice, I attach very great importance, for again and again I have listened to speeches in the House of Commons

about India, made by persons of excellent intentions, which were, it appeared to me, almost valueless, from a want of that kind of knowledge which persons belonging to the Indian families sucked in, so to speak, with their mothers' milk. Whatever harm, however, was done in this direction *within* the service, by the change, is long gone and passed, and now you are reaping simply the good of it; you are getting better material, and the old family links are becoming reunited.

Do not understand me to say that I think our present system of competition by any means perfect. I should like to see each of the two old universities found a great Oriental faculty, and should like to see all successful Indian candidates obliged to spend, in connection with one or other of these, the greater part of their probationary time. I know that there would be a great deal of opposition to such a course, but it would be a wise course, and the Government, backed by the two old universities, would be strong enough to enter upon it. It is a sin and a shame that, considering our position in the East, these two enormously wealthy institutions should have done so little either for Oriental learning, or for the training of Indian administrators. The scheme which I propose would no doubt be so unacceptable to many vested interests that it is most unlikely ever to be carried into effect; but, if I am correctly informed, projects of a humbler kind have been very recently discussed between the India Office and the universities.

Ninthly, you ask me my view as to the best means of preventing famines: whether irrigation or railroads or what?

I reply, neither irrigation nor railroads nor roads, but all three. As I said in the House of Commons in the year 1869 when making the Indian financial statement—

“Irrigation is of the last importance in the development of our great Indian estate, and we shall spend, I believe, a great many millions upon it before the century is done. At the same time we should, I think, be cautious not to allow ourselves to be led away by those who believe irrigation to be a panacea. Irrigation would not by itself have prevented the Orissa catastrophe. Roads and railways, coming in aid of irrigation, would have prevented it.”

India really looks, as if it had been *made* for the purpose of being managed by a civilized and wealthy people, who would pour capital into it from without. It is common to say that it is a poor country, and so it is, but it is only a poor country because its vast resources require a prodigious amount of development, a development which its own people cannot give them.

Tenthly, you ask me to what extent public works not directly remunerative can be defended as conducing in the long run to economical advantage.

You are aware, of course, that we have two kinds of public works in India: public works ordinary, and public works extraordinary. The former we pay for out of income, for the latter we consider ourselves entitled to borrow.

Now, as long as we can afford to pay for our public works out of the revenue of the year, *without overtaxing* the people, and as long as the central authority severely controls the expenditure, so as to see that jobbery and blundering are minimized, I am perfectly content to see a large expenditure upon public works *ordinary*. You can hardly overrate the wants of India in this particular. The expenditure of hundreds of millions upon her soil will not bring her up to the level of a civilized country like England or even France; but when it becomes a question of borrowing, then it is a very different matter, and I watch the increase of our public works *extraordinary* with great jealousy. I do not, for a moment, say that we have as yet gone too fast, but we have been, again and again, urged to go too fast. All the time I was at the India Office, I had to combat two classes of objections to our proceedings, the objections of those who wanted us to borrow too much, and the objections of those who wanted us to borrow too little. Long before the half-informed talk about the errors of Indian financiers grew loud in this country I said:—

“I have no doubt that if the Anglo-Indian mind once disabuses itself of the pernicious heresy that its finances are in a thoroughly satisfactory state, and once for all resolutely refuses to listen to the sirens who sing to it that barracks and the like should be built out of loans, we shall soon put an end to Indian deficits.”

And again:—

“It is, however, out of the question for us to carry on either great irrigation works or State railways out of annual income; and if they are to be useful, as we believe, to future generations, and if they are to be directly remunerative to us, there is no reason why they should be so carried on. Some of our friends are advising us to spend £10,000,000 a year out of borrowed money for the construction of remunerative public works. No array of terms can express how glad we should be to do so if we had a certainty that we could spend that sum in works which would be remunerative to us. We think, however, that in the new railway scheme which has been so much discussed since it was laid before the country by my noble friend the Secretary of State for India, ten days ago, and which will, I doubt not, be much discussed here to-day, we are going just as far and as fast as we dare, with a due regard to prudence and to the safety of our credit. If we find we can, in future years, go further and faster, depend upon it we shall be only too happy to do so; but I fear our friends who are so very urgent in pressing us to spend ten millions a year on remunerative public works would be uncommonly sorry to guarantee the Indian funds standing as high this day ten years, if we follow their advice, as they did in the *Times* this morning.”

So on the 5th of August, 1870, when speaking of our public works, I urged that we should be great “*purists in the matter of*

debt," and "steadily resist the blandishments of 'couleur de rose' financiers."

I believe, by the way, that it was my use of that phrase "*couleur de rose financiers*," in *deprecation* of *couleur de rose* finance, which led to my being so often described by persons who did not know what they were talking about as a *couleur de rose* or optimist financier.

From the above extracts you will see that I can give but one answer to your question. I do not think public works not directly remunerative can be defended merely as conducing in the long run to economical advantages. I think they can only be defended when an over-mastering necessity is laid upon us. If, for instance, the Viceroy can say, "We may be certain that all future famines will have to be treated like the last famine; that is to say, that millions will have to be poured out like water to prevent a possibility of death from starvation. That being so, it is cheaper to make canals and railways in the most threatened districts, rather than spend the money in averting the results of a bad season combined with want of communication when it comes, even although our revenue is seriously overladen;" then, and not otherwise, we shall be justified in making public works which have to be carried out with borrowed money, and are not remunerative.

Of course, you will now and then find the works which you expect to be remunerative not really remunerative, and there will be the usual cheap jokes about their being indeed public works *extraordinary*; but with every decade there will be less and less money lost in this way. It is the fashion to abuse the Public Works Department in India, and doubtless it has made many mistakes, but do its critics always know the extraordinary difficulties with which it has had to contend? Remember that a great many of those who have worked under it have been only clever amateurs—that they have been working in a country whose resources and climatic conditions they only learnt as they went on—further, that they had to trust to a great extent to native or low-class European subordinates; and you will, I think, have a glimpse of these difficulties. The creation of the Cooper's Hill College by the Duke of Argyll will completely alter the conditions of the future, and in a dozen years we shall have a large body of men trained for Indian public works, and understanding what they have to do at least as well as our best engineers do at home; and, further, I hope, there is reason to believe that at Roorkee and elsewhere a better class of subordinates will be reared.

I would just like, in passing, to hint at a danger against which the India Office must guard with the utmost care—the growth, namely, of undue service claims from the engineers. We have had quite enough of this already; witness the concessions which

the present Government has made—I think, unfortunately—to certain military demands.

You ask me, in the eleventh place, to what extent the missionaries of any Christian sects have produced any effect on the native population, and of what kind.

That is a question which I have no *special* means of answering, for the Government, I need not say, adopts, in all religious matters, the only possible policy—a policy, that is, of absolute neutrality. As an official, accordingly, hardly anything with reference to missions or missionaries ever came before me, and my opinion is just of as much, or as little, value as that of any one who has talked to a great many Indians, and taken a bird's-eye view of India. You are, however, entitled to have it, such as it is. I believe then that the missionaries of all Christian sects have been a useful and civilizing influence in India. Whether the results produced have been in proportion to the money and zeal expended, is rather a question for those who have supplied the money and zeal, than for persons who look at it from the Indian political point of view.

I came across hardly any missionaries during my tour, but I heard very good things of the Free Church College at Calcutta, and of the Roman Catholic establishments at Agra. Such a book as that of Mr. Robson, to which I called attention in your pages lately, indicates, I think, unless it is quite exceptional, an extremely good tone in the United Presbyterian Mission, to which, if I am correctly informed, that gentleman was attached; while the name of Dr. Wilson, of Bombay, is an honour both to the Scotch Establishment, with which he was originally connected, and to his present associates; but I have no means of knowing how far the various agencies to which I have alluded have, or have not, been successful.

With regard to the Church of England missions, I should like to call your attention to a document of the very highest authority, which has not, I think, received all the attention it deserves. I allude to the circular letter, dated the 27th November, 1873, addressed by the Bishops of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay to their episcopal brethren at home, in which they give an account of the results which they have produced. No document could possibly be more authoritative, and few could be more interesting.

“We would put before you the actual condition of India at the present time, and we would urge you to consider that the season is critical. We are convinced that the future of India depends very much on what is done for it by the Church of England during the next few years. India in the present century is passing through a state of disintegration, and its habits and forms of life are subjected to influences which are affecting it seriously and fundamentally. Forces, Christian in their origin, though only partially

religious, and predominantly of a civilizing and intellectual kind, are everywhere in active operation ; and the people of India are being carried, almost without a will, and as if by a tide of circumstances, from a past, to which their hearts cling with regret, to a future which is still unknown and undiscernible. Education, which the missionaries have led and in some degree controlled for good ; law and government, which the judges and civil servants of the State have equitably administered ; railways, commerce, and other like influences, which have introduced new and more active habits of life, are working in society as dissolvent of old customs, and have actually had their result in a condition of things analogous, perhaps, to that produced by the literature of Greece and the order of Rome, which, in a former age, prepared the way for the first great triumph of our Lord's Kingdom. And among the aboriginal races, which never have been Aryanized, and those lower castes of Hindooism whose state is one of great degradation, the labours of the missionaries have not been unrewarded. In certain parts of India, especially in certain districts of the south and north, many thousands have become believers in Christ, and give proofs of stability and independence, while converts are annually added in increasing proportions, and the number of the native clergy is steadily augmenting. But in India we are dealing with millions, not with thousands, and we should mislead you if we gave you to understand that any deep general impression has been produced, or that the conversion of India is as yet imminent. There is nothing which can at all warrant the opinion that the heart of the people has been largely touched, or that the conscience of the people has been affected seriously. There is no advance in the direction of faith in Christ like that which Pliny describes, or Tertullian proclaims, as characteristic of former eras. In fact, looking at the work of missions on the broadest scale, and especially upon that of our own missions, we must confess that, in many cases, their condition is one rather of stagnation than of advance. There seems to be a want in them of the power to edify, and a consequent paralysis of the power to convert. The converts too often make such poor progress in the Christian life that they fail to act as leaven in the lump of their countrymen. In particular, the missions do not attract to Christ many men of education, not even from among those who have been trained within their own schools. Educated natives, as a general rule, still stand apart from the truth, maintaining, at the best, a state of mental vacuity, which hangs suspended for a time between an atheism from which they shrink, and a Christianity which fails to overcome their fears and constrain their allegiance. We state this, not at all to disparage such work as has been done, and still less to discourage efforts, but because we feel bound to describe to you India as it is, and to dispel any illusions of marked religious success which might arise out of the statements and reports of official and other eminent authorities, though these in reality describe social or political results rather than religious victories."

You will observe that the bishops very properly take credit for the work that has been done amongst such populations as the Kols in the north, or the Shanars in the south of India. There seems no doubt that this has been real and considerable, but here is another passage from the circular which entirely agrees with what I have heard from other quarters, and must be taken into consideration by those who are inclined to attach excessive importance to what has happened amongst non-Aryan or very low-caste parts of the population.

"At the same time, partly perhaps through the activity of thought

which missions have created, the false religions—Mahomedanism, Buddhism, and Hindooism in its two chief forms of Vaishnavism and Shaivism—seem lately to have gained some new religious life and energy, and have in some measure become active once more, and even aggressive; so that among those aboriginal races, numbering several millions, in which missions have hitherto found their most hopeful field, the Church of Christ is confronted by its rivals, and is constrained to ask if they are to snatch out of its hands, through greater zeal and activity, races who are waiting for a religion, and who might be won for Christ."

The requests which the bishops make are also very interesting. Amongst other things they say :—

"You have given us your men of high gifts in too sparing a measure: give generously as God gives; give us of your finest gold; give us men of high talent, men of profound learning, men of earnestness and great simplicity; men trained in our universities; theologians, metaphysicians, philologists; men as able to direct thought as to inspire devotion; and thus wipe off that reproach which clings to us as a Church, because we have done but little in translations and other literary effort, so that too often, even when the Word of God is read, we enter into other men's labours, and reap the fruits of earlier and more zealous toil.

* * * * *

"And lend to us as well as give. Lend to us, in that season of the year when the climate of India is as temperate as that of Europe, men of matured minds and ripened knowledge. Lend us men like the Bishops of Peterborough and Derry, and Canon Liddon, who may travel throughout India, and visit the chief centres of population and thought."

The results of a visit to India on the part of these three, in their different ways, most distinguished men, would be no doubt excellent to the men themselves, and I think I can see various ways in which their presence would be most useful and most desirable to the English community in India. I should be extremely pleased to hear that any or all of them agreed to go, and think quite seriously that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel could hardly spend its money better than in enabling all three to make an Indian journey under favourable circumstances. But, I confess, I should be beyond measure surprised if any one of them even succeeded in putting himself in intellectual *rapproch* with more than the smallest possible handful of educated natives. At the same time the opinion of, especially, the Bishop of Calcutta on such a point, is worthy of all possible respect.

You ask me, twelfthly, about the chance of education being set on foot amongst the great masses of the common people.

Well, it is being set on foot; Sir George Campbell, for example, did a great deal in this direction in Bengal, and his successor is precisely the man to carry that and all good administrative things further, as fast as can be done.

I believe that the most important thing you can do for education in India at present is to throw as much weight as you can into the

scientific as against the literary scale. You are in great danger of raising up, especially in Bengal, an educated proletariat, with no ambition except to enter Government offices, become teachers, or write for newspapers. It is infinitely important that you should multiply the as yet altogether trifling number of natives of India who know anything about the material world by which they are surrounded, and the still smaller number who can turn what knowledge they have of it to practical use. Infuse, I say, into your higher education a very large proportion of scientific, and especially technical knowledge. That seems to me the first thing to do. Spread the net of primary education wider. That seems to me the second thing to do. Extend and improve your higher education. That seems to me the third thing to do. The two last are being done, and will be done more and more: I wish I saw more general attention given to the first.

Thirteenthly, you ask me how far it is true that natives are ineradicably untruthful.

Well, I doubt if it is true at all. My impression is, but of course I only speak at second hand, that they are extremely untruthful, but by no means ineradicably untruthful.

Sir Thomas Munro once offered to give to a younger administrator some hints for his guidance. The latter took his seat, pen in hand, to jot down the precepts of the great master. "Never punish a lie," were the first words he dictated, explaining that the falsehood of the native had been for generation upon generation his only defence against intolerable wrong, and that it was perfectly absurd, and also perfectly useless, to attempt to apply to him the morality of a race which had grown up under the régime of law. I believe that the untruthfulness of the native will be for a very long time a great difficulty to your administrators in India, but I also believe that the honesty and virtue of your own administration, which is getting, and will always get while the heart of England is sound, better and better, will prodigiously improve the native in this as in most other respects. Even now he is said to be very truthful within his own village community. His untruthfulness begins outside its limits, and to no one is he so economical of truth as to the representative of the Government. I do not think we attach enough importance to the slow influence of good example upon him, nor, in speculating about the Indian future, do we calculate enough on the great improvement that is going on amongst ourselves. Your own officers, as a class, are immeasurably better in character than they were sixty years ago; and sixty years hence, not only will they be much better than they are now, but your overseers and stokers and what not, the lower parts in fact of your European population, will be greatly improved. Both this country and India are progressing, but this

country is progressing much more rapidly, and that is one of the reasons why you may hope to keep India. There was, as it seems to me, great depth of wisdom in the remark of a native, which I quoted the other day at Elgin, with reference to this subject. "I often hear," he said, "my countrymen say, 'In time we shall have learnt all we can from the English, and then we shall be able to do without them;' but I always think, when I hear language like that, of the man who said, '*In two years I shall be as old as my elder brother.*'"

Next you ask me in what ways, social and other, native influences seem to affect Anglo-Indians.

I think they affect them curiously little. The separation between the European and the native is almost complete. I have known a very intelligent person live long at an Indian station without ever entering the great historical city hard by, and that is merely an extreme case of what happens almost always. The travelling European is perfectly astonished to see how completely the resident takes things, which are of deep interest to him, as a mere matter of course. When native influences do affect the European community, I think it usually happens in this way. Some of the more quick-minded Europeans are struck by this or that aspect of native life, and they communicate their interest very slowly and gradually to the rest of the community. One way in which this is working is in the increased appreciation of native art. There was a time when all Indian manufactures were voted barbarous, when indeed everything Asiatic was tabooed in India. That was the period when, for instance, Oriental china was considered vulgar in Calcutta, and common white cups and saucers from home were the rage. The tide is now turning, slowly no doubt, but surely, because a number of the most intelligent and high-placed Anglo-Indians, both men and women, are resolutely setting themselves in favour of native art, and against the detestable imitations of European articles which were lately encouraged. To pooh-pooh native art now is rather a mark of the person who does it having lived in an inferior set in India.

Then, again, the passion for sketching, which is become so general, and is encouraged, by example if not by precept, in the very highest quarters, is doing much and will do more to attract the Europeans to what is best in native life as well as in Indian scenery. And as our English education improves, as more men and women are trained to observe the world around them, more and more people will go to India *with an eye for the external aspects of the country and its people*. Then a returned Indian will not be considered, as he has so often been hitherto, merely as a man who bores his listeners about the details of administration, for

which they care nothing. What have we not all suffered in the days of our youth from old collectors, who had passed all their lives in the midst of curious and interesting things without knowing it?

Still further, one cannot overrate the effect that will be produced by such books as are now beginning to be written about India. Take Mr. Lyall's *Essays in the Fortnightly Review*; take Sir Henry Maine's *Lectures*; take a perhaps less-known book, the third volume of Mr. Talboys Wheeler's "*History of India*." Nothing that has been done in past times with reference to India is at all the same in kind. These three writers have got the art of speaking to the educated public of Europe about India in a way that will make it listen, and they will soon raise up a school. When that school begins to send disciples to India, we shall no longer have to complain that whatever is good or interesting in native works and ways will not have its legitimate influence.

Lastly, you ask me for my views as to the right policy to be pursued on our North-west and on our Burmese frontiers. These are large questions, and must be kept quite separate.

On our north-west frontier we have first a line of wild tribes, then Afghanistan, and next the countries over which Russia is slowly advancing. With regard to the wild tribes, I think the best authorities are now agreed that all that can be done is to protect our own frontier, and to win them gradually to better modes of life by the example of the far more prosperous existence of their civilized neighbours. Peshawur, as you know, lies close to some of the most warlike of these tribes, and at one time they gave infinite trouble there. Now, however, exclusion from Peshawur and its markets is considered the severest possible punishment and the fear of it keeps them in very tolerable order. Just before I was there, some of these people picked up, as I mentioned in my *Notes*, a band-master one night after dinner, and carried him off to the hills, but he was got back without any difficulty through the agency of the persons whom we employ to keep the frontier quiet. A few years ago his throat would have been cut. I am afraid it would be very sanguine to hope that we shall not, from time to time, be obliged to make raids across the frontier, and chastise these people for aggressions upon our own subjects; but these raids will become fewer and fewer. A frontier raid is still the first thought of the *irresponsible* European in that part of the world, when he hears of some Donald Bean Lean having been up to mischief; but it is by no means the first thought of the *responsible* European. It is with him only the *ultima ratio* when all else has failed.

Before passing from the immediate line of our frontier, I may

just mention that the colony of fanatics at Sittana, about which there was a great deal of sensational writing a few years ago, has been miserably unprosperous of late, and has dwindled into insignificance.

Another decade or two, and we shall know a great deal about the regions which are at present absolutely inaccessible to us—Swat, for instance, whose Akhoond has a good deal of influence amongst our own Mahomedan subjects, and furnishes an odd sort of parallel to the ruler of Montenegro, while he still was a bishop, though a bishop with pistols in his girdle. For the present, however, the more we discourage imprudent attempts to penetrate these dangerous countries, the better. With regard to Afghanistan, I laugh to scorn the idea that we want Afghanistan as a bulwark against Russia. Afghanistan is quite useless for that purpose, but it is most desirable for us that Afghanistan should be as quiet and orderly as it is in its nature ever to be; and I think that Lord Lawrence was perfectly right in both the phases of his policy, alike when he held aloof and did nothing, being utterly uncertain as to what was the right thing to do, and when he supported Shere Ali after it became pretty clear that he was the man most likely to make Afghanistan as orderly and quiet as it is in its nature to be.

Lord Mayo, under the direction of the then Secretary of State, steadily persevered in Lord Lawrence's second policy, and the present Viceroy, who has brought to bear on the tangled skein of our North-west diplomacy a singularly trained judgment, and an exceptionally firm mind, has steadily followed the same course.

Speaking on behalf of the late Government in 1869, I said:—

“The Government wants to be able to use every penny it can scrape together in India for the moral and material development of the country. We wish to stimulate commerce round the whole of the land and sea frontier, and it does not at all suit us to have one of our trade gates locked up by a burning house, the cellars of which are known to be full of explosive compounds. We want Shere Ali to understand that we do not covet a square inch of his territory, or ask any kind of assistance from him other than the sort of indirect assistance which a civilized Government must always derive from being known to exercise a pacifying and semi-civilizing influence around its own borders.

“If we effect this object, the money we have given, and the money we may give, will be an uncommonly good investment. It will be honourable to Shere Ali to receive it, because he is asked to do nothing for it except what it would be to his interest and honour to do if he did not receive one farthing; and it will be honourable to us to give it, because our only object is to get that done which every benevolent man would wish to see done, even if his own interest were in no way affected—that is, to see a fine country rescued from miserable anarchy.

“The experience of the past tells us that we are never safer than when a strong man keeps his house on our frontier. The danger comes when

the strong man is gone, and the house is divided against itself. Contrast the period of Runjeet Singh with the period that immediately followed it. Was it in the days of the Old Lion, or in the days of his weak successors, that wave after wave of war broke upon our border, until we were obliged fairly to incorporate with our dominions a territory as large as the kingdom of Italy? Did our last experiment of making it worth while for the Affghans to be peaceable neighbours turn out so badly? If Dost Mahomed had not been eating our salt in 1857, is it quite so certain that he would have resisted the pressure, the very strong pressure, that was put upon him by the fanatical party at Cabul to swoop down upon the Punjab?

"We have been accustomed to talk scornfully of Affghan faith, as another great imperial nation used to talk of Punic faith; and probably in the main we speak truly; but if the transactions of the last forty years between us and the house of Dost Mahomed were carefully added up and compared, I am not so sure that the balance in our favour would be so great as it ought to be."

Nothing that has happened since I spoke these words has materially changed the situation. Although, however, Affghanistan is worthless, considered in the light of a bulwark against Russia, it is to the last degree desirable that, at least for a long time to come, there should lie between the actual possessions of the two countries in Asia a large zone of non-English territory over which England exercises great influence, and a large zone over which Russia exercises great influence. That is the present state of things, and I shall be sorry to see it altered.

Whether it would not have been better if the various conversations and correspondences that have taken place between the Foreign Offices of the two countries had not taken place, is another question. I, for one, had rather some of them had not taken place. I do not think that anything has yet happened to make it well for us to depart from the policy which I advocated in 1868,* which was to "strengthen our own position in India, and to keep ourselves minutely acquainted with all that bears upon this Central Asiatic problem, so as neither to tremble at shadows nor disregard real dangers." I think the conversations and correspondences might well have been adjourned.

Writing in 1868, I said:—

"But there is another way of looking at the whole matter. Is it quite so sure that Russia must be always hostile to this country? Is it not possible that there may come a time when we shall understand each other in Asia, and strengthen each other's hands? Many a day must pass before Bokhara becomes a bed of roses for any Christian ruler; and if Russia can trouble us, we can assuredly return the compliment. It would be very premature to do anything at present; but I cannot help thinking that the day may come when we may hear of a co-operative policy in Central Asia, as we have heard already of a co-operative policy at Pekin."

No incident in the gradual, and, as I think, inevitable advance of

* Political Survey, pp. 66, 67.

Russia through the Tartar khanates has seemed to me sufficiently to affect our interests to make it worth while for our public men to do more than to show that they most thoroughly understood what was going on. If some of them had done this more fully and frankly, they would, I think, have spared themselves a good deal of unnecessary trouble, and they would certainly have prevented the sort of panic which was caused in England by the Khivan expedition. I would, if it had lain with me, have deferred any correspondence with Russia on the affairs of Central Asia until an expedition to Merv became talked of. Then, in my view, the occasion would have arisen for our Government to explain to the Russian Government that it quite understood its objects in going to Merv, and saw the convenience of such a step with reference to what has been already done by Russian commanders; but that Merv was in a different category from Khiva or Samarcand, and that the occupation of it would *touch*—although no doubt only *remotely*—English interests. I think if our Government had put off showing any susceptibility until that moment had arrived, and had, by declarations in Parliament and elsewhere, completely dissociated itself from the half-informed Russo-phobia of a portion of the press, we should have been, when the question of Merv arose, in a much better diplomatic position.

I do not know what may have passed with reference to this matter since I left the India Office, but, as at present advised, I should imagine that there would be some difficulty in making any decided diplomatic stand about Merv. If up to this time we had expressed no opinion about the doings of Russia in Central Asia, but had been satisfied merely to show that we knew all that was going on, we might, I think, with great propriety have said, We cannot pretend to have any interest in Merv itself; that place lies wholly beyond the sphere where we wish to exert influence. But Merv is uncomfortably near Herat, which lies within that sphere. Do you not think that the object which both nations have in view will be best attained by your making no permanent settlement there?

I think that such a representation would very likely have been successful, because any interest which Russia may have in going to Merv is far less urgent than the interest which she has in keeping on cordial terms with this country, alike in Asia and in Europe.

Now, it strikes me that although the wiser heads in Russia will probably be very sceptical as to the advantages of going to Merv being at all equal to the disadvantages of going thither, *our* power of pressing those disadvantages seems to me diminished. This, however, is just one of the cases where the personal

character and ability of an ambassador are of the greatest importance. A man who had at St. Petersburg the same amount of personal influence that Sir James Hudson, for example, had in Italy, might be able to do a great deal at the Russian Court which another could not. In fact, in the present state of circumstances, the end of all speeches on the Central Asian question might very well be as uniform as those of Cato—"Send the very best man you can pick out of your diplomatic service to St. Petersburg."

Unless diplomacy keeps the Russians away from Merv, we can take up no attitude in these countries except one. We have nothing to say as of right beyond the limits of the dominions which we have recognized as those of Shere Ali, but any aggression on those dominions by a European Power means war with England.

I am generally supposed, and I believe justly, to be as favourable to Russia as any one who has studied this question, and I do not imagine that any person in Russia whose opinion is worth considering has ever dreamt of meddling with Herat; but the necessity of our not allowing a European Power to meddle with Herat I have never doubted, as any one who will take the trouble to look at my writings and speeches may readily convince himself.

Russia, even if she were in possession of Herat, would still find herself further from our Scinde frontier than the Land's End is from John O'Groat's. An attempt upon India by Russia, even if she were in possession of Herat, would be a disastrous failure; but the accidents of history, and the engagements assumed by various ministers, have committed us as to Herat, and by Herat we must stand.

The last fancy of alarmists is that Merv would be used by the Russians for the purpose of making a dash at Herat. Dover might, with infinitely greater facility, be used as a place for making a dash against Calais; but the inhabitants of that city sleep in peace, and so may the inhabitants of Herat, until some English minister altogether disavows the policy that has been hitherto pursued by all English ministers of all parties.

It is necessary to say this to prevent misconception; but pray understand that I do not think Russia has hitherto done any one single thing in Central Asia that she had not a perfect good right to do, so far as *we* are concerned. As to how far she may have made imprudent statements to us as to what she meant and did not mean to do, that is a matter on which I express no opinion.

Our situation with reference to Burmah is entirely different

from our situation with reference to Afghanistan, although the objects which we have in view with reference to the two countries are precisely similar. We *don't* want a square inch of either, and we *do* want both to be prosperous and peaceful. Burmah is inhabited by a very well-disposed, quiet people. We have no more harmless subjects than those of British Burmah; but our difficulty in dealing with the independent kingdom arises from two sources: the extreme folly of the Burmese Government, and the anxiety of some of the mercantile community in our own provinces to have everything their own way in Burmah. A strong Executive at Calcutta and the India Office would always be sufficient to hold our own people in check; but what are you to do when their efforts are seconded by a Government at Mandalay which may at any moment do something unpardonable? In these countries we cannot afford to be unsuccessful. If we once make up our mind to ask for a thing, we must obtain it; for which reason we should be extremely cautious about asking for anything. We have to deal, in the King of Burmah, with a very shrewd barbarian, but a perfect barbarian—a barbarian who has not in the least realized that, as compared to his neighbours, he is miserably weak, and would have to disappear into space at the first collision. He will endure nothing from his own subjects but the language of flattery, and utterly refuses to listen to what the more intelligent of his own *entourage* know perfectly well, with reference to the vast power which is wielded by the Indian Viceroy. He dreams dreams—now of giving the go-by to the Viceroy, and appealing to the Secretary of State directly; now of getting help from China; now of making to himself other European allies. Such a ruler on our frontier is *the* most dangerous person we can possibly have. If once he could know what the strength of China really was, as compared with the strength of England, and how utterly fallacious were all hopes of aid from any European power in case he quarrelled with us, there would be no Burmese question at all; but an adversary who is armoured in invincible ignorance is very likely one day to provoke a quarrel.


As to the recent tragical occurrence, of course it is very desirable that we should everywhere increase our knowledge of geography; and from that point of view, no one can look without interest at the efforts which have been made by that very distinguished explorer, Mr. Cooper, by poor Mr. Margary, and others, to open a route from Western China into Burmah; and no doubt there will, one of these days, be a trade route of some little value, down past Bhamo from Yunnan. There was, before the Panthay insurrection broke out, a trade of some little value which flowed that way, and I, for one, am strongly in

favour of keeping open, as much as you can, every one of our Indian trade-gates; but anything more ridiculous than the hopes that have been founded upon this trade by a great many of our manufacturers cannot be imagined. Especially absurd was a project of a railway to Kianghung, with reference to which I had occasion to speak at length in the House of Commons in July, 1869, but which has not been much heard of since that time. If you know any one who attaches any great importance to the trade *via* Rangoon with South-western China, I would advise you to direct his attention to an article by Colonel Yule in a recent number of the *Geographical Magazine*, where that great authority, *facile princeps* in Asiatic geography, and with all a geographer's anxiety to have these interesting countries opened, shows how little trade can be expected to flow that way, till the Yangtze and the Canton river change their minds, and agree to run into the Bay of Bengal. The delusion about a railway to Kianghung being a matter of national importance is merely an off-set of the huge delusion that the important markets for our commerce are not the *near* markets, but the *distant* markets. Half the energy that has been applied in opening markets that are worth very little when you have got them would, wisely directed, have opened admirable markets at our own doors.

The same kind of person who is all for a "spirited foreign policy," and "taking time by the forelock" on the North-west frontier, is all for eating up Burmah when occasion serves. He does not reflect that if we take Burmah, we must keep for some time a considerable body of troops to occupy it, and that by so doing we shall either diminish our force on our opposite frontier, or unduly thin the garrisons which we have dotted over India, or increase taxation; for we have already got the richest part of Burmah, and, the moment after annexation, we should begin to think of good administration—that is, of giving the country the advantages of a *European* Government in return for an *Asiatic* revenue.

And now, I think, I have answered every one of your questions as fully as any regard for your space will permit. There is not one of them which is not capable of great development; but I think I have said about each what I most care to say; and as you have kindly allowed me to tell your readers *what I wished to tell them, the impressions produced by the external aspects of the country, as noted down from hour to hour*, I could not do less than comply with your wish.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



THE LAST ATTEMPT TO REFORM THE CHURCH OF ROME FROM WITHIN.

*"Sed sic, Scipio, justitiam cole, et pietatem, quæ, cum
sit magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in
patria maxima est; ea ritia, ritia est in cælum."*
CICERO. *Somnium Scipionis.*

WHEN Roman Catholic controversialists of the higher stamp inquire what justification the Church of England has to offer for breaking away from the jurisdiction of the Western Patriarchate, of which she once formed an integral part, the answer can be given in one brief sentence—"The Council of Trent." The meaning of this answer is that the Tridentine Synod was expressly convened "for the reformation of the Church," and that, in despite of the ceaseless intrigues which hampered and vitiated its projects, it did result in a very large measure of practical reform, and the abolition or mitigation of numerous abuses which had dominated Latin Christendom for centuries before. Consequently, by initiating, enacting, and carrying out these reforms, the Roman Curia acknowledged in the clearest manner that the complaints which had been made for five hundred years previously, but which had been invariably met with denials, excuses, delays, and, where practicable, with the slaughter of such protesters as Arnold of Brescia and Girolamo Savonarola, were thoroughly well founded, and the inevitable outcome of grievous scandals. But as the Council of Trent did not even begin to sit till the Lutheran, Calvinist, Zwinglian, and Anglican separations were accomplished facts, it was a mere shutting of the stable-door after the steed was stolen, and, by its very efforts to remedy the disaster which the Curia had occasioned, confessed that there was an adequate cause for the Reformation. Had Rome continued the language and attitude

which it maintained against the decrees of Pisa and Basle, nay, even against the Report of that noteworthy Committee of Select Cardinals which was named by Pope Paul III., it might have consistently, however untruly, denied the existence of any serious defects and abuses, and by so denying have impeached, as it now can never do, the justice of the revolt. That Trent, which most persons in this country have been taught to look upon as a retrograde and obscurantist assembly, was, in truth, as much the offspring of the Reformation as the Thirty-Nine Articles, or the Westminster Confession, and that it did indeed sweep away many grave scandals and mischievous superstitions, is a truth familiar to all students of ecclesiastical history. It did more; it set on foot that remarkable counter-reformation which has never yet been adequately described, and which won back, mainly under Jesuit guidance, a full half of revolted Europe to the Papacy. The two chief factors in this counter-reformation were an unsparing pruning of abuses, particularly such as stained the lives and functions of the clergy, and the establishment of admirable schools which competed on far more than equal terms with those which had arisen under the auspices of the New Learning. It may be freely conceded that if these important measures had been carried out when they were first called for at the close of the fourteenth century, or even a hundred years later, the Reformation would probably have never taken place at all, and the numerous accretions on the original deposit of Christianity which have grown up, in the course of ages, under the shadow of the Papacy, would have provoked no public resistance, however they might have contributed in private to the cynical temper of which Chaucer and Boccaccio furnish us with examples, and of which Rabelais is the crowning type. The Eastern Church, which has not as yet passed through the fires of a Reformation, but which is, on the whole, reasonably free from scandals, though not from superstitions, represents by its general acquiescence in the existing condition of things what Western Christendom would perhaps be to-day, had the reforms of Trent come when they were first demanded.

But the Reformation brought the knowledge of good and evil too fully home to men's minds to permit them ever to close their eyes again. Ever since Trent, there have been at least two factors at work within the Latin obedience which have prevented it from ever sinking back as a whole into its former lethargic state. One is the abiding consciousness amongst the most philosophic Roman Catholic thinkers that even Trent, thanks to Italian intrigue, was in a great measure a *coup manqué*, and but the first instalment of further reforms yet to be instituted. The other is the presence, side by side with the Roman Church, of a powerful Christian system at variance with it in many important particulars, no longer

lurking in hidden corners or in the mystery of secret sects, but openly challenging its rival in the face of day, and discharging for it very much the function which a strong Liberal Opposition, not yet able to take office, does for a Conservative administration in a country which has not yet shaken off the trammels of absolutism. Now, this Protestant opposition—grouping under that common title all non-Roman Christianity outside the hoary Eastern communions—is in the main altogether free from the heavy discredit which justly overtook mediæval nonconformity by reason of its unquestionable relations with an immoral Gnosticism, propagated secretly from the fourth century downwards, and reappearing at intervals, under the various names of Paulicians, Bogomili, Tur-lupins, and Albigenses, but never entitled by descent or creed to the name of Christian. These sects, lurking at times under more respectable names, and allying themselves at the Reformation with bodies whose one point of contact with them was their common hostility to Rome, showed themselves again as Anabaptists, as Familists of Love, or, disguised as Huguenots, inspired the prophets of the Cevennes, and, by direct propagation from the enthusiasts of Soho who converted Ann Lee to their opinions a hundred years ago, are the parents of the modern Gnostic sects of America—the Shakers, the Free Lovers, and the denizens of Oneida Creek. But these, after all, are no more than the muddy and unconsidered hem on the robe of Protestantism. The Lutheran and the Presbyterian bodies, inclusive of Baptists and Independents, the Anglican Church, and the great Methodist sect to which it has given birth, fairly hold their own, to say the least, with the Roman obedience in their standard of morals, in their grasp of the main tenets of Christianity as embodied in the Creeds, in their zeal for good works, and in the lives and attainments of their pastors. If we go further into the matter, and allowing the lowest grade of Latin ecclesiastic, such as meets us in Spanish America, to pair off with the ministers of the less respectable minor sects, we should find it very hard to match the acquirements and culture of Anglican and Lutheran teachers with any save the very choicest intellects who serve the Church of Rome; though it is no more than justice to say that in the one particular of foreign missions, diligently, wisely, and self-denyingly carried on, Protestants of all kinds are left far behind by their great rival. However, the point immediately under consideration is not to estimate the several merits of the two systems, but to emphasize the fact of their inevitable reaction on each other. Now, this reaction exhibits itself in two radically unlike forms within the Roman Church.

If the learning, the freedom, the intellectual triumphs, and the social achievements of Protestantism beget, on the one hand, respect and sometimes envy in a large number of manly lay

Roman Catholic minds, on the other hand its divisions, its lack of cohesion, its unsystematized method, its breach of continuity with historical Christianity, its frequent resemblance to those Australian rivers which begin as wide and sparkling torrents to end ignominiously in a desert of sand, have each and all intensified the clerical appreciation of the note of Unity as a mark of the True Church, and have induced many to interpret Unity as being equivalent and convertible with uniformity. Hence, especially since the French Revolution, the iron pressure of the Vatican, never light, has been tightened everywhere, and, in pursuit of the single aim of keeping the Latin obedience One, there has been comparatively little heed taken that it should also be Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic. One very practical way in which this has worked is that the new aftermath of abuses, superstitions, and scandals which has been growing up ever since Trent, lush enough, though by no means so rank as that which Luther's scythe mowed down, draws almost no protest out, and certainly finds authority more ready to fence it round with privileges and indulgences than to send fresh labourers into the field to cut it down before casting it into the oven. Provided the new religious opinions broached, the practices introduced, the cults invented, do not seem likely to militate against the one central dogma of absolute submission to the Holy See, it is most rarely that their extravagance, their hysterical or superstitious character, or even their gross theological heresy, as judged by authoritative Roman Catholic standards, provoke any interference from the ecclesiastical authorities, or that the earnest remonstrances of old-fashioned believers whom they scandalize obtain any other result than a rebuff. It is not very long since the attention of the Congregation of the Index was drawn by a learned English Roman Catholic priest to the theological writings of a very popular convert, who had never troubled himself to define the border between sentiment and orthodoxy. The critic pointed out a multitude of heretical propositions in these writings, and asked that they might be formally censured, to avoid peril to religion. But as the writer was hyper-Papalist in his loyalty to the Holy See, and one of the most ardent champions of the extremest forms of Marian devotion, it was judged injudicious to cool the enthusiasm of such a fervent adherent and his large following, so that the objector was snubbed for his pains, and took nothing by his motion. This example covers the great majority of the grounds of complaint from the doctrinal side, because it usually happens that the popular cults which, amongst other results, are gradually bringing back the Roman Breviary into a worse condition than it was when Pius V. drastically purged it of apocryphal and unedifying legends, are either originated or encouraged by men whose Ultra-

montanism is beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, and who are therefore the chartered libertines of the Curia. On the moral side, the principle of "edification" comes in. It is agreed that the wisest way of dealing with a clerical scandal is to hush it up, and to deny loudly, even in the face of manifest proofs, that the alleged event has ever happened at all. If the facts be too notorious, the offender is simply transferred to a less eligible cure at a distance; if the scandal given be exceptionally great, he may be obliged to begin his new life with what is euphemistically styled a "retreat," of more or less duration, in a monastery, but which is in truth a term of imprisonment, to which he must needs submit, if he do not prefer the alternative of professional ruin. The aim in each case is the same—to maintain such an outward show of unity and discipline as may impress the Roman Catholic world with the conviction that neither heresy nor vice taints the fair fame of the clerical body; and in order that this may be done at least plausibly, it becomes necessary to acknowledge no mistake, to repair no wrong, to countenance no reform. This does not in any degree imply inward assent to the "pious opinions" which almost yearly crystallize into tenets, nor unacquaintance with the need of cauterization of many a sore. Pius IX. himself, not by any means a man likely to be startled by a new dogma or miracle, is alleged to have thrown aside with contempt the letter, purporting to be of heavenly origin, which was despatched to him from La Salette; and it is but the other day that he refused a petition, backed with several millions of signatures, to dedicate the whole Church to the Sacred Heart, on the ground that no union or dedication of the Church to her Head could be more complete or intimate than that which exists already. But that has not prevented him from giving his sanction and benediction, his privileges and indulgences, to the pilgrimages and devotions of Lourdes and Paray-le-Monial.

"Still, when you bid me purify the same,
To such a process I discern no end,
Clearing off one excrescence to see two;
There's ever a next in size, now grown as big,
That meets the knife: I cut and cut again!
First cut the Liquefaction, what comes last
But Fichte's clever cut at God Himself?
Experimentalize on sacred things!
I trust nor hand, nor eye, nor heart, nor brain
To stop betimes: they will get drunk alike
The first step I am master not to take."

Such being the policy of the heads of the Church, it may well be supposed that the kind of men out of whom reformers are made—who cannot see an abuse without trying to abolish it, who cannot hear a lie without promptly contradicting it—are at a discount in Latin Christendom just now, and can find no rest for

the sole of their feet; since, if they be laics, their right to criticize their teachers in any fashion is haughtily denied; and if they be clerics, they are either reduced to speedy submission by a perfectly organized and familiar process, or summarily expelled—privately, indeed, but with such a brand fixed upon their characters that any protest they may venture to make is discredited beforehand with the main body of the faithful, and can secure no audience worth mentioning. Hence the great numbers of French clergymen who now ply secular trades and occupations, often of the humblest, for a living, because, being subject to the system known as *amovibilitas ad nutum*—that is, holding their posts or benefices at the mere pleasure of the bishops—they once ventured to express an opinion of their own.

All this condition of things has begotten a huge mass of sullen volcanic alienation underneath the surface unity and calm of the Roman Church, not bold enough to upheave itself and act as the Old Catholics have done, but retained in quiescence only by dead pressure from above and languid scepticism below, with no principle of moral cohesion whatever to prevent an outburst any day. This peril to Latin Christendom has been enormously increased by the promulgation of the Vatican dogmas, not so much because of what was done on July 18, 1870, as because of what was not done. This means simply that the great majority of Roman Catholics throughout the world, accustomed, save in Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, and Italy since 1860, to live under despotic governments, felt little or nothing of that instinctive resistance which Protestants feel to the unbounded claims formally made for the Papacy, especially as they had heard them preached informally everywhere from their cradles. They were just as willing to submit to a spiritual despot as France has shown herself ready to accept the rule of a temporal despot, provided only he would avail himself of his supremacy to secure them against evils too strong for them to cope with themselves. A despot who is only strong to oppress his subjects, but who proves powerless to defend or to avenge them on other oppressors, is not likely to retain his sway long; and all those Roman Catholics throughout the world who hoped that the Vatican Council would take up and carry on the unfinished work of Trent, and set in order the house now threatened by the Revolution as the house then threatened by the Reformation, have been signally disappointed. They did not believe, such of them as thought the matter out seriously at all, that so many hundreds of bishops from Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia could assemble without some discussion of the practical evils which bar the advance of Latin Christianity, which leave Protestantism antagonistic and heathenism unconvinced. They could not imagine that the only result of so great

and august a gathering would be the abdication by almost all those bishops of the independent jurisdiction which was their indefeasible right from the infancy of the Church, and their acceptance, instead, of the undignified and novel position of being the mere removable curates and puppets of an infallible and irresponsible chief, knowing, as they did full well, that even this is but a colourable veiling of their real subjection to certain bureaux and cliques in Rome, to which even infallibility, which does not as yet possess the quality of omnipresence, is compelled to delegate the practical exercise of its powers. No doubt it may be urged that the Vatican Council is not ended, but merely prorogued, and that nothing hinders it from taking into future consideration any or all matters belonging to the belief and discipline of the Church. But there is nothing in the original programme of the Council, in the scheme of its sessions, or in the language of any of its manipulators, so far, to warrant such a hope. The Council was not convened, like that of Trent, to debate *de reformandâ Ecclesiâ*, and its action has even made any such discussion theoretically superfluous, since the infallibility of the Pope in matters of dogma, and his direct jurisdiction in every one of the dioceses which acknowledge his Primacy, give him, nominally at least, the power and the right to amend or suppress, by his mere motion, anything which may need to be so dealt with. But in practice, the Pope, like every other autocrat who enjoys the privilege of personal government, is hampered by restraints quite as serious and almost as public as those which environ a constitutional king. He cannot be everywhere or know everything, and depends for his information on those about him, who communicate exactly what and how they please. He must act, as the head of a great methodical system, through certain recognized channels; and it depends entirely on the good-will of the officials who immediately control those channels whether the action shall be swift or sluggish, or whether, in truth, there shall be any action at all. And Popes die, while Congregations, Chancery, Datary, and all the other minor organisms which in their aggregate make up the Roman Curia, live on, and are more powerful by far in the long run. Even a reforming Pope, therefore, should one arise, and were he able to overcome for the moment the inert force of passive resistance he would encounter, could effect but little, and might—nay, probably would—have his measures as emphatically reversed by a successor as Clement XIV.'s Bull of July 21, 1773, *Dominus ac Redemptor noster*, for the suppression of the Jesuits, was by Pius VII.'s Bull of August 7, 1814, *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum*, for reinstating them.

No hope, therefore, can as yet be entertained of any corporate action of the whole Roman Church in favour of necessary reforms;

and the question at once arises whether that which cannot be done universally may be done locally ; whether any possibility exists of national, provincial, or diocesan Churches reforming themselves piecemeal by internal local action, as St. Charles Borromeo reformed Milan three hundred years ago. The answer is emphatically No. There have been indeed shadowy national synods convened in our own time, as by the Roman hierarchy of Ireland at Thurles, and by that of the United States at Baltimore ; but when they venture any further than mere registration of the decrees of their Italian master, they find themselves like the bird which a boy holds by a thread fastened to its leg, whose tension makes itself speedily felt if the wings be used in a moment's dream of freedom. This lesson was brought home quite lately, it is said, to the Anglo-Roman hierarchy by the prompt disallowance at headquarters of several resolutions they had agreed to in a recent synod ; though, with their usual discretion, they did not direct public attention to the fact.

The history of the last effort of the kind which was made, now eighty-nine years ago, is worth recording briefly, in order to show what were the conditions of the struggle even then, when the constitution of the Latin Church had not been overthrown by a treasonable revolution. It is recorded in one of the worst arranged and unreadable of books, De Potter's "*Memoires de Scipion de Ricci*," published at Brussels in four volumes, in 1825. A few words of preface are necessary. The Emperor Joseph II., son of Francis of Lorraine and Maria Theresa, though he obtained the imperial title in 1765, was practically his mother's subject till her death in 1780. Imbued with many of the philosophical ideas which heralded the French Revolution, though refusing all democratic overtures with the sufficient answer from a monarch, "*Mon métier à moi c'est d'être royaliste*," he availed himself of the old power supposed to be latent in him, as temporal head of the Holy Roman Empire, to carry out ecclesiastical reforms with as bold a hand as Otto the Great or Henry III., his imperial precursors. He aided the pressure put on Clement XIV. to secure the overthrow of the Jesuits ; he issued an Edict of Toleration in 1781, which nearly drew Pius VI. to Vienna to have it set aside ; he suppressed a large number of convents in his dominions, wrested from the Holy See the right of nominating bishops, redistributed the dioceses of his States, and put out, on his own responsibility, a number of regulations on religious instruction and the ceremonies of public worship. These reforms, crudely conceived and hastily carried out, lacked root, and were not destined to survive him long. But his example was not without its charm for his fellow-sovereigns, who thought it a very delightful thing to exercise despotic authority in this novel fashion ; and one of his earliest converts and imitators, in both his civil and spiritual measures,

was his younger brother, Peter Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany. He began in a less impetuous and high-handed manner than his elder brother, and, having but one homogeneous State under his sceptre at his accession in 1765, was not embarrassed, like Joseph, with the effort to reduce such warring elements as Austrians, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, and Croats, under one centralizing and uniform system. He introduced several really valuable reforms, bestowed a comparatively liberal constitution on his people, softened and amended the penal code; remitted taxes, and yet, by abolishing monopolies, increased the revenue, and furthered the cause of education, commerce, manufacture, and agriculture; playing, in short, to admiration the part of a philosophical and paternal despot. Having proceeded so far, he thought it time to regulate the Church also, more, as after events would seem to indicate, from a desire to please his brother than from any very hearty personal zeal in the matter. However, several disputes which his father, Francis I., had begun with the Roman Curia, were already bearing fruit, and were urging him on the path of ecclesiastical reform, even had he been more averse to it than he actually was. The first blow to the concord which had existed between the Courts of Vienna and the Vatican without break from the accession of Ferdinand III. was struck by a law enacted at Vienna on February 1, 1751, and published at Florence on March 1 of the same year by the Count of Richecourt, President of the Council of Regency, and Senator Rucellai, Secretary of the Board of Crown Rights—a ministry of public worship—which forbade the clergy to acquire property in mortmain; and the issue of this law was accompanied by a paper of instructions drawn up by the Government, pointing out the disadvantages to society of multiplying and enriching artificial families, such as convents, colleges, and corporations, at the expense of natural families. This was followed up by a fresh edict, transferring the censorship of printed books to the civil power from the Inquisitor-General, whose criminal jurisdiction was soon afterwards abolished on the alleged ground of gross and tyrannical abuse. Several convents of nuns were also suppressed by the State with the reluctant consent of Rome, and an effort was made to reduce the number of small parishes with which the city of Florence swarmed. And the last of all the measures of the Emperor Francis in Tuscany was to deport the Bishop of Pienza for excommunicating several Government officials of his diocese under the censures of the Bull *In Cena Domini*, while a scheme for abolishing the mischievous right of sanctuary, which made many churches and convents a secure asylum for the worst criminals, was on foot when Francis died, so that Church and State were already at war when Leopold ascended the Grand Ducal throne in 1765.

His first contribution to it was to declare the Bull *In Coena Domini* null and void so far as Tuscany was concerned, and to forbid its recognition or publication there in any fashion. The moment his attitude was recognized, he was beset with appeals from priests and nuns, who called his attention to grave abuses which existed, unredressed, in the Church of his dominions, such as the encouragement of mendicancy by indiscriminate doles, and of crime by yet more hurtful rights of asylum, while strongly worded indictments, fortified with express details of place and person, pointed to moral scandals of the gravest kind existing in the convents of nuns, and chiefly those which were under the direction of the Dominicans. It is unnecessary to do more than refer to this painful subject, and to say that the charges seem amply borne out by the evidence, and are, besides, fully in agreement with the nearly contemporary evidence of Van Espen as to the condition of the religious houses in the Low Countries. The result of these petitions was that in 1770 Leopold directed Rucellai to draft a scheme of ecclesiastical reform under the following heads:—1. The diminution of convents in Tuscany, and the refusal of permission to foreigners to enter them. 2. To prohibit the taking of monastic vows by persons under twenty-four years of age. 3. To prohibit the mendicant Orders from receiving novices under eighteen for men, and sixteen for women. 4. To suppress all convents of mendicant Orders containing fewer than twelve members. 5. To limit the right of public preaching to the secular and parochial clergy. 6. To exclude all monks and friars from the direction of nunneries, and the subjection of these in all spiritual matters to the Ordinaries only. As the monastic orders were then, as now, the trustiest militia of the Papacy, this programme meant war between Florence and Rome. Such was the condition of affairs when Scipio de' Ricci, kinsman and heir of Lorenzo de' Ricci, the last general of the Jesuits before the suppression, who died a prisoner in the Castle of St. Angelo, in 1775, entered on his ecclesiastical career. Scipio himself was born in Florence in 1741; and his family being out of favour at Court for political reasons, he was sent to Rome by his uncles in 1756, to be educated by the Jesuits, and placed on the high road to ecclesiastical preferment. Cured, as he believed by miracle, of an obstinate tumour, while in the house of Canon Bottari, a concealed Jansenist, at Rome, he imbibed there the opinions which made him finally break with the Jesuits, although it was only the absolute prohibition of his family which prevented him from entering the Order. They recalled him to Florence in 1758, and he found there and at Pisa, where also he studied, teachers, especially the Benedictines of Monte Cassino, who completed in his mind the work begun by Bottari, and gave him that

bent towards hyper-Augustinianism which coloured much of his after-life. He was ordained priest in 1766; and by the singular hap which marked his career, his colleague in the auditorship to the Nunciature, to which he was immediately appointed, Canon Martini, was another of the concealed Old Catholic school, and directed Scipio's studies to ecclesiastical history, patrology, and conciliar literature, subjects then no more in favour with authority in the Roman Church than now. In 1772, Ricci became heir of his near kinsman Corso de' Ricci, Canon of Florence, and brother of Lorenzo, last general of the Jesuits. While Lorenzo was still in prison, Clement XIV. died, the victim, as was loudly alleged at the time, but on very insufficient testimony, of poison administered in revenge for the Bull of Suppression. Angelo Braschi, Pope Pius VI., who succeeded him in 1775, owed his first important preferment to Lorenzo de' Ricci, but was unable to release him from his captivity, owing, it is said, to a promise forced from him by the Bourbon princes before the dissolution of the Conclave, by threatening to interpose their veto to his election. Scipio de' Ricci went to Rome to attend the festival of the coronation, and while there saw enough of the intrigues of the Curia to refuse the offer made him of becoming a member of the *prelatura*, with every prospect of rising to the highest dignities. He was enabled to hold communication with his imprisoned relative, though refused permission to visit him, and to secure the papers, afterwards published, wherein the deposed general formally asserted his entire innocence of the charges brought against him. On returning to Florence, Ricci was made Vicar-General of the Archbishop, and, five years later, was nominated to the see of Pistoia and Prato, to which he was consecrated on June 24, 1780.

His first task in his new sphere was to suppress the scandals which raged in the Dominican nunneries of his diocese, and notably that of St. Lucy at Pistoia; whereby, though he abated a formidable evil, he earned the undying hostility of the Friars Preachers. As if they were not enemies enough, his next enterprise was to suppress the then novel cult of the Sacred Heart, the favourite Jesuit devotion, in defiance of a brief authorizing it in Prato, issued from Rome by Cardinal Rezzonico, but not given the necessary local validation by Ricci. In truth, the cult at the time was little else save an organization, through its guilds and confraternities, for procuring the re-establishment of the Jesuits; and though it had been firmly opposed, on religious grounds, by Clement XIV., yet now that it was mainly political, it had the informal support of Pius VI. This Pope at first warmly espoused the cause of the excommunicated Dominicans of Pistoia and Prato, although their evil fame was no recent thing, having prevailed for a century and a half, and addressed a very severe

brief to Ricci, censuring his action against that "most holy order." The bishop laid it before the Grand Duke, who immediately wrote a strong remonstrance to the Papal Court, in which he declared that if the Pope did not oblige the convents to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, he would himself reform, at his discretion, every religious house in Tuscany. As Ricci sent at the same time a long reply, containing irrefutable proofs of his charges against the Dominicans, Pius VI. was compelled to retract the brief, and to give him full liberty to suppress the disorders of which he complained. The next step the Bishop of Pistoia took was to visit his diocese, especially its outlying mountain villages on the Apennine slopes, and to provide some means for raising the social, moral, and intellectual status of the parochial clergy.

To that end, his first measure was to prohibit all regulars from preaching in his diocese, especially Lenten and mission sermons, till they had undergone a strict examination as to their doctrine, acquirements, and character. This thinned them out rapidly, and at once relieved the parochial clergy from a rivalry which, wherever it has been permitted, lowers them in the eyes of their flocks, and destroys their self-respect, a fact sufficiently familiar to all who know the religious condition of France at the present day. Next, as Leopold granted him the suppressed convent of the Olivetans at Pistoia, he converted it into a theological college for the diocese, and thereby brought on himself another swarm of enemies, who subsequently raked up against him the charge of having compassed, like another Ahab, the ruin of the Olivetans, in order to seize their inheritance. He also incurred further odium by placing at the head of the new seminary a suspected Jansenist, Giambattista Ganzi, who had been recommended to him by the eminent theologian Tamburini, then Professor at Pavia. Availing himself of his recovered jurisdiction over the regulars, he began a visitation of some of their houses in his diocese, chiefly with a view of ascertaining the literary acquirements of the friars, and inspecting their libraries. His report on both these heads discloses a deplorable condition of ignorance and neglect, especially amongst the Franciscans. He next fell upon the canons of his cathedral, a very wealthy body, who never performed their turns of service, but paid a miserable stipend to some of the lowest and most ignorant of the clergy to act as their vicars, thereby bringing the cathedral into disrepute. The enforcement of residence and work upon the Chapter created a fresh body of foes for the innovating prelate. All these measures, as well as his introduction of Gourolin's Catechism, which had passed the Index, and been approved by his own predecessor, Ippoliti, belonged to the year 1782, and stirred up much opposition, secret and public, from placards on the cathedral door inscribed "*Orate pro Episcopo*"

nostro heterodoxo," and anonymous threatening letters, to intrigues against him at Court, and condemnation of his catechism at Rome. Some attempts to limit ceremonial, especially by allowing but one altar in each church, and to introduce vernacular litanies in public worship, added to his unpopularity with the reactionary part of the clergy.

As if all this were insufficient, he soon flew at higher game, and attacked the very stronghold of the Curia in its domination over the episcopate, by denouncing the "infame bottega," the disgraceful huxtering of dispensations for marriages issued by the Roman Court. Fortified by the support of the Grand Duke, he granted dispensations on his own authority in his diocese as bishop, and charged nothing for them, whereas the Roman tariff was very high. This act, had it been imitated by the other bishops of the time, would have made the later Vatican decrees impossible, because the main lever by which the Curia overcame episcopal resistance during and after the Council was by threatening to withdraw from every recalcitrant prelate the faculties for granting dispensations, which are never granted for more than five years at a time, and thereby at once to set his diocese in revolt against him—the laity because they are impeded in their marriages, the clergy because they are mulcted in their fees, by his opposition. Nevertheless, the Pope did not find it convenient to quarrel with Ricci just then, and he received many compliments on his zeal, with a recommendation, forwarded through Cardinal Pallavicini, to hold a diocesan synod, a scheme he was already pondering. Then he endeavoured the reduction of the monasteries of his diocese to a very small number, and next assailed the system of "reserved cases," according to which certain offences could be absolved only by the Archbishop of the province, or in more serious cases by the central authority at Rome, and thereby gained an enemy in a fresh quarter; while the one counterpoise to this growing weight of hatred, the gratitude of the secular clergy, for whom he created and endowed new parishes, was heavily discounted by an attack he made on the traffic in masses for the dead, and other sources of clerical gain, endeavouring, as he did, to have the moneys hitherto devoted to these purposes employed in alms-giving and in education. While matters were in this condition, Leopold ordered all the bishops of Tuscany to hold diocesan synods at least once in two years, to which the parish priests were to be summoned, in order to discuss abuses in discipline, and to provide the needful remedies, and issued, early in 1786, a paper of fifty-seven questions, as a circular for the Ordinaries, in order to obtain information on a variety of ecclesiastical matters, previous to holding a national synod of Tuscany to establish the projected reforms on a firm canonical basis.

This was the signal for which Ricci had waited, and accordingly he convened the famous Synod of Pistoia on September 18, 1786.

It will have been seen already that he lacked wisdom and patience in reform. The changes he had made in little more than five years, with scant sympathy save from the Grand Duke, whose Ministry took the other side, would have been more than enough for a generation, and public opinion was not ripe for several of them. He made some equally serious mistakes in the conduct of his Synod: firstly, by naming as Promoter the celebrated Tamburini, who was not merely a stranger to the diocese, with no right to be even present, but who had recently been deprived of his professorship at Pavia by the Bishop, Cardinal Molino, on the ground of Jansenist teaching. Further, although the Jansenist controversy was almost unknown in Italy, save to an inner circle of learned theologians, Ricci obliged the Synod not merely to vote the Gallican Articles of 1682, but to accept in block the articles sent by the University of Louvain in 1677 to Innocent XI., and the abstract of them in the twelve propositions laid by Cardinal de Noailles before Benedict XIII., and approved by him. So far, it might be urged that he had not gone beyond what possessed some kind of Papal sanction, but the condemned propositions of Michael Baius and of Pasquier Quesnel also found favour in his eyes, and coloured the theological decrees of the Synod, thereby at once discrediting it with exactly the persons whom it was most necessary to win over by moderation to acceptance of its practical reforms. And although Ricci had done something to propagate his views amongst the clergy by the circulation of books and pamphlets, besides the encouragement of public catechizings from text-books which he recommended, there is little doubt that the majority of the two hundred and forty-six ecclesiastics who attended the fullest session were not very much more competent to pronounce on the intricate questions of grace, free-will, predestination, and the basis of morals, than an equal number of Welsh literates would be here in our own Church to-day. It seems probable that Ricci's impetuous action in this particular of getting these doctrinal decrees all passed in the third session—the first which was not merely formal—was owing to pressure from his Jansenist friends in France and Holland, with whom he kept up constant communication, and who advised many of his plans.

The spiritual feeling of Christendom, both within and without the Roman communion, with the exception of the dwindling and dying Calvinist sects, has gradually come round to the conviction, long delayed by the terrible wit and sarcasm of Pascal's *Provinciales*, that whatever the gross faults of the lax Jesuit casuistry

may be, yet in the theological dispute with the Jansenists they were in the right, and propounded a system at once more divine and more human than the hyper-Augustinianism of their opponents, who did not recognize that the great Bishop of Hippo had never got the early taint of Manichæism out of his mind, even when he was arguing most hotly against that form of opinion.

The session on the Sacraments does not contain very much which is noteworthy, except that it forbids the use of the organ at High Mass between the Preface and the Post-Communion, and also prohibits the custom of making collections during the office, as interrupting the devotions of the congregation, besides limiting the number of altars in each church to one, and allowing neither reliquaries nor flowers to be placed on it. The Synod also expressed an opinion that so soon as circumstances permitted, Mass should be celebrated in the vernacular. In discussing the sacrament of penance, the Synod discourages, without forbidding, frequent confession of venial faults, and ordains that to add dignity and reverence to the confessional, the priest is not to barely give absolution, as the current usage was then and is now, but should add prayer and imposition of hands; besides entirely prohibiting conditional absolutions. More important is the deliverance on Indulgences. These are declared to have been at first no more than the remission by authority of part of the temporal penalties annexed by the canons to certain offences, and, observes the Synod:—

“The influx of the Barbarians, the ignorance of the time, the interested spirit of ecclesiastics, and finally the enthusiasm of the Crusades, overthrew this admirable arrangement, and caused the loss of correct notions about it. The Schoolmen, who then came, completed the change of ideas, and, puffed up with their subtleties, invented that strange and much misunderstood treasure of the merits of Jesus Christ and the saints, and substituted for the clear idea of remission of canonical penalties the confused and erroneous one of an application of merits.”

It then proceeds on this ground to deprecate the “scandalous prodigality” and “chimerical application” of these “pretended indulgences,” and closes by referring the faithful to a work against them, but without formally declaring them null and forbidden.

On Excommunication there are some very forcible remarks. It is laid down that the result of excommunication is merely deprivation of external communion with the Church in prayers and sacraments, whereas sin breaks the ties of internal communion. It follows that it is not competent for the Church to add penalties such as exile or imprisonment, as part of sentences of excommunication, and that *ipso facto* excommunications have no just title to exist at all. But the gloss which follows shows that the meaning of this term in Italian Church law differs seriously from its import in

England, where it often occurs in the Canons of 1603. The Synod explains that it intends by *ipso facto* excommunication the launching of a sentence without any trial or examination of the accused, on mere proof of the fact that he is charged with a certain offence. In England, the very same phrase means that after the accused has been regularly tried and convicted, the Court *must* decree excommunication as the penalty, and cannot substitute a milder sentence for it. And the last deliverance under the head of penance, is to declare absolutely null and void all sentences of suspension pronounced against ecclesiastics by their Ordinaries *ex informati conscientiâ*, that is, for private reasons, and without formal trial, as derived from violence and ignorance alone. It may be remembered that this was the very process employed lately against Father O'Keeffe of Callan by his bishop.

Under the head of Holy Orders, the Synod protests against the unnecessary multiplication of clergy, leading to the creation of a pauper class living on masses and stole-fees—what we call “surplice-fees”—and bringing much discredit on the Church. It lays down that a bad priest is worse than no priest at all, and recommends the limitation of ordinations in future to the numbers actually required for the cure of souls or the occupation of other *bonâ fide* benefices, such as theological chairs, prebends, &c., and has a few hard words for the vicars-choral and choristers of cathedrals, whose suppression it recommends. It deprecates any tampering, by means of dispensations, with genuine disqualifications for orders or benefices, enjoins greater strictness in examining candidates, and pronounces strongly against sinecures, non-residence, and pluralities, and ends by taking up the championship of curates against incumbents disposed to bully them, and recommending Montazet's Catechism instead of Goulin's, against which some objections had been taken.

Under the head of Marriage, the Synod refuses to countenance or regard as valid the religious ceremony when it contravenes the civil law, recommends the simplification and diminution of the forbidden degrees, and requests the State to take into consideration the legality of those quasi-clandestine marriages contracted by surprise in presence of a priest who is not himself officiating—a case, it will be remembered, on which much of the plot of Manzoni's *I Promessi Sposi* turns—specially provides against clandestine and irregular banns, and the marriage of persons between whom canonical impediments exist, two precautions much needed in the Church of England now, where the law is frequently evaded in these respects.

In treating of Prayer, the Synod recommends caution and avoidance of superstition in devotion, specifying the Stations of the Cross, the Salutations of the Blessed Virgin, and the cultus of

images, as all requiring much discretion in both pastors and people. But the Fathers evidently felt that here they were on very delicate ground, and would not do battle as boldly as on some previous matters, besides which, as will presently appear, Scipio de' Ricci himself was not much averse to the popular customs on this head. In touching on public prayer, the Synod directs the clergy, when celebrating the Office of the Dead, to instruct the people that this office is profitable to all the faithful departed, and that the current opinion that there are certain forgotten souls in Purgatory for whom no one prays, and who are therefore deprived of refreshment, has no basis whatever, but contradicts the doctrine of the solidarity of the Church. They promise a reformed Breviary, from which all apocryphal legends should be expunged, and a new Ritual and Manual, Latin and Italian, following in this respect the then comparatively recent example of many French dioceses. Restrictions were at once placed on Novenas, Octaves, Processions, and exceptional festivals; and a petition to the Grand Duke to suppress all the minor festivals, as encouraging idleness and dissipation, was also agreed upon. Under the head of the discipline of the clergy, the only points to note are the prohibition of theatres, balls, and dances, as places and occasions of resort and amusement, and the regulation of ruridecanal conferences; while the last matter of importance before the close of the Synod was a memorial drafted for presentation to the Grand Duke, asking him to legislate on six points:—1. To abolish pre-matrimonial contracts or betrothals, as leading to much mischief. 2. To do away with the oaths required in courts of law, and on admission to posts and offices, substituting for them simple forms of declaration—a counsel which might well be adopted amongst ourselves. 3. To extend the operation of the law of 1749 by suppressing all the minor festivals as days of obligation, and to retain this character on Sundays only, or the feasts of Our Lord, but asking that the shops should be shut on these days during divine service. 4. To redistribute the Tuscan parishes, by union or by subdivision, as need required. 5. To reform the monastic orders, and bring them back to their earlier model, by decreeing (*a*) that no monk should be eligible for the cure of souls or for elevation to a bishopric; (*b*) that all orders, save the Benedictine, should be abolished,* and that it should be reformed on the model of Port Royal; (*c*) that no more than one monastery should be allowed to each town, and that in a distant and remote suburb; (*d*) that manual labour should be insisted on as an integral part of the

* Strong as this measure seems, it does not go as far as the unanimous recommendations of the Select Cardinals to Pope Paul III. in the Report of 1538, for the total abolition of monasticism, "*Conventuales ordines abolendos esse putamus omnes.*" Sadolet, Pole, Contarini, and Caraffa (afterwards Paul IV.), sat on the Committee.

rule ; (e) that the distinction between choir-monks and lay-brothers should be abolished ; (f) that the vow of perpetual stability should be no longer tolerated, but that at most vows for a year, renewable at pleasure, should be allowed ; (g) that the bishop should have the right of visitation and inspection, all exemptions being taken away ; (h) that nuns should not be permitted to take perpetual vows till at the age of forty or forty-five, and should have plenty of work to do, and be discouraged from sentimental devotions and "carnal spirituality, which is the occupation of most of them." The last of the six points was a supplication to the Grand Duke to convene a national synod, in order that the reforms of Pistoia might be extended to the rest of Tuscany.

Such was this famous assembly, in whose acts we find that the number of dissentients ranged from three to eight in each session, while the number of members present varied from 234 to 246, and the first consideration at each session was the examination of the objections raised at its predecessor by any protesting member.


But as the Synod was intensely unpopular at Rome and amongst the nobility of Pistoia, Ricci's opponents secured the delay of its ratification till after the meeting of the proposed Synod of Florence, and in the meanwhile petitions against it were organized amongst the clergy, and a violent riot at Prato was contrived to break out just as the Florentine assembly, consisting of three archbishops and fourteen bishops, each attended by two or three legal assessors, began to sit on St. George's Day, 1787. The first question raised was, whether a plurality of votes or absolute unanimity should decide the suffrages. The opposition, by far the stronger party, ruled the former plan, while Ricci and his only two supporters, the Bishops of Chiusi and Colle, were obliged to content themselves with recording their protest in the Acts against this irregularity. During nineteen sessions, the Grand Duke's fifty-seven queries were debated without any substantial agreement, but the temper of the assembly was, on the whole, manifestly hostile to the Synod of Pistoia, and made it abundantly clear that the hopes entertained of the possible results of a National Council were chimerical ; and accordingly that project was dropped for ever. Meanwhile congratulations poured in upon Ricci from the Church of Utrecht, from the Catholic Faculty of Tübingen, and other sources, while the Synod was acquitted of error by the first of three congregations of Cardinals appointed to examine into it. The second drafted a few trifling verbal objections, never proceeded with, and the third was merely summoned and kept sitting to spread the idea that there was something wrong, which might at any moment lead to Ricci's arrest. While matters were in this state, Joseph II. died on February 20, 1790, and the Grand Duke, his brother, succeeded him on the Imperial Throne as Leopold II.,

leaving Tuscany in the hands of a Council of Regency, most of whose members were but little friendly to Ricci. A popular riot, directed against him, broke out in June, 1790, and resulted in the concession of the demand for the abolition of all his reforms wherever they had been introduced in Tuscany, under colour of their heretical taint, even when they did but strike at notorious moral scandals. The Emperor returned to Florence in April, 1791, to instal his son Ferdinand as Grand Duke, and although at first desirous of supporting Ricci, lacked either the courage or the will to do so, and soon gave him to understand that his resignation of his see would be accepted; so that he accordingly gave it in. Nevertheless, Leopold was too much attached to him not to have protected him against his enemies, but dying in March, 1792, after a reign of little more than two years, left the ex-Bishop of Pistoia defenceless. Meanwhile, a new cause of hostility had arisen against Ricci. The Constitutional Church of France, a much maligned institution, whose history has yet to be written truly, had adopted the decrees of Pistoia as its model; and as it was itself the object of the bitterest hostility at Rome, Pius VI. seized on this fact as a lever against Ricci, and launched in 1794 the Bull *Auctorem Fidei* against the doctrinal decrees of Pistoia. The Bishop remained in retirement and very necessitous circumstances for some considerable time, and was at last arrested in his house at Florence on July 11, 1799, by the Aretine insurgents against the French occupation of Tuscany, and thrown into prison, whence he was released after a month, but obliged by the Archbishop of Florence to choose a new prison in any monastery he might select. He did choose that of San Marco, and, by a singular irony of history, being prohibited from saying mass publicly, he was restricted to the very oratory where the illustrious Florentine martyr, Girolamo Savonarola, was wont to celebrate the Holy Eucharist, forming, as it does, part of his cell. After a time he was permitted to retire to a country villa, but was still made the object of many intrigues and petty persecutions, in the midst of which Pius VI. died, on August 29, 1799, and was succeeded by Gregory Chiaramonte, Pope Pius VII. To him Ricci, now worn out with age, worry, and sickness, addressed a letter of submission, couched in general terms; but received no answer for ten months, when Cardinal Consalvi required a more precise retractation, and the final acceptance of the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, with a verbal threat that, if he refused, the Council of Regency would give him up to the Pope, who would imprison him for life in St. Angelo. While he was hesitating, the French re-entered Italy, and saved him for the time; but the enthronement of Louis de Bourbon of Parma at Florence as King of Etruria, according to the treaty of Madrid, put a reactionary bigot in power, and, though

Louis I. died in March, 1803, his widow, Maria Louisa, as Regent for her son, shared his fanaticism. But Ricci, attributing his second deliverance by the king's death to the miraculous intercession of his own ancestress, St. Catharine de' Ricci, a Dominican nun, who died in 1590, and was canonized by Benedict XIV. in 1746, composed offices and hymns in her honour, and endeavoured to popularize this devotion. The queen, hearing of this, thought that Scipio could not be quite so hardened a heretic as she had previously supposed, had prayers put up in several convents for his conversion, and persuaded Pius VII. to pass through Florence in order to see him, on returning from the coronation of Napoleon in 1805. To this the Pope consented, but refused to grant the interview till Ricci should sign a paper of retraction, of rejection of the doctrines of Baius, Jansen, and Quesnel, and of acceptance of the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*. Under grievous pressure, and urged by the advice of his friends Palmieri and Fontani, he consented to efface himself, like Gratry the other day, by signing the paper on October 17, 1805, though he endeavoured to save his self-respect by alleging to the Pope the purity of his intentions, and the Catholic sense he had meant to put on propositions which the Bull *Auctorem Fidei* had branded as heretical. The Pope, contented with having secured the main point, replied with courteous generalities; and so the matter ended. It appears, from letters of Ricci himself, that his motives were mainly to clear himself of the charge of disbelief in the Pope, and that no other way of doing so than to sign a document presented to him by the Pope himself existed; that he was bound to do what made for peace and unity; that, in yielding on certain points of discipline, he did but adapt himself to the change of circumstances; and that, being now a mere private person, he ought to refer the innovations he had made as a bishop, and without the consent of the Holy See, to the Pope's judgment. There seems no ground for supposing, however, that his opinions were really altered; but he was not a strong man naturally, and could not do battle unsupported. His real mistakes were, as already pointed out, over-haste in pushing forward changes for which public opinion was not ready, too much trust in the civil power and in the force of State enactments, and forcing on a doctrinal controversy unfamiliar in Italy. And with the hard and bigoted Primate, Archbishop Martini, always attacking him on the score of the *law*, meaning thereby some audacious figment based on a false Decretal, or on some biassed decision of a corrupt Court of Final Appeal at Rome; another stolid prelate warning him against *anomia*, and advising him that obedience could never be wrong; and a third episcopal busy-body sanctimoniously assuring him that he had no choice between recantation and sad and sorrowful seces-

sion ; while all dwelt on his alienation of the laity, and left the moral right and wrong entirely out of sight ; it is not wonderful that he finally yielded against his better judgment, and that all the reward he got from the Church, for which he had always toiled honestly and diligently, if not wisely, was a brand on his reputation after his death on January 27, 1810, though he had spent most of the interval since his reconciliation with Pius VII. in fostering the cultus of St. Catharine de' Ricci ; so that now he fills a long notice in the Abbé Migne's "Dictionary of Heresies." If he failed so signally with a Catholic Sovereign at his back, and at a time when the Bishops of the Roman Church still enjoyed at least the shadow of independent jurisdiction, it may be gathered what hope there is for internal reforms now.

RICHARD F. LITTLEDALE



SAXON SWITZERLAND.

I.

I PACKED my portmanteau full of silent hurrahs, and set off, with a lightesome step, for the Boehmisehe Bahnhof. It was a divine June day, and Dresden looked so bright that I could almost have disbelieved its evil odour. The club balcony, on Victoria Strasse, had got its afternoon shadow, and never looked more inviting; but there was a train to catch, and I might not pause even there. Prager Strasse, gay and crowded, wooed me to loiter; but I had cast off, for good and all, the lazy leisure which a Dresden residence begets, and felt that time was precious once more. In a few minutes, I reached the broad, open space in front of the Bahnhof, passed through the serried droschkeys, on stand there side by side, bought a ticket to Krippen, and took my seat in a third-class carriage.

I have often done the journey on foot; the highway from Dresden to Saxon Switzerland—about five-and-twenty miles—being itself excellent, while its situation is more or less picturesque throughout. The main objection to it is its openness, and the circumstance that Koenigstein and Lilienstein—the twin rocky giants that sentinel the entrance to the mountainous region—are visible from the outset of the walk, and are a long while in getting to look nearer. For the rest, the road traverses seven or eight tiny villages and two towns—Pirna and Koenigstein—as quaint, crooked, and narrow-streeted as heart could desire. For many miles it skirts the river-bank; after Pirna, climbs a steep hill, has

an up-and-down time of it as far as Koenigstein fortress, and then plunges headlong down a straight incline, stone-paved and ridged for the behoof of clambering waggons, into Koenigstein town. Steep and long as is the ascent, it is pleasanter than the going down; the grade being such that running is dangerous, and walking almost impossible. Koenigstein passed, highway and railway run cheek by jowl along the precipitous river-bank, onward through the heart of the country. The road is level, and parasolled with trees; but the squat, nine-pin-shaped steeple of Schandau church, on the opposite side of the river, now takes its turn in making the walk wearisome by its unintermittent visibility. The scene, however, is really very pretty; and were it not that his five-and-twenty miles beneath a summer sun may have rendered the pedestrian a trifle captious, doubtless he might swallow the incessant steeple with more than toleration.

But it was not my cue to foot it on the present occasion. Frequent pilgrimages to and fro had taken all novelty out of the enterprise—not to mention that my portmanteau did, strictly speaking, have some heavier things than hurrahs in it. So, for the nonce, I chose the railway-carriage; the noisiest, ugliest, tiresomest, most unprivacied mode of conveyance extant; but not wholly deficient, even in Saxony, in the exhilaration of speed; and never lacking in broad variety of human interest. And, to the end of ensuring, while I was about it, the full flavour of the experience, I took a third-class ticket—an unfailing passport to whatever human interest might happen to be in the way. First-class carriages are empty, in every sense of the word; the seats may be softly cushioned, the guard may salute whenever he catches my eye, and request the favour of my ticket with such sweet cajolery that I feel, in giving it up, as if I were making him happier than it is right or lawful for man to be; nevertheless, the noise and weariness remain, and there is nothing better than my own dignity to distract my attention therefrom. As for the second-class, it can be endurable only to penitents and to second-class people; the guard (whose behaviour admirably gauges the traveller's social estimation throughout) now chats with me on terms of friendly equality; while my neighbours are hopelessly unpicturesque and ordinary, yet of such pretensions that I am dejected by a doubt whether they are not as good as I am after all. No: the moral and mental depression brought on by second-class outweighs the pecuniary outlay of first and third combined.

But the third—the third is romantic! It piques my imagination, and gives the observation scope. I fancy myself a peasant: I think of my farmyard, my oxen, my Frau, my geese, my children; of that bargain got out of Mueller; of that paltry advantage gained by Schultze over me. My breath savours of



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proceeded to have the honour to inquire whether I were of Russian extraction, observing that my features were of the Russian type. He meant it as a compliment, of course; but it is odd that a German, a Frenchman, and an Englishman should severally, and in like manner, have claimed countrymanship with me on the testimony of my visage. The explanation is to be found, I take it, in nothing more nor less than my affability, which I can neither disguise nor palliate. Why else, from a streetful of people, should I invariably be the one picked out by the stranger to tell him his way? It is not because I look as if I knew—and, in fact, I never do know—but he feels convinced, as soon as he claps eyes on me, that whether I know or not, at all events he will get an affable answer from me. Or why else, in third-class carriages and elsewhere, am I the one to whom every smoker applies for a light? It is not because my light is better than other people's, but because they perceive in me a lack of gall to make their oppression bitter. Yet, but for this experience, I should have supposed the cast and predominant expression of my countenance to be especially grave and forbidding; which goes to prove that the world knows its individuals better than they know themselves.

Intellect plays but a subordinate part in the divination of character. It's your emotional, impressible person who finds you out most surely and soon: hence women are so apt to pass their verdict at sight, and (prejudice apart) are so seldom entirely mistaken. They cannot say, categorically, what you are—the faculty of formulating impressions being no necessary part of their gift—but they can tell what you are not, and description by negatives is often very good description. Of course, they are easily led to alter, or at least ignore their first judgment; and their second thought is never worth much. It is here that the intellect steps in, confirming and marshalling the emotional insight; and with both at their best, out comes Shakespeare.

If, in these days of committees, we could have a committee on geniuses—those whose works captivate all ages—I think the most of them would turn out soft-fibred persons, of no assertative individuality: egotists, no doubt, but with a foolish personal—not lofty moral and intellectual—egotism; yielding, sensitive natures, albeit finely-balanced, and with an innate perception of truth and proportion, sufficient to prevent their being forced permanently out of shape. Were they other than this, they would be always tripping up their inspiration (meaning thereby the power of so foregoing oneself as to reflect directly the inner truth and beauty of moral and physical creation). Obstinate, prognathous geniuses must have a hard time of it: inspiration is not easily come at, upon any terms: how then when breathless and sweating from a tussle with one's own personality?

III.

"But you have lived in Russia. At the least you speak the language?" No. I was obliged to confess that I had not. The little agent looked hard at me, debating within himself whether he should ask me outright where I did come from; he decided against it, and applied himself to staring out of the window, and ever and anon spitting towards any part of the prospect that attracted his interest. As there was a strong draught setting inwards, I moved further up the seat. Presently, a thought of his personal appearance visited him, and he pulled from an inner pocket a little greasy box, having a tiny mirror set within the lid, and containing four inches of comb. With these appliances, the Russian went through the forms of the toilet, replacing his box, when he had finished, with a pathetic air of self-complacency, such as I have observed in a frowzy dog who has just scratched his ear and shaken a little dirt from his coat. This human being had an untrained, unintellectual, repulsive aspect enough, but he looked good-natured, and I have no doubt his odour was the worst part of him.

Sitting beside me was a lean, elderly man, of pleasant and respectable appearance, and seemingly well-educated and gentlemanlike. He had a guide-book, which he consulted very diligently, and was continually peering out of the windows on either side, in hasty search for the objects of interest which the book told about. He referred to me repeatedly, with a blandly-courteous air, for information regarding the towns and scenes through which we passed, and, by-and-by, he produced the stump of a cigar, and asked me for a light, which I gave him. At Pirna he was painfully divided between the new bridge then in course of building, the rock-mounted castle, now used as an insane asylum, and the perpendicular brown cliffs on the other side of the river—the beginning of the peculiar formation which makes the Saxon Switzerland. While poking his head out of the Russian's window, he fell into talk with him, and whether they turned out to be compatriots or not I cannot tell, but, at all events, my lean friend spoke my frowzy friend's language: they sat down opposite one another—a pendant to the two lovers at the other side—and emptied themselves into one another's mouths, so to speak, during the rest of the journey. The guide-book and the scenery were alike forgotten—such is the superior fascination of a human over a natural interest. They more cared to peep into the dark interiors of each other's minds than gaze at the sunlit trees and river, and rocks, and sky outside. What is this mysterious, irresistible magnet in all men, compelling them to attend first of all

to one another? Is it smitten into them from the infinite creative magnet? I find it most generally sensitive in men of small cultivation, and in women, who, on the other hand, seldom take much genuine interest in grand natural scenery. The conversation of my two friends, so far as I could make it out, was confined mainly to cigarettes, and matters thereto related. They fraternized completely; the Russian worked himself into paroxysms of genial excitement, and gesticulated with much freedom. Shortly before our arrival at Krippen, he took out a pocket-case of cigarettes, and shared its contents with his new acquaintance, and the two likewise exchanged names and addresses. Every man searches for something of himself in those he meets, and is hugely tickled if he discovers it.

The remaining occupant of our compartment was a poor, meagre little fellow, pale and peaked, with dirty-white hands, and imperfect nails, and dingy genteel attire. He was chilly, though the day was warm and generous, and kept rubbing his pithless hands together, in the vain attempt to get up circulation. He was altogether squalid and dyspeptic, and smoked a squalid cigar, and said nothing, save in answer to some question put to him by his Russian neighbour. Even the endearments of the lovers availed not to bring lustre to his pallid eyes; and when his cigar went out he put it in his pocket, without asking for a light. Some unwholesome city clerkship was his, I suppose, in a street where the sun never shone, and the drainage was bad.

The fortress of Koenigstein reeled dizzily above us, perched indefinite hundreds of feet in air, on its breakneck precipice, shelving towards the base, and shawled in verdure. But the first sight of Lilienstein, as we sweep around the curve, is, perhaps, more impressive. The rock, like most in this region, is of an irregular oval plan; its wooded base sloping conically upwards to within two hundred feet or so of the top, at which point the rock itself appears, hurtling straight aloft with black, naked crags. Seen from the river level, its altitude is increased by the height of the bank—at least one hundred feet more; and presenting itself end-on, it bears a striking resemblance to the dismantled hull of some titanic frigate, wrecked on the tall summit of a hill. The gloomy weather-beaten bows rise in slow grandeur against the sky: there are the shattered bulwarks—bowsprit and masts are gone. Ages have passed since the giant vessel was stranded there, and the pre-historic ocean which hurled it to its place has rolled into oblivion. But still looms the barren hulk over that old ocean bed, now green with trees and crops, dotted with tiny villages, and alive with pigmy men. What mighty captain commanded her on her last voyage?—whose hand swayed her tiller and hauled her ropes?—what enormous exploits are re-

corded in her log-book? But for some foolish historic and geographic scruples, I should christen her *The Ark*, manned by Noah and his sons, and freighted, long ago, with the hopes of humanity. On second thoughts, however, that could not be, for if there is any truth in measurements, Lillienstein might have swung the ark from her stern davits, and never felt the difference.

IV.

Some of these canal boats, however, would have made her stagger; it seems impossible that anything so ponderous should float. Looking down at them from above they appear to be of about the tonnage of an ordinary London street. Their masts are in proportion, but their sails (which they ostentatiously spread to the lightest breath of air) are exasperatingly insufficient, and help them along about as much as its wings do a penguin. Nevertheless, fleets of them are continually passing up and down, and seem to get to their destinations ultimately. Horses are harnessed to the mast, and tug away along the rounded stone levees, the long rope brushing the willows and bushes which grow beside the banks. One mariner dreams over the tiller, another occasionally slumbers in the hows, upwards of a hundred yards away. Such leisurely voyaging can hardly be supposed to keep pace with the fleet foot of time, and traditions linger hereabouts of boats that have left Dresden early in the spring, and, losing four months on the passage, have only arrived at Bodenbach by the end of the previous autumn. Can this be true?

We arrived at Krippen just as a soft grey cloud was poising itself above the valley, and sending down a misty message of rain-drops; the sun, however, peeped beneath, and translated it into a rainbow. I hastened down the steps to the ferry-boat—a flat-bottomed skiff about twenty feet long—and sat down there along with a dozen other passengers. Charon took his pole (oars are unknown in this kind of craft) and poked us across; the boat, which was loaded down to the gunwale, rocking alarmingly, and the people ejaculating and protesting. At landing we were beswarmed by porters, but I knew the coast, and, escaping from them, took my way along the pretty winding path towards the old Badehaus, which reposes at the upper end of the desultory village of Schandau. Schandau proper, indeed, is comprised in the little garden patch of red-roofed houses huddled in the mouth of the valley where it opens on the river; but its “Bad” reputation has generated a long progeny of stuccoed villas, standing in a row beneath the opposite sides of the gradually narrowing canon. The pine-clad hillsides rear up within arm’s reach of their back windows, and as steep as their roofs. For about half-a-mile up, the valley

averages scarce a hundred yards in breadth, while its sides are at least as high as that, and look much higher. Down the centre flows a brook, dammed once or twice to turn saw-mills, and bordered with strips of grassy meadow. The main road, unnecessarily tortured with round cobble stones, and miserable in a width of some ten feet, crawls along beneath the house-row on the northern side; but the southern is the aristocratic quarter—the houses are villas, and have balconies and awnings, overlooking a smooth gravel path densely shaded with trees—the fashionable morning and evening promenade, untrodden by hoof of horse, and familiar to the wheels of children's perambulators only. Very charming is all this, and after the clatter, glare, and poison of the city, unspeakably soothing and grateful.

As I walked along, fragments of the rainbow shower occasionally found their way to me through the leafy roof overhead, while children toddled across my path, escaping from white-aproned nurses; and villa-people—girls in coquettish white hats, and gentlemen indolent with cigars—stared at me from the vantage-ground of their shaded windows. At the garden restaurant were beer-drinkers, merry in the summer-houses, and great running to and fro of Kellner and Kellnerinnen. The dust was laid—the trees were painted a livelier green—the grass and flowers held themselves straighter and taller—the air lay cool and still on the sweet earth, or moved faintly under the influence of a doubtful breeze—the brook gurgled unseen, and the noise of the saw-mill, a moderate distance off, sounded like the busy hum of some gigantic grasshopper.

Where the Bade-haus stands, the hill-ridges verge towards each other, till a stone could be thrown from one summit to the other. In the square court on which the hotel faces, the aristocratic pathway finds its end, and thenceforward the road, relieved of its cobbles, and otherwise improved, takes up the tale alone. The brook washes the Badehaus wall, and in the earlier part of its course cleaves to the southern side of the narrow gorge. The Badehaus places itself transversely across the valley, looking down villagewards, and giving the brook and the road scarcely room to turn its northern wing. Its opposite end, meanwhile, thrusts right into the hillside, and even digs a cellar out of it, to cool its provisions in. The front court, when I entered it, was noisy with multitudinous children, and the daily brass band was on the point of striking up in the open pagoda. The audience were preparing their minds for the entertainment with plentiful meat and drink, and the three Kellner employed by Herr Boettcher had, as usual, three times too much to do. Herr Boettcher (who looks like a mild Yankee until he opens his mouth) and his pale-haired helpmate received me with many smiles, and ushered me

into a small, scantily furnished chamber, overlooking the brook and the road, and likewise commanding a view of a small villa crowded close against the hillside opposite.

V.

I ordered supper, and then sat down at my window. The brook, which flowed directly beneath it, was somewhat cloudy of current, and disfigured as to its bed by indistinct glimpses of broken crockery and bottles scattered there. A short distance down, it was crossed by a bridge communicating with the Badehaus court. Some slender-stemmed young trees were trying to make themselves useful along the road side; and there, likewise, were ranged three rectangular piles of stone, awaiting the hammer of the stone-breaker; and a wedge-shaped mud-heap, hard and solid now, but telling of wet days and dirty walking in times gone by. A weather-beaten picket fence, interlarded at intervals with white-washed stone posts, inclosed a garden, devoted partly to cabbages and potatoes, and partly to apple-trees. At one end of this inclosure stood the villa; at the other, a large tree, with a swing attached to it; several small people were making free with this plaything, subject to an occasional reproving female voice from the direction of the house, and the fitful barking of a self-important little cur. I could also see the lower half of a white skirt, squired by a pair of black broadcloth legs, moving up and down beneath the low-extending branches of the apple-trees.

The villa, whose red-tiled roof was pleasantly relieved against a dark-green back-ground of pines, was provided with an astonishing number of windows. I counted no less than fifteen, besides a door, in the hither end of it alone. Over the front door was a balcony, thickly draped with woodbine; and here sat two ladies, in blue dresses, dividing their time between the feminine diversions of sewing, reading, gossiping, and watching the passers-by. Small or large parties were continually strolling up the road towards the Schutzenhaus—the women, mostly attired in white, with white hats, and white or buff parasols; and all chatting and laughing with great volubility and good humour. One pretty girl, walking a little in the rear of her companions, happened to glance up at my window and catch my eye; and all at once it became necessary for her to cross the road, which being rather dirty, she was compelled to lift her crisp skirts an inch or two above a shapely pair of little boots. What happy land first received the imprint of those small feet? Could it have been Saxony? They soon walked beyond my field of vision, which was limited by the sash. Here, however, came into play a species of ocular illusion, made possible in Germany by the habit windows

have of opening inwards on hinges. The upper stretch of road to its curve round the bold spur of the hill, a bit of dilapidated bridge, and one or two new villas half-clad in trees,—all this pretty picture was mirrored and framed in the pane of glass at my left hand. A few moments, therefore, after the owner of the boots had vanished from actual sight, she stepped daintily into this phantom world, and proceeded on her way as demurely as though no such astonishing phenomenon had occurred. She was, to be sure, unaware of it; and we all live in blind serenity amidst marvels as strange. Perhaps, when our time comes, we shall take our first walk beyond the grave with no less unconscious self-possession than attended the march of those little boots across my window-pane.

As the afternoon wore on, waggons and droschkeys, full of returning excursionists, began to lumber by, with much cracking of whips, singing, and jollity. Many of the men wore monstrous hats, roughly plaited of white reeds, quantities of which were on sale in the village for a groschen or so each, being meant to last only a day. They were bound with bands of scarlet ribbon, and lent their wearers a sort of tropical aspect. Every vehicle was overcrowded, and everybody was in high spirits except the horses, who, however, were well whipped to make up for it. Meanwhile, the band in the pagoda round the corner had long been in full blast, and odds and ends of melody came floating past my window. In the pauses of the music I could hear two babies bemoaning themselves in an adjoining room. A small child, with red face and white hair, made itself disagreeable by walking nonchalantly backwards and forwards over an impromptu plank bridge without railings, escaping accident so tantalizingly that I could almost rather have seen it tumble in once for all, and done with it. At last, when the miracle had become threadbare, the bath-girl appeared and took the infant Blondin away; and at the same moment a waiter knocked at my door, and told me supper was ready.

VI.

Supper was set out on a little table under the trees in the front court. The musicians had departed, leaving a skeleton growth of chairs and music-rests in the pagoda; and most of the late audience had assembled at the long dining tables in the Speise-Saal, where I could see them through the open windows paying vigorous attention to the meal.

Several young ladies, however, under the leadership of a plump, brisk little personage, whom I cannot better describe than by calling her a snub-nosed Jewess, had got up a game of croquet, which they played with much coquettish ostentation; but in other

respects ill. They were in pronounced evening costume; and my waiter—a small, fat boy, smuggled into a man's swallow-tail—said there was going to be a ball. The Tanz-Saal faced me on the other side of the court; being connected at right angles with the hotel, corner to corner. It was a white stuccoed building, about on an architectural par with a deal candle-box. A double flight of steps mounted to the door, over which were inscribed, in shaky lettering, some lines of doggerel, composed by Herr Boettcher himself in praise of his medicinal spring. The hall inside may have been sixty feet in length, with a raised platform at one end for the accommodation of the musicians.

It was lighted by two candelabra; but these eventually proving inadequate, a secret raid was made upon the kerosene lamps in the guests' rooms, and every one of them was carried off. I retired early that night, and, having discovered my loss and rung the bell, an attendant did, finally, appear, in the shape of the bath-girl. To make a short story of it, no light, except starlight, was to be had. It is a hardship to have to go to bed in Saxony at all. You know not, from hour to hour, whether you are too hot or too cold, but are convinced, before morning, that you are three or four feet too long. But the Badehaus beds are a caricature, rather than a fair example, of Saxon beds; and to go to bed not only in Saxony but in the Badehaus, and not only in the Badehaus but in the dark, was for me a memorable exploit. I have reason to believe, however, that three-fourths of the hotel guests had to do the same thing; for my wakefulness, up to three o'clock in the morning, was partly due to the noisy demands and expostulations wherewith they made known and emphasized their dissatisfaction.

But I am anticipating. By the time I had finished supper it was growing dark, and the dancers were arriving in numbers. The dresses were mostly white and gauzy, though here and there were glimpses of pink and blue satins, and one young woman had divided herself equally between red and green. My pretty vision with the shapely feet was not among them. As evening came on, the hall filled, and I could see the heads of the company moving to and fro within; and some were already stationary at the windows. Meanwhile the whole domestic brigade appertaining to the hotel, including Herr Boettcher himself, were busied in carrying chairs from the court yard to the hall, to be used in the cotillon. The least active agents in this job were the two head waiters; the most strenuous and hard-working were the bath-girl and the chamber-maid. Finally, the only chairs left were my own, and one occupied by a huge, fat Russian, at a table not far from mine; and from these the united blandishments of the entire Boettcher establishment availed not to stir either of us.

Darkness fell upon the valley—the stars came out above the

lofty brow of the impending hillside—the trees stood black and motionless in the still air: all light, life, and sound were concentrated behind the glowing windows of the Tanz-Saal. The musicians had struck up amain, and the heads were now moving in couples, bobbing, swooping, and whirling in harmony with the rhythm of the tune. Now and then an exhausted pair would reel to a window, where the lady would fan herself and pant, and the gentleman (in three cases out of five an officer) would wipe his forehead with his handkerchief and pass his forefinger round inside the upright collar of his military jacket. Then both would gaze out on the darkness, and, seeing nothing, would turn to each other, and launch themselves into the dance once more. Between the pauses I could distinguish Herr Boettcher's brown curly pate hastening busily backwards and forwards, and began to remark an increase of illumination in the hall; but was, of course, without suspicion of the cost to myself at which it was being obtained.

The huge Russian and I were the only voluntary non-combatants; for the half-score of forlorn creatures (among them the chambermaid and the bath-girl) who had climbed on the railing of the steps, and were stretching their necks to see what they could see, would gladly have taken part if it had been permitted them. It was too dark for me to do more than roughly guess at the outline of my stout neighbour; but I could hear him occasionally take a gulp from his beer-glass, sigh heavily, and anon inhale a whiff of cigarette-smoke. I also had drunk a glass of beer; but it now occurred to me to try the possibility of getting something else. I called the waiter, and bade him bring me a lemon, some sugar, some hot water, and one or two other things—from which I concocted a mixture unknown to Saxon palates, but which proved none the less grateful on that account to my own. The cordial aroma must, I think, have been wafted by some friendly breeze to the Russian's nostrils; for, after an interval, he, too, summoned the waiter and categorically repeated my own order.

Meanwhile the music surged and beat, and the ball went seething on. It is much pleasanter, as well as wiser, thought I, to sit here quiet and cool beneath the stars, with a good cigar and a fragrant glass of punch for company, than to dance myself hot and tired in yonder close, glaring room. Then, somehow or other, the recollection of that pretty figure with the white parasol and the small arched feet, which had marched so daintily across my window-pane that afternoon, entered my mind; and I was glad to think that she was not one of the red-faced, promiscuous throng. She belonged to a higher caste than any there; or, at all events, there was in her an innate nicety and refinement, which would suffice to keep her from mixing in such an assemblage. The more I reflected upon the matter, the less could I believe that she was a

Saxon. I had contracted, it may be, a prejudice against the Saxons, and was slow to give them credit for exceptional elegance of form or bearing. That graceful *tournure*—that high-bred manner—no, no! why might she not be a Spaniard—nay, why not even an American? And here I entered upon the latter half of my glass of punch.

The waiter returned, bearing the Russian's hot water and so forth on a tray, and, having set them before him, hastened off to his post at the ball-room door. The soft glock-glock of liquids, and the subdued tinkle of tumbler and spoon, now became audible from the womb of night, accompanied by occasional labouring sighs and tentative smackings of the lips—tokens that my heavy neighbour was making what, for him, was probably a novel experiment. I became gradually convinced, moreover, that it was not altogether a successful one; and I was more pleased than surprised when I heard him, after a little hesitation, push back his chair, and advance upon me out of the darkness, entreating me, in the gentlest tone imaginable, to favour him with a light for his cigarette.

This having been done, he stood silent for a moment, and then observed, engagingly, that he had been informed the gentleman was an American: that the relations of Russia and America had always been cordial; that the fame of the American punch was known to him, but not, alas! the exact method of preparing it: that——

I here ventured to interrupt him, begging that he would bring his glass and his chair to my table, and suffer me to improve the opportunity, so kindly afforded, of introducing him to a national institution, peculiarly adapted to increase the *entente cordiale* to which he had so pleasantly alluded. He accepted my invitation as frankly as it was given; and in five minutes we were hobnobbing in the friendliest manner in the world. Like all educated Russians, he had a fair understanding of English; and I was anticipating an evening of social enjoyment, when the following incident occurred:—

The first part of the ball was over, and an intermission of ten minutes was announced before the beginning of the cotillon. The hall doors were thrown open, and among the couples that came out upon the steps was one which attracted my attention. The lady, who was dressed in white, after a moment sent back her partner for a shawl; and during his absence she stood in such a position that the light from within fell directly upon her face. The man—he was not an officer—returned with the shawl, and folded it round her pretty shoulders with an air that was not to be mistaken. They descended the steps arm in arm, and came forward, groping their way and laughing, in our direction. They

stumbled upon a table only three or four yards from ours, and sat down to it. After a short confabulation the man called out "Karl!" and the waiter came.

"Karl, two glasses of beer; but quick!"

"And a portion of raw ham thereto, Karl," said the lady, in the unmistakable Saxon accent: "I am so frightfully hungry!"

"Two glass beer, one portion ham," recited Karl, and hurried off.

The man pulled a cigar from his pocket, and lit it with a match. I had recognized him before: he kept a small cigar-shop on See Strasse, in Dresden. He threw the lighted match on the ground, and it burnt there until the lady put out a small, arched foot, neatly booted, and daintily extinguished it. She was a pretty girl for a Saxon, especially a Saxon in her humble rank of life.

"Herr Kombustikoff," said I to my Russian friend, "I must leave you. I am very sorry—but I have received a great shock! Good night!" and I was gone before Karl returned with the raw ham and the beer; and thus it happened that I went to bed so early that night. I rested ill; but it would have fared yet worse with me had I known then what I discovered next morning—that my too courteous Russian had gone off after having paid for my punch as well as for his own! Did he imagine that I meant to barter my instruction for the price of the beverage to which it related? May this page meet his eye, and discover to him, at last, the true cause of my unceremonious behaviour.

VII.

By daylight I was dimly awake, and dreamily aware of the singing of a bird outside my window. Of all the bird-songs that ever I heard, this was the briskest, most high-strung, most dandified: giving my drowsy-head the fancy that some elfin exquisite was busy arranging his cravat, parting his hair, and pointing the ends of his moustache before a dew-drop mirror; uttering the while a brilliant series of fairy witticisms upon the follies of society. I fell asleep again, and dreamed incoherently, though not unpleasantly, despite my cramped position: but awoke soon after to see the pure sunshine lighting up the fir-trees on the opposite hillside, and to hear the inner voice of the brook babbling to itself beneath the window. Even then I should not have got up, had not a steady tide of weeping set in from the babies in the adjoining room.

No matter how early I rise in Saxony, I never fail to find people up before me. It was now but little after five o'clock; and two elderly hypochondriacs were dipping up the iron water from the

spring in the front court, while a pallid young lady, blanched, I suppose, from indulgence in city dissipations, was pacing slowly up and down the walk, sipping fresh milk out of a tall tumbler. For my own part, being in search of an appetite, I started up the steep zigzag hill-path, and steered a breathless course heavenward, through dewy heather and blueberry bushes, and over difficult rocks and grassy knolls. The world enlarged around me as I climbed, though the feathery arc of white cloud which spanned the blue overhead grew no nearer for all my pains. At length I attained a small semicircular stone erection, which, from below, had seemed to crown the hill, but which now turned out to be somewhat below the highest point. It commanded, nevertheless, a comprehensive view of the Schandau valley, still hazy with the remnants of last night's mist. The pine-trees on the ridge of the hill opposite seemed almost within reach of my outstretched arm. Below, some four or five hundred feet, appeared the flattened roof of the Badehaus; and there were the hypochondriacs, pigmies now, still lingering over the iron-spring; and a young lady, a couple of inches high, pacing slowly to and fro, and occasionally sipping milk from an infinitesimal tumbler. There, too, comes a microscopic Karl, and begins to set a breakfast-table, with tiny white cloth, and glistening plates no bigger than heads of pins. This pebble, which I hold in my hand, were I to cast it down, would utterly overwhelm and crush out the entire establishment—Badehaus, hypochondriacs, Karl, iron-spring, young lady, breakfast-table, and all! Heavens! what power for wholesale destruction is in this arm of mine. Yet, tremble not, poor mites, I will not annihilate ye; moreover, were one of you but to turn his eyes hitherwards, it is I who would appear insignificant, and you the giants.

Fresh and invigorating was the atmosphere at this height, polluted by no human exhalations, but seeming to be the essence of last night's stars, dissolved for my use by this morning's sunshine. After swallowing my fill of it, I left the little stone semicircle, and took my way along the ridge of the hill towards the river. Looking downwards, there were the red tiled roofs of the villas almost below my feet; farther out, the brook, flowing on hastily between its green banks, and at one time rushing out in white foam beneath a dark archway. Beyond still, the road, with its line of houses of older and quainter growth, seeming to rest their aged shoulders against the perpendicular hill-wall behind them. Long narrow flights of stone steps mounted straight upwards from the kitchen doors of the villas, leading to heights of backyard on a level with the tops of their chimneys. There was one villa, high up on the opposite hillside, where it made a white break in the dense growth of firs, which was romantic with battlemented

turrets and mullioned windows, and dignified with an elaborate staircase of dressed stone, winding through several landings to the porticoed doorway. Farther on, surmounting the extreme spur of the ridge and abreast of the village, was the little Schloss-Bastei Restauration, with its flag flying, its camera-obscura like a black pill-box, and its vine-covered beer-garden, where I had quaffed many a refreshing stoup after a dusty tramp from Dresden, chatting the while with bright-eyed, good-humoured little Marie.

Before long, I found myself at the end of my own ridge, apparently overhanging the red-roofed irregular town, and sat down on one of the hospitable benches established there. A wooden railing afforded a not unnecessary precaution against tumbling over into the front yard of the little villa on the road-side below. The villa, plain enough in itself, was surrounded by a small garden full of roses; and its porch was heavily overgrown with woodbine. Out of this porch presently issued a woman and a little girl, and walked about the garden picking the beautiful flowers. The woman was simply clad in white, and had a green bow on the bosom of her dress—as if she were a humanisation of the villa. Her hair, however, was not red, but black.

Beyond the town flowed the river Elbe, and, winding westward, gleaming white, swept round the broad base of Lilienstein, five miles away. The great rock, from this point of view, resembled an old woman sitting closely huddled up beside the river in a green cloak, her grey head bowed forwards on her knees. On the railroad, just across the stream, an engine was steaming itself out of breath in the effort to set in motion an innumerable train of freight waggons. Above the railroad was a showy, glistening, bannered edifice, perched brand new on its raw green terraces; above this again, a yellow stone quarry; and higher still, the pine-fringed summit against the sky. Ferry-skiffs, gay with awnings, and full of passengers by the early train from Dresden, were being poled across; the landing-place, however, was shut out from my view by the intervention of the line of hotels which is drawn up so officiously along the river margin. The most prominent feature in my immediate neighbourhood was the church steeple, which bulged out irregularly, like an insufficiently-swaddled infant. None of the streets in the town were visible; but the green tops of the trees planted along them rose up above the ruddy roofs, seaming them into uneven quadrilaterals. Meanwhile, from the chimneys the smoke of a hundred breakfasts began to rise, reminding me that my own was still uneaten. I returned along the ridge of the hill to my semicircular bastion, whence descending, as it were, through the very tops of the gloomy fir-trees, I sat down to table, warm and glowing, with an appetite for the largest of beefsteaks. The hypochondriacs, and the milk-drinking

lady, had wandered away; several people, singly or in parties, were breaking their fast beneath the trees; excursionists were strolling past, and Sunday was getting fairly under way. By the time I had lit my morning cigarette, the yard was quite alive, and those who had parted latest the night before were now hypocritically complimenting one another upon the freshness of their appearance. After a cool half-hour, I resumed my hat and staff, and leisurely began the ascent of the Schiller-Hoehe, on the other side of the road.

VIII.

It was a ten minutes' easy climb. The well-built, easily-graded path went zig-zagging upwards beneath the tall dark pines, bordered with dewy green ferns, purple-tipped heather, huckleberry bushes and turfs of narrow-leaved grass. At the turns of the ascent were benches, either constructed from a slab of stone laid across two uprights, or hewn in the solid rock whenever it jutted out conveniently. Enterprising climbers had worn short-cuts straight upwards from corner to corner of the path, tempting to look at, but, as short-cuts, fallacious, unless men were made on the principle of a balloon; and, on reflection, I have come to the conclusion that they must have been created by people on the downward trip. Saxons will climb, and climb to good heights; but it is indispensable that the incline should not be arduous. In the present case, the gradual slope was further modified by putting in three or four stone steps at the end of each short stretch; and if all should prove insufficient, there were always the benches to fall back upon.

The profound stillness which prevailed here at this hour had an exquisite charm. Through openings between the trees I caught lovely green glimpses of the valley below. I met no one until, when nearly at the top, I came upon two peasant girls, each with her basket, sitting down to rest. I gave them good-morning, and one of them responded with sober courtesy. A few steps further on I was startled, emerging from such a depth of seclusion, at coming abruptly in sight of an open, commonplace road, with a cart rumbling along it; and beyond, broad fields sown with potatoes and cabbages, and scattered over with half-a-dozen women-cultivators. Still keeping to the path, I soon came to the "Schiller-Hoehe" monument itself.

In itself, it certainly did not amount to much—a square shaft of grey stone, on a pedestal, the whole less than ten feet high. On the side towards the valley was a medallion of Schiller's head, and a date—1859: and all four sides both of shaft and pedestal were crowded with the names of visitors, and the dates of their

visits. Round about, at a respectful distance, were placed wooden benches, apparently for the purpose of facilitating the study of so remarkable a work of art. Accordingly, I sat down, and fixed my eyes upon it. Three small ragged boys, dismayed at my solemnity, gave up their irreverent gambols, and retreated into the woods. Finding myself once more solitary, I filled a pipe with sweet Lone-Jack, and smoked, and dutifully meditated upon the poet, who, I suppose, composed some one of his poems or tragedies on this spot.

After a while, I heard an approaching step, weighty and sedate; and soon appeared a stout, elderly gentleman in wide black clothes, who, upon seeing me, paused to deliver a gravely ceremonious bow; being under the impression, probably, that I was a sort of deputy tutelar genius of the grove, employed during the poet's absence. I returned his salute with all the dignity I could command. He advanced towards the monument, and inspected, though with a rather embarrassed and mechanical air, the medallion and the date. It was easy to perceive that he was a morbidly considerate man, and shrank from subjecting the affair to a rigid criticism, while even the deputy tutelar genius was looking on. Moreover, finding nothing to admire, and being altogether too honourable a person to counterfeit admiration, he was not long in making up his mind that his only proper course was to retire. This he accordingly did, as sedately as he had come; by no means forgetting to deliver me a second ceremonious bow (which I returned) before passing out of sight.

Hereupon ensued another interval of silence and solitude: I finished my pipe; and so soothing was the murmuring of the pines, and the wild domestic twittering of the birds, that I think I should have yielded to the temptation of compensating my bad night with a nap, had not my drowsiness been scared away by the sudden advent of a bevy of laughing, prattling, sky-larking young women, upon whom the solemnity of my demeanour produced not the slightest effect. So, finding that they were determined to take possession of the place, I resigned my deputy-tutelarship perforce, and retired in my turn. Following a downward-bending track, I stumbled upon a small cave, partly hollowed out of the natural rock, but owing most of its attractions, such as they were, to masonry. Schiller's Grot it was called, in black letters upon a white ground. Of course, Schiller may have sat in it: there is a pretty outlook over the valley from a point near at hand; and the Grot is ostentatiously fitted up with a semicircular stone seat, which, however, can hardly date back to Schiller's time. Be that as it may, the place, when I visited it, was peculiarly unsavoury, and nothing less than a Noachian deluge would have kept me in it a moment. I rambled on, and soon

came to another coign of vantage, a little lower down than the first, but overlooking a wider prospect. Wooden benches were provided here also, and a signboard, mounted on a pole, informed the visitor that this was Friedens-Platz.

The Saxon custom of sentimentalizing over all their pretty places, and branding them with lackadaisical titles, is not altogether agreeable to a foreigner. It destroys the finest aroma of natural beauty to have it coarsely insisted upon and crammed down your throat by some vulgar fellow who happens to have been beforehand with you in discovering it. Every one, it seems to me, ought to be allowed to believe, if it suits his fancy to do so, that whatever charm he finds in nature is virginal for him; that it has not been previously breathed upon, handled, catalogued, and labelled by an impure rabble—spectacled and professional enthusiasm-mongers—who never can rid themselves of their itch for besmearing everything with which they come in contact with the slime of their own offensive personality. The Saxons, though they carry the matter to the greatest extreme, are not the only nation blameworthy in it. Let a man name his house, if he likes; it is his own, and should suggest him, and the name helps it to do so. But what is the use of giving to eternal mountains and everlasting rivers the puny patronymics of our so-called great men, whose pigmy reputations are astonishingly long-lived if they endure five hundred years? If such things must be directly named at all, let the name be simply descriptive, like those the Indians give. There is much talk, nowadays, about the wholesome effects of a sense of humour and a perception of the ludicrous; and Englishmen, Americans, and others pride themselves upon the possession of these qualities. But nature, I imagine, must often find us humorous in another sense than we intend; and bears our tiny impertinences with a smile too broad for us to see. A rage for what is called conciseness is the vice of the time, and circumlocution has been made a bugbear. The truth is that our conciseness, which is a literal and not a real conciseness, leads to the worst kind of circumlocution, which is not real circumlocution at all. To be truly concise is, once to express clearly one idea; circumlocution is primitive and majestic, and must lie at the bottom of all right perception of truth. Such polemical eulogies, however, are not particularly suited to a Friedens-Platz.

IX.

Whatever other people's feeling may be, there is no doubt that Saxons like a pretty place all the better for having a lackadaisical name. It gives them their cue, and they dispose themselves accordingly. I had not more than got through the above dia-

tribe, when a Saxon family appeared—a man and wife, child of four years, and nurse. They looked at the prospect with complacency, it is true; but the signboard was their primary admiration. “Friedens-Platz!” they repeated one to another, in a congratulatory tone, and then took another look with new eyes. Friedens-Platz—yes, yes! Observe, once more, the peculiar peacefulness of the valley; and methinks the sky is calmer, and the breeze gentler here than elsewhere. Blessed signboard! to think that we might have come and gone and never known wherein the charm of this spot consisted, or whether it had any charm at all! It is all in the signboard—peace be unto it, and to the poetic insight that placed it there!

These people did not stay there very long, and I sat them out. My next visitors were a woman and two men—pleasant, respectable people, and, I think, Swedes. The woman was not only very good-natured, but incredibly loquacious and voluble; and so agreeable were the tones and inflections of her voice, that, although not understanding a syllable she uttered, I found an indescribable charm in listening to her. The effect was magnetic and soothing. Here was a good opportunity for studying the influence of mere speech, divorced from all knowledge of its meaning, upon the ear and sentiments of the hearer. Undoubtedly it has great significance—is at least as important to language as the material of a building is to its architectural design. It was only my guess that this language was Swedish; it may just as well have been Hawaiian or Persian. Whatever it was, it tripped along at a great pace, in a kind of short four-footed canter; no drawling or dwelling upon syllables; little sibilation, but plenty of sh’ing, tt’ing, and pp’ing. While the woman thus held forth, one of her companions sat quietly listening, giving occasional vent to an assenting or annotatory grunt; the other kept walking restlessly to and fro, interpolating a sentence here and there. I sat for half-an-hour, my back turned upon the party, apparently absorbed in the view—really so, in fact; for the flow of babble did not interfere with my appreciation of what I saw, but chimed in with it. Very likely, on the other hand, it was I who interfered with the Swedes.

Small sounds below in the valley were distinctly audible at this height. The first-fiddle of the Badehaus band was tuning his instrument in the front court. Then came the slow jar of a cart, and now the driver cleared his throat. The road was visible for a considerable distance, winding up the valley like a smooth buff riband, the brook flowing light and dark beside it, in pleasing contrast with the bright, moist green of the grass and the swarthy tint of the pine-clad hill. The whole valley was a westward curving furrow, ploughed by some immeasurable giant.

The summit of the opposite hill was bald above its side-growth of trees, just like the head of an elderly man in a counting-house. White villas dotted the slope, even to the top; riverwards lay Schandau, wedged between its valley walls, and massed around its steeple. Against the horizon, on all sides, uprose abrupt pinnacles of rock and jagged detached boulders, the like of which abound throughout this region. Lilienstein was hidden by the woods behind me; but the crest of Wesenstein, across the river, reached into sight. A faint odour of pine-leaves hung in the air, though the breeze was scarcely strong enough to blow it about.

X.

I left Friedens-Platz to the babbling Swedes, and walked along the ridge of the hill, as on the back of some enormous animal. The stillness of the woods was such as to make the heart beat: each lusty blade of grass, and leaf, and tree, and vegetable, stood so motionless, yet so deeply alive. At length the path brought me to the verge of the narrow precipitous cañon, through which the road runs after passing the bend above the Badehaus. I managed to clamber out upon an almost inaccessible boulder, which had been partly detached from the face of the cliff, and dizzily overhung the road. Here a deep ledge, cushioned with heather, served me admirably for a chair, and a projection lower down gave a rest for my feet. I was indistinguishable from the road, and invisible from behind, yet myself commanded everything. It was a fall of about three hundred feet to the road below.

Facing me was a magnificent bastion of rock, rising to a higher level than mine, and split and cleft in every conceivable direction. Wherever root could cling, the stern surface was softened and enriched with small trees, bushes, or heather; which last, being very plentiful and in full purple bloom, gave a delicious tone to the slopes. The rock itself was various in tint; reddish where little exposed to rain and sunshine; in other places grey; and mottled elsewhere by lichens like a Persian rug. One kind of lichen, not uncommon, showed in broad splashes of sulphur yellow. All these colours, harmonizing among one another, were tuned to wholly different keys by sunshine or shadow. In many parts, the sunlight caught the bastion obliquely, illuminating the projecting points in sharp contrast with the rest. The silent immobility of rocks is profoundly impressive, and this surface-play of light and colour but emphasizes their real unchangeableness.

The broader clefts or gorges, extending from top to bottom of the bluffs, were verdant and rich with crowded foliage, and seemed to invite ascent; for wherever a tree can grow, there man fancies

that he, too, has a right to be. Great boulders had in many places fallen from above, and lay buried in green beside the brook. For centuries had they lain there, and slowly, silently, and beautifully had nature healed their scars and clothed their nakedness with moss, heather, and leaves of all kinds. Trees pressed in lovely jealousy to the brookside, eager to see their tender images mirrored there. How sweetly and closely they mingled together, branch within branch and leaf to leaf, each with its own beauty beautifying its neighbour! How rich were their contrasting shades of green! How melodiously did they whisper to one another, when the breeze gave them tongue! How well each leaf and bough turned sun and shade to advantage, and how inspiring was the upward impulse that filled each one! If trees, as some maintain, are emblems of men, it must be the men of the golden age!

Those which grew beside the brook had, in some cases, attained a large size, but only the smaller ones had been venturesome enough to scale the cliffs and peer fearfully over the hollow verges. Trees have a fine and novel effect when seen from above with the sun shining on them. The edges of the successive layers of branches catch the yellow light, and the structure and character of the tree, as it tapers upwards to a point, is thus more clearly defined than when viewed from below or on a level. But their fascination is in all respects inexhaustible. Where they overhung the brook, its warm brown tint was deepened to black; but through the midst of the gloom its wrinkled surface snatched at the light in magic sparkles: nature never omits what is needful to complete her harmony. I could hear the gurgle of the stream, however, more distinctly than I could discern the stream itself. All sounds were so echoed up between the rocky walls that they reached my ears as plainly as if originating but a few yards off.

A hill-top is a real, and not an apparent—a moral as well as a physical—height. I doubt whether a murder, seen from a great elevation, would move the beholder to any deeper feeling than pity. Men's deeds appear of importance proportioned to their doers' size. I should like to be informed, however, which requires the finer structure of mind—the power to appreciate nature in great, or in little? to be able to see the beauty of a grand prospect, or of a mossy stone shadowed with fern? Certainly, an uneducated man, who would gape with admiration at the former, would see nothing worthy attention in the latter. It is true, on the other hand, that refinement loves not the little to the exclusion of the great, but great and little both: neither does vulgar admiration necessarily vulgarize its object. Nevertheless, who can discern minute beauties, may recognize, in great, qualities invisible to the untrained eye; and the uneducated man, perhaps, loves not

solely or chiefly the grandeur of the prospect, but rather, the sensation of moral and material elevation—the feeling grander than the grandeur—the crown and culmination of it.

XI.

A precipice possesses a strange charm; it is in a manner divine, being inaccessible to man, with his belittling civilization. But if steep places lead our upward-gazing thoughts heavenwards, they also remind us of the devil when we shudder on their brink. What is the spiritual significance of the phenomena of gravitation? Something profound and universal, I fancy. I have never experienced the common desire to jump from great heights; but had I, as a malefactor, to choose my form of death, I would cling to some such great boulder as that on which I was now sitting, and bid the executioner use his lever. Then headlong downwards would we thunder to the valley's far bottom; and, falling underneath, I should be provided with both a grave and a gravestone ere I were well dead. But that the general adoption of this expedient for settling with condemned criminals would soon deprive us of all our overhanging cliffs—to say nothing of scaring away superstitious tourists and pic-nickers from our valleys—I would respectfully recommend it to the consideration of the Board.

What I most liked about my boulder (apart from such reflections) was its isolation: the thought that nobody could find me out, or get to me if they did. I was separated from my kind; and though greatly in the minority, I felt that the advantage was on my side. I had banished them, not they me. Moreover, I indulged myself with the persuasion that I was the first who had ever set foot on that spot, and that a long time would elapse before any one came after me; and then I amused myself with speculating on what manner of man he, my successor, would be; whether he were yet born; whether he would be a Frenchman out of the next war; or whether æons would go by, and Europe be known by another title before he came. Pending these questions, I took out my pipe and smoked, where no man ever smoked before. My isolation, it must be confessed, had not separated me from the faculty of enjoying good tobacco, as other men enjoyed it; or, for that matter, from being shone on by their sun and breathing their air. After all, therefore, it amounted to very little—every human soul stands on a pinnacle of its own, eternally individualized from all its fellows; but our plainest badge of brotherhood is this very individuality, which the love and life that the good God gives us show to be but a means to His end, and otherwise insignificant.

An excursion carriage rattled by, seeming to make slower progress than it did. I watched it from its first appearance round the southern bend till it disappeared just beneath my feet; and on its reappearance, till it went out of sight beyond a roadside cottage about a quarter of a mile northward. The driver blabbed his guide-book formulas as they passed, pointing here and there with his whip; and the people stared dutifully at the rocks, and straight at my boulder, but without noticing the strange fungus upon it. At one moment, I might have dropped the ashes of my pipe right into the open mouth of the senior member of the party. Some time after this, three pedestrians came in sight; two at the southern bend of the road, and one at the northern. The curve of the valley was such that, at the rate they were going, they would not come in view of each other until within a few yards of their meeting-point; this point being a little to the right of my position, and about opposite a decayed bridge; which, by the way, must have been built for no other purpose than to be fished from; for its further end almost impinged upon the vertical face of the opposite cliff—up which not even a Bertram Risinghame could have conveyed himself.

As the three pedestrians drew near, I perceived the two southerners to be tramps; but the northerner was an ambitious young man in a black frock-coat, ruffled shirt-front, and straw hat on the back of his head. He strode along with a magniloquent step, declaiming, with passionate emphasis and at the top of his compass, some passage of blank verse. His gestures were very striking: he held his head well up, flung his arms about, slapped his breast, and made his voice resound through the cañon. Meanwhile the two tramps shuffled along, as unconscious as was he of mutual proximity.

"This young fellow," said I to myself, "evidently has a mind to be an orator and a statesman. He feels the seeds of greatness within him. Now he imagines himself in the Senate, confronting the opposition. That point was well given! Bismarck is getting old: who knows whether I do not here behold his successor?" The young orator was now within a couple of rods of the bridge, and suddenly he and the tramps came face to face. I watched with painful interest. His voice quavered and sank: he cleared his throat, put his hands in his pocket, and whistled. Bismarck, or any truly great man, would have kept on louder than ever—nay, would have compelled the tramps to stop and hear him out! But this young man feared to appear ridiculous; and the savage sincerity which Mr. Carlyle ascribes to all great men is not reconcilable with any such timidity. A great man must be capable of spending his life in a position which a small man would find intolerably ridiculous even for a minute's lease.

XII.

I climbed gingerly back to the mainland, and, leaving my boulder for ever, made my way by degrees to the road, and followed it for about a mile. At one point, the brook made a little detour, enclosing a lawn of the softest and most vivid green I ever beheld. Straight upwards from it sprang a smooth gray bluff, near two hundred feet in height, throwing a deep, cool shadow, sharply defined, over half the plot. Two peasant women were mowing the grass with sickles, and the wind that had begun to rise was taking great liberties with the skirts which, at best, scarcely covered the knees of their stout, bare legs. Along the summit of the cliff overhead a procession of long-shanked trees were straggling against the sky. Further on, I came to the entrance of a wood-path, whose shady invitation I could not resist; and in a few minutes more I found myself in the heart of a pine forest.

I sat down upon a mossy stump, such as poets write of; indeed, mossy stumps and stones have become so hackneyed in literature that I am shy of further enlarging upon them. The pines were from sixty to one hundred feet high, growing palm-like, with all their foliage at the top. Their music, therefore, sounded far away, like the murmur of an ocean in the clouds. Their thick, dark foliage strove to veil from the sun the slender nakedness of their long, graceful limbs; but he peeped through nevertheless, and made beautiful sport of their shyest secrets. Around their roots was a sweet, omnipresent dampness, encouraging moss to flourish, and display its most delicate tints. There was no grass or flowers to speak of, but plenty of low bushes, and green creeping vines, and elegant ferns. The forest was full of clear twilight, in which the occasional shafts of sunlight burnt like celestial torches.

Still bearing eastwards, the forest gave way to high rocky fields, crossing which I presently sighted a stupendous four-sided mountain of stone, standing solitary and apart, its bare walls ascending far above the tops of the tallest trees, and scarcely suffering even lichens to gain foothold on them. Deep fissures, crossing one another almost rectangularly, gave the great mass the appearance of having been piled together of blocks, in comparison with which the huge shafts of Stonehenge would be mere dominoes. On the summit was a sparse growth of scrawny pines, looking as though they had lost flesh from exposure and anxiety at the peril of their position. In short, this might have been the donjon-tower of some Atlantean castle, the remainder of which had either been overthrown and annihilated, or was buried beneath the sand out of which the lonely tower arose.

But whether or not the antediluvian theory be tenable, at all events this rock has been used as a stronghold in modern times—that is, within the last three centuries. A band of robbers lived here, and the rock is full of traces of their occupation. A place more impregnable could scarcely be imagined. After toiling up an arduous sandy path, as steep as the roof of a house, until pretty well out of breath, I came to the base of the “Stein” itself. The way now lay up perpendicular fissures, through narrow crevices, underneath superincumbent masses, and along dangerous precipices, where precarious footholds had been cut out in the solid stone. Still further up, hands rather than feet came into play, and three or four extra pairs of arms and legs might have been employed to great advantage. How the robbers ever got their booty up this ascent, or had strength left for anything except to lie down and faint after they had done so, is hard to understand. At length, however, I reached the great cave formed by the leaning together of the two principal boulders of the pile. It was about twelve feet wide at the base, and four times as high to the crotch of the roof. The end opposite the entrance was blocked up with fragments of rock and rubbish. A large oblong pit, dug in the solid stone floor, was used, I presume, either to keep provisions and booty in, or as a dungeon for captives. It had been formerly covered over with a wooden flooring, the square holes in the rock which held the ends of the beams being still visible.

From this, which may be called the ground-floor of the robbers’ dwelling, to the upper stories, there was no natural means of access. The old fellows, therefore, by wedging short sticks of wood one above another into an irregular fissure, extending nearly from the top to the bottom of the Stein, constructed a primitive sort of staircase, traces of which yet remain. Some enterprising modern, however, has introduced a couple of ladders, whereby the ascent is greatly facilitated. Above, I found, at various well-chosen points, the marks of old barricades, showing that these brigands had some sound notions on fortification, and had resolved, moreover, to sell their lives dearly, and to fight to the last man. It is inconceivable, though, that any force unprovided with the heaviest artillery could have made the slightest impression on such a stronghold as this. In those days of bucklers and blunderbusses, a new-born babe might have held it single-handed against an army.

It was very windy on the summit, and an excess of wind ruffles up the nerves, blows away common sense, baffles thought, and tempts to rashness and vain resentment. The place, too, was a maze of sudden crevasses, just wide enough to fall into, and utterly impossible to get out of. What a ghastly fate to be

lodged in one of them, remembering that the Stein is visited hardly once a month in the height of the season! I was already so hungry that the mere thought of such a catastrophe put me out of all conceit with the robber-fortress. Accordingly, I made the best of my way earthwards; and, having previously taken my bearings, I steered for a neighbouring farm-house, where a smiling old lady, white-capped, yellow-petticoated, and bare-legged, fetched me a tumbler of cool creamy milk, nearly twelve inches high.

XIII.

On my homeward journey, I happened upon a long, winding, shadow-haunted pass, such as abounds in this region, and which reminded me (as, indeed, did the whole Saxon Switzerland) of our own Yellowstone Valley, modelled on the scale of one inch to the foot, or thereabouts. The white-sanded bottom was so narrow that space was scarcely left for the slender path to follow the meanderings of the rivulet, which tinkled, concealed, beneath luxuriant overgrowths of forget-me-not and fern. Up to the sky on either side climbed the rugged walls, shaggy with fir and hemlock, and thatched below with grass-tufts and shrubs. The fallen fragments, which ever and anon blocked the way with their surly shoulders, were iridescent with green moss, and dampness seemed to exude from the rocky clefts. The footpath was criss-crossed with pine-roots till it resembled an irregular parquet-floor. Sometimes the boulders had so fallen together as to enclose spacious hollows, the crevices of which had been stopped up with sand and pebbles and vegetable decay. I might have lived very comfortably in many of these caves: they were over-run with raspberry and blackberry vines, and within were cool and dry, with clean sanded floors: but I saw no troglodytes.

At one point a broad nose of rock jutted over the pathway full fifteen feet, like a ceiling; and so low-studded was it, that I could easily touch its flat surface with my upraised hand. There was something fascinating about this freak, and, at the same time, provocative of a smile—old nature making a humorous pretence of imitating the works of man! But the grotesque pranks she plays with that soft-hearted white sandstone of hers are indescribable and endless. In many places the surface of the rock is honeycombed and otherwise marked as if by the action of water. I am not acquainted with the geological history of this strange tract, but I should fancy it might have been the compact sandy bed of some great lake, which having broken its boundaries, and gone seaward by way of the Elbe, the sand-bed caked and cracked and hardened, and became traversed with ravines and gullies, worn by downward percolating streams. The lake must

have subsided gradually, to produce the horizontal markings which are everywhere apparent. I have often seen precisely similar formations to this of the Saxon Switzerland at the bottom of dried-off mud-ponds. Beyond the mouth of the Elbe are great shoals and bars, composed of the same kind of sand as that which I trod under foot in this shadowy ravine.

It should not be called a pass, for it was a place to linger and pause in—to enter at sunrise, and scarcely depart from by moonlight. It seemed wholly secluded; I met neither foot nor footprint throughout its whole length. Even the sky might not be too familiar; looking upwards, but a narrow strip of blue was visible, and the overbending trees fretted even that with emerald lattice-work. However, I could not support life on raspberries and water: the afternoon was more than half gone; and I had no idea how far off the Badehaus might be. Hastening onward, the narrow walls of the ravine suddenly opened out right and left in a vast circular sweep, and I stood within a grand natural amphitheatre, rising high and descending low above and beneath. My station was about a third of the way up, in what might be called the dress-circle. The area below was crowded thick with summer foliage—oaks, elms, beeches, and underbrush in profusion. These were the players—gay fellows in nodding caps and green fluttering cloaks. The audience was composed of a stiff and sedate assemblage of dark-browed hemlocks, standing rigid and erect each in his rock-bound seat. Not one of them all was sitting down; but whether this were owing to some masterly exploit on the part of one of the actors bringing every spectator in irrepressible enthusiasm to his feet, or whether (as, judging from their gloomy and unyielding aspect, seemed more likely) they had started up to demand the condign punishment of some unlucky wretch who had outraged their sense of decorum, I had no means of determining. In fact, my arrival seemed to have put an abrupt stop to the proceedings, whatever they may have been; there was no voice or movement anywhere, save as created involuntarily by the mysterious wind. On my shouting across, however, to a sombre giant on the opposite side of the amphitheatre, to know the title of the drama which was under representation, he answered me, indeed, but with an unreal tone of hollow mockery, and in such a manner as to leave me no wiser than I was before. Manifestly, I was looked upon as an interloper who had slipped in without paying for a ticket, and self-respect demanded that I should retire at once.

The theatre, vast as it was, had only two doors—that by which I had entered, and another just opposite. To reach this I must make half the circuit of the enclosure, the direct route across the arena being impracticable, owing to the savagely precipitous nature of the descent. The path which had hitherto guided me

now bearing to the right, I followed it in that direction, passing almost within reach of the outstretched arms of hundreds of the inhospitable hemlocks. Presently the sun, which, hidden behind a cloud, had sunk almost to the upper verge of the rocky rampart, shone out with mellow lustre, flinging my shadow far away into the centre of the arena, where the green-coated actors treated it with great indignity, bandying it from one to another, tossing it up and down, and more than once letting it tumble heedlessly into some treacherous pitfall. Meanwhile the wind, which had caused me no small annoyance already that afternoon, was maliciously making the rounds of the house, and stirring up every individual in it to a sibilant utterance whose import there was no mistaking. It was my first—and will, I fancy, be my last—experience of being hissed out of a theatre; and since I was neither a condemned playwright nor an unsuccessful actor, I could not help resenting the injustice of the proceeding. Yet, after all, why should I consent to be ruffled by the senseless clamour of a lot of trees? I can accuse myself of no worse fault than the venial one of having “interviewed” them and their like pretty often, and occasionally published some part of my observations in the public prints: but if I have erred, it has been on the side of eulogy; and should I ever have occasion to mention trees in future, it will be with the proviso that every one of them—the oldest, biggest, and respectabest more particularly—are no better than incorrigible blockheads at bottom.

XIV.

To the banks of the Elbe I came at last, with a dusty distance of three or four miles still lying between me and Schandau. But the scenery hereabouts is novel and striking; the stone quarries extending up and down the river for many leagues; and the heaps of sand and débris, rising to an average height of perhaps a hundred feet, and sloping sharply downwards to the water's edge, are a remarkable if not a strictly picturesque feature. The path—if the informal track which leads a risky life along the base of these lofty dumping-grounds can be called such—yields wearisomely to the feet, and a wary look-out must be kept to dodge the heavy stones which are continually bowling downwards from the summit. At intervals there are slides, compactly constructed of masonry and worn very smooth, by which the square blocks quarried from the cliffs are shot to the water's edge, to be taken on board by canal-boats and floated to Dresden, all the modern part of which is built of this material. The supply is practically inexhaustible, but that does not prevent the cliffs from suffering in appearance; and before many years a

voyage up the Elbe will be no longer attractive. It is a nice question in economy, whether it be worth while to rob Saxon Switzerland to pay Dresden. Perhaps only the stone contractors would answer it unhesitatingly in the affirmative. It reminds me of the little boy who was courted by his friends as being the possessor of a fine cake. With the praiseworthy purpose of at once concentrating and augmenting their regard, he made the cake a part of himself by eating it. But, strange to say, his friends ceased to visit him from that day forwards, and the cake gave him a stomach-ache.

I took my dinner that evening at the Forsthaus, one of that row of hotels which rampart Schandau. Hot and noisy as they are to live in, their bill of fare is to Herr Boettcher's as a novel by Thackeray to a schoolboy's composition. I dined on a terrace beneath the trees, with the river just beyond. At dark every table had its great astral lamp, and the gentlemanly proprietor amused himself and his guests by making blue, red, and green fires on the stone steps.


Next morning, as I stood with my valise on the platform of the railway station at Krippen, a fellow—he keeps a small tobacco store on See Strasse in Dresden—stepped up to me, and, after requesting the favour of a light from my cigar, supposed, in a cheerful tone, that I was returning to town by the approaching train.

“No,” said I, with a serene smile, “I left Dresden finally yesterday morning. I am now for Prag; and never expect, sir, to see you, or buy your cigars, again!”

The train came in, the cigar vendor assisted a pretty young woman, with small, shapely feet, into a second-class carriage; the whistle blew, and the train moved off.

I have remembered and reproduced this disappointing little episode, because of the emblematic likeness it bears to my experience of Dresden. The city, like the young woman, enchants at first sight, but is presently detected in familiar association with sentimental vulgarity, and betrays an appetite for gross and crude fare: whereupon our parting regrets are narrowed down to the somewhat equivocal one that, despite certain picturesque passages of physical contour, so little in the capital of Saxony is honestly regrettable.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.



LIKENESSES ; OR, PHILOSOPHICAL ANATOMY.

TO say of any man that "he does not know a hand from a foot" is to state that his power of estimating difference is defective in an extreme degree, and this statement also seems to imply that such defect is even more remarkable than would be its opposite—namely, a failure in apprehending the likeness which exists between those two parts. Indeed, to proceed from a recognition of such unlikeness to an apprehension of such likeness—or, as it is called, "Homology"—is to make a step in advance. Our appreciation and comprehension of the world around us is but a continued repetition, on an ever-widening scale, of similar successive processes of analysis and synthesis. In each branch of science, along with our keener and keener perception of differences, we come to perceive more and more recondite relations of agreement. The telescope and the microscope, the chemical laboratory and the dissecting room, at first enable us to detect more and more hidden differences in sidereal masses, in animal tissues, in atomic relations, and nerve distributions. Yet, afterwards, the very same agencies enable us to discover facts which tend to harmonize in corresponding unities the previously discovered diversities of nerve distribution, of chemical relation, of histological condition, and (by spectrum analysis) of sidereal constitution.

In however many directions the human mind sends forth its energy upon surrounding nature, its activity brings just so many vistas of agreement underlying difference before its ken. Indeed,

as Mr. Lewes says,* with, perhaps, some exaggeration of expression: "Science is in no respect a plain transcript of reality . . . but . . . an ideal construction in which the manifold relations of reals are taken up and assimilated by the mind, and there transformed into relations of ideas, so that the world of sense is changed into the world of thought." And again he declares:† "What we call laws of nature are not objective existences, but subjective abstractions." We say that these expressions are somewhat exaggerated, because what is the product of the "manifold relations of reals" must have some real foundation and some objective validity in the eyes of those who admit, as it seems Mr. G. H. Lewes does not, the real and known existence of an external world of more than mere feelings. Any one who admits such existence must also admit that the various ideal entities which are ultimately justified to reason as true ideals, have their foundation in their agreement with real objective existence, "truth" being a relation between "Being" and an "Intellect."

The various groups into which animals and plants have been divided are of this nature—*i.e.*, are ideal entities with an objective basis. Classes, orders, families, genera, and species exist *as such* only in a mind. Objectively, there is nothing but individual animals and plants. Nevertheless, the different biological groups also exist objectively in those facts of structure which various individual animals and plants present, and which serve for the definitions of such different groups. What Mr. Lewes says‡ of certain other abstractions applies here with perfect correctness: "They are realities in the sense of being drawn from real concretes; but they are not realities existing apart from their concretes otherwise than in our conception; and to seek their objective substratum, we must seek the concrete objects of which they are the symbols."

Natural classification, indeed, though formed by the mind, does not depend on the mind. It is not arbitrary, but is governed by the external realities of things. It is not that we *choose* to separate bats and whales from birds and fishes respectively, and put them both in the same class as that which contains also the lion and the antelope. We are *compelled*, by the multitudinous facts of animal structure, so to separate and so to class them. Moreover, such zoological classification is only possible because different animals are found to have like parts (parts alike as to their relations of position to other parts) which can be compared and contrasted, and can, by the agreements and differences they present, furnish us with the determining and limiting characters of the different natural groups.

* "Problems of Life and Mind." vol. i. p. 342.

† Op. cit. p. 297.

‡ Op. cit. p. 281.

As it is with respect to the various groups of animals and plants, so it is with respect to the parts and organs which together compose each individual animal or plant. As the human mind surveys these parts and organs in different lights, it finds different series of unlikenesses and likenesses, extending along that line of thought which it elects to follow. Here again, however, the resulting groups of likenesses cannot be freely and arbitrarily established, but must follow objective reality. It is thus that fanciful notions which do not respond to the realities of things have to succumb and give place to conceptions which do harmonize with such realities.

Every bird and beast, every fish and insect, is formed of a complex aggregation of parts which are grouped together into an harmonious interdependency and have a multitude of relations, amongst themselves, of different kinds. The mind detects a certain number of these relations as it contemplates the various component parts of any individual animal in different ways—as it follows up different lines of thought.

These perceived relations, though subjective as *relations*, have nevertheless an objective foundation in real parts, or conditions of parts, of real wholes, and it is their correspondence with such objective foundations, which gives to ideal relations whatever truth they may possess. To detect the most hidden laws of unity underlying the differences presented by animal structure, is the work of "Philosophical Anatomy."

Speculative and creative minds, imbued with natural knowledge, have pursued with avidity this kind of inquiry. While more ordinary minds have been content with observing the facts of animal structure, the few have ever tried to solve the problems of the "how" and the "why."

An inquiry of this kind into the nature of the skeleton is the anatomical question which has specially occupied Goethe, Oken, Spix, Carus, De Blainville, Geoffrey St. Hilaire, and Owen. It may not be uninteresting to consider whether the attempt to solve such problems is, as so many persons have come to believe, an altogether vain one, and if it does not appear to be a vain pursuit, then to inquire what is the nature of the answer which reason and observation combine to furnish.

By a singular coincidence, the casual finding of the mutilated skull of a Ruminant helped to evolve, independently, from the minds of Goethe and of Oken, full and distinct conceptions of a new theory of the bony framework of the head. Each of these thinkers conceived the idea that the skull, instead of being (as had been universally supposed) an altogether peculiar structure, was in reality similar in composition to the backbone, or spinal column. The backbone is made up of a series of rings of bone mutually adjusted, called *vertebræ*. Goethe and Oken conceived that the

skull was also made up of a series of vertebræ—much altered, however, as to size and shape, from those which form the spinal column. This idea, once emitted, was rapidly taken up by Oken's countrymen (as at later periods they have vehemently taken up the ideas of Schwann and of Darwin); and Spix, Bojanus, and C. G. Carus further developed and modified the original idea. Nor did Oken's countrymen by any means stand alone, for De Blainville and Geoffrey St. Hilaire in France, and Goodsir, MacIise, and Owen in the British Isles, more or less accepted and modified, in different ways, the hypothesis propounded. Oken, indeed, at once pushed his speculation to extremes: expecting, on *à priori* grounds, to find the whole trunk, with its appendages, represented in the head. He was by no means content with assimilating the skull to the backbone, but insisted on finding the arms and legs, the hands and feet, even the fingers and toes, of the head; imagining that the last mentioned members (fingers and toes) were represented by the teeth! Such a conception may be taken as a good example of those fanciful notions before referred to, which, not being sustained by objective facts, are surely destined, as was this, to die out and to disappear.

The vertebral theory of the skull, in an amended form, became widely known in England through Professor Owen, and anatomical science in this country will ever be very deeply indebted to him for his attempt to familiarize the English mind with "Philosophical Anatomy," since all must at least admit that it has been the occasion of an important scientific advance, through the efforts it occasioned to support, to modify, or to refute it. According to Professor Owen's hypothesis, the skull of every backboned animal, from man to the cod-fish, was really made up of four modified vertebræ, each being provided with an inferior arch, like those which in the trunk are formed by the ribs. The skeleton of every existing vertebrate animal was represented as being formed from some modification of an ideal archetypal skeleton, which was again represented as composed of a series of ideal archetypal vertebræ. This notion for a time met with very general acceptance, but was, ere long, attacked, especially by Professor Huxley, as being inconsistent with the facts of development. It was said that if the skull was made up of modified vertebræ, its vertebrate character should be plainest in its earliest and least modified stages; and that yet such stages had no resemblance to vertebræ at all. Indeed, it was triumphantly shown that, as soon as the backbone begins to be a backbone, the skull begins to be something very different. It was shown in fact, that the skull is never segmented, as is the primitive vertebral column, but mainly consists, in its earlier stage, of a mass of cartilage, from which two cartilaginous rods (the *trabecule cranii*) extend forwards along the

base of the brain case quite unlike anything found in the incipient vertebral column. Yet other suggestions were made by Professor Seeley and by Mr. Herbert Spencer, to account mechanically (by the necessary action of pressures and strains on a frequently flexed elongated cylindrical body), for the simultaneous existence of a segmented backbone and a non-segmented skull. Finally, a flood of ridicule and sarcasm was poured on the vertebrate theory of the skull, and the doctrine of archetypal ideas was supposed to be once for all disposed of by means of the hypothesis of evolution. Mr. Darwin's "Natural Selection" was lauded as having given the *coup de grâce* to such fancies; and, lastly, appeared "Pangenesism," to slay the slain, and to make fortuitous compounds of atoms occupy the vacant thrones of the deposed prototypal divine ideas. Evolution seemed to so many persons to have this destructive effect because by and through it, similarities existing between the parts of different animals came to be represented as exclusively due to blood relationship between them. It was no longer a wonder that the skulls of a monkey and a mud-fish were essentially similar, if both these animals were the diverging descendants of some ancient common ancestor.

A distinction had long been recognized, had been plainly put forth by Professor Owen, between parts which resembled each other in their function—*analogous* parts—and parts which resembled each other in their position with regard to neighbouring bodily structures—*homologous* parts. The wing of the humming-bird and the wing of the humming-bird hawk-moth are *analogous* parts—they perform the same function—as, in a less perfect degree, does the parachute of the little lizard (*Draco volans*). But the bones which sustain that parachute, and the ribs of the humming-bird are *homologous* parts—*i.e.*, they have similar relations of position to neighbouring bodily structures. The parachute-bones and the wing-bones, on the contrary, are *analogous parts*. Such facts of "homology" had been deemed deep mysteries. No *à priori* reason could be given why animals of the most different modes of life should have been formed on similar patterns. The man, the horse, the whale, and the bat, all have the pectoral limb—whether arm, fore-leg, paddle, or wing—formed on one type, diverse as are the uses to which these limbs are applied. Again, the butterfly and the shrimp, different as they are in appearance and mode of life, are constructed on one common plan, of which they exhibit diverging manifestations. These facts were recognized as facts, though no explanation of them could be offered. But they became readily explicable on the assumption of a blood-relationship, through actual generation and descent from common ancestors. Here, then, appeared to be the end of mystery with respect to homology—a ready, clear, and sufficient explanation

seemed to have been supplied. A new definition of homologous parts thus suggested itself. They might be simply described as parts which resembled each other, because they were alike descended from one single part in a remote common ancestor.

Soon, however, investigation rendered necessary further analysis, with respect to parts said to be homologous. It came to be recognized that there are likenesses between different animals and different parts of the same animal, which a theory of common descent cannot explain; and "similarity in relative position" had to be once more had recourse to, as a definition of what was meant by homology, such similarity being, in certain cases, explicable by "descent," and in others not so explicable.

A very obvious example of likeness not explicable by "descent" is the familiar one referred to in the early part of this paper, between our right hand and our left. This likeness is part of that general correspondence which exists between the right and left sides of most animals, and which is spoken of as "*bilateral symmetry*," or *lateral homology*. Another example is that likeness which sometimes exists between parts placed one above another, as between the upper and lower parts of the tail-fin of most fishes. Such likeness is an example of "*vertical symmetry*," or *vertical homology*. Another kind of "likeness," or homology, is termed "*serial*." It is chiefly in our limbs that this kind of homology is manifested externally in us, but it is plainly enough to be seen in the human skeleton (or in that of any backboned animal), in the ribs or in that series of generally similar bones (*vertebræ*) which make up our vertebral column or backbone. Our limbs, however, as was said at the outset, do present, even externally, a certain degree of similarity, the thigh, leg, and foot of the lower limb evidently more or less repeating the upper arm, arm, and hand of the upper limb.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "*First Principles of Biology*," attempts to explain these and all facts of structure, not due to inheritance, by the action upon each organism of its environment. Thus he explains the very general absence of symmetry between the dorsal and ventral (upper and lower) surfaces of most animals by the different conditions to which these two surfaces are respectively exposed. But it may be objected that this is no real explanation, but a mere restatement of the facts. No reasons have been given by him showing either how or why each organism so responds to such external differences of environment, or how such differences in environment tend to produce such particular modifications. Mr. Spencer, indeed, beautifully illustrates that correlation which, however produced, all must admit to exist between the structure of organisms and their surrounding conditions, but he quite fails to show that such conditions are the *causes*

of such structure. His argument is, indeed, an example of the old fallacy, *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. We believe the cause to be, not external, but internal. If animals and plants respond so readily to the action of external incident forces, it must be the case that conditions exist in such animals and plants which dispose and enable them so to respond, according to the maxim, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*, as the same rays of light which bleach a piece of silk blacken nitrate of silver. If, therefore, we attribute the external forms of organisms to the action of external conditions, we but remove the difficulty a step back, since we must conceive an internal power and tendency occasioning such ready modifiability of structure. But, indeed, it is not at all easy to see how the influence of the surface of the ground, or any conceivable similar external condition or influence, can produce such differences as those existing between the dorsal and ventral shields of the carapace of a tortoise.

The likenesses, then, which exist between arm and leg, and between hand and foot, are hardly to be explained by any mere action of the environment. But serial homology is much better exemplified in a very different group of animals from backboneed creatures—namely, in that group to which all insects, lobsters, centipedes, leeches, and earth-worms belong—the group of Annulose animals. In the centipede, the body (except at its two ends) consists of a longitudinal series of similar segments. Each segment supports a pair of limbs, and the appendages of all the segments (except at each end of the body) are completely alike. In most other creatures of the Annulose group, the fundamental similarity between the successive segments of which the body is composed is more or less disguised. Thus, for example, in the lobster a number of the anterior segments of the body are united together into one solid mass, while only in the abdomen (the so-called tail) do the segments remain distinct. The limbs also, which at first are all similar, assume, with the development of the young lobster, different forms, and become respectively antennæ, jaws, claws, legs, and swimming-feet. The peculiar and strongly marked serial homology of these Annulose animals has been the subject of an exceedingly ingenious suggestion by Mr. Herbert Spencer. In his work just referred to, he has attempted to explain such serial homologies thus:—Some animals of a very low grade propagate themselves by spontaneous fission—one individual spontaneously dividing, and so becoming two distinct individuals. If certain creatures found benefit from this process of division remaining incomplete, they would (on the theory of “Natural Selection”) transmit to their posterity a naturally selected tendency to such incomplete division. It is conceivable that certain animals might thus have come to assume the form of a chain of similar segments

—i.e., a chain of imperfectly separated individuals. Such a chain would, of course, in one kind of animal be the equivalent of a series of perfectly separated individuals of another kind of animal in which the process of fission was completely carried through. In other words, Mr. Spencer would explain the serial homology of Annulose animals by the supposed coalescence (through imperfect fission) of organisms of very simple structure, such as the small aquatic worms called *Planaria*, in one aggregated longitudinal series through the survival of the fittest aggregation. This is a very ingenious speculation, yet not only is there no evidence that *Planaria* propagate by fission, but there is positive evidence which directly conflicts with Mr. Spencer's hypothesis. Mr. Mosely, in his investigations of the land *Planaria* of India, has brought forward evidence that a single *Planaria* is the equivalent not of a segment of a leech but of a whole leech. Yet a leech is the morphological equivalent of a whole centipede, lobster, or other higher Annulose animal, and therefore each higher Annulose animal must be regarded as itself a morphological unit, and not an aggregation of such units.

Moreover, even lateral, vertical, and serial homology do not exhaust the kinds of likeness (homologies) which have arisen independently of descent. For structures are continually being discovered (in animals of different kinds) so strikingly alike that their resemblance would naturally be taken, on the theory of evolution, for a sign of genetic affinity, and yet the circumstances under which they occur preclude any such explanation. The resemblance which exists between the ankle bones of such widely different animals as frogs, and the small African lemurs, termed Galagos, may be taken as an example of such uninherited likeness. In a genus of the frog order (namely *Pelobates*), and in the turtle, a bony expansion covers over that hollow at the side of the head which is called the "temporal fossa." A similar expansion has lately been found to exist in a certain African animal of the rat order (namely *Lophiomy*), though it exists in no other known beast. The resemblance which exists between *Pelobates*, the turtle, and *Lophiomy* must be supposed to have been occasioned independently, and not by inheritance. Again, the African ant-eater, the aard-vark (*Orycteropus*), has each tooth, though apparently simple, really composed of a closely set bundle of very fine, long, cylindrical teeth united together side-by-side. Such a structure exists in no other genus of the same class, but is found in the class of fishes—namely, in the skate (*Myliobatis*). Yet the aard-vark can have no special relation of genetic affinity with these fishes. The shape of the teeth in kangaroos is similar to that of certain shrew-like, insect-eating African beasts (of the genus *Macroscelides*), which also agree with kangaroos

in having the hind-legs and feet much elongated and a jumping mode of progression; yet this double similarity is almost evidently induced and not inherited. The only beasts of burthen known in South America when it was discovered by the Spaniards, were the Llamas, animals which present a singular structure as to the course of their vertebral arteries which pierce the neck-bones on their inner sides. The very same condition, however, occurs again in the great ant-eater, also an inhabitant of South America. Yet it is impossible to believe that any special affinity, through descent, can connect such strangely divergent forms. It is also noteworthy that this character can hardly have been due to any action of "natural or sexual selection." The examples cited are but a few of many which might be adduced as evidence in this matter.

It has then been forced upon our attention (alike by the facts of lateral and serial homology, as well as by such as those just cited) that there *are* likenesses or homologies which *cannot* be due to inheritance, and which have to be distinguished from others which are, or which may be so due. With the new mental conception came, as was fitting, the new oral expression. We have to thank Professor Ray Lankester for the introduction of the terms "homoplasy" and "homoplast," to express such uninherited resemblance and such resembling parts, as well as for the anti-theoretical terms "homogeny" and "homogen," to express inherited resemblance and the parts which manifested it.

For our part, experience more and more convinces us that the number of similarities which have arisen independently (*i.e.*, cases of homoplasy) is prodigious, as well as that very great caution is needed in endeavouring to discriminate between likenesses which may be due to inheritance, and those which are due to some other cause. The wonderfully minute, exact, and elaborate investigations of the first of our English embryologists (my friend, Professor Parker), constantly make manifest the existence of an apparently inexhaustible number of complex cross relations between widely different animals, and show more and more plainly the entangled interdependencies of their structure. The notion, once popular with Evolutionists, that "similarity of structure" necessarily implies "genetic affinity," can certainly now be maintained, as a biological axiom, by no well-informed naturalist.

Indeed, the distinction between homogeny and homoplasy (between the influence of a common descent and that which produces independent similarity) has its importance much reduced through the power which the latter possesses of simulating the former. The degree to which homoplasy can rival homogeny in the degree of likeness produced, is shown, not only by the instances cited, but also by the likenesses existing between some of the bones

of the skull in beasts and in osseous fishes. Probably but few naturalists would now dispute the independent origin of the bones of the skull in these two classes of animals. Yet their cranial bones are in many instances indisputably homologous, while in others their homology is a subject of keen discussion.

If it be asked what is meant by parts being "homologous" if they are not "homogenetic," it may be replied that it means they show a complex likeness, or agreement, as to their relative positions to other surrounding parts. This likeness, or agreement, may be of different kinds, according as we follow different lines of thought. An intellect of a higher order than that of man would probably detect an indefinite number of relations between two animals and between their component parts, which relations escape our observation altogether, though we can readily enough apprehend a considerable number of such relations.

Thus we may enumerate as examples of different kinds of homology:

1. Parts which have a similarity of function but differ structurally and in their relations of position to all the other portions of the body—*e.g.*, the legs of a lizard and of a lobster.

2. Parts which are similar both as to function and relative position—*e.g.*, the wings of a bat and of a bird.

3. Parts which, upon the hypothesis of evolution, are descendants of some ancient similar structure—*e.g.*, the arm and leg bones of the horse and of the rhinoceros.

4. Parts which are similar as to their mode of origin in the individuals compared, whatever be their racial genetic relations—*e.g.*, the occipital skull bones of a panther and of a perch.

5. Parts which are alike but which do not arise similarly in the individuals compared, whether or not they are the descendants of parts in some one common ancestral form—*e.g.*, the legs of different kinds of fly—these insects differing strangely in their modes of attaining their adult structure.

6. Laterally homologous parts.

7. Vertically homologous parts.

8. Serially homologous parts.

(These last three kinds of homology have been already sufficiently explained.)

9. Parts of the same individual which have a certain likeness and correspondence though placed at opposite ends of the body—*e.g.*, buccal and anal chambers.

10. Parts of one individual which repeat each other and which radiate from a central point—*e.g.*, any two arms of a starfish.

11. Parts which agree with each other as being successive subdivisions or segments of some part or organ—as of a limb or

insect's feeling organ (*antenna*)—and which are thus serial homologues of a subordinate kind, or subordinate serial homologues.

12. Parts of such subordinate serial homologues, which parts stand to each other in a secondary serial relation, as, for example, does the root segment of the leg of a lobster to the root segment of one of its swimming appendages.

13. Parts which stand to each other in a tertiary serial relation, as being annexed to such subordinate serial homologues as stand to each other in a secondary serial relation.

14. Special homologues which are parts existing in different animals, but belonging to the same *special skeletal category*—as, e.g., the nail of a man's middle toe and the hoof of a horse.

15. General homologues, which are parts belonging to the same *general skeletal category*—as, e.g., when we say of a part that it is a limb, or of another that it is a rib, or of a third that it is a vertebra. We may distinguish, then, different kinds and degrees of relationship, which are severally perceived according as the mind is directed along one line of inquiry or another, and whether concerning different individuals or different parts of the same individual.

Now, we contend that it is against reason to suppose that mere indefinite variation, together with the "survival of the fittest," could ever have built up all these serial, lateral, and other homologies without the action of some innate power or tendency so to build up possessed by the organism itself in each case.

What can be more wonderful than the symmetry of those lowly but beautiful organisms, the *Acanthometra*, a symmetry for which it is difficult to conceive any external cause? Hardly, if at all less wonderful, is the radial symmetry of the Echinoderms (the sea-stars, sea-eggs, and sea-urchins) with their multitudinous variety of component parts. If, then, internal forces can build up such varied structures as these, they may well be also capable of producing the various serial, lateral, and vertical symmetries which higher animals exhibit.

We may next consider whether there are not other external evidences (besides the homologies themselves) of the existence of such an internal power, by the action of which these recondite "likenesses" may be conceived to be brought about. It is here contended that there is good evidence of the existence of some such special internal power, which evidence may be gathered from three sources: 1, Comparative anatomy; 2, the science of monstrous births, or teratology; and 3, the science of diseased structures, or pathology.

First, as to comparative anatomy, one example may be selected where others can be easily adduced, if required.*

* For others see "Genesis of Species," chap. viii.

On the hypothesis of evolution, tortoises must be reckoned as very far indeed from being the first and earliest kinds of quadrupeds. Yet certain tortoises exhibit the most extraordinary resemblance and correspondence between their anterior and posterior limbs. This degree of likeness and correspondence, then, must be the effect of a spontaneous development, and cannot be merely due to inheritance, because it does not exist in other forms which, upon evolutionary principles, are more nearly related to the hypothetical root-forms.

As to teratology, it is notorious that serially homologous parts tend to be similarly affected—great toes sharing abnormalities of structure with thumbs, and ankles with wrists, knees with elbows, and so on. Professor Burt Wilder has recorded six cases in which both the little fingers and both the little toes were similarly affected, and one case in which serial symmetry was alone exhibited, the right little finger and the right little toe being the only ones affected. But perhaps the most curious and instructive instances are those in which the feet of pigeons or fowls are abnormally feathered, or, as it is termed, furnished with “boots.” These extra feathers are developed along the very parts of the foot which correspond to (*i.e.* are serially homologous with) those parts of the bird’s hand which bear the wing-feathers, so that these “boots” are plainly a serial repetition of the true wing-feathers. These foot-feathers have, indeed, been sometimes known to exceed the wing-feathers in length. Moreover, these foot-feathers resemble the true wing-feathers in structure, and are quite unlike the down which naturally clothes the legs of such birds as grouse and owls. But there is a more striking correspondence still, for in pigeons which are thus “booted” the two outer digits (toes) become more or less connected by skin, as is also the case with the corresponding digits of the pigeon’s hand.

As regards pathology, Sir James Paget has declared, speaking of symmetrical diseases, that “a certain morbid change of structure on one side of the body is repeated in the exactly corresponding part of the opposite side”—*i.e.*, we have a spontaneous manifestation of lateral homology. In the pelvis of a certain lion affected with a kind of rheumatism Sir James remarked a deposit which had formed a pattern more complex and irregular than the spots upon a map, while not one spot or line on one side failed to be represented with daguerreotype exactness on the other. He also considers that parts which are serially, as well as those which are laterally homologous, are likely to be affected in a similar manner. Such serially homologous parts are the back of the hand and the corresponding surface of the foot, and these are likely to be both modified in the same manner, as also are the

palms and soles, the elbows and knees, together with the other serially corresponding parts of the arms and legs.

What explanation can be offered of these phenomena? To say that they exhibit a "nutritional relation," brought about by a "balancing of forces," is but another statement of the fact, and affords no explanation of it whatever. The changes are, *of course*, brought about by a "nutritional" process, and the symmetry is undoubtedly the result of a "balance of forces;" but to say so is to affirm a truism. The question is, what is the cause of this "nutritional balancing?" It seems impossible not to concede the existence of an internal force. If this power be referred, as it seems Mr. Spencer would refer it, to certain physiological units of which he imagines each organism to be composed, it must none the less be recognized as an innate power, possessed by such units, of inheriting the effects of ancestral modification. It is not easy to see the advantage of Mr. Spencer's reference. It seems easier, simpler, and more consonant with known facts, to recognize in each organism as a whole (which is visibly a unity) an innate power, tending to development of a special kind, though the actual results of the developing force must be modified by the external conditions which happen to exist in each case during the process of development.

Amongst the results of the recognition of such innate powers and tendencies are an increased support to Teleology and a rehabilitation of "Philosophical Anatomy." With such recognition, indeed, it is much less difficult than without it, to conceive (if "purpose" in nature be recognized at all) that results which become manifest only at last, and after complex changes which do not seem to foreshadow them, may have been latent and pre-ordained from the first.

When "Philosophical Anatomy" fell in general esteem, in the manner already related, it did not fall alone. Teleology—or the doctrine of final causes—had been a favourite subject with Professor Owen; and with Teleology, the doctrine of evolution appeared to many to wage a battle *à outrance*. It was not that this or that explanation was disputed; but the whole conception fell into utter disesteem, and the "purposelessness" of the organic world (which became with some persons almost an article of faith) has come to form a special branch of study, with its proper scientific title of "dysteleology."

This materialistic and atheistic spirit of negation has been, however, modified, and seems destined to be more affected hereafter, by that very study which at first came so aptly to its aid.

The further prosecution of embryological research, seemingly so fatal to "Philosophical Anatomy" in its earlier form, is calculated to have this anti-materialistic effect. The mazy complexity of

developmental changes, the half-revealed affinities, thus seen to radiate in all directions, have convinced more than one of our most eminent observers that no series of hap-hazard changes is thus offered to their ken, but that they have before them the evidences of an orderly and pre-determined evolution. One such observer, at least, has been thus turned from crass materialism, if not to theism, yet to the belief in a Pantheistic Demiurge ever weaving Protean matter into structures, the cross relations and affinities of which are too complex for the sharpest of human observers to unravel. Thus, time has brought about strange changes.

"Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna."

From the same professorial chair whence Professor Owen, in 1849, promulgated his views as to "Philosophical Anatomy," his unwearied opponent, Professor Huxley, in 1870, gave out in turn his quasi-vertebral theory of the skull, followed four years later by Professor Parker. Moreover, Professor Huxley has not only eloquently proclaimed the complete compatibility of "Teleology" with "Evolutionism," but even the utter impotence of the latter to weaken, in however small a degree, the position of the teleologist. If such results are admitted by those who are at once zealous evolutionists and eminent advocates of the supreme importance of the study of development, they may well be yet more apparent to those who, on principle, deny that the study of development is the one key whereby may be unlocked the mysteries of animal organization. Useful, highly useful in its degree, as is the study of development, its importance seems to us to have been of late somewhat over-estimated. For, in the first place, it is manifest that if our embryological researches be carried back as far as possible, we shall not find in the incipient germ any available characters at all, while at later stages diversities in the interpretation of nascent structures are almost always possible. In back-boned animals, when the skull begins to assume the consistence of cartilage, the meaning of the initial changes of that process must be elucidated through the changes which take place at subsequent stages. Thus Professor Huxley has lately* testified, referring to the development of the skull of the American gilled-eft *Menobranchus*, that, in his opinion, "No definite answer can be given" to the question whether the trabeculae "grow into adjacent tissues, as a tree pushes its roots into the soil," or whether their apparent extension does not "arise rather from a chondrification of the pre-existing tissue in the immediate neighbourhood of the trabecular cartilage?"

Secondly, when ossification begins to set in, the meaning of the

* See Proceedings of the Zoological Society, for 1874, Part II. p. 199.

several ossific centres as they arise must be interpreted by their later stages, or subsequent adult conditions in the same animal or in other animals. How else could epiphyses ever be discriminated from other ossific centres? Again, the circumstance of a bone or cartilage making its appearance as a single element may in any case be due to the junction of its incipiently distinct parts at a period anterior to possible observation—in other words, it may be made up of parts which are called *connate*—i.e., never distinct to observation, though judged from analogy to be essentially multiple. Of such rationally inferred but invisible distinctness botany offers us a multitude of examples. The stages passed through by the larvæ of moths and butterflies throw but a doubtful light on their adult condition; and what misleading ideas might not be suggested by the development of the *Sitaris* beetle? This insect, instead of at first appearing in its grub stage, and then after a time putting on the adult form, is at first active and furnished with six legs, two long antennæ, and four eyes. Hatched in the nests of bees, it at first attaches itself to one of the males, and then crawls, when an opportunity offers, upon a female bee. When the female bee lays her eggs, the young *Sitaris* springs upon them and devours them. Then, losing its eyes, legs, and antennæ, it sinks into an ordinary grublike form, and feeds on honey, ultimately undergoing another transformation, re-acquiring its legs and antennæ, and emerging a perfect beetle. Surely the results of development are as much to be considered as are its earlier stages. We are far indeed from denying that the study of embryology is of great importance, that the investigation as to “how things become” is a most interesting and valuable inquiry; but we deny that it is all-important.* Aristotle declares the essence of a thing to be “what it is to be,” and the outcome of development is, to our mind, *the* important matter. If the apes of the old world, and of the new, have descended from

* The wide-spread tendency now existing to sacrifice other and more important considerations, to considerations as to origin, is noted by Mr. Morley, in his work on “Compromise,” 1874. He tells us (p. 23): “Curiosity with reference to origins, is for various reasons the most marked element among modern scientific tendencies. . . . Character is considered less with reference to its absolute qualities, than as an interesting scene, strewn with scattered rudiments, survivals, inherited predispositions. Opinions are counted rather as phenomena to be explained than as matters of truth or falsehood. Of usages we are beginning, first of all, to think where they came from, and secondarily, whether they are the most fitting and convenient that men could be got to accept. In the last century, men asked of a belief or a story, Is it true? We now ask, How did men come to take it for true? In short, the relations among social phenomena which now engage most attention, are relations of original source, rather than those of actual consistency in theory, and actual fitness in practice. The devotees of the current method are more concerned with the pedigree and genealogical connections of an idea, than with its own proper goodness or badness, its strength or its weakness.” The author goes on to show, from his point of view, some of the evils attendant on this method, such as, “its tendency, if uncorrected, to make men shrink from importing anything like absolute quality into their propositions,” and “to place individual robustness and initiative in the light of superfluities with which a world that goes by evolution can very well dispense.”

radically different stocks, are they on that account not to be classed together as apes? If it turns out that birds have come, not from one but several distinct reptilian sources, are they not all just as much and as truly "birds" for all such divergence in origin?

Our view as to each organism is, that it is, dynamically considered, a single form or force, which the human mind is unable to thoroughly comprehend and appreciate. Partial apprehensions of it are to be obtained by different modes of study and contemplation—one such mode being the study of the development of such organism. But a synthesis of all our modes of study is the necessary preliminary to our obtaining the least imperfect apprehension which is possible for us of any animal or plant. We cannot grasp it in its totality and unity—in its essence—we can only comprehend it approximatively, as we approach it, intellectually, on as many different sides as we can, and as nearly as we can.

To return to the question of the vertebral or non-vertebral nature of the skull: the result of all the controversy on the subject, up to the present time is that such vertebral nature may be affirmed in one sense and denied in another, according to the line of thought which is followed.

The whole body of every animal with a distinct skull and backbone exists at first as a rounded, almost structureless mass of tissue, in which the first clear indication of such animal is a longitudinal furrow marking the place of the future spinal marrow and brain. Beneath this furrow a rod made up of cells (the *chorda dorsalis*) comes to lay the foundation of the future spinal column. From each side of the groove a fold extends upwards, the two folds being called the *laminæ dorsales*, and these folds meeting together above, form a canal. It is within that part of the *laminæ dorsales* which form the spine, that first the cartilages, then the bones, are developed which form the sides of the vertebral arches. Similarly, it is within that part of the *laminæ dorsales* which form the skull that first the cartilages and then the bones are developed which form the sides of the skull arches, and thus there is an undeniable similarity between these two parts. Moreover, in subsequent development, the bones of the skull—especially in the *higher animals*—present a singular reminiscence of vertebræ in the three serially successive arches which they form. Certainly, if the essence of vertebræ consists in their being a series of bony rings fitted together, and enclosing the nervous centres along the dorsal region of the frame, then it must be asserted that the skull is in part composed of three bony vertebræ.

In certain fishes the transition from the *spinal column* to the *skull*

is so gradual that it is easy to mistake part of that column for part of the skull. Thus, in the sturgeon, the cartilaginous representatives of true vertebræ coalesce into one mass with the cartilaginous skull; and in the Siluroid fish *Bogrus* the bony vertebræ next the head are greatly expanded, and join each other by the same mode of union (by suture) as do true cranial bones, and this shows how undoubted vertebræ may simulate cranial walls.

There are, however, various elements which enter into the composition of the brain-case (or skull), which do not enter into that of the spinal-marrow-case (or vertebral column), and there are differences as to development; but, after all, the existence of a remarkable secondary and induced resemblance between these skeletal parts is undeniable.

As to development, it has always been affirmed that while the spinal column is essentially, and in almost its earliest stages, a serially segmented structure, the primitive skull presents no serial segmentation. It is, indeed, true that parts which temporarily or permanently represent in cartilage the bony skull are never serially segmented; and more than this, the cartilaginous precursors of the bones on one side may be completely separated by an interspace of softer substance from their fellows of the opposite side—a single fore-and-aft segmentation in the skull thus violently contrasting with the manifold transverse segmentation of the spine. But a most interesting point has lately been noticed*—namely, that in the young eft and Axolotl, before the base of the future skull has become cartilaginous, an indication of transverse segmentation is to be traced in the soft tissue of that region—a proof of what oversights may be committed by relying too hastily on development as our guide. The continuous chondrification of the base of the skull before observed had led to a denial of all fundamental transverse segmentation of that region by the opponents of the vertebral theory of the skull, while the assertors of that theory regarded such continuity as an induced and adaptive masking of a segmentation visible to the eye of the intellect, though not to that of the sense. The latter view now turns out to have been the right one, and a latent tendency speculatively divined has now been to a certain extent made palpably evident. How many other latent tendencies may not exist which never render themselves visible to sense? Might it not be contended that the ultimate segmentation of the bony cranium of mammals is one mode of expression, disguised and highly modified, of such latent earliest tendency to serial segmentation?

But most striking of all recent phenomena concerning the verte-

* See the paper before referred to, *Pro. Zoo. Soc.*, 1874, p. 196, pl. xxxi, figs. 1 and 2.

bral archetype is the explicit return just made by Professor Huxley* to the conception so long ago advocated by Professor Owen, that serial segmentation, however latent and disguised, extended primitively and fundamentally to quite the anterior end of the head. The first-named Professor now advocates the view that we have an approximation to the early form of the vertebrate skull in that very exceptional little fish the Lancelet (*Amphioxus*), in which the front end of the body is, like all the rest of it, made up of a series of similar segments, although the part representing the bodies of the vertebræ of higher animals is itself unsegmented. The general resemblance of the new concrete type of Professor Huxley to the old type, as exhibited in the well-known plate of Professor Owen's book on the archetype of the vertebral skeleton, is striking enough.

It is none the less true that there are profound differences between the two conceptions. According to the recently put forth view, the skull of the higher vertebrates is really made up of something less than twenty segments, each of which has a morphological value equivalent to a spinal vertebra with its annexed parts. Again, the recent conception does not repose so much upon a speculative basis, but presents us with an apparently concrete type instead of an abstract ideal. And yet even the concrete *Amphioxus* must after all be idealized to serve as the type of vertebrate structure, since in ear-structure it is strangely defective, and, though its body is segmented as a whole, the central part of the spinal column is not segmented, but presents, like the embryos of the higher animals, a continuous *chorda dorsalis*.

The conception of cranial vertebræ, then, like conceptions of serial, bilateral, special, and general homology, all forming parts of "Philosophical Anatomy," are subjective apprehensions of relations which have an objective existence in nature. Such conceptions are similar to our conceptions of "types," the very name of which

* See Proceedings of the Royal Society, No. 157, p. 127. The author's determination of the homologies he seeks to establish, rests entirely upon the constancy of position of the *velum palati* which he has selected as his fixed point. A certain hesitation in assenting to the new view may be justified by the absence (as far as yet known) of the auditory organ in the *amphioxus*. If there is one thing which is constant in the vertebrata it is the auditory capsule, and the figures on the paper referred to, show it relatively largest in the youngest condition of the *amphioxus* chosen for comparison. The distribution of the cranial nerves can hardly be said to afford decisive characters, since as there are myotomes, if nerves are supplied to them laterally from a central nervous trunk, each nerve must divide into a dorsal and a ventral branch to supply each muscular segment. Similarly nervous supply must be sent to the front end of the body, and if the so-called eye-spot of *amphioxus* be an eye-spot, the circumstance that this nerve passes over it, though a striking fact, is scarcely sufficient to identify it with the ophthalmic division of the fifth nerve of fishes and higher vertebrates.

The constantly increasing number of instances of the independent origin of similar structures makes us think it far from impossible that vertebrate genetic affinity may lie at least as much in the direction of the annelid worms as in that of the ascidians, and that there are hardly yet data to determine which of the curious relationships exhibited by the Lancelet are due to genetic affinity, which to homoplasy, and which perhaps merely to degradation.

is distasteful to so many. It is true that types, *as types*, are not real objective entities. But though, as types, they are ideal, they have none the less a basis in reality. The fact that they have no complete concrete being as types, is no more a reason for refusing to recognize their existence than is the non-existence objectively of species, *as species*, a reason for refusing to recognize the *individual realization* of a species, to make use of zoological and botanical specific names. The acceptance of the theory of evolution forms no bar to the reception of that view which represents all organic forms as having been created according to certain fixed ideal types. The two beliefs, far from being reciprocally exclusive, can and do co-exist in perfect harmony in one and the same individual mind.


But have the conceptions of philosophical anatomy any other existence besides that subjective existence in the human mind, and that objective foundation in the natural world, neither of which can be denied? The answer to this must depend upon the philosophical system of him who answers the question, and especially on his acceptance of and his mode of conceiving a first cause.

The teaching of what we believe to be true philosophy, is that the types shadowed forth to our intellects by material existences, are copies of divine originals, and respond to prototypal ideas in God. Those who deny the existence of God, or who deny that we can know anything as to such existence, may, of course, consistently enough deny or doubt the existence of such prototypal ideas. On the other hand, the teaching referred to has been ridiculed as if the maintainers of it must necessarily either pretend to possess some far-reaching intellectual power not shared by most naturalists, or else assert that the very natural phenomena were themselves sufficient to make manifest such transcendent conceptions. But, in fact, the acceptance of such prototypal ideas follows as a consequence, not upon the investigation of irrational nature considered by itself, but upon its investigation considered as a portion of one great whole, of which the human mind, endowed with intelligence and free-will, forms a part, and which is consequently to be viewed as the creation of God. Let the idea of God be once accepted, and then it becomes simply a truism to say that the mind of the Deity contains all that exists in the human mind, and infinitely more. Thus it is that such human conceptions, gathered from nature, must, so considered, be asserted to be ideas in the divine mind also, just as every separate individual that has been, is, or shall be, is present to the same mind. Nay, more, such human conceptions can be but faint and obscure adumbrations of corresponding ideas which must exist in perfection and in fulness in the mind of God.

We have seen that even by viewing organisms from all the points of view possible to us, we can but attain to a very imperfect comprehension of such organisms. But the wider and wider generalizations of broader and better-informed minds continually advance our power of comprehension. All then who admit that the natural world is the product of a divine mind must also admit, since such mind is infinitely above all human minds, that it possesses in perfection what the most perfectly developed human minds possess, as it were, in germ.

Thus viewed, the questions of philosophical anatomy acquire a fresh value, and it becomes plain that we owe a debt of gratitude to those who, years ago, forced questions such as these upon willing and unwilling ears. Not less plain is the justification which the most modern views afford them. Platonic and peripatetic conceptions are far indeed from having been overthrown by the rising tide of a revived Ionian philosophy—a flood of which has slightly covered part of our land, and deeply submerged Germany. Philosophical anatomy, types, divine prototypal ideas are one by one emerging and reappearing, refreshed and invigorated by the bath of Darwinian Evolutionism, through which they have been made to pass. It is again becoming manifest that nature, when broadly surveyed, confirms and accords with the speculations of philosophy, though never without a certain want of minute agreement, so opening fresh vistas, which invite the intellect to further advance, and to the solution of more and more recondite problems which it is the task of philosophical anatomy perpetually to strive after, to elucidate in part, but never, in this life, exhaustively to solve.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.



MODERN BALLADS

WHAT is the right attitude which modern art should occupy in relation to ancient art—that of imitation and reproduction, or that of eclecticism and adaptation? If this question has been less frequently debated in the province of literature than in the provinces of architecture, painting, and sculpture, it is no nearer to a settlement; and, while human nature remains unchanged, the tendency of some minds to recede, and the tendency of others to advance, must inevitably bring about a recurrence of the controversy. The arguments which, to the advocate of progress, seem fatal to the retrograde doctrine, may thus be summed up. The art of a given age must be considered as its spontaneous, healthy outcome, the genuine expression of its imagination, thought, and culture, its emotions, beliefs, and aspirations, and appropriate to it as the fruit is to the tree. If this be admitted, it will be evident that the art of an age cannot be dis severed from it without violence, or appropriated to another without artifice. Its spontaneity and genuineness are lost in the literal reproduction of its forms by an age which differs from that which produced it in the essential conditions of social and intellectual life. The right course is prescribed by the analogy of Nature, which continually advances by developing new varieties from antecedent types. To accord with its practice, Art must not stagnate by attempting a direct imitation of past forms, but accept them only as outlines of structure, of which such features as are

serviceable to existing requirements should be retained, and upon the framework of which such modifications should be made as are demanded by changes in the state of society, or the successive acquisitions of knowledge and refinement. If the truth of this principle were generally recognized, the art of each new epoch, while preserving the traditions of all preceding epochs, would genuinely represent the spirit of its own; and attempts to revert from the healthy art-life of the present to the modes of a past age, representing obsolete habits of thought and a less perfect culture, would be denounced as barbarous and insincere. Such attempts can only be pardonable in periods when Art is in a state of decadence, and there may seem no hope of its recovery but in recalling the memories of its vigorous youth. Even then the expedient is dangerous; a rash interference with the process of nature, which is likely to entail the penalty of abiding sterility. In most cases it is difficult to imagine that the attempts have even this semblance of justification, or to credit their authors with any worthier ambition than that of escaping, at all risks, from the beaten track, an ambition which, so far from being healthy, is itself a symptom of the decadence against which it affects to rebel.

An application of this principle may be made in one of the minor fields of poetic art. The conditions under which our ancient ballad-poetry arose are tolerably well understood. It belongs to a primitive state of society, in which the knowledge of letters was restricted to a select class, and tradition was the sole vehicle of history to the mass of the people; when manners were ruder, law less revered, the passions more unbridled, the utterance of emotion franker and less conventional than now. Though the writers cannot always be supposed contemporary with the events they record, they uniformly address a sympathetic audience, whose standard of morality or sentiment, and level of culture, little, if at all, differ from those prevailing at the period to which their traditions refer. The *Border-minstrelsy*, for example, was obviously written for the children or grandchildren of the moss-troopers whose exploits it glorifies, a generation to whom appeals to a higher code or a purer taste than their ancestors accepted would have been wholly unintelligible. The general characteristics of the best specimens that remain to us, whether of the narrative and legendary ballad or of the lyrical and emotional ballad, are an unconscious simplicity of thought and language, a coarse but vivid realization of the scenes and delineation of the personages presented. They show few marks of artistic construction or ornament, beyond a rudimentary sense of pictorial expression, and the occasional introduction of abrupt snatches of wild fancy. In those cases where a burden is added, it serves either to mark the

leading motive of the theme, to suggest the musical accompaniment to which the piece was set,* or that "rhythm of the feet" from which the composition first took its name.†

The impossibility of restoring the conditions under which this description of poetry arose does not oppose any obstacle to its successful cultivation in our own day, if the principle laid down be duly observed. To surrender the type would be a gratuitous waste of means, for of all narrative and lyrical forms, it is the simplest and the most direct in its effects. The testimony borne to its potency by Sir Philip Sidney, by Addison, and the authority for whom Fletcher of Saltoun stood sponsor, would be unanimously endorsed to-day. The varnish of our social conventionalism is, after all, extremely thin, and the most cultivated audience cannot listen to a plain story of heroism or of pathos without flushing cheeks and brimming eyes. For enshrining the memory of any grandly heroic achievement, for giving utterance to any pure emotion, the ballad still remains the most appropriate vehicle. When a modern ballad-writer is dealing with a theme of his own time, or of a period but little anterior to it, the standards of morality, sentiment, and culture to which he appeals will, as a matter of course, be such as are currently accepted. When he is dealing with a theme of a remote past, on the other hand, he has a divided duty. While restricted to a general observance of the structural outlines and traditionary usages of the form he is employing, and bound by the laws of dramatic propriety to intrude no ideas into the minds of the characters whom he assumes to represent, that would have been foreign to the spirit of the age selected, he is equally bound to remember that the audience whom he addresses is not composed of their contemporaries but of his own, that it has advanced from the intellectual and social level which that age attained. The same rule which forbids him to ignore the exigencies of the past, forbids him to ignore the acquisitions of the present. The taste that was satisfied with rude exhibitions of mental and physical power, and bare suggestions of natural scenery, has developed an appreciation of the finer traits of character and subtler combinations of landscape; the ear which asked for nothing better than a rough metrical lilt, and a coarse, vigorous style, has become accustomed to stricter harmony and a polished

* Charles Kingsley's surmise that what he calls "these meaningless refrains," are imitated from the notes of birds ("Prose Idylls," p. 10), is too fanciful to bear examination. Of the examples which he cites—"Binnorie! O Binnorie!" repeats the musical name of the place where the crime recorded occurred: "With a hey lillalu, and a how lo lan," is not a bad attempt to translate into words the sound of the national bagpipe; while the undertones of "Fine flowers in the valley," and "The green leaves they grow rarely," were surely intended, in Mr. Allingham's words ("Ballad Book," notes), at once to "deepen and soften the tragedy" with which they contrast.

† Ballad from *ballare* (Ital.) to dance; whence *ball* and *ballet* are also derived.

diction. In endeavouring to reconcile these conflicting requirements, he will find himself impelled to avoid anything like a literal reproduction of his models, and to introduce such modifications as will strictly differentiate the work of the nineteenth from the work of the fifteenth or the sixteenth century.

The best writers of our time, as it seems, have recognized this necessity. By way of illustration, we may select for comparison two such typical specimens of the ancient and modern ballad as "The Hunting a' the Cheviat" and Macaulay's lay of "Horatius." The comparison has been almost invited by the modern poet himself in his prefatory remarks, and there can be no doubt that the two versions of the ballad referred to were before him when he wrote.

The analysis which Addison made of the later and inferior recension of "Chevy Chase" (*Spectator*, Nos. 70, 74) necessarily omitted features which the discovery of the original has since brought to light, so that it will not appear presumptuous to attempt the task afresh.

The old poet plunges at once into his theme with incomparable spirit:—

"The Persè owt of Northombarlande,
And a vowe to God mayd he,
That he wolde hunt in the mountayns
Off Chyviat, within dayes thre,
In the mauger of doughtè Dogles,
And all that ever with him be.
The fattiste hartes in all Cheviat
He sayd he wold kill, and cary them away;
Be my feth, sayd the doughtè Doglas agayn,
I wyll let that hontyng yf that I may."

This vivacity is not maintained throughout, but confined to the passages which record feats of individual prowess. The indications of time and place, however, suffice to depict the scene at the expense of some diffuseness and repetition.

"This begane on a Monday at morn,
In Cheviat, the hillys so he: . . .
The dryvare thorowe the woodes went,
For to reas the dear;
Bomen bickarte uppone the bent,
With ther browd aras cleare.
Then the wyld thorowe the woodes went,
On every syde shear;
Greahondes thorowe the greves glent
For to kyll thear dear.
The begane in Chyviat, the hyle above,
Yerly on a Monynday."

An abrupt turn serves to change the situation. The Percy has just gone "to se the bryttlynge off the deare," and sworn "a gret oth" because the Douglas has not kept his promise:—

"At the laste a squyar of Northembalonde,
 Lokyde at his hand full ny,
 He was war oth the doughetie Doglas comyng;
 With him a mightè meany,
 Both with spear, byll, and brande,
 Yt was a mightè sight to se."

The suggestions of character, though often conventional, leave upon the whole a distinct impression. The Douglas is always "doughtè," but touches are added to expand this conception of him. He comes in riding ahead of his men—

"His armor glytteryde as dyd a glede;
 A bolder barne was never borne."

His opening speech is temperate; and to the last he shows himself magnanimous and unboastful. With a brave man's aversion from needlass bloodshed—

"To kyll all thes giltyless men,
 Alas! it wear great pittè"—

he challenges the Percy to single combat. As "a captayne good yenoughe," he disposes his force to the best advantage—

"The Dogglas portyd his ost in thre,
 Lyk a cheffe cheften off pryde,
 With snar speres off myghttè tre,
 The cam in on every syde."

With a brave man's respect for his foe, when he thinks he has the advantage, he proffers him an earl's ransom as

"The manfullyste man . . .
 That ever I conqueryd in filde fightyng."

After his death-wound, his last words are to encourage the survivors:—

"Fyghte ye, my merry men, whylls ye may,
 For my lyff days ben gon."

His enemy's characteristics are also well marked. Though an Englishman, the writer does not fail to indicate the vein of boastfulness that runs through the heroic mould. It is seen in the vow that the Percy makes at the outset, the great oath that he swears at his disappointment, his defiant answer to the Douglas—

"We wyll not tell the what men we ar, he says,
 Nor whos men that we be;
 But we wyll hount hear in this chays,
 In the spyte of thyne and of the;"

in his vehement and confident rejoinder to his foe's courteous and modest challenge—

"Nowe Criste's cors on his crowne, sayd the lord Perse,
 Whosoever therto says nay;
 Be my troth, doughtè Doglas, he says,
 Thow shalt never se that day;
 Nethar in Ynglande, Skottlande, nar France,
 Nor far no man of a woman born,
 But and fortune be my chance,
 I dar met him on man for on;"

and in his repetition of the same vaunt when the Douglas offers him ransom. The generous and tender side of his nature speaks out in his lament when the Douglas falls—

“The Persè leanyde on his brande,
And sawe the Doglas de;
He tooke the dede man be the hande,
And sayd, Wo ys me for the!
To have savyde thy lyffe I wold have pertyd with
My landes for years thre,
For a better man of hart nare of hande
Was not in all the north countrè.”

The minor characters are sketched by a few bold strokes. Wytharynton, the “squyar off Northumbarlande,” who protests against the Percy’s acceptance of the Douglas’ challenge that

“I wyll never se my captayne fyght on a fylde,
And stand myselffe and looke on,”

and who

“When both his leggis wear hewyne yn to,
Yet he knyled and fought on hys kne;”

Sir Hewethe Mongonbyrry, “the Skottishe knyght,” who, when he saw his chief fall,

“rod uppon a corsiare,
Throughe a hondrith archery;
He never styntyd nar never blane,
Tyll he cam to the good lord Persè.
He set uppone the lord Persè
A dynte that was full soare,
With a suar spear of a myghtè tre,
Clean thorow the body he the Persè bore;”

“Jamy the Skottishe kyng,” who, when he hears of Douglas’ death,

“His handes dyd he weal and wryng,
He sayd, Alas, and woe ys me!
Such another captayn Skottland within,
He sayd, y feth shuld never be;”

and “the fourth Harry our kyng,” who receives news of the Percy’s death with the ejaculation—

“God have merci on his soll . . .
Good Lord, yf thy will it be!
I have a hondrith captayns in Ynglande, he sayd,
As good as ever was hee;
But Persè, and I brook my lyffe,
Thy death well quyte shall be.”

Rude as the handling is, the consistent delineation in each portrait of the distinguishing national traits will not escape notice.

A soldier’s familiarity with the ghastly sights of the battle-field is apparent throughout the poem, and no delicacy prompts him to spare his hearers such detail as “in at the brest bone,” “thorow lyvar and longs bothe,” “with his hart blood the wear wete.” There is little or no imagery, but clear evidences of poetical

feeling occur in the twice-repeated exclamation which realizes for us (as Addison has pointed out) the true significance of the tragedy—

“The chylde may rue that ys unborne,
It was the mor pittè;”

in the graphic reference to the incessant feuds by which it was followed—

“Ther was never a tym on the march partes
Sen the Doglas and the Persè met,
But yt was marvele, and the redde blude ronne not
As the reane doys in the stret;”

and the introduction of picturesque local touches—

“The wear borne along by the watter a Twyde,
Yth bowndes of Tividale.”

“Glendale glytteryde on ther armor bryght,
Over castill, towar, and town.”

The composition is quite artless, the poet dividing it into two fyttes with the avowed intention of whetting our interest—“Yet ys there mor behynd;” and winding up with a common devotional formula that would have been equally appropriate in any other connection. His homeliness of style will speak for itself, but a note may be made of one or two mannerisms; his frequent repetitions, apparently for the sake of emphasis; his vaguely conventional epithets and needless expletives. The occurrence of the battle on “a Monynday” is thrice, and the hour of the day twice repeated. We are again and again reminded that it took place “in Chyviat,” the hilly character of the district being indicated four times. Such an adjective as “myghtè” does duty for the “meany” which each chieftain brings into the field, and for the “tre” of the bow or spear that the slayer of either wields. “Bright” is thrice used as an epithet for armour. “Worthè” is given to two knights of whom one is further commended as “a knyght of great renowen,” a phrase subsequently applied to the English king. Expressions such as “never a foot wold fle,” “shall never be,” “sad and soar,” “the mor pittè,” “hart and hande,” &c., are in like manner duplicated. Still more frequent is the recurrence of “he sayd” in the dialogue, of “good,” “full,” “yenough,” “ther,” and other redundancies in description. The unevenness of the verse, which, after occasional efforts to maintain regularity of measure and cadence, subsides into a loose jingle, and the prevailing monotony of the rhymes, are features that require no illustration.

It is unnecessary to dissect the modern ballad with the same minuteness, but may suffice to note what features of his model the writer adopts, what blemishes he avoids, and what graces his superior advantages enable him to add. Like his pre-

decessor, he plunges in *medias res*, projecting the scene at a stroke, and borrowing the precise features of solemnity and determination which gave the other its vivid sense of reality :—

“Lars Porsena of Clusium,
By the Nine Gods he swore,
That the great house of Tarquin
Should suffer wrong no more ;
By the Nine Gods he swore it,
And named a trysting day ;
And bade his messengers ride forth,
East, and west, and south, and north,
To summon his array.”

This freshness of tone is maintained without abatement to the close. Every verse is a picture, and almost every line adds a touch that could not be spared. Where the old writer was content to sketch in the surroundings, the modern draws them carefully, and colours harmoniously. Instead of the Percy's “myghtè meany,” “owt of Banborow,” with fifteen hundred archers, “chosen owt of shyars thre,” and the Douglas' “mightè meany” of two thousand men armed “with spear, byll, and brande,” we have an elaborate description of the muster of the Etrurian host, a landscape vignette of each district which sent forth its tale of men, and graphic representations of the successive incidents—the panic-stricken flight of the peasants to Rome, the approach of the invading army, its martial aspect across the Tiber, the exploits of Horatius and his fellows in detail, the cutting asunder of the bridge, his plunge into the stream, his joyous entry into the city. The characterization is not less incisive, though less lavish of expenditure than in the old ballad. The dignified, self-confidence and impulsive generosity of Porsena, the vainglorious audacity of Astur, the craven cruelty of Sextus, the patriotic fervour and dauntless resolution of Horatius, are unmistakable traits. In one respect the elder writer has a clear advantage over his successor. Both are skilful in playing upon the emotions, but the former obtains the purer tone in virtue of his absolute simplicity. The ostentation of Percy, for example, is so naturally expressed that we never think of him as posing. A touch of modern consciousness, on the other hand, gives a slightly theatrical ring to some of the speeches of Horatius, especially his apostrophe to the prostrate Lausulus, that detracts from the modest heroism which is his dominant characteristic.

The resources of a richer vocabulary permit Macaulay to express precisely what the author of “The Hunting a' the Cheviat” could only indicate by an indefinite and oft-repeated epithet, or was obliged to omit altogether. “Purple Apennine,” “triremes heavy with fair-haired slaves,” “choked every roaring gate,” “the swarthy storm of dust,” “broken gleams of dark-blue light,” “a sullen murmur ran,” “the tossing sea of steel,” and a score more

such phrases, are miniatures, the truth and delicacy of which would have been thrown away upon those whom the earlier writer addressed. Such graces as Macaulay borrows he contrives to heighten. The introduction of sonorous names is frequent but not excessive. The aid to emphasis afforded by repetition is freely used without redundancy, witness especially the spirited refrain of "the brave days of old," and the quatrain which depicts the restless indecision of Sextus—"Thrice looked he," &c. Nor does he wholly neglect the grim detail of slaughter upon which a Roman minstrel would have unhesitatingly dwelt, but judiciously modifies it in deference to a milder taste. The composition is thoroughly artistic, the reader's interest rising naturally with the gradual development of the incidents, and culminating with the national hero's success. The truth and appropriateness of the imagery drawn from scenes with which a Roman audience would be familiar, the allusions by which the supposed narrator links the past with the existing state of Rome, and the occasional turns of expression which Macaulay has adopted from our old ballads, to suggest the analogy between them and the literature he is assuming to restore, are noteworthy touches of his art. His command of his metrical instrument is like that of a skilful rider over a trained steed. Always well in hand, the verse bounds freely along, with a crisp, nervous tread, the pace quickening with the excitement or slackening with the gravity of the theme. The variety of the rhymes and the judicious employment of alliteration complete the charm of treatment.

It would be easy to pursue the same process of comparison between ancient and modern examples of the lyrical ballad. A parallel, for instance, is suggested between the pathetic Scottish ballad "The Twa' Sisters of Binnorie,"* and Kingsley's "Sands o' Dee," by the occurrence in both of the same incident, the discovery of the body of a drowned girl. Nothing can be more truthful than the conception of the scene by the old poet. We see, as in a picture, how "sometimes she sunk, sometimes she swam," in the stream; how when "she cam' to the mouth of yon mill-dam," the miller's son coming out "saw the fair maid soummin' in," and called his father to draw off the water, for

"There's either a mermaid or a swan,
By the bonny mill-dams o' Binnorie;"

and how, when the water was drawn, their eyes rested on the rich attire of the "drowned woman":—

"Round about her middle sma',
(Binnorie, O Binnorie!)
There went a gouden girdle bra',
By the bonny mill-dams o' Binnorie.

* The best version is that adopted by Mr. Allingham, in his excellent "Ballad Book," pp. 132-6.

"All amang her yellow hair,
(Binnorie, O Binnorie!)
A string o' pearls was twisted rare,
By the bonny mill-dams o' Binnorie.

"On her fingers lily-white,
(Binnorie, O Binnorie!)
The jewel-rings were shining bright,
By the bonny mill-dams o' Binnorie."

But the description occupies seven verses, or fourteen lines, six of which are devoted to the glory of dress and jewels; detail which, however appropriate to the character of the supposed spectators, somewhat detracts from the pathos of the tragedy. The advantage of dramatic force is obviously with the modern poet, who condenses the scene into six lines, and concentrates attention upon the victim's personal beauty:—

"Oh! is it weed, or fish, or floating hair,
A tress of golden hair,
A drowned maiden's hair,
Above the nets at sea?
Was never salmon yet that shone so fair,
Among the stakes on Dea."

The significant precision of his diction, again, contrasts with the poverty of his predecessor, who repeats the word "swim" to indicate the struggling of the living girl and the floating of her corpse, and the word "come" to mean both rest and motion, but has no epithet to express the activity of the instrument by which the tragedy was effected. When Kingsley applies the same epithet "rolling" to the wind and the foam, he aptly denotes the elemental concord to which the catastrophe was due, a concord further emphasized by the reiteration of the word "western"—

"The western wind was wild and dank with foam . . .
The western tide crept up along the sand."

How the variety of phrase employed to mark the ruthless action of the sea—"crept up," "rolling foam," "the cruel, crawling foam," "the cruel, hungry foam"—serves to intensify the reality and deepen the impression of pathos, must have struck the least observant reader.

By such points of difference as these, which modify or override its substantial lines of resemblance, the good modern ballad may usually be discriminated from its ancient exemplar. Closely as a living artist will strive to approach the manner in which the characteristic beauties of his prototype are presented, his instinctive sense of propriety, and appreciation of the gains which have accrued to his generation by time and culture, protect him from the snare of imitation, and dictate the introduction of some touch of expression, some tone of sentiment, which serves to stamp his work as the product of his own epoch. Such a ballad as Mr. Tennyson's "Lady Clare," for instance, in

the lucid simplicity of its language recalls the best specimens of the old love-legends, but its nobility of feeling, which transcends the mediæval ideal, its perfect music, and definite phrasing, are undeniable marks of its modern handiwork. The two first lines would alone suffice to distinguish it. Perhaps the least indefinite reference to the seasonal aspects of Nature that can be found in an old ballad is in the opening verse of "Robin Hood and Guy of Gisborne:"—

"When shaws been sheene, and shradds full fayre,
And leaves both large and longe,
It is merrie walking in the fayre forest,
To hear the small birdes' song."

Charming as the picture is, it conveys no precise significance, and might express with equal truth the ordinary conditions of forest landscape from the end of May to the middle of July. The modern poet has an exact idea in his mind, and selects two salient features which enable the reader to apprehend it—

"It was the time when lilies blow,
And clouds are highest up in air;"

seizes in a moment familiar aspects of earth and sky which can by no possibility be associated with any other season but mid-summer.

A favourable test of discrimination between ancient and modern ballad-writers is afforded by their respective employment of the burden or refrain. In conformity with the musical conditions under which it originated, this may be observed to be strictly uniform in an ancient ballad. Where a mere name is reiterated, the practice is open to no objection; but where the incidents or ideas vary from verse to verse, the monotony of a set phrase must frequently jar upon the ear as incongruous. Any one who attempts to read aloud such a ballad as "The Cruel Brother,"* for example, will find the impossibility of modulating his tone so as to bring its unchanging refrain into harmony with these successive verses:—

"What would ye give to your brother John?"
With a heigh-ho! and a tily gay.
'A rope and a gallows to hang him on!'
As the primrose spreads so sweetly

"What would ye give to your own true lover?"
With a heigh-ho! and a tily gay.
'My dying kiss, and my love for ever!'
As the primrose spreads so sweetly."

Its original musical conditions being obsolete, the modern ballad-writer is free to adopt only so much of the form as will serve his needs. In certain relations no change is called for; in others, a flexible employment commends itself, which shall preserve the

* Mr. Allingham's "Ballad Book," p. 265.

charm of music while avoiding the defect of repetition. Two examples from Mr. Tennyson will indicate the distinction. In "Oriana" the recurrence of the name tends to keep continually in view the one tragedy which absorbs the speaker's thought, and has confused past, present, and future in undistinguishable gloom; while the word is so melodious in itself as to need no addition as a lyrical burden. In "The Sisters" the varying emotions which the speaker calls to memory demand a different treatment. Starting from the full security of triumphant power which finds a harmony between itself and the elemental strength of Nature, she hears the wind "blowing in turret and tree." As she revives the sense of the wrong she had suffered and the first tumult of her fury, "the wind is howling in turret and tree." As she recalls the successful scheme by which she lured her enemy, "the wind is roaring." That strange conflict of hate with lust of which she was conscious as she gazed on his beauty finds an apt translation in the wind's "raging." The fierce recoil of the intenser passion, and the climax of its maniacal satisfaction as she made her "dagger sharp and bright" and "three times stabbed him through and through," are echoed in the wind's "raving." As the fire of passion dies down, and her mind subsides into its original mood of sated revenge, the wind once more "is blowing in turret and tree."

Until past the middle of this century, all the modern ballads which have gained popular acceptance were composed in accordance with the principles thus indicated. Besides those already named, Scott's "Eve of St. John," "Young Lochinvar," and "Bonny Dundee;" Campbell's "Lord Ullin's Daughter;" Macaulay's "Armada" and "Ivry;" Aytoun's "Edinburgh after Flodden" and "Execution of Montrose;" and Mrs. Browning's "Duchess May"—to mention a few of the most prominent—though dealing with themes of the past, are stamped as the workmanship of the present; the writers having adopted more or less completely whatever was of permanent value in their ancient models, and rejected what was unavailable, in favour of the higher advantages which the progress of art had secured. During the last twenty years, a disposition to surrender or ignore these advantages has shown itself in almost every quarter devoted to the cultivation of art. The change from which ballad-writing has suffered may be traced to the influence of a tiny wave forming part of that larger fluctuation which has brought about the revival of Byzantine and Gothic architecture, pre-Raphaelite painting, Ritualistic worship, and cognate forms. Originating, it may be, in a genuine reaction against conventionality and insincerity, and gaining strength from its temporary alliance with the reaction of faith against the assaults of science, this movement has long since "o'erleapt itself," and plunged into the abyss of affectation and unreality. Its

fanatical apostles have rescued from merited disuse features of ancient art neither beautiful in themselves nor serviceable to modern needs, and have held up the literal reproduction of them to the admiration of their disciples as the perfection of honesty and truth. With characteristic patience the public has submitted to the tyranny of a small and noisy faction, not without murmuring indeed, but without open revolt. Laymen had comparatively little to complain of so long as the Gothic and Byzantine revivalists confined themselves to church-architecture, but their hands were soon laid upon secular buildings, with a zeal to which the public inconvenience and discomfort still bears ample testimony. Offices, courts, and libraries, where Government clerks, barristers, and students are condemned to work daily in all weathers under the capricious conditions of a city atmosphere, have been erected in conformity, not with their wants, but with the laws of style which demand the insertion of crypt-like rooms, dark and draughty corridors, windows heavily mullioned or filled with stained glass. Happily, the common sense of a few determined men has interfered to remove some of these tyrannous inflictions, but many must remain unremedied, and the spirit which inspired them is yet far from extinct. From architecture the madness spread to painting. Those of us old enough to look back upon twenty years will remember how the exhibitions swarmed with pictures of wry-necked, woe-begone women, their shapeless bodies clothed in clinging, trailing robes of the twelfth century; men with matted hair and rigid limbs; landscapes without composition or perspective, wherein every detail was magnified, and the general effect lost; trees of impossible forms, verdure of incredible tints. The leaders of the school which put forth these barbarous crudities have long since transcended them, but a few of their followers remain faithful to tradition, and an artist of genius like Mr. E. Burne Jones may yet be found, who, gifted with an eye for colour that reminds one of Giorgione, deliberately sets himself to copy the drawing of Cimabue.

Simultaneous, or nearly so, with the development of pre-Raphaelitism in painting, was the irruption of a kindred disease into poetry. Some of those who had caught infection in the one art were agents of its propagation in the other. Of course, its symptoms were not confined to the ballad-writers, but it is here that they have been most severely marked. A notorious characteristic of the imitator is his tendency to exaggerate the defects instead of the beauties of his model. The permanent charms of the old ballads, their absolute simplicity of thought, their strength of characterization and clearness of language, have thus been ignored by the imitative school, which has seized, instead, upon their transient features, quaintness and vagueness of expression,

looseness of versification, inaccuracy of accent, and carried the reproduction of these to the extreme of caricature. The legitimate prototype of such art as this is surely to be found in China, where invention, after reaching a certain stage, has ceased to advance, and the repetition of past forms has become so stereotyped a habit, that if you give an old plate to a potter, or an old coat to a tailor, as a pattern, you will obtain a fac-simile copy, with every crack reproduced in the porcelain, and every rent in the cloth.

The earliest writer of mark in this school whose name is familiar to us, Mr. William Bell Scott, took the infection but slightly. His volume of verse,* now more than twenty years old, gave a promise of power which, so far as we know, has never been redeemed, or, at all events, proved commensurate with its subsequent development in painting. That he was capable of writing a ballad which could reflect the spirit of the past without transcribing the letter, he clearly showed in "Woodstock Maze," whose delicate and truthful picturesqueness, derived from modern culture, put to shame the distorted archaism and exaggerated detail of the drawing which purported to illustrate it. In "The Four Acts of St. Guthbert," on the other hand, the author gave more scope to aberration, though still keeping within bounds. The introduction of such local forms as "bigg," "glent," "yett," and the like, might have been permissible in a north-country ballad, but no excuse could be accepted for the obsolete spelling of words such as "frere," "minstrelle," and "worken," or for his antiquating accent and spelling alike in the last word of this couplet:—

"The tears then from her sweet eyes fell,
To think of his great beauteie."

The poem containing these barbarisms, however, is an exception to the rest of the volume, and, moreover, has many a touch of graceful and tender feeling which no mere imitator could have given it.

A few years later, Mr. Morris, since more successful than his predecessor in cultivating the twin arts of design and song, developed in a violent fashion the tendencies thus mildly introduced. We have, on a previous occasion, noted the signs of promise in his early volume.† Having endeavoured to do equal justice to his matured genius, we shall not be understood as disparaging it by calling attention here to the extravagances of his youth, which, though he has long outgrown them, claim remembrance in a literary retrospect, especially as at the present moment they are being perpetuated by his successors. The symptoms of infection

* Poems, by W. B. Scott, 1854. Since the above was written, Mr. Scott has republished his poems, possibly with some alteration of the passages here referred to.

† "The Defence of Guenevere," and other poems, 1858. A reprint is recently announced.

in his case were so severe that no one in future need despair of recovery. Quaintness run mad is the characteristic of the principal ballads in this volume. After reading them, one is forcibly reminded of the story told of a German professor who gave his pupils a passage to translate, which, after labouring at for some time, a youth brought back with a request for explanation. The words by themselves, he said, were plain enough, but he could not understand the meaning of the whole. "Mine young friend," said the professor, "it has no meaning; it is boetry." What else is to be said of such a ballad as the following? We extract three verses, assuring the puzzled reader that those omitted will afford him no assistance whatever. That it relates to a ruined castle (identical in name with the state prison of Turkey) is tolerably clear; but in spite of the semblance of logic which the repetition of "therefore" lends to the refrain, we dare not hazard a conjecture as to the real drift.

THE TUNE OF SEVEN TOWERS.

"No one goes there now,
For what is left to fetch away
From the desolate battlements all arow,
And the lead roof heavy and grey?
'Therefore,' said fair Yoland of the flowers,
'This is the tune of Seven Towers.'

* * * * *
"By my love go there now,
To fetch me my coif away,
My coif and my kirtle, with pearls arow,
Oliver, go to-day!
'Therefore,' said fair Yoland of the flowers,
'This is the tune of Seven Towers.'

* * * * *
"If you will go for me now,
I will kiss your mouth at last,
[She sayeth inwardly]
(The graves stand grey in a row),
Oliver, hold me fast!
'Therefore,' said fair Yoland of the flowers,
'This is the tune of Seven Towers.'"

Only a shade less obscure is "Two Red Roses across the Moon," which opens thus:—

"There was a lady lived in a hall,
Large in the eyes, and slim and tall;
And ever she sang from morn to noon,
Two red roses across the moon."

The rest of the ballad, each verse of which has the same refrain, chronicles the exploits of a knight who, hearing the lady's song in passing, adopts it as a battle-cry, and achieves renown. His return from the fight is told in the two last verses:—

"I trow he stopped when he rode again.
By the hall, though draggled sore by the rain;
And his lips were pinched to kiss at the noon,
Two red roses across the moon."

"Under the may she stooped to the crown,
All was gold, there was nothing of brown;
And the horns blew up in the hall at noon,
Two red roses across the moon."

We venture upon a daring surmise that the refrain may be intended to represent the device on the knight's shield; "a moon argent charged with two roses gules" would, we suppose, be its translation into heraldic language; but the hypothesis can only be reconciled with the statement that "his lips were pinched to kiss" the aforesaid roses by assuming the song to be here used for the lady's mouth which uttered it. If this explanation be rejected as too far-fetched, we surrender the task as hopeless: *Davus sum, non Œdipus.*

Other ballads in the volume are not much more intelligible nor less quaint. In most of them the monotony of an unvarying burden has been closely imitated from the antique. That this constraint was avoidable appears from occasional evidences of variation and adjustment to the narrative, while the simplicity of style in a few instances—*e.g.*, "The Sailing of the Sword," and "Welland River"—affords similar proof that the prevailing mannerism was wilful.

In the imitative ballads of Mr. Swinburne, published a few years later,* quaintness has become grotesque, and affectation been reduced to a system. The collocation of incongruous ideas in such a ballad as "The King's Daughter" altogether defies analysis. Three or four verses will suffice to illustrate it.

THE KING'S DAUGHTER.

"We were ten maidens in the green corn,
Small red leaves in the mill-water;
Fairer maidens never were born,
Apples of gold for the king's daughter.

"We were ten maidens by a well-head,
Small white birds in the mill-water;
Sweeter maidens never were wed,
Rings of red for the king's daughter.

"The first to spin, the second to sing,
Seeds of wheat in the mill-water;
The third may was a goodly thing,
White bread and brown for the king's daughter.

"The fourth to sew, and the fifth to play,
Fair green weed in the mill-water;
The sixth may was a goodly may,
White wine and red for the king's daughter."

And so on *ad libitum*. The burden of "mill-water" recurs in every verse, the words preceding it being alone varied. If there is any adjustment to the narrative in these variations, we have failed to detect it. What connection small red leaves, small white birds,

* Poems and Ballads, 1866.

seeds of wheat, &c., have with a mill-water, or any of them separately with the attendant maidens of a king's daughter, we cannot even guess. Why mill-water should be selected in preference to river-water or sea-water, is sufficiently puzzling in itself. The mention of water is not wholly without rhyme or reason, since the rhyme may stand for a reason in default of better. So far as the ballad can be said to have any drift, it appears to be tragical; the king's daughter in some mysterious way being responsible for the calamitous ending of an intrigue between "the king's young son" and the fairest of her maidens. The two last verses sum up the *dénouement*:—

"He's ta'en his leave at the goodliest,
Broken boats in the mill-water;
Golden gifts for all the rest,
Sorrow of heart for the king's daughter.

"Ye'll make a grave for my fair body,
Running rain in the mill-water;
'And ye'll streak my brother at the side o' me,
The pains of hell for the king's daughter."

Readers coming for the first time upon this queer nursery-jingle about "white bread and brown," "broken boats," &c., and knowing nothing of the author, might be puzzled to decide whether he were suffering from mental disorder, or only constructing an elaborate joke. Those who know Mr. Swinburne as the author of "Atalanta in Calydon," and regard the ballad as one of a series, will be unable to accept either of these explanations, but they will find it less easy to acquit him of being the slave of a vicious and absurd system, or ambitious of achieving singularity at no matter what cost.

We have selected the worst of the series, but others are grotesque enough. "The Sea-Swallows" is the fantastic title of one which tells of the shame brought on a father by the dishonour of his daughter. In the course of the dialogue which takes place between them, one or the other is incessantly enouncing that

"Red rose leaves will never make wine."

"Mr. F.'s aunt," in Dickens' "Little Dorrit," who was in the habit of remarking at intervals that "there's milestones on the Dover Road," was scarcely less sententious or more intelligible. The burden with which nearly every verse concludes,

"The ways are sair fra' the Till to the Tyne,"

has more meaning, but the exigencies of monotony necessitate the sacrifice of meaning to sound. "Tyne" must be fitted with a rhyme; hence the perpetual reference to "wine," and the curious ornithological observation that sea-swallows "fly full thick by six and nine!" The well-known tricks of style by which Mr. Swinburne has contrived to spoil some of his most musical lyrics are freely

lavished upon this sham-antique. Alliteration, in the abuse of which, faithful to his system of imitation, he has caricatured Edgar Poe, is especially plentiful. "Blossom of broom will never make bread," "a weed and a web," "bearing-bread," "bearing-bed," "the well-water and washing wine," are a few of the choicest examples. Colour, of course, is profusely thrown in. Beside the "red rose leaves" (Mr. Swinburne does his best to make us, like Hood's poor flower-girl, "hate the smell of roses"), we have "between her brows she is grown red," "three girls' paces of red sand," and "the bed was made between green and blue." What trace of the old ballad's simple charm is visible under these coverings of artificial barbarism and meretricious finery?

How far the copy falls short of the original may be seen by comparing an extract from the old Scottish ballad of "Edward" with one from Mr. Swinburne's "Bloody Son," founded on a Finnish theme almost identical in its motive, and which, presumably for the sake of suggesting the comparison, he has thought fit to compose in the Scottish dialect. In "Edward," a son who has killed his father having confessed the crime to his mother, this dialogue ensues:—

" ' And quhatten penance wul ye drie for that,
Edward, Edward?
And quhatten penance wul ye drie for that?
My dear son, now tell me, O ;'
' I'll set my feet in yonder boat,
Mither, mither;
I'll set my feet in yonder boat,
And I'll fare over the sea, O.'

" ' And quhat wul ye doe wi' your towers and your ha',
Edward, Edward?
And quhat wul ye doe wi' your towers and your ha',
That were sae fair to see, O ?'
' I'll let thame stand til they down fa',
Mither, mither;
I'll let thame stand til they down fa',
For here nevir mair mann I bee, O,'

" ' And quhat wul ye leive to your bairns and your wife,
Edward, Edward?
And quhat wul ye leive to your bairns and your wife,
Quhan ye gang ovir the sea, O ?'
' The warldis room, let thame beg throw life,
Mither, mither;
The warldis room, let thame beg throw life;
For thame nevir mair wul I see, O.' "

In "The Bloody Son," the dialogue takes place between him and his mother after he has confessed to the murder of his only brother:—

" ' And where will ye gang to mak your mend,
My merry son, come tell me hither?
And where will ye gang to mak your mend?
And I wot I hae not anither.'
' The warldis way, to the warldis end,
O dear mither'

* Percy's Ancient Reliques. New Edition, p. 32.

“‘And what will ye leave for your wife to take,
 My merry son, come tell me hither?
 And what will ye leave for your wife to take?
 And I wot I hae not anither.’
 ‘A goodly gown and a fair new make,
 For she’ll do nae mair for my body’s sake,
 O dear mither.’

“‘And what will ye leave your young son fair,
 My merry son, come tell me hither?
 And what will ye leave your young son fair?
 And I wot ye hae not anither.’
 ‘A twiggen school-rod for his body to bear,
 Though it garred him greet he’ll get nae mair,
 O dear mither.’

“‘And what will ye leave your little daughter sweet,
 My merry son, come tell me hither?
 And what will ye leave your little daughter sweet?
 And I wot ye hae not anither.’
 ‘Wild mulberries for her mouth to eat,
 She’ll get nae mair though it garred her greet,
 O dear mither.’”

It would be doing Mr. Swinburne injustice to doubt that he wrote these verses with a serious intent, but had he deliberately set himself to turn the pathetic force and tragic bitterness of his model into ridicule, we question if he could have succeeded better. Observe the pains taken throughout to preserve the epithet “merry” (used in its ancient sense of manly), however obviously malappropriate; to seek out such *bizarre* phrases as “come tell me hither,” such obsolete forms as “twiggen,” which we suppose to be the past participle of “to twig”! How ingenious the frugality which obtains two lines and rhymes out of a single sentence—“Though it garred him,” &c., “She’ll get nae mair,” &c.! Truly the old ballad has had hard measure dealt to it. Wits like Prior have vulgarized its modest simplicity; antiquaries like Percy have botched its venerable ruins; critics like Johnson have flouted its beauties as barbarous; jesters like Praed and Barham have converted its romance into burlesque; but its would-be revivers in our own day have given it “the unkindest cut of all.” Could its ghost speak, we do not think its cry would be “Deliver me not unto mine enemies,” but “Save me from my friends!”

With less brilliancy and versatility of genius than Mr. Swinburne, Mr. Dante Rossetti, as we venture to think, is by far the truer artist, and in his hands the imitative method might be expected to be shorn of some of its worst defects. His imitative ballads,* in so far as they are good, are good in spite of, not by reason of, their theory of composition. Two of them, indeed, “Troy Town” and “Eden Bower,” might be surrendered with scarcely a protest to Mr. Buchanan’s scathing censure, of the one for its “grotesque mediæval classicism,” of the other for its “false and

* Poems, 1870.

shallow mysticism.* Yet even in these, regarded as works of art, there are features which redeem them from the charge of servile imitation. Though the thought is archaic, the language is modern, clear, and strong, without tawdry ornament or tortured construction. The burden, monotonous as it is, is originally employed, not to indicate, as it usually does, the instrumental accompaniment or the prevailing idea of the theme, but to sound, after the manner of a tragic chorus, a prophetic note of the doom hidden in the womb of the future which Nemesis makes audible to the ear of the singer. With respect to the other ballads in the volume, we cannot but think that the stress of indignation under which Mr. Buchanan's animadversions were impelled must have blunted for the moment his critical instinct. Admitting all that has been urged as to the over-imitative tone of "Sister Helen," and any objection that may be taken to the artificiality of the situation supposed, we retain an unshaken impression of the weird power and vivid distinctness with which the poet has worked out his conception. The contrast marked in every verse between the innocent wonder of the child and the vindictive satisfaction of the woman as the tragedy is gradually unfolded; the pathetic portraiture of the suppliant father, who, after his kinsmen have pleaded in vain, enters with "his white hair on the blast," "looks and tries to speak," and then, "kneeling in the road," with a "sad and weak" voice cries for pity on his dying son, but suddenly ceasing as the death-knell tolls, is "raised from his knee" and rides back "in silence hastily;" and the last touch of all, when, vengeance ended, the recoil begins, and the presence of the "white thing at the door" that "sighs in the frost" carries conviction to the murderess that her victim's "soul is lost as mine is lost;" these are surely strokes of an incisive hand which no mistakes of theory or minor defects of execution can avail to impair. Here also, as in the other ballads, a transparent purity of language tempers the archaism of the thought. "Stratton Water" is less powerful than "Sister Helen," and more closely imitative. It has borrowed too many features, indeed, from such well-known pieces as "Burd Ellen" and "The Lass o' Lochroyan" to have much claim to originality, but the writer's pictorial skill, verbal precision, and strict versification effectually rescue his work from condemnation as a modern-antique. Its character is sufficiently marked in the two verses which depict the hero's amazement as he gazes on the figure of her whom he had believed to be dead:—

"Lord Sands has won the weltering slope,
Whereon the white shape lay;
The clouds were still above the hill,
And the shape was still as they.

* "The Fleshly School of Poetry," *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, Oct., 1871.

"Oh, pleasant is the gaze of life!
And sad is death's blind head,
But awful are the living eyes
In the face of one thought dead."

No old balladist could have written such lines. The tone and diction of "The Staff and Scrip" still more clearly pronounce its age. With their date-marks thus set upon their face, the attempt to give these poems a factitious look of antiquity by introducing a few obsolete expressions ("right so," "grame," &c.), and by dislocating the accent of such words as "body" and "mantle," seems to us a waste of labour, and in very questionable taste. The touches of pathos and grace which Mr. Rossetti has thrown into his most imitative ballads secure them a place apart, but we the more regret that he should have lent the sanction of his high authority to a method that has nothing but fashion to recommend it, and which weaker or less refined hands than his are certain to abuse.

Its *reductio ad absurdum* has been achieved by one of the newest members of the brotherhood of young poets who look up to Mr. Swinburne and Mr. Rossetti as their masters. In a volume of collected verses,* many of which, *e.g.*, "Sunshine before Sunrise," and the series called "Fortunate Love," are full of fancy and charm, Mr. Edmund Gosse has allowed himself to perpetrate such a *bêtise* as the following:—

"When the autumn nights were hot,
(Peach and apple and apricot,)
Under the shade of a twining rose,
Deep in the high-walled garden-close
Guenevere, red as a sunset glows,
Plighted her love to Lancelot.

"Overhead, at a window, unseen,
(Apple and filbert and nectarine,)
Gawaine lounged in the hot gold air,
Fingered a lute, and, at last aware
Of an eager face and the Queen's bright hair,
Laughed a little in bitter spleen."

A lady to whom these stanzas were read naïvely inquired, in our hearing, whether their burden were intended to imitate the cry of an itinerant fruit-seller, or the *sotto voce* of a waiter handing round the dessert at a *table d'hôte*. Further comment would be surely superfluous.

Anything better than mockery would be wasted upon puerilities of which the authors will probably live to be heartily ashamed. They are only excusable as symptoms of an epidemic mania under whose influence the patient becomes for a time infatuated. The ballad, as every one acquainted with this school is aware, is but one of many ancient forms of which it has attempted a literal

* "On Viol and Flute." By Edmund W. Gosse, 1878.

reproduction. Mr. Swinburne has written a miracle-play, a masque, a Christmas carol, rondels, and *chansons*. His followers, in like manner, have given us rondels, virelays, and madrigals. Each new writer seems to vie with his predecessor in endeavouring to exhume some disused type, and we may look for the resuscitation of the Provençal *tensons*, or *jeux partis*, and the entire ceremonial of the Court of Love, if this fashion only holds. But the prospect of its duration does not alarm us. No literary school has ever stood its ground in England that had anything less solid than nature and common sense for its principles; and though the caprice by which these attempts are dictated enjoys a momentary popularity, the most sanguine prophet can scarcely predict for it a longer reign than was enjoyed by the pedantry of the Euphuists or the foppery of the Della Crusicans. So long as it lasts, the critic must possess his soul in patience, and be content to put in an occasional plea on behalf of good taste and sobriety. If we are condemned to be fed upon imitations, we are at least entitled to stipulate that the food shall be of decent quality. When a poet of credit like Mr. Gosse ventures to put his name to a "virelay" of which this is the refrain—

"Little winged god that dozes (*sic*),
Fly not with the falling roses!" *

we are less concerned to know whether it be imitative or original than to inquire with Mr. Calverley,

"But is it grammar?"

Already there are some signs that the tide is turning. Possibly, Mr. Morris's example has not been lost upon the body of which he has ceased to be a member. Although he styles his latest poem a "Morality," and partially returns in it to the system of alliterative verse, he has stopped very far short of a fac-simile restoration. A recent volume of poems† by one of the most promising of the new brotherhood, Mr. Payne, contains two or three ballads, especially "May Margaret," "The Westward Sailing," and "Sir Erwin's Questing," which only resemble their models in simplicity and grace, without copying their defects of language or versification. Even Mr. Gosse has found a *locus pœnitentiæ*. In a judicious criticism upon Edgar Poe, his language amounts to a repudiation, not, indeed, of the imitative method upon which his leader works, but of the artifices of style by which it has been chiefly recommended. "In versification," says Mr. Gosse, "Poe was far in advance of his time; no English writer *before Mr. Swinburne* has been able to produce verses so full of the mere splendour of sound, irrespective of meaning or emphasis. He used all the tricks of

* *Athenæum*, November 14, 1874.

† "Songs of Life and Death," 1872.

verse-music, and one of them, alliteration, he carried to such excess that *it has been out of favour ever since.*" * Mr. Swinburne may feel disposed to exclaim, "Et tu, Brute!" and considering the quarter whence they come, such words are not without significance. We shall be more hopeful of the future of the new school if Mr. Gosse may be accepted as a representative spokesman. Though robustness of thought is still strangely wanting to them, no one will deny that its members are amply dowered with imagination, feeling, musical perception, and scholarship. If they would only resolve to

"Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff,"

affectation, the fruit of our century's last quarter might be not less worthy of remembrance than that which it has borne in its prime.

Meantime, to revert to ballad-writing, there is no need to fear it is a lost art while Mr. Tennyson will give us once and again a poem so rigidly antique in its conception, so faithfully modern in its execution as "The Victim," or Mr. Browning infuse dramatic fire and emotional force into another "Hervé Riel." † From Mr. Buchanan, also, we may hope for more ballads not less weird and touching than his "Judas Iscariot," not less truthful and pictorial than his "Death of Roland" and "Battle of Drumlie-moor." ‡ One hand, alas! among the most nervous that have held the pen in our generation, will give us ballads no more. It has always been a difficulty with a modern poet to select for his theme an incident of daily life which shall be at once impressive and familiar in its interest without being vulgarized by its associations. A solution of the difficulty may be found in Charles Kingsley's "Three Fishers" and "Bad Squire," which furnish typical examples of the class of available subjects. The tone of homely pathos and weary resignation which vibrates in the one, of passionate indignation and scorn which thunders through the other, brings the life of the poor and the oppressed very near to us. There is surely an art-field here which our contemporary poets, with one or two noteworthy exceptions, have too much neglected, although worked so successfully by Dickens and Mrs. Gaskell in prose fiction, by Israël, Hook, and Edouard Frère in painting. Tragic, tender, and heroic incidents have not been wanting within living memory, nor the poetic sensibility and genius that are requisite to appreciate and immortalize them. Yet the stories of the Lancashire cotton famine and the foundering of the *Birkenhead* troop-ship remain unsung.

HENRY G. HEWLETT.

* *Examiner*, January 30, 1875.

† *Cornhill Magazine*, March, 1871.

‡ *Collected Works*, vol. i. 1874.



BAD LITERATURE FOR THE YOUNG.

WE are loth to occupy even a few pages of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW with an article which may be supposed even by the most unfriendly reader to be written to catch a capfull of passing wind; but we hope we may safely defy reproof in dealing very briefly with a current topic which may be called at once difficult and shallow. Mr. Disraeli once defined a Select Committee as a contrivance for pretending to discover what everybody knew already—at least that was what he meant by what he said—and the reader who is invited to go through a paper, even a short one, about bad literature for the young, may not quite unreasonably ask what there can be to say upon the subject that is not known already. The question, what remedy is to be applied to admitted evils in this respect, is sure to arise at the same moment of time; and it involves a thousand thorny matters. It is very easy to say that the legislature ought to put down bad literature for the young; but, admitting for a moment the principle upon which all such suggestions must proceed, it still remains to ask who the young are, and what bad literature is. If we say that all bad literature is to be put down by the legislature, we land ourselves in difficulties of the gravest kind. The greater number of that portion of the British and American people which holds the reins or pulls the strings of political power believe—with a faith which, however imperfect in logic or sincerity, is practically effective, and, roughly speaking, honest—that morality cannot live without

a religious root. We ourselves certainly believe this. Now, if it is the duty of the legislature to put down all immoral literature, it has no more urgent duty than to shut up all mouthpieces of what is called the "positive" spirit. But if the "positive" minority should become a majority, they would, granting the principle, be equally bound to shut up by force of law every mouthpiece which teaches that morality and religion are interdependent. Because the particular problem is remote, it is easy to set down this way of looking at the matter as mere fantastical casuistry; but any thoroughly conscientious man who will seriously and patiently face the question will see reason for asking himself whether it can be proved—whether it can even be plausibly made out—that all the "Penny Dreadfuls" put together can do as much harm as one atheistical book of science, or one cynical story.

Nor do the rough-and-ready or common-sense solutions of such problems afford much help. If we say that the legislature must interfere to protect the young from bad literature just as it must interfere to protect them from physical ill-usage,—*i.e.*, because they are young and cannot protect themselves,—we are at once called upon to decide at what age human beings who can read may be left to choose their own books (for that is what it would come to). If we turn to another "broad common-sense view of the matter," and say that the magistrates should have the power of putting down publications which seem to them calculated to incite boys to crime, to offences against person or property; we take up ground which appears to be pretty safe, though every day's reading may serve to assure us that difficulties would occur in practice, and there are no precedents in favour of the success of any such measures. But there is a still greater difficulty. Might we not, in ways not easy to trace in detail, be multiplying the chances of literature still worse? Let us consider. There is a large mass of reading, mainly for the young, in which worldly success is the *motif*; and it is natural in an age of luxury and commercial strife that this should be so. Few would say that this sort of literature was immoral, though here and there a parent would keep it from the children as if it were ratsbane or strychnia. But, after all, how may such reading work? We may suppose that one in ten thousand of the shop-boys who read "Penny Dreadfuls" is thus incited to robbery or worse. But if so, when we come to boys a little higher in the social scale, who read such books for the young as have worldly success for *motif*, we may safely assume that one in ten thousand will be incited by such reading to pursue worldly success at all safe costs, and then we have perhaps a wealthy but cruel and unfair trader whom no law can touch. And how are we to choose between literature which

makes one boy in ten thousand a burglar, and literature that helps to make one boy in ten thousand a dealer in coffin-ships? We have no hesitation whatever in suggesting these difficulties, because we know that, however often they may be suggested, they will be pooh-poohed and set aside. Englishmen do not care for symmetrical justice; they hammer away, blow by blow, at what they call practical results; and, when an evil is to be abated, they seldom hesitate about going to work the nearest way. It is a fine impulse, but it should at least be well instructed before it acts.

In our own country the conditions of the growth of this bad kind of literature for boys and girls are to be seen, some of them at least, lying plain upon the surface. There is the rapid increase of the population; the diffusion of the capacity to read among the classes whose circumstances are in other respects most unfavourable to the formation among them of proper standards of taste and good feeling; and there is the fact that the young have of late years been turned out early to earn their livings, and left pretty much to their own misguidance. Whether a state of civilization like that of London or New York can exist without "social deposits" of such a kind that these or similar conditions will be always reappearing in some shape, is a question on which opinions will differ. But we believe it is certain that the existence of this vile literature, whether for old or young, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. There appears to have been nothing like it (of course the *same* thing could not have then existed) when the late Dr. Kitto was engaged in those struggles after something to read which he has so admirably recorded; and there seems to have been nothing like it when the Queen came to the throne. At that date there was much more broad indecency in caricatures and in popular literature for adults; but that is a very different matter. Nowadays, we have flourishing in vile luxuriance whole jungles of literature, chiefly for the young, such as Mr. Anthony Trollope and Mr. James Greenwood have, each in his own way, described in magazine articles. In a powerful sketch, entitled "The Spotted Dog," Mr. Trollope introduces a poor scholar in bondage to the proprietor of a jungle of "Penny Dreadfuls," and relates what happened when he himself called on the proprietor or editor on behalf of the poor scholar:—

"'I am at present,' says the poor scholar, 'employed on the staff of two or three of the "Penny Dreadfuls." Your august highness in literature has probably never heard of a "Penny Dreadful." I write for them matter which we among ourselves call "blood and nastiness," and which is copied from one to another.'"

"We did not find that we ingratiated ourselves with the people at the office of the periodical for which Mr. Mackenzie worked, and yet we endeavoured to do so, assuming in our manner and tone something of the

familiarity of a common pursuit. After much delay, we came upon a gentleman sitting in a dark cupboard, who twisted round his stool to face us while he spoke to us. We believe that he was the editor of more than one 'Penny Dreadful,' and that as many as a dozen serial novels were being issued to the world at the same time under his supervision.

"Oh!" said he, 'so you're at that game, are you?' We assured him that we were at no game at all, but were simply influenced by a desire to assist a distressed scholar. 'That be blowed!' said our brother; 'Mackenzie's doing as well here as he'll do anywhere. He's a drunken blackguard, when all's said and done. So you're going to buy him up, are you? You won't keep him long—and then he'll have to starve.' . .

"That's all right," said our brother, twisting back his stool. 'He can't write for both of us, that's all. He has his bread here regular week after week, and I don't suppose you'll do as much as that for him.' Then we went away, shaking the dust off our feet, and wondering much at the great development of literature which latter years had produced. We had not even known of the existence of these papers, and yet there they were, going forth into the hands of hundreds of thousands of readers, all of whom were being more or less instructed in their modes of life and manner of thinking by the stories which were thus brought before them."

In an article in *St. Paul's Magazine* for February, 1873, Mr. James Greenwood, under the title "Penny Awfuls," went into considerable detail upon the subject:—

"Never was poor recruit so dazzled and bewildered by the wily sergeant whose business it is to angle for and hook men to serve as soldiers as is the foolish lad who is beset by the host of candidates of the Penny Awful tribe for his patronage. There is Dick Turpin bestriding his fleet steed, and with a brace of magnificently mounted pistols stuck in his belt, beckoning him to an expedition of midnight marauding on the Queen's highway; there is gentlemanly Claude Duval, with his gold-laced coat and elegantly curled periwig, who raises his three-cornered hat politely to the highly-flattered schoolboy, and begs the pleasure of his company through six months or so, at the ridiculously small cost of a penny a week, that he, the gallant captain, may initiate our young friend in the ways of bloodshed and villany. There is sleek-cropped, bullet-headed Jack Sheppard, who steps boldly forth with his crowbar, offering to instruct the amazed youth in the ways of crime as illustrated by his own brilliant career, and to supply him with a few useful hints as to the best way of escaping from Newgate or any other prison stronghold he may, in the ordinary course of business, be consigned to. Besides these worthies are the Robbers of the Heath, and the Knights of the Road, and the Skeleton Crew, and Wildfire Dick, and Hell-fire Jack, and Dare-devil Tom, and Blueskin, and Cut-throat Ned, and twenty other choice spirits of an equally respectable type, coaxing him to make himself acquainted with their delectable lives and adventures at the insignificant expense of one penny weekly."

We do not know whether Mr. Greenwood is exact in his account of the early history of this kind of literature; but what he writes seems likely enough:—

"At least a quarter of a century ago it occurred to some enterprising individual to reprint and issue in 'penny numbers' the matter contained in

the 'Newgate Calendar,' and the publication was, financially, a great success. This excited the cupidity of other speculators, and they set their wits to work to produce printed weekly 'pen'orths' that should be as savoury to the morbid tastes of the young and the ignorant as was the renowned Old Bailey Chronicle itself. The task was by no means a difficult one when once was found the spirit to set about it. The 'Newgate Calendar' was, after all, but a dry and legal record of the trials of rogues and murderers for this or that particular offence, with at most, in addition, a brief sketch of the convicted one's previous career, and a few observations on his most remarkable exploits. After all, there was really no *romance* in the thing; and what persons of limited education and intellect love in a book is romance. Here, then, was a grand field! What could be easier than to take the commonplace Newgate raw material, and redip it in the most vivid scarlet, and weave into it the rainbow hues of fiction?"

But highwaymen's lives were not enough for the market, and, indeed, they did not appeal to the whole of the public to be catered for:—

"There were in London and the large manufacturing towns of England hundreds of boys out of whom constant drudgery and bad living had ground all that spirit of dare-devilism so essential to the enjoyment of the exploits of the heroes of the Turpin type, but who still possessed an appetite for vices of a sort that were milder and more easy of digestion. It was a task of no great difficulty when once the happy idea was conceived. All that was necessary was to show that the faculty for successfully defying law and order and the ordinations of virtue might be cultivated by boys as well as men, and that as rogues and rascals the same brilliant rewards attended the former as the latter. The result may be seen in the shop window of every cheap newsvendor in London—'The Boy Thieves of London,' 'The Life of a Fast Boy,' 'The Boy Bandits,' 'The Wild Boys of London,' 'The Boy Detective,' 'Charley Wag,' 'The Lively Adventures of a Young Rascal,' and I can't say how many more. . . . If these precious weekly pen'orths do not openly advocate crime and robbery, they at least go as far as to make it appear that although to obtain the means requisite to set up as a Fast Boy, or a Young Rascal, it is found necessary to make free with a master's goods, or to force his till, or run off with his cash-box, still the immense amount of frolic and awful jollity to be obtained at music-halls, at dancing-rooms,—where 'young rascals' of the opposite sex may be met,—at theatres, and low gambling and drinking dens, if one has 'only got the money,' fully compensates for any penalty a boy of the 'fast' school may be called on to pay in the event of his petty larcenies being discovered. 'What's the good o' being honest?' is the moral sentiment that the Penny Wharf author puts into the mouth of his hero, Joe the Ferret, in 'The Boy Thieves of the Slums.' 'What's the good of being honest?' says Joe, who is presiding at a banquet consisting of the 'richest meats,' and hot brandy and water; 'where's the pull? It is all canting and humbug. The honest cove is the one who slaves from morning till night for half a bellyful of grub, and a ragged jacket and a pair of trotter-cases (shoes) that don't keep his toes out of the mud, and all that he may be called a good boy and have a "clear conscience"' (loud laughter and cries of 'Hear, hear,' by the Weasel's 'pals'). 'I ain't got no conscience, and I don't want one. If I felt one a-growing in me, I'd pison the blessed thing' (more laughter). 'Ours is the game, my lads. Light come, light go. Plenty of tin, plenty of pleasure, plenty of sweethearts and that kind of fun, and all got by making a dip in a pocket, or sneaking a till.'"

To the truth of this account of the latter class of pennyworths we can testify, if testimony be needed; and there is proof to be gathered from newspapers, from the personal evidence of philanthropic labourers among the poor, and from ordinary observation, that these detestable pennyworths too often do, on the minds of boys and girls, just the infernal sort of work they might be expected to do. Many a time have we heard a shopkeeper declare, "Hard as it is to have an errand-boy who cannot receipt a bill, or even read one, I would rather mine could not read at all." We fear, too, that there would be an alarming approach to general consent among mistresses, as to female servants taken from the poorest classes, as female servants have lately been taken in very large numbers: "Here is a girl of twenty, who has learnt to read at Sunday-school, talks good Evangelical, and yet reads the vilest penny trash, steals in order that she may dress like a prostitute, gets into the company of young roughs who have fed full fat upon just the same kind of reading, and before she has had time to learn what household decency is, she is gone to the bad." The case is too common not to be at once recognized for true.

As far as concerns those classes of boys and girls who are at this moment regular feeders on this horrible garbage, we fear there is nothing to be done. Neither do we see that good literature for the young could possibly, except in very rare cases, make any sort of successful appeal to the sons and daughters of parents who read the *Police News* and the *London Clipper*. The alarming and dispiriting part of the case is the gradual spread, upwards in what is called the social scale, of this sort of trash. Any observant person may notice low newspapers and low periodicals in houses of a pretension which would seem to point to something a great deal better. Respectable people—people who have influence in vestries and on school boards—may every day be seen spending money on fine dress and furniture, and, while they go regularly to church and maintain all the respectabilities, taking in journals and magazines that one would beforehand suppose to be quite beneath their notice. It is indeed undeniable that the last ten years have witnessed a general lowering of the standards in all strictly popular literature. There is more amateur or half-amateur literature; there is more false and vulgar sentiment, even where there is what is called "pure Christian teaching;" and everywhere there is a pandering to the appetite for luxury and worldly success.

It is, perhaps, in the popular literature of America that we see the least favourable examples of the manner in which recent conditions of living affect literature for "the masses." It is certainly to America that we must go to see the most barefaced instances of pandering, and the most ingenious evasions of the higher

literary responsibility. Let us take up at random, from a pile of periodicals, one with a respectable name, and avowedly intended for family reading. The editor says in every number :—

“ Its contents are such as will be approved in the most fastidious circles nothing immoral being admitted into its pages. The paper contains no ultra sentiments, and meddles with neither politics nor religion, but is characterized by a high moral tone.”

And yet what do we find on the very page which contains this announcement, and side by side with the column for the young? We find advertisements—some of which the young could not understand—of such a nature that we could not dare to transfer them to our own pages; but here is a specimen of a milder kind, though quite bad enough, and it is one of numbers :—

“ Three young gentlemen, with plenty of leisure time, fond of excursions, picnics, theatres, sleigh-riding, dancing, suppers, champagne, &c., all of which they are deprived of in the region they reside in, would be pleased to receive letters from any lady willing to form their acquaintance. All letters answered promptly. Address,” &c., &c.

We take up another “family” paper, largely appealing to boys and girls. Here is a false note struck to begin with :—

“ The enthusiasm of the beautiful girl advocating this best of all books, inspired Joe with an intense desire to become better acquainted with it, and he pleaded with Jennie that she would read it to him, and tell him all about it. This request was joyfully received by her, and that very night she began her work. And she began, too, at the right place—the life and death of Christ, and its great divine meaning—that wondrous story of love and mercy which captivates and subdues all hearts; which none can resist, and none can condemn. As the transcendent character of that holy One was presented to his gaze, as the thrilling incidents of that unparalleled career from Bethlehem to Calvary passed before him, as he listened to the gracious words of Him who spoke as never man spoke, as he was brought face to face with the wrongs He endured, the parables He uttered, the miracles He performed, and the death He died, the strong man wept like a child, and alternately mourned and rejoiced.”

Of course, a sincere Christian will find no words too strong when speaking of the Christian life; but *these* words are mere literary upholstery. It is poor, thin maundering,—we were going to call it chlorotic Christianity; and close at hand there is a description of “an Egyptian Messalina.” In a story of a “child-wife married at school,” there is more than enough of such writing as this :—

“ Lenore Edmunds is nearly fifteen years of age; a rarely beautiful creature, with the dark, rich loveliness of a tropic flower.

“ She is at once the pride and terror of the seminary.

“ Full of pranks and capers as a young kitten, defiant of control, yet generous and loving, and pure and innocent as an angel.

“ This is sweet Lenore, the heroine of my true narrative.”

And in a tale of the Cuban insurrection we find the following passages:—

"The Spanish soldiers were in ecstasies over the appearance of a beautiful *vivandière* among them, ever ready to talk, or tender the beverage she carried in a small keg.

"When night came, she was walking around some of the buildings near the barracks, and easily effected an acquaintance with the sentinel, who was pacing, with martial step, in front of a large stone edifice.

"After a little conversation, she asked him 'if he wouldn't like something to warm him up?'

"Just what I have been thinking about ever since you first spoke; I ain't had any for some time."

"Do you drink brandy?" she asked.

"Oh! you have got something to wet my palate with. Well, that's better than *nothing*," said the soldier, with a disappointed look at the finely-formed girl, which soon changed, however, when he saw the cup being filled with the amber draught.

"If you will guard this, I will go for something to eat," said the *vivandière*, taking the miniature barrel from her side, and depositing it on the ground.

"Certainly he would; but, instead of the guard guarding it, he helped himself rather freely.

"She had scarce turned her back, ere that guardian was minding that dear little barrel so closely, that it would puzzle an expert to determine whether the tap belonged to the keg or the soldier.

* * * * *

"Can you violate the decision of the court-martial, without overstepping your power or authority?" asked the prisoner, in a low tone.

"We do many unlawful acts during emergencies," returned the colonel.

"But this is *no emergency*; 'tis true I was caught within your lines, but I swear *I am not Gonzales the spy!*"

"Rebel! fortitude and principle commands my respect, but when you attempt to foil me by falsehood, honour turns to hatred. Spy! I grant you ten minutes for prayer."

"At the expiration of the allotted time, Colonel Garcia walked over to the kneeling prisoner, and said:

"Soldier, are you prepared to retract your last statement, ere you confront your Maker?"

"No! I am not; but over my heart you will find my confession."

"Colonel Garcia unbuttoned the coat, and there, exposed to the astonished gaze of officer and soldiers, were nature's proofs that the prisoner was a woman!"

This is smart enough, but how it is to help growing boys and girls we cannot see.

We cut the following advertisement from a "family" magazine making the highest pretensions to morality:—

"A young lady, a member of a Christian Church, who, in a moment of thoughtlessness, was induced to leave her home and beloved parents through the sinister advice of a relative, now desires the counsel and sympathy of a Christian sister in order to restore her to the bosom of her family. The path of duty only having been departed from, the labour of love is easy, and the reward great. Address," &c., &c.

We trust the clever hypocrisy of this will excuse our reproducing it. The "young lady" must have known only too well that though no "Christian sisters" would reply, she would have no end of answers from correspondents of another kind. And, by-the-bye, this may serve to show the extreme difficulty of dealing with such matters by law. The advertisement—on the face of it—is more than harmless, while the object cannot be doubted, and yet cannot be proved, and certainly ought not to be assumed, for the ends of any law whatever.

We have another illustration of the same difficulty. Here again we are going to a "family" magazine, and the passage we are to extract is from a story expressly appealing to lads and lasses—especially lads. The girl in question is at school, and is, we suppose from the picture, about thirteen years old. The "trustee," or guardian, is a young man. The big girls of the school are having an undress romp in their bed-room; the young "trustee" is down-stairs; and the passage deserves attentive reading:—

"Madame dragged Lutie down to the little parlour, whither he had wisely fled.

"Here, sir!" she exclaimed, her voice shaking with rage. 'I demand that this insubordinate creature be punished to the extreme limit of our authority.'

"He put on all his dignity, and tried to look at her as if he had been fifty instead of thirty. There she stood, with only a little blue wrapper thrown over her night-dress; her short hair in curls, and tangled all over her head; and her little white feet bare! Poor Lutie! She could have sunk through the floor. Why *wasn't* that odious wrapper longer? it showed every bit of her feet—ankles, too—she reflected despairingly, after a side glance at the mirror.

"The young trustee thought he had never seen anything half so pretty in his life. Involuntarily he compared that little white, blue-veined foot to the one he had seen flopping up the staircase, not ten minutes since. He admired Lutie's hair excessively. He thought the little blue wrapper the very prettiest dress he'd seen yet; but that foot—and he suddenly became possessed with a desire to touch it, apparently an unattainable desire; but the young trustee was a man of many expedients. He rose, stopping madame's shrill gabble with a wave of his hand, and said majestically:

"I have not time at present to attend to this case; I will call to-morrow.'

"Notwithstanding her rage, madame bows servilely, and says it shall be as he wishes.

"With a cool 'Good-evening,' he turns to leave the room. Just as he passes Lutie, his glove accidentally drops; drops most unaccountably upon her very foot.

"Ah, well done!" thinks he, as he quickly stoops to seize it. Some way or other it slips from his hand, and, in stepping aside, Lutie finds, to her amazement, that now it is *under* her foot. With a polite, 'Excuse me,' the triumphant young trustee clasps the little warm foot in his hand, and gently draws the glove away. Lutie hardly knows whether to be desperately vexed, or to laugh; but she has no time to think of that now, for she is alone with madame, and madame is in such an infuriated state that Lutie flies off to her room, and locks the door; the other D. D.'s,

huddled together in the middle of the floor, receive her with open arms, and, after hearing her adventures, are base enough to congratulate her upon her chance to show off, in such becoming rig, to the handsome young trustee. Then they all go to bed, and sleep the sleep of the just.

"The next day the young trustee called, and remarked, resignedly, to madame, that he was prepared now to attend to the case of their troublesome charge.

"So Lutie was sent for, and, after having made herself look pretty as possible, she went to the little parlour. She took particular satisfaction in her dainty little boots and pretty curls, and hoped he had forgotten all about the tangles, and the bare feet. Whether he had or not, deponent saith not; but deponent knows that, while Lutie and the young trustee were together in the little parlour, they had no end of fun about something—laughed till madame, in desperation, opened the door, and found them confronting each other so gravely, that she apologized and went away."

We do not know anything more ingeniously prurient than this, and yet where is there an indecent word? The last few sentences are very vulgar, and that is all. The pruriency is to be felt, rather than defined.

We almost owe an apology to the readers of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for serving up such a mess as this, even with a justifiable motive. But we wish to emphasize our own strong feeling that neither ordinary education nor even religious education will suffice to keep up the standard of popular literature. The tastes of the majority must be law, because the majority are themselves law, and the young are no exception. These American periodicals are thickly buttered with Christian phraseology, and we see what purpose it serves. The whole question of engaging the attention of the young in favour of good literature is, every way, a most difficult one. It has at times quite a hopeless look about it—at all events, we cannot bring ourselves to deal in the customary commonplaces about it. Everybody is ready with a "What is wanted is this"—and yet, goodness only knows what is wanted. We should be sorry to see English editors adopt the tricks that are common in America—such as publishing photographs and memoirs of little boys at school who win prizes, thus puffing the schools and turning a penny in that line, as well as doing something to spoil the poor boys. We are not aware that they have yet got so far as publishing photographs of school-girls; but it is likely enough, for they freely publish stories of the love affairs—most fantastically conducted—of boys and girls of fourteen, and these with illustrations. It must be remembered, too, by those who think that the "education" of the masses will make an immense difference in these matters, that the public addressed by these trans-Atlantic periodicals is better read and more "respectable" than the public that would take in similar periodicals over here.

Yet it is not to be supposed that publishers who think they see

their way to much better things, who have large experience, and who have counted their resources, will stay their hands for any of the dismally discursive considerations suggested by what we have seen. For myself, I think the flood of bad literature could be very materially checked by any competent publisher taking a common-sense view of the subject, and working it out with the help of strong faith in human nature and in the general progress of society. Some things are clear, and admitted on all hands. Literature for boys and girls, as distinguished from children, must be forward-looking, and full of spirit and enterprise, and quick with the warm blood of youth. It must be full of incident and picture, its *motif* must be will and feeling, rather than ideas. It must not be goody-goody, and it must certainly not be prudish. Perfectly pure and modest, of course it must be, but it must be gay and fresh. And the spirit of divine obligation and human service must be everywhere present, though nowhere obtruded. When these conditions are united in literature for growing boys and girls, and when really high-class talent is brought to bear upon the production of such literature, a better state of things will have been begun. Much harm has undoubtedly been done by the diffusion of a false light, but this cannot be undone by excluding the people from all prospect of amelioration in their current literature. Never, never! The people, young as well as old, will be sure to read something; they will read what is offered to them. The incitements to an inappeasable mental restlessness are come into the world. The powers that awaken and foster the spirit of curiosity are to be found in every village; magazines are in every cottage and hovel. The infant's cries are hushed with picture-leaves, and the cottager's boy sheds his first bitter tears over pages which go to mould his character for life. From all desire to quietly stand by, and see this great power of the press falling into the devil's service, Good Sense deliver us!

A. STRAHAN.



THE RELIGIOUS AND CONSERVATIVE ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM.

PART I.

WHILST so many modes of what is vaguely known as Progress are at open or secret war with all systematic Religion and a traditional Order of life, there is one progressive school, and it is often thought to be of the extreme type, which takes, as the centre of its faith, systematic Religion and organic social Order. It is usually forgotten, that, of all the assaults directed on the system of Comte, the far larger part of necessity apply to any definite organization of religion and to any foundations of social order; so that they, who in the name of Science or of Liberty dispose of Positivism with a jest, for the most part begin with some half-unconscious assumption, that Religion is a thing we have outgrown, and individualism is an ultimate truth. Such men are naturally scandalized at an attempt to reconcile Science with Religion, rather because they have lost all faith in Religion as an institution, than because they are specially jealous for Science. And the secret of the indignation they display towards the discipline of life and of society, foreshadowed in the pages of Comte, is perhaps the silent hope that, when Science and Culture have said their last word, human life may get free from all discipline whatever.

It is usual enough to inveigh against the Positivist principle that Thought and Life must be placed on a religious basis and organized to a religious end, on the ground that this is mere Obscurantism, and a return to the Syllabus and the ages of

Faith. All this, too, is heard from men who decline to consider how the principle is applied, for this they have never examined, but on the simple *à priori* ground that religion must be kept in its place. That is to say, in fact, that they hold it to be a private æsthetic emotion; thus silently discarding the meaning which religion has had to the really religious world, be it Protestant or Catholic—nay, even Mahometan or Buddhist. It is usual again to make merry at the very mention of a Priesthood; though it is plain that, without a priesthood of some kind, call it what we will, no Christian Church could exist, neither Jew, Turk, nor Pagan community—nay, indeed, neither science, literature, or art. In civic, as in spiritual life, the same holds good. The very notion of *system*, or *organization*, or *institutions*, revolts the very soul of our critics; though they seem to forget that, if society could become the individual chance-medley it must be without these things, we should realize the dream of the wildest anarchists.

I shall attempt in these essays to show, that criticism of the kind is inspired by the old individualist temper which assails all religions in turn, and, further, that Comte stands alone, amongst all the philosophers of Progress, in claiming for Religion and Order the same importance they have held in the most spiritual and conservative of human systems. I am far from suggesting that he belongs to these various schools, or will ever find welcome amongst them. He is just as deeply pledged to the schools of Science and of Progress. But in these days, when all men are reconstructing their belief along with their armies and their navies, I take occasion to say, that widely in method and in data as Positivism must differ from the ancient systems of faith and life, it cherishes the same attitude of spirit and aims at kindred conclusions. It belongs, in the true sense of that word, to the spiritual, and not to the materialist philosophy; its allegiance is set in the realm of Belief, of Tradition, of Feeling, and not in that of criticism, revolution, or intellect.

Now, they who cling to a world of the more religious and more ordered type, looking on our Past as an object of veneration, of submission, and in some sense of imitation, who deliberately place Faith and Love above Knowledge or Power, the good order of society above the culture of individuals, so that the moral beauty of man's life be not sacrificed to the enlargement of our intelligence or of our resources—all who see much that is sterile, cruel, and discordant in this Jubilee of science, industry, and liberty—such should remember that, amongst all the progressive and realist schools of thought, Auguste Comte stands alone in repeating that, until Religion and Order interpenetrate Thought, Sentiment, and Action, there can be neither real Progress nor true Science.

Yet, such is the hold which names and forms gain over men's

minds, that Positivism is often numbered with the materialist, critical, and anarchical parties with whom it has least sympathy, and is denounced by men whose own peculiar principles it is striving to clothe with system. And thus, the philosopher who has worked out the meaning of religion, in its omnipresent influence on life, more richly and powerfully than any theologian, who, without sacrificing freedom, has given education and discipline the importance dreamed of by Plato, and who, above poets and preachers, has celebrated the supreme place of all moral and æsthetic beauty, is spoken of by the superficial as the prophet of a cynical and subversive materialism.

I propose now to call attention to some of the religious and conservative aspects of this system; and, in so doing, I would rather address (if I might) those who have not lost all sympathy with ancient sentiments and institutions, than those who have run up the black flag against all such obsolete weakness. I shall first have to show that Positivism is entitled to use the words religious or conservative, in their natural sense. Throughout I shall never forget, and shall strive that no reader shall forget, that this system has its positive and its constructive side quite as important and distinct; that its care for science and for progress is quite as real as its zeal for religion and order. It seeks to combine both, and not to present a paradox of contradictory principles. Nothing, indeed, is accomplished unless it effects a real, and not a verbal alliance of science with religion, conservatism with movement. A rehabilitation or adaptation it utterly rejects, any straining of discarded formulæ, or gilding of condemned foundations. In these days of antiquarian revival, it repudiates Neo-Christianity as much as the New Feudalism, the higher Pantheism, or the return to the state of Nature. By its name and genius it is pledged at the outset to the real, the scientific, the useful, the demonstrable, the human. And if it incorporates with these so much of the genius of ancient life, it does this by virtue not of its restoring the belief or practice of the past, nor by reimposing them, nor imitating them, but by honestly working out from facts the law of their natural development.

To pass at once to "the root of the matter," as it was well called in a great age. It is sometimes asked—what meaning can the term *Religion* have for Comte? Now, it is no paradox to say, that the conditions and elements of religion have never been so thoroughly conceived before, by Theologian or by Philosopher, Christian or Pagan, ancient or modern. I am not about to enter upon the complex idea, in which he finds religion embodied; much less am I going to enter upon any defence of it. I confine myself now to the single point—that the scope, function, and parts of

Religion have never been completely examined, until this was done by the founder of Positivism. It is a singular thing, that amidst the masses of Theological literature, and the myriad writers on every phase of religion, there has never been put forth any adequate analysis of religion as an institution, or any systematic account of its functions and elements. It is still more significant, that the loosest and most opposite meanings are from time to time affixed to the very word; and any sonorous metaphor seems to satisfy men as an account of that institution of life, which most men declare to be of supreme importance, and yet which almost all men understand in a different sense.

From the point of view of those who know, or have ever known, the majestic symmetry of any organized Religion, how flippant are the terms in which we so often hear Religion described! "The relation of man to the Unseen," "to the Unknown," "to the Invisible," say many; and one philosopher has gone so far as to assure us, that it is "the relation of man to the Unknowable." Another declares that it is "what the Immensities have to say to us;" another that it is a sense of "the stream of Tendency, &c." One who has written more about Religion than ten theologians, deliberately assures us, at the close of thirty volumes, that it is a "great heaven-high Unquestionability," or "the inner light of a man's soul." Well, but the inner light of some men's souls tells them to get on in the world—to eat, drink, and be merry. The Immensities tell many men to make hay whilst the sun shines; the greedy speculator finds the stream of Tendency take him into swindling adventures; and the utter reprobate has long set his teeth with a curse, that Religion certainly is the Unknowable, and treats of the Unknowable only.

Now I say, to men who have known what a working Religion is, how hollow would such phrases ring! Take men like St. Bernard, or Aquinas, or Cromwell, or Calvin, or Wesley, or Ken, to speak only of Christians. They were not to be put off by a phrase. They meant by Religion a creed—i.e. a coherent body of doctrines, and further, a definite form of worship, and above all, a system governing men's lives. That is what is meant amongst ourselves still by Cardinal Cullen, or Cardinal Manning; by the Wesleyan Congregation; nay, we may add, by the Archbishop of Canterbury, or Canon Liddon. To all such men, to the workers in any organized religion, these phrases about the "Unseen" and the "Unquestionability" betray the mind struggling to fly upwards on the wings of a metaphor from the presence of intelligible propositions. Men who sneer at the Mass or the Thirty-nine Articles, and who think the Bible a set of poems, hagiologies, homilies—anything except the revealed word of God—are forced into mysticism when they try to define a thing so complex and

real as Religion, whilst shrinking from all systematic forms whether of confession or of practice.

But I will say nothing of those who, in an age fulminous with gathering scepticism and atheism, have persuaded themselves that men and women can be taught to bow down before a nebulous Theosophy, or a yet more nebulous Atheosophy. Organized Religions of every kind have had little trouble in dealing with Mystics, even when the mysticism meant a fanatical society and an iron discipline. How much more readily can they dispose of a mysticism which is purely intellectual, and even that but languidly, and of which the only passionate element is a jealous individualism? Mysticism has at times been troublesome; but certainly not when it was little but a well-bred esoteric culture, and every man insisted on being his own mystic.

To turn rather to the really Christian world, to all the manifold sections of sincere men, who in various ways retain a living hold on Christianity, and look for its ultimate triumph not only over all the yellow, black, and white races of men, but over all difficulties, doubts, and facts; over all philosophies and sciences; over mammonism, wars, and antagonisms amongst men: how often even they are found seeking to transcendentalize their own religion, to escape from its old dogmas, and efface its ancient discipline! The great and growing movement we call Neo-Christianity is virtually an attempt to shake off at once the burden of creed, ritual, and Church, in the sense in which the founders of Christianity (and indeed in which plain men) ever understood these things; and to substitute for all these an elastic Theosophy, coloured, at the will of the believer, by the Sermon on the Mount, or the letters of Paul. *Longo intervallo*, in analogous ways, the many phases of the Latitudinarian Churches labour to ease their aching shoulders of creed, form, and discipline—to rise into a wider, more humane, more God-like Christianity—something more catholic, more full of sweetness and of light, on more harmonious terms with Science, more tolerant of differences, more Christ-like in fellowship. In plain words, something more vague. They are afraid to strain their own creeds, not quite sure that they are seaworthy, they have not the nerve to enforce their own discipline, and their consciences get wounded on the harder angles of their official morality. It was a sad sight—pitifully strange—to see a noble heart and an eloquent moralist, one whose party has died with him, raising up his fettered hands in the pulpit as if in love with his own official chains, rejoicing like Paul in these bonds, and so pour out a flood of indignation over the Scriptural sentiments he was ordered to rehearse, or the plain doctrines he was bound to preach, and the narrow walls of the Church he would force himself to think Catholic; and then, after repudiating ortho-

doxy from the depths of a fine nature, wind up with a sonorous Theosophy, which meant to his hearers what is meant by a country choir when they sing—Hallelujah-Salem.

How many sections of Christians are really seeking to vaporize or sublimate their religion, on the plea of more humane and comprehensive ends, but perhaps rather to escape from the bonds of the definite and the systematic? The troubled air resounds with Pan-Christianities, Pantislatries, Eirenika, the fraternization of Churches, and the amalgamation of sects. One sect is exalting Theism, by getting rid of the Gospel; whilst another school implores us to save the religion of Jesus by giving up our belief in God. Churchmen and Dissenters would exchange pulpits as freely as migratory curates; and some burn with zeal to uproot the wall of demarcation, whether in formularies or in graveyards. It is very right and noble; but very significant. Churches and Sects are rising out of the four chill walls of their long death-sleep, like the dead in a mediæval Last Judgment; they are embracing and joining hands, as they find themselves new-winged with Spiritual Interpretation, and rise transfigured into an impalpable Light, of which the mystical effulgence is such that, sometimes we may fear, they can hardly see, or indeed be seen, by the human and carnal eye.

One Christian Church, it is true, shows a marked contrast with this tendency. Amidst this eagerness of the rest to escape outside of their own skins, and to find a new *pou sto* in pure æther, Rome has been distinctly, systematically, hardening her own system. She is making her formulæ far more definite, and has applied them with startling courage to all the problems of the world. In all three parts of a religion, in doctrine, worship, and government, especially in the last, she at least has been showing no cowardice of her opinions, no desire to apologize herself into a metaphor. Therein, doubtless, in her own light she is right. That profound staff, which from the Vatican directs the Catholic army, a staff to which that of Von Moltke is as a petty and clumsy machine, has long been at work to refit every part of the Catholic organism, and to make more unmistakable the mechanism of its discipline. The growing success of this tremendous project, the insignificance of the Old Catholic bubble, and of all attempts at rebellion, have shown how truly the scheme was in the air and akin to the spirit of the situation. That sagacity of Papal Rome, comparable to nothing in history but to the sagacity of Imperial Rome, saw, no doubt, that in the great and final battle with Revolution and Science, a Religion, like a State, or an army, must tighten and not loosen its cohesion; must give its whole intellectual and practical mechanism more unhesitating authority. Suicidal, we may say, in the long run; but inevitable for the

occasion. The re-assertion of Ultramontaniam, in which Prince Bismarck, afflicted like so many Roman Emperors with the delirium tremens of power, sees a spectre threatening his life, is really as old as our own generation; it began when the Catholic staff first realized the crisis to be met, and resolved on the desperate issue—*S. Petrus contra mundum*. Suicidal it may be—but Rome, at any rate, will not die of *nephelo-cephalus*, nor swear that she never meant anything by Christianity, but a devout form of Pantheism.

But with the exception of Rome, and no doubt of those of her satellites, the more Romanizing Anglicans, who reflect her policy, there is a prevalent tendency to make religion a much more vague and elastic thing than it was. Now, when men say that it explains the relation of man to the "Unseen" or the "Invisible" world, the phrase means anything or nothing. All this is true of the larger part of such a science as Physics; and the phrase might fairly express the connection of electricity with Biology. The worthy Christians who assure us that "Religion explains the links between the human and the spiritual world" are using a phrase which is often in the mouth of a common spiritualist swindler. To say simply that it provides for the good of the Soul, is to shut Religion out from all part in physical and scientific truth. To say simply that it assures us of the Life hereafter, is to say, that it does not explain the life here; and it is to say, moreover, that Moses and David had no religion. Those who say that Religion is the "relation of mankind to the Creator" mean something intelligible when they start with a definite revelation contained in Church or Bible. But they, who in these days of Biblical criticism are nervous about literal inspiration, may indeed talk of "the relation of man to the Creator," but they really mean what they have brought themselves to hold as right, or true, or good. We thus find a striking contrast in the way in which men use the definite name of the Deity. The more unimpassioned and speculative reasoner shows a strange anxiety to avoid the name of God. He will substitute capital letters and decasyllabic entities, or a whole paragraph of words, for the simple old word—God. On the other hand, the more vehement and thoughtless are disposed to describe their personal likings or individual thoughts as manifestations of their Almighty. And a man's favourite hobby becomes the will of God; and his own private opinion is "God's truth." All these descriptions of Religion, and all forms of Religion, remain thus simple formulæ for the speaker's personal views, unless when he avows a *coherent scheme of doctrines*, as the basis of an *organized code of practice*.

Amidst all these tendencies to make Religion a more transcendental and idiosyncratic thing than it ever has been, it is, I repeat,

a significant fact, that a philosopher of progress should be the man to vindicate for Religion its old organic, dogmatic, and social type. In so doing, he recalls to us what Religion has meant, wherever it has been a permanent power—what it was to the ancient Theocracies, of which the law of Moses or Mahomet is a type; what it was, and in fact is, in the Catholic Church; what it meant to Hooker, Calvin, Knox, or Wesley. I am obviously speaking, not of the tenets or practices peculiar to any of these. I am dealing entirely with the part which it bore to man's life, and the function it claimed to perform. In his chapter on the Theory of Religion,* Comte has elaborately discussed the tasks which every Religion must undertake, and the various parts of which it must consist. This is of course of general application; and it is equally open to the Catholic or the Anglican, the Wesleyan or the Jew, to argue, each that his particular religion best fulfils these different duties, and is most aptly constituted in all its parts. But the fact remains, that the functions, and breadth, and parts of Religion have never been set forth before with equal completeness, or with at all similar comprehension. A brain like that of Aquinas, no doubt, had conceived a Theology as equally the master science of life; and a spirit like that of St. Bernard had in some sort made it visibly incorporate with his age. But the absolute and superhuman nature of their creed made it impossible for either of them to see how Religion could be a part of Thought without superseding it—could influence Thought whilst leaving it free; just as it prevented them from conceiving Religion as interpenetrating and elevating mundane life, whilst developing all its beauty. And as the philosophy of Religion was never worked out in mediæval times, this has not been done in later times. And though many a Church has practically exhibited a general idea of what Religion undertakes, this has never been carried out into systematic exposition. It is far from impossible, that when this, the greatest of all the conceptions of Comte, shall be adequately known, the orthodox may come, as by night, to quarry for material in its foundations. For the analysis of the fundamental elements of religious power may well serve, in presence of anarchical attacks, to supply justification and defence to most of the ancient constructions. The work of Comte is so comprehensive, that the builders of many methods can find in it available material. It stands, like the Amphitheatre at Rome, open and accessible to all; the stones, ornaments, and pillars of many a famous palace have been dug out of its walls; the Barberini of letters† have plundered it most actively, whilst the Barbarians of

* "Positive Polity," ii. ch. 1.

† Quod non fecerunt Barbari, fecere Barbarini.

reaction seek only to destroy it; but after plunder and assaults it looks vaster and more massive.

It is impossible in a few pages to give any adequate account of a theory which is contained in the whole of a very long work. All that can here be attempted is to give a mere outline, as far as possible in his own words, of what Comte understands by Religion. The term itself must denote complete harmony in human life, whether social or individual, when all the parts of life are ordered in their natural relations to each other. Now, this implies that it embraces at once the heart and the intellect; for both must concur to produce any true unity of life. But what does this unity require? Its task is to consolidate and *regulate* the personal life of each individual, quieting the conflict of instincts within; and then to *combine* these separate lives, and to find some common principle which can temper their activities in unison. Man is a social creature; and he is at peace within, only when he is in harmonious union with his fellows. Intellectual, moral, and practical union—each is best realized in persons, under conditions similar to those which can realize the three kinds of union amongst aggregates of men. Here, then, we have the primary axiom: the business of Religion is as much to *combine* societies, as it is to *regulate* individuals. If it confine itself to the latter alone, the social instincts urging men to *combination* will escape from its sphere—they will form ideals of their own; the ideal of personal life will jar with the ideal of social life (as so often we see it now); and Religion will be left stranded, with no access to the highest and most abiding of human instincts—the social.

Now, this is precisely the danger towards which Religion has long been leading; but into which the vaguer Theosophies and Atheosophies would all utterly plunge it. When Religion confines itself to explain the relation of man's soul to the Unseen and the Unquestionability, directing it to that high goal by its own "inner light," *ex hypothesi*, Religion confines itself to the individual life, and withdraws in silence from the social. It may give an efflorescence to the personal development of some; but what if it hand over their social development to instinct? Such a doctrine must rest upon a basis of pure individualism—*i.e.*, the rule to perfect the individual by system, and to leave society to perfect itself.

Next to the primary axiom—that the business of religion is to *combine* men as much as to *regulate* lives—we pass to the two aspects which any unity must present. It is the fashion to speak sometimes as if Religion were solely a thing of Feeling, sometimes as if it were solely a thing of Intellect. Our modern Neologians float mistily between an aspiration and an idea. Now, Comte, in accordance with all organized systems, insists that Religion has

two co-ordinate conditions, first an Intellectual and then a Moral centre.

"To constitute any true religious state there must be a concurrence of two primary elements: the one, objective, and essentially intellectual; the other, subjective, and essentially moral. Thus Religion exerts an influence at once over the understanding and the feelings, neither of which separately would suffice to establish a true unity, either for individual or for collective life. On the one hand, it is requisite that our minds should conceive a Power without us—so superior to ourselves as to command the complete submission of our entire life. But, on the other hand, it is equally indispensable that our moral nature should be inspired within by one affection, capable of habitually combining all the rest. These two essential conditions naturally tend to work as one; since the sense of submission to a Power without necessarily seconds the discipline of the moral nature within; and this in turn prepares the way for the spirit of submission to that Power.

"The extreme difficulty which in modern times is found to arrive at any *mental* condition of unity, leads us frequently to suppose unity possible only in the field of *morals*. It is, no doubt, only in the moral nature that any agreement at all is consistently sustained in the midst of the prevailing anarchy. But the too obvious imperfection of this moral unity as a basis of Order, whether public or private, is a very good proof of the inherent weakness of this principle by itself, either to combine men or to regulate human life.

"Even if the nature of the human brain permitted more completely than it does, the supremacy of the higher instincts, still their constant ascendancy would not establish any true unity within us, especially in the sphere of action, without an objective basis without us, which the intellect only can supply. So long as this belief in an external Power remains incomplete or unsteady, the loftiest emotions are no check against infinite extravagance and profound disagreement. What would be the consequence of supposing the life of man entirely independent of the external world? In this preposterous hypothesis not only would the activity of our race be at once deprived of any substantial object, but the benevolent emotions also would at the same time lose all character of consistency, and would ultimately be wasted in barren and aimless effusion.

"In order, then, to regulate or to combine mankind, Religion must, in the first instance, place man under the influence of some external Power, possessed of superiority so irresistible as to leave no sort of uncertainty about it. This great principle of social science is at bottom merely the full development of that primary notion of sound Biology—the necessary subordination of every Organism to the Environment in which it is placed. . . . A sound theory of Biology thus furnishes the Positive theory of Religion with a foundation wholly unassailable; for it proves the general necessity for the constant supremacy of an external Power as a condition of unity for man, even in his individual life."

To pass now to the Moral centre of Unity, it is more important and yet more difficult. The task is to order and harmonize all the emotions, whilst yet leaving all of them free.

"The second condition necessary to religion, its Moral unity, we must regard as the principal means of establishing indispensable harmony with the first, or Intellectual unity. This is, by its nature, invariable, at least in all essential laws; and thus the mutual agreement between them must in the main be due to the moral element, which alone can dispose the being to voluntary submission. We have hitherto not properly distinguished

submission from a degrading servility, for want of a sound moral theory. Of the three Organs of the brain devoted to the altruistic instincts, the religious sentiment depends principally on that of Veneration. This is the disposition which accords best with feelings of devotion towards a superior Power. But beside the reaction of Veneration on Attachment as well as Benevolence, these also must share directly, although in a less degree, in originating that composite feeling of which Religion is the product. In fact, to make submission complete, *Affection* must unite with *Respect*; and this combination of feelings is indeed effected spontaneously by the sense of gratitude, which has its origin in the union of dependence and respect. This relation, at first, seems limited to the most special of the sympathetic instincts—that which we especially call Attachment. But it extends also to the highest, that of universal Benevolence, on which the complete unity of the affections more especially depends. To this end it is enough, that the same disposition be observed in the external Power, which by its superiority demands our submission. This similarity of feeling between the external Power and those subject to its influence has nothing of the fortuitous about it; it is a consequence of the universality of the benefits conferred. This is such that no one of the various beings whose submission is supposed can claim them for itself exclusively. In the second place, the profound respect inspired by the Supreme Power awakens also a mutual sentiment of benevolence in all who join in devotion to the same great Object. This last characteristic of the religious spirit leads us to comprehend a further attribute of the external Power. We must suppose, in fact, that the Supreme Power admits of a real attachment on our part, an idea which presumes in it a faculty by which its natural Goodness controls the exercise of its Authority. By this further condition of the religious state we get a more complete union between its two principal conditions: Belief and Love.”

Here, then, we are brought face to face with the great difficulty and pitfall which Religion must surmount. It must first have an intellectual centre of thought in a dominant Power without us; it must next have a moral centre of Emotion in a supreme love. Yet this lofty affection within us, though it must reign over life and inspire our thoughts, must not encroach on, or distort, the conception of external fact. *Unless this be true* the whole equilibrium is destroyed.

“The religious state, therefore, has for its basis the permanent combination of two conditions equally essential—Love and Belief; these, though profoundly distinct, must conspire to one natural end. Each of them, beside that it is itself indispensable, adds to the other an element, without which its complete efficacy would not be exerted. Such is the instability of our cerebral organization, that Belief would not be perfect without Love, however high might be the degree of demonstration reached. But conversely the best heart would fail in due Love for any external Power whose very existence admitted of continual doubt. And thus, whilst Love stimulates Conviction by overcoming pride, Conviction prepares the way for Love by counselling submission.

“These are broadly the respective parts which fall to the feelings and to the reason in that supreme task of human skill—the formation by a series of efforts, at first instinctive and then systematic, of some principle of Unity to govern the active life of man, individual or collective. Harmony in the moral sphere results from the subjection of the egoistic to the altruistic feelings; mental unity is derived from the predominance of an external Order over us. On the one hand, all our instincts are con-

centrated under one Affection, which alone can reduce them to order ; on the other hand, all our ideas group themselves round the contemplation of a Force external to us. At the same time this economy of external nature furnishes us with a direct guide to action, which consists in accepting this order of nature with dignity, or in modifying it with wisdom. Our being is thus knit together, within and without, by a complete convergence both of the feelings and of the thoughts towards that Supreme Power which controls our acts. At that point there arises Religion in its true sense, that is, a complete unity, whereby all the motives of conduct within us are reduced to a common object, whilst our conduct as a whole submits with freedom to the necessity imposed by a power without. The mere composition of this admirable word will serve to suggest the leading idea of this theory ; it recalls the fact of two states of unity in succession : the first, the combination of the powers within ; the second, the connection with the Force without. This is the issue in which terminates the grand dualism of positive thought between the organism and its environment ; or rather between Man and the World ; or, better still, between Humanity and the Earth."

Such is the twofold function of Religion, such its two conditions. We pass to its three parts, as they concern thought, feeling, or action. It must first explain to us the aggregate of that external Order, the Power which governs our lives. Next it must cultivate feelings ; and thirdly it must govern conduct. We thus get in the positive theory the three parts of every organized Religion : DOCTRINE, WORSHIP, GOVERNMENT.

"Such are the constituent parts of Religion, which, undertaking to reduce human life to unity, brings within its sphere the three chief sides of our nature, Thought, Feeling, Action. The Doctrine thus forms the ground-work for the Worship, and the Worship for the Government. This, the natural arrangement of the three elements, shows the propriety of the universal rule that a religion must be characterized by its worship. The worship, which holds a middle place, is dependent on the doctrine, and instrumental to the government, and thus is entitled in principle to represent them both. Taking the worship and the government together, we have the true twofold division of Religion into the sphere of Faith and that of Love. Taking, on the other hand, the worship with the doctrine, we have another combination, that of the theoretic element and of the practical element. If we are to regard Religion as composed of two elements only, we must take it as a combination of Worship and Government. But the analysis which I finally choose as the best to express the true series of parts is that which makes Religion to consist of three essential elements : Doctrine, Worship, and Government. Thus Religion in its complete form resumes in itself the entirety of man's real existence, and is equally scientific, æsthetic, and practical. It thus combines in their sources the three great creations of man, philosophy, poetry, and politics. This universal synthesis begins by giving system to the study of the True ; next, it idealizes the instinct for the Beautiful ; and, finally, it realizes the attainment of the Good."

It is impossible in such a sketch as this to enter on the vast construction of thought and practice by which these ends are worked out. Suffice it to say that it fills the whole of four large volumes. In these no substantive branch of science is omitted ; no established feature of worship discarded ; nor any element of

discipline neglected. The charge which is most usually brought against it is rather that it exaggerates and overelaborates the rites or the rules familiar to organized systems of religion. It would be difficult indeed to find a single sentiment dear to the devout, or a single act of practical piety, which has not its analogue in the Positivist ideal.

Wherein, then, if on the score of devotion it so deliberately sets itself to follow the analogies of Christian, and still more of Catholic, worship—wherein is the signal difference by which it stands at the opposite pole to all theological schemes? It is this. The Doctrine of Positivism is no half-mystical utterance about superhuman entities, nor even a scheme of salvation of the Soul, in which the earth and the body—man's visible dwelling-place and his activity in it—form simply an unhonoured appendage—a mournful corollary. By Doctrine, Comte meant simply the sum of positive knowledge, the consensus of all science, the real laws of the whole field of phenomena, physical and moral, Cosmological, or all those relating to the World, and Sociological, or all those relating to mankind. Thus is science reconciled with religion by religion having as one of its parts, as its external and intellectual basis, the sum of science; not science in its concrete facts, or developed in its departmental details, but the consensus of the principles of science, however briefly for the time being these may be summed up. Thus all possible antagonism between science and religion is at end; and no less so that hopeless division of the field between the two empires, which seems now the accepted solution. It was the fashion to tell us that the business of science is to explain the facts of the material world, and the business of religion to explain to us the inner truths of the spiritual world. But now that science insists on dealing with the social and the moral world, and this claim can no longer be gainsaid, this division of empire is obviously hopeless. All that theologians have, then, to say is either that the statements of science are wicked—which is the Syllabus; or that, however true, they are subordinate to a higher law, one of arbitrary will—which is mysticism. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.*

Now, in the Positive theory, neither is there any antagonism between science and religion, for science is itself, in its natural sense, the *creed*; nor, on the other hand, is there any partition of the field between the two, because religion on its other two sides idealizes the creed by *worship*, and carries it out into harmonious action by *discipline*. In the culmination of the Catholic system, and in the first infancy of science, it was, say in the age of Aquinas, almost possible for rational men to believe that religion could embrace, or at any rate could inspire, all positive knowledge. But the gigantic achievements of positive knowledge soon left

the theological creed standing apart in a sanctuary of its own. From that moment the antagonism of the two became hopeless; and in one sense, the dead-lock of both became complete. For centuries Theology has been struggling, first to incorporate, then to crush, next to emasculate science; and now its only hope is to escape from it into a fortress with a remnant of the faithful. For centuries Science has been struggling, first to get a hearing for itself, then to exterminate Theology, and now to treat it with silent indifference. But, however sublimely it affect to ignore Theology, it cannot establish its own reign. The vast multitudes call for a religion; they cry out for a creed which is not a mere pantology, an encyclopædia of facts and theories, for a worship which shall idealize their spiritual nature, and for a Church which can bind them into spiritual communion. If they ask science for these things, science can only turn on them a smile of wonder and pity. It calmly invites them to go to the Churches for all this; and to the Churches they go, for the most part muttering amidst the services of their faith—*E pur si muove*.

Science must remain for ever a thing for scientific men, a mere erudite encyclopædia, and not the mind of the world, so long as it insists on being morally sterile, devoid of social duty, misty and hesitating, even when not cynical or evasive, about a Supreme Power and a Providence—in other words, *materialist*. Religion must remain for ever a thing for the meditative hours of the devout, and not be the guide of thought and life, so long as it will not see that science is a part of itself, its only possible creed; so long as it fails to make all knowledge its own proper sphere, and man's natural life and being here its direct task—in other words, so long as it remains *unreal*. Something of this kind was once the ideal of Catholicism in its glory, an ideal to which it came nearer, in fact, than systems often come to their ideals. We can hear the echoes of this claim in the Syllabus to-day. When Christianity first dealt with the chaos of Polytheism, the moral abyss was so awful that all the attention was directed on purifying the moral nature, and checking the license of life. It was natural then to make short work with the intellect by some absolute and sublime dogmas. But as things grew, and thought enlarged, and won for itself a vast empire, the fatal consequences appeared when religion claimed to direct life without embodying the best attainable knowledge. From that time the conflict has deepened; so that religion palpably cannot direct the mundane life, of which it does not pretend to know the simplest laws; whilst science is for ever baffled before the obstinate religious instincts of mankind, because it chooses to have no part or interest in the highest part of man's nature.

What, then, is the issue, as worked out by Comte? It is that

religion fails for not being true to itself, for shrinking from its full domain, and for abdicating its ancient, and still nominal, claim to direct life. To direct life, it must generally know and teach all that is to be known. It must ally itself with Science, by adopting science into itself, without reserve or equivocation. So, too, science must rise to a higher estimate of its own self. It has grander realms yet to conquer. It must possess itself of the spiritual, as completely as it has won the material sphere. Science must become religious, and Religion must become scientific: religion taking science as its creed; and science being organized to far higher ends by developing itself into religion.

It is no part of my present purpose to enlarge on the mode in which Comte has answered the problems he states, or to set forth the form of religion which he himself has proposed. It would be a very long and difficult task to do so; and those who feel any interest in the matter will prefer to follow out his intricate reasoning on the most subtle of all his conceptions in his own words. I am concerned now only with this: to draw attention to the full and profound insight into the conditions of Religion which he has shown, and to insist that they are at least as complete as those which are aimed at in any known creed. It is open to any one to argue that, even if Comte has adequately stated the functions and Parts of Religion, his own solution of the problem fails to satisfy his own data. For my own part, I have no sort of doubt that they are most amply fulfilled; but this is a point which I have here no means of maintaining. All that I can undertake is to show that the aim which he proposes to reach is substantially the same as that which has been aimed at in those systems of Religion where the aim has been highest and widest.

For this reason, his scheme has necessarily met the whole of the opposition which is always at hand in the critical schools, to reduce Religion to an idea or an emotion. Those whose millennium would be to see it reft of all organic character, whether in creed, worship, or government, are naturally scandalized by what seems to them a desertion of the spirit of free thought, the attempt to reconstruct all three on still broader lines. It is obvious at once how all of the current theories of Latitudinarian Theology, be they within or without the Christian pale, even that singular product of our age, Gospel-Atheism itself, signally fail before the tests which Comte has constructed, or, more properly speaking, has revived. These Unseens, Unquestionabilities, Unknowables, Streams of Tendency, will take us a very short way either in creed, worship, or government. If the creeds of Christianity had stopped short at the Incomprehensible of Athanasius, there would have been neither Catholic nor Protestant Churches, but only a few obscure ontological sects. A Supreme

Power which can only be described by a negative prefix is not likely to be very much of a power. The Gospel-Atheism, which scorns the imputation that it holds to a Personal God, whilst insisting on the spiritual beauty of the Bible, might as well find religion to consist in listening to the music of Beethoven. The Bible, spiritualized by the free imagination of the reader, may, like grand music, suggest most beautiful ideas. But unhappily, it will suggest very different ideas to each different reader, and for the most part will only irradiate ideas which were already floating in his mind.

These are surely the two congenital vices of every one of the schemes for eliminating from Religion systematic creeds and organized government; whether these schemes be Neo-Christian, Anti-Christian, Theistic, Pantheistic, or Anti-theistic. As they substitute an idea, more or less vague, for a coherent system, they cannot combine, but can only separate men. And, by the same reason, they make all Religion subjective; and leave it practically to each mind to fashion its own. Those who reverently use the ancient name of God for their Supreme Power, declining all Decasyllables as well as Rivers of Metaphor, are in a very different position. So long as they mean by God what Augustine meant, or what Luther or Cromwell meant, and mean by God's Government of the world what is taught by the Churches, or what is told them in plain words in the Bible, so long they are possessed of a substantive Doctrine, a common Worship, and a practicable Government. But when they speak with their lips of God, and God's will, but in their hearts mean not the Judge of quick and dead, so much as the All, or the Good, and the inner light of a man's soul, taking themselves to be now far out of the stage of Creeds and Articles, Rituals, or Discipline, then are they turning their religion into a piece of poetry, which can as little *regulate* their lives, *combine* them with their fellows, and *unite* their own souls within, as if they thought to find all this by listening to the Mass in C.

Comte is thus entirely in a line with all the organized religions in maintaining that there can be no religion at all, unless it be at once *definite* and *systematic*, comprising a whole body of fixed doctrines, offering a complete worship, and imposing a consistent method of life. It has been the fashion to sneer at his close approach on many sides to Catholicism itself. But this close approach he himself distinctly proclaimed, as when he said that the moral purpose of that scheme could hardly ever be improved, much less superseded. And his authorized exponent in England most happily parried a sarcasm by saying that Positivism was Catholicism *plus* Science. But it would be far from true to suppose that Positivism finds analogies in Catholicism alone, in this battle

it is waging for organized religion. On the contrary, it so far repeats and establishes all that has been claimed by every living Protestant Church, and, indeed, by every spiritual community which ever had a history. Dogma, ritual, and government, was the theory of the Church of England at its foundation, and all that is vigorous within it still labours to carry that theory into action. It is still the theory and the practice of those Protestant communities amongst us which have been able to resist the devouring Spiritualism whereby Christianity, in so many Protestant groups, is evaporating into a legend. It was also the theory as well as the practice, of all the historical religions recorded in the past, and still dominant over men. It was reserved for our age to discover that religion was a thing all soul and no body, an aspiration or an idea, but not a system or a doctrine. The very suggestion of such a view is one of those bits of æsthetic mysticism which sometimes, in presence of a great revolution, seize upon cultured minds, too sceptical to defend the old, and too indolent to join with the new. Just as the Platonizing Jews thought that the religion of Moses could be interpreted into reason and grace; so Hypatia thought that all the poetry of Polytheism might be spared by turning it into an allegory. Both thought that anything was better than to get rid of one dogmatic religion, only to fall into another, of far more definite creed and much more real a discipline.

Indignation has been lavished on Comte, and pulpits have rung with lamentation, that any one could have conceived of religion, devoid of the sense of a ruling power. The objection would be most just, and the indignation most right, if this were really the case. But the contrary is, in fact, the truth. Neither theologian nor moralist has ever insisted more earnestly than Comte that the harmony of moral life within us, and the association of men in communion, are both equally impossible, without the ever-present sense of a superior power controlling our lives, itself endowed with sympathies kindred to our own. This is, in truth, the central point of his conception of religion, both on the intellectual and on the moral side. Those who have spoken of Positivism as a mere apotheosis of all human kind, as the idealization of human pride, as the consecration of intellectual self-sufficiency, may well be astonished to find how every line of Comte's theory of religion implies a Power outside of each of us, as well as outside of all of us, of which no one of us is part, from which all our strength comes, and to which all our services are due, whom we can love, and who loves us, and into whose bosom we may return for the life after death. Nothing, again, can be more marked than the sense of humility, of gratitude, of self-surrender which Positivism inspires in each believer, of the littleness of his own services,

and yet, withal, of the happiness which it produces to render them :—

“A deeper study of the great universal Order reveals to us at length the ruling power within it of the true Great Being, whose destiny it is to bring that Order continually to greater perfection, by constantly conforming to its laws; and which thus best represents to us that system as a whole. This undeniable Providence, the supreme dispenser of our destinies, becomes, in the natural course, the common centre of our affections, our thoughts, and our actions. Although this Great Being evidently exceeds the utmost strength of any, even of any collective human force, its constitution and its function endow it with the truest sympathy towards all its servants. The least amongst us can and ought constantly to aspire to maintain and even to improve this Being. This becomes the natural object of all our activity, both public and private; and it gives the character of our whole existence, either in feeling or in thought. For our existence as a whole must be devoted to love and to know, in order rightly to serve our Providence, by a wise use of all the means which it furnishes to us. In its turn again, this continued service of our lives, whilst strengthening our true unity, renders us at once both happier and better. And at length it has the power to incorporate us at the end of life in that Great Being, in the development of which we have had a part to bear.”

It is impossible here to trace out the highly artificial conception in which Comte finds these conditions realized. It is no doubt open to any one to argue that his conception is not a reality at all, or that it falls far short of the problem. It is not, however, open to any thoughtful reader of his words to say that the conditions, as he states them himself, are not the conditions of the religious spirit. It must be an eristic mind indeed which, carefully weighing the work as a whole, should undertake to deny that, true or false, it effectually meets the character of religion. The statement of the problems of religion, apart, indeed, from the results, would have satisfied Augustine or Aquinas; and the religious ardour of the method would touch chords in the hearts of Bernard or Bossuet.

This explains and justifies, what at first sight may surprise many, Comte's constant reprobation of Atheism and Materialism. No theologian or preacher of any Church or sect has ever condemned both with more lively indignation. Atheism in particular stands with Comte as a synonym for a worthless brain and a base heart; for he sees in atheists the most illogical of all metaphysicians, and the most ungrateful of all rebels. Habitually he speaks of atheism, as well as materialism, in the vein of a very earnest Christian. What is the meaning of this? For it is most certain that he says nothing of God or of Gods, except by way of history; and he treats with contempt the hypothesis of the Soul being an entity or substantive existence. Comte, however, meant by atheism and atheist that which the words connote in ordinary speech—the opinion of those who insist that there is no God or Maker of the Universe, who plant their thoughts and life upon that central negation, and who thereby fall into the intel-

lectual welter in store for those who make a negation the basis of their ideas, and that a negation as to a wholly incomprehensible enigma. Further, he means those who fall into that moral welter which is the effect of training the heart to reject all sense of a Supreme Power, and to refuse all gratitude to Providence. The atheistical temper and mind is accordingly that of which Positivism is most abhorrent; and although the age is given to press to affectation the derivation of words instead of their meaning, it is a violent use of speech to insist that atheist is every one who is not a theist. It is only rancour which calls a Mahometan an infidel, in place of describing him by his proper positive faith. It would not be right to speak of Buddha or Confucius as atheists, though they certainly were not theists; for their attitude of mind and nature was in harmony with that of the theist, and not with that of the atheist. Those who in a theistic age deny and defy a Supreme Creator of the Universe, and think and live in the light of that denial and in the spirit of that defiance, are very truly called atheists. But those who in an atheistical age presume not to dogmatize about Creation or the Universe at all, whilst reverencing and loving the Supreme Power that they know, with all the faith and all the gratitude which Theism can inspire, will not be stigmatized as atheists, except by those whom a passion for bitter phrases has blinded to sense and fairness.

So, too, with the word and notion of Materialism. With Comte it means, what it means in ordinary speech, the seeking to explain the moral and spiritual side of life by means of the physical. Now, materialism in this sense is naturally more abhorrent to the Positivist even than to the Christian; for the spiritual and the physical side are more closely connected in the eyes of the former, whilst the supremacy of the spiritual is to him quite as important. But Comte is as free to use the word spiritual as the word moral; the word Soul as much as the word Mind; although by spiritual he describes the noblest faculties of human nature apart from any metaphysical figment; whilst by Soul he means the consensus of these faculties, without any wild hypothesis of an incomprehensible entity. Mere controversialists, and hot partisans, pretend indeed to debar the Positive schools from all employment of the terms or the notions which are used by orthodox religions. It is an old and futile purism. These great and ancient terms are the birthright of the human race. They existed, as the things they describe existed, before Catholics or Protestants were heard of. Religions and priesthoods, spiritual life, the worship of a Supreme Power, the communion of the faithful, and the immortality of the soul, were solid verities to myriads of men and women for countless ages in every clime, before the web of Christian metaphysic was spun. It is the pedantry of sect alone

which can dare to monopolize to a special creed these precious heirlooms of our common race. They are the creations of unnumbered generations; and though they differ in form from age to age, and from tribe to tribe, like the languages in which they are uttered, they are truly in substance the same realities and mean a similar conception, for they come out fresh perennially from the same fountain of human nature. Now and then some shrill polemist will raise a cry at the sacrilege or mockery involved, when Positivism adopts these sacred words and institutions. Who made them the property of that shrill polemist or of his sect? It is a mockery and a sacrilege which every movement in religion or thought or morality has made, and which it cannot avoid from making. Sects and polemist can take out no patent of exclusive right to religious ideas, any more than they can to broad and generous feeling. When Polytheism saw its sceptre bowing down before the advance of the Gospel, there were priests of Venus and Bacchus who cried out at the mockery, as they thought it, that unclean fanaticisms of the East could be a worship or boast of a Priesthood, as if worthy of enlightened men of taste. When Islam swept away the putrescent Christianity of Asia, there were pious hands raised up in horror when they heard these miscreants invoke their God or talk of Paradise. And when Luther and Calvin founded Protestantism, the Catholic world rang with indignation at the mummery which imitated Church, and sacrament, and rubric, parodied the very mass, and adapted the hymns and collects of the true faith. It must be so always. The great religious conceptions and institutions of mankind have been borrowed in turn by every sect, and none can keep them for their own. The Sabbath has come down to us in ever-varying forms from an Egyptian hierophant; there were priests upon the earth ever since there were old men; and Prayer may have been heard, perhaps, coeval with the drift. Sects can no more appropriate them, than a faction can appropriate a nation. The sole question to consider is not, to what Church do these institutions belong? but which Church can use them most nobly, best for human good and most near to reason and to fact?

All the eternal and essential institutions of religion are not only open to Positivism, but are profoundly embraced and developed by it. It is familiar, too, with that sense of individual weakness and yearning for consolation, that spirit of humiliation before Providence and contrition in the consciousness of guilt, that peace within, in communion with an abiding sweetness and goodness without, that unquenchable assurance of triumph in final good—all of which are the old and just privileges of the purest Christianity. And men have passed from a real and devout attachment to that faith, carried to the point of an enthusiastic

acceptance of the mystery of the Sacraments, by long and trying stages it may have been, into a solid belief in Positivism, and yet withal, have been unconscious of breach in the spiritual life, except the breach of healthy development. So they who read the Polity of Comte will find themselves in an air which is hardly to be breathed, except by those who have been carried on the wings of the great religious teachers of old. One can then understand how the master intellect of Aquinas could survey the whole range of life and thought, and see it all transfigured by the light of an omnipresent Theology; how Bernard trusted in his soul that Love was stronger than Force and deeper than Mind; how Bossuet used to pierce behind the veil, and see the hand of Providence marshalling the random lives of men into a destiny as ancient and as vast as our world. This was no madness in the religious temper of Comte, as some journalist will say to-morrow, just as he said yesterday, grimacing at the unusual like a truant schoolboy; there is nothing grotesque in this habit of mind. It is the habit of his mature mind, consistent with his daily practice; a tone natural enough to one—nay, incumbent on one—whose sole study for years was the Divine Comedy and the Imitation of Christ; who, night and morning, spent an hour in prayer; and who passed one afternoon of every week in meditation in a Catholic church, and in silent communion with a beloved one dead:—

“With the full assurance that Happiness, like Duty, is to be found only in the more perfect surrender of self to the Great Being, in whom the Universal Order is transfigured, the wise will strive ever to devote their lives more truly to its service. Man’s prudence and energy, with all their resources, only bring out more fully man’s natural state of dependence; so that they force him to seek outside of himself the sole foundations by which he can give stability to his life.

“The entire system of Positive Belief points to the existence of a single dominant Power; whose real and incontestable attributes appeal directly to the Affections, in no less measure than they appeal directly to the Intellect.”*

FREDERIC HARRISON.

* Pos. Pol., vol. ii.

